The Kremlin is in the endgame of a decades’ long strategic effort to de facto annex Belarus — an effort which will permanently augment Russia’s military and economic capabilities to pursue its revanchist geopolitical objectives against the United States and NATO. 

Ukraine’s ability to force the Russian military to divert its efforts to advance is a positive indicator of Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting this war.

North Korea has sent troops to support Russia in Ukraine, deepening their cooperation since Russia's 2022 invasion.

This paper primarily aims to offer a new framework for Ukrainian forces and their Western backers to break the current positional warfare and restore maneuver to the battlefield.

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Iran Update, January 18, 2025

The Israeli government approved the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage deal on January 18. The ceasefire will go into effect at 1:30AM ET on January 19 and the release of Israeli hostages will start at 9:30AM ET on January 19. Unspecified security sources cited by Israeli Army Radio stated that Israel estimates that 25 out of the 33 hostages Hamas will release in the first phase of the deal are alive. Hamas is expected to release three hostages on January 19 and release the other 30 hostages every subsequent Saturday until March 1.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 18, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) units and other Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot of the Kaluganeftprodukt joint-stock company (JSC) near Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, causing a fire at the facility on the night of January 17 to 18. Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed on January 17 and 18 that a drone strike caused a fire at an unspecified industrial enterprise in Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, and later added that Russian forces downed seven drones over the region.[2] Russian sources posted footage purportedly showing the fire at the oil depot.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2025

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16. The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, January 16, 2025

The South Korean authorities discovered a 164-foot tall and wide steel framework installed by the PRC within the Provisional Measures Zones (PMZ) of the Yellow Sea in December 2024. This installation is part of the PRC’s ongoing efforts to assert territorial control over the disputed waters, taking advantage of the leadership vacuum in South Korea amid its internal political turmoil following President Yoon Suk-yeol's martial law declaration on December 3, 2024.

Africa File, January 16, 2025: SAF Advances in Central Sudan en Route to Khartoum; Canadian Gold Mining Company Leaves Mali with Russia on Standby; JNIM’s Deadliest-Ever Attack in Benin; DRC Launches Counteroffensive Against Rwandan-backed M23

The SAF recaptured Wad Madani from the RSF on January 11, an operationally significant district capital in central Sudan that will help to set conditions for the SAF to achieve its strategic objective of retaking the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. The capture of Wad Madani is part of the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) effort to encircle the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum and ultimately dislodge the RSF from the capital. The recapture of Khartoum is a strategic objective for the SAF that supports the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. The SAF capture of Khartoum could affect external support for the SAF and RSF from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, respectively.