Ukraine Conflict Updates

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 3, 2024

Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Fredrick W. Kagan

November 4, 2024, 6:50pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on November 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian and pro-Kremlin actors launched an information operation on November 4 to discredit incumbent Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s victory in the Moldovan presidential elections. The Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) confirmed on November 4 that Sandu won 55.35 percent of the vote, defeating Kremlin-friendly opponent Alexandr Stoianoglo.[1] Numerous world leaders congratulated Sandu on November 3 and 4, and international election observers largely commended the conduct of the elections in spite of Russian attempts to sway the outcomes against Sandu.[2] Pro-Russian opposition parties and officials attempted to discredit Sandu’s victory, with the Moldovan Socialist party calling her “an illegitimate president”; Kremlin-affiliated Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor telling Russian state TV channel Rossiya-24 that the Moldovan opposition has 'evidence' of mass falsifications in favor of Sandu; and pro-Kremlin former Moldovan president Igor Dodon telling Kremlin newswire TASS that Sandu only won because of the Moldovan diaspora vote.[3] The Russian information space, including Russian milbloggers, echoed the words of the pro-Russian Moldovan opposition claiming that Moldovan elections were controlled by 'European bureaucrats' and that Moldovans had no agency in determining the outcome of the elections.[4] ISW previously reported on Russia’s systematic efforts to interfere in the Moldovan election in order to derail the passage of Moldova’s European Union (EU) referendum and Sandu’s victory.[5]

Georgian civil society and opposition resumed peaceful demonstrations on November 4 against the highly contested October 26 Georgian parliamentary elections, calling for continued resistance and further investigations into large-scale voting irregularities. Thousands of Georgians gathered in the center of Tbilisi and reiterated their refusal to acknowledge the increasingly pro-Russian Georgian Dream party’s victory in an election marred by large-scale evidence of voting irregularities and Russian influence.[6] The opposition outlined three main goals for the protest movement: 1) continuing efforts to collect evidence demonstrating the elections were not free and fair; 2) urging the international community to refrain from acknowledging the election results; and 3) practicing their right to assemble and to resist the results.[7] Georgian legal entities ranging from the Tbilisi City Court to the Georgian Prosecutor's Office have dismissed some of the demands of the Georgian opposition and civil society and cast doubt on allegations of systematic voter fraud, while showing some willingness to conduct investigations into claims of irregularity.[8] The opposition announced its intention to conduct regular protests while calling for international investigations into election falsification and internationally administered snap elections.[9]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Sistema project released an investigation on November 4 detailing Russia's initial 2022 demands for Ukraine's total capitulation, further supporting ISW's long-standing assessment that Russia has never been willing to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine on any terms but its own.[10] RFE/RL reported on November 4 that it obtained a draft of the treaty that Russia offered to Ukraine on March 7, 2022, entitled "Treaty on the Settlement of the Situation in Ukraine and the Neutrality of Ukraine." The draft document includes seven provisions, all of which amount to Ukraine's complete surrender and disarmament and the abandonment of its sovereignty, lands, and people. The document calls for Ukraine to reduce its army from nearly 197,000 personnel to 50,000 personnel, which RFE/RL notes would have meant that the Ukrainian army would be smaller than the Belarusian army, despite the fact that the Belarusian population in 2022 was one-fifth of the Ukrainian population. The document also states that Ukraine would not be able to develop, produce, buy, or deploy missile systems with a range of more than 250 kilometers; that Ukraine would have to recognize occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as independent Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DNR and LNR) and cede parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that Ukraine still controlled in March 2022; that Ukraine would have to commit to the financial costs of rebuilding parts of the Donbas that Russia had destroyed following its initial 2014 invasion; that Ukraine and the international community would lift all sanctions and cancel all lawsuits that had been levied against Russian since 2014; that Ukraine would grant the Russian language the status of a "state language" and restore all property rights of the Kremlin-controlled Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate; and that Ukraine would re-legalize Soviet and communist symbols.[11] In essence, Moscow was asking Ukraine to willingly give up its military, its offensive and defensive capabilities, its land, a significant portion of its population and economic capacity, and cease protecting its language, history, and culture.

The Kremlin has been incessant in its claims that it set out to negotiate in March 2022 (after illegally invading Ukraine) but that it was Ukraine and the collective West that destroyed the prospect of negotiations.[12] The RFE/RL investigation supports ISW's long-standing assessment that this was never the case, however, and that Russia never intended to negotiate in good faith with Ukraine.[13] Russia presented outrageous demands calling for Ukraine to surrender its security and sovereignty, knowing that Ukraine would (rightly) refuse to do so, and then blamed Ukraine for the supposed "failure" of negotiations. ISW continues to assess that Russia has constructed a narrative around the concept of negotiations that it is using in an effort to encourage the West to make concessions on Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the RFE/RL investigation emphasizes that Russia's "diplomatic" engagements with Ukraine and the West since the full-scale invasion have always been oriented around this destructive objective.[14]

Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Summer 2024 reportedly significantly impacted Ukrainian electrical generation capacity compared to March 2024, though it is unclear whether Russia had been able to inflict significant further damage on the Ukrainian energy grid since. Ukrainian energy experts told Politico in an article published on November 4 that Ukrainian power generation capacity decreased by over nine gigawatts between March 2024 and Summer 2024 after Russian forces launched more than 200 missiles and drones at Ukraine’s power production facilities in late August 2024.[15] Experts estimated that Ukrainian power production facilities generated 37.6 gigawatts of electricity in early 2022, likely referring to the period prior to the start of the Russian drone and missile campaign targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in October 2022; 18.3 gigawatts in April 2023; 21.4 gigawatts in March 2024; and 12.1 gigawatts in Summer 2024. Politico noted that the extent of the damage that Russian strikes inflicted on Ukrainian power production facilities in August 2024 is unknown, and the data does not represent Ukraine's most updated energy generation capacity as of November 2024. A Ukrainian energy expert told Politico that Ukraine needs additional air defense systems to protect its energy infrastructure. Artur Lorkowski, Director of The Energy Community (an international organization that manages Ukraine’s energy procurement), also stated that repairing damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure may require a significant amount of time because it can take up to one year for Ukraine to find and reinstall specialized equipment like auto transformers.

The Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram channel and social media project attempted to falsely portray himself as a non-Kremlin actor in the Western media and confirmed the Kremlin’s efforts to establish “media schools” abroad. In an interview with the Washington Post published on November 4, Rybar founder and director Mikhail Zvinchuk commented on the US Department of State (DoS) program Rewards for Justice’s reward offer for information about the whereabouts of nine Rybar employees reportedly involved in interfering with US elections.[16] Zvinchuk denied reports of his and Rybar’s election interference and used the opportunity to falsely portray Rybar as a "think tank" that is involved in "defending [Russia’s] informational borders." Zvinchuk also claimed that Rybar has an organized "worldwide" network consisting of over 250 channels in 28 languages and confirmed that Rybar is opening "media schools" in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Kyrgyzstan. Rybar reportedly has 60 employees and has taught a class at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Zvinchuk also seized on a question about Rybar's previous appearance on the investigation list for "discrediting" the Russian military in an attempt to portray Rybar employees as "patriots" who occasionally call out problems in Russia. Zvinchuk’s efforts to misrepresent Rybar as a Western-style think tank that is occasionally critical of Russia is likely part of the Kremlin’s wider effort to infiltrate Western and international media via new online-based sources such as Rybar. The Kremlin holds significant power over the Russian information space and civil society, and Rybar’s large-scale operations in Russia and abroad likely would not be possible without Kremlin’s direct funding. Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably awarded Rybar with several state honors, and Rewards for Justice noted that Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec currently funds the channel.[17]

Russian authorities arrested Rosgvardia's Deputy Head of Logistics Major General Mirza Mirzaev for bribery on November 3.[18] Russian authorities have notably arrested several high-ranking Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials on bribery charges after Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced then Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and moved him to the position of Security Council Secretary in May 2024.[19] A Russian insider source speculated that arrests of senior security officials may spread outside of the Russian MoD to Rosgvardia (which operates separately of the Russian MoD) following Mirzaev's arrest.[20] The source claimed that Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov has maintained a "fairly good reputation and strong position" in Russia's security apparatus but noted that Mirzaev's arrest may lead to additional Rosgvardia arrests and reduce Zolotov's influence.

Key Takeaways:

Russian and pro-Kremlin actors launched an information operation on November 4 to discredit incumbent Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s victory in the Moldovan presidential elections.
Georgian civil society and opposition resumed peaceful demonstrations on November 4 against the highly contested October 26 Georgian parliamentary elections, calling for continued resistance and further investigations into large-scale voting irregularities.
Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Sistema project released an investigation on November 4 detailing Russia's initial 2022 demands for Ukraine's total capitulation, further supporting ISW's long-standing assessment that Russia has never been willing to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine on any terms but its own.
Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Summer 2024 reportedly significantly impacted Ukrainian electrical generation capacity compared to March 2024, though it is unclear whether Russia had been able to inflict significant further damage on the Ukrainian energy grid since.
The Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram channel and social media project attempted to falsely portray himself as a non-Kremlin actor in the Western media and confirmed the Kremlin’s efforts to establish “media schools” abroad.
Russian authorities arrested Rosgvardia's Deputy Head of Logistics Major General Mirza Mirzaev for bribery on November 3.
Russian forces advanced near Novy Put, Kursk Oblast.
Ukrainian forces advanced in Kharkiv Oblast and Russian forces advanced in the Kupyansk, Kreminna, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues attempts to form a cadre of loyal military journalists in an effort to control the pro-war Russian information space and centralize control over Russia’s war coverage.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 2, 2024

Davit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, William Runkel, and Fredrick W. Kagan

November 3, 2024, 8pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Incumbent Moldova President Maia Sandu has claimed victory in the Moldovan presidential runoff election held on November 3, 2024.[1] Preliminary results reported by the Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) show that Maia Sandu has won around 55 percent of the vote, defeating Kremlin-friendly presidential candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo.[2] The Moldovan CEC reported on November 3 that over 54 percent of the Moldovan electorate voted in the presidential runoff elections compared to the approximately 51 percent voter turnout during the first election round held on October 20, 2024. The reported voter turnout for the runoff election is also over the minimum legal turnout requirement of 20 percent.[3] ISW will cover the final result of the runoff Moldovan presidential elections on November 4 after the Moldovan CEC finishes counting all votes, including votes from the Moldovan diaspora voters whose votes take longer to count due to time zone differences.

Moldovan authorities reported extensive Russian interference and sabotage efforts during the runoff presidential elections held on November 3, 2024, in a likely effort to favor pro-Kremlin Stoianoglo. Sandu’s National Security Advisor Stanislav Secrieru warned on November 3 of significant Russian interference in the runoff election, noting the organization of voter transport in Transnistria (which is illegal under Moldovan law); the organization of buses and charter flights from Russia to polling stations in Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Belarus; the distribution of vouchers to Moldovan voters in Moscow; and cyberattacks against the Moldova CEC's voter education site.[4] Moldovan Independent Press Agency IPN reported on November 2 that Russian authorities preemptively transported 150 Moldovan citizens from Russia to Moldova via Turkey for free in a concerted effort to maximize the voter base of Kremlin-friendly Stoianoglo.[5] Moldovan authorities also notified numerous Western countries about Russian efforts to disrupt Moldovan diaspora voting abroad by creating false bomb threats at polling stations.[6] The Moldovan diaspora notably largely favored Sandu in the first round of the presidential elections. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean stated that Moldovans throughout the country had received anonymous “death threats” through phone calls, likely as part of a scare tactic to sway election results.[7] ISW previously reported on large-scale Russian intervention efforts in the first round of the 2024 Moldovan presidential elections in order to enhance the outcome in favor of Stoianoglo and against Moldova’s European Union (EU) referendum vote, which ultimately passed by a small margin.[8] Sandu stated on October 21 that "criminal groups" and "foreign forces" — likely referring to Russia and Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor — used tens of millions of euros to spread propaganda to destabilize Moldova.[9] Sandu also stated that Moldovan authorities had evidence that the criminal groups wanted to buy 300,000 Moldovan votes during the first round of presidential elections and that the scale of fraud was "unprecedented.”[10]

The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) efforts to centralize control over informal Russian drone operation units may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone capabilities. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) gathered several accounts from Russian milbloggers complaining that the Russian military command is systematically disbanding informal Russian drone operation units and committing experienced drone operators to infantry assaults, resulting in high casualties among drone operators.[11] Some milbloggers explained that the Russian military command prioritizes attritional, infantry-led ”meat” assaults and lacks the manpower necessary to continue these assaults, and noted that some companies have 90 people of whom only 20 are regular assault personnel — with the rest being informal drone operators, communications specialists, and troops supporting evacuations of dead and wounded personnel. Some Russian milbloggers, however, connected the trend to the Russian MoD’s recent efforts to form “joint technical drone battalions” and the MoD’s “Rubikon” Center for Prospective Unmanned Technologies. A milblogger and advisor to the Kursk Oblast Governor claimed that the Russian military commanders seem to be afraid that the Russian MoD will deprive them of available manpower for assaults by reallocating drone operators from their current units to Russian MoD-operated “technical drone battalions,” and are instead committing these drone operators to assaults to sabotage this effort. Russian milbloggers also criticized the Russian MoD’s efforts to create separate, specialized “technical drone battalions,” citing the lack of a joint Russian communications system that would allow dedicated drone units to closely coordinate with assault units. Russian milbloggers also complained that it would take the Russian MoD a long time to establish communications between newly centralized drone units and assault units, which will result in Russian assault elements temporarily losing drone coverage. ISW recently reported on the milblogger backlash regarding the deaths of two Russian drone operators of the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment of the 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), Dmitry Lysakovsky (alias Goodwin) and Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Gritsai (alias Ernest), after both were committed to infantry assaults in Donetsk Oblast.[12] The reduction in Russian drone specialists may also at least temporarily inhibit Russian drone operations if the Russian MoD continues its centralization efforts.

Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets refuted a Russian information operation about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and undermining Ukrainians' trust in their government.[13] Lubinets responded on November 2 to claims from Russian Human Rights Ombudsman Tatyana Moskalkova and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova falsely accusing Ukrainian authorities of attempting to sabotage the POW exchange processes and deliberately refusing to return all Ukrainian POWs from Russian captivity.[14] Lubinets directly called on Moskalkova to provide Ukraine with a list of all Ukrainian POWs whom Russia is willing to return and reiterated that Ukraine is ready to accept all lists of POWs from Russian authorities, accusing the Russian government of holding up the POW exchange processes.[15] Russia and Ukraine have engaged in more frequent POW exchanges since the start of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 following a months-long period of minimal POW exchanges, during which Ukraine had to reportedly construct a third POW camp for Russian POWs in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials also reported at the time that Russian authorities were the cause of the significant delays in POW exchanges.[16] Kremlin information operations centered around POWs also likely intend to distract from the Kremlin's own efforts to disrupt the POW exchange process and from consistent reports of Russian human rights abuses, including executions, against Ukrainian POWs.[17]

Key Takeaways:

Incumbent Moldova President Maia Sandu has claimed victory in the Moldovan presidential runoff election held on November 3, 2024.
Moldovan authorities reported extensive Russian interference and sabotage efforts during the runoff presidential elections held on November 3, 2024, in a likely effort to favor pro-Kremlin Stoianoglo.
The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) efforts to centralize control over informal Russian drone operation units may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone capabilities.
Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets refuted a Russian information operation about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and undermining Ukrainians' trust in their government.
Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets refuted a Russian information operation about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and undermining Ukrainians' trust in their government.
Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast.
A Ukrainian official reported that Russian naval infantry units cannot be considered “elite” due to a lack of specialized training for new recruits and because Ukrainian forces have destroyed the main core of the Russian professional army since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 1, 2024

Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, and Fredrick W. Kagan

November 2, 2024, 4:45 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on November 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck seven Russian radars and air defense systems since the night of October 20 to 21. A Russian Telegram user, who claims to be an employee of an unspecified branch of the Russian special services, claimed on November 2 that Ukrainian forces conducted an ATACMS strike against a Russian S-300/400 air defense system near occupied Mospyne (just southeast of Donetsk City) and that their sources are still clarifying the damage to the system.[1] The Telegram user claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted the air defense systems with six ATACMS missiles and that Russian forces downed three of the missiles. The Telegram user claimed on October 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian "Podlet" radar station near occupied Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea with a drone on October 23 and that Russian forces have not evacuated the damaged station for repairs yet.[2] A Ukrainian division posted footage on October 31 purportedly showing a successful Ukrainian strike against a Russian Buk air defense system in an unspecified frontline area, and the footage showed secondary detonations consistent with a successful strike against such a system.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system and destroyed the radar system of another Buk-M2 air defense system in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of October 24 to 25.[4] Official Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Buk-M2 system in southern Ukraine on October 23 and a Buk-M3 air defense system on the night of October 20 to 21 in an unspecified frontline area.[5] ISW has previously observed indications that Russia has struggled to source the microelectronic components necessary to produce complex weapons and air defense systems due to Western sanctions, and Russia may not be able to produce or repair a sufficient number of air defense systems to maintain the current density of Russia's air defense coverage over occupied Ukraine if Ukraine destroys a significant number of Russian systems.[6] Further degradation of Russia's air defense umbrella, particularly over occupied Ukraine, may impact how close to the frontline Russian pilots are willing to operate and could limit Russia's ability to effectively use glide bombs against both frontline areas and rear Ukrainian cities.

South Korea signaled possible readiness to increase support for Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian intelligence on the deployment of North Korean forces near the Russian border with Ukraine. South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul stated on November 1 that "all possible scenarios are under consideration" in response to a question about possibly sending weapons to Ukraine following the deployment of North Korean troops in Russia.[7] Cho emphasized that South Korea will monitor North Korean troop involvement in Russia and the "benefits" that North Korea receives from Russia to determine a course of action. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 2 that Russian forces transferred 7,000 additional North Korean personnel to unspecified areas near the border with Ukraine in the last week (since about October 26).[8] The GUR reported that Russian forces have armed North Korean soldiers with 60mm mortars, AK-12 assault rifles, RPK/PKM machine guns, SVD/SVCh sniper rifles, Phoenix anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers and have equipped North Korean forces with some night vision devices, thermal imagers, and other optical equipment.

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor implemented its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts on November 2. The Russian Ministry of Digital Development announced on November 2 a new registration mechanism for social media channels with over 10,000 subscribers on the state services portal.[9] Channels must register with the Russian government by January 1, 2025, and provide “minimal” personal information about the identity of their operators via a special platform or risk restrictions on advertising and their right to be reposted by other channels. Outcry about the deanonymization effort from Russian milbloggers previously prompted Roskomnadzor to slightly alter the program and may have caused a slight delay in its implementation, marking a significant example of how the Russian ultranationalist information space maintains some sway over Kremlin decision making.[10]

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck seven Russian radars and air defense systems since the night of October 20 to 21.
South Korea signaled possible readiness to increase support for Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian intelligence on the deployment of North Korean forces near the Russian border with Ukraine.
Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor implemented its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts on November 2.
Ukrainian and Russian forces marginally advanced north of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast.
Russian forces marginally advanced north of Kurakhove in Donetsk Oblast.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed to have rescinded an order for his Akhmat Spetsnaz soldiers to not take Ukrainian servicemembers as prisoners in the war in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 31, 2024

Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, and Fredrick W. Kagan

November 1, 2024, 7:20pm ET

Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), highlighted ongoing social and ideological divides within Russian society while reiterating boilerplate justifications for the war in Ukraine during a speech on October 31. Kirill offered his assessment of the main external and internal threats to the Russian state during a meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the World Russian People's Council, which include ethno-religious conflict, migration, and Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine.[1] Kirill noted that while the war in Ukraine is the "most pressing threat" to the Russian state, some people within Russian society "prefer to ignore" what is happening on the frontline in Ukraine and the struggles of people who live in Russian border areas closer to the combat zone. Kirill criticized Russians who are unwilling to "give up their personal comforts" and who are relying on "frivolous entertainment" to distract them from the reality of the war.

Kirill's rebuke of Russians who are apathetic and disinterested in the war suggests that the Kremlin may be increasingly concerned about the sustainability of Russian society's support for the war. Recent Russian opinion polls have suggested that support for local Russian government entities and some Kremlin policies, including the invasion of Ukraine, may be wavering, although Russian citizens continue to widely support Russian President Vladimir Putin.[2] Additional polling has suggested that most Russians, particularly Russians who have not personally lost family members in Ukraine, are largely apathetic to the invasion and are able to avoid thinking about the invasion entirely as long as it does not personally affect them.[3] The Kremlin may be concerned about the growing cleavage between Russian citizens who have been immediately impacted by the invasion and Russians who have successfully insulated themselves and their families from the invasion. The Kremlin may also be concerned about apathy towards the invasion in the context of the possible societal reaction to conducting a second wave of mobilization, to which most Russians remain averse.[4] Kirill has previously acted as a key figure in injecting Kremlin narratives into the Russian information space, and the Kremlin may be in the early stages of justifying and preparing Russian society to support a future wave of mobilization.[5]

Kirill also highlighted the growing trend of brutality and cruelty in the Russian military and attempted to excuse this trend as the emergence of a “neo-pagan” cult.[6] Kirill stated on October 31 that neo-pagan preachers are trying to revive paganism and instill a "cult of brute force and cruelty” in Russia. Kirill added that neo-pagans are introducing a false belief that Christianity discourages personal heroism and valor and that "holy" Russian servicemen disprove this belief with their conduct, but he then noted that "neo-paganism" is present in the Russian army. Kirill concluded the segment by criticizing Halloween celebrations in Russia, and Kirill likely used the occasion to introduce a discussion about Russian servicemen committing brutal and cruel acts on the frontlines or upon their return to Russia from the frontlines.

ISW has observed numerous instances of Russian military personnel, especially former Wagner Group fighters, committing gruesome acts against fellow Russian servicemen on the frontlines, Ukrainian forces and civilians, and Russian citizens upon their return from the frontlines.[7] Russia is likely to see a significant rise of brutality and cruelty in its communities upon the arrival of more traumatized Russian servicemen home as long as it continues to brutalize its soldiers; refuses to provide the necessary psychological assistance to returning veterans; and militarizes its society, educational institutions, and government.

Russian authorities also continue to identify conflict between ethnic Russians and minority groups as a critical issue. Kirill identified "issues with migrants" and ethno-religious tensions as key internal threats to the Russian state during his October 31 speech, and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev noted on October 31 that Russia needs to address its migration issues.[8] Medvedev suggested that Russia should introduce "digital migrant profile[s]," which would reportedly allow Russian authorities to stop foreigners at any time and identify foreigners via electronic immigration or travel documents. ISW has reported at length on the balance that Putin is trying to strike between catering to his pro-war ultranationalist constituency, which espouses extreme anti-migrant sentiments, and his practical need to leverage migrant labor both economically and militarily.[9]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his North Korean counterpart Choe Son-hui in Moscow on November 1, securing strong affirmations of North Korea's support for Russia amid updated Western reports on the number of North Korean troops deployed to Russia.[10] Lavrov emphasized that Russia and North Korea share "respect and reverence" for their common history and claimed that Russian-North Korean relations are developing "at an accelerated pace in terms of the qualitative level of interaction in all areas."[11] Choe claimed that North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un instructed North Korea to support Russia's "holy war" against Ukraine until Russia's victory.[12] Choe's invocation of the concept of a "holy war" against Ukraine is notable, as the Russian Orthodox Church has used parallel language to rhetorically justify Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine as an existential and civilizational struggle—a struggle into which North Korea has now willingly entered.[13]

Choe's visit to Moscow comes against the backdrop of reports that North Korean troops have already deployed to Kursk Oblast and will soon enter combat alongside Russian forces. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken held a joint press conference with South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul and South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong Hyun on October 31, during which Austin assessed that 8,000 North Korean soldiers are in Kursk Oblast and will enter into combat against Ukrainian forces in "the coming days."[14] Austin stated that Russian forces have trained North Korean troops on how to use artillery systems, operate drones, and conduct basic tactical infantry maneuvers.

North Korean troops are unlikely to present Russia with a long-term solution to its manpower concerns, despite Choe's comments about Pyongyang's indefinite commitment to Russia's war effort. Austin reported that Russian forces are suffering over 1,200 casualties a day (or about 36,000 casualties a month), and recent US estimates placed Russian recruitment at between 25,000-30,000 new soldiers per month—meaning Russia is just shy of being able to replace its current rate of frontline losses at a 1:1 ratio.[15] The 8,000 North Korean soldiers reportedly preparing to enter combat in Kursk Oblast thus represent about one week's worth of casualties across the entire frontline. North Korea has committed an estimated total of 12,000 troops to Russia.[16] It remains unclear exactly how Russia intends to leverage North Korean manpower, but the commitment of North Korean troops into the type of highly attritional offensive operations that Russia has been pursuing is very likely to lead to high North Korean casualty rates.

ISW recently assessed that North Korea likely decided to engage in the war on Russia's behalf in order to gain valuable combat experience in a modern war but noted that the way that the Russian command uses North Korean troops in combat will impact the ability of North Korean forces to meaningfully internalize and disseminate combat experience.[17] If North Korean troops face the same casualty rates as Russian forces, then the battlefield lessons Pyongyang hopes to learn will be undermined, and Kim is unlikely to commit his forces to face such losses on the battlefield indefinitely.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new tranche of military assistance valued at $425 million to Ukraine on November 1. The new tranche, which is drawn from DoD stockpiles, includes Stryker armored personnel carriers (APCs); munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); Stinger man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) missiles; air-to-ground munitions; HIMARS ammunition; 105mm and 155mm artillery ammunition; Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) equipment and munitions; and Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems.[18] The package also includes small arms and ammunition, medical equipment, and other equipment. US-provided equipment, in particular Stryker APCs, could assist Ukrainian forces in kitting or resupplying new or existing Ukrainian brigades, possibly alleviating some burdens that Ukrainian officials have previously identified in equipping new Ukrainian brigades.[19]

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor failed to enforce its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts by its stated November 1 deadline. Roskomnadzor and the Russian Ministry of Digital Development published a draft resolution on October 4 requiring social media pages with an audience of over 10,000 subscribers to register their identity and contact information with the Russian government.[20] Russian officials specified that public discussion of the resolution would continue until October 31, meaning that the resolution should have come into force on November 1. A Russian milblogger claimed that he contacted Roskomnadzor on October 31 to verify if the resolution would go into effect on November 1 and that Roskomnadzor officials responded that the "law is still in development."[21] Roskomnadzor reportedly told the milblogger that it will publish additional information about the law on Roskomnadzor’s website soon. Russian milbloggers commented on Roskomnadzor's response, with one stating that Russia is passing "draconian laws" to leak milbloggers’ data but had failed to instruct the milbloggers on how to abide by the law before it was supposed to come into force.[22]

Key Takeaways:

Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), highlighted ongoing social and ideological divides within Russian society while reiterating boilerplate justifications for the war in Ukraine during a speech on October 31.
Kirill also highlighted the growing trend of brutality and cruelty in the Russian military and attempted to excuse this trend as the emergence of a “neo-pagan” cult.
Russian authorities also continue to identify conflict between ethnic Russians and minority groups as a critical issue.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his North Korean counterpart Choe Son-hui in Moscow on November 1, securing strong affirmations of North Korea's support for Russia amid updated Western reports on the number of North Korean troops deployed to Russia.
North Korean troops are unlikely to present Russia with a long-term solution to its manpower concerns, despite Choe's comments about Pyongyang's indefinite commitment to Russia's war effort.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new tranche of military assistance valued at $425 million to Ukraine on November 1.
Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor failed to enforce its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts by its stated November 1 deadline.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Sudzha.
Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced within central Vovchansk. Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Kreminna.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) introduced a new system on November 1 allowing Russian veterans and their families to confirm their veteran statuses digitally.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 30, 2024

Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Fredrick W. Kagan

October 31, 2024, 6:50pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on October 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

North Korea and Russia signed an agreement on October 30 to cooperate in the sphere of digital communications — the latest development in Russian-North Korean cooperation likely aimed at enhancing the Kremlin's digital authoritarianism tools to increase domestic repressions. The North Korean Ministry of Information Technology and the Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media signed a cooperation agreement on October 30 that includes cooperation in the fields of communications, information technology, and digital development.[1] Russia and North Korea signed an agreement on joint work between the Russian and North Korean prosecutor generals' offices in July 2024, after which Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov stated that Russia wanted to learn about North Korean judicial practice, particularly in the spheres of communication and information technology.[2] ISW previously assessed that the North Korean-Russian judicial agreement was likely part of Kremlin efforts to increase Russia's arsenal of domestic control methods and consolidate control over the Russian information space, including via messaging platforms and virtual private network (VPN) services.[3] The details of the October 30 digital communications agreement are unclear, but it is likely similarly aimed at increasing Russia's tools for domestic information space repression.

The South Korean government reportedly intends to send an unspecified number of South Korean personnel to Ukraine to monitor North Korean troops. South Korean newspaper Hankyoreh reported on October 31 that a senior South Korean presidential office official stated on October 30 that South Korea has a "legitimate need" to analyze North Korean military activities in the war in Ukraine and "feels the need" to establish a team to monitor North Korean troops and the battlefield situation.[4] South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun reportedly stated on October 31 that the South Korean defense minister can make the decision about the monitoring team's deployment without parliamentary approval. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on October 22 that a South Korean government source stated that South Korea was considering sending South Korean military personnel, likely from intelligence units, to Ukraine to monitor North Korean forces' tactics and combat capabilities and to question captured North Koreans.[5] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 29 that he discussed enhanced intelligence cooperation with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol.[6]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Andriy Kovalenko reported on October 31 that 3,000 North Korean military personnel are in Kursk Oblast and that "separate" North Korean engineers are also present in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[7] Western intelligence officials reportedly told CNN on October 30 that a small number of North Korean personnel are in occupied Ukraine but did not specify their locations, and Ukrainian and South Korean officials reported in early October 2024 that a limited number of North Korean personnel, mainly engineering personnel, were in occupied Donetsk City.[8] Kovalenko's October 31 statement clarifies that North Korean personnel are reportedly in more than one location in the combat zone.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to communicate that he is uninterested in a negotiated ceasefire and is committed to achieving his goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood. Bloomberg reported on October 30 that Serbian President Alexander Vucic spoke with Putin in early October 2024 for the first time in two and a half years.[9] Vucic told Bloomberg that he brought up the subject of a ceasefire in Ukraine, to which Putin responded that Russia will fulfill all the goals of its "special miliary operation" in Ukraine, which ISW continues to assess are tantamount to the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and government.[10] Putin outright rejected any negotiated ceasefire during a press conference with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on July 5, claiming that a ceasefire would allow Ukraine to regroup and rearm.[11] A negotiated ceasefire on current lines and under current circumstances will only benefit Russia and will afford the Kremlin time to further radicalize and militarize Russian society against Ukraine and the Russian military time to rest and reconstitute, likely before conducting a future attack on Ukraine.

Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine and ensure future aid provisions over the long-term. United Kingdom (UK) Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves stated on October 30 that the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) budget for 2025 will ensure that the UK can provide three billion pounds ($3.87 billion) of "guaranteed" military support to Ukraine per year "for as long as it takes."[12] Norway announced on October 29 a new military aid package worth 500 million euros ($544 million) for Ukraine, including weapons and spare parts for F-16 fighter jets and NASAMS air defense systems.[13] Lithuania announced on October 30 that it will deliver unspecified ammunition, mortar rounds, and electricity generators to Ukraine this week (the week of October 27 through November 2).[14]

The Russian military command continues to commit seriously wounded personnel to highly attritional infantry-led “meat” assaults in the Kurakhove direction as Russian President Vladimir Putin attempts to posture himself as deeply concerned with the medical treatment of Russian veterans. A former Russian Storm-Z instructor and milblogger amplified reports accusing the Russian military command of committing wounded personnel of a medical company belonging to the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) to the frontlines in the Kurakhove direction.[15] The milblogger summarized that the Russian military command failed to provide adequate medical treatment to the wounded personnel and instead held them hostage in a “medical basement.” The Russian military command reportedly demanded bribes of 1.5 million rubles ($15,459) to release the wounded personnel from the basement and claimed that there are not enough people to support assault operations in the Kurakhove direction.[16] The milblogger noted that the Russian military command transferred wounded personnel to the frontlines to fight as part of assault companies. The milblogger stated that although Russian officials immediately responded to these complaints, closed the "medical basement," and transferred the remaining wounded personnel to hospitals, the practice of detaining wounded personnel in "medical basements" persists among other Russian military units that are fighting on different sectors of the front, such as the Russian 109th Rifle Regiment (132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) operating in the Toretsk direction. The milblogger emphasized that the Russian military command is committing wounded personnel and specialists to assaults because it relies on "meat" assaults to sustain the tempo of Russian advances, resulting in heavy Russian manpower losses. Putin highlighted during a meeting with the Russian government on October 31 that he recently met with disabled Russian veterans who told Putin they were satisfied with government care and benefits, but tasked the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Presidential Administration to increase government support for disabled veterans, stating that government efforts in this sphere are "not enough."[17]

The Moldovan Constitutional Court confirmed on October 31 the passing of the October 20 European Union (EU) referendum with a 50.72 percent turnout rate.[18]

Key Takeaways:

North Korea and Russia signed an agreement on October 30 to cooperate in the sphere of digital communications — the latest development in Russian-North Korean cooperation likely aimed at enhancing the Kremlin's digital authoritarianism tools to increase domestic repressions.
The South Korean government reportedly intends to send an unspecified number of South Korean personnel to Ukraine to monitor North Korean troops.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to communicate that he is uninterested in a negotiated ceasefire and is committed to achieving his goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood.
Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine and ensure future aid provisions over the long-term.
The Russian military command continues to commit seriously wounded personnel to highly attritional infantry-led “meat” assaults in the Kurakhove direction as Russian President Vladimir Putin attempts to posture himself as deeply concerned with the medical treatment of Russian veterans.
The Moldovan Constitutional Court confirmed on October 31 the passing of the October 20 European Union (EU) referendum with a 50.72 percent turnout rate.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Svatove, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar, and Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kurakhove.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 29, 2024

Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Fredrick W. Kagan

October 30, 2024, 6:40pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on October 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Western intelligence officials reportedly stated that North Korean troops are in an unspecified area in occupied Ukraine. CNN, citing two unspecified Western intelligence officials, reported on October 30 that a small number of North Korean personnel are in occupied Ukraine but did not specify their location — the first such confirmation from Western sources.[1] The intelligence officials stated that they expect the number of North Korean personnel in Ukraine to grow as they complete training in Russia. Ukrainian and South Korean officials reported in early October 2024 the presence of a limited number of North Korean personnel in occupied Donetsk City, mainly engineering personnel, who were likely repairing or somehow improving the quality of a large amount of low-quality ammunition that North Korea provided to the Russian military.[2] The reports from Western intelligence officials could refer to the same group of North Korean personnel or similar specialists conducting engineering work in occupied Ukraine. Financial Times reported on October 30 that senior unspecified Ukrainian intelligence officials have stated that Russian authorities transferred about 3,000 North Korean personnel to western Kursk Oblast from other areas in Russia in civilian vehicles and that the group consisted of a few hundred special forces servicemembers and regular troops.[3] North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui visited Russia on October 29 but did not specify the purpose of the visit.[4] AP, citing South Korean intelligence, reported on October 29 that Choe might have visited Russia to discuss the deployment of additional North Korean troops to Russia. Russian Foreign ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that the arrival of the North Korean foreign minister was pre-planned, in line with Russia–North Korea cooperation.[5]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted enhanced Ukraine–South Korea cooperation amid since-retracted reports that South Korea would consider providing direct military assistance to Ukraine. Zelensky reported on October 29 that he had discussed enhanced intelligence cooperation with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in order to develop an action plan and propose a set of countermeasures in response to Russian and North Korean escalation of the war.[6] Zelensky announced that the two countries will soon exchange delegations to coordinate their actions and that they will involve common partners in their proposed intelligence cooperation. South Korean news outlet The Dong-A Ilbo reported on October 30 that the South Korean government was considering providing 155mm artillery shells directly to Ukraine, but the South Korean presidential office denied these reports, stating that Ukrainian officials have not requested such assistance.[7]

The Kremlin is reportedly struggling to prepare for the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections campaign due to uncertainty about the course of the war in the Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin is not confident that Russia will be able to win the war over the next two years. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on October 30 that Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko has not started to plan the "contours" of the 2026 Duma elections even though the Kremlin usually does so two years in advance of the elections.[8] A source close to the Presidential Administration told Meduza that the Duma elections’ policy framing depends on whether the war in Ukraine will continue in 2026. Meduza reported that a source within United Russia's leadership stated that it is unclear if United Russia's 2026 campaign should feature military personnel or a person who "symbolizes a return to peaceful life," such as Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. A political strategist who works with the Kremlin and several regional governments reportedly stated that if the war continues during the 2026 election campaign season, then the Kremlin will need "a force that leans on ultra-patriotism," such as an entirely new political party or a "slightly updated" A Just Russia party. The source stated that if the war ends, then the Kremlin will need "moderate forces." A Just Russia notably held a congress on October 26 and announced that its new political course will be "patriotic socialism," which the party described as necessary during Russia's war in Ukraine and "firmly based on the great achievements of Russian civilization and the most important condition for [Russia's] further development."[9]

The Kremlin simultaneously continues to militarize various levels of Russian government, likely in preparation for long-term war efforts in Ukraine and confrontation against NATO despite the reported lack of preparation for the Duma elections. The "Time of Heroes" program, which Kiriyenko oversees, aims to place Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine in local, regional, and federal government positions; and ISW assesses that this program is part of Kremlin efforts to militarize Russian society and government.[10] The Kremlin has also pursued multiple efforts aimed at preparing Russian society and military for a potential large-scale conflict with NATO.[11] Although Meduza's reporting suggests the Kremlin may be willing to focus the 2026 Duma campaign on a return to peacetime should the war end by that time, the Kremlin likely views this as a short-term effort within an electoral body that wields little independent influence in the overall Russian political sphere. The "Time of Heroes" program is likely a better indicator of Russia's long-term trajectory under the current regime.

The US Treasury and State departments sanctioned nearly 400 entities and individuals from over a dozen countries on October 30 in one of the largest concerted efforts to address Russian sanctions evasions via third parties to date.[12] The sanctions targeted dozens of People’s Republic of China (PRC)–, Hong Kong–, and India-based companies while also impacting targets in Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Thailand, Malaysia, Switzerland, among other countries. Russia has extensively used bilateral relations and devised mechanisms with countries, entities, and individuals to evade Western and international sanctions to support its war effort in Ukraine.[13]

Key Takeaways:

Western intelligence officials reportedly stated that North Korean troops are in an unspecified area in occupied Ukraine.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted enhanced Ukraine-South Korea cooperation amid since-retracted reports that South Korea would consider providing direct military assistance to Ukraine.
The Kremlin is reportedly struggling to prepare for the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections campaign due to uncertainty about the course of the war in the Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin is not confident that Russia will be able to win the war over the next two years.
The Kremlin simultaneously continues to militarize various levels of Russian government, likely in preparation for long-term war efforts in Ukraine and confrontation against NATO despite the reported lack of preparation for the Duma elections.
The US Treasury and State departments sanctioned nearly 400 entities and individuals from over a dozen countries on October 30 in one of the largest concerted efforts to address Russian sanctions evasions via third parties to date.
Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Pokrovsk.
Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Russian occupation authorities continue to advertise Russian military service to civilians in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 28, 2024

Davit Gasparyan, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, Christina Harward, William Runkel, and Fredrick W. Kagan

October 29, 2024, 6:10 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on October 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has increased in recent weeks but remains slow and consistent with positional warfare rather than with rapid mechanized maneuver—emphasizing how generally stagnant Russian advances have been after over two and half years of war. Recent Western reporting linking the Russian rate of advance in September 2024 with Russian advances at the start of the war is highly misleading.[1] ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced at an average rate of 1,265 square kilometers per day in March 2022—roughly 90 times the roughly 14 square kilometers that ISW calculates that Russian forces have taken per day in September 2024. Rapid Russian advances deep into Ukrainian territory, including the temporary seizure of large portions of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts characterized the first month of the Russian full-scale invasion, whereas more recent Russian advances have been characterized by small-scale, localized, tactical advances.[2] Russian forces have been making gains in eastern Ukraine recently, but comparing those gains to the initial deep Russian penetration into Ukraine at the start of the war misleadingly frames these most recent advances. For example, Russian forces seized the settlement of Vuhledar as of October 1, 2024, have continued to advance north and northwest of Vuhledar, and have made significant tactical gains in and near Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) over the course of the past week.[3] These respective advances are tactically significant but do not represent a general increase in the pace of Russian advances across the frontline, much of which remains relatively stagnant, nor are they within two orders of magnitude of the rate of Russian advance in the first stage of the war.[4] The current rate of Russian advances is consistent, rather, with ISW's recent assessment that the Russian command has likely ordered Russian forces to significantly increase their tempo of mechanized attacks throughout the theater before the full onset of muddy ground conditions in the fall months.[5]

Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to use an annual Russian nuclear deterrence exercise to further boilerplate nuclear saber-rattling information operations that aim to influence Western decision making. Putin participated via video conference in a Russian military training exercise on October 29 in which the strategic deterrence forces launched ground-launched Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched Sineva and Bulava ballistic missiles, and air-launched cruise missiles.[6] Putin claimed that Russia's nuclear triad continues to guarantee Russian sovereignty and security and helps maintain the global balance of power. Putin also highlighted Russia's need to possess modern strategic deterrent forces given "growing geopolitical tensions" and the "emergence of new threats."[7] Putin also claimed that the Strategic Missile Forces are receiving new, unspecified fixed and mobile missile systems that allegedly have improved accuracy, reduced launch time, and increased capabilities. Russia previously conducted similar nuclear deterrence exercises using the same missile systems in October 2022 and 2023.[8] ISW continues to assess that Putin and other senior Russian officials attempt to leverage nuclear rhetoric and regular military exercises as a form of reflexive control in an effort to force Western decision-makers to self-deter and temper their support for Ukraine.[9]

Recent Russian polling suggests that Russian domestic support for local government entities has somewhat declined over the past year, most likely in response to increased crypto-mobilization force generation efforts at the regional level. Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center published on October 24 the results of a month-long poll conducted in September 2024 that found that 43 percent of respondents trust local government entities; that 69 percent of respondents trust the Russian military; and that 80 percent of respondents trust Russian President Vladimir Putin.[10] Similar Levada polling in September 2023 found that 45 percent trusted local government entities, that 72 percent trusted the Russian military, and that 76 percent trusted Putin. The Levada Center’s polling data indicate that Putin continues to rely on local government-level crypto-mobilization efforts to deflect discontent regarding Russian mobilization practices away from him and the federal government and onto local officials, while also avoiding having to call a general mobilization. The slight decrease in trust towards local officials and increase in trust in Putin are indicators that Putin's efforts to silo discontent away from himself and scapegoat lower-level officials for problems related to the war in Ukraine may be working.[11] ISW continues to assess that Putin will continue to instruct local government authorities to maintain crypto-mobilization efforts until federal-level mobilization efforts are necessary to achieve operational requirements in Ukraine.[12]

Russian officials and milbloggers are conducting information operations that falsely portray the Georgian opposition's peaceful and legal challenges to the conduct of the October 26 parliamentary election results as a Western- and Ukrainian-sponsored illegal coup d'état. Russian state media claimed on October 29 that the West is supporting the transfer of Ukraine-trained snipers to Georgia in order to organize false flag provocations and trigger a pro-Western coup akin to the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity that started in 2013, which Russian actors have often labeled a Western-instigated illegal coup.[13] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev called on October 28 for the arrest of Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili, falsely claiming that she “called for a coup.”[14] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova baselessly suggested that the West ordered the opposition protests, which they claim are trying to destabilize Georgia.[15] Russian milbloggers also widely claimed that the West and Ukraine are sponsoring a revolution via the Georgian opposition and Zourabicvhili and that Georgian opposition reports of Russian interference in the Georgian elections are false, Western-backed talking points.[16]

The Russian information space continues to closely echo the rhetoric of the ruling Georgian Dream party. Georgian Prime Minister Kobakhidze rejected the claims of election irregularities on October 28, and Georgian Dream member of parliament and Vice-Speaker of Parliament Nino Tsilosani claimed on October 29 that the opposition is attempting to organize a coup.[17] ISW previously assessed that Georgian Dream’s rhetoric has increasingly echoed that of the Kremlin, particularly the Kremlin's narratives that aim to justify Russia's violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of post-Soviet countries that seek greater Western integration, including Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.[18]

The Georgian protests have been peaceful and legal - far from the Russian claims of an illegal coup. The pro-Western Georgian opposition and tens of thousands of Georgian civil society members gathered in central Tbilisi for a peaceful demonstration against the highly contested election results on October 28, in accordance with their constitutional right to peaceful assembly.[19] Neither Zourbachvili nor representatives of the Georgian opposition called for violence, and there have been no reports of notable clashes or confirmed reports of so-called Ukrainian snipers. The opposition has instead called for an organized contestation of the election results, asking Georgian civil society to continue their efforts to gather concrete evidence of voting irregularities while encouraging the international community to address the reportedly fraudulent election results.[20] The opposition also suggested holding internationally administered snap elections without the participation of the Georgian Central Election Commission (CEC), and the CEC responded on October 29, claiming that the opposition's statements were baseless and stating that the CEC was willing to cooperate with the Georgian Prosecutor’s Office to investigate the reports of electoral fraud.[21] The Georgian Constitution provides specific mechanisms through which Georgian officials can contest the election results — tools that Zourabichvili and members of the opposition can leverage amid mounting evidence of voting irregularities.[22] International and Georgian election observation bodies continue to document evidence suggesting systematic voting irregularities before and during the parliamentary elections with some calling the election neither free nor fair.[23]

These concerted Russian efforts to baselessly discredit the Georgian pro-Western opposition and civil society are part of a common Kremlin tactic aimed at framing the valid and legal concerns of pro-Western political entities in the post-Soviet space as illegitimate and violent. Russia has repeatedly accused pro-Western politicians and parties — or even ones simply not fully supportive of Russia — of acting beyond the confines of their domestic legal frameworks while also setting conditions for Russian aggression against these states or encouraging pro-Russian domestic actors to themselves engage in violence or repressions. Such efforts are a part of Russia’s strategic efforts to weaken the Western ambitions of post-Soviet countries and forcefully re-establish Russian imperial boundaries.[24]

Key Takeaways:

The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has increased in recent weeks but remains slow and consistent with positional warfare rather than with rapid mechanized maneuver—emphasizing how generally stagnant Russian advances have been after over two and half years of war.
Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to use an annual Russian nuclear deterrence exercise to further boilerplate nuclear saber-rattling information operations that aim to influence Western decision making.
Recent Russian polling suggests that Russian domestic support for local government entities has somewhat declined over the past year, most likely in response to increased crypto-mobilization force generation efforts at the regional level.
Russian officials and milbloggers are conducting information operations that falsely portray the Georgian opposition's peaceful and legal challenges to the conduct of the October 26 parliamentary election results as a Western- and Ukrainian-sponsored illegal coup d'état.
The Georgian protests have been peaceful and legal - far from the Russian claims of an illegal coup.
These concerted Russian efforts to baselessly discredit the Georgian pro-Western opposition and civil society are part of a common Kremlin tactic aimed at framing the valid and legal concerns of pro-Western political entities in the post-Soviet space as illegitimate and violent.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk, and Russian forces made advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and southwest of Donetsk City.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) continues to rely on Russia's prison population to replace depleted Russian units on the frontline.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 27, 2024

Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, William Runkel, and Fredrick W. Kagan

October 28, 2024, 4:30pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00pm ET on October 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that South Korean intelligence officials shared evidence with NATO officials on October 28 that North Korean units are operating in Kursk Oblast.[1] Rutte stated that senior representatives from South Korea's National Intelligence Service and Ministry of National Defense and other Western allies shared intelligence assessments during a meeting on the morning of October 28 about North Korea's growing involvement in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Rutte stated that the deployment of North Korean forces represented a significant escalation in North Korea's involvement in Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a breach of United National Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and a “dangerous expansion” of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Rutte, on behalf of NATO, called for Russia and North Korea to immediately cease these actions and stated that he will meet with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov later on October 28. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 27 that Russian forces are transferring North Korean military personnel along the E38 Kursk-Voronezh highway in vehicles with civilian license plates.[2] Ukraine's Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on October 28 that Ukrainian forces have not engaged North Korean forces in combat or taken North Korean forces as prisoners of war (POWs), although Ukrainian intelligence has information indicating that North Korean forces have been transferred to Kursk Oblast.[3] ISW previously noted that the involvement of North Korean troops in combat operations in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active combatant and belligerent in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.[4]

Ukrainian forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Russian distilleries on the night of October 27 to 28, reportedly to reduce Russian aviation capabilities. Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksander Gusev claimed that falling drone debris damaged two unspecified industrial enterprises in Anninsky and Novokhopersky raions.[5] Geolocated footage shows a fire in Krasnoye, Novokhopersky Raion.[6] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian drones struck the Ethanol Spirit distillery in Krasnoye.[7] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of a drone strike against a distillery in Krasnoye and noted that Russian distilleries produce rocket fuel and fuel for aviation brake systems, technical needs, and anti-icing agents.[8] Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian strikes against Russian distilleries are meant to reduce Russian aviation capabilities.[9] Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on the night of October 21 to 22 targeting distilleries in Tula Oblast.[10]

Russian President Vladimir Putin briefly acknowledged Russia's labor shortages on October 28, but highlighted Russia's low unemployment rates in an attempt to reframe this challenge in a beneficial light and claim that the Russian economy is able to sustain a long war in Ukraine. Putin held a meeting with the Russian government about the economy on October 28 and highlighted Russian industrial growth and low unemployment rates.[11] Putin claimed that Russian industry has grown 4.5 percent in the first eight months of 2024 and that Russia's manufacturing and mechanical engineering sectors grew by 8.15 percent and almost 20 percent, respectively. Putin claimed that Russian unemployment is at a record low for the third month in a row at 2.4 percent and particularly highlighted low unemployment rates among Russians under the age of 25. Putin noted, however, the Russia's economy “slowed somewhat” in the third quarter of 2024 and that the Russian economy is facing “difficulties and imbalances,” such as international sanctions against Russia and Russian personnel, technology, and logistics shortages. Putin claimed that the 2025–2027 federal budget will focus on developing a supply-side economy, increasing the production of goods and services, launching new investment projects, and creating modern jobs in all sectors. The September 2024 draft bill of the 2025–2027 federal budget expected Russia to spend about 41 percent of its annual expenditures on national security and defense in 2025 — somewhat at odds with Putin's claimed desire to focus on goods and services and new investments.[12] A Russian insider source claimed on October 28 that several major Russian political figures, including Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin, CEO of Russian financial development institution DOM.RF Vitaly Mutko, CEO of Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec Sergei Chemezov, and Russian elites Oleg Deripaska and Alexei Mordashov, are expressing their discontent with the Russian Central Bank's announcement to raise the key interest rate to 21 percent.[13] ISW recently assessed that Russia's economy and war effort is coming under increasing strain, which will pose increasingly acute challenges to Putin's ability to sustain the war over the long term.[14]

The Moldovan Constitutional Court stated it that it will review the results of the October 20 European Union (EU) referendum on October 31, and the third runner up in the first round of the presidential election announced that he would not endorse a candidate in the runoff.[15] The Moldovan Central Election Commission submitted its reports on the referendum to the court on October 25, and the court has until November 4 to either confirm or reject the results, according to the Moldovan Electoral Code.[16] ISW recently assessed that although there have been widespread Moldovan official reports about electoral violations in the October 20 vote, it is unclear if these reports will meet the required threshold for the Constitutional Court to nullify the referendum results.[17] Renato Usatii, who came in third in the first round of the Moldovan presidential election with 213,169 votes, stated on October 28 that he would not endorse Maia Sandu or Alexandr Stoianoglo in the November 3 presidential run off.[18] Vasile Tarlev, who gained 49,316 votes in the first round; Ion Chicu, who gained 31,797 votes; and Natalia Morari, who gained 9,444 votes all endorsed Stoianoglo. ISW recently assessed that Usatii's possible endorsement of Stoianoglo would likely have allowed Stoianoglo to seriously challenge Sandu in the second round, and it is unclear how Usatii's refusal to endorse either candidate will affect the outcome of the November 3 runoff.[19]

Georgian civil society, opposition, and international election observers continue to reject the results of the 2024 Georgian parliament elections amid a large-scale demonstration in Tbilisi on October 28. Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili urged Georgian citizens to take to the streets of Tbilisi on October 28 to protest the election results that local Georgian and international election observation bodies have largely condemned for large-scale voting irregularities.[20] Zourabichvili, alongside various representatives from pro-Western opposition parties, addressed thousands of peaceful protesters and stated that they will continue to reject the reportedly fraudulent and Russian-influenced election results and urged Georgians to continue to collect evidence of voting irregularities.[21] Member of the opposition Unity-National Movement Party Giorgi Vashadze called for an international administration to hold snap elections without the participation of the Georgian Central Election Commission (CEC).[22] Zourabichvili and the opposition stated that they will continue to challenge the election results and noted that they will clarify their next steps in the coming days. The Russian information space continued to express jubilation over the Georgian Dream victory while Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev called for the arrest of Zourabichvili for “calling for a coup.”[23] US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller stated on October 28 that the US will not rule out possible consequences to Georgian officials if the Georgian Dream party continued its anti-democratic trajectory, urging the party to conduct full investigations into allegations related to the results.[24] Twenty-eight European Union (EU) ministers issued a joint statement on October 28 expressing concern over voting irregularities and stated that the violations of electoral integrity are “incompatible” with EU candidate country standards, highlighting a potential further deterioration in Georgia's EU membership prospects.[25]

Key Takeaways:

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that South Korean intelligence officials shared evidence with NATO officials on October 28 that North Korean units are operating in Kursk Oblast.
Ukrainian forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Russian distilleries on the night of October 27 to 28, reportedly to reduce Russian aviation capabilities.
Russian President Vladimir Putin briefly acknowledged Russia's labor shortages on October 28, but highlighted Russia's low unemployment rates in an attempt to reframe this challenge in a beneficial light and claim that the Russian economy is able to sustain a long war in Ukraine.
The Moldovan Constitutional Court stated it that it will review the results of the October 20 European Union (EU) referendum on October 31, and the third runner up in the first round of the presidential election announced that he would not endorse a candidate in the runoff.
Georgian civil society, opposition, and international election observers continue to reject the results of the 2024 Georgian parliament elections amid a large-scale demonstration in Tbilisi on October 28.
Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26, 2024

Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros

October 27, 2024, 5pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on October 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia's economy and war effort is coming under increasing strain, which will pose increasingly acute challenges to Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to sustain the war over the long term. The Washington Post reported on October 27 that the Russian economy is "in danger of overheating," noting that Russia's excessively high military spending has fueled economic growth in a way that has forced Russian companies to artificially raise their salaries in order to fulfill labor demands by remaining competitive with Russia’s high military salaries.[1] The Washington Post quoted Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina, who warned in July 2024 that Russia's labor force and production capacity are "almost exhausted." The Washington Post noted that private Russian companies are struggling to keep up with Russian military salaries and are increasingly having to offer wages several times higher than the typical industry averages. ISW has recently reported that Russian regional authorities are significantly increasing the one-time signing bonuses for Russian contract servicemembers in order to sustain Russia’s rate of force generation (roughly 30,000 troops per month), which underscores the fact that Russia does not have an indefinite pool of manpower and must financially and socially reckon with the ever-growing costs of replenishing its frontline losses via various force-generation avenues.[2] The Washington Post also noted that Russia's stringent migration policies, particularly after the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack, have further depleted Russia's labor pool and amplified economic frictions. This has particularly become the case as migrant workers are increasingly identifying Russia as a hostile and unattractive place to relocate for work.[3] ISW has reported at length on the balance that Putin is trying to strike between catering to his pro-war ultranationalist constituency, which espouses extreme anti-migrant sentiments, and his practical need to leverage migrant labor both economically and militarily.[4]

Putin very likely assesses that calling another partial mobilization wave, or introducing general mobilization, will be too costly to his regime, and has therefore resorted to crypto-mobilization efforts that appear to be placing greater and greater strains on the Russian wartime economy. The recent appearance of North Korean troops in Russia, and their reported deployment to the combat zone in Kursk Oblast, further suggests that Putin's entire force-generation system is very tenuous.[5] The costs of fueling the war will increase as Russia continues to burn through manpower and materiel on the frontline. Russian resources are finite, and Putin cannot reckon with these costs indefinitely. Russia's economy will reach a burnout point. That burnout point will inflict great costs on Russian society, which may force Putin to make major decisions about how to resource Russia’s war or change Russia’s mode of warfighting to preserve his regime’s stability.

Key Takeaways:

Russia's economy and war effort is coming under increasing strain, which will pose increasingly acute challenges to Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to sustain the war over the long term.
Ukrainian and Russian forces both advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.
Russian forces advanced in and near Selydove and northwest of Vuhledar.
Russian authorities are using Cossack organizations to militarize Russian children and build out Russia's force generation reserve in the long term.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 25, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 26, 2024, 5:45 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The October 26, 2024 Georgian parliamentary election will be covered in a separate special edition.

Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South Korean intelligence documents, that a second group of North Korean soldiers will soon deploy to Russia. Bloomberg reported that it viewed South Korean intelligence documents from an unspecified date that assessed that the first group of 1,500 North Korean "elite special forces" had arrived in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai between October 8 and 13 and that this first group was part of a planned deployment of roughly 10,000 North Korean soldiers in total.[1] Bloomberg also reported that the documents assessed that North Korea has sent roughly 8 million rounds of 122mm and 152mm shells to Russia since August 2023, roughly 100 KN-23 Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles, and an unspecified number of Bulsae-4 anti-tank weapons. Bloomberg, citing two people familiar with the matter, stated that South Korean officials will share South Korea's assessments about North Korean-Russian cooperation with NATO officials at an October 28 NATO meeting. The New York Times (NYT), citing one unnamed Ukrainian official and two unnamed US officials, reported on October 25 that "several thousand" North Korean soldiers arrived at Kursk Oblast to participate in an upcoming Russian counteroffensive operation to push Ukrainian forces from their salient in Kursk Oblast.[2] The officials stated that North Korean forces have not engaged in combat operations yet and that the North Korean forces' task in Kursk oblast is unclear. The officials noted that a significant contingent of North Korean forces would help the Russian military to avoid pulling additional forces from eastern Ukraine to participate in counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast. A senior Ukrainian official told the NYT that a maximum number of 5,000 elite North Korean troops had likely arrived in Russia by October 21.[3] The participation of North Korean troops in combat operations in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active combatant and belligerent in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced preparations to open additional defense industrial plants in Ukraine. Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger announced on October 26 that Rheinmetall already opened one plant in Ukraine that serves as a maintenance and production facility for infantry fighting vehicles and main battle tanks and is on track to build a powder factory and a munitions manufacturing plant in Ukraine.[4] Papperger added that Rheinmetall expects to begin the production of the Lynx infantry fighting vehicles at the recently operational plant in Ukraine by the end of 2024. Rheinmetall also reportedly plans to open a joint production facility for air defense systems in Ukraine. Rheinmetall announced in March 2024 that it plans to open at least four weapons manufacturing plants in Ukraine.[5]

Key Takeaways:

Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South Korean intelligence documents, that a second group of North Korean soldiers will soon deploy to Russia.
German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced preparations to open additional defense industrial plants in Ukraine.
Russian forces recently advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast and near Pokrovsk and Vuhledar.
Russian military command is reportedly continuing to commit military specialists to assault operations and incurring unnecessary losses, likely in an effort to centralize control over Russian forces and maintain the tempo of Russian offensive operations throughout the theater.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 24, 2024

Davit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 25, 2024, 7:05 pm ET

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia will imminently deploy North Korean forces to unspecified combat zones on October 27 and 28, as Russian and North Korean officials continued to issue vague yet suggestive statements regarding the possible presence of North Korean troops in Russia.[1] Zelensky stressed that Russia's involvement of North Korean forces in combat is an escalatory step and urged the international community to apply pressure on Moscow and Pyongyang. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans confirmed on October 25 that Dutch intelligence assesses that Russia is deploying at least 1,500 North Korean forces likely to Kursk Oblast.[2] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published an intercepted audio recording on October 25 in which elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District [SMD]) operating in Kursk Oblast reportedly expressed concerns about the ability of North Korean troops to adjust to Russian command culture and language upon their deployment to the region.[3] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian air assault brigade operating in the Kursk direction stated that Ukrainian forces have not yet observed North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast and emphasized that North Korean forces do not have experience fighting in large-scale, technologically-driven wars.[4] Head of Ukraine’s Center for Military Legal Research Oleksandr Mysyenko stated on October 25 that Russia’s efforts to directly involve North Korean forces in the war are ultimately indicative of Russia's inability to recruit sufficient personnel amid systematic yet likely unsuccessful attempts to recruit volunteers domestically.[5]

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Jong Gyu failed to deny reports of North Korean troop deployments to Russia but claimed that such deployments would be in line with principles of international law.[6] Russian President Vladimir Putin once again failed to deny the presence of the North Korean troops in Russia during an interview with Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 on October 25 following the conclusion of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan and stated that it is Russia’s sovereign decision to activate the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea signed on June 18, 2024.[7] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov similarly claimed that the provision of military assistance under the treaty is a signal of deterrence and that military assistance will be activated only in the event of “aggression” against any of the parties to the treaty.[8] The participation of North Korean troops in combat operations in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active combatant and belligerent in Russia's war in Ukraine. The Kremlin may be setting information operations to accuse Ukraine of being the aggressor in Russia's invasion of Ukraine to justify its use of North Korean forces as combatants in its war.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled that Western “Ukraine fatigue” is encouraging Russia to continue its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and pursue its theory of victory predicated on Russia outlasting Western support for Ukraine. Putin responded to a question during an interview with Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 on October 25 following the conclusion of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on whether exhausted Ukrainian troops, Western war fatigue, or Russian military’s power is contributing to the success of Russian theater-wide offensive operations.[9] Putin responded by stating that Russia should continue to double down on its war effort in Ukraine and not pay attention to discussions of the enemy's fatigue. Putin added that the West is “beginning to realistically assess the situation around Ukraine” and “change its rhetoric” about the need for Russia’s “strategic defeat,” and that Russia can “only praise” the West for this rhetorical shift away from complete Russian defeat in Ukraine. Putin later stated in the interview that any outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine must be in Russia’s favor and be based on the "realities on the battlefield," indicating that Russia remains committed to its original goal of forcing the Ukrainian government to capitulate and destroying Ukraine’s statehood and military and that Western hesitance in support for Ukraine only encourages Russia's commitment to this goal. ISW continues to assess that Putin’s theory of victory rests on a critical assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either of its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to persuade the West to do so, and that it is far from clear that the West will do so.[10]

Putin also continued to exaggerate Russian progress in Kursk Oblast, likely in an attempt to reassure domestic audiences of the Russian military's ability to suppress Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast. Putin responded to a question during his interview with Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 on October 25 about his earlier claims on October 24 that Russian forces “blocked” roughly 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers in Kursk Oblast.[11] Putin doubled down on this claim, stating that Ukrainian forces that are “encircled” in Kursk Oblast “do not even really understand that they are encircled.”[12] Putin also claimed that Ukrainian forces have lost control over encircled units and emphasized that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had not publicly reported on claimed successful Russian infiltration of some Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast. Putin once again failed to acknowledge that the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast extends from the Ukrainian-Russian international border and that Ukrainian forces can freely transit the sections of the border under Ukrainian control. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi notably refuted Putin’s October 24 claims of Ukrainian forces being encircled and suffering significant losses, and in turn, reported that Russian manpower casualties total 17,819 personnel (including 711 prisoners of war [POWs]) since August 8.[13] ISW cannot independently verify Ukrainian estimates of Russian losses, however, Russian and Ukrainian reporting indicates that Ukrainian forces are continuing to operate in Kursk Oblast.[14] Putin’s exaggerated statistics on Ukrainian losses are likely part of his attempt to explain away Russia’s inability to decisively repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast after nearly three months in the context of the likely imminent deployment of North Korean troops to combat in this area.

Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Sparta” Battalion Commander and Plenipotentiary Representative in the Urals Lieutenant Colonel Artyom Zhoga to the Russian Security Council, likely in an ongoing effort to establish younger, pro-war figures within the Kremlin. Putin signed a decree on October 25 adding Zhoga to the Russian Security Council — a key Russian consultative body that informs Putin’s decisions on national security issues.[15] Zhoga previously served as a member of Putin's re-election campaign initiatives group, and the Kremlin previously highlighted Zhoga and an interaction between Zhoga and Putin to announce Putin's presidential bid in December 2023.[16] Zhoga is also the highest-profile Kremlin appointee from the ”Time of Heroes” professional training program that aims to prepare Russian veterans to take municipal, regional, and federal government positions.[17] Zhoga is now the youngest member of the Russian Security Council at 49 years old. A Russian Telegram channel that routinely shares insider information commented on Zhoga’s appointment, stating that Putin typically includes newly appointed plenipotentiaries in the Russian Security Council, and Putin appointed Zhoga as the Presidential Representative to the Ural Federal Okrug on October 2.[18] The Telegram channel added that Zhoga’s appointment significantly increased the influence of Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko’s group within the Kremlin.[19] Kiriyenko has been a leading figure in the Kremlin’s efforts to establish a new elite via the ”Time of Heroes” program.[20] Zhoga’s appointment follows the promotion of presidential aide and close personal ally Alexei Dyumin to the Russian Security Council on September 30.[21] Dyumin had been the youngest-ever member of the council before Zhoga.[22] ISW continues to assess that Putin appears to be using the "Time of Heroes" program to militarize the Russian government, further solidify a pro-war ideology in the Russian state and society, and form a new, highly militarized elite class.[23]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia does not seek to “influence” elections of other countries "unlike the West" amid continued evidence to the contrary.[24] Peskov stated on October 25 that the January 2025 presidential elections in Belarus are an “internal matter” but that everyone in Russia will support Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's candidacy nevertheless. Peskov claimed that while the West interfered in the 2020 Belarusian presidential elections, the West will likely fail to do so again given that Belarus has learned from previous experience. Peskov also accused the West of unprecedented attempts to interfere in the Georgian and Moldovan elections and claimed that Moscow is not trying to influence the elections of these countries. Peskov’s accusations come amid statements from Moldovan officials, including Moldovan President Maia Sandu, about unprecedented levels of election interference from Kremlin-linked officials in the first round of Moldovan presidential elections that were held on October 20.[25] Sandu stated on October 21 that Moldovan authorities have evidence that criminal groups wanted to buy 300,000 Moldovan votes against Moldova’s European Union (EU) membership referendum and Sandu herself in favor of pro-Russian presidential candidates. The Georgian parliamentary elections will be held on October 26 and Russian officials and milbloggers have launched information operations portraying Georgian Dream as the stable choice for Georgia’s future and discrediting openly pro-Western opposition parties while suggesting that a Georgian Dream victory could lead to territorial reconciliation, including potential compromises on the Russian-occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[26] Russia has a rich history of attempting to influence elections in post-Soviet countries in its favor through war, economic pressures, political threats, information operations, and other modes of meddling.[27]

Russian authorities swiftly responded to xenophobic riots in Korkino, Chelyabinsk Oblast on October 25, a marked change from Russian authorities' slow and disorganized response to the October 2023 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan.[28] Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin ordered a federal-level investigation into the murder of a female taxi driver purportedly by a member of the local Roma community in Korkino and the ensuing riots during which roughly 150 people attacked the home of several Roma people.[29] Russian authorities reportedly quickly quelled the riot, detained 30 people, and blocked a Telegram channel accused of encouraging locals to participate in the riot.[30] Russian authorities have consistently struggled to balance placating xenophobic sentiments among Russian ultranationalists and Russian communities with maintaining Russia's economic and internal security, particularly given Russia's dependence on migrants and non-ethnic Russian communities for economic growth and force generation.[31] ISW has previously noted that the Kremlin is working to develop the capacity to use information operations on social media platforms to trigger kinetic activity, and the role of social media accounts in provoking such riots highlights the influence that such Russian operations could have abroad.[32]

German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced on October 24 that it recently delivered 20 additional Marder infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine and noted that Germany financed the delivery of the vehicles.[33]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia will imminently deploy North Korean forces to unspecified combat zones on October 27 and 28, as Russian and North Korean officials continued to issue vague yet suggestive statements regarding the possible presence of North Korean troops in Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled that Western “Ukraine fatigue” is encouraging Russia to continue its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and pursue its theory of victory predicated on Russia outlasting Western support for Ukraine.
Putin also continued to exaggerate Russian progress in Kursk Oblast, likely in an attempt to reassure domestic audiences of the Russian military's ability to suppress Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Sparta” Battalion Commander and Plenipotentiary Representative in the Urals Lieutenant Colonel Artyom Zhoga to the Russian Security Council, likely in an ongoing effort to establish younger, pro-war figures within the Kremlin.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia does not seek to “influence” elections of other countries "unlike the West" amid continued evidence to the contrary.
Russian authorities swiftly responded to xenophobic riots in Korkino, Chelyabinsk Oblast on October 25, a marked change from Russian authorities' slow and disorganized response to the October 2023 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan.
German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced on October 24 that it recently delivered 20 additional Marder infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine and noted that Germany financed the delivery of the vehicles.
Ukrainian forces advanced near Borki and regained lost territory near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.
Russian forces advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and regained territory near Obukhovka.
The Kremlin is continuing to forge new state-affiliated veteran societies and organizations likely in an ongoing effort to replace veteran organizations that have been critical of Russia’s conduct of war in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 23, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 24, 2024, 7:15pm ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to deny the presence of North Korean military personnel in Russia on October 24, amid official Ukrainian reports that the first North Korean military units arrived in Kursk Oblast on October 23. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 24 that the first units of North Korean personnel arrived in Kursk Oblast on October 23.[1] The GUR reported that the North Korean personnel trained at the Baranovsky military training ground in Ussuriysk, Primorsky Krai; the Donguz military training ground in Ulan-Ude, Republic of Buryatia; the Yekaterinoslavsky military training ground in Yekaterinslavka, Amur Oblast; the 248th military training ground in Knyazye-Volkonskoye, Khabarovsk Krai; and the 249th military training ground in Primorsky Krai. The GUR reported that the Russian military spent several weeks coordinating with the North Korean military units. The GUR reported that North Korea has transferred roughly 12,000 North Korean personnel, including 500 officers and three generals, to Russia and that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is responsible for overseeing the training and adaptation of the North Korean military personnel. The GUR noted that the Russian military is providing ammunition and other personal kit to the North Korean personnel. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to a question at a press conference after the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, regarding recently released South Korean intelligence satellite imagery reportedly showing North Korean troops in Russia.[2] Putin wryly responded that "photos are a serious thing" and "reflect something."[3] Putin reiterated the mutual defense article in the Russian-North Korean strategic partnership agreement with North Korea, announced in June 2024 and officially ratified by the Russian State Duma on October 24, 2024.[4]

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko strongly hinted that Belarusian forces will not fight in Ukraine and appeared to question Russian President Vladimir Putin's likely efforts to introduce North Korean forces into Russia's war against Ukraine in the process. Lukashenko answered a question from the BBC on October 23 about reports of North Korean troops going to fight alongside Russian forces in Ukraine, claiming that these reports are "rubbish," that Russian President Vladimir Putin would "never try to persuade" another state to involve its army in Russia's war in Ukraine, and that the deployment of armed forces from any state – including from Belarus – to the frontline in Ukraine would be a "step towards the escalation" of the war.[5] Lukashenko claimed that if "we" (Belarussians) got involved in the war, this would be the "path to escalation" and that NATO would deploy forces to Ukraine in response to another country's involvement. Lukashenko continued to deny that Belarus was involved in the Russia's launch of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in part from Belarussian territory. Lukashenko also gave an interview on October 23 to Russian state-run TV channel Rossiya 1 in which he claimed that he did not think that the Russian leadership or military needs North Korean troops as there are enough Russian forces on the front and Russia has significant mobilization resources.[6] Lukashenko claimed that Moscow understands that the deployment of North Korean forces to the war would be "undesirable for Russia" and that the West will respond by sending NATO troops to Ukraine. Kremlin newswire TASS notably did not report on Lukashenko's statements about how the use of North Korean forces in Russia's war against Ukraine is not in Russia's interests and only reported on his claims that NATO would deploy troops to Ukraine in response to the participation of North Korean forces in the war.[7]

The Kremlin is reportedly attempting to portray the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan as evidence of widespread international support for Russia – especially to domestic audiences in Russia. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on October 24 that it reviewed the Russian Presidential Administration's manual to Russian state media and propagandists with guidelines about how to frame the ongoing BRICS summit in Kazan.[8] The manual reportedly highlighted three themes: Russian President Vladimir Putin is the "informal lead of the world majority," Western elites are "panicking," and "anxiety" is prevalent in the West generally. The Kremlin reportedly told media outlets to report that the BRICS summit "has the world's attention" and proves that "attempts to isolate" Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine have "failed." Meduza reported that media outlets are supposed to highlight how Putin establishes "strategic ties that are not limited to one direction" in contrast to the West's alleged "fleeting alliances" (NATO celebrated its 75th anniversary this year). Russian state media and propagandists recently published articles highlighting many of these themes, sometimes even word for word as reportedly written in the manual."[9] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on October 24 that pro-Russian bots on Russian social media site VKontakte (VK) have left over 10,000 comments in two days about the BRICS summit – reportedly one of the largest Kremlin bot efforts recently.[10] The bots were promoting the idea that Russia is not internationally isolated, that BRICS' influence is growing, that anti-Russian sanctions are decreasing in importance, and that Russian forces are achieving successes in Ukraine. A Russian insider source claimed on October 24 that unspecified Kremlin-linked sources stated that BRICS states largely do not support Russia's position on its war in Ukraine, forcing the Kremlin to push this topic into the background in order to achieve some kind of "serious international association."[11] The insider source claimed that multiple meetings during the summit discussed the People's Republic of China's (PRC) and Brazil's peace proposals – which favor Russia – but that these discussions "ultimately led to nothing." ISW assessed on October 23 that the adoption of the Kazan Declaration on the second day of the BRICS summit demonstrated that Russia has not yet secured the international support nor created the alternative security structure that the Kremlin desires.[12]

Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to project Russian confidence in the Russian military's ability to repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast at a press conference after the BRICS summit on October 24. Putin claimed that Russian forces have surrounded roughly 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers who are now "blocked" in Kursk Oblast.[13] Putin notably failed to acknowledge that the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast extends from the Ukrainian-Russian international border and that Ukrainian forces can freely transit the sections of the border under Ukrainian control. Putin also claimed that Ukrainian forces have lost roughly 26,000 personnel during the operation in Kursk Oblast in the past "month and a bit" - likely a gross exaggeration.

Ukrainian authorities are investigating another execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) by Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction against the backdrop of Russian forces' increasingly frequent POW executions across the theater. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office stated on October 24 that it is opening a pre-trial investigation into the murder of Ukrainian POWs by Russian forces near Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk).[14] The Prosecutor General's Office reported that Russian forces captured four Ukrainian servicemembers near Selydove on October 6 and filmed their interrogations, and that Ukrainian forces discovered the bodies of the four killed servicemembers after regaining the lost positions on October 7. The Prosecutor General's Office did not publish photographs or footage confirming this report.[15] Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on October 24 that he sent letters to the United Nations (UN) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) about Russian forces' violation of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of POWs.[16] Ukrainian officials notably recently reported that Russian forces executed two unarmed Ukrainian POWs near Selydove on October 18.[17]

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to deny the presence of North Korean military personnel in Russia on October 24, amid official Ukrainian reports that the first North Korean military units arrived in Kursk Oblast on October 23.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko strongly hinted that Belarusian forces will not fight in Ukraine and appeared to question Russian President Vladimir Putin's likely efforts to introduce North Korean forces into Russia's war against Ukraine in the process.
The Kremlin is reportedly attempting to portray the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan as evidence of widespread international support for Russia – especially to domestic audiences in Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to project Russian confidence in the Russian military's ability to repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast at a press conference after the BRICS summit on October 24.
Ukrainian authorities are investigating another execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) by Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction against the backdrop of Russian forces' increasingly frequent POW executions across the theater.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and Siversk.
The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Rosgvardia reportedly each have their own Akhmat units that perform different functions in different sectors of the front and rear.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 22, 2024

Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, Katherine Wells, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 23, 2024, 7:45pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The adoption of the Kazan Declaration on the second day of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on October 23 demonstrated that Russia has not yet secured the international support nor created the alternative security structure that the Kremlin desires. The Kazan Declaration notably only mentioned Russia's war in Ukraine once.[1] The declaration states that all signatories should act in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter — including the provision on respect for territorial integrity — and that BRICS states welcome "relevant" offers of mediation aimed at ensuring a peaceful settlement of the war through dialogue and diplomacy. Ukraine has emphasized that the "principles of the UN Charter" is a main avenue through which Ukraine can achieve peace and highlighted the illegality of Russia's war under international law.[2] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded to the Kazan Declaration, stating that it shows that Russia failed to "export" its views on changing the world order and global security architecture to BRICS summit participant states.[3] The Ukrainian MFA stated that the declaration also demonstrates that BRICS states are not unified around Russia's war against Ukraine, likely since many of these countries support the UN Charter's principles. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service similarly assessed that the BRICS summit will not result in the international community's approval of an alternative system of international settlements that Russia wants and stated that India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Brazil, and South Africa opposed the transformation of BRICS into an anti-US coalition.[4]

People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping reiterated the PRC’s longstanding position calling for de-escalation in Russia’s war in Ukraine and discouraged the involvement of third parties in the war amid reports of Russia preparing to deploy North Korean troops to Ukraine. Xi emphasized the need to promote “a rapid de-escalation" of Russia’s war in Ukraine and avoid “adding fuel to the fire” during the 16th annual BRICS summit in Kazan on October 23.[5] Xi also stated that BRICS members must prevent the spreading of the war to “third parties” and avoid the escalation of hostilities. Xi stated that the PRC, Brazil and countries of the Global South created a group of “Friends of Peace,” which aims to unite voices in support of a peaceful resolution of Russia’s war in Ukraine.[6] Xi had previously called for de-escalation of the war and attempted to position the PRC as an impartial third-party mediator for a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine.[7] Russia has been increasingly leveraging partnerships with North Korea and Iran, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has accused Russia of directly involving North Korea in the war amid reports of North Korean combat forces training in Russia for possible participation in the war.[8]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23.[9] NOTE: This text also appears in ISW-CTP's October 23 Iran Update. Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Russo-Iranian economic and strategic relations on the sidelines of the summit.[10] Pezeshkian stated that the two officials will finalize and sign memorandums soon, suggesting that both states will sign the new comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.[11] Putin authorized the signing of the deal on September 18.[12] It is in Iran’s interests to have a formalized agreement with Russia. Iran presumably will seek greater international support as Israel’s ground and air offensives on the Gaza Strip and Lebanon have disrupted some elements of Iran’s proxy network. This disruption is particularly notable given that Hezbollah’s capabilities — which now appear degraded by Israeli action at a minimum — have long served as Iran’s principal deterrence against Israeli attack.[13] Russia has discouraged Israeli attack on nuclear facilities, demonstrating the advantages of strong Iranian relations with Russia.[14] The Pezeshkian administration’s policy continues former President Ebrahim Raisi’s "neighborhood policy.” This policy is centered on building relations with regional and extra-regional states, thus demonstrating the administration’s efforts to mitigate the impact of international sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy. The Iranian regime calculates that mitigating the impact of sanctions increases domestic stability and regime credibility.[15] Russo-Iranian cooperation has accelerated since the start of Russia’s offensive campaign in Ukraine due to Iran’s military support in the war.

Russian forces have made significant tactical advances into and around Selydove in recent days, but the Russian military command's apparent focus on securing Selydove has come at the expense of Russian forces' ability to sustain a meaningful offensive drive directly on Pokrovsk — Russia's self-defined operational objective on this sector of the front. Geolocated footage published on October 22 and 23 shows that Russian forces have advanced along Skhidna Street in northeastern Selydove and northward along Berehova and Zakhysnykiv streets in eastern Selydove towards the center of the town.[16] Geolocated footage published on October 23 also shows that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) seized Izmailivka (southeast of Selydove), and additional geolocated footage published on October 23 indicates that Russian forces also advanced on the northeastern outskirts of Novoselydivka (west of Izmailivka and south of Selydove) and in fields northwest of Tsukuryne (also south of Selydove but north of the Izmailivka-Novoselydivka area).[17] Russian sources widely claimed that Russian forces advanced into northern Selydove, reached the outskirts of Vyshneve (west of Selydove) via the C05091 road by pushing northwestward from Tsukuryne, and made territorial gains in Hirnyk (southeast of Selydove), although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these claims.[18]

Russian advances into Selydove, as well as territorial gains to the south and north of the town, may soon cause Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the area to avoid being trapped within a collapsing pocket. Ukrainian forces appear to have committed to a robust defense of Selydove, however, and have largely delayed Russian advances since Russian forces first began attacking into the settlement around August 2024.[19] Selydove is not Russia's operational objective on this part of the front, notably, and Ukraine's decision to defend the settlement has likely fixed a relatively large contingent of Russian troops on the southern flank of Pokrovsk — which is Russia's primary, and operationally meaningful, objective in the area.[20] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets identified this dynamic on October 21, noting that the Russian command in the Pokrovsk direction is now facing several more localized "problems" that do not directly lend themselves to the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk.[21] Mashovets emphasized that while a large number of Russian forces have been committed to the entire Pokrovsk front, a large contingent of 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Central Military District [CMD]) and 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) units are involved in trying to seize Selydove, as opposed to developing attacks on Pokrovsk.[22] Mashovets concluded that the Russian command created a large operational reserve for Russian forces to attack Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but that these forces got bogged down in attacks on Selydove and the southern flank of Pokrovsk, which the Russian command had hoped to capture rapidly.[23] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor largely agreed with Mashovets' analysis, noting that despite the widely understood value of a Russian seizure of Pokrovsk, "the process is stalling."[24] The milblogger stated that the Russian command's fixation on the southern flank of Pokrovsk has led to a "spreading of forces and resources" that has resulted in "excessive" Russian infantry losses and afforded Ukrainian troops additional time to further fortify Pokrovsk itself.

Russia may well take Selydove in the coming days, but the capture of Selydove does not inherently portend the seizure of Pokrovsk, and, in fact, the seizure of Selydove is likely to have exhausted and attrited Russian forces in a way that will likely reduce their combat effectiveness if they are ordered to pivot towards Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian defense of Pokrovsk and its approaches (namely the rail-line and the M-30 highway) has already stymied Russian advances towards the city, and attrition of Russian forces in the area will likely further slow these advances, damaging Russian offensive prospects in the area in the coming weeks.[25]

The Pentagon and White House confirmed the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin reported on October 23 that the US government has evidence that there are North Korean troops in Russia but that it is unclear what they are doing.[26] National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby also stated on October 23 that North Korea deployed at least 3,000 personnel to Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai between early to mid-October but that it is unclear if these forces will enter combat alongside Russian forces.[27] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 22 that potentially two "brigades" of 6,000 North Korean personnel each (larger that the doctrinal endstrength of a typical brigade) are training in Russia.[28] South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on October 23 that South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated during a closed-door parliamentary intelligence committee meeting that North Korea has sent 3,000 troops to Russia so far to support Russia's war in Ukraine and will send a total of 10,000 by December 2024.[29] Yonhap News Agency also reported that a NIS assessment stated that North Korean munitions factories that produce weapons that North Korea has shipped to Russia are operating at "full capacity."[30] ISW will discuss the development of Russia-North Korea relations and assess the implications of recent North Korean troops deployments on the security situation both in Ukraine and on the Korean Peninsula in a forthcoming special edition.

Russia and Belarus announced plans to conduct the “Zapad-2025” command staff exercise on an unspecified date in 2025 against the backdrop of deepening Russian-Belarusian security integration within the Union State framework. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin approved the plan for the Zapad-2025 exercises on October 23 during Belousov’s visit to Minsk.[31] Khrenin announced that the Russian and Belarusian general staffs had already begun preparations for Zapad-2025 exercises and stated that these exercises will help to improve the combat readiness of the regional grouping of forces and the ability of Russian and Belarusian forces to jointly fulfill their tasks.[32] Belousov noted that Russian and Belarusian forces will practice tasks that take into account "modern threats to Russia and Belarus,' including experiences from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[33] Belousov and Khrenin also approved the Union State military security Work Plan for 2025 and 2027, emphasized the continuation of Russian-Belarusian cooperation in military-technical sphere, and reiterated that Moscow and Minsk are completing preparations for a new security concept under the Union State framework.[34] The last Zapad exercises — which have historically occurred once every four years — took place in September 2021, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably cancelled the planned 'Zapad-2023' exercises scheduled for September 2023.[35] ISW will discuss the development and implications of the Union State security, economic, and societal integration in an upcoming report.

Key Takeaways:

The adoption of the Kazan Declaration on the second day of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on October 23 demonstrated that Russia has not yet secured the international support nor created the alternative security structure that the Kremlin desires.
People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping reiterated the PRC’s longstanding position calling for de-escalation in Russia’s war in Ukraine and discouraged the involvement of third parties in the war amid reports of Russia preparing to deploy North Korean troops to Ukraine.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23.
Russian forces have made significant tactical advances into and around Selydove in recent days, but the Russian military command's apparent focus on securing Selydove has come at the expense of Russian forces' ability to sustain a meaningful offensive drive directly on Pokrovsk — Russia's self-defined operational objective on this sector of the front.
The Pentagon and White House confirmed the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia.
Russia and Belarus announced plans to conduct the “Zapad-2025” command staff exercise on an unspecified date in 2025 against the backdrop of deepening Russian-Belarusian security integration within the Union State framework.
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
The Russian military is reportedly coercing Russian conscripts into contract service in the Russian military by issuing enlistment bonuses to conscripts who never signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 21, 2024

Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 22, 2024, 5:40pm ET

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on the night of October 21 to 22 targeting distilleries in Russia that reportedly manufacture products for the Russian military. Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged distilleries in Yefremov and Luzhlovsky.[1] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the Ukrainian drone strike also damaged local Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) buildings near the distillery in Yefremov.[2] Russian opposition and insider sources posted footage showing a fire near the Yefremov distillery, synthetic rubber plant (just northwest of the distillery), and thermal power plant (just northeast of the distillery).[3] Tambov Oblast Governor Maksim Egorov claimed that a drone struck the Biokhim enterprise in Rasskozovo, starting a fire.[4] Biokhim produces ethyl alcohol, and its website claims that it manufactures products that are of "strategic importance to the [Russian] state."[5] Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksander Gusev claimed that Russian forces "suppressed" a drone that then fell on an unspecified industrial enterprise in Voronezh Oblast, damaging a workshop.[6] Head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russia uses alcohol factories to manufacture fuel for military needs and explosives.[7]

South Korea may be considering directly sending weapons and intelligence personnel to Ukraine in response to the reported deployment of North Korean troops to Russia to participate in Russia's war in Ukraine. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on October 22 that a South Korean government source stated that South Korea is considering sending South Korean military personnel, likely from intelligence units, to Ukraine to monitor North Korean forces' tactics and combat capabilities and to question captured North Koreans.[8] The source also reportedly stated that South Korea will prioritize giving Ukraine defensive weapons over lethal aid but, if South Korea were to provide lethal weapons, Seoul will first try to find a way to provide them indirectly to Ukraine. South Korean National Security Director Chang Ho-jin stated on June 20 following the initial creation of the Russian-North Korean strategic partnership agreement on June 19 that the agreement had encouraged South Korea to change its long-standing policy prohibiting the transfer of arms to Ukraine, and Yonhap News Agency reported on June 21 that South Korea was considering sending 155mm artillery shells and unspecified air defense systems to Ukraine.[9] South Korea's continued consideration of sending lethal aid to Ukraine comes against the backdrop of threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 20, when Putin stated that Seoul would be making "a very big mistake" if it decided to supply arms to Ukraine.[10]

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone on October 22 that the first North Korean military personnel are expected to arrive in Kursk Oblast on October 23 but that it is unclear how large the force grouping will be or how they will be equipped.[11] Newsweek reported that a South Korean government official stated that North Korea sent fighter pilots to Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai in September 2024, possibly to train on Russian combat aircraft that Russia has allegedly supplied to North Korea, or to supplement Russia's pilot shortages.[12]

Thirty-six world leaders, including from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, South Africa, and Iran, arrived in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, for the 16th annual BRICS summit held from October 22 to 24 during which Russia will likely seek to establish mechanisms to enhance its war effort in Ukraine. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, the Taliban’s Minister of Trade and Industry Nooruddin Azizi, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and other world leaders also arrived in Kazan on October 22.[13] Russian President Vladimir Putin met with PRC President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit during which both leaders emphasized the importance of multifaceted Russia-PRC relations while Xi highlighted BRICS as a format for global strategic cooperation.[14] Putin also met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa with whom he discussed bilateral ties, the creation of a multipolar world order, and the use of national currencies in mutual trade settlements.[15] Modi reiterated the need to find "the earliest possible" peaceful solution to the war in Ukraine and reaffirmed India’s role as a potential mediator.[16]

Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri reported on October 22 that India returned 85 Indian citizens who had involuntarily joined the Russian military to fight in Ukraine and that Modi would negotiate with Russian authorities the return of 20 more Indian nationals during the BRICS summit.[17] Russia will likely use the BRICS summit as an opportunity to showcase its efforts at enhancing global ties with non-Western states and possibly establish deals and trade mechanisms through which it can support its war efforts in Ukraine by mitigating the impacts of Western sanctions.

A recent Russian opinion poll suggests that Russian President Vladimir Putin enjoys widespread support among Russian citizens even though many do not agree with some of the Kremlin's policies, including the war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Current Time reported on October 22 that they viewed the results of a recent poll conducted by independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles between September 10 and 17.[18] The Chronicles survey found that 78 percent of respondents stated that they generally approve of Putin's activities as Russian president but wanted the government to prioritize issues that are "directly opposite of the actual actions" of Putin, such as domestic social and economic problems (83 percent), a peace treaty with Ukraine that includes mutual concessions (61 percent), and the restoration of relations with Western states (43 percent). Putin has refrained from transferring the Russian economy to a full wartime footing, but the Russian government has nevertheless heavily focused Russian federal spending on defense and national security instead of social policies.[19] Putin has demonstrated that he is uninterested in agreeing to Russian concessions to Ukraine, repeatedly indicating that he is not interested in negotiations that do not result in Ukraine's complete capitulation and even demanding that Ukrainian forces withdraw from areas of eastern and southern Ukraine that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[20] Putin has repeatedly tried to distance himself from incompetent, corrupt, and overly bureaucratic Russian officials and has attempted to posture himself as a capable and caring leader who can quickly resolve average Russians' issues, despite the fact that he is behind the decision-making that most of the population appears to take issue with.[21]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on the night of October 21 to 22 targeting distilleries in Russia that reportedly manufacture products for the Russian military.
South Korea may be considering directly sending weapons and intelligence personnel to Ukraine in response to the reported deployment of North Korean troops to Russia to participate in Russia's war in Ukraine.
Thirty-six world leaders, including from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, South Africa, and Iran, arrived in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, for the 16th annual BRICS summit held from October 22 to 24 during which Russia will likely seek to establish mechanisms to enhance its war effort in Ukraine.
A recent Russian opinion poll suggests that Russian President Vladimir Putin enjoys widespread support among Russian citizens even though many do not agree with some of the Kremlin's policies, including about the war.
Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kurakhove and Vuhledar.
Russian forces conducted multilateral military exercises with international partners. Iran hosted Russian and Omani naval forces as part of the "IMEX 2024" naval drills, which took place between October 19-20 in the Indian Ocean.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 20, 2024

Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 21, 2024, 6:35pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2pm ET on October 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Moldova's October 20 European Union (EU) referendum passed by an extremely narrow margin in large part due to support from the Moldovan diaspora, and current Moldovan President Maia Sandu will face Alexandr Stoianoglo in a second round of voting on November 3. Several Moldovan and European officials reported potential Russian interference in the election, and the Kremlin and its affiliates in Moldova will likely continue their malign influence efforts in the leadup to the November 3 runoff. The Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) completed the vote count on October 21 and reported that 50.46 percent (751,235) voted in favor of the EU referendum and that 49.54 percent (737,639) voted against — a difference of only 13,596 votes.[1] The CEC reported that Sandu took first place in the presidential election with 42.45 percent (656,354) and Stoianoglo took second with 25.98 percent (401,726). Sandu failed to gain the majority vote required to win in the first round, and she and Stoianoglo will move to the second round. Moldovan authorities counted votes from polling stations abroad last, during which the number of votes in favor of the referendum and Sandu greatly increased. Sandu stated early on October 21 while Moldovan authorities were still counting votes that "criminal groups" and "foreign forces" — likely referring to Russia and Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor — used tens of millions of euros to spread propaganda to destabilize Moldova.[2] Sandu stated that Moldovan authorities have evidence that the criminal groups wanted to buy 300,000 Moldovan votes and that the scale of fraud was "unprecedented." The European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations' (ENEMO) International Election Observation Mission reported on October 21 that it found "massive malign foreign interference attempts" ahead of the October 20 election despite Moldovan authorities' efforts to counter misinformation and vote buying schemes.[3] The BBC reported that it witnessed at least one instance of vote buying at a polling station in the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic of Transnistria after a voter exited the poll and asked where she would receive her promised payment.[4] Moldovan authorities previously reported that Shor used a Russian state bank to distribute at least $15 million to Shor-affiliated regional leaders and voters in Moldova in September 2024 alone.[5]

Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers claimed that Moldovan authorities falsified the results of the election and referendum and continued to promote long-standing Kremlin narratives targeting Moldova's path towards European integration. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Moldovan authorities used "totalitarian" methods during the election campaign and that the number of votes supporting the referendum "inexplicably" began to increase during the later stages of counting.[6] Zakharova claimed that the West is trying to turn Moldova into a "Russophobic NATO appendage deprived of sovereignty." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Moldovan authorities of persecuting opposition forces and claimed that Russian authorities are monitoring the allegedly questionable increase in the number of votes for Sandu and in support of the referendum.[7] Several Russian milbloggers, including Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers, claimed that Moldovan authorities falsified the election results and adjusted the referendum's voter turnout numbers.[8] One milblogger called for Russian authorities to create a network of "analytical and information centers" that will study how to influence processes in Moldova and promote Russia's state interests in Russia.[9]

US Secretary of Defense Llyod Austin traveled to Kyiv on October 21 and announced a new $400 million military aid package for Ukraine.[10] The aid package includes additional HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortar systems and rounds; tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin anti-armor systems; M113 armored personnel carriers; satellite communication equipment; and small arms and ammunition.[11]

Russia appears to be scrambling to reduce tensions with South Korea following credible reports of intensified North Korean cooperation with Russia, including South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence warnings that a contingent of North Korean troops has deployed for training to Russia. South Korea's Foreign Ministry summoned Russia's Ambassador to South Korea, Georgy Zinoviev, over reports of the deployment of North Korean military personnel to Russia.[12] The Russian Embassy in South Korea falsely framed the event as a voluntary meeting, as opposed to a diplomatic summons, and notably claimed that any cooperation between Russia and North Korea "is not directed against the security interests" of Seoul.[13] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia-North Korea cooperation "should not cause concern" to other states, and that information about the alleged presence of North Korean troops in Russia may be "contradictory."[14] The Kremlin's apparent desire to assure South Korea that its cooperation with North Korea is not a threat to Seoul suggests that the Kremlin remains very concerned about the prospect of Seoul's potential pivot towards providing Ukraine with necessary military support, and the implications of worsened relations with Seoul for Russian security interests in the Asia Pacific region. Russia has previously attempted to court Seoul in order to mitigate the impacts of its growing reliance on North Korea, as ISW has noted.[15]

Russian forces continue to systematically perpetrate war crimes, including the continued executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and use of chemical weapons. Ukrainian officials reported on October 21 that Russian forces executed two unarmed Ukrainian POWs near Selydove, Donetsk Oblast on October 18 by shooting them while restrained at point-blank range.[16] ISW assessed that Russian forces have recently increased systematic executions of Ukrainian POWs in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs, which forbids the inhumane treatment and execution of POWs.[17] A Russian milblogger also posted footage and openly claimed on October 20 that Russian forces are using chloropicrin (a pesticide and lung damaging agent) against Ukrainian forces.[18] The US Department of State announced on May 1 that it had determined that Russian forces are using chloropicrin and riot control agents (RCAs) in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.[19] Ukrainian officials have previously reported that Russian forces are increasingly equipping grenades with chloropicrin.[20] The apparent systematic perpetration of war crimes throughout the entire theater suggests that Russian forces continue to operate at a low level of discipline, and that Russian field commanders are doing nothing to prevent their subordinates from engaging in such criminal behaviors, or may even be encouraging them. There is no evidence that Russia is holding Russian personnel accountable for the violations of the laws of war that have been reported.

Key Takeaways:

Moldova's October 20 European Union (EU) referendum passed by an extremely narrow margin in large part due to support from the Moldovan diaspora, and current Moldovan President Maia Sandu will face Alexandr Stoianoglo in a second round of voting on November 3. Several Moldovan and European officials reported potential Russian interference in the election, and the Kremlin and its affiliates in Moldova will likely continue their malign influence efforts in the leadup to the November 3 runoff.
Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers claimed that Moldovan authorities falsified the results of the election and referendum and continued to promote long-standing Kremlin narratives targeting Moldova's path towards European integration.
US Secretary of Defense Llyod Austin travelled to Kyiv on October 21 and announced a new $400 million military aid package for Ukraine.
Russia appears to be scrambling to reduce tensions with South Korea following credible reports of intensified North Korean cooperation with Russia, including South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence warnings that a contingent of North Korean troops has deployed for training to Russia.
Russian forces continue to systematically perpetrate war crimes, including the continued executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and use of chemical weapons.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the western part of the Kursk Oblast salient.
Russian forces advanced west of Kreminna, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southeast of Kurakhove.
Russian forces recently conducted several mechanized attacks of various echelons in the Kurakhove direction.
Russian occupation authorities continue to coerce occupied Ukrainian populations into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 20, 2024, 3:50pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on October 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against the Lipetsk-2 Air Base near Lipetsk City and Russian state-owned defense enterprise Sverdlov in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on the night of October 19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that forces from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck the Lipetsk-2 Air Base and caused a fire and secondary explosions.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces targeted ammunition depots, fuel storage, and aircraft and noted that the Russian military bases Su-34 fighter-bomber, Su-35 fighter, and MiG-31 interceptor/fighter fixed-wing aircraft at the base. Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed that Russian forces intercepted drones over Lipetsk City and Oblast and that a crashed drone caused a fire in an unspecified area.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that forces from Ukraine's SBU, GUR, and SSO also struck the Sverdlov Plant, causing secondary explosions.[3] The Sverdlov plant produces chemicals for artillery ammunition and stores and produces glide bombs, and sources in Ukrainian intelligence told Western and Ukrainian news outlets that the plant is one of Russia's largest explosives factories.[4] Geolocated footage published on October 20 shows an explosion near the Sverdlov Plant.[5] The US imposed sanctions on the Sverdlov Plant in July 2023 for its support of Russia's war effort in Ukraine.[6] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike on the Dzerzhinsk industrial zone and that several plant employees received minor injuries.[7]

Moldovan authorities have yet to announce the results of the October 20 presidential election and European Union (EU) referendum, but both the election and referendum have passed the required voter turnout threshold to be valid. Current Moldovan President Maia Sandu is up for re-election, and the referendum — if passed — would change the Moldovan Constitution to define EU membership as one of Moldova's "strategic objectives."[8] The presidential election and referendum results will both be considered valid, as they surpassed the 33.33 percent voter turnout requirement.[9] The Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) reported that about 51 percent of registered voters had already voted in the presidential election by the end of the voting period within Moldova, but polling stations abroad are still open as of the time of this publication.[10] Moldovan media reported that 42.44 percent of voters had already participated in the referendum as of 1800 local time in Moldova.[11] ISW recently assessed that, although Moldova stands to advance its path towards European integration with the October 20 election and referendum, the Kremlin will continue its efforts to sabotage Moldova's EU accession and destabilize Moldovan democracy into the next decade.[12]

Moldovan authorities reported several attempted electoral violations, including attempts by pro-Russian actors to influence the results of the election and destabilize Moldova through violent protests and other kinetic activities. The Moldovan General Police Inspectorate reported that authorities have observed 113 electoral violations within Moldova as of 1830 local time, including photographing the ballot, damaging the ballot, and organizing the transport of voters.[13] The Moldovan CEC stated that "observers" from unspecified pro-Russian Moldovan political parties requested access to polling stations in Russia and Romania but that authorities denied their requests as they had not officially registered as observers before the deadline.[14] The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on October 20 that unspecified actors "artificially" created large lines at the two polling stations in Russia as part of attempts to illegally transport voters to the polling stations.[15] Moldovan IPN News Agency reported that unspecified actors gave Moldovan voters at the polling station in Moscow "invitations" to a restaurant, claiming that the Moldovan embassy in Russia organized the event — a claim that embassy representatives denied.[16] The "Cultural Educational Center of Moldova," which is reportedly affiliated with US-sanctioned, Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor, reportedly offered voters in Moscow "Moldovan citizen in Russia" cards that offered free services, such as internet, medical, legal, and banking services in Russia.[17] Moldovan media reported a bomb threat at a polling station in Italy but did not specify the responsible actor.[18] Director of Moldova's Intelligence and Security Service Alexandru Musteata reported on October 17 that Moldovan authorities found that foreign instructors affiliated with the Wagner Group had trained a group of about 100 young, pro-Russian Moldovans at "guerilla camps" in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.[19] Musteata stated that the Moldovans learned how to challenge law enforcement, use weapons and objects to cause non-lethal injuries, use improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and handle drones with explosive attachments. The Moldovan police also reported that over 300 Moldovans learned about protest tactics at a training ground near Moscow and that Shor's Eurasia non-profit organization funded the training. Kremlin authorities and pro-Kremlin Moldovan actors may plan to ignite protests after the election as part of efforts to destabilize Moldovan society and discredit the results.

Russian sources claimed on October 20 that former Russian Yukos Oil Company Vice President for Corporate Management Mikhail Rogachev was found dead in a possible suicide after falling from a window in Moscow.[20] Russian sources claimed that Rogachev left a suicide note and had been suffering from late-stage cancer.[21] One Russian insider source, claiming to cite unspecified people within Rogachev's "inner circle," denied that Rogachev had cancer and claimed that his death was unexpected for his family.[22] Rogachev held various positions in Yukos from 1996 to 2007, including vice president, before becoming the executive director of the Russian private investment fund ONEXIM Group and later the deputy general director of the Russian mining and metallurgical company Nornickel.[23] Russian opposition activist Mikhail Khodorkovsky owned Yukos until Russian authorities arrested Khodorkovsky, likely for political reasons, in 2003 and closed the company in 2007.[24]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against the Lipetsk-2 Air Base near Lipetsk City and Russian state-owned defense enterprise Sverdlov in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on the night of October 19 to 20.
Moldovan authorities have yet to announce the results of the October 20 presidential election and European Union (EU) referendum, but both the election and referendum have passed the required voter turnout threshold to be valid.
Russian sources claimed on October 20 that former Russian Yukos Oil Company Vice President for Corporate Management Mikhail Rogachev was found dead in a possible suicide after falling from a window in Moscow.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Sudzha and Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Toretsk and Selydove.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 19, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 18, 2024

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on October 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 19, 2024, 3pm ET

Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the "Kremniy El" microelectronic plant in Bryansk City on the night of October 18 to 19. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on October 19 that Ukrainian drones struck the plant and noted that "Kremniy El" is one of Russia's largest microelectronic manufacturers and that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is one of the company's main customers.[1] Head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko acknowledged the report of the strike and stated that the plant manufactures microelectronics for Russian Pantsir air defense systems, Iskander missiles, radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and drones.[2] Ukrainian outlet RBC Ukraine and Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno published photos showing the aftermath of the strike and damage to a building at the plant.[3] Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on October 19 that debris from a downed Ukrainian drone struck and caused a fire at a "non-residential building" in Bryansk Oblast, possibly referring to the plant.[4]

Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on October 18 - the fourth exchange since the start of Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 19 that Ukraine returned 95 POWs, including Ukrainian servicemembers who defended the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol in early 2022, Ukrainian National Guardsmen, servicemembers of the Ukrainian State Border Service, and other Ukrainian military personnel.[5] The Russian MoD claimed on October 18 that Russian authorities also returned 95 Russian POWs and that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.[6] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs noted that many of the returned Ukrainian POWs had serious illnesses and severe injuries and experienced weight loss due to torture and malnutrition in Russian captivity.[7] ISW previously observed that the frequency of POW exchanges between Ukraine and Russia has significantly increased since the start of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on August 6, with both sides exchanging a total of 267 POWs each in three separate exchanges prior to the most recent October 18 POW exchange.[8] Russia and Ukraine only conducted three POW exchanges between January 1 and August 6, 2024, in comparison. ISW continues to assess that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has likely increasingly incentivized Russia to engage in POW exchanges.

Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office reported on October 18 that Ukrainian authorities opened an investigation into the execution of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) in Bakhmut Raion in September 2024.[9] Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office reported that the Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office opened a pre-trial investigation into violations of the laws and customs of war and intentional murder in connection with Russian forces shooting an unarmed and injured Ukrainian POW near the Phenol Plant in Niu York, Donetsk Oblast on September 6, 2024. ISW has recently observed an increase in Russian violations of different aspects of the Geneva Convention on POWs, which prohibits the inhumane treatment and execution of POWs or persons who are clearly rendered hors de combat.[10]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the "Kremniy El" microelectronic plant in Bryansk City on the night of October 18 to 19.
Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on October 18 - the fourth exchange since the start of Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast in August 2024.
Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office reported on October 18 that Ukrainian authorities opened an investigation into the execution of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) in Bakhmut Raion in September 2024.
Russian forces recently advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 17, 2024

Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 18, 2024, 7:30 pm ET

South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported that North Korea transferred roughly 1,500 North Korean special forces to eastern Russia, where they are reportedly training before deploying to participate in Russia's war against Ukraine. The NIS stated on October 18 that seven Russian Pacific Fleet ships transported roughly 1,500 North Korean special forces from Chongjin, Hamhung, and Musudan in North Korea to Vladivostok, Russia between October 8 and 13 and that North Korea will send a second batch of military personnel to Russia soon.[1] The NIS stated that North Korean servicemembers are currently stationed in Vladivostok, Ussuriysk, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshchensk in eastern Russia. The NIS stated that the Russian military has issued the North Korean personnel Russian uniforms, weapons, and fake identification cards claiming that the North Koreans are residents of the Sakha and Buryatia republics. The NIS posted satellite imagery showing a Russian transport ship near North Korea and an estimated 640 North Korean personnel gathered at Russian military facilities in Ussuryisk and Khabarovsk on October 16. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on October 18 that the NIS also stated that North Korea recently decided to send four brigades totaling 12,000 personnel to the war in Ukraine.[2] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone on October 17 that there are nearly 11,000 North Korean infantry troops training in eastern Russia and that they will be ready to fight in Ukraine by November 1.[3] Budanov stated that the first cadre of 2,600 North Korean soldiers will deploy to Kursk Oblast but that it is unclear where the remaining troops will deploy. ISW cannot independently verify these statements but has no basis to question the veracity of these intelligence reports, which are consistent with previous reports from South Korean and Ukrainian officials about North Korean troops training in Russia before deploying to the war in Ukraine, including to Kursk Oblast.[4] ISW has also observed recent reports that a limited number of North Korean military personnel, mainly engineering personnel, are likely operating near occupied Donetsk City.[5]

A number of sources provided footage purporting to substantiate these intelligence reports. The footage appears consistent with reports of North Korean troop deployments to Russia but does not independently validate the intelligence reports. A Russian Telegram channel posted footage on October 18 purportedly showing North Korean soldiers marching at a Russian training ground, and the footage was later geolocated to Sergeevka, Primorsky Krai.[6] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne, along with Vox Ukraine's fact-checking project VoxCheck, reported that they could neither confirm nor deny that the soldiers in the footage are North Korean as the speech in the video is hard to hear and there are no clear external signs to indicate that the soldiers are North Korean.[7] The Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications (Stratcom) posted additional footage on October 18 reportedly showing Russian forces outfitting North Korean troops with Russian uniforms and equipment at the Sergeevka training ground.[8] ISW cannot independently verify the presence of North Korean troops in either of the videos and cannot verify the location of the second video.

Suspilne stated that the footage of North Korean troops marching was filmed at the base of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) in Sergeevka.[9] ISW has observed reports that elements of the 127th Division's 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment were operating in Kursk Oblast as of late August 2024, while other elements of the division, including its 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment, have been operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area since at least June 2024.[10] Both the 394th and 143rd motorized rifle regiments are based in Sergeevka.[11] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is likely leveraging its June 2024 Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, which Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted for ratification on October 14, to in part offset Russian force generation and border security requirements – further cementing Putin's commitment to avoiding mobilization for as long as possible.[12]

Russian forces appear to be further intensifying mechanized activity in western Donetsk Oblast amid initial reports of the start of autumnal muddy ground conditions. Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Ruslan Muzychuk stated on October 18 that Russian forces are increasingly supporting infantry-led assaults with armored vehicles ahead of the onset of muddy ground conditions in Ukraine in Fall 2024.[13] Muzychuk stated that Russian forces have recently increased their use of armored personnel carriers and tanks in assaults in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions but noted that Ukrainian forces are effectively destroying Russian armored vehicles in these directions.[14] Muzychuk stated that Ukrainian forces recently repelled several platoon-sized Russian mechanized assaults on the eastern outskirts of Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk).[15] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction reported on October 17 that Russian forces conducted a battalion-sized mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[16] The brigade reported that Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka with 27 armored vehicles and six tanks and that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed 14 armored vehicles and four tanks. Geolocated footage published on October 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault near Maksymilyanivka (east of Kurakhove).[17] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the recent attack near Maksymilyanivka reported that Russian forces attacked in two waves with a total of 33 armored vehicles and that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed 19 Russian armored vehicles.[18] Russian forces also conducted a company-sized mechanized assault near Selydove, as well as a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault and several company-sized and platoon-sized mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction over the past week.[19] ISW observed three battalion-sized mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast in the last week alone - a notable increase in tempo, as ISW only observed reports of Russian forces conducting four battalion-sized mechanized assaults in eastern Ukraine from late July to early October 2024.[20]

Russian and Ukrainian sources have recently reported worsening ground conditions throughout the frontline in Ukraine, and the arrival or the impending arrival of muddy ground conditions are likely prompting the Russian military command to intensify mechanized offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast.[21] ISW previously noted that the Russian military command may intend for this intensified mechanized activity to facilitate advances across open fields before the onset of seasonal rainy weather and muddy ground conditions and to allow Russian forces to consolidate positions in preparation for future offensive operations in the coming months.[22] Muddy ground conditions will likely constrain Russian infantry maneuver and Russian forces' use of motorcycles and other small, wheeled vehicles along the frontline, and the Russian military command may assess that advances during the current, less muddy weather conditions will limit the number of open fields that Russian infantry will have to cross later after ground conditions deteriorate. Russian forces may be able to more successfully employ tracked vehicles (the Soviet versions of which are designed to operate in such conditions) in muddy ground conditions, and muddy ground conditions may incentivize Russian forces to use armored vehicles and tanks in place of the smaller wheeled vehicles on which Russian infantry have come to rely to conduct assaults in certain frontline sectors.[23]

ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will continue offensive operations following the fall muddy season, though adverse weather conditions will likely degrade the effectiveness of Russian infantry until weather and ground conditions improve.[24] Russian forces notably made a concerted effort to regain the theater-wide initiative during the period of the most difficult weather conditions for mechanized offensive operations in Fall 2023 and may seek to retain the theater-wide initiative through consistent offensive pressure in Fall 2024 under similar weather conditions.[25]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to signal his disinterest in meaningful peace negotiations with Ukraine while using the upcoming BRICS summit to legitimize Kremlin information operations falsely portraying Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate. Putin met with prominent media organization heads from BRICS member states in Moscow on October 18 and claimed that Russia is willing to negotiate with Ukraine but later countered that Russia is "ready to continue this fight" and that "victory will be ours."[26] Putin's October 18 statements are the latest in a series of contradictory statements from Putin and other senior Kremlin officials that attempt to portray Russia as willing to negotiate while simultaneously signaling that the Kremlin is unwilling to accept terms that do not amount to Ukraine's capitulation and destruction.[27] Putin also claimed on October 18 that Russia needs to create conditions for an enduring peace and falsely portrayed Ukraine as the aggressor state in the war, further indicating that these conditions amount to eliminating Ukraine's ability to defend itself against possible future Russian aggression.[28] Putin used the meeting to promote alternative peace plans by Brazil and the People's Republic of China (PRC), the key principles of which favor Russia. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is uninterested in good-faith peace negotiations with Ukraine and that the Kremlin only invokes the concept of "peace plans" or "negotiations" to prompt the West to pressure Ukraine into preemptive concessions regarding Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[29]

Putin used ongoing conversations about security guarantees in Ukraine's Victory Plan to further boilerplate nuclear saber-ratting information operations that aim to discredit Ukraine to its Western partners and prevent Western aid to Ukraine. German outlet Bild claimed on October 17 that a Ukrainian official who specializes in weapons procurement stated several months ago that Ukraine would only need a few weeks to develop its first nuclear bomb.[30] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denied the Bild allegations on October 17.[31] Putin responded to a question on October 18 about the Bild article and Zelensky's recent statements about Ukraine's need for more concrete security guarantees during his meeting with BRICS member states media organizations, claiming that Russia will respond with an "appropriate reaction" should Ukraine take steps to develop a nuclear weapon, which Putin labeled as a "dangerous provocation."[32] Putin has routinely engaged in nuclear saber-ratting in order to push the West into self-deterrence, particularly during critical moments in Western policy discussions about support for Ukraine.[33] ISW continues to assess that Russia's nuclear saber-ratting is not indicative of Russia's willingness to use nuclear weapons and that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.[34] In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Russia specifically committed to "respect" and "refrain from the threat or use force" against Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity – making no exceptions for Crimea or the Donbas region – in exchange for Ukraine's commitment to give the Soviet nuclear weapons on its soil to Russia.[35]

Western partners continue to announce new military assistance to Ukraine. Germany announced on October 17 a new military aid package for Ukraine, which includes eight Leopard tanks; 20 Marder infantry fighting vehicles; two TRML-4D radar systems; 4,000 unspecified attack drones; 42,000 40mm artillery ammunition rounds; and one IRIS-T SLM and IRIS-T SLS air defense system each.[36] NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced on October 17 that NATO is working to provide Ukraine with the remainder of the promised 40 billion euros (about $43 billion) worth of military aid - 20.9 billion euros (about $31 billion) of which NATO has already provided - by the next NATO summit in June 2025.[37] Canadian Defense Minister Bill Blair announced on October 18 that Canada will provide 64.8 million Canadian dollars (about $47 million) worth of military aid to Ukraine, which will include small arms, ammunition, protective gear, and funding for the training of Ukrainian forces.[38] Dutch Prime Minister Dick Schoof announced on October 17 that the Netherlands will allocate 271 million euros (about $294 million) to purchase artillery shells for Ukraine.[39] Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds and Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasčiūnas announced on October 18 that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia will allocate 0.25 percent of their GDPs to support Ukraine.[40] Denmark announced on October 17 that it will allocate 2.4 billion Danish kroner (about $348 million) to Ukraine for the purchase of new military equipment and has signed agreements with international partners to donate materiel to support Ukraine's equipment of its new brigades.[41]

The US Department of State (DoS) program Rewards for Justice offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the identification or location of foreigners involved in interfering in US elections, including members of prominent Kremlin-awarded milblogger channel Rybar.[42] Rewards for Justice announced the award on October 18 and specified that the Rybar channel manages several social media channels, including at least one propaganda channel on X (formerly Twitter), that are trying to promote internal division and discord in the US and promote the interests of the Russian government.[43] Rewards for Justice identified nine Rybar employees who are of particular interest to the DoS: Rybar founder and director Mikhail Zvinchuk; creative director Valeriya Zvinchuk; video department head Alexander Kan; foreign language resources head Tatyana Kosterova; regional manager Olga Kuznetsova; designer and content team lead Maksim Matveyev; content head of a propaganda channel Alexander Minin; and Vladimir Berkutov and Alexander Minin, who both work on the propaganda channel.[44] Rewards for Justice noted that deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin funded Rybar before his death and that Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec currently funds the channel.[45] The Kremlin has coopted the Rybar channel as part of efforts to strengthen the Kremlin's control over the Russian information space, and ISW has previously assessed that the Rybar channel is also attempting to expand its influence in the international information space, including by supporting Iranian-backed Iraqi efforts to gain greater control over the Iraqi information space.[46]

Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on October 18 that Ukraine has recorded more than 100 confirmed cases of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) amid a recent theater-wide increase in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.[47] Lubinets stated that the number of Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs is likely much higher. ISW has recently observed an increase in Russian violations of different aspects of the Geneva Convention on POWs, which prohibits the inhumane treatment and execution of POWs or persons who are clearly rendered hors de combat.[48] The European Union (EU) reported on October 16 that at least 177 Ukrainian POWs have died in Russian captivity since February 2022.[49] Head of the Ukrainian Department for Combating Crimes in Conditions of Armed Conflict Yuri Bilousov stated on October 4 that Russian forces have executed 93 Ukrainian POWs on the battlefield since the start of the full-scale invasion and that 80 percent of the recorded cases occurred in 2024, suggesting a clear and systemic increase in the pace of such war crimes.[50]

Key Takeaways:

South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported that North Korea transferred roughly 1,500 North Korean special forces to eastern Russia, where they are reportedly training before deploying to participate in Russia's war against Ukraine.
A number of sources provided footage purporting to substantiate these intelligence reports. The footage appears consistent with reports of North Korean troop deployments to Russia but does not independently validate the intelligence reports.
Russian forces appear to be further intensifying mechanized activity in western Donetsk Oblast amid initial reports of the start of autumnal muddy ground conditions.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to signal his disinterest in meaningful peace negotiations with Ukraine while using the upcoming BRICS summit to legitimize Kremlin information operations falsely portraying Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate.
Putin used ongoing conversations about security guarantees in Ukraine's Victory Plan to further boilerplate nuclear saber-ratting information operations that aim to discredit Ukraine to its Western partners and prevent Western aid to Ukraine.
Western partners continue to announce new military assistance to Ukraine.
The US Department of State (DoS) program Rewards for Justice offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the identification or location of foreigners involved in interfering in US elections, including members of prominent Kremlin-awarded milblogger channel Rybar.
Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on October 18 that Ukraine has recorded more than 100 confirmed cases of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) amid a recent theater-wide increase in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.
Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Kreminna, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 16, 2024

Davit Gasparyan, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 17, 2024, 4:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00pm ET on October 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian sources reported on October 16 that unspecified actors killed the deputy commander of Russia's Special Operations Forces (SSO) Training Center, Nikita Klenkov, near Moscow City.[1] Klenkov reportedly fought in the war in Ukraine as part of military unit 43292 and was a high-ranking officer of the Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Russian authorities claimed that Klenkov's murder was a planned contract killing and opened a criminal investigation into the murder but have yet to accuse Ukraine or other Western actors of being involved in the murder.[2] ISW cannot independently verify these claims.

The European Union (EU) issued a statement on October 16 condemning Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and noted that at least 177 Ukrainian POWs have died in Russian captivity since February 2022.[3] The EU called Russia's increasingly frequent executions of Ukrainian POWs a grave breach of the Geneva Convention, highlighting that the executions demonstrate Russia’s systemic disregard for international law. The Geneva Convention on POWs prohibits the inhumane treatment and execution of POWs or persons who are clearly rendered hors de combat.[4] ISW has recently observed an increase in Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout the theater of war.[5] Head of the Ukrainian Department for Combating Crimes in Conditions of Armed Conflict Yuri Bilousov stated on October 4 that Ukrainian sources documented evidence indicating that Russian forces have executed 93 Ukrainian POWs on the battlefield since the start of the full-scale invasion and that 80 percent of the recorded cases occurred in 2024.[6]

Key Takeaways:

Russian sources reported on October 16 that unspecified actors killed the deputy commander of Russia's Special Operations Forces (SSO) Training Center, Nikita Klenkov, near Moscow City.
The European Union (EU) issued a statement on October 16 condemning Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and noted that at least 177 Ukrainian POWs have died in Russian captivity since February 2022.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 15, 2024

Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 16, 2024, 6:15pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented Ukraine's five-part Victory Plan aimed at winning the war by the end of 2025 to the Verkhovna Rada on October 16, which includes a promise to contribute experienced Ukrainian troops to defending NATO's eastern flank following the resolution of the war in Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine's Victory Plan is intended to end the war "no later than" 2025 and is composed of five points, including: an immediate invitation to join NATO; continued Western support and aid including equipping Ukrainian brigades, supporting Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia and increasing intelligence sharing with Ukraine; Western and Ukrainian non-nuclear strategic deterrence against Russia; Western investment in Ukraine's strategic economic growth; and a promise that Ukrainian forces will "replace" certain Western military contingents currently stationed in Europe after the war's conclusion.[1] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces will use their experience in the war to strengthen NATO's defense and ensure security in Europe and noted that Ukrainian units could replace unspecified contingents of US forces in Europe in the future. Zelensky noted that there are several secret aspects of the plan that he has shared with Ukraine's Western allies. Zelensky stated that Ukraine's fate is connected to the fate of its neighbors in the Baltics, Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia and warned that Ukraine and the West must support Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity or risk future Russian aggression. Ukrainian and Western officials expressed support for Zelensky's plan on October 16, and Zelensky noted that he will present the plan to the European Council on October 17.[2]

Russian President Vladimir Putin's current theory of victory in Ukraine seeks to protract the war and posits that Russian forces can outlast Western support for Ukraine and collapse Ukrainian resistance by winning a war of attrition. Russia will likely face serious medium- and long-term constraints that will undermine this strategic effort, however. Putin and the Russian military command have committed the Russian military to a year-long offensive effort along the frontline in eastern and northeastern Ukraine that seeks to exhaust Ukrainian forces and prevent Ukraine from accumulating the necessary manpower and materiel to conduct counteroffensive operations that contest Russia's theater-wide initiative.[3] Putin and the Russian military command likely view retaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic priority and have shown themselves to be tolerant of protracted offensive operations that result in gradual, creeping advances far short of their intended operational objectives.[4] The Russian military is currently attempting to eliminate a challenge to its theater-wide initiative in Kursk Oblast following the Ukrainian incursion in early August 2024 while maintaining offensive pressure in eastern Ukraine in pursuit of longstanding operational objectives.[5] The Russian military's intensified Summer 2024 offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk and reduce the wider Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast will likely culminate in the coming months, although the Russian military command will likely continue to commit Russian forces to the overall strategic effort to retain the theater-wide initiative and exhaust Ukrainian forces well past this operational culmination point regardless of the state of Russian forces' combat effectiveness.[6] Putin's theory of victory relies on Russian forces conducting consistent offensive operations indefinitely, but these grinding assaults will likely degrade available Russian manpower and materiel significantly enough that Russian forces will have to decrease offensive tempo on at least select sectors of the front — presenting Ukrainian forces with opportunities to contest and perhaps seize the battlefield initiative in these areas.[7]

Medium- to long-term constraints on Russian force-generation capacity and Russian military-industrial production will undermine Russia's ability to support consistent offensive operations that seek to protract the war and overwhelm Ukraine through attrition. ISW has observed a steady widespread increase in financial incentives that Russian authorities are offering for concluding a military contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), suggesting that Russia is exhausting recruitment pools of willing volunteers.[8] Russian authorities have reportedly expressed concerns that ongoing recruitment efforts are producing diminishing results, and Putin remains committed to avoiding another partial mobilization call-up of reservists despite growing signs of force-generation constraints.[9] Putin retains the option to conduct another partial mobilization wave — as he did in Fall 2022 — but will likely only do so under immense pressure or once the ongoing crypto-mobilization campaign seriously fails. Russian offensive operations in Ukraine have resulted in pronounced equipment losses, particularly for armored vehicles, and Russian military industrial production capacity will likely fail to replace these losses in the medium- to long-term.[10] Russia currently relies on refurbishing a large but finite stock of Soviet-era equipment to replace its outsized losses in Ukraine and appears to be depleting stockpiles at an increased rate.[11] Russia is leveraging partnerships with North Korea and Iran to acquire ammunition and military equipment and is engaging with the People's Republic of China (PRC) to acquire critical components for defense production, but these international procurement efforts will not address all the Russian materiel requirements in Ukraine.[12] Putin appears just as reluctant to conduct a full-scale economic mobilization as he is to conduct another mobilization wave, and it remains unclear if critical bottlenecks and worsening labor shortages would even allow Russia to rapidly and fully mobilize its economy for the war effort in the event that Putin permitted it.[13]

Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin notably questioned the Kremlin's articulated theory of victory and assessed that 2025 and possibly late 2024 will be “a serious test” for Russia because the Kremlin has yet to address medium- to long-term force-generation and defense-industrial-capacity constraints. Girkin published a series of letters from prison written between September 28 and October 12 in which he argued that the Kremlin’s current strategy depends on the outcome of the US presidential elections, implying that the Kremlin anticipates that Russia will be able to outlast Western support for Ukraine based on the policies of a new US administration.[14] Girkin acknowledged that he does not have access to reliable tactical forecasts due to his imprisonment but noted that the Kremlin has yet to fix its systematic defense industrial base (DIB) and manpower problems since launching the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and that these problems may soon lead to military-economic crises in Russia. Girkin claimed that the Kremlin has exaggerated its military capabilities, resulting in the Russian DIB failing to catch up to war-time equipment needs. Girkin emphasized that the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has long “consumed” or “is finishing” remaining Russian weapon reserves. Girkin also noted that Russia has expended trained personnel as if they are “endless and inexhaustible,” and that the war has already “eaten up" Russian professional forces. Girkin implied that subsequent Russian force generation efforts are detrimental to the Russian economy because the Kremlin now needs to generate forces from its labor force. Girkin argued that the Kremlin’s lack of long-term strategic planning and poor tactical planning created conditions in which the Russian military and DIB systems respond to emerging problems only after these problems become “critically dangerous.” Girkin notably claimed that the Kremlin has wasted the time it has had to correct these “gross mistakes,” noting that the Kremlin missed the opportunity that the West and Ukraine “kindly provided” to Russia “via their own incompetence and degradation” by delaying the provision of US aid to Ukraine in Winter 2023–2024 and Spring 2024. Girkin routinely pointed out Russia's long-term military and political vulnerabilities prior to his arrest in July 2023. Girkin is also notably one of the first voices within the Russian ultranationalist information space to openly question the Kremlin's theory of victory.

Girkin also assessed that Russian Summer–Fall 2024 offensive campaign did not accomplish its goals in the entire theater and is unlikely to do so ahead of the muddy season, although Russian forces are continuing intense offensive operations in several operational directions in Ukraine. Girkin stated that the Russian offensive operation north and northeast of Kharkiv City has “stalled” with very insignificant territorial advances; that Russian offensives in Donetsk Oblast merely “pushed” Ukrainian positions but did not break through the frontline; and that Russian forces are spending their reserves on repelling Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast.[15] Girkin argued that the Russian seizure of Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast was “unsurprising” because Russian forces once again failed to encircle Ukrainian forces, which are now able to consolidate on a shortened frontline to the northwest of the settlement. Girkin assessed that the Ukrainian Summer–Fall 2024 defensive operation was successful in achieving its goals of repelling Russian offensives with minimal territorial losses; delivering strong counterattacks; preserving unused reserves; and maintaining morale within the military and society.

US President Joe Biden announced a new military assistance package for Ukraine worth $425 million following a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on October 16.[16] Biden stated that the package will include additional air defense capabilities, air-to-ground munitions, armored vehicles, and unspecified munitions and that the US will provide Ukraine will hundreds of air defense interceptors, dozens of tactical air defense systems, hundreds of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and thousands of additional armored vehicles in the coming months. The Department of Defense (DoD) specified that the package will include additional munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), RIM-7 missiles and support for air defense, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, munitions for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), air-to-ground munitions, 155mm and 105mm artillery munitions, tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles, Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), and other munitions and equipment. The DoD noted that this is the Biden administration’s 67th tranche of equipment drawn from DoD inventories provided to Ukraine since August 2021.The Australian government announced that it will provide Ukraine with 49 M1A1 Abrams tanks as part a new aid package to Ukraine worth 245 million Australian dollars (about $164 million).[17]

The South Korean Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on October 16 that it is "closely" monitoring indications that North Korean troops are directly supporting Russia's war effort in Ukraine amid reports that the Russian military is training North Korean soldiers.[18] The South Korean National Intelligence Service also announced on October 16 that it is tracking the possibility that North Korean troops are participating in Russia's war effort and that it is coordinating with Ukrainian intelligence services.[19] Sources in Ukraine's military and intelligence services told Ukrainian outlets RBC Ukraine and Suspilne that the Russian military is currently training over 10,000 North Korean soldiers in Russia's Far East and are preparing to transfer some of them to border areas near Ukraine in order to free up Russian military personnel for rotations.[20] Ukrainian outlets Suspilne and Liga reported on October 15, citing anonymous military intelligence sources, that the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade is forming a 3,000-person “battalion” staffed by North Korean citizens (the numerical strength is far beyond a battalion’s), which the Russian military will likely deploy to defensive operations in Kursk Oblast.[21] ISW has not observed reports that North Korean troops are involved in combat operations, however. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated on October 16 that NATO does not have "definitive" information that North Korean troops are fighting in Ukraine.[22] The New York Times (NYT) reported on October 16 that unspecified US military and intelligence officials "expressed some skepticism" that a significant number of North Korean personnel were fighting in Ukraine, but stated that they had "little doubt" that North Korean engineers and observers are operating in occupied Ukraine and Russia in part to build and operate North Korean-provided ballistic missiles for Russian forces.[23]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented Ukraine's five-part Victory Plan aimed at winning the war by the end of 2025 to the Verkhovna Rada on October 16, which includes a promise to contribute experienced Ukrainian troops to defending NATO's eastern flank following the resolution of the war in Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin's current theory of victory in Ukraine seeks to protract the war and posits that Russian forces can outlast Western support for Ukraine and collapse Ukrainian resistance by winning a war of attrition. Russia will likely face serious medium- and long-term constraints that will undermine this strategic effort, however.
Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin notably questioned the Kremlin's articulated theory of victory and assessed that 2025 and possibly late 2024 will be “a serious test” for Russia because the Kremlin has yet to address medium- to long-term force-generation and defense-industrial-capacity constraints.
Girkin also assessed that Russian Summer–Fall 2024 offensive campaign did not accomplish its goals in the entire theater and is unlikely to do so ahead of the muddy season, although Russian forces are continuing intense offensive operations in several operational directions in Ukraine.
US President Joe Biden announced a new military assistance package for Ukraine worth $425 million following a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on October 16.
The South Korean Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on October 16 that it is "closely" monitoring indications that North Korean troops are directly supporting Russia's war effort in Ukraine amid reports that the Russian military is training North Korean soldiers.
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, near Kreminna, near Siversk, and near Toretsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 14, 2024

Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 15, 2024, 7:20pm ET

The Kremlin is likely leveraging the recent June 2024 Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in part to offset Russian force generation and border security requirements—further cementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to avoiding mobilization for as long as possible. Ukrainian outlets Suspilne and Liga reported on October 15, citing anonymous military intelligence sources, that the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade is forming a 3,000-person “battalion” staffed by North Korean citizens (the numerical strength is far beyond a battalion’s).[1] Ukrainian intelligence sources assessed that the “battalion” will likely be involved in ongoing Russian defensive operations in Kursk Oblast and reported that up to 18 North Korean soldiers have already deserted their positions in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts before the unit has been committed to combat operations.[2] ISW cannot independently confirm the veracity of these reports, but Russian officials notably did not deny them on October 15. Putin submitted the text of the Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, which both countries signed in June 2024, to the Russian State Duma for ratification on October 14.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov emphasized in a comment to Kremlin newswire TASS that the Russia-North Korea agreement is "unambiguous" in its provision of "mutual defense and security cooperation."[4] The Kremlin is likely using the "mutual defense" provision of the agreement to provide the legal justification for the deployment of North Korean soldiers to the combat zone in Russia in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. ISW has recently observed reports that a small contingent of North Korean personnel was operating near occupied Donetsk City.[5]

Beyond the legal justification, however, the Kremlin's willingness to enter into a mutual defense agreement with North Korea, resulting in the reported commitment of North Korean personnel into combat operations in Russia, highlights Putin's continued reliance on pursuing alternative force generation avenues instead of committing to declaring partial or general mobilization. ISW has reported at length on Putin's continued reliance on crypto-mobilization and the formation of new volunteer formations to avoid the domestic ramifications of conducting a society-wide general mobilization or another partial mobilization wave.[6] This dilemma has become particularly acute for Putin since Ukraine's August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion, as the Russian military had to reckon with new manpower requirements introduced by the need to defend an entirely new front within Russia itself. Putin's response to the Kursk incursion has been consistent with his handling of Russian force generation throughout the war thus far, however, and he has maintained his unwillingness to counter the incursion more seriously with a wider mobilization, instead focusing on the ad hoc creation of new territorial defense units, the redeployment of existing units from Ukraine, and the use of conscripts.[7] The use of North Korean personnel under the mutual defense clause of the Russia-North Korea agreement is part of the same wider effort. Putin appears more willing to absorb North Korean personnel into the Russian military and resort to other irregular force generation efforts than to call for a wider mobilization to actually address the combat situation in the theater of operations.

The Kremlin has elected to address the recent controversy regarding its reliance on conscripts to repel Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast by offering financial incentives to any personnel involved in defending the state border. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed on October 14 expanding the criteria for Russian combat veteran status to include soldiers who have defended against an "invasion into Russia" or "armed provocations on the state border," which likely includes conscripts and local territorial defense elements involved in facing Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast.[8] Legal Russian combat veteran status would entitle these personnel to veterans' pensions and other social benefits, and Kremlin newswire TASS noted that the Russian federal expenditures to expand the list of military personnel classified as combat veterans will exceed 3.4 billion rubles (about $35 million) in 2025-2027.[9] Current Russian federal law stipulates that Russian conscripts cannot participate in combat operations, and the Russian MoD has instead relied on conscripts to conduct border security functions along the border with Ukraine to free up combat power to deploy elsewhere in the theater.[10] Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast exposed the vulnerability of Russia's border security and conscription policies, as Russian conscripts actively participated in combat operations in the region in response to the incursion.[11] The Russian MoD’s vague proposal to extend veteran statuses to personnel involved in border security functions is likely another loophole that will allow the Kremlin to covertly rely on conscripts to defend the border without the need to formally amend the Russian legal restrictions on the use of conscripts in combat. The proposal also likely aims to appease conscripts and their families by providing financial compensation and incentives with the likely aim of avoiding backlash similar to the controversies the Soviet Union and later Russia faced over the use of conscripts in combat operations in Afghanistan and Chechnya.[12] Putin could have chosen to amend the Russian law to formally allow conscripts to conduct combat functions but instead chose to expand the combat veteran eligibility criteria and increase spending for combat veterans.[13] The provision of veteran statuses also likely aims to incentivize recruitment into newly formed territorial defense formations such as BARS-Kursk and BARS-Belgorod. Putin has been increasingly turning to issuing a wide variety of long term financial incentives to generate manpower, appease mobilized personnel and their families, and prolong his war effort in Ukraine, and Putin‘s persistent reliance on these incentives suggests that he remains concerned about the possible negative consequences on the stability of his regime if he demands involuntary sacrifices from Russian society.[14]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law allowing Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin to stay in his position despite reaching retirement age (again) demonstrating Putin's continued preference for keeping curated loyalists from his inner circle in positions of power. Putin signed a law on October 14 allowing the Russian head of state (himself) to "extend the term of office of the head of the Investigative Committee who has reached the age of 70."[15] Bastrykin turned 71 in August 2024 and has held his position since 2011. The previous law stated that the maximum age for Investigative Committee officials was 65 but that Putin could extend this term to 70.[16] Putin has taken similar steps in recent years to raise the retirement ages of government and military officials — current Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev lowered the age limit for civil servants from 65 to 60 in 2010, but Putin raised this to 70 in 2013 when he returned to the presidency.[17] Putin also signed laws in 2021 that allowed the president to extend the term of army generals, marshals, fleet admirals, and presidential appointees.[18] Putin's continuous raising of the retirement age allows him to keep those within his inner circle who are loyal to him in positions of power. Bastrykin was notably a classmate of Putin's at university.[19] Bastrykin has also recently positioned himself as a prominent figure in Russia's ultranationalist community, specifically appealing to ultranationalist animus towards migrants.[20] Putin has likely calculated that having a loyalist like Bastrykin rhetorically lead the ultranationalist community is beneficial for the Kremlin's recent wider efforts to appeal to and co-opt this community, and has manipulated the law accordingly.[21] Putin recently promoted younger members of his inner circle, such as 52-year-old Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin, to positions within the Kremlin, but these younger appointees have also been loyal Putin supporters for decades.[22]

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin is likely leveraging the recent June 2024 Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in part to offset Russian force generation and border security requirements—further cementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to avoiding mobilization for as long as possible.
The Kremlin has elected to address the recent controversy regarding its reliance on conscripts to repel Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast by offering financial incentives to any personnel involved in defending the state border.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law allowing Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin to stay in his position despite reaching retirement age (again) demonstrating Putin's continued preference for keeping curated loyalists from his inner circle in positions of power.
Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
A former Russian Storm-Z instructor and milblogger heavily criticized Russian forces' reliance on the partially-encrypted communications platform Discord following Russia's recent ban of the platform.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 13, 2024

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Nate Trotter, and George Barros

October 14, 2024, 5:50pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on October 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov arrived in the People's Republic of China (PRC) for an official visit on October 14, highlighting continued Russia-PRC defense cooperation against the backdrop of bilateral naval exercises in the Pacific Ocean. Belousov met with PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun in Beijing on August 14 and discussed the role of bilateral cooperation in enhancing each state's respective defensive capabilities and maintaining global security and regional stability.[1] Dong emphasized that Russia and the PRC share a common desire to develop military cooperation and open new avenues for unspecified joint defense cooperation.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably published footage on October 14 of ongoing joint Russia-PRC People's Liberation Army (PLA) anti-submarine naval exercises in the northwestern Pacific Ocean and claimed that a detachment of Russian and PLA naval vessels are conducting a joint patrol of the Asia–Pacific region.[3] Such joint naval exercises are manifestations of intensified Russia-PRC defense cooperation, as each party can learn valuable lessons from one another during combined exercises, improving interoperability and potentially shaping military doctrine in the future. Russian forces have experience repelling Ukrainian autonomous naval drone strikes against Russian naval and port infrastructure, and the PLA may hope to absorb some of these lessons in planning for the PRC's potential future actions against Taiwan. Taiwan's MoD warned that the PRC launched "massive military drills" encircling Taiwan with warships on October 14, which overlapped with Belousov's visit.[4]

Russian forces struck civilian vessels docked at Ukrainian ports for the fourth time since October 5, part of an apparent Russian strike campaign targeting port areas to undermine Ukraine's grain corridor, spoil international support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations. Odesa Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck the port of Odesa with a ballistic missile during the day on October 14, hitting the civilian vessels NS Moon flying the Belize flag and the Optima dry cargo vessel flying the Palau flag, as well as port infrastructure and a grain warehouse.[5] The officials stated that Russian strikes on October 7 already damaged the Optima. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces most recently struck civilian vessels docked at the port of Odesa overnight on October 5 to 6 and on October 7 and 9.[6] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers responded to the October 9 strike with rhetoric supporting existing Kremlin narratives aimed at undermining confidence in the grain corridor as well as attempting to justify the strike.[7] Milbloggers explicitly called for further Russian strikes against Ukrainian grain infrastructure, civilian vessels at Ukrainian ports, and other targets that would further degrade Ukraine's economic potential. ISW recently assessed that Russian strikes against civilian vessels and other grain corridor infrastructure are almost certainly intended to undermine Western confidence in Ukraine's ability to enforce and defend the corridor, influence ongoing Western discussions about long-term support for Ukraine, and impede Ukraine's ability to survive economically during the war.[8]

Key Takeaways:

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov arrived in the People's Republic of China (PRC) for an official visit on October 14, highlighting continued Russia-PRC defense cooperation against the backdrop of bilateral naval exercises in the Pacific Ocean.
Russian forces struck civilian vessels docked at Ukrainian ports for the fourth time since October 5, part of an apparent Russian strike campaign targeting port areas to undermine Ukraine's grain corridor, spoil international support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations.
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recaptured positions in Kursk Oblast.
Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in central Toretsk.
Russian forces recently conducted a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kurakhove direction and recently made confirmed advances northeast of Vuhledar.
Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on October 11 that sources within the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program, which places veterans of the war in Ukraine into government positions after returning to Russia, is meant to increase the popularity of contract military service and boost recruitment.
Russian occupation officials continue to pathologize Ukrainian identity in an effort to indoctrinate children in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 12, 2024

Riley Bailey, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, and George Barros

October 13, 2024, 4:05pm ET

Russian forces have recently resumed tactical offensive attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and have made tactical gains in localized assaults, but this activity so far does not appear to be a part of a larger operational offensive effort to support the wider Russian offensive operation in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated on October 12 and 13 that elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) launched assaults near Levadne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and broke through Ukrainian defenses.[1] A Ukrainian military observer noted that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Levadne and advanced in the direction of Novodarivka (southwest of Novodarivka).[2] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces seized Levadne and advanced up to the southern outskirts of Novodarivka, although ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims.[3]

These tactical gains are not the result of a sudden or unexpected Russian breakthrough. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces began conducting renewed ground assaults southwest of Velyka Novosilka beginning around October 11.[4] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on October 3 that Russian forces were preparing assaults groups for offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast in the near future but that Ukrainian forces had not identified large Russian force concentrations in southern Ukraine.[5] Voloshyn added that the planned Russian offensive activity aimed to improve Russian tactical positions and establish tactical footholds for continued offensive actions.[6] Russian forces activated on a long dormant sector of the front in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Kamyanske (south of Stepnohirsk) in early October, but this activity has so far been limited and has resulted in only marginal tactical gains.[7] Russian forces may be reactivating in less active sectors of the front in southern Ukraine to divert Ukrainian attention away from Russia's priority offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and to fix Ukrainian forces along the front in southern Ukraine and prevent Ukraine from redeploying forces to Donetsk Oblast.

Concerted Russian offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area could theoretically support the ongoing Russian operational effort to eliminate the wider Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast and advance up to the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway by pressing up the T-0518 (Velyka Novosilka-Bahatyr) highway and pressuring the western flank of the Ukrainian grouping in western Donetsk Oblast.[8] Russian forces have activated on the western bank of the Mokryi Yaly River that runs west along the T-0518 highway and the western outskirts of Velyka Novosilka, however, and are currently attempting to advance in areas that diverge from the western flank of the Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces would likely need to seize Velyka Novosilka in order to drive up the T-0518 highway and pursue significant advances into the western flank of the Ukrainian salient, which would require intensified offensive activity on the eastern bank of the Mokryi Yaly River immediately south of Velyka Novosilka. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger noted on October 13 that there has been a lull in Russian activity north of Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka and immediately on the western and eastern banks of the Mokryi Yaly River, respectively).[9] Russian advances in the Levadne-Novodarivka area could theoretically aim to cut the road connecting Hulyaipole to Velyka Novosilka and degrade Ukrainian logistics to Velyka Novosilka ahead of hypothetical intensified Russian assaults to seize Velyka Novosilka. ISW has not observed reports that Russian forces are conducting notably large assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, however, or accumulating manpower and materiel for an intensified offensive effort comparable to the Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. Russian forces, on the contrary, have redeployed forces that were previously in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and elsewhere in southern Ukraine to respond to Ukraine’s incursion in Kursk.[10]

Russian forces recently executed nine Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast amid a theater-wide increase in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) project reported on October 13 that Russian forces executed nine Ukrainian POWs near the village of Zeleny Shlyakh, Kursk Oblast on October 10.[11] Ukrainian drone operators reportedly unexpectedly encountered Russian forces in what they likely perceived to be a near rear area and came under Russian fire. The Ukrainian drone operators, facing limited ammunition, were compelled to surrender and Russian forces took them as POWs. An image of the aftermath of the execution suggests that Russian forces disarmed, lined, stripped, and shot the Ukrainian POWs — a clear indication of the premeditated nature of the executions.[12] Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets condemned the executions on October 13 as a serious violation of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of POWs and stated that he sent letters to the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regarding the case.[13] The Geneva Convention on POWs prohibits the execution of POWs or persons who are clearly rendered hors de combat.[14] The Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office also announced on October 13 that it launched an investigation into the reports of the execution of the nine Ukrainian POWs in Kursk Oblast.[15]

ISW has recently observed an increase in Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout the theater, and Russian commanders are likely writ large condoning, encouraging, or directly ordering the execution of Ukrainian POWs. Head of the Ukrainian Department for Combating Crimes in Conditions of Armed Conflict Yuri Bilousov stated on October 4 that Ukrainian sources documented evidence indicating that Russian forces have executed 93 Ukrainian POWs on the battlefield since the start of the full-scale invasion and that 80 percent of the recorded cases occurred in 2024.[16] The largest single-instance of execution of Ukrainian POWs occurred on October 1 when Russian forces executed 16 Ukrainian POWs in the Pokrovsk direction.[17] ISW continues to track footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs and has observed a wider trend of Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appear to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders.[18] The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office recently noted that Russian commanders directly ordered the execution of four Ukrainian POWs at the Vovchansk aggregate plant in Summer 2024.[19]

Russian milbloggers largely glorified the Russian execution of the Ukrainian POWs, reinforcing a cultural norm to justify and celebrate war crimes within the broader Russian ultranationalist community. Many Russian milbloggers not only justified but celebrated the Russian execution of the POWs in Kursk Oblast by claiming that the executions were deserved or that such executions are a common aspect of war.[20] Other Russian milbloggers specifically called on the Russian military to increase the execution of Ukrainian POWs throughout the theater.[21] Many of these Russian milbloggers have very large followings and are affiliated with the Kremlin, providing them with a sense of authority in establishing and reinforcing the accepted cultural norms within the Russian ultranationalist community. The Rybar Telegram channel, which celebrated the execution of POWs, has received awards from the Kremlin and has a following of roughly 1.3 million subscribers as of this publication, and Rybar founder Mikhail Zvinchuk regularly appears on Russian state television to comment on the war in Ukraine.[22] Other prominent ultranationalist milbloggers who praised and justified the October 10 execution include: RVvoenkor with about 1.62 million Telegram subscribers, Dva Mayora with roughly 1.17 million subscribers, Starshe Edy with about 627,000 subscribers, and Zapisky Veterana with about 357,000 subscribers as of this publication.[23] Many of these subscribers are Russian military personnel and volunteers currently fighting in the war, and Russian soldiers routinely interact with these channels through correspondences and crowdfunding efforts. Russian milbloggers have often glorified Russian atrocities and brutality in Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion, and this glorification underscores a broader culture that is likely encouraging the systemic execution of Ukrainian POWs.[24]

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces have recently resumed tactical offensive attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and have made tactical gains in localized assaults, but this activity so far does not appear to be a part of a larger operational offensive effort to support the wider Russian offensive operation in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces recently executed nine Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast amid a theater-wide increase in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.
Russian milbloggers largely glorified the Russian execution of the Ukrainian POWs, reinforcing a cultural norm to justify and celebrate war crimes within the broader Russian ultranationalist community.
Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Selydove, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Donetsk City, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 11, 2024

Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros

October 12, 2024, 5:55pm ET

Russian forces are reportedly relying on illicitly obtained Starlink terminals to improve combat coordination and the effectiveness of their tactical reconnaissance strike complex (TRSC) in Ukraine as part of an overarching effort to reach technological parity with Ukrainian forces.[1] Ukrainian military personnel operating in Donetsk Oblast told the Washington Post in an article published on October 12 that Starlink terminals have increasingly appeared at Russian frontline positions and that the illicitly obtained technology is helping Russian forces fix persisting issues with combat coordination and communications while improving the precision of Russian tactical fires.[2] The commander of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating near Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) told the Washington Post that Ukrainian reconnaissance drones started widely recording Starlink terminals at Russian positions in the area in September 2024 and that the arrival of the terminals corresponded with a decrease in intercepted Russian radio transmissions in which Russian soldiers relayed incomplete or incorrect battlefield information to their commanders.[3] Another Ukrainian soldier reportedly stated that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction appear to have enough Starlink terminals to give individual tactical groups their own terminal.[4] Ukrainian soldiers reportedly credited recent Russian battlefield gains, including the Russian seizure of Vuhledar in late September 2024, partially to the Russian use of Starlink terminals.[5] Russian forces have mainly relied on radio and other insecure communication technologies for organizing combat coordination and relaying targeting information to fire and strike elements, and Russian forces have yet to field modern battlefield management systems at scale to organize their TRSC as many Ukrainian units have.[6] Ukrainian access to Starlink has afforded Ukrainian forces a technological edge to conduct more effective combat coordination and field new developments in the TRSC ahead of Russian forces, and Russian forces are likely trying to degrade these Ukrainian advantages by scaling up their own use of the terminals.[7] Ukraine is currently pursuing a strategy to offset Russian manpower and materiel advantages through technological innovation and adaptation, and technological parity between Ukrainian and Russian forces will undermine this effort.[8]

A Russian milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian F-16 downed a Russian Su-34 fighter aircraft in an unspecified area of the theater on October 12. ISW cannot verify the claim that a Ukrainian F-16 was involved in the reported loss of the Russian Su-34. A Russian milblogger closely affiliated with Russian aviation published a tribute to a lost Su-34 aircraft on October 12 but did not provide additional details about the incident.[9] A prominent Russian milblogger also confirmed that the Su-34 crew died but claimed that this loss was not related to Ukrainian activity, and other milbloggers speculated that the Su-34 could have crashed as a result of technical malfunction or human error.[10] A Russian Telegram channel, which claims to be managed by Russian airborne (VDV) officers and staff of the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces, claimed that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet presumably shot down the Russian Su-34 fighter aircraft while the Su-34 was dropping FAB glide bombs with unified planning and correction modules (UMPC) at a distance of about 50 kilometers from the frontline.[11] The Telegram channel later responded to the claims that the Su-34 could have crashed due to technical malfunction or human error, noting that such hypothetical scenarios still highlight a problem with the wear and tear of Russian aircraft, unprofessionalism among pilots, and pilot exhaustion.[12] The Telegram channel accused Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers of lying about the Su-34 crash and preventing Russian forces from developing plans to counter the Ukrainian F-16 threat.[13] The Telegram channel claimed in March 2024 that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor filed a complaint against the channel for “discrediting” a Russian military commander.[14] ISW cannot independently confirm the Telegram channel’s claim, but if confirmed, this incident would mark the first Ukrainian shootdown of a Russian manned aircraft with a Western-provided F-16 fighter jet.

Unknown actors opened fire on personnel of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs' (MVD) Center for Combating Extremism in Nazran, Republic of Ingushetia on the night of October 11.[15] The shooters reportedly targeted the car of the center's deputy head, Adam Khamkhoev, who was reportedly not injured.[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Khamkhoev's whereabouts following the shooting were unknown.[17] The shooters killed three people, including one of Khamkhoev's security guards.[18] Russian law enforcement-affiliated outlet Baza noted that this was the fifth attempt on Khamkhoev's life and that Khamkhoev's former boss at the Center for Combating Extremism, Ibragim Eldzharkiyev, was assassinated in Moscow in 2019.[19] Russian business outlet Kommersant noted that Khamkhoev is listed as a victim in numerous criminal cases, including a case about a previous murder attempt against Eldzharkiyev.[20] Russian authorities previously claimed that members of the "militant group" of the Sufi followers of Batal-Khadzhi Belkhoroev (called the Batalkhadzhintsy) were involved in Eldzharkiyev's murder.[21] A member of the Batalkhadzhintsy claimed in 2023 that he killed Eldzharkiyev as part of a "blood feud."[22] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov reportedly supports fellow Sufi Batalkhadzhintsy, offering them protection in Chechnya in exchange for sending volunteer units to fight in Ukraine.[23] Kadyrov notably declared a "blood feud" against three Republic of Dagestan and Republic of Ingushetia legislators on October 10 after accusing them of plotting his assassination.[24] The Russian Emergencies Ministry stated that a gas tank exploded at a gas station in Grozny, Chechen Republic on October 12, reportedly due to safety violations.[25] ISW is not prepared to assess any connections between these events at this time.

Indian enterprises are reportedly increasing exports of dual-use technologies to Russia, in part thanks to large Russian reserves of rupees from oil sales to India. Bloomberg reported on October 11 that US and European officials stated that India has become the second largest supplier of restricted technologies, such as microchips, circuits, and machine tools, to Russia – after the People's Republic of China (PRC).[26] Monthly Indian exports of these technologies reportedly doubled to $60 million in both April and May 2024 as compared to unspecified months earlier in 2024 and increased to $95 million in July 2024. Bloomberg reported that the official sources stated that about one-fifth of "sensitive" technologies imported by the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) come via India. Russia's large stocks of Indian rupees following Russian oil sales to India are reportedly driving the growth of Russian imports from India. The Financial Times similarly reported in September 2024 that leaked documents revealed that Russia has been covertly acquiring sensitive dual-use electronics from India with "significant reserves" of Indian rupees amassed by Russian banks from increasing oil sales to India.[27] It is unclear to what extent private Indian businesses or state enterprises are exporting these technologies to Russia, but Indian firms appear to nonetheless be helping Russia sustain its war effort in Ukraine. These reports come against the backdrop of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's August 2024 visit to Ukraine, during which he rhetorically highlighted the principles of international law, including sovereignty and territorial integrity, in discussions with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[28] Reported transfers of Indian artillery shells through European intermediaries to Ukraine have also reportedly generated tensions in the Russian-Indian relationship.[29]

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces are reportedly relying on illicitly obtained Starlink terminals to improve combat coordination and the effectiveness of their tactical reconnaissance strike complex (TRSC) in Ukraine as part of an overarching effort to reach technological parity with Ukrainian forces.
A Russian milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian F-16 downed a Russian Su-34 fighter aircraft in an unspecified area of the theater on October 12, but ISW cannot verify the claim that a Ukrainian F-16 was involved in the reported loss of the Russian Su-34.
Unknown actors opened fire on personnel of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs' (MVD) Center for Combating Extremism in Nazran, Republic of Ingushetia on the night of October 11.
Indian enterprises are reportedly increasing exports of dual-use technologies to Russia, in part thanks to large Russian reserves of rupees from oil sales to India.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Donetsk City, and Robotyne.
Russian forces are reportedly struggling to conduct effective counterbattery fires.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 10, 2024

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, and George Barros

October 11, 2024, 8:20pm ET

Russian forces intensified their ongoing effort to dislodge Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast around the evening of October 10 and have recently advanced further into the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast while reportedly eliminating almost the entirety of the smaller Ukrainian salient in Glushkovsky Raion. Russian forces reportedly simultaneously intensified counterattacks in Glushkovksy Raion, on the left flank of the main Ukrainian salient in Korenevsky Raion, and on the right flank of the main Ukrainian salient in Sudzhansky Raion on the evening of October 10.[1] Geolocated footage published on October 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo) and to the northern outskirts of Zeleny Shlyakh (southeast of Korenevo) and enveloped Ukrainian positions near Lyubimovka (southeast of Korenevo).[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating in Korenevsky Raion seized Olgovka (east of Korenevo) and Nizhny Klin (southeast of Korenevo and Lyubimovka), advanced up the outskirts of Tolsty Lug and Novoivanovka (both southeast of Korenevo), and broke through Ukrainian defenses near Lyubimovka during an alleged battalion-sized mechanized assault.[3]

ISW has yet to observe confirmation that Russian forces recently conducted a battalion-sized mechanized assault in the area or recaptured any settlements. Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces enveloped Ukrainian forces in Lyubimovka and Tolsty Lug, although some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have encircled up to two Ukrainian battalions in Korenevsky Raion.[4] ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces have encircled any Ukrainian units in Kursk Oblast, however. Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly conducting these intensified counterattacks in Korenevsky Raion.[5]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating in Sudzhansky Raion broke through Ukrainian defenses near Martynovka and Mykhailivka (both northeast of Sudzha), advanced two kilometers deep north of Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha), and are enveloping Ukrainian positions near Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha).[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade advanced up to the northwestern outskirts of Sudzha, although a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger repeatedly denied these reports.[7] ISW has not observed any visual confirmation of Russian advances in Sudzhansky Raion since the start of intensified Russian counterattacks in the area on the evening of October 10. Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD), 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 1220th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit), and unspecified Chechen Akhmat units are reportedly conducting the intensified counterattacks in Sudzhansky Raion.[8]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of most of Glushkovksy Raion on October 10 and 11, although ISW has yet to observe visual confirmation of these alleged Russian advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating south of Glushkovo pushed Ukrainian forces back from Veseloye, advanced near Medvezhye, and approached the international border with Sumy Oblast.[9] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only retain limited positions near Krasnooktyabrskoye and on the outskirts of Novy Put (both south of Glushkovo and immediately on the border with Sumy Oblast) and declared the Ukrainian offensive effort in Glushkovsky Raion a failure.[10] Ukrainian forces began ground assaults into Glushkovsky Raion on September 11, 2024, following the start of Russian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast on September 10, 2024, but have not yet established a significant foothold in the area.[11] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, 1434th Akhmat "Chechnya" Regiment, 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), 83rd VDV Brigade, and 106th VDV Division are reportedly conducting intensified counterattacks in Glushkovsky Raion.[12]

Intensified Russian counterattacks likely aim to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast before poor weather conditions in Fall 2024 and early Winter 2024-2025 begin to constrain battlefield maneuver. Ukrainian officials have previously noted that Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in Ukraine, particularly mechanized offensive operations, to take advantage of dry road and terrain conditions before rainy seasonal weather causes muddy ground conditions.[13] It is likely that this Russian operational calculus also extends to the Russian effort to recapture all of Kursk Oblast, where several Russian sources have reported the start of limited muddy terrain conditions as of October 11.[14] The Russian military command may be concerned that the poor weather conditions in Fall 2024 and early Winter 2024-2025 will encourage positional fighting in Kursk Oblast and afford Ukrainian forces more time to entrench themselves in their main salient and fortify existing positions. Better-entrenched Ukrainian forces with more extensive fortifications in Kursk Oblast will likely further complicate Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces back across the border. Russian forces may perceive a closing window of opportunity to eliminate the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast with the current level of manpower and materiel that the Russian military has allocated to the effort. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated in a documentary published on October 10 that Russian forces have redeployed roughly 50,000 personnel from other operational directions to Kursk Oblast since the start of the incursion on August 6, 2024, and the Russian military likely aims to avoid committing more manpower to the area in the event that the Ukrainian presence persists into 2025.[15] Such redeployments have likely degraded the readiness of Russian operational groups in Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Kharkiv oblasts.

The Russian military command likely aims to rapidly push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast in order to free up combat power for its priority offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and to ease the theater-wide operational pressures that the Ukrainian incursion has generated. Russian units redeployed from elsewhere in the theater to Kursk Oblast— many of which are VDV elements that the Russian military has routinely used to rapidly reinforce priority operational efforts — could have served as reinforcements for the Russian military's priority offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction and western Donetsk Oblast.[16] The Russian military has instead relied on the operational reserves it established ahead of its Summer 2024 offensive operation to sustain its offensive tempo in Donetsk Oblast, and the exhaustion of these operational reserves will contribute to the likely culmination of the Russian Summer 2024 offensive operation in the coming months.[17] The Russian military command likely hopes that by rapidly eliminating the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast it can redeploy forces from Kursk Oblast to Donetsk Oblast and stave off culmination before it can achieve its operational objectives of seizing Pokrovsk and eliminating the wider Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast.[18] Russian forces have yet to make rapid gains in Kursk Oblast since starting counterattacks on September 10, however, and intensified counterattacks threaten to exhaust and degrade the very combat power that the Russian military hopes to recommit to the priority offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast.

South Korean and Ukrainian officials reportedly continue to identify North Korean military personnel already fighting in Ukraine as well as training in Russia for possible future deployments alongside the Russian military. The Washington Post reported on October 11 that South Korean and Ukrainian officials stated that North Korean soldiers are operating alongside Russian forces in Ukraine.[19] A Ukrainian military intelligence official reportedly stated that individual North Korean officers are observing Russian forces and studying the battlefield in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, but that Ukraine has not yet observed North Korean units operating in Ukraine. The Ukrainian official reportedly added that "several thousand" North Korean infantry personnel are training within Russia and that the Russian military command could deploy them to the frontline in Ukraine by the end of 2024 or to Russian border areas to free up Russian "reserves" to fight within Ukraine. South Korean and Ukrainian officials have recently reported that North Korean military personnel are likely operating in occupied Donetsk Oblast, and a recent Ukrainian missile strike near occupied Donetsk City reportedly killed several North Korean military officials.[20] The extent of the North Korean force grouping that Russia could deploy to the frontline or that could free up Russian forces along the border is unclear, but these scenarios may also aid Russian efforts to commit additional manpower to priority offensive operations in Ukraine and prolong the culmination of the Russian Summer 2024 offensive operation. North Korean troop deployments to Ukraine could also create opportunities for Ukrainian exploitation, depending on the quality, force structure, arrayment, and interoperability of North Korean forces.

Western partners continue to announce and provide new military assistance to Ukraine. The Norwegian government announced on October 11 that Norway will allocate 967 million Norwegian kroner (about $90 million) for projects aimed at increasing Norway’s defense capacity, including to produce defense materiel for Ukraine.[21] German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced on October 11 that Germany, along with Belgium, Denmark, and Norway, will allocate 1.4 billion euros (about $1.5 billion) in military aid to Ukraine by the end of 2024 which will include the transfer of IRIS-T and Skynex air defense systems as well as Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, self-propelled artillery guns, armored vehicles, combat drones, radars, and artillery ammunition.[22] Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala announced that Ukraine will receive approximately 500 thousand 155-mm artillery ammunition as a part of the Czech Initiative by the end of 2024 while stressing that the program may expand with participation from other donor countries.[23] French outlet Avionlegendaires reported on October 9 that France will deliver between 12 and 20 Dassault Mirage 2000-F5 fighter jets to Ukraine in early 2025 following French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu's announcement that France would send an unspecified number of the fighter jets to Ukraine in the first quarter of 2025.[24] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on October 11 that he met with Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto and discussed the possibility of increasing Italian investment in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).[25] Umerov also noted the potential creation of joint Ukrainian-Italian defense enterprises given Ukraine’s strong industrial capacity.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues diplomatic efforts to establish and clarify Ukraine’s strategic vision for peace. Zelensky denied on October 10 claims that he discussed with Western allies Ukraine’s readiness for a ceasefire along the current frontline and territorial concessions to Russia in exchange for U.S. security guarantees and accelerated EU membership.[26] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on October 10 that it refutes allegations voiced in foreign media about Ukraine’s alleged readiness to make concessions to Russia at the expense of its own sovereignty and territorial integrity, emphasizing the inadmissibility of such Ukrainian concessions.[27] The MFA noted that the only realistic approach to just and sustainable peace in Ukraine is Ukraine’s proposed Peace Formula based on principles of the UN Charter and full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Zelensky stated during a meeting with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on October 11 that Ukraine aims to create the necessary and fair conditions for honest diplomacy regarding achieving lasting peace in Ukraine. Meloni noted that peace in Ukraine cannot mean surrender and that Italy will support Ukraine in establishing conditions conducive to principled peace negotiations.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov declared a "blood feud" against Russian legislators, suggesting that Kadyrov is becoming increasingly emboldened in his personal political disputes. Kadyrov declared a blood feud on October 10 against Republic of Dagestan Senator Suleiman Kerminov and State Duma Deputies Bekkhan Barakhoyev and Rizvan Kurbanov, claiming that they "seized" Russia's largest online retailer Wildberries from the company's co-founder Vladislav Bakalchuk and were plotting to assassinate Kadyrov.[28] Vladislav Bakalchuk, who co-founded Wildberries with his ex-wife and current Wildberries CEO Tatyana Bakalchuk, led 20 to 30 armed accomplices on simultaneous assaults of two Wildberries offices in Moscow City in September 2024.[29] Vladislav previously appealed to Kadyrov to help prevent Tatyana from taking over the company and claimed days before the September armed assaults that Kadyrov saved his life and kept him out of prison.[30] Kadyrov notably announced the blood feud in a video in the Chechen language on his Telegram channel but did not mention the feud specifically in the accompanying Russian text, likely in an attempt to prevent its reporting in Russian media.[31] Kadyrov has previously rhetorically attacked Kremlin officials, speaking out against Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin's June 2024 statements about religious extremism in Russia.[32] It is unclear if Russian President Vladimir Putin will respond to Kadyrov's announcement of the blood feud, as Putin has supported Kadyrov's rule over Chechnya but has consistently attempted to posture Russia as a harmonious multi-ethnic and multi-religious society.[33]

Ukrainian officials confirmed that Ukrainian journalist Viktoriya Roshchyna died in Russian captivity. The Ukrainian Humanitarian and Information Policy Committee confirmed on October 10 that Roshchyna died in Russian captivity but that the circumstances surrounding her death are unknown.[34] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office stated that it upgraded the case surrounding Roshchyna's death to a war crime and intentional murder.[35] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on October 10 that Roshchyna was included on a list of prisoners that Ukraine and Russia were to exchange in the near future.[36] Roshchyna disappeared in occupied Ukraine in early August 2023, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly sent a letter to Roshchyna's family on October 10 stating that she had died on September 19.[37] The Ukrainian Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories stated that there were 4,337 Ukrainians in Russian captivity as of November 2023, including 763 civilians.[38] These numbers, which rely on data from the Red Cross may be even higher as the Red Cross does not always have access to places where Russian authorities hold Ukrainian civilians, including detention centers and penal colonies in occupied territories.

Ukrainian officials announced new appointments in the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on October 11 the appointment of Serhiy Boyev to the post of Deputy Defense Minister for European Integration and Serhii Melnyk as the Deputy responsible for education, medicine, humanitarian support, and human capital policy.[39] Umerov also noted the creation of supervisory boards for the Defense Procurement Agency and the State Logistics Operator.

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces intensified their ongoing effort to dislodge Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast around the evening of October 10 and have recently advanced further into the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast while reportedly eliminating almost the entirety of the smaller Ukrainian salient in Glushkovsky Raion.
Intensified Russian counterattacks likely aim to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast before poor weather conditions in Fall 2024 and early Winter 2024-2025 begin to constrain battlefield maneuver.
The Russian military command likely aims to rapidly push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast in order to free up combat power for its priority offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and to ease the theater-wide operational pressures that the Ukrainian incursion has generated.
South Korean and Ukrainian officials reportedly continue to identify North Korean military personnel already fighting in Ukraine as well as training in Russia for possible future deployments alongside the Russian military.
Western partners continue to announce and provide new military assistance to Ukraine.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues diplomatic efforts to establish and clarify Ukraine’s strategic vision for peace.
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov declared a "blood feud" against Russian legislators, suggesting that Kadyrov is becoming increasingly emboldened in his personal political disputes.
Ukrainian officials confirmed that Ukrainian journalist Viktoriya Roshchyna died in Russian captivity.
Ukrainian officials announced new appointments in the Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Kurakhove.
The Kremlin is deceptively recruiting young African women to assemble Iranian-designed Shahed drones in the Republic of Tatarstan, likely to address labor shortages in Russia.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 9, 2024

Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and George Barros

October 10, 2024, 11:50am ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:00am ET on October 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Shahed drone storage facility in Krasnodar Krai and an ammunition warehouse in the Republic of Adygea on October 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 9 that Ukrainian naval forces and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck a Russian Shahed drone storage facility near Oktyabrsky, Krasnodar Krai and that Russian forces stored around 400 Shahed drones at the facility.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that there were secondary detonations at the facility immediately following the strike, and footage published on October 10 shows a large fire and secondary detonations near the facility.[2] Krasnodar Krai officials stated on October 9 that Ukrainian drone strikes damaged several houses near Oktyabrsky and that unspecified warehouses in the area caught fire but claimed that the strike did not significantly damage the facilities.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 10 that drone operators from the SBU, Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck an ammunition warehouse at the Khanskaya Air Base in the Republic of Adygea.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces base Su-34 fighter-bombers and Su-27 fighter aircraft at the Khanskaya Air Base, and Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that sources within Ukrainian special services stated that there were 57 Russian training and combat aircraft and helicopters at the airfield at the time of the strike.[5] Suspilne's sources stated that Russian forces use the Khanskaya Air Base to refuel planes during air strikes against frontline Ukrainian units and settlements.[6] Ukrainian forces are still determining the extent of the strike's damage to the airfield, and it is unclear whether Ukrainian forces struck any Russian aircraft at the Khanskaya Air Base as of the time of this report.[7] Russian sources published footage on October 10 purportedly showing Ukrainian drones striking the airfield and noted that the Russian 272nd Training Aviation Base of the Krasnodar Higher Military Aviation School of Pilots is based at the Khanskaya Air Base.[8]

Russian forces rely on Shahed drones to strike both frontline and rear Ukrainian settlements and cities and expend roughly 10,000 artillery shells per day against frontline Ukrainian positions.[9] Ukrainian forces notably struck the Oktyabrskii and Toropets ammunition depots in Tver Oblast and the Tikhoretsk ammunition depot in Krasnodar Krai in September 2024 and a Russian missile and storage ammunition storage facility in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast on October 8, which resulted in the destruction of dozens of ammunition storage buildings, rail cars, and likely a significant amount of ammunition, missiles, and drones.[10] While the impact of a single strike is unlikely to significantly impact Russia's war effort, repeated strikes against ammunition depots within Russia may force a decision point on the Russian military command to reorganize and disperse support and logistics systems within Russia‘s rear areas to mitigate the impact of such strikes at the expense of mass-optimized Russian logistics to support the war in Ukraine. The timely lifting of restrictions on the use of Western systems and the continued development of Ukraine's own long-range strike capabilities may allow Ukrainian forces to more effectively exploit such Russian vulnerabilities before Russia deploys countermeasures. Ukrainian strikes against facilities within Russia could impact offensive operations throughout the theater in Ukraine if Ukrainian forces have the materiel, capabilities, and permission to conduct such a strike campaign against logistics and support facilities within Russia at scale.

Russian forces have reportedly struck three civilian vessels docked in Ukrainian ports since October 5, likely as part of intensified Russian military, political, and economic pressure to undermine confidence in Ukraine's grain corridor, Western support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations. Ukrainian Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper stated on October 9 that Russian ballistic missiles struck port infrastructure in Odesa Raion and that Russian missiles struck a civilian container ship under the flag of Panama.[11] Kiper noted that this was the third Russian strike on a civilian vessel in the last four days and stated that these strikes are an attempt to disrupt Ukraine's grain corridor, kill civilians, and destroy Ukrainian infrastructure. Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian ballistic missile struck a civilian vessel under the flag of Palau in Odesa's port on October 7 and that Russian missiles damaged a civilian cargo ship on the night of October 5 to 6 near Odesa City.[12] Russian sources have attempted to justify the recent Russian strikes against civilian ships by claiming that the ships were carrying weapons, but ISW has not observed independent confirmation of these claims.[13] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a cruise missile strike against a civilian cargo ship under the flag of St. Kitts and Nevis transporting Ukrainian wheat to Egypt as it was leaving Ukrainian territorial waters in the Black Sea on the night of September 11.[14] Russian forces have previously heavily targeted Ukrainian ports and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine and have engaged in threatening military posturing in the Black Sea in an effort to damage Ukrainian grain exports and undermine international confidence in Ukraine's grain corridor.[15] Russian strikes against civilian vessels in the grain corridor are almost certainly intended to undermine confidence in Ukraine's ability to enforce and defend the corridor, influence ongoing Western discussions about long-term Western support for Ukraine, and negatively impact Ukraine's efforts to economically recover amid the ongoing war.|

An unspecified senior US defense official stated on October 9 that Russian forces have suffered over 600,000 casualties since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 — a stark increase from a prior US intelligence assessment that Russian forces suffered about 315,000 casualties in Ukraine as of December 2023.[16] The senior US defense official stated on October 9 that Russian forces have suffered more battlefield casualties in Ukraine in this past month – likely referring to early September through early October 2024 – than in any other month of the war.[17] US intelligence reportedly assessed as of December 2023 that the then-estimated 315,000 Russian casualties amounted to nearly 90 percent of Russia's military personnel at the start of the invasion.[18] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed in May 2024 that Russian forces have suffered over 465,000 casualties since February 2022 and that the Russian daily casualty rate starting in May 2024 was about 1,000 per day.[19]

An Iranian outlet affiliated with former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei claimed on October 8 that Russia provided Iran with an S-400 air defense system and a squadron of Su-35 fighter jets but provided no evidence for this claim. NOTE: A version of this text appears in the October 9 ISW-CTP Iran Update. An Iranian outlet affiliated with former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei claimed on October 8 that Russia provided Iran with an S-400 air defense system and a squadron of Su-35 fighter jets but provided no evidence for this claim.[20] ISW has not observed similar reports in prominent Western or Russian media, and ISW cannot independently verify this claim. ISW continues to assess that Russia could supply Iran with advanced military equipment in return for Iran’s ongoing support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[21]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Shahed drone storage facility in Krasnodar Krai and an ammunition warehouse in the Republic of Adygea on October 9 and 10.
Russian forces have reportedly struck three civilian vessels docked in Ukrainian ports since October 5, likely as part of intensified Russian military, political, and economic pressure to undermine confidence in Ukraine's grain corridor, Western support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations.
An unspecified senior US defense official stated on October 9 that Russian forces have suffered over 600,000 casualties since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 — a stark increase from a prior US intelligence assessment that Russian forces suffered about 315,000 casualties in Ukraine as of December 2023.
An Iranian outlet affiliated with former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei claimed on October 8 that Russia provided Iran with an S-400 air defense system and a squadron of Su-35 fighter jets but provided no evidence for this claim.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City.
The Russian military appears to be increasingly recruiting older Russian volunteers in order to sustain ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 7, 2024

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Angelica Evans, and George Barros

October 9, 2024, 12:15pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:20am ET on October 9 and covers both October 8 and 9 due to the fact that ISW did not publish a campaign assessment on October 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian military command has likely ordered Russian forces to conduct a relatively high tempo of mechanized assaults in Ukraine to pursue significant tactical advances before muddy ground conditions in fall 2024 constrain mechanized maneuver. Poor weather conditions in fall 2024 and early winter 2024-2025 will likely complicate and constrain both mechanized and infantry maneuver, but Russian forces may seek to maintain their consistent offensive pressure in eastern Ukraine despite these difficulties. Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Ruslan Muzychuk stated on October 8 that Russian forces are increasing their use of armored vehicles on the battlefield — specifically in the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk directions — in order to take advantage of dry road and terrain conditions before rainy seasonal weather causes muddy grounds conditions.[1] Russian forces have been conducting a high tempo of mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast since late July 2024 and have conducted at least four observed battalion-sized mechanized assaults in eastern Ukraine since July 25, 2024.[2] Russian forces have also resumed relatively large mechanized assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line since late September 2024.[3] The Russian military command likely aims for intensified mechanized offensive activity to allow Russian forces to advance across open fields and consolidate in nearby frontline settlements that Russian forces can then use as a foothold for staging and launching offensive operations that seek to achieve operational objectives — such as the seizure of Kurakhove in western Donetsk Oblast or the seizure of Pokrovsk.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 9 that muddy seasonal conditions have already started in Kursk Oblast and are constraining maneuver for wheeled vehicles.[5] ISW has not yet observed wide reporting that muddy terrain is constraining mechanized maneuver on any sector of the front in Kursk Oblast or in Ukraine, however.

Fall weather conditions will also likely constrain Russian infantry maneuver, and the Russian military command likely hopes that mechanized advances that Russian forces can achieve now will limit the number of open fields that Russian infantry will have to cross after weather conditions deteriorate. Russian forces have relied on small infantry groups to advance under the concealment of windbreaks in open fields from settlement to settlement, particularly in the Pokrovsk direction.[6] Fall weather will cause many windbreaks comprised of deciduous trees to lose most of their foliage and will provide less concealment for Russian infantry groups during fall 2024 and winter 2024-2025 — leaving Russian infantrymen more vulnerable to pervasive Ukrainian drone reconnaissance and tactical fires.

Russian forces will likely not cease offensive operations following the fall mud season, though adverse weather conditions will likely degrade Russian infantry effectiveness. Russian forces made a concerted effort to regain the theater-wide initiative during the period of the most difficult weather conditions for mechanized offensive operations in fall 2023, however, and may seek to retain the theater-wide initiative though consistent offensive pressure in fall 2024 under similar weather conditions.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command are pursuing a strategy that aims to prevent Ukraine from accumulating manpower and materiel to contest the theater-wide initiative by maintaining consistent offensive pressure on Ukrainian forces throughout the frontline and will likely continue to pursue this strategy despite seasonal constraints on mechanized and infantry maneuver.[8] Russian forces have exhausted many of the reserves that they established for their intensified Summer 2024 offensive operation that has heavily focused on advancing in Donetsk Oblast, and ISW continues to assess that the ongoing Russian offensive operation will likely culminate within the coming months.[9] Poor weather conditions that constrain battlefield maneuver will likely contribute to culmination, but the culmination of the Russian Summer 2024 offensive operation will not necessarily result in a complete end of consistent Russian offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in fall 2024 and early winter 2024-2025. Russian forces have an established pattern of fighting beyond their culmination points as well as fighting through adverse weather conditions.

US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli reportedly stated that the US is withholding several US weapon systems and other military communications networks from Ukraine that could support Ukraine's war effort. CNN reported on October 8, citing sources familiar with the situation, that Cavoli outlined a list of several US capabilities that could better support Ukraine's war effort in a September 2024 report to the US Congress.[10] Another source familiar with the matter told CNN that that the list included the air-launched Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSMs) cruise missile and the Link 16 system – a data sharing network that the US and other NATO countries use for communication and command and control (C2). CNN reported that Cavoli's report does not explain why the US has not yet provided Ukraine with systems that the US assesses could aid Ukraine's war effort. An unspecified source told CNN that the US has likely refrained from providing Ukraine with the Link 16 system over operational security concerns.

South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun stated on October 8 that a limited number of North Korean military personnel are likely operating near occupied Donetsk City.[11] Kim stated that North Korea likely deployed several military personnel to Ukraine to support Russia's war effort in response to a report that a Ukrainian missile strike near occupied Donetsk City killed several North Korean military officials on October 3.[12] Head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation, Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, stated on October 5 that a small number of North Korean military personnel, mainly engineering personnel, are operating in occupied Donetsk Oblast and are repairing or somehow improving the quality of a large amount of low-quality ammunition that North Korea provided to the Russian military.[13]

Russian illegal arms dealer and Ulyanovsk Oblast parliamentarian Viktor Bout reportedly helped broker a deal for Russia to sell arms worth $10 million to Yemen's Houthi rebels in August 2024 amid increasing reports of potential Russian arms transfers to the Houthis and deepening Russo-Iranian cooperation. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on October 7, citing a European security official and other sources familiar with the matter, that Bout assisted in negotiations for small arms sales worth $10 million when a Houthi delegation visited Moscow in August 2024.[14] The WSJ's sources stated that the first two deliveries would consist of mostly AK-74 assault rifles and that the Houthis also discussed the potential transfer of Kornet antitank missiles and anti-air weapons. The sources stated that they were unsure whether Bout negotiated the deal on behalf of the Kremlin or just with the Kremlin's tacit approval, and the WSJ noted that the transfer has not yet occurred and the source of the arms is still unclear.[15] The WSJ reported that these deliveries could begin as soon as October 2024 to Hodeidah Port under the guise of food supplies. Both Bout and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied the WSJ report.[16] Russia has reportedly been involved in Iranian-brokered "secret talks" to transfer Russian Yakhont (P-800 Oniks) anti-ship cruise missiles and other military equipment to the Houthis, but it is unclear whether these transfers have or will occur.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russia likely aims to leverage Iranian proxies to indirectly confront the West and shape Western decision making, particularly to deter the West from supporting Ukraine over fears of Russian escalation against the West, including escalating in a different theater.[18]

Russia banned the partially-encrypted communications platform Discord on October 8, likely degrading some frontline Russian forces' ad-hoc communications in the near term. Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor announced on October 8 that it had banned Discord within Russia on October 8 following recent Russian fines against Discord for failing to comply with Russian censorship laws.[19] Some frontline Russian forces use Discord for coordinating operations, including combat drone operations, and this ban will likely impede some Russian military communications on the frontline in the near term.[20] The Kremlin has recently implemented several measures that have threatened frontline ad-hoc communication systems, including limiting the use of personal electronic devices on the frontline, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has failed to establish a secure and effective official communications system for Russian forces to use instead.[21] Some Russian milbloggers responded to the Discord ban by reiterating complaints about the lack of adequate alternative communications systems for Russian forces on the frontline.[22] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger complained that the Russian MoD has failed to address this issue for the past three years but claimed that Russian forces have been able to use other communications services to coordinate combat operations successfully.[23]

Russian forces continue to use chemical weapons in Ukraine in a continued apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a party. The Ukrainian Support Forces Command reported on October 8 that Russian forces continue to use K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing harmful but not necessarily lethal riot control agents (RCA), which are prohibited in combat by the CWC.[24] The Ukrainian Support Forces Command reported that there have been 250 cases of Russian forces using munitions containing unknown types of dangerous chemical agents in Ukraine in September 2024. The Ukrainian Support Forces Command reported that Russian chemical weapons use has been systematic since February 2023 and that as of September 24 Ukraine has recorded Russian forces using munitions equipped with chemical weapons 4,228 times. ISW has consistently reported on increasingly common instances of Russian forces using chemical substances in combat that are banned by the CWC.[25]

Key Takeaways:

The Russian military command has likely ordered Russian forces to conduct a relatively high tempo of mechanized assaults in Ukraine to pursue significant tactical advances before muddy ground conditions in fall 2024 constrain mechanized maneuver. Poor weather conditions in fall 2024 and early winter 2024-2025 will likely complicate and constrain both mechanized and infantry maneuver, but Russian forces may seek to maintain their consistent offensive pressure in eastern Ukraine despite these difficulties.
US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli reportedly stated that the US is withholding several US weapon systems and other military communications networks from Ukraine that could support Ukraine's war effort.
South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun stated on October 8 that a limited number of North Korean military personnel are likely operating near occupied Donetsk City.
Russian illegal arms dealer and Ulyanovsk Oblast parliamentarian Viktor Bout reportedly helped broker a deal for Russia to sell arms worth $10 million to Yemen's Houthi rebels in August 2024 amid increasing reports of potential Russian arms transfers to the Houthis and deepening Russo-Iranian cooperation.
Russia banned partially-encrypted communications platform Discord on October 8, likely degrading some frontline Russian forces' ad-hoc communications in the near term.
Russian forces continue to use chemical weapons in Ukraine in a continued apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a party.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Robotyne.
Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Vitaliy Sarantsev stated on October 8 that Russian forces may have exhausted their preexisting stocks of aerial bombs for glide bomb strikes.

ISW did not publish a Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment on October 8.

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 7, 2024, 12pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:15am ET on October 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: ISW will not be publishing a Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment tomorrow, October 8. The ISW Russia and Geospatial teams will be participating in a wreath-laying ceremony honoring heroes of an earlier generation who gave their lives defending freedom and liberating others. Updates will resume on October 9.

Ukrainian forces struck an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea on the night of October 6 to 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 7 that Ukrainian forces struck an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia causing a fire near the facility and that Ukrainian authorities are clarifying the damage to the facility.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Feodosia houses the largest oil terminal in occupied Crimea and that Russia uses this terminal to transport petroleum products to the Russian military. Feodosia occupation mayor Igor Tkachenko acknowledged the fire at the oil depot and claimed that it did not cause an oil spill.[2] A Crimea-focused source claimed that the Russian military had deployed a Pantsir-S1 air defense system to the area in June 2024 to protect the Feodosia oil terminal.[3] Footage published on October 7 shows a fire purportedly at the Feodosia oil terminal.[4]

Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets reported on October 7 that Ukrainian authorities are investigating another case of Russian forces' unjust abuse and execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). Lyubinets reported that he sent letters to the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in response to recent aerial footage of Russian forces torturing and executing three unarmed Ukrainian POWs near Niu York, Donetsk Oblast.[5] Lyubinets noted that a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area published the footage on October 6 and highlighted that the highest levels of the Russian military command appear to be tolerating Russian war crimes in Ukraine. The Geneva Convention on POWs prohibits the "mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture" of POWs, as well as the execution of POWs or persons who are clearly rendered hors de combat.[6] Head of the Ukrainian Department for Combating Crimes in Conditions of Armed Conflict Yuri Bilousov stated on October 4 that Ukrainian sources documented evidence indicating that Russian forces have executed 93 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) on the battlefield since the start of the full-scale invasion and that 80 percent of the recorded cases occurred in 2024.[7] Bilousov noted on October 5 that these war crimes are systemic and that Russian authorities clearly condone these crimes. ISW has extensively reported on previous footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and observed a wider trend of Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appeared to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and unpunished by Russian field commanders.[8]

Russian authorities announced an "unprecedented" cyberattack against Russian state media infrastructure on October 7. The All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) reported that unspecified actors hacked VGTRK's online services overnight in an "unprecedented" attack, and pro-Kremlin Russian news outlet Gazeta reported that the attack took down broadcasts of Russian state television channels Rossiya-1, Rossiya-24, Rossiya Kultura, Karusel, and roughly 80 regional television and radio companies.[9] Gazeta cited a source in the Russian information security field claiming that hacker group "sudo rm -RF," which is allegedly linked to Ukraine, conducted the cyberattack.[10] (The group’s name refers to a Linux command to delete files.) Ukrainian news outlet Suspilne, citing its own sources, stated that "sudo rm -RF" has claimed responsibility and that VGTRK employees complained that the attack deleted all backup information.[11] The information security expert claimed to Gazeta that the hackers most likely used a type of encryption virus that deletes files rather than just encrypting them and warned that VGTRK will now have to close the vulnerability in addition to recovering backups of its systems.[12] VGTRK claimed that its systems did not suffer significant damage despite the attack and that its systems are operating normally.[13] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov expressed support for VGTRK and characterized the cyberattack as an attack on Russian critical infrastructure.[14]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces struck an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea on the night of October 6 to 7.
Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets reported on October 7 that Ukrainian authorities are investigating another case of Russian forces' unjust abuse and execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
Russian authorities announced an "unprecedented" cyberattack against Russian state media infrastructure on October 7.
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, in Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 6, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 5, 2024

Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, and George Barros

October 6, 2024, 10:45am ET

Russian forces have reportedly lost at least five divisions’ worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion since beginning their offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during intensified Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in Summer 2024. An open-source X (formerly Twitter) user tracking visually confirmed Russian vehicle and equipment losses in Ukraine stated on October 4 that the user has confirmed that Russian forces have lost 1,830 pieces of heavy equipment in Pokrovsk Raion since October 9, 2023.[1] The X user stated that Russian forces have lost a total of 539 tanks (roughly a division and a half's worth of Russian tanks) and 1,020 infantry fighting vehicles (roughly four to five mechanized infantry divisions’ worth of vehicles) during offensive operations in Pokrovsk Raion and specified that Ukrainian forces destroyed 381 of the 539 Russian tanks and 835 of the 1,020 armored vehicles. The X user noted that Russian forces have also lost 26 infantry mobility vehicles, 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), 11 towed artillery systems, and 92 unarmored trucks. The X user noted that he confirmed that Russian forces lost 25 tanks and 59 armored vehicles (roughly two battalions' worth of mechanized equipment) in Pokrovsk Raion since September 6, 2024. Russian forces launched an intensified four-month-long offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and later continued assaults west of Avdiivka and west and southwest of Donetsk City in spring and summer 2024, and the user's data should reflect Russian vehicle losses accrued during these offensive efforts.[2] The X user’s assessment based on visually confirmed vehicle losses is likely conservative given that not all Russian vehicle losses are visually documented. The actual number of Russian vehicle losses in the Pokrovsk area is likely higher than reported.

The Russian military command may not be willing or able to accept the current scale and rate of vehicle loss in the coming months and years given the constraints in Russia's defense industrial production, limits to Russia’s Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles, and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through mechanized maneuver. Russian forces expended a significant number of armored vehicles during the first weeks of their offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and later limited their armored vehicle usage while fighting within Avdiivka's administrative boundaries.[3] Russian forces appear to have limited their armored vehicle use in the area immediately west of Avdiivka in recent months, although Russian forces have simultaneously intensified their offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk city and frequently conduct largely unsuccessful platoon- and company-sized mechanized assaults in the area.[4] Russian forces have conducted several battalion-sized mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast since July 2024, the majority of which resulted in significant armored vehicle losses in exchange for marginal territorial advances.[5] The commander of a Ukrainian bridge operating in the Donetsk direction recently reported that Russian forces are losing up to 90 percent of the vehicles used in mechanized assaults in the Donetsk direction.[6] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank previously estimated that Russian forces were losing over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles annually as of February 2024, although Russia's current rate of armored vehicle losses may be higher given that the X user's data notably does not account for Russian equipment losses throughout the entire frontline.[7] Russian forces have only advanced about 40 km in the Avdiivka/Pokrovsk operational direction since October 2023 and a loss of over five divisions’ worth of equipment for such tactical gains is not sustainable indefinitely without a fundamental shift in Russia‘s capability to resource its war.

Russian forces have likely accumulated a large amount of equipment for these assaults, although the medium- to long-term constraints of Russia's armored vehicle stocks and production rates alongside mounting equipment losses may force the Russian military to rethink the benefit of intensified mechanized activity in this sector over Russia's longer-term war effort in Ukraine.[8] The Russian military command's willingness to pursue limited tactical advances in exchange for significant armored vehicle losses will become increasingly costly as Russian forces burn through finite Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks in the coming months and years.[9] Russia will likely struggle to adequately supply its units with materiel in the long term without transferring the Russian economy to a wartime footing and significantly increasing Russia's defense industrial production rates — a move that Russian President Vladimir Putin has sought to avoid thus far.[10]

Ukrainian officials continue to document and prosecute Russian war crimes committed against Ukrainian forces. Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office Head Oleksandr Filchakov announced on October 5 that his office has initiated a pre-trial investigation into the execution of four Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) ordered by Russian commanders at the Vovchansk aggregate plant in Summer 2024.[11] Filchakov noted that Russian POWs provided testimony about the executions during interrogations in Ukrainian detention. Filchakov suggested that Ukrainian forces might already have the perpetrator in custody, allowing for a fair trial and sentencing regarding the crime.

Russian authorities reportedly arrested the administrator of the Russian Telegram channel Thirteenth, who has previously criticized the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), on October 5. Russian milbloggers and Russian opposition media stated on October 5 that Russian police detained Thirteenth administrator Yegor Guzenko at a concert in Novopavlovsk, Stavropol Krai.[12] Russian sources speculated that Russian authorities may have arrested Guzenko due to his refusal to undergo drug tests or after an altercation with Russian police.[13] Several Russian sources claimed that Russian authorities placed Guzenko under house arrest in 2021 but that Guzenko later violated house arrest in March 2022, causing Russian authorities to place him on the Russian and international wanted list.[14] Guzenko has frequently criticized Russian authorities, and his arrest may be part of the ongoing Kremlin effort to crack down against critical voices within the Russian ultranationalist information space while encouraging a culture of self-censorship among the pro-war information space.[15] It is not yet clear whether Guzenko's arrest is directly related to the Kremlin's effort to exert control over the pro-war ultranationalist information space, however.

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces have reportedly lost at least five divisions’ worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion since beginning their offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during intensified Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in Summer 2024.
The Russian military command may not be willing or able to accept the current scale and rate of vehicle loss in the coming months and years given the constraints in Russia's defense industrial production, limits to Russia’s Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles, and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through mechanized maneuver.
Ukrainian officials continue to document and prosecute Russian war crimes committed against Ukrainian forces.
Russian authorities reportedly arrested the administrator of the Russian Telegram channel Thirteenth, who has previously criticized the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), on October 5.
Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 4, 2024

Riley Bailey, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and George Barros

October 5, 2024, 11:10 am ET

The Russian Government plans to allocate 90 billion rubles ($948 million) to one-time payments for concluding a military contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) between 2025 and 2027, indicating that the Kremlin plans to continue relying on ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts to meet the manpower requirements of its war in Ukraine for as long as the crypto-mobilization system works.[1] The Russian federal government currently offers 400,000 rubles ($4,200) one-time payments for signing a military contract (in addition to one-time payments offered by regional governments, some of which recently exceed one million rubles), suggesting that the Kremlin intends to recruit 225,000 new personnel through contract service between 2025 and 2027, assuming current rates hold, which is unlikely given these rates have steadily increased since 2022.[2] Russian authorities have significantly increased financial incentives, particularly one-time payments, in recent months for signing military contracts, and the Kremlin may have allocated 90 billion rubles to one-time payments with the intent of further raising federal payments between 2025 and 2027.[3] Russian authorities have reportedly expressed concerns that ongoing recruitment efforts are producing diminishing results, however, and the significant increase in financial incentives in recent months suggests that existing recruitment efforts were insufficient for maintaining the consistent generation of new forces that the Russian military relies on for sustaining its offensive tempo in Ukraine.[4] ISW assesses that there are medium- to long-term constraints on how many recruits the ongoing Russian crypto-mobilization campaign can generate, and increased financial incentives are unlikely to significantly address these constraints.[5] Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to the ongoing crypto-mobilization campaign in order to avoid declaring another widely unpopular partial mobilization call-up of reservists, although he maintains the option to call another round of partial mobilization — as he did in Fall 2022.[6] Putin and the Russian military command appear unwilling to accept reducing the intensity of Russian combat operations in Ukraine since they view maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative, and it remains unclear whether Putin will respond with another round of mobilization if faced with another crisis similar to or worse than the crisis the Kremlin faced in Fall 2022.[7]

Ukrainian officials continue to provide statistics regarding Russian war crimes, shedding light on the extent of violations committed by Russian forces and authorities. Head of the Ukrainian Department for Combating Crimes in Conditions of Armed Conflict Yuri Bilousov stated on October 4 that Ukrainian sources documented evidence indicating that Russian forces have executed 93 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) on the battlefield since the start of the full-scale invasion and that 80 percent of the recorded cases occurred in 2024.[8] Bilousov noted that Russian servicemembers’ discipline and attitude towards committing such war crimes have deteriorated further. Bilousov stated on October 5 that such war crimes are systemic and Russian authorities clearly condone these crimes, as evidenced by repeated calls for violence against Ukrainian POWs by high-ranking Russian officials such as Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev.[9] The Geneva Convention on POWs prohibits the "mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture" of POWs, as well as the execution of POWs or persons who are clearly hors de combat.[10] Politico reported on October 4 that a representative of Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for POWs, Victoria Tsymbalyuk, reported that at least 177 Ukrainian personnel and civilians have died in Russian captivity since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.[11] Tsymbalyuk emphasized that the actual number of casualties could be significantly higher due to a lack of international oversight. Tsymbalyuk noted that Ukrainian authorities have returned approximately 3,600 Ukrainian POWs and civilians through exchanges with Moscow but that thousands remain imprisoned in Russia. ISW has repeatedly observed widespread and systemic war crimes committed by Russian forces and authorities against POWs and civilians with the most recent case being the execution of 16 Ukrainian POWs near Pokrovsk, the largest recorded case of such execution during the war.[12]

The Russian government appears to have amended its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts following significant backlash within the Russian ultranationalist information space. Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor and the Russian Ministry of Finance published a draft resolution on October 4 requiring social media pages with an audience of over 10,000 subscribers to register their identity and contact information with the Russian government.[13] The draft resolution requires that social media pages with 10,000 or more subscribers register and submit their contact information (including full name, phone number, and email address) through the Russian government services portal, Roskomnadzor's website, or a chat bot on social media platforms. The draft resolution states that Roskomnadzor will publish a public list of all “verified” social media pages after the owner registers their information and that Roskomnadzor will require the page to include a link to Roskomnadzor's list for subscribers. The draft resolution also states that Russian authorities will not allow “unverified” social media pages to advertise or accept donations, which could be an effective enforcement mechanism as many milbloggers depend on income from advertisements to sustain their channels documenting the war in Ukraine and often collect donations for frontline Russian units.[14] Many Russian milbloggers decried this new version of the registration law and argued that it could lead to the Russian state censoring the Russian-language internet and the milbloggers’ coverage of the war.[15] Roskomnadzor published and immediately deleted a previous version of this resolution that required social media pages to also submit IP addresses to Roskomnadzor in September 2024 amid outcry among Russian milbloggers about the effort and ongoing concerns about the Kremlin's intensifying censorship efforts.[16] ISW noted at the time that Roskomnadzor's decision to delete the draft resolution indicates that the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community maintains some influence on the Kremlin's decisions, Roskomnadzor's decision to amend the draft resolution further indicates the milblogger community's influence over the Kremlin. It remains unclear how the Kremlin will react to the latest wave of milblogger criticism against the new watered-down version of the Telegram deanonymization law. Prominent Kremlin-linked and co-opted milbloggers such as Rybar, Evgeniy Poddubny, and Alexander “Sasha” Kots have not commented on the new draft regulation as of this publication. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is working to secure further control over the Russian information space via both codified regulations and reflexive control campaigns aimed at encouraging milbloggers and other critical voices in the Russian information space to self-censor.[17]

A recent Ukrainian missile strike near occupied Donetsk City reportedly killed several North Korean military officials. Unspecified sources in Ukraine's intelligence community told the Kyiv Post that an October 3 Ukrainian missile strike near occupied Donetsk City killed 20 Russian soldiers, including six unidentified North Korean officers "who came to confer with their Russian counterparts," and injured three other North Korean soldiers.[18] The Kyiv Post, citing Russian social media posts, reported that Russian forces were demonstrating infantry assault and defense training to the North Korean military personnel. ISW cannot independently confirm the presence of North Korean military officials in occupied Donetsk City. ISW has previously observed unconfirmed reports in June 2024 that North Korea planned to dispatch a large-scale engineering force to occupied Donetsk Oblast as early as July 2024.[19] ISW also observed reports in July 2024 that a delegation from North Korea's Kim Il Sung Military University visited Russia, which against the backdrop of deepening bilateral relations, suggests that the North Korean military likely intends to learn from the Russian military's experience in the war in Ukraine.[20]

Key Takeaways:

The Russian Government plans to allocate 90 billion rubles ($948 million) to one-time payments for concluding a military contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) between 2025 and 2027, indicating that the Kremlin plans to continue relying on ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts to meet the manpower requirements of its war in Ukraine for as long as the crypto-mobilization system works.
Ukrainian officials continue to provide statistics regarding Russian war crimes, shedding light on the extent of violations committed by Russian forces and authorities.
The Russian government appears to have amended its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts following significant backlash within the Russian ultranationalist information space.
A recent Ukrainian missile strike near occupied Donetsk City reportedly killed several North Korean military officials.
Russian forces recently advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk, near Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 3, 2024

Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 4, 2024, 10am ET

Ukrainian forces struck a fuel storage facility in Anna, Voronezh Oblast on the night of October 3 to 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian military struck at least one vertical fuel reservoir at the Annaneftprodukt fuel and oil storage facility and that Ukrainian military officials are still clarifying the damage at the facility.[1] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference caused a Ukrainian drone to fall onto the fuel storage facility and start a fire at an empty fuel reservoir.[2] Footage published on October 4 shows a fire at a purported fuel storage facility near Anna.[3]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces struck a fuel storage facility in Anna, Voronezh Oblast on the night of October 3 to 4.
Russian forces recently advanced in Vovchansk, near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 2, 2024

Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 3, 2024, 1:00pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 9:30am ET on October 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine that began in fall 2023 continues to produce gradual Russian tactical gains in specific sectors of the front, but operationally significant gains will likely continue to elude Russian forces. Ukrainian forces are conducting an effective defense in depth along the frontline, inflicting significant losses upon Russian forces while slowly giving ground but preventing the Russian military from making more rapid gains on the battlefield. Ukrainian forces do face serious operational challenges and constraints, which are providing Russian forces with opportunities to pursue tactically significant gains. Russian forces do not have the available manpower and materiel to continue intensified offensive efforts indefinitely, however, and current Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine will likely culminate in the coming months, if not weeks, as Ukrainian officials and ISW have previously assessed.

Russian forces have recently made notable tactical gains but have not demonstrated a capacity to seize operationally significant objectives. ISW distinguishes between tactical gains, which are relevant at the tactical level of war in the near vicinity of the fighting, and operational gains, which are significant at the operational level of war and affect large sectors of the entire frontline. Russian forces seized Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast as of October 1, and the settlement will likely afford Russian forces an improved tactical position for pursuing their operational effort to advance towards the H-15 (Donetsk City–Zaporizhzhia City) highway and eliminate the wide Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast.[1] The Russian seizure of Vuhledar will not on its own radically change the operational situation in western Donetsk Oblast, however, and Russian forces will likely struggle to achieve their operational objectives in the area during the ongoing offensive operation in western Donetsk Oblast.[2] Russian offensive operations that are pursuing operationally significant objectives, like the Russian effort to seize Chasiv Yar or to push Ukrainian forces off the left (east) bank of the Oskil River, have either stalled or are resulting in particularly gradual gains over long stretches of time, respectively.[3] Russian forces continue to prioritize their offensive push towards Pokrovsk, and the operational significance of seizing the city will likely in part depend on the Russian military's ability to leverage the city in wider operational maneuver in Donetsk Oblast.[4] Russian forces have tried and failed to conduct wide operational maneuver across several axes throughout Donetsk Oblast on several occasions during the full-scale invasion and are currently conducting intensified offensive operations in pursuit of more limited objectives on only two mutually supporting sectors of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast (western Donetsk Oblast and the Pokrovsk direction).[5]

The Russian military command prepared the ongoing Russian summer 2024 offensive operation for months in advance and accumulated operational reserves and resources for the operation that the recent months of attritional fighting have likely heavily degraded. Russian forces reportedly aimed to establish a new operational grouping of forces with uncommitted operational reserves of up to 70,000 personnel for the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024 while also establishing operational reserves for the Central Grouping of Forces' push to Pokrovsk this summer.[6] Russian forces have likely expended a good portion of these reserves on the stalling offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast, the intensified offensive tempo in the Pokrovsk direction and western Donetsk Oblast, and the response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[7] Russian forces also continue to suffer heavy armored vehicle losses in large, unsuccessful mechanized assaults throughout the frontline, particularly in western Donetsk Oblast.[8] Russian forces likely accumulated a large amount of equipment for such mechanized assaults, but significant medium- to long-term constraints on Russian armored vehicle stocks will become more salient as losses grow and may force the Russian military command to rethink the benefit of continuing such intensified mechanized activity in Ukraine.[9] Continued heavy Russian attrition in Donetsk Oblast and further Russian redeployments to Kursk Oblast will weaken Russia's ability to sustain offensive operations in northeastern and eastern Ukraine, although Russian forces are more likely to continue decreasing offensive activity on lower-priority sectors of the front than to do so equally along the entire frontline.[10] The current Russian summer 2024 offensive operation will likely culminate in the coming weeks and months, but Russian forces may nevertheless continue to conduct offensive operations at a much lower tempo throughout Ukraine in hopes that consistent offensive pressure would prevent Ukrainian forces from accumulating the manpower and resources needed to contest the theater-wide initiative.[11]

Russian forces have reportedly committed a significant portion of their intended operational reserves to offensive operations in Donetsk and northern Kharkiv oblasts, indicating that the Russian military command may have prioritized forming operational reserves to support offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline over developing theater-wide strategic reserves for the entire offensive campaign in Ukraine. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on October 3 that the Russian military command originally intended to commit most of Russia's "strategic reserves" to the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk-Toretsk directions, but that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and slowing Russian advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast complicated this plan.[12] Mashovets noted that the creation of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and the reinforcement of the Central Military District [CMD] in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions throughout 2024 comprised most of Russia's efforts to develop "strategic reserves." Mashovets noted that within the Leningrad Military District [LMD] Russian forces have established the newly-formed 69th Motorized Rifle Division and another unspecified motorized rifle division (both part of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], the 44th Army Corps (AC) and its 72nd Motorized Rifle Division and another unspecified motorized rifle brigade, and are continuing to staff the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA) and the 71st Motorized Rifle Division (14th AC).[13] Mashovets stated that Russian forces also established the 51st and 3rd CAAs and the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA) under the CMD in 2024. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command has already introduced some of these units and formations into combat below their doctrinal end strength and may introduce other formations as understrength "combined-reduced divisional tactical groups" in the near future.[14]

ISW has recently observed confirmation that some of these formations have been deployed to the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk directions. Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces recently reported that the Russian military deployed elements of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division near Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Division are also operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[16] The Russian military command has reportedly deployed elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division to northern Kharkiv Oblast as well, and Mashovets recently stated that the Russian military command intends to deploy the remainder of the understrength division to the frontline in northern Kharkiv Oblast between the end of October and the beginning of November 2024.[17] Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly operating southeast of Pokrovsk.[18] ISW has not observed reports of elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Division participating in offensive operations in Ukraine, however. Mashovets' report likely does not encompass all of the reserve units and formations that Russia recently formed or is currently forming, although it is notable that Russia has already introduced elements of most of these formations to combat.

The Russian military command is continuing to prioritize offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline over long-term planning for Russia's theater-wide campaign in Ukraine, but the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast appears to have significantly complicated the development of Russia's operational reserves. The Russian military command's reported intention for these reserves to participate in a specific priority of the sector instead of being committable throughout the theater indicates that these are "operational" and not "strategic" level reserves. Unspecified US officials told the New York Times (NYT) in August 2024 that Russia likely needs to deploy 15 to 20 brigades — at least 50,000 troops — from Ukraine or Russia's operational reserves to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast.[19] The Russian military command will likely continue to grapple with the impacts of manpower constraints on Russia's offensive capabilities until Russian President Vladimir Putin decides that the benefits of more effective force-generation policies, such as another partial mobilization call up of Russian reservists, outweigh the risk of societal backlash.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be using the "Time of Heroes" veteran support program to militarize regional and local government administrations and further solidify a pro-war ideology into the Russian state and society. Putin met with former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Sparta” Battalion Commander and Speaker of the DNR Parliament Artem Zhoga on October 2 and offered him the position of Presidential Representative to the Ural Federal Okrug, which Zhoga accepted.[20] Zhoga previously served as a member of Putin's re-election campaign initiatives group, and the Kremlin previously highlighted Zhoga and used an interaction between Zhoga and Putin to announce Putin's presidential bid in December 2023.[21] Putin signed a decree on October 2 confirming the recent appointments of Zhoga and nine other "Time of Heroes" participants to various federal, regional, and local appointments: Artur Orlov as chairperson of the Russian patriotic youth organization "Movement of the First," Alexei Kondratyev as a Russian senator, Igor Yurin as Sakha Republic Minister of Youth Affairs and Social Communications, Alexander Surazov as Altai Republic Committee for Physical Culture and Sports head, Yevgeny Chintsov as head of the Nizhny Novgorod City Duma, Zaur Gurtsiev as Stavropol City first deputy head, Roman Kulakov as Sevastopol occupation legislative assembly deputy, Konstantin Yashin as head of the Samara Research and Production Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, and Vladimir Saibel as deputy head of Russian Railways' social development department.[22] The "Movement of the First" is a Kremlin-affiliated youth organization that promotes military-patriotic education and ideology to youth within Russia and occupied Ukraine to set long term conditions for the militarization of Russian society and Russification of occupied Ukraine.[23] Putin noted that the Russian government has extended job offers to 10 additional "Time of Heroes" participants within the Russian Presidential Administration, federal and regional entities, and state-owned companies.[24] The increasing appointments of Russian military veterans of the war in Ukraine in government and state entities throughout Russia is likely part of an effort to establish pro-war, ultranationalist individuals loyal to Putin in prominent places within local government and society as Russia seeks ways to reintegrate war veterans into Russian society and subtly message Putin's vision for a future Russian class of elites and wider society comprised of such individuals.[25] Putin's publicized and likely scripted meeting with Zhoga was likely aimed at establishing Putin's public expectations of "Time of Heroes" participants. Zhoga repeatedly emphasized in his meeting with Putin that he is a "soldier first and foremost" who will serve Russia "where [he] is most needed," indicating that Putin likely expects loyalty from these handpicked individuals above all else.[26]

Russian authorities continue to arrest Russian officials on charges related to mismanagement and corruption within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The Russian Investigative Committee announced on October 2 that it placed former MoD Forestry Department Deputy Head Alexander Sluchak under house arrest and detained the General Director of “Translesstroy” LLC Ozman Avdolyan for embezzling 20 million rubles (about $210,248) related to the mismanagement of MoD contracts.[27] Russian sources stated on October 2 that Russian law enforcement initiated a case into a theft of military property worth over 1 million rubles (about $10,500) at the Tyumen Higher Military Engineering Command School, detaining two suspects including the driver of Major General D. Yevmenenko.[28] The Russian Investigative Committee also placed Deputy Head of the Russian MoD's Military Construction company, Dmitry Sergel, on the interstate wanted list for embezzling funds from the Russian MoD.[29] Sergel reportedly embezzled over 35 million rubles (about $367,935) as part of a contract for overhauling a military hospital in Perm valued at more than 190 million rubles (about $ 1,997,363). ISW has observed an increase in MoD-related arrests particularly under the leadership of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in a likely effort to not only “cleanse” widespread corruption prominent under the leadership of former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, but also satisfy the Russian public’s demand for justice and demonstrate that the Kremlin is fighting corruption.[30]

Strikes reportedly targeted an ammunition depot near Russia's Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia Province, Syria overnight on October 2 to 3. Footage published on October 3 shows a fire and secondary detonations overnight reportedly near Hmeimim Airbase, and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights claimed on October 3 that unknown drone strikes destroyed an ammunition depot near Jableh City near the airbase.[31] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights claimed that the unknown drone strikes coincided with the presence of Israeli warplanes in the area and that both Syrian and Russian air defenses attempted to shoot down incoming Israeli missiles for roughly 40 minutes.[32] A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian air defenses activated and claimed that Iranian and Syrian forces used the ammunition depot and that the Israeli strikes did not target Russia's Hmeimim Airbase directly.[33] ISW is unable to confirm the actor responsible for the October 3 Latakia strike. CTP-ISW observed a strike, reportedly conducted by Israeli forces, targeting a weapons shipment near Jableh on July 9 after an Iranian weapons shipment arrived at the nearby port of Latakia.[34] Syrian sources claimed that Syrian air defenses intercepted 17 reportedly Israeli missiles near Jableh and Tartus (south of Latakia) and reported explosions near Tartus on September 24, but the actors involved and the result of the strike remain unconfirmed.[35]

Key Takeaways:

The Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine that began in fall 2023 continues to produce gradual Russian tactical gains in specific sectors of the front, but operationally significant gains will likely continue to elude Russian forces.
Ukrainian forces are conducting an effective defense in depth along the frontline, inflicting significant losses upon Russian forces while slowly giving ground but preventing the Russian military from making more rapid gains on the battlefield.
Ukrainian forces do face serious operational challenges and constraints, which are providing Russian forces with opportunities to pursue tactically significant gains.
Russian forces do not have the available manpower and materiel to continue intensified offensive efforts indefinitely, however, and current Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine will likely culminate in the coming months, if not weeks, as Ukrainian officials and ISW have previously assessed.
Russian forces have recently made notable tactical gains but have not demonstrated a capacity to seize operationally significant objectives.
The Russian military command prepared the ongoing Russian summer 2024 offensive operation for months in advance and accumulated operational reserves and resources for the operation that the recent months of attritional fighting have likely heavily degraded.
Russian forces have reportedly committed a significant portion of their intended operational reserves to offensive operations in Donetsk and northern Kharkiv oblasts, indicating that the Russian military command may have prioritized forming operational reserves to support offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline over developing theater-wide strategic reserves for the entire offensive campaign in Ukraine.
The Russian military command is continuing to prioritize offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline over long-term planning for Russia's theater-wide campaign in Ukraine, but the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast appears to have significantly complicated the development of Russia's operational reserves.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be using the "Time of Heroes" veteran support program to militarize regional and local government administrations and further solidify a pro-war ideology into the Russian state and society.
Russian authorities continue to arrest Russian officials on charges related to mismanagement and corruption within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Strikes reportedly targeted an ammunition depot near Russia's Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia Province, Syria overnight on October 2 to 3.
Russian forces recently advanced south of Siversk and east and southeast of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast.
Russian authorities continue to nationalize Russian enterprises for the benefit of the federal government.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 1, 2024

Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, and George Barros

October 2, 2024, 1:15pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:30am ET on October 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine continues efforts to expand domestic production of significant military equipment and maintain its drone advantage over Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 1 that Ukrainian companies can currently produce four million drones annually and that Ukraine has already contracted the domestic production of 1.5 million drones (presumably in 2024).[1] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently claimed that Russia plans to increase drone production by tenfold to 1.4 million drones in 2024, which will be lower than the two million drones that Ukraine aims to produce in 2024.[2] Zelensky also stated that Ukraine can produce 15 "Bohdan" self-propelled artillery systems every month and recently conducted a successful flight test for an unspecified domestically produced ballistic missile.[3] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on October 2 that Ukraine will continue prioritizing domestic production of drones and long-range missiles, including ballistic missiles.[4] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on October 2 that Ukraine has allocated $7 billion for the purchase of weapons and military equipment in the Ukrainian draft 2025 state budget — a 65 percent increase from the 2024 state budget.[5] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine increased domestic weapons production by a factor of three in 2023 and by factor of two in the first eight months of 2024.[6] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian efforts to expand domestic military production will allow Ukraine to reduce its dependence on Western military assistance in the long-term, but that Ukraine still requires considerable Western assistance for the next several years in order to defend against Russian aggression and liberate strategically vital areas that Russian forces currently occupy.[7]

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov condemned the Israel Defense Force's (IDF) ground operation in southern Lebanon during a meeting with the Lebanese ambassador to Russia on October 1.[8] Bogdanov met with Lebanese Ambassador Shawki Bou Nassar and discussed the military-political situation in the Middle East. Bogdanov expressed "strong condemnation of Israel's ground invasion of Lebanon and emphasized Russia's opposition to alleged Israeli political assassinations. Bogdanov highlighted the importance of providing humanitarian assistance to Lebanon and safely evacuating Russian citizens from Lebanon. Russian Ambassador to Israel Anatoly Viktorov called for an immediate end to the conflict in the Middle East, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with ambassadors of unspecified Arab states and called for the immediate end of military operations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict area.[9] The Kremlin likely seeks to take advantage of the conflict in the Middle East to promote Russian-dominated international structures, including some connected to the Kremlin's effort to establish an alternative "Eurasian security architecture." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on October 2 that Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas has accepted Russia's invitation to attend the BRICS summit in Kazan on October 22–24 and that participants will discuss the situation in the Middle East.[10] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) recently condemned Israel’s “political assassination” of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Israel's decision to simultaneously detonate thousands of pagers belonging to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) members across Lebanon and Syria, and previous Israeli strikes against Iran.[11]

Latvian forces enhanced air defense near the Russian border following a recent Russian drone crash in the country. Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds announced on October 2 that the Latvian Air Force deployed mobile combat groups equipped with air defense missiles in Latgale near the Russian-Latvian border and set up specialized radars along the border to detect drones.[12] Spruds confirmed that both professional military personnel and members of the Latvian National Defense Service are actively participating in the air defense operation. This decision comes in response to the September 7 Russian Shahed-type drone crash in Latvia's Rezekne municipality, close to the Russian border.[13]

Key Takeaways:

Ukraine continues efforts to expand domestic production of significant military equipment and maintain its drone advantage over Russia.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov condemned the Israel Defense Force's (IDF) ground operation in southern Lebanon during a meeting with the Lebanese ambassador to Russia on October 1.
Latvian forces enhanced air defense near the Russian border following a recent Russian drone crash in the country.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued assaults in Kursk Oblast.
Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Svatove, Siversk, and Vuhledar and east and southeast of Pokrovsk
Russian defense enterprises are recruiting tens of thousands of new workers due to acute personnel shortages amid increased production of weapons due to the war in Ukraine.