Data cutoff: 9:30 AM ET, July 23

Key takeaways:

• Iranian Defense Minister Nasir Zadeh paid an official visit to Moscow, likely to secure Russian military assistance following the Iran-Israel war. Iran may increasingly view the PRC as a viable and more reliable defense partner compared to Russia, however.
• Iran has continued to pursue PRC investment in support of its effort to develop Iran into an international transit hub. This further highlights Iranian reliance on the PRC to support the Iranian economy and mitigate international sanctions.
• Iran held trilateral talks with the PRC and Russia over its nuclear negotiations with the United States. Iran is likely looking for diplomatic support from the PRC and Russia, as the E3 considers the reimposition of snapback sanctions against Iran.
• Russia and Iran have lost influence in the Caucasus and are concerned by growing Turkish influence in the region. Moscow and Tehran could collaborate to pursue their mutual interests in the Caucasus despite their historic disagreements there.
• The PRC and Russia have cooperated to legitimize and provide international top cover for some Western-designated terrorist organizations in the Middle East and Central Asia. These organizations include the Houthis and Afghan Taliban.

Defense and Military-Technical Cooperation

Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow on July 21, possibly to secure Russian military assistance following the Israel-Iran War. NOTE: A version of this text also appeared in CTP-ISW’s July 21 Iran Update. Iranian media reported that Nasir Zadeh and Belousov discussed “expanding military cooperation.”[1] Nasir Zadeh also attended Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 20.[2] The Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry oversees the Iranian defense-industrial complex and manages Iranian arms sales and purchases.[3] Iran has long sought to acquire Russian Su-35 fighter jets and has pressured Russia to provide it with S-400 air defense systems after Israeli airstrikes in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[4] Russia has not provided Iran with this equipment and is unlikely to do so in the near future.[5] Iran may view the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) as an increasingly viable defense partner and more reliable compared to Russia, given the limited Russian support for Iran during and since the war against Israel.[6]

Iran and Russia completed an annual combined naval exercise in the Caspian Sea on July 23.[7] The navies of the Artesh—the conventional Iranian military—and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as well as the Russian Navy began the three-day, search-and-rescue exercise on June 21 in the 4th Artesh Naval District, which is based in Bandar-e Anzali, Gilan Province.[8] The Russian SB738 tug participated in the exercise.[9] IRGC-affiliated media reported that the exercise aims to strengthen “maritime interactions” between Caspian Sea states.[10] Iran and Russia have used combined military exercises in recent years to improve interoperability, disseminate technical and tactical lessons, and pressure the US and its allies.[11] Iran previously hosted Russia and other Caspian Sea states for a previous iteration of this naval exercise in July 2024.[12]

Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cooperation

Nothing significant to report.

Economic and Financial Cooperation

Iran is continuing to pursue investment from the PRC to support its effort to become an international transit hub. Iranian media reported on July 14 that Iran granted a contract to a PRC state-owned rail company to electrify about 1,000 kilometers of railway that stretches across northern Iran from Sarakhs on the Iran-Turkmenistan border to Razi on the Iran-Iraq border.[13] Iranian media reported that the electrification of the rail line would “triple” rail transport along the route and “increase” PRC rail transport through Iran. Iran has long sought to establish itself as a major transit hub in order to support its economy and to reduce the impact of international sanctions. Iran has lobbied the PRC and Russia for help developing Iranian transit infrastructure projects in recent years.[14] China State Railway Group Chairman Guo Zhuxue said during a meeting with the CEO of Iran’s state-owned rail company in Beijing on July 14 that the PRC seeks to increase container cargo transit through Iran as a partner of the PRC Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[15] The PRC sees Iran as a valuable part of the BRI due to its connection to Europe and Asia.[16] The PRC also pledged to invest $400 billion in Iranian transportation systems and other infrastructure and industries in the 25-year cooperation agreement that the PRC and Iran signed in 2021.[17] Ongoing PRC investment in Iranian transport systems and other infrastructure is a critical component of Iran and the PRC’s economic cooperation. Iran continues to rely heavily upon the PRC to mitigate the impact of heavy sanctions on the Iranian economy.

Political and Diplomatic Cooperation

Iran held trilateral talks with the PRC and Russia in Tehran on July 22 ahead of expected United States-Iran nuclear talks, likely to rally diplomatic support for Iran in the event that the E3 triggers the JCPOA snapback mechanism. Iranian media reported on July 22 that representatives of Iran, the PRC, and Russia discussed the nuclear negotiations and sanctions against Iran and agreed to continue “close consultations” in coming weeks.[18] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said that Iran has “aligned positions” with the PRC and Russia and noted that Iran is in “continuous” consultations with both countries to prevent the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from reinstating snapback sanctions or to mitigate the potential consequences of a reinstated sanctions.[19] The E3 threatened on July 17 to trigger the JCPOA snapback mechanism if Iran fails to achieve progress on a nuclear deal by August 2025.[20] Iran has previously engaged with the PRC and Russia over the possibility that the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[21] It is unlikely, however, that the PRC and Russia could prevent the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism, so Iran is likely trying to get the PRC and Russia to prevent the E3 from activating the snapback mechanism in the first place.[22]

Russia and Iran may increase their diplomatic coordination in the South Caucasus to offset their waning influence in the region. Both Russia and Iran have experienced tensions with Azerbaijan recently. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated calls on July 19 for Russia to acknowledge its responsibility for the December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane, which a Russian air defense system reportedly downed over Kazakhstan while it was en route from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Grozny, Chechnya.[23] Aliyev notably reiterated his support for Ukraine and encouraged Ukraine to “never accept occupation.” Smaller-scale incidents have caused Russo-Azerbaijani relations to deteriorate further since late 2024 as well, including a Russian law enforcement raid on ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg in June 2025 that left two Azerbaijani citizens dead and a later Azerbaijani raid on the regional headquarters of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik in Baku.[24] Russia has historically aligned with Azerbaijan’s chief adversary, Armenia, but Russo-Armenian relations have become increasingly strained since Russian peacekeepers failed to stop Azerbaijan’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, which prompted Russia to foster relations with Azerbaijan to maintain its regional influence until the December 2024 aircraft incident.[25] Russia now faces soured relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, which will likely weaken Russia’s foothold in the South Caucasus writ large.

Iran is similarly reckoning with shifting power dynamics in the South Caucasus. Iranian media criticized new Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s July 12 visit to Baku, during which Shara signed a memorandum of understanding with the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) on the export of Azerbaijani gas to Syria via Turkey.[26] Iranian-Azerbaijani relations have been strained historically due to Azerbaijan’s ties with Israel and Turkey, and Iran likely sees Shara’s visit to Baku as indicative of Syria’s rapprochement with Iran’s regional adversaries and a solidification of Syrian-Turkish ties. Senior Iranian officials also recently reiterated their opposition to the Zangezur Corridor—a proposed Turkish-Azerbaijani transit route that would connect Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region.[27] Iran sees the Zangezur Corridor as an attempt to expand Turkish influence into Eurasia and fears that the project would sever Iran’s land access to Russia and Europe through Armenia.

Geopolitical dynamics in the South Caucasus have historically been a source of friction in the Russo-Iranian relationship.[28] Both view the region as part of their sphere of influence. Russia has historically supported the construction of the Zanzegur Corridor, despite Iranian opposition to the project.[29] Iran has publicly supported Azerbaijan’s claims to Nagorno-Karabakh, whereas Russia helped mediate a ceasefire to Armenia’s benefit during the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020.[30] Russia and Iran may overcome their historical differences due to fears of shifting power and losing influence in the South Caucasus; however, neither Russia nor Iran wants to see an emboldened Turkey take a more active role in the region. Iran has continued diplomatic outreach to Russia even following Tehran’s apparent disappointment with Russia’s lackluster response to the Israel-Iran war, suggesting that Iran still sees Russia as a necessary diplomatic partner.

Russia and Iran could develop a more collaborative relationship in the southern Caucasus similar to how they have cooperated in other contexts. Russia and Iran had long collaborated to keep Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad in power during the Syrian Civil War.[31] Russia and Iran were also frequent collaborators between 2022 and 2024 against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, but Russia has indigenized many of the capabilities it was getting from Iran since 2024.[32] This has minimized the importance of Ukraine as a theater of Russo-Iranian cooperation. Moscow and Tehran may therefore attempt to intensify their cooperation and alignment in the South Caucasus in order to offset the proliferation of Turkish and Western influence, and are likely to maintain diplomatic-level contacts in order to secure mutually-beneficial foreign policy objectives in the region.

The PRC and Russia are cooperating to legitimize and provide international top cover for some Western-designated terrorist organizations in the Middle East and Central Asia. The PRC and Russia both abstained on July 15 from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 2787, which condemned the Houthi strikes against international shipping as acts of terrorism and extended the reporting requirements for such Houthi strikes.[33] PRC Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Geng Shuang condemned the Houthi strikes against commercial vessels but justified the PRC decision to abstain from the UN vote by claiming that countries have used previous UN resolutions to justify military action against Yemen.[34]

The PRC and Russia have also legitimized the Taliban government in Afghanistan in recent weeks. The Kremlin accepted the credentials of the Taliban’s ambassador to Russia in June 2025 and announced its recognition of the Taliban government as the legitimate government of Afghanistan in early July 2025.[35] The PRC praised this move, as the PRC accepted the credentials of a Taliban ambassador in 2023 but has not yet officially recognized the Taliban government.[36] Russia has long been setting conditions to normalize relations with the Taliban and accelerated these efforts in the second half of 2024, and Taliban representatives have attended prominent Russian-led international events, including the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.[37]

Russia and the PRC are likely providing such diplomatic support to secure their own interests around the Middle East and Central Asia. Russia desires to preserve stability and counter US influence in the Middle East, while the PRC aims to protect its economic interests. Russia has long cooperated with the Houthis, including reportedly sending military personnel to help train Houthis, providing the Houthis with targeting assistance, and has reportedly considered sending missiles to augment Houthi offensive capabilities.[38] Russia is likely supporting the Houthis as part of its broader partnership with Iran and its Axis of Resistance, which aligns with the shared Russo-Iranian interest in countering US interests in the Middle East. The Houthis have supported Russia in turn by not targeting Russian vessels in the Red Sea and have recruited Yemeni citizens to fight in Russia’s military.[39] The PRC has provided indirect military and technical support for the Houthis, likely to disincentivize Houthi strikes against PRC vessels in the Red Sea and protect PRC trade routes. A PRC-linked satellite company has provided intelligence to the Houthis, and Yemeni authorities intercepted PRC-produced hydrogen fuel cells en route to a Houthi-controlled port.[40] A People’s Liberation Army Navy vessel recently harassed a German aircraft supporting an EU mission to defend trade routes in the Red Sea against Houthi strikes.[41] The PRC likely expects the Houthis to avoid targeting PRC-affiliated vessels in exchange for this support.

Russia and the PRC likely seek to reduce extremist activity in Central Asia that could threaten their respective interests. Russia likely seeks to cooperate with the Taliban to maintain stability in Central Asia and counter the Taliban’s regional adversary, the Islamic State (IS). IS affiliates, including its Afghanistan-based regional cell, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), have claimed responsibility for major terrorist attacks in Russia in 2024. Russia has increased its cooperation with the Taliban in response.[42] These terrorist attacks exposed critical Russian security failures despite the Kremlin’s efforts to project domestic security and unity during the war in Ukraine, so the Kremlin likely hopes that supporting the Taliban against IS-affiliates will lead to fewer threats from the region against Russia. Russia and the PRC are also likely attempting to fill the gap in influence resulting from the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 that allowed the Taliban to take power. The PRC is likely concerned about extremism from IS and IS-affiliates, including ISKP, spreading into the western PRC and supporting militant Uyghur cells.[43] The PRC also likely hopes to trade with Afghanistan and use Afghanistan to facilitate transregional trade for economic benefits, including strengthening the PRC’s role as a strong economic presence in Central Asia.[44]

[1] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/234585/Iran-Russia-defense-ministers-meet-in-Moscow

[2] https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1947209086866530591

[3] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf?x85095

[4] https://x.com/ali_motahari_ir/status/1939591211867582569 ; https://www.newsweek.com/iran-pivots-russia-china-quest-new-weapons-after-israel-war-2100933 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/consequences-idf-strikes-iran

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-9-2025

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025

[7] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/07/23/751705/Iran,-Russia-wrap-up-joint-Caspian-Sea-naval-drills

[8] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/31/3359875; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/29/3358153

[9] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2025/07/21/3358978/russian-vessel-enters-iranian-waters-for-joint-drill

[10] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/04/29/3358153

[11] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf

[12] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/501292/Iran-hosts-joint-Caspian-Sea-search-and-rescue-exercise; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-19-2024

[13] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/07/14/751212/Iran-railways-electrification-projects-China-cargo-transit

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-27-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-30-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-17-2024

[15] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/07/14/751212/Iran-railways-electrification-projects-China-cargo-transit

[16] https://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/events/iran-and-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-between-desirable-and-feasible

[17] https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/China-Iran_Relations.pdf

[18] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85895192/برگزاری-نشست-ایران-روسیه-و-چین-درخصوص-تحولات-مرتبط-با-موضوع;; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85895483/چین-به-ایفای-نقش-سازنده-در-گفت-وگوهای-هسته-ای-ایران-ادامه-می-دهیم; https://t.me/Tasnimnews/358150

[19] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85895192/برگزاری-نشست-ایران-روسیه-و-چین-درخصوص-تحولات-مرتبط-با-موضوع;; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85895483/چین-به-ایفای-نقش-سازنده-در-گفت-وگوهای-هسته-ای-ایران-ادامه-می-دهیم

[20] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-europeans-hold-nuclear-talks-friday-diplomatic-sources-say-2025-05-13/; https://www.reuters.com/world/how-un-sanctions-iran-could-be-restored-2025-04-10/#:~:text=WHAT%20IS%20SNAPBACK?,snapback%20was%20not%20formally%20recognized; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-3-2025

[21] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-3-2025

[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-21-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-3-2025

[23] https://president dot az/en/articles/view/69421; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2025; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/azerbaijan-airlines-flight-was-downed-by-russian-air-defence-system-four-sources-2024-12-26/; https://suspilne dot media/910467-u-kazahstani-rozbivsa-litak-na-bortu-bulo-ponad-65-pasaziriv/; https://tengrinews dot kz/kazakhstan_news/krushenie-samoleta-azerbaijan-airlines-bliz-aktau-online-557947/; https://www.zakon dot kz/proisshestviia/6461298-vse-shestero-kazakhstantsev-nakhodivshikhsya-na-bortu-Embraer-190-pogibli.html; https://www.wsj.com/world/dozens-feared-dead-in-crash-after-passenger-flight-diverts-from-russia-fb2cdf2c

[24] https://newsukraine dot rbc.ua/news/azerbaijani-police-raid-sputnik-office-in-1751286398.html

[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2023

[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/asia-pacific/azerbaijan-s-state-oil-company-signs-gas-supply-mou-with-syria/3629292; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/762172; https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1732230

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-21-2025

[28] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf

[29] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf

[30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/erdogan-seeks-upend-kremlin-backed-status-quo-nagorno-karabakh

[31] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Russia-Iran%20Coalition%20Deepens%20013025.pdf

[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/israel-iran-war-rebalances-adversary-entente; https://www.ft.com/content/ac24e38c-d679-44e5-8d29-ef2f0f815873

[33] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202507/1338477.shtml

[34] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202507/1338477.shtml

[35] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-formally-recognize-taliban-rule-afghanistan-china/; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russia-accepts-talibans-nominated-ambassador-moscow-2025-06-01/

[36] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202507/1338477.shtml

[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121224; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053124; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040124; https://www.facebook.com/groups/725464725834833/posts/taliban-arrives-at-russia8217s-st-petersburg-economic-forum-the-annual-st-peters/1316478366733463/;

[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-3-2025#:~:text=Russia%20has%20provided%20the%20Houthis,Iranian%20support%20for%20the%20Houthis. ; https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-russian-military-advising-houthis-inside-yemen-us-intelligence-suggests ; https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20September%2018%2C%202024.pdf ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3-2024

[39] ttps://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-5-2025

[40] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-17-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-21-2025

[41] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-july-11-2025

[42] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080524; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar06272024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061624;

[43] https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/01/17/afghan-sino-relations-a-different-mindset-a-different-outcome/; https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2022/05/chinas-activities-and-influence-in-south-and-central-asia?lang=en; https://www.freiheit.org/south-asia/china-navigates-new-afghanistan-taliban-its-rulers

[44] https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/01/17/afghan-sino-relations-a-different-mindset-a-different-outcome/; https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2022/05/chinas-activities-and-influence-in-south-and-central-asia?lang=en; https://www.freiheit.org/south-asia/china-navigates-new-afghanistan-taliban-its-rulers