Toplines
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 25 that US President Donald Trump has made a “final decision” to grant Ukraine licenses to produce unspecified types of Patriot air defense systems interceptor missiles.[1] Sources within Zelensky’s administration stated that Ukraine is in negotiations with the United States to obtain licenses for the production of more capable PAC-3 interceptors and the simpler PAC-2 interceptors.[2] Trump himself has yet to confirm his decision to grant Ukraine production licenses for Patriot interceptors as of this writing. Allowing Ukraine to domestically produce Patriot air defense missiles will help improve Ukraine’s ability to more effectively repel Russian ballistic missile strikes, though it will likely take time for Ukraine to establish production facilities and source components necessary to produce interceptors.
Russian forces are intensifying efforts to specifically target Ukrainian data centers and telecommunications infrastructure as part of their ongoing long-range strike campaign aimed at degrading Ukraine’s economy since 2022. Russian long-range strikes have been increasingly targeting Ukrainian internet infrastructure and data centers since mid-September 2026, with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) explicitly mentioning that Russian forces are conducting strikes against data centers and telecommunications infrastructure on September 11.[3] Russian forces have been heavily targeting data centers in Kyiv City every day since September 23, and multiple Ukrainian internet service providers have reported damage to their data centers and subsequent communications disruptions as a result of Russian strikes.[4]
This latest diversification of Russia’s strike campaign aims to disrupt Ukraine’s economy and the digital infrastructure that civilians and businesses rely on daily. Ukrainian officials and business leaders are forecasting that Russia may seek to cause broader telecommunications disruptions that could threaten Ukraine’s banks, online payment providers, businesses, government services, and the military, according to the Financial Times (FT).[5] Ukrainian officials and business leaders added that Russia’s latest strikes against Ukraine’s communications infrastructure, although not a new development in Russia’s full-scale invasion, appear to be a “targeted escalation.” Russia’s strikes since September 23 have caused widespread internet disruptions in Kyiv City.[6] Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andriy Sybiha noted that the strikes disrupted Ukrainians’ access to mobile air raid alerts about incoming Russian drones and missiles.[7]
Russian strikes against data centers have reportedly not affected the Ukrainian military, despite the Russian Ministry of Defense claiming that such strikes are meant to degrade the Ukrainian military’s capabilities. The Russian MoD claimed that Russia’s September 11 strikes on data centers aimed to disrupt the Ukrainian military’s network connection.[8] Ukrainian government authorities have not seen indications that Russian strikes damaged the Ukrainian military’s or any state institutions’ communications, however, according to Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksandr Fedienko, who heads the Rada Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Government Communications, and Cryptographic Information Protection.[9]
Russian strikes against data centers and telecommunications infrastructure can cause temporary internet outages but are unlikely to lead to a complete internet shutdown. Ukraine has an extensive network and many internet providers that make a complete shutdown unlikely, according to internet provider representatives speaking to Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne.[10] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated that Ukraine is unlikely to face a complete internet blackout as the country has some of the most widely distributed internet channels.[11] Russian strikes might, however, lead to increasing internet costs for local users, as internet providers will need to fund repairs to damaged infrastructure.[12]
Russian strikes on data centers are one of the latest Russian attempts to disrupt the Ukrainian economy and follow a similarly targeted Russian strike campaigns against Ukraine’s port and railway infrastructure. Russian forces have recently intensified their strike campaign against Ukraine’s Black Sea port areas, aiming to degrade Ukraine’s ability to use its ports for grain and goods exports as of July 2026.[13] Russian forces are simultaneously targeting Ukrainian railway infrastructure, specifically locomotives, in an effort to disrupt Ukraine’s nationwide railway logistics network.[14] The Kremlin is likely intensifying its strike campaign and diversifying its target sets to seek alternative defeat mechanisms given that Russia’s offensives in 2026 have failed to achieve their objectives, and Ukrainian forces are achieving operationally- and even strategically-significant advances in 2026.[15]
Russian high-ranking military officials continue exaggerating the extent of Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast as part of the Kremlin’s continuous cognitive warfare effort to portray Ukrainian defenses as collapsing and divert attention from Ukraine’s advances north of Lyman. Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov inspected the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) on September 25, and the Russian Northern GoF Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov claimed that Russian forces seized 10 settlements and over 250 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast over Summer 2026 and are continuing offensive operations to seize four more settlements in Sumy Oblast.[16] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized or infiltrated into two settlements and seized or infiltrated into 36.78 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast between June 1, 2026, and August 31, 2026. ISW has also observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized or infiltrated into eight settlements and seized or infiltrated into 151.66 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast since January 2026, but even those calculations fall short of Colonel General Nikiforov’s exaggerated claims as of September 25. Russian President Vladimir Putin similarly claimed on June 29 that Russian forces advanced up to 10.5 kilometers from Sumy City and later claimed on September 1 that Russian forces were operating 12 kilometers from Sumy City — notably directly discrediting his earlier exaggerated claims.[17] The Russian military has fostered a pervasive culture of lying within its ranks, leading Russian forces to continuously fabricate claims of tactical successes in areas where Russian forces do not maintain enduring positions.[18] Russian military officials have recently claimed false encirclements of Ukrainian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast and Dobropillya and the Russian MoD’s Sumy Oblast claims are part of Russia’s ongoing cognitive warfare effort to present Russia’s exaggerated battlefield successes in an effort to divert attention from Ukraine’s elimination of the Russian salient north of Lyman in recent months.[19]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 25 that US President Donald Trump has made a “final decision” to grant Ukraine licenses to produce unspecified types of Patriot air defense systems interceptor missiles.
- Russian forces are intensifying efforts to specifically target Ukrainian data centers and telecommunications infrastructure as part of their ongoing long-range strike campaign aimed at degrading Ukraine’s economy since 2022.
- This latest diversification of Russia’s strike campaign aims to disrupt Ukraine’s economy and the digital infrastructure that civilians and businesses rely on daily.
- Russian strikes against data centers and telecommunications infrastructure can cause temporary internet outages but are unlikely to lead to a complete internet shutdown.
- Russian strikes on data centers are one of the latest Russian attempts to disrupt the Ukrainian economy and follow a similarly targeted Russian strike campaigns against Ukraine’s port and railway infrastructure.
- Russian high-ranking military officials continue exaggerating the extent of Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast as part of the Kremlin’s continuous cognitive warfare effort to portray Ukrainian defenses as collapsing and divert attention from Ukraine’s advances north of Lyman.
- Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil refineries and several military industrial enterprises across Russia on September 24 or overnight on September 24 to 25.
- Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Dobropillya. Russia forces launched 295 drones against Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil refineries in Rostov Oblast and Perm Krai on September 24 or overnight on September 24 to 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the Novoshakhtinsky Oil Refinery, which has an annual capacity of approximately 7.5 million tons of oil, and 64L6 Gamma-S1 and 39N6 Kasta-2E2 radar stations in Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov Oblast (roughly 14 kilometers from the Ukrainian border).[20] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar acknowledged on September 25 that the Novoshakhtinsky Oil Refinery temporarily halted operations following Ukrainian strikes.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery, which has an annual processing capacity of approximately 13 million tons of oil, in Perm City, Perm Krai (roughly 1,449 kilometers from the Ukrainian border), causing a fire.[22] A Ukrainian Lyutyi-type drone reportedly struck the AVT-5 Unit providing around 34 percent of the refinery’s refining capability, according to geolocated footage published on September 25.[23] Perm Krai Governor Dmitry Makhonin confirmed on September 24 that Ukrainian drones struck an industrial facility in Perm Krai.[24] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck two oil refineries and two radar stations in Rostov Oblast and Perm Krai overnight.[25]
Ukrainian forces also conducted several long-range strikes against Russian military industrial enterprises in Ulyanovsk, Tula, and Voronezh oblasts overnight on September 24 to 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the Iskra Research and Production Plant in Ulyanovsk City, Ulyanovsk Oblast (roughly 802 kilometers from the Ukrainian border), the Efremov Synthetic Rubber Plant in Efremov, Tula Oblast (roughly 300 kilometers from the Ukrainian border), and the Voronezhsintezkauchuk Plant in Voronezh City, Voronezh Oblast (roughly 179 kilometers from the Ukrainian border).[26] The General Staff noted that the plants support the Russian military-industrial complex by producing Pantsir-S1 combat vehicles and semiconductors and fuel for Iskander ballistic missiles and Kh-59M2/M2A guided aircraft missiles. Ukrainian Lyutyi-type drones struck the Iskra Research and Production Plant, according to geolocated footage published on September 25.[27] Ulyanovsk Oblast Governor Alexei Russkih confirmed on September 25 that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged an industrial facility in Ulyanovsk City.[28] A Ukrainian drone likely struck an Ozon warehouse near Ulyanovsk City, according to geolocated footage published on September 25.[29] Ukrainian drones struck the Voronezhsintezkauchuk Plant in Voronezh Oblast, according to geolocated footage published on September 24.[30]
The Kuibyshev Railway – a branch of Russian Railroads – press service reported on September 25 that “external interference” with rail transport damaged the electric locomotive and the first passenger train car of the Moscow-Tolyatti train along the Racheika-Belasheika railway section in Samara Oblast (roughly 777 kilometers from the Ukrainian border).[31]
Open-source channels provided updated battlefield damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes in Samara Oblast. Satellite imagery published on September 24 shows damage to three oil tanks, a pump station, and pipelines between the AVT-4 and AVT-5 processing units at the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery in Samara City (roughly 920 kilometers from the Ukrainian border), which reportedly halted production following Ukrainian drone strikes on September 22, according to an open-source Telegram channel.[32]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
See topline text for additional claims of Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 24 and 25 but did not advance.[33]
Russian forces are using modernized Molniya-type drones in northern Sumy Oblast to increasingly target Ukrainian reconnaissance drones in the area. A deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone interceptor battery operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported on September 25 that Russian forces are increasing their use of modernized Molniya drone models, which can carry a greater payload than Molniya-2 drones and have a stronger design, in northern Sumy Oblast.[34] The deputy commander noted that Russian forces install anti-tank mines or mine components on the new drones and added that the new drones can carry cumulative and high-explosive fragmentation warheads. The deputy commander stated that Russian forces are actively developing new interceptor drones to target Ukrainian reconnaissance drones. The deputy commander added that Russian forces deploy reconnaissance drones more carefully and use the “Evasion” system to improve drone protection after losing a significant number in northern Sumy Oblast.
Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 24 and 25 but did not make confirmed advances.[35]
Russian milbloggers continue to make inaccurate claims about Russian advances in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Russian milbloggers amplified the Russian Ministry of Defense’s September 24 claim that Russian forces seized Buzove and Khyzhiakove (both north of Velykyi Burluk).[36] Milbloggers claimed on September 25 that Russian forces continue to tighten the alleged encirclement of Ukrainian troops in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast by claiming to seize Reznykove, Blohodatne, and Dovzhanka (all north of Velykyi Burluk).[37] The Russian MoD additionally claimed on September 25 that elements of the Russian 11th Army Corps (Northern Grouping of Forces) are using self-propelled howitzers to strike the allegedly encircled Ukrainian forces.[38] ISW still has not observed evidence to support Russian claims of a Ukrainian encirclement in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and recent Ukrainian statements and Russian milblogger commentary refute these Russian claims.[39]
Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 24 and 25 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Borova direction.[40]
Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest
Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements
The Russian military’s pervasive culture of lying and inaccurate reporting is impeding Russian precision standoff strikes and drone strike missions in the Lyman direction. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on September 25 that Russian forces are conducting chaotic airstrikes on settlements and windbreaks in an attempt to detect Ukrainian positions.[41] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have not managed to locate new Ukrainian positions following significant Ukrainian advances in the Lyman direction during Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi. A commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the area stated on September 25 that Ukrainian forces used camouflage, concealment, and disinformation to mask their preparations for Operation Vivaldi.[42] The commander stated that the Russian military command was unaware of Ukrainian preparations due to inaccurate reports from units of Russian advances in the area. Russian milbloggers have repeatedly reported that false reporting prevents Russian forces from calling in fire missions on locations Russian forces earlier claimed to control.[43] Russian misinformation about the current state of the frontline degrades Russian battlefield awareness and Russian commanders’ ability to determine Ukrainian and Russian positions, actively impeding Russia’s capability to conduct effective standoff, artillery, and drone strike missions to suppress and disrupt advancing Ukrainian infantry and equipment.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east
Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions east of Slovyansk. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position in Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk), according to geolocated footage published on September 23, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely maintain positions in the area.[44]
Ukrainian counteroffensives across the fortress belt are limiting Russian offensive capabilities in the Slovyansk direction. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on September 25 that the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive north of Lyman has threatened Russian positions in the Slovyansk direction, where Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate positions, particularly near Rai-Oleksandrivka.[45] The milblogger stated that Ukrainian counterattacks in the Slovyansk direction and north of Lyman will delay a potential offensive against Slovyansk and necessitate that Russian forces adapt their logistics to account for Ukrainian positions north of Slovyansk.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction on September 24 and 25 but did not advance.[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south
Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction on September 24 and 25 but did not advance.[46]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest
Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in southwestern Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya), according to geolocated footage published on September 24, indicating that there are likely no Ukrainian forces present in the area.[47]
Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 24 or 25 but did not advance.[48]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions northeast of Oleksandrivka. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position northeast of Yalta (northeast of Oleksandrivka), based on geolocated footage posted on September 24, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area.[49]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr Grouping of Forces
Russian sources continue to promote exaggerated claims of Russian advances northwest of Hulyaipole. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), continued on September 24 and 25 to claim Russian advances in and near Svitla Dolyna, Zorivka, and Zelena Dibrova – all settlements northwest of Hulyaipole and roughly 14 to 17 kilometers from the nearest assessed Russian position.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces on September 24 and 25 attacked near Vozdvyzhivka and Rivne – settlements near the frontline which ISW currently assesses are 11 to 16 kilometers from Svitla Dolyna, Zorivka, and Zelena Dibrova.[51]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations west of Orikhiv on September 25 but did not make confirmed advances.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 24 that Russian forces advanced south of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv and southeast of Zaporizhzhia City).[53] Russian milbloggers also claimed on September 25 that Russian forces advanced west of Chervona Krynytsya (northeast of Orikhiv) and Novoselivka (east of Chervona Krynytsya).[54] Russian forces are likely aiming to bypass Orikhiv from the northeast, but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian infiltrators in Chervona Krynytsya and south of Novoselivka have consolidated their positions and made confirmed advances closer to Orikhiv’s northeastern flank.
Ukrainian drone strikes against the Russian near rear are hindering Russian forces’ remote mine laying capabilities in western occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Zemledeliye remote minelaying system northeast of Stepove (roughly seven kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 24.[55]
Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian mobile fire groups that are attempting to defend against Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics routes in southern occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a Russian mobile fire group along the H-30 Tokmak-Berdyansk highway just southeast of Tokmak (roughly 27 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 24.[56]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations near the Antonivskyi Bridge (east of Kherson City) on September 25 but did not advance.[57]
Summertime Ukrainian strikes against crossings connecting occupied Crimea with mainland Ukraine have forced Russian authorities to divert traffic to improvised alternative routes. Geolocated footage published on September 25 shows significant damage to the bridge connecting occupied Crimea and Kherson Oblast near Henichesk (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline) following Ukrainian strikes in June 2026.[58] The footage shows that Russian authorities have diverted traffic to an improvised earthen causeway alongside the damaged bridge.
Russian authorities are taking measures to protect the Kerch Strait Bridge and reduce the number of vehicles travelling along it, likely out of fear of future Ukrainian strikes against the bridge. The Ministry of Transport in occupied Crimea issued an order on September 17 establishing a regime prioritizing the crossing of vehicles with essential goods, such as medical supplies and fuel.[59] Locals reportedly noted that Russian authorities are sending trucks carrying non-essential items to use the land corridor connecting Russia with occupied Crimea – roads that Ukrainian forces have been heavily striking in recent months.[60] A local Crimean Telegram channel claimed on September 25 that Russian authorities have constructed air and coastal defense firing positions on the Arshintsev Spit near Kerch to protect the bridge from Ukrainian aerial and naval drones.[61]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[62]
See topline text for more reports about Russia’s long-range strike campaign to degrade the Ukrainian economy.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on September 24 and 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 295 Shahed-type (of which 52 were jet-powered) and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[63] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 267 drones, that an unspecified number of air targets struck 16 locations, and that debris fell at four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck commercial, residential, transport, government, logistics, telecommunications, energy, medical, and port infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Odesa, Zaporizhia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[64] Ukrainian state energy company Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts on September 25.[65] Metinvest Group reported on September 18 that Russian ballistic missile strikes had extensively damaged all three major Ukrainian steelmaking enterprises in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and forced them to suspend operations.[66]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21065
[2] https://suspilne dot media/1412582-ukraina-domovlaetsa-pro-licenziu-na-raketi-pac-2-i-pac-3-dla-patriot-dzerela/
[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/67220; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2098382025665176000; https://suspilne dot media/1412362-ak-ataki-rosii-po-data-centrah-vplinut-na-internet-zvazok/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://www.facebook.com/datagroup1/posts/pfbid0nsYbrDtzPzj5qp1FvaveN4PqQzaGmx6HkV6AVCmqnJTd3nZad4HPh2o2VU4sbaWql; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21074
[5] https://www.ft.com/content/7fbecb15-c396-49d2-8cab-1518809a7b2b?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/
[7] https://www.ft.com/content/7fbecb15-c396-49d2-8cab-1518809a7b2b?syn-25a6b1a6=1
[8] https://t.me/mod_russia/67220
[9] https://suspilne dot media/1412362-ak-ataki-rosii-po-data-centrah-vplinut-na-internet-zvazok/
[10] https://suspilne dot media/1412362-ak-ataki-rosii-po-data-centrah-vplinut-na-internet-zvazok/
[11] https://t.me/serhii_flash/7770
[12] https://suspilne dot media/1412362-ak-ataki-rosii-po-data-centrah-vplinut-na-internet-zvazok/; https://t.me/serhii_flash/7770
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/
[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/67626; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/28152367
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2026/; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80665; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42368 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2486
[21] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/7277
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42368 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2485
[23] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8202
[24] https://t.me/mahonin59/13438
[25] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21064
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42369 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2486
[27] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/13559; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8204; https://x.com/Magyargeo56/status/2103407479816339949; https://t.me/supernova_plus/60537
[28] https://t.me/Russkih_Aleksey/12497
[29] https://x.com/Magyargeo56/status/2103498419662999937; https://t.me/supernova_plus/60580
[30] https://x.com/Magyargeo56/status/2103434003504328788; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/31623
[31] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1118410; https://t.me/tass_agency/397251
[32] https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/125; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/naslidky-udariv-po-kujbyshevskomu-npz/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42358; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42361; https://t.me/dva_majors/99522; https://t.me/wargonzo/37174
[34] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MB1hqNyHNhI; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/09/25/pokrashheni-molniyi-ta-systema-uhylyant-komandyr-batareyi-perehoplyuvachiv-magury-pro-borotbu-z-vorozhymy-bpla/
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42358; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42361; https://t.me/dva_majors/99522; https://t.me/severnnyi/9424; https://t.me/wargonzo/37174;
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48001; https://t.me/voin_dv/21280
[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48001; https://t.me/voin_dv/21280; https://t.me/divgen/84199; https://t.me/wargonzo/37174
[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/67631
[39] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42358; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42361; https://t.me/wargonzo/37174; https://t.me/grvZapad/19880
[41] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1411948-sili-oboroni-prodovzuut-prosuvanna-na-limanskomu-napramku-u-66-ombr-rozpovili-pro-uspihi-ta-kontrataki-rf/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHiuKvFUr2w&pp=0gcJCf4LAYcqIYzv
[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/25/vorog-paranoyidalno-brehav-nagoru-oficzer-125-yi-brygady-darvin-pro-pidgotovku-operacziya-vivaldi/; https://soundcloud.com/army_fm
[43] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/; https://t.me/dva_majors/99519
[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13041 ; https://t.me/OMSBr_123/2765
[45] https://t.me/rybar/83475
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42358; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42361; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48028; https://t.me/wargonzo/37174
[47] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2103175959268516239 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38509 ; https://t.me/soniah_hub/18358 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2103289621304246379
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42358; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42361
[49] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2103215631533326740; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/38649
[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/67621 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37174; https://t.me/sashakots/64663; https://t.me/dva_majors/99522; https://t.me/voin_dv/21268
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42358; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42361
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42361
[53] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33966
[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/37174; https://t.me/voin_dv/21276
[55] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2103155509247590811; https://x.com/markito0171/status/2103142227077681439
[56] https://x.com/markito0171/status/2103142227077681439; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2103146182038171883; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2103155509247590811
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42361
[58] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38522; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2103496568959549553; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38522
[59] https://mtrans dot rk.gov.ru/documents/63110b3e-84f6-410a-bf9f-1bee539d5778; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/110058
[60] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/110058
[61] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/110050
[62] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[63] https://t.me/kpszsu/80051
[64] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21056; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7614; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/75638; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7622; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7621; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21068; https://t.me/kyivregionpolice/33946; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21062; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/4138 https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7617; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/34785; https://t.me/kateryna_yamshchikova/14446; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20823; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3342; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3353; https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/25877; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67893; https://www.facebook.com/vitaliy.bunechko/posts/pfbid028jVbfxqkqqT7jZj1RGnRwJwNfqRL27YwfvpnfTYvsXehVPhB2YyqR98w5vk59ABMl; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/48833 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/48834 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67875 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67876 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67877 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/67886; https://t.me/synegubov/25921
[65] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5454
[66] https://metinvestholding dot com/en/media/news/bryusselj-ma-vrahuvati-scho-ukrana-voyu-oleksandr-vodovz-pro-umovi-dlya-konkurentozdatnost-ukransjko-metalurg-na-rinku-s-dlya-strefa-biznesu; https://corporate.arcelormittal dot com/media/news/regulatory-news/statement-regarding-missile-strike-on-arcelormittal-kryvyi-rih
