Toplines

Russian forces conducted a second consecutive day of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine’s critical and energy infrastructure overnight on November 7 to 8, causing widespread power outages. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 164 strike drones, including 112 jet-powered drones, and three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles overnight, and that Ukrainian forces intercepted 137 drones.[1] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry and Ukrainian officials reported on November 8 that Russian forces struck several energy facilities, resulting in power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Kharkiv, Odesa and Chernihiv oblasts, and prompting rolling blackouts throughout northern and central Ukraine.[2] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry added that Dnipropetrovsk Oblast faced the most severe power outages due to damage to energy infrastructure and that power restrictions remained in place in Kyiv City following the November 6 to 7 drone and missile strike series. Ukrainian officials stated on November 8 that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure left 600,000 people without power in Dnipro City and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; and 140 high-rise buildings in Zhytomyr Oblast without heat.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 8 that Russian forces struck a substation near Biloshytsi, Zhytomyr Oblast overnight on November 7 to 8, and the Kamyanske substation in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the afternoon of November 8.[4]

Russia continues to leverage its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign to degrade Ukrainian energy security and disrupt civilian life, highlighting Ukraine’s urgent need for capabilities to defend against and degrade Russia’s ability to launch large strike packages.[5] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated on November 7 that Germany has exhausted available Patriot interceptor stockpiles for transfer to Ukraine, highlighting the global interceptor shortage that is impeding Ukraine’s ability to secure interceptors necessary to defend against Russian ballistic missiles.[6] Ukrainian forces are now increasingly targeting missile launch sites and ballistic missile production sites in Russia to reduce Russia’s ability to launch such devastating strikes as Ukraine’s air defense stockpiles continue to dwindle, underscoring the importance of ensuring Ukraine has sufficient long-range strike capabilities to prevent Russia from launching combined strike packages.

Russian forces reportedly suffered a nearly 450,000 death toll in Ukraine since February 2022, which does not include wounded, missing, or foreign personnel. Belarusian pro-opposition and pro-Ukrainian hacker groups claimed on November 7 that they hacked into the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) and found that Russian authorities registered at least 440,982 deceased Russian servicemembers from February 2022 through the end of August 2026.[7] The hacker groups specified that Rosstat attributed about 356,000 deaths to “war operations” and the remaining deaths to other war-related causes including “military operations” and “terrorist acts;” causes vaguely related to or not specified directly as combat. Rosstat reportedly also registered some deaths in occupied Ukraine that did not have a specified cause, and non-combat deaths of servicemembers including suicides, road accidents, and illness. The hackers noted that this figure does not include wounded, missing, or casualties among foreign mercenaries. The hackers assessed that the total Russian death toll is over 450,100 deaths, including 9,118 personnel who died for unspecified reasons outside of occupied Ukraine. ISW is unable to verify the groups’ findings, but the reporting is relatively consistent with Russian opposition sources Mediazona and Meduza’s joint investigation, which independently confirmed over 285,000 Russian deaths and estimated over 350,000 registered deaths as of November 2026.[8] The actual number of Russian servicemembers killed in action (KIA) is likely much higher, as both the hacker groups’ and Meduza and Mediazona’s figures are very likely a conservative estimate due to reporting limitations. Russian officials have also tried to misrepresent the total number of deceased servicemembers by registering them as missing in action (MIA).[9] Total Russian casualties (killed or seriously wounded) are reportedly nearly 1.6 million as of November 2026, and Russian forces experienced their highest monthly casualties throughout the war in October 2026.[10] Russia’s increasing casualties come as Russian forces have suffered more casualties than they have been able to recruit as of July 2026.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) signaled that logistics remain a significant challenge for Russian forces, but it remains unclear whether the MoD can meaningfully resolve it. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Valery Solodchuk, who officially took his post as deputy defense minister for rear-area logistics on November 6, outlined the Russian MoD’s two main priorities for logistics in a speech on November 8.[11] Solodchuk stated that the Russian MoD’s primary focus is on using unmanned systems to conduct logistics in the “kill zone” — the roughly 30-kilometer zone behind the frontline wherein Ukrainian drones can strike Russian troops, vehicles, and logistics, impeding movement.[12] Solodchuk also identified rear-area logistics as the Russian MoD’s other priority and stated that the Russian MoD is creating a unified system intended to allow Russian commanders real-time visibility into rear-area logistics services.[13] Solodchuk also postured the Russian MoD as already effectively solving some logistics issues from Ukraine’s strike campaigns, claiming that the MoD has “resolved” the objective of defending rear-area facilities, warehouses, and arsenals by strengthening different aspects of Russia’s air defense umbrella.[14]

Ukrainian forces have been intensifying their intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns for much of 2026, particularly against Russian logistics arteries and defense production facilities. It remains unclear if the Russian MoD could adequately counteract Ukrainian strikes, however, and Russian milbloggers continue to identify shortfalls in these Russian efforts. A Russian milblogger responded to Ukrainian strikes against a bridge along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway in Rostov Oblast on November 8, noting that Ukrainian forces continue expanding the geography of their interdiction campaign and that strikes against roadway bridges complicate Russian logistics.[15] Another milblogger complained that Russian authorities have not been transparent about Ukrainian rear-area strikes and that the lack of transparency degrades public trust in Russian authorities.[16]