Toplines
Russian President Vladimir Putin used his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19 to reaffirm his commitment to achieving his full war aims in Ukraine. Putin stated that Russia is ready and willing to end the war based on the principles he outlined during his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).[1] Putin used that speech to lay out his conditions to agree to a ceasefire and only then start negotiations: Ukraine’s complete withdrawal from all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Ukraine’s abandonment of its NATO membership aspirations.[2] Putin stated in this 2024 speech that Russia’s “fundamental” position calls for Ukraine’s neutral status, demilitarization (the Russian demand for limits on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself), and denazification (the Russian demand for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government). Putin had also demanded that the international community enshrine its recognition of Russia’s annexation of the four oblasts and Crimea in international agreements and that the West lift all sanctions against Russia. Many of Putin’s June 2024 demands, which Putin reiterated on December 19, directly contradict the US-proposed 28-point peace plan and its subsequent iterations. The 28-point plan, for example, called for freezing the war along the current frontlines in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts and for the United States to recognize Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and Crimea as Russian territory de facto rather than de jure.[3] That plan did not require other states, including Ukraine, to recognize the occupied regions as Russian territory de jure. Putin’s statements continue to make clear that he will not be satisfied with a peace agreement along the lines of those based on the 28-point proposal currently under discussion. Putin may make temporary compromises, as he claimed during his Direct Line speech he did during the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska summit, but his unwavering commitment to his original, maximalist war aims shows that he will not be satisfied with such an agreement and will continue to pursue his full goals even after he signs an agreement. Any peace agreement must therefore ensure a strong Ukraine with robust security guarantees in order to establish a lasting and sustainable peace and prevent renewed Russian aggression. The Kremlin has publicly and explicitly rejected such security guarantees multiple times, however.[4]
Putin made even more exaggerated claims about Russian battlefield victories than his senior military officials have made in recent days. Putin claimed that Russian forces have seized the small town of Siversk in Donetsk Oblast and Vovchansk in Kharkiv Oblast.[5] Putin also claimed that Russian forces have seized 50 percent of Lyman in Donetsk Oblast and Hulyaipole in Zaporizhia Oblast and more than half of Kostyantynivka in Donetsk Oblast. ISW has not observed evidence to confirm any of these claimed seizures or extensive advances and has only observed evidence indicating a Russian presence (either through infiltration missions or assaults) in 7.3 percent of Hulyaipole and 2.9 percent of Lyman. Even Russian milbloggers’ claimed advances do not support many of Putin’s claims, with milbloggers claiming that Russian forces have seized a maximum of about seven percent of Lyman and 11 percent of Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets further reported on December 18 that Russian forces are currently struggling to completely push Ukrainian forces out of southern Vovchansk.[6] Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is having to allocate forces meant to continue offensive operations south of the settlement to repel Ukrainian forces counterattacking within Vovchansk. Putin’s claims are even more exaggerated than the December 17 and 18 claims from Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov respectively.[7] Belousov and Gerasimov claimed that fighting was ongoing within Lyman and Hulyaipole but did not offer any figures on how much territory in the settlements Russian forces had allegedly seized.
Putin’s claims are part of the ongoing Kremlin effort to frame the seizures of small settlements — which required months of difficult fighting and significant losses — as evidence of the apparent ease with which Russian forces will take significantly larger population centers in Donetsk Oblast. Putin framed Russian advances in Siversk and Lyman as paving the way for the Russian seizure of Slovyansk and stated that he has “no doubt” that Russian forces will seize Kostyantynivka.[8] Vovchansk, Lyman, Siversk, and Hulyaipole each had a pre-war population between about 12,000 and 20,000 people — considerably smaller than the cities of Slovyansk (about 105,000) and Kramatorsk (about 147,000) that make up the northern part of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast. Kremlin officials have repeatedly attempted to aggrandize tactical Russian successes of seizing small- to medium-sized settlements to support the false narrative that Russian forces can rapidly seize the Fortress Belt.[9] The cities in the Fortress Belt are larger in terms of both area and density than any of the settlements Russian forces have seized since 2022, and Ukrainian forces have been fortifying the cities since 2014 — as Putin noted in his Direct Line speech.[10] ISW continues to assess that it will take Russian forces two or more years to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast at great cost at current rates of advance and losses.[11]
Putin tried to conceal Russia’s recent defeats in Kupyansk, doubling down on the false narrative that Russian successes in Kupyansk demonstrate that a Russian battlefield victory is inevitable. Putin repeated ongoing Russian military officials’ claims that Russian forces seized Kupyansk “several weeks ago.”[12] Putin claimed that Russian forces are “not yet” advancing westward from the town because they must first eliminate the Ukrainian group on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the area and seize Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk on the east bank) — an attempt to deflect from the fact that Ukrainian counterattacks have pushed Russian forces back and prevented any westward advances. Putin attempted to discredit footage of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s December 12 visit to the southwestern outskirts of Kupyansk as fake, claiming that Ukrainian and Russian drones in the area make it impossible to approach the town. ISW has observed mounting evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated a significant portion of Kupyansk, however.[13] Mashovets further stated on December 19 that Ukrainian forces have encircled up to two understrength Russian companies in central and southern Kupyansk along both banks of the Oskil River.[14] Mashovets assessed that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces command will likely have to commit forces and means from other nearby sectors to the Kupyansk area following successful Ukrainian counterattacks within and north of Kupyansk. Mashovets also assessed that Russia’s inability to secure Kupyansk has had effects on other nearby sectors of the front, with the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) thinly stretched between the Vovchansk, Velykyi Burluk, and Kupyansk directions.[15]
Putin, however, claimed that Ukrainian attempts to retake lost positions in Kupyansk have been unsuccessful and resulted in heavy losses.[16] Putin claimed that these unsuccessful efforts should “encourage” Ukraine to end the war peacefully as Ukraine has “practically” no forces left to commit to the Kupyansk effort. Putin’s statements are the latest in the Kremlin’s ongoing cognitive warfare effort that aims to paint Ukrainian defenses as on the brink of collapse and a Russian victory as inevitable.[17] This Kremlin effort is meant to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Russia’s demands now out of fear of further Russian offensive operations. Putin’s explicit use of Kupyansk — the sector of the front where Ukrainian forces have had the most success recently — as the illustrative example of why Ukraine should capitulate is notable and demonstrates the extent to which the Kremlin is trying to cover up Russian forces’ inability to maintain positions in a town that the Russian military command falsely claimed that Russian forces fully seized in late November 2025.[18] Putin’s efforts to conceal the battlefield realities in Kupyansk demonstrate the degree to which he sees Ukrainian successes in the area as a major informational setback for the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare efforts to influence ongoing negotiations.
Putin continued to praise the strength and resilience of the Russian economy, but Kremlin economic policies indicate that the economy is performing markedly worse than Putin is portraying. Putin claimed that the Russian federal budget will be able to continue to meet the needs of the Russian military.[19] Putin claimed that Russian inflation will be 5.6 to 5.8 percent by the end of 2025, meeting the Kremlin’s goal of reducing it at least to six percent. Putin also referenced the Russian Central Bank’s December 19 decision to cut the key interest rate by 0.5 percent to 16 percent.[20] Putin claimed that the Central Bank’s international reserves are growing and are currently worth $741.5 billion. Putin congratulated the Russian federal government on balancing the budget but noted that the Kremlin had to raise the value-added tax (VAT) in order to do so. Putin also lauded Russia’s low unemployment rate of 2.2 percent, which Putin noted is even lower than Russia’s previous historic low of 2.5 percent in 2024.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent estimated actual Russian inflation to be over 20 percent in October 2025.[21] Russia’s extremely low unemployment rate reflects the fact that Russia is experiencing labor shortages and is likely causing wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors, contributing to overall inflation. Russia has also likely had to resort to importing labor from foreign states, including North Korea and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), to compensate for these labor shortages.[22] The Russian Central Bank began selling its physical gold reserves in late November 2025 for the first time as part of the Russian Ministry of Finance’s operations to fund the state budget.[23] Russia has steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves funding its war in Ukraine and has had to resort to selling its gold reserves due to unsustainable spending. Kremlin efforts to promote the alleged strength of the Russian economy are part of wider efforts to convince the West and Ukraine that Russia can outlast Ukraine on the battlefield such that Ukraine should capitulate now to Russian demands at the negotiating table. Russia’s economic policies demonstrate, however, that the Russian economy is not as resilient against Western sanctions, monetary constraints, and the cost of the war effort as Putin has long claimed.
Putin continues to promote Russia as a multinational, multireligious state ahead of the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in 2026. Putin used his Direct Line speech to applaud the contributions of ethnic minorities in Russia, particularly those serving in the Russian military, to the war effort and highlighted how Russian soldiers of different nationalities and religions are fighting “for their homeland shoulder to shoulder.”[24] Putin specifically spotlighted Senior Lieutenant Naran Ochir-Goryaev, a native of the Republic of Kalmykia and assault company commander who briefed Putin about the alleged Russian seizure of Siversk, throughout Direct Line in several likely highly staged interactions.[25] Putin stated that the upcoming Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in 2026 is especially important during the war because “when a country faces such challenges, it unites.”[26] Putin stated that a Russian soldier’s religion does not matter when under fire on the battlefield and that all the peoples of Russia have common values that unite them.
Putin specifically highlighted the role of religion and Islam in Russia.[27] Putin praised Islam as sharing many traditional values with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and noted that over 10 percent of Russian citizens are Muslim. Putin stated that the Russian government is actively developing Islamic education in the Republic of Bashkortostan and promised to support all traditional religions within Russia. Putin also praised the Republic of Tatarstan, claiming that leaders of Islamic countries look to Tatarstan as an example of peaceful coexistence between people of different nationalities and religions.
Putin’s narratives about Russia as a multiethnic and multireligious state whose people come together under a united love for the Russian Federation is at odds with the xenophobic views of the Russian ultranationalist community — one of Putin’s core constituencies with ardent supporters of the war effort — about the need for Russian identity to center on ethnic Russians and the ROC as well as its loud complaints about migrants, especially Muslim migrants. Putin has long had to balance using migration to help address Russia’s demographic problems and labor shortages — both significantly exacerbated by Putin’s war in Ukraine — with the demands of this ultranationalist constituency.[28] Putin is notably leaning into a concept of civic nationalism more consistent with the Soviet ideal than with Christian Russian nationalism.[29]
Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide financial support to Ukraine. The EU agreed on December 18 to provide Ukraine with an interest-free loan of 90 billion euros (about $105 billion) in 2026-2027.[30] European Council (EC) President António Costa stated that Ukraine would pay back the loan only if Russia paid reparations to Ukraine for the war. The loan does not use frozen Russian assets but is backed by the EU budget.[31] The EU has not yet made a decision on the potential seizure of frozen Russian assets.
Ukrainian forces continue their strike campaign against Russia’s shadow fleet. Sources in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told several Ukrainian outlets on December 19 that the SBU struck the QENDIL, a Russian shadow fleet tanker, with unspecified aerial drones in the neutral waters of the Mediterranean Sea.[32] The sources noted that the ship was not carrying cargo at the time of the strike but that the strike critically damaged the vessel, preventing it from performing its intended tasks. Ukrainian military intelligence similarly reported to Ukrainian outlets about strikes against Russian shadow fleet vessels in late November and early December 2025.[33]
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin used his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19 to reaffirm his commitment to achieving his full war aims in Ukraine.
- Putin made even more exaggerated claims about Russian battlefield victories than his senior military officials have made in recent days.
- Putin continued to praise the strength and resilience of the Russian economy, but Kremlin economic policies indicate that the economy is performing markedly worse than Putin is portraying.
- Putin continues to promote Russia as a multinational, multireligious state ahead of the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in 2026.
- Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide financial support to Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces continue their strike campaign against Russia’s shadow fleet.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in The Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil, energy and defense industrial infrastructure overnight on December 18 to 19. Sources within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) published strike footage and told multiple Ukrainian media outlets on December 19 that Ukrainian long-range drones struck the gas turbine of a Lukoil oil rig in the Rakushechnoye field in the Caspian Sea overnight, the third such facility in the Caspian Sea that Ukrainian forces have recently struck.[34] Geolocated footage published on December 19 shows a fire after a reported Ukrainian drone strike on the Oryol Thermal Power Plant in Oryol City, Oryol Oblast.[35] Oryol Oblast Governor Andrey Klychkov confirmed the strike on December 18 and claimed that the strike caused power outages in Sovetsky Raion of Oryol City.[36] Geolocated footage published on December 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely struck the TogliattiAzot plant in Tolyatti, Samara Oblast, overnight.[37] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported on December 19 that TogliattiAzot is one of the largest chemical plants in Russia with an annual production capacity of three million tons of ammonia.[38]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 19 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Yablunivka, Kindrativka, Novomykolaivka, and Varachyne on December 18 and 19.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka.[40]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 2nd Battalion of the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Varachyne and Yablunivka.[41] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) and the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[42] Artillery elements of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy border area.[43]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on December 19 that Russian forces seized Synelnykove and Tsehelne (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[44]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Prylipka, Lyman, Vilcha, and Starytsia and toward Izbytske and Okhrimivka on December 18 and 19.[45]
Mashovets reported that Russian forces are unable to advance along the T-2104 Vovchansk-Bilyi Kolodyaz road (southeast of Vovchansk) despite constant attacks within southern Vovchansk.[46]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported that Russian forces are frequently employing motorcycles in the Vovchansk direction.[47] The spokesperson added that Ukrainian fiber-optic drone operators are interdicting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) across the international border in Belgorod Oblast. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces primarily use servicemembers on foot to conduct logistics but have recently introduced unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for such missions.[48]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are operating near Synelnykove, Vilcha, and Tsehelne.[49] Fiber-optic drone operators of the Russian 244th Artillery Brigade (11th AC, LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Bairak (northeast of Kharkiv City).[50] KVN fiber optic drone operators of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[51] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion (Chechen 204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) and Zapad-Akhmat Battalion reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 19 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and toward Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dovhenke on December 18 and 19.[53]
Mashovets reported on December 18 that Russian forces in the Velykyi Burluk direction have been conducting unsuccessful attacks from their foothold on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River near Dovhenke in an attempt to advance toward Dvorichna and Ridkodub (both southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[54] Mashovets noted that Russian forces have failed to make significant gains in the sector since reaching the Odradne–Dvorichanske line (east to southeast of Velykyi Burluk) in November 2025, and assessed that the Russian military command will need to commit operational reserves or units from other directions to continue attacks in the direction.[55]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2
Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Kupyansk direction.
Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced northwest of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk) — an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[56]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka and Pishchane and toward Hlushkivka on December 18 and 19.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk.[58]
A Ukrainian commander operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on December 18 that Russian forces’ culture of false reports of advances to superiors influenced the Russian military command’s decision-making in the direction while Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[59] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces gained fire control of the Kupyansk–Holubivka road (north of Kupyansk), a Russian ground line of communication (GLOC).[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that muddy weather conditions make it difficult for Russian forces to operate wheeled vehicles in the direction.[61]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces northwest of Stepova Novoselivka.[62] Elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD), including its 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, LMD), and the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in and near Kupyansk.[63]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Borova direction.
Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 18 shows Ukrainian forces operating east of Kolisnykivka (north of Borova) – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[64]
Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and toward Chervonyi Stav and Druzhelyubivka on December 18 and 19.[65]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Borova direction.[66]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 19 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself, northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and Shandryholove, north of Lyman near Stavky, east of Lyman near Zarichne, and southeast of Lyman near Dibrova on December 18 and 19.[67]
Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Oleksandr Borodin reported on December 19 that Russian forces continue to use infiltration tactics in the Lyman direction but sometimes send assault infantry into attacks without drone support.[68] Borodin noted that Russian forces rarely use mechanized vehicles and continue to attack during foggy weather, which degrades both Russian and Ukrainian drone operations. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on December 19 that Ukrainian forces control Stavky (north of Lyman) and Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman), settlements that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized as of November 21.[69] The spokesperson reported that most Russian servicemembers only receive a month of training before deploying to the frontline.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st and 15th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly operating on the west (right) bank of the Chornyi Zherebets River in the Lyman direction.[70] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[71]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 19 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Platonivka (northwest of Siversk).[72]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Platonivka, Dronivka, Zakitne, and Ozerne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Zvanivka; and southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka, Svyato-Pokrovske, and Pazeno on December 18 and 19.[73]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on December 19 that claims of the Russian seizure of Serebryanka and Dronivka are false and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the settlements.[74] The brigade reported that Russian forces are conducting localized assaults and sabotage and reconnaissance activity in the area and are trying to infiltrate between Ukrainian positions. The brigade noted that Russian forces are using the Siverskyi Donets River as a barrier to facilitate logistics and cover assault routes. The brigade stated that Russian forces are disguising themselves in civilian clothing – an act of perfidy under international law.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Yampil (northwest of Siversk).[75]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[76]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne and Predtechyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk; southeast of Kostyantynivka toward Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, Shcherbynivka, and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Toretske and Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka on December 18 and 19.[77]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the northern outskirts of Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya).[78]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and toward Nove Shakhove and Toretske; and southeast of Dobropillya near Boikivka on December 18 and 19.[79]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Toretske.[80] Elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Boikivka.[81] Elements of the 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[82]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on December 19 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk, into central Svitle, and west of Myrnohrad (both east of Pokrovsk).[83]
Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, Molodetske, and toward Novopidhorodne on December 18 and 19.[84]
An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 19 that Russian forces are incurring significant personnel and equipment losses during attacks near and within Pokrovsk while attempting to exploit foggy weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone operations.[85] The officer reported that Russian forces struggle to coordinate and conduct armored assaults during foggy weather conditions.[86] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 19 that sudden temperature changes, fog, and snow inhibit Russian infantry assault operations and that Ukrainian forces captured several Russian prisoners-of-war (POWs) who did not have any equipment.[87] A Ukrainian brigade published footage on December 19 showing Ukrainian drone operators striking Russian positions in Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces have extended the ”kill zone” (an area of elevated drone strike risk) to over 21 kilometers from the frontline.[88]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) and the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) are reportedly operating north of Pokrovsk.[89] Elements of the 1487th Motorized Rifle Regiment (under the operational control of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) and the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in and near Myrnohrad.[90] Armored elements of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[91]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on December 19 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and east of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[92]
Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself and near Filiya (south of Novopavlivka) on December 18 and 19.[93]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on December 19 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[94]
Russian forces attacked near Oleksandrivka; northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka, Tovste, and Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad and toward Lisne; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Stepove, Verbove, and Krasnohirske on December 18 and 19.[95]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction published footage on December 19 showing Ukrainian forces repelling an at least reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[96] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Russian T-72 tank, one MT-LB armored fighting vehicle (AFV), one BMP infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and two trucks and killed 35 personnel during the assault. A Ukrainian drone company commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on December 19 that Russian forces have conducted mechanized assaults in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) for the past two days consecutively, exploiting worsening weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone operations, including fog, rain, and snow.[97]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on December 19 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Hulyaipole and to the western bank of the Haichur River west of Radisne (north of Hulyaipole).[98]
Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Radisne, Herasymivka, Andriivka, Nove Zaporizhzhia, and Dobropillya and toward Varvarivka, Bratske, and Kosivtseve; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Zlahoda, Pryvilne, and Rybne on December 18 and 19.[99] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole, Herasymivka, Andriivka, and Ternuvate (northwest of Hulyaipole).[100]
Order of Battle: Assault elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Hulyaipole.[101] Drone operators of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Hulyaipole.[102] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions with glide bombs in Hulyaipole.[103] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Ternuvate.[104]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the western Zaporizhia direction on December 19 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked toward Orikhiv itself; northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske; west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Stepnohirsk, Plavni, and Prymorske on December 18 and 19.[105]
Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) sabotaged a section of railway between occupied Vesele and Novouspenivka (both southwest of Orikhiv, about 91 kilometers from the frontline) in occupied Zaporizhia, derailing a Russian 2M62 locomotive with 25 cargo cars.[106] The GUR added that a subsequent Ukrainian airstrike destroyed an unspecified amount of military cargo backed up nearby and awaiting movement.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in Stepnohirsk.[107] KVN fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Orikhiv.[108] Elements of the 104th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the western Zaporizhia direction. [109]
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on December 19 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City toward Antonivka on December 18 and 19.[110]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 299th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Kherson City.[111]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on December 18 and 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 160 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which about 90 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea overnight.[112] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 108 drones in southern and eastern Ukraine as of 0800 local time and that 47 drones struck 23 locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[113]
Russian forces are continuing their strike campaign against energy and transport infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and are extending their “human safari” tactics against civilians and use of cluster munitions in the region. Odesa City Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on December 19 that Russian forces struck critical and civilian infrastructure in Odesa City, causing electricity, water, and heating outages in the city.[114] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Kuleba stated that Russian strikes left 74,000 Odesa Oblast residents without power and 85,000 without heat.[115] Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways) Board Chairperson Oleksandr Pertsovsky reported that a Russian strike damaged railway infrastructure in Odesa City and injured one railway worker.[116] Geolocated footage published on December 19 shows damage to the railway dispatcher’s office and a train station in Odesa City following the Russian drone strike.[117] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that repairs are ongoing after a recent Russian strike against a bridge near Mayaky, Odesa Oblast on the M15 Odesa City-Reni highway.[118] Ukrainian State Customs and Border Guard Service reported that Ukraine temporarily closed some customs checkpoints along the Ukrainian-Moldovan international border on December 19 due to the strike on the Mayaky bridge and power outages in Odesa Oblast.[119] A Russian milblogger implied that Russian forces are mining bridges with cluster munitions dropped from Geran-2 drones and claimed that Russian forces launched an Iskander missile with a cluster warhead, likely to target crews doing repair work on the Mayaky bridge after previous Russian Geran drone strikes.[120] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated that Russian forces targeted the Mayaky bridge with 10 Shahed drones on the night of December 18 to 19, five more Shaheds during the day on December 19, and an unspecified ballistic missile in the afternoon of December 19.[121] Beskrestnov stated that Russian forces used cluster warheads, which could not damage the bridge itself, in a likely effort to strike repair crews operating at the scene. Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov published footage on December 18 showing a Russian drone, possibly a Shahed, striking a car as it drove along a bridge in Odesa Oblast, killing one civilian and injuring three children.[122]
Russian forces continue adapting their long-range strike tactics to degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Ukrainian Energy Research Center Director Oleksandr Kharchenko stated that Russian forces are increasingly targeting smaller energy transformer stations, especially in Odesa Oblast and in frontline areas.[123] Kharchenko stated that Russian forces destroyed all the substations in Odesa Oblast during a recent strike and struck the distribution network to complicate Ukraine’s use of alternative routes but assessed that Russian forces are not yet capable of more damaging strikes. Kharchenko stated that Ukraine is struggling to repair substations because Russia is also conducting strikes against repair teams. ISW continues to assess that Russia has been attempting to split Ukraine’s energy grid and create energy islands that are cut off from Ukraine’s electricity generation, deliveries, and transmission systems.[124]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on December 19 that Russian forces’ deployment of an Oreshnik missile system to Belarus is a threat to Poland, Germany, and other European countries.[125] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian intelligence is aware of the Oreshnik deployment location and will provide the intelligence to its European partners, reporting that Russia is not yet able to scale Oreshnik production.[126]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
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[83] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105906
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[96] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/19/broneshturm-zahlynuvsya-na-pidhodah-minus-tank-t-72-bmp-mt-lb-i-do-35-shturmovykiv-rf/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/864404509328138
[97] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/19/mangaly-vidhodyat-u-nyh-v-trendi-jorzhyky-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-vorog-shukaye-nestandartni-rishennya/
[98] https://t.me/voin_dv/18089; https://t.me/motopatriot78/46316
[99] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32725; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13470; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32723; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105931; https://t.me/wargonzo/31185; https://t.me/motopatriot78/46316; https://t.me/motopatriot78/46332
[100] https://t.me/voin_dv/18089; https://t.me/dva_majors/85244
[101] https://t.me/voin_dv/18097
[102] https://t.me/voin_dv/18097
[103] https://t.me/voin_dv/18091
[104] https://t.me/voin_dv/18098
[105] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32725; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13470; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32723; https://t.me/wargonzo/31185; https://t.me/dva_majors/85244
[106] https://t.me/DIUkraine/7541
[107] https://t.me/motopatriot78/46316; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37562
[108] https://t.me/wargonzo/31204
[109] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37558; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37573; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37590; https://t.me/mod_russia/59591
[110] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32725; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32723
[111] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37562
[112] https://t.me/kpszsu/50167
[113] https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1193006-armia-rf-geranami-atakuvala-centr-novgoroda-siverskogo-pid-obstrilom-opinivsa-zitlovij-masiv-mista/; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02xThkqHis5aswsewQJnq4TtFdtegHEFjePFZmAZQCJxuU5prid23sjW71RjD5sSeGl&id=61579137283645; https://t.me/milinfolive/162636; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/14TN5W9YzrB/; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1193532-rf-zavdala-ponad-10-udariv-po-gazovidobuvnomu-pidpriemstvu-na-harkivsini/; https://t.me/synegubov/19034; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1193390-majze-vsim-abonentam-na-mikolaivsini-vidnovili-elektropostacanna-pisla-obstriliv-kim/
[114] https://t.me/odesaMVA/667; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1193000-cergova-ataka-v-odesi-poskodzeni-obekti-kriticnoi-ta-civilnoi-infrastrukturi-odna-postrazdala/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/99921
[115] https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/7721
[116] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1FjAzVCDjs/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1193098-nicnij-obstril-odesi-zaznala-poranenna-pracivnica-zaliznici/; https://t.me/xydessa/60272; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/191131
[117] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2001943220784406875?s=20; https://x.com/NAFOvoyager/status/2001915140866977972?s=20;
[118] https://t.me/odeskaODA/13010
[119] https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1193346-cerez-obstril-odesini-timcasovo-nemae-propusku-v-deakih-kpp/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1193550-na-odesini-obmezili-ruh-transportu-cerez-maaki-pisla-ataki-rf-ta-zakrili-trasu-odesa-reni-dla-vantazivok/; https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/pfbid0sTCt3R2X3iGWuFJ37PXZyZrVXTpnYW8vqQWszPkjrxSoo6eM4UPC4sGdG33xjGnvl;
[120] https://t.me/milinfolive/162695; https://t.me/milinfolive/162692
[121] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6720
[122] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/25493
[123] https://suspilne dot media/1193578-nemae-ni-gabioniv-ni-miskiv-z-piskom-nicogo-ekspert-iz-pitan-energetiki-oleksandr-harcenko-pro-naslidki-obstriliv/
[124] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2025/
[125] https://news.liga dot net/ua/politics/news/rosiia-zakinchuie-rozmishchennia-orieshnika-u-bilorusi-a-sanktsiy-zakhodu-vse-shche-nemaie-zelenskyy
[126] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4071426-zelenskij-znaemo-de-v-bilorusi-rozmistat-oresnik-i-peredaemo-cu-informaciu-partneram.html
