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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 12, 2026

March 12, 2026

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 12, 2026

Toplines

A US delegation met with lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev in Miami, Florida, on March 11.[1] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff reported on March 11 that he, former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, and senior advisor to US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace Josh Gruenbaum met with Dmitriev in Miami.[2] Witkoff stated that the teams discussed “a variety of topics” and agreed to continue contacts, but did not offer further details. Neither side has released an official readout as of this publication.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that three groups of Ukrainian specialists departed to strengthen the air defenses of the United States and its allies in the Middle East.[3] Zelensky stated on March 11 that three groups of Ukrainian experts, military personnel, and engineers departed for the Middle East and that the military personnel are already “communicating and working.” Zelensky stated that Ukrainian National Security and Defense Secretary Rustem Umerov arrived in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on March 11 to discuss areas of collaboration and will visit other countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia. Zelensky stated on March 9 that Ukraine recently sent interceptor drones and a team of drone experts to protect US military bases in Jordan and that another team of Ukrainian experts would go to the Middle East to help unspecified states evaluate their protective measures against Iranian drones.[4] The arrival of the Ukrainian experts and specialists underscores the concrete ways in which Ukraine’s experience in defense against Iranian drones can strengthen the air defenses of the United States and its allies in the Middle East.[5] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine can offer the United States and US allies in the Middle East unique insights into how to combat Iranian strikes, as the Ukrainian military has institutionalized and operationalized the fighting experience that Ukraine has learned throughout the past four years of war.[6]

The Kremlin continues intensifying its crackdown on control of the Russian information space and eliminating Russians’ access to the free internet. Russian authorities have restricted mobile data in Moscow City since March 5, and sources in the Russian State Duma told Russian business newspaper Vedomosti that authorities cut mobile data and internet in the Duma building for the second consecutive day on March 12.[7] State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin attributed the communication issues in the Duma building to issues of “state security.”[8] The Kremlin also continues to signal that it intends to continue throttling Telegram. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Telegram must comply with Russian laws to avoid a full block in Russia and called for Telegram to maintain “flexible” contact with Russian authorities.[9] State Duma Information Policy Committee Deputy Chairperson Andrey Svintsov claimed that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor possesses the technical capability to throttle Russians’ access to Telegram even when Russian users access Telegram through virtual private networks (VPNs) and will gradually start throttling Telegram through VPNs.[10] Svintsov justified Russia’s throttling of Telegram and bans on some foreign social media applications by connecting “uncontrolled communications” to terrorist attacks in Russia.[11] The Kremlin may be accelerating its internet censorship campaign now to preempt domestic backlash and insulate the regime ahead of future unpopular decisions, such as rolling reserve call-ups – particularly ahead of the September 2026 Duma elections.[12] This campaign includes Kremlin efforts to compel Russians to use Russian state-controlled applications (such as the Max messenger app), imprison dissidents, and restrict access to foreign internet resources.[13]

The Kremlin’s censorship campaign continues to draw backlash in the Russian information space. A Russian Telegram channel commenting on political issues claimed that the information space dialogue about these Russian censorship efforts concluded that they are “madness.”[14] The channel claimed that the censorship efforts have destroyed a “narrative of unity” between the Russian government and people that the Russian government will struggle to recover ahead of the September 2026 Duma elections. The intensification of this censorship campaign continues to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin may not be as confident in his regime’s stability, and the Kremlin will likely continue building out Russian physical and social controls on the Russian internet, potentially ahead of a future conflict with NATO.[15]

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. German Bundestag President Julia Klockner announced during a speech to the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) on March 11 that Germany will provide Ukraine with an additional 200 million euros (roughly $230 million) to strengthen Ukrainian air defenses, including funding for reconnaissance drones and civil defense.[16]

Key Takeaways

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure overnight on March 11 to 12. Sources in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlet RBK-Ukraine and broadcaster Suspilne on March 12 that SBU drones struck the Tikhoretsk oil pumping station in Krasnodar Krai overnight, reportedly causing fires at several fuel storage tanks.[17] The SBU sources stated that the Tikhoretsk hub is one of the largest in southern Russia and is critical for Russian petroleum product logistics. Footage and imagery published on March 12 show a large fire reportedly near the Tikhoretsk oil pumping station.[18] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Russian language service published satellite imagery and assessed that the strike caused at least one of the fuel tanks to catch fire.[19] Tikhoretsky Raion Head Anatoly Perepelin acknowledged that a Ukrainian strike caused a fire at an oil pumping station on March 12.[20]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukrainian forces of attempting to strike the Russkaya compressor station in Gai-Kodzor, Krasnodar Krai, overnight on March 10 to 11 and on March 11 to 12, but claimed that Russian forces intercepted the Ukrainian drones.[21]

The Ukrainian Atesh partisan group reported that its agents disabled a railway relay cabinet near Stary Oskol, Belgorod Oblast, that supports Russian operations in the Kupyansk direction on an unspecified date.[22] The Atesh group reported that the attack impacted an urgent ammunition delivery to the Russian 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA)in the area, forcing the Russian units to conduct assaults with ammunition shortages and therefore suffer high casualties.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on March 12 but did not advance.

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Russian forces attacked in Sumy Oblast along the international border with Kursk Oblast, including southeast of Glushkovo near Borky and northeast of Sumy City near Myropillya on March 11 and 12.[23]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 12 that Russian forces have infiltrated one to two kilometers deep into Sumy Oblast from the international border near Pokrovka, Popivka, Vysoke, and Hrabovske (all southeast of Sumy City).[24] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attempting to fully seize Pokrovka and advance toward Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City).

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[25]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchanski Khutory, Prylipka, and Symynivka, and toward Zybyne and Vesele on March 11 and 12.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Hrafske.[27]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 12 that Ukrainian forces have effectively halted the advance of Russian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast, although elements of the Russian 44th Army Corps (AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA, LMD) continue attempts to advance south along the east (left) bank of the Siverskyi Donets River toward Hrafske (southwest of Vovchansk) and Symynivka (south of Vovchansk).[28] Mashovets added that Ukrainian counterattacks near Prylipka (west of Vovchansk and north of Hrafske) have left Russian forces with a narrow corridor to resupply Russian forces attempting to attack toward Hrafske and Symynivka, but that Ukrainian forces exercise fire control over this corridor. Mashovets noted that Ukrainian forces continue to maintain positions on the southeastern outskirts of Vovchansk, hindering a Russian advance southeast from Vovchansk toward Bilyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Kharkiv City).

Order of Battle: Assault elements of the 3rd Battalion of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) continue to operate in the Vovchansk direction.[29] First-person view (FPV) drone operators and other elements of the 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD), the 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC), and the Chechen Okhotnik [Hunter] Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[30]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 12.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

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Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

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Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 12 that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[31]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 12 that Russian forces infiltrated in northeastern and eastern Kupyansk, and toward eastern Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[32] Mashovets’ report indicates that Russian forces likely infiltrated toward Novoosynove (southeast of Kupyansk). ISW assesses that these events do not indicate a change in the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself and southeast of Kupyansk toward Podoly and Hlushkivka on March 11 and 12.[33]

Mashovets reported on March 12 that Russian efforts to advance east and northeast of Kupyansk have been unsuccessful despite the Russian Western Grouping of Forces’ redirection of its main efforts to the area of responsibility (AoR) of the Russian 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) east of Kupyansk.[34]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 47th Tank Division, including its 153rd Tank Regiment and 245th and 272nd motorized rifle regiments, are operating east of Kupyansk.[35] Elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 121st and 122nd motorized rifle regiments, and the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA are operating near Kupyansk.[36] Drone operators of the 7th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 47th Tank Division are striking Ukrainian forces in northern Kivsharivka.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Cherneshchyna on March 11 and 12.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Borova direction.[39]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid- and long-range strike campaigns against Russian military targets in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of March 11 to 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 12 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300V anti-aircraft missile system launcher near occupied Borovenky (roughly 45 kilometers from the front line), a material and technical equipment warehouse and an ammunition depot near occupied Dubivskyi (roughly 110 kilometers from the front line), and a train with fuel and lubricants near occupied Dovzhansk (roughly 145 kilometers from the front line) on the night of March 11 to 12.[40] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces conducted the three strikes with Ukrainian-made FP-2 drones.[41] Geolocated footage published on March 12 shows fires in all three locations after Ukrainian strikes.[42] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik acknowledged that the Ukrainian forces struck a freight train carrying fuel and posted images that show a damaged train and fire.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

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Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on March 12 but did not advance.

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Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve; north of Lyman toward Stavky; north of Slovyansk near Svyatohirsk; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka; east of Slovyansk near Kalenyky, Rai-Oleksandrivka, Riznykivka, Kryva Luka, and Zakitne; and southeast of Slovyansk near Fedorivka, Fedorivka Druha, and Nykyforivka on March 11 and 12.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyman.[45]

A Ukrainian non-commissioned officer (NCO) operating in the Lyman direction reported that the Starlink outage is forcing Russian forces to control unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) with infantry-operated remote controls rather than networked systems, creating operational inefficiencies.[46] The commander stated that Russian forces are fielding fixed-wing reconnaissance drones instead of heavy bomber drones, whose production Russian forces have not yet scaled up. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported that Russian forces previously used UGVs for logistics prior to the Starlink outage, but are now relying on Mavic first-person view (FPV) drones to drop supplies to forward positions.[47] The spokesperson reported that Russian efforts to sustain logistics through drone drops are largely unsuccessful due to Ukrainian air defenses intercepting many of these drones, with about 90 percent of the supply drops failing to reach their intended recipients.

An NCO of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported that Russian forces are likely preparing to intensify assaults in the Lyman direction in the spring.[48] The NCO stated that Russian forces are currently intensifying attacks against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) while Ukrainian forces are identifying and striking Russian drone operator positions. The NCO reported that Russian forces are emphasizing drone use and likely aim to establish fire control over settlements that would enable advances toward the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.

Order of Battle: Self-propelled artillery elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) struck a reported Ukrainian command post southwest of Kryva Luka.[49] Elements of the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[50] Drone operators of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Slovyansk direction.[51]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

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Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced on the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[52]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 11 shows a Russian servicemember operating southeast of Kostyantynivka during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[53]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka, Pavlivka, Torske, and Pryiut on March 11 and 12.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Illinivka.[55]

Ukrainian 11th AC Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on March 12 that Russian forces are accumulating infantry, drone operators, and armored vehicles, including tanks, in parts of occupied Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) in preparation for an anticipated spring offensive.[56] Zaporozhets noted that Russian forces have intensified airstrikes in the corps area of responsibility (AoR) from an average of three to five strikes daily as Russian forces have been able to better reconnoiter with clearer weather and lengthening daylight hours. Zaporozhets added that Ukrainian forces eliminate or suppress 100 to 150 Russian drones daily.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators, artillery, and other elements of the Russian 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces), 1008th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC), and Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces and armored vehicles in Kostyantynivka.[57] Drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kostyantynivka.[58] FPV drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Toretske (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[59]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 12, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Vilne and toward Novyi Donbas; and southeast of Dobropillya near Ivanivka on March 11 and 12.[60]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 12 that Russian forces have recently reduced their attacks toward Kucheriv Yar and in the Dorozhnie-Novyi Donbas and Nove Shakhove-Vilne directions to a minimum. [61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 55th Naval Infantry Division (Pacific Fleet, newly formed from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya tactical area.[62]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

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Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 12 that Russian forces seized Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and the Pokrovska mine north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[63]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Hryshyne and northwest of Udachne.[64]

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 11 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions south of Bilytske, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[65]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Svitle; west of Pokrovsk toward Novooleksandrivka and Serhiivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on March 11 and 12.[66]

Casualties incurred in the Russian offensive for the Pokrovsk urban area have reportedly forced Russian forces to limit offensive operations. Mashovets reported on March 12 that the heavy losses in Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) when fighting for Myrnohrad have forced the 51st CAA to reduce the intensity of its operations.[67] Mashovets stated that the 51st CAA is only attacking sporadically in the Rodynske-Shevchenko and Sukhetske-Bilytske directions. Mashovets reported that the 2nd CAA (CMD) is attempting to advance through Hyrshyne to Novooleksandrivka. Mashovets observed that a Russian push toward Dobropillya (northeast of Pokrovsk) would force Russian forces to divert resources from the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk direction and significantly reinforce the 51st and 2nd CAAs.[68]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on March 11 that constant Ukrainian tactical drone strikes in the Pokrovsk direction are forcing Russian forces to sometimes maintain positions in basements for months without supplies or rotation.[69]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) and 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces south of Bilytske.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykolaivka on March 12 but did not advance.[71]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novopavlivka itself.[72]

Russian forces continued offensive operations and Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 12, but ISW has not observed evidence to change its control of terrain assessment.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove on March 11 and 12.[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Andriivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka), Novooleksandrivka, Vovche, and Sosnivka (all southeast of Oleksandrivka), and are conducting mechanized counterattacks north of Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[74]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that the February 1 Starlink blocking has significantly disorganized Russian command and control (C2) and FPV and reconnaissance drone operations, enabling successful Ukrainian counterattacks.[75] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are attempting to restore communications using WiFi bridges that are less effective than Starlink. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces have to install an amplifier antenna every kilometer to make such a system effective and that the loss of one such antenna can disrupt the entire system.

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are exploiting the dispersed nature of Russian positions in the Oleksandrivka direction to advance with infantry groups on foot or mounted on armored fighting vehicles (AFVs).[76] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces employ heavy drones to both strike Russian positions and resupply infantry groups.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Sosnivka and striking Ukrainian forces near Sosnivka and Kolomiitsi (east of Oleksandrivka).[77]

Ukrainian sources provided battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian mid-range strikes against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 12 that a March 11 Ukrainian strike against a Russian field artillery depot near occupied Shyroka Balka (roughly 112 kilometers from the frontline) destroyed over 6,000 rounds of ammunition.[78] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported on March 10 that satellite imagery taken on March 8 shows that Ukrainian cruise missile strikes against the occupied Donetsk City Airport (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline) conducted on March 7 damaged or destroyed several hangars storing Russian strike drones, and a likely warhead depot nearby.[79] The OSINT source reported that Russian forces removed eight drone hangars after the strike and recently finished the construction of four concrete bunkers for drone storage near the airport, and assessed that these concrete bunkers will be harder to strike.

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka, Rizdvyanka, Tsvitkove, Rizdvyanka, and Verkhnya Tersa and toward Vozdvyzhivka; north of Hulyaipole near Danylivka, Zelene, and Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda and Rybne; west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Hirke; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne on March 11 and 12.[80]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian positions near and within Dolynka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[81] Aviation bombers of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vozdvyzhivka and Verkhnya Tersa.[82] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly interdicting Ukrainian logistics west of Vozdvyzhivka.[83]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

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Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Novodanylivka (southeast of Novodanylivka).[84]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and toward Mahdalynivka, southeast of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and west of Orikhiv near Stepove on March 11 and 12.[85]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on March 12 that Ukrainian forces are successfully intercepting Russian Molniya fixed-wing drones at greater altitudes exceeding one kilometer after Russian forces previously flew these drones at lower altitudes.[86] A Russian milblogger complained that Ukrainian forces have begun fielding E-300 long-range fixed-wing drones against targets closer to the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast and that Russian forces are struggling to combat these drones.[87]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 12 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian bridge near Zaporizhzhia City and disrupted Ukrainian logistics.[88]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions near Novodanylivka and reportedly on the outskirts of Orikhiv.[89] Drone operators of the Nemets Group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Orikhiv.[90] Elements of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[91]

Ukrainian forces continued their medium-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 12 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near occupied Vasylivka (roughly 16 kilometers from the frontline) and a repair and recovery unit of a Russian artillery brigade near occupied Yakymivka (roughly 96 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of March 11 to 12.[92] Geolocated footage published on March 12 shows Ukrainian drone operators striking a Russian Tor-M2 air defense system west of occupied Berdyanske (roughly 102 kilometers from the frontline).[93] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian USF drones struck four assets of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, including a position, warehouses, and a drone workshop, in Zaporizhia Oblast since March 1.[94] Geolocated footage published on March 11 shows Ukrainian forces striking positions of the Russian Rubikon-7 Reserve unit in occupied Probudzhennya (roughly 52 kilometers from the frontline).[95]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on March 11 and 12.[96]

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Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[97]

Geolocated footage confirms recent reports of Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and military targets in occupied Crimea. Geolocated footage published on March 11 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian oil depots in occupied Azovske with FP-2 drones, which official Ukrainian sources reported on March 11.[98] Geolocated footage published on March 12 shows drone operators of Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) striking Sopka-2 and 48Ya6-K1 Podlyot radar stations near occupied Vynohradnyi on unspecified dates in February 2026.[99] The GUR also published footage on March 12 showing Ukrainian strikes against a P-18 Terek and 39N6 Kasta 2E2 radar stations, a Geran- or Gerbera-type drone ground repeater, an RSP-6M2 precision approach radar, and a radar jamming station at unspecified locations in occupied Crimea in February.[100] A Russian milblogger complained that Starlink-assisted Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian radar stations will either significantly degrade the Russian air defense umbrella in occupied Crimea within a year or force Russian forces to divert radar stations and air defense systems from other areas if Russian forces do not counter the strikes.[101]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces conducted long-range drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on March 11 to 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 94 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other types of strike drones, of which about 60 were Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[102] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed about 77 Russian drones, that 16 Russian drones struck 11 locations, and that downed debris hit one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes hit an enterprise in Kharkiv City, a police department building in Sumy Oblast, and residential areas in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[103] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian strikes also hit trains and railway infrastructure in Sumy and Mykolaiv oblasts.[104]

Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported that Russian forces struck a residential area in Zaporizhzhia City with guided KAB glide bombs on the evening of March 11, injuring 11 civilians.[105]

Significant Activity in Belarus 

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing Significant To Report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] https://x.com/SEPeaceMissions/status/2031855349980897685 ; https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/2031856060420464881 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/365810 ; https://t.me/kadmitriev/573
[2] https://x.com/SEPeaceMissions/status/2031855349980897685
[3] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18288 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2031801117428908385
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2026/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2026/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-5-2026/
[7] https://t.me/vedomosti/74526 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/03/12/deputaty-dolzhny-byt-ediny-s-narodom-v-gosdume-propala-mobilnaya-svyaz-i-wi-fi ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/92580 ; https://t.me/severrealii/32942
[8] https://t.me/vedomosti/74526 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/03/12/deputaty-dolzhny-byt-ediny-s-narodom-v-gosdume-propala-mobilnaya-svyaz-i-wi-fi
[9] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/03/12/kreml-telegram-dolzhen-byt-na-gibkom-kontakte-s-vlastyami-rossii-chtoby-izbezhat-blokirovki
[10] https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/47340; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/03/12/telegram-budet-tupit-i-cherez-vpn-v-gosdume-poobeschali-chto-vlasti-tochnozablokiruyut-messendzher
[11] https://t.me/astrapress/106910
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/putins-internet-crackdown-is-rooted-in-weakness-and-a-need-to-demand-greater-war-sacrifices/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/putins-internet-crackdown-is-rooted-in-weakness-and-a-need-to-demand-greater-war-sacrifices/
[14] https://t.me/arbat/2284; https://t.me/russicaRU/67258
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/putins-internet-crackdown-is-rooted-in-weakness-and-a-need-to-demand-greater-war-sacrifices/
[16] https://interfax dot com.ua/news/economic/1150774.html
[17] https://t.me/RBC_ua_news/184966; https://suspilne dot media/1261890-sbu-urazila-odin-iz-najbilsih-naftovih-vuzliv-na-pivdni-rf-dzerelo/
[18] https://t.me/astrapress/106878; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2031994557798211976; https://t.me/supernova_plus/49474;
[19] https://t.me/radiosvoboda/94730
[20] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/03/12/v-krasnodarskom-krae-v-rezultate-ataki-dronov-zagorelsya-npz-v-tihoretske
[21] https://t.me/mod_russia/61876; https://t.me/mod_russia/61889
[22] https://t.me/atesh_ua/9462
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35989; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35962 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35960 ; https://t.me/rybar/78479 ; https://t.me/uvkkursk/269
[24] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3287
[25] https://t.me/severnnyi/7125
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35989;https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35962; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20231; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35960; https://t.me/dva_majors/89487; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40712; https://t.me/severnnyi/7118; https://t.me/wargonzo/32850
[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40712
[28] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3287
[29] https://t.me/otukharkiv/7398; https://t.me/kharkivnapriamok/1719
[30] https://t.me/dva_majors/89484; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6411
[31] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3287
[32] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3287
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35989; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35962; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20231; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35960; https://t.me/wargonzo/32850 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/17998
[34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3287
[35] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3287
[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3287
[37] https://t.me/Osintpen/2651; https://t.me/russkii_dom/80869
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35962; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20231 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35960;
[39] https://t.me/gvZapad/17995
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35981
[41] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2074
[42] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2032051784227737972?s=20; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2074; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/2032028999262572778;https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/2032080624354292210; https://x.com/i/status/2032032470049112238
[43] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/4779
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35989 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35962; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20231 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35960 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/89487 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32850 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40739 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/17998 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/365816
[45] https://t.me/gvZapad/17998
[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/11/vony-prosto-pihotnym-pultom-keruyut-rosiyany-ne-mozhut-upravlyaty-nazemnymy-dronamy-dystanczijno/
[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/11/vono-prosto-ne-dolitaye-tudy-kudy-potribno-na-slovyanskomu-napryamku-rosiyan-vidrizaly-vid-postachannya/
[48] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1261692-vidbuvaetsa-pidgotovka-vijska-rf-planuut-posiliti-sturmi-na-limanskomu-fronti-serzant-66-ombr/
[49] https://t.me/Osintpen/2652; https://t.me/shock3OA/5646
[50] https://t.me/gvZapad/18004
[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/89518
[52] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2031754892545532274; https://t.me/zayndi_zingiev/298
[53] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2031762130391711909; https://www.instagram.com/2battalion.marines.ua/reel/DVvnX2JiBmo/
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35989; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35962; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35960; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40739; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71072; https://t.me/wargonzo/32850;
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40730
[56] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1262002-rosiani-vikoristovuut-zahoplenu-castinu-casovogo-aru-ak-hab-dla-nastupu-na-kostantinivku-recnik-11-korpus
[57] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2031766497308119344; https://t.me/verumreactor/34045; https://t.me/verumreactor/34061; https://t.me/Osintpen/2654; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2031846581918711861; https://t.me/verumreactor/34049; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2031855527454548259; https://t.me/verumreactor/34050; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2031864341658575312; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2031754892545532274; https://t.me/zayndi_zingiev/298
[58] https://t.me/tass_agency/365814
[59] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15128
[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/89487; https://t.me/wargonzo/32850; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71072
[61] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3288
[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/89483
[63] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3288
[64] https://t.me/rybar/78478; https://t.me/motopatriot78/49507
[65] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2031793142459220138?s=20; https://t.me/nm_dnr/15120
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35989; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35962; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35960; https://t.me/rybar/78478; https://t.me/dva_majors/89487; https://t.me/wargonzo/32850; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/71072; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40746
[67] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3288
[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3289
[69] https://t.me/rybar/78478
[70] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2031793142459220138?s=20; https://t.me/nm_dnr/15120
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35989
[72] https://t.me/wargonzo/32850
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35962; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35960
[74] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40746; https://t.me/rybar/78503
[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/12/odnu-antenu-vybyv-usya-systema-porushylas-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-voroga-zahopyly-znenaczka/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2026/
[76] https://t.me/rybar/78503
[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/18931; https://t.me/voin_dv/18929; https://t.me/voin_dv/18932
[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35981; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2026/
[79] https://t.me/StrategicaviationT/28005
[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35989 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35962 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35960 ; https://t.me/rybar/78503 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32850 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/18926 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/18932
[81] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/1194; https://t.me/Osintpen/2655
[82] https://t.me/voin_dv/18925
[83] https://t.me/voin_dv/18927
[84] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11461; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/6925
[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35962 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32850 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/89487
[86] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/12/znahodyat-molniyi-protyagom-chotyroh-hvylyn-na-orihivskomu-napryamku-vorozhi-drony-zbyvayut-desyatkamy/
[87] https://t.me/rusich_army/28721
[88] https://t.me/epoddubny/26679
[89] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11461; https://t.me/ZS42MSD/6925
[90] https://t.me/wargonzo/32849
[91] https://t.me/dva_majors/89493
[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35981
[93] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2032057851523346891?s=20; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/2032028999262572778?s=20; https://t.me/raid_413/1032; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2074
[94] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2074; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/12/operatory-sbs-urazyly-chotyry-obyekty-pidrozdilu-rubikon-na-okupovanomu-pivdni/
[95] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2070; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2031649879093641563; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2031733530267414789
[96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35962; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35960
[97] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40723 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/61881
[98] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34180; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2070; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2026/
[99] https://t.me/DIUkraine/7989; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/2032050142291865772
[100] https://t.me/DIUkraine/7989
[101] https://t.me/milinfolive/168359
[102] https://t.me/kpszsu/57751
[103] https://t.me/astrapress/106875; https://t.me/synegubov/20500 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/92563 ; https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/21376 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1261672-ratuvalniki-potrapili-pid-povtorni-udari-u-zolocevi-ta-harkovi-dsns/ ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3600 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3601 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3602 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3603 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3604 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/92557 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1260766-rosijska-armia-atakue-sostku-na-sumsini-bpla/; https://t.me/astrapress/106870 https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1260766-rosijska-armia-atakue-sostku-na-sumsini-bpla/; https://t.me/astrapress/106870
[104] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40748; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/70861
[105] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1261408-ce-mij-dim-budu-zalisatisa-i-vidnovluvati-ocevidci-pro-rosijsku-ataku-kabami-po-zitlovih-budinkah-u-zaporizzi/

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