Ukraine Conflict Updates

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23, 2024

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Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, Kelly Campa, and Fredrick W. Kagan

December 23, 2024, 9:15pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:45pm ET on December 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces are gradually advancing south and southwest of Pokrovsk, but it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to exploit these gains to envelop the town or if they intend to advance to the administrative boundary of Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on December 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of and within eastern Novovasylivka (southwest of Pokrovsk), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novovasylivka towards Solone and Vovkove and are attacking towards Kotlyne.[1] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are focusing their attacks on Novotroitske (east of Novovasylivka) and Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk) and forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw to the Lysivka-Pishchane line (southeast to south of Pokrovsk).[2] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are also advancing from Pustynka and Pushkine (both further south of Pokrovsk) towards Ukrainka (southwest of Pushkine). ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command intends to envelop Pokrovsk via a turning maneuver from the south, but Russian advances southwest of Pokrovsk could be aimed at widening the Russian salient in preparation for the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the south or alternatively for advancing westward to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border as part of the Kremlin's political and informational objective of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast.[3]

It remains unclear which effort the Russian military command will prioritize, as Russian President Vladimir Putin may have tasked the Russian military with securing territorial gains rather than seizing significant settlements. Putin stated during his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19 that Russian forces are advancing not in "100, 200, 300 meters" but in square kilometers throughout the frontline, and Putin appears to be increasingly characterizing Russian advances in terms of square kilometers instead of highlighting the seizure of particular settlements as he had previously done.[4] Putin may have instructed the Russian military command to delay the seizure of Pokrovsk in favor of making further gains through open fields and small settlements, particularly as Russian forces advance closer to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary. ISW has observed geolocated evidence sufficient to assess that Russian forces are within 10 kilometers of the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary, and Putin may be pressuring the Russian military command to advance to the boundary rather than to envelop Pokrovsk at this time. Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast is one of Putin's long-standing objectives in Ukraine, and Putin would likely highlight Russian advances up to the boundary to make outsized claims about Russian successes in Ukraine for both foreign and domestic audiences.[5] An organized offensive operation against well-defended towns could slow the rate of Russian advance during a critical moment in the Kremlin's efforts to project the inevitability of Russian military victory on the global stage.

The Russian military command appears to have split responsibility for the Pokrovsk direction between the Central Military District's 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs), and ISW has yet to observe significant Russian activity in the 41st CAA's area of responsibility (AoR). Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command has mainly concentrated elements of the 2nd CAA south and southeast of Pokrovsk and elements of the 41st CAA east and northeast of Pokrovsk in the directions of Myrnohrad and Novoekonomichne with the exception of the 90th Tank Division, which is mainly attacking south of Pokrovsk near Novotroitske towards Novoolenivka and Ukrainka (south of Novotroitske).[6] Mashovets noted that the 2nd CAA has a wider AoR extending from Novotroitske to Lysivka (east to southeast of Pokrovsk) and that the Russian military command may be preparing to activate the 41st CAA east and northeast of Pokrovsk in the near future. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA), 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD), and likely the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) have recently struggled to advance further along the Novotroitske-Shevchenko-Novyi Trud-Dachenske line due to successful Ukrainian counterattacks.[7] Russian forces have remained relatively inactive in the 41st CAA's reported AoR since late October 2024 and will have to make significant advances in the direction of Novoekonomichne and Rodynske (both northeast of Pokrovsk) or towards and into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) in the near future if Russian forces intend to envelop Pokrovsk from both the northeast and southwest.[8] The relatively lower level of activity east and northeast of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command may currently be prioritizing advances to the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary over the envelopment of Pokrovsk.

Decreased combat effectiveness among Russian forces may be slowing the rate of Russian advance in the Pokrovsk direction. Mashovets suggested that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division have suffered significant personnel losses and are struggling to make further advances south of Pokrovsk and north of Kurakhove due to decreased combat capabilities.[9] Elements of the 90th Tank Division reportedly participated in the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024 and have remained committed to various sectors of the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions since then.[10] A Ukrainian brigade officer recently estimated that Russian forces lost nearly 3,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction in two weeks in mid-December 2024, and the 90th Tank Division has likely suffered significant personnel losses in the Pokrovsk direction and other directions where it was previously committed.[11] It is unlikely that the Russian military command has granted the division's various units extended periods of leave to rest and reconstitute over the last year as the Russian military command largely viewed the 90th Tank Division as its primary exploitation formation in 2024.[12] ISW recently observed geolocated footage showing Russian forces conducting a motorized assault with civilian vehicles east of Ukrainka — within the 90th Tank Division's AoR — suggesting that the division may also be struggling to replace armored vehicle losses while engaged in frontline combat.[13]

Increased Russian armored vehicle losses over the last year, particularly among Russian units and formations that have been engaged in frontline combat for most of 2024, may be impacting Russia's rate of advance in certain sectors of the frontline. A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on December 22 and assessed that Russian forces have 47 percent of their pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of pre-war infantry fighting vehicle reserves, and 45 percent of pre-war armored personnel carrier reserves remaining in storage as of a recent unspecified date.[14] The social media source's data suggests that Russian forces have used all of their pre-war T-90 tanks and most of their T-80 tanks thus far but still have most of their older T-72, T-64/62, and T-54/55 tanks in storage. The social media source noted that Russian forces will not be able to field these older tanks as the tanks have likely been degraded by weather and time. ISW is unable to independently verify the social media source's characterizations of the quality of various Russian tanks and armored vehicles based on satellite imagery as Russian forces may also be cannibalizing older tanks to repair newer tanks operating in Ukraine, which would be difficult to determine based on satellite imagery alone. Russian forces may also have additional armored vehicles and tanks in covered storage that are not visible in satellite imagery.

Armored vehicle limitations among Russian forces likely differ among sectors of the frontline, as Russian forces conducted battalion-sized mechanized assaults in the Siversk direction on November 2 and December 15 and a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction on October 19.[15] Russian forces operating in the Siversk and Kupyansk directions — frontline areas with a relatively lower tempo of Russian offensive operations over the last few months — may currently have more armored vehicles because they have not been conducting armored assaults and taking armored vehicles losses at the same intensity as Russian forces in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions. The Russian military may, however, be struggling to reequip Russian frontline units and formations because the Russian military command does not want to withdraw Russian units for rest and reconstitution and risk further slowing Russian advances in high-priority frontline sectors.

North Korea is reportedly planning to deploy more troops and weapons to Russia amid reports that over 3,000 North Korean troops have been killed and wounded in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 23 that over 3,000 North Korean troops have been killed and wounded in Kursk Oblast — roughly a fourth of the total 12,000 North Korean troops deployed to Russia.[16] The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on December 23 that at least 1,100 North Korean troops have been wounded and killed in Kursk Oblast and that North Korea appears to be preparing to deploy an unspecified number of additional troops and military equipment to Russia, possibly including loitering munitions.[17] The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff added that it is unclear if North Korea is rotating troops out of Russia or increasing the deployment of troops to Russia. Russian authorities continue attempts to conceal the presence of North Korean soldiers operating in Kursk Oblast. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that the Russian military is issuing North Korean troops fake identification documents with Russian names and the Republic of Tuva as their birthplace.[18] A Ukrainian brigade posted footage on December 23 describing Russian-North Korean troop interaction in Kursk Oblast as minimal with no joint training or cooperation between Russian and North Korean units.[19] ISW previously observed reports that poor communication and coordination due to language barriers between Russian and North Korean forces are hindering Russian combat operations in Kursk Oblast.[20] The language barrier reportedly continues to create difficulties in communication and coordination, and North Korean forces are reportedly conducting the initial assaults against Ukrainian positions - after which Russian forces advance and secure positions.[21]

North Korea continues to provide Russia with weapons and troops in exchange for Russian oil, cash, and military technology that violate international sanctions. The New York Times (NYT) reported on December 23, citing unspecified US officials, that US intelligence agencies assessed that North Korea originally proposed the idea of deploying North Korean troops to Russia — not the Kremlin.[22] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an article published on December 23 that 60 percent of the artillery and mortar shells that Russian forces use in Ukraine come from North Korea.[23] Unspecified Ukrainian officials also told the WSJ that Russian forces conducted almost one third of their ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in 2024 with North Korean-provided missiles. The WSJ reported that North Korea originally provided Russia with "decades-old" ammunition, likely in Fall 2023, but is now supplying Russia with "newer" munitions such as 240mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) with "new guidance and control systems." The WSJ reported that unspecified South Korean officials stated that Russia is transferring fuel and equipment to support the North Korean defense industrial base (DIB) and that 200 North Korean munitions factories are currently operating at full capacity. The WSJ added, citing satellite imagery, that North Korea is expanding a missile manufacturing facility that produces KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles. The WSJ reported, citing unspecified South Korean officials, that Russia is providing air defense systems and sending technicians to aid North Korea's spy satellite operations, and that North Korea likely seeks intercontinental ballistic missile technology from Russia. The WSJ reported that the London-based Open Source Centre assessed that Russia has provided North Korea with over one million barrels of oil since March 2024 — double the annual cap imposed under United Nations sanctions.[24] The WSJ also reported that Olena Guseinova, a researcher at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, assessed that Russia could have paid up to $5.5 billion in arms deals since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and that Russia may be paying up to up to $572 million yearly for the North Korean troop deployment to Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to advance Russia's campaign to undermine Western unity in supporting Ukraine. Putin and Fico met in Moscow on December 22 for the first time since 2016, marking the third visit by a European Union (EU) official to Russia since Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[25] Putin and Fico reportedly discussed Ukraine's decision to not transit Russian gas starting January 1, 2025, and exchanged views about Russia's war in Ukraine.[26] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that Fico and Putin would not host a joint press conference or offer joint statements following the meeting.[27] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin cultivates relationships with individual Western and NATO members to leverage these relationships to exacerbate fissures within the West and undermine support for Ukraine.[28]

The Kremlin may be setting information conditions for a false flag in the pro-Russian breakaway region of Transnistria likely in a continued attempt to destabilize Moldova and hinder its integration into European Union (EU). The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on December 23 that Moldovan President Maia Sandu is preparing a plan for a military operation in Transnistria and speculated that this military operation may lead to a war.[29] The SVR added that Sandu called on the government to develop a plan to establish control over Transnistria and eliminate the Russian presence in the region during a meeting with Moldova's energy security leadership.[30] A milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) insinuated that Sandu is planning to attack Transnistria in retaliation for Russia stopping its gas transit via Ukraine.[31] The milblogger identified the possible place for the false flag attack as the Cuciurgan Power Station in Transnistria. Sandu's Chief of Staff Andrian Balutel responded to the SVR claims, stating that Moldova is not preparing military operations in Transnistria and that these claims are "are serious and dangerous disinformation, designed to sow panic and distrust."[32] Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean also stated that SVR claims are part of the Kremlin's "hybrid war," and the Moldovan Reintegration Policy Bureau reiterated that the Kremlin is trying to destabilize Moldova.[33] The Kremlin had historically used gas and energy blackmail in attempts to destabilize internal Moldovan affairs and may be using Ukraine's refusal to extend the gas transit deal to spread panic and distrust in Moldovan society towards the pro-Western Sandu government.[34] The Kremlin may also be setting information conditions for a false flag operation in Transnistria, however.

Russian forces have reportedly withdrawn completely from most of their positions in Syria, including their base at Qamishli in northern Syria. (NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP's December 23 Iran Update.) Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 23 that Russian elements completed their withdrawal from all positions in Syria’s interior and are now only present at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus.[35] CTP-ISW cannot independently confirm the GUR report, though it is consistent with the pace of Russian military evacuations from Syria since the fall of Assad. CTP-ISW last observed Russian forces present at the Qamishli base, Hasakah Province, on December 18, suggesting that Russian elements fully evacuated the base in the days since.[36] Russia still maintains a presence in coastal Syria at Hmeimim Air Base and the port of Tartus, but visual evidence and Syrian reporting continue to indicate that Russian forces are preparing to either significantly draw down or withdraw fully from coastal Syria.[37] The GUR stated on December 23 that a Russian cargo ship that broke down in the Mediterranean Sea was traveling to Syria to evacuate Russian equipment and weapons from Tartus.[38] The GUR stated on December 23 that Russia and the "new [Syrian] authorities," likely referring to the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government, have continued negotiations and have discussed alleged Syrian demands that Russia withdraw from Hmeimim and Tartus no later than February 20, 2025.[39] Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov stated on December 23 that Russia is in contact with the new authorities in Syria through both diplomatic and military channels.[40]

Germany announced additional military assistance for Ukraine on December 23. The German government announced that Germany will deliver two Patriot launcher systems; 15 Leopard 1 A5 tanks and ammunition for Leopard 1 and Leopard 2 tanks; two Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and 65,000 ammunition rounds for Gepard guns; 30 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles; one Panzerhaubitzen 2000 self-propelled howitzer; 12 armored vehicles with kinetic defense systems; seven Caracal amphibious vehicles; one IRIS-T SLM anti-aircraft missile system with missiles; one IRIS-T SLS anti-aircraft missile system; two TRML 4-D aerial radar systems; one AIM-9L/I-1 Sidewinder guided missile; 68 reconnaissance drones of Vector, RQ-Heidrun, and Hornet XR type; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) materiel, tank and artillery munitions; logistics and special purpose vehicles; and small arms ammunition.[41] Ukraine's Defense Procurement Agency announced on December 20 that German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall will supply Ukraine with 155mm artillery rounds, with the first deliveries scheduled for the first half of 2025.[42]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are gradually advancing south and southwest of Pokrovsk, but it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to exploit these gains to envelop the town or if they intend to advance to the administrative boundary of Donetsk Oblast.
• It remains unclear which effort the Russian military command will prioritize, as Russian President Vladimir Putin may have tasked the Russian military with securing territorial gains rather than seizing significant settlements.
• The Russian military command appears to have split responsibility for the Pokrovsk direction between the Central Military District's 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs), and ISW has yet to observe significant Russian activity in the 41st CAA's area of responsibility (AoR).
• Decreased combat effectiveness among Russian forces may be slowing the rate of Russian advance in the Pokrovsk direction.
• Increased Russian armored vehicle losses over the last year, particularly among Russian units and formations that have been engaged in frontline combat for most of 2024, may be impacting Russia's rate of advance in certain sectors of the frontline.
• North Korea is reportedly planning to deploy more troops and weapons to Russia amid reports that over 3,000 North Korean troops have been killed and wounded in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin used his meeting with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to advance Russia's campaign to undermine Western unity in supporting Ukraine.
• The Kremlin may be setting information conditions for a false flag in the pro-Russian breakaway region of Transnistria likely in a continued attempt to destabilize Moldova and hinder its integration into European Union (EU).
• Russian forces have reportedly withdrawn completely from most of their positions in Syria, including their base at Qamishli in northern Syria. NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP's December 23 Iran Update.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to appoint Russian veterans into government positions, is already causing conflict between veterans and corrupt regional officials.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 22, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, William Runkel, and George Barros

December 22, 2024, 3:30 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on December 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin repeated his latest assertion that he should have violated the ceasefire he had imposed on Ukraine in 2014 and 2015 by launching a full-scale invasion even earlier than February 2022. Putin reiterated during an interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on December 22 that Russia should have started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine earlier than February 2022 but added that it is impossible to say exactly when that should have been.[1] Putin blamed Ukraine and the West for "misleading" Russia and not implementing the Minsk II Accords, which Putin claimed gave the West time to prepare Ukraine for future "military actions" against Russia. Putin claimed that Russia should have "prepared for this" and "chosen the right moment" to begin its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and not "waited for the moment when it was no longer possible to do nothing." Putin failed to mention that Ukraine worked to strengthen its military as a defensive response to Russia's 2014 annexation of Ukrainian territory and the launch of a war in the country's east. Putin made similar remarks during his December 19 Direct Line televised press conference wherein he claimed that he would have made the decision to launch his full-scale invasion earlier if he could do it over again.[2] Putin also claimed on December 19 that Ukraine did not abide by the Minsk II Accords and that Russia "spontaneously" invaded Ukraine in 2022. The Minsk II Accords were notably extremely favorable to Russia, placing no obligations on Moscow – which was party to the negotiations as an alleged neutral mediator.[3] The Accords established a "ceasefire" that Russian proxies continually violated with Russian support.[4]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an oil depot in Oryol Oblast with drones on the night of December 21 to 22. Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on December 22 that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) downed 20 Ukrainian drones over Oryol Oblast and that drone strikes caused a fire at a fuel facility.[5] Footage published on December 22 purportedly shows a drone strike at the Stalnoy Kon (Steel Horse) oil depot on the northeastern outskirts of Oryol City.[6] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Stalnoy Kon oil depot on the night of December 13 to 14.[7] Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on December 22 that international sanctions preventing Russia from accessing Western equipment and components, Ukrainian drone strikes, reduced Russian oil exports, and high Russian loan rates have caused Russian oil refineries to increase their downtime in 2024.[8] The SZRU reported that Russian oil refineries experienced a total downtime that prevented the facilities from refining 41.1 million tons of oil in 2024 after having only experienced a total downtime worth 35.9 million tons of oil in 2023. Ukrainian drone strikes have also targeted Russian air bases and the Russian military appears to be building shelters for aircraft at several Russian air bases. Satellite imagery collected throughout October 2024 indicates that the Russian military has been constructing shelters for aircraft at several air bases, including in Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Kursk City; and occupied Belbek, Crimea.[9]

Russian forces recently executed more Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the battlefield. Geolocated footage published on December 22 shows Russian forces executing five Ukrainian POWs in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area in Blahodatne (south of Velyka Novosilka).[10] ISW has routinely assessed that Russian commanders are either complacent or enabling their subordinates to engage in POW executions in clear violation of international law.[11]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin repeated his latest assertion that he should have violated the ceasefire he had imposed on Ukraine in 2014 and 2015 by launching a full-scale invasion even earlier than February 2022.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an oil depot in Oryol Oblast with drones on the night of December 21 to 22.
• Russian forces recently executed more Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the battlefield.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.
• North Korea may have transferred at least four additional ballistic missiles to Russia.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 21, 2024

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Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, Olivia Gibson, and George Barros

December 21, 2024, 6:50pm ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to expand Russia's network of military-patriotic education programs for youth in Russia and occupied Ukraine ahead of the Kremlin's upcoming "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" in 2025. Putin approved a list of four instructions for the Russian government on December 20, which include orders to: establish and develop a network of "military-sports camps" to promote enlisting in the military among young people; expand the Kremlin's "Roads of Victory" program; create an online platform to organize military-patriotic education programing for Russian youth; and transfer one children's "health camp" to year-round operations.[1] The Kremlin's "Roads of Victory" program is aimed at "foster[ing] patriotic feelings in modern children and youth" and offers free excursions to Russian cultural and historical sites of "military glory" for Russian children and youth.[2] The Kremlin has previously leveraged "Avangard" military and sports training camps to militarize and indoctrinate Ukrainian youth into Russian cultural and historical narratives and appears to be expanding its network of these and similar camps throughout Russia as part of its long-term force generation efforts.[3] The Kremlin is also preparing to expand and elevate other youth military-patriotic organizations, such as Yunarmiya and Movement of the First, to militarize Russian youth. In addition, it is leveraging its "Time of Heroes" program to place veterans of the war in Ukraine into government positions and militarize Russian society writ large.[4] Putin announced on December 20 that the Kremlin will consider 2025 as the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland," indicating that he intends to orient Russia's political and ideological priorities for 2025 around Russian veterans and further militarizing Russian society.[5] The Kremlin likely intends to leverage these military-political organizations to encourage and elevate the prestige of military service among Russian youth and society as the Kremlin continues to plan for its long-term war effort in Ukraine and possible future armed conflicts with Western countries.[6]

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on December 21. Footage published on December 21 shows several Ukrainian drones striking large apartment buildings and other unspecified buildings in Kazan, reportedly after Russian electronic warfare (EW) disabled the drones.[7] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces destroyed six Ukrainian drones near Kazan and downed one drone over a nearby river and that one drone struck near an unspecified industrial enterprise in Kazan.[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin called Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov after Minnikhanov visited damaged residential areas of Kazan.[9] Russian opposition media suggested that Ukrainian forces were likely targeting a gunpowder production facility, an airfield, a military base, or a helicopter production facility near Kazan.[10]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to expand Russia's network of military-patriotic education programs for youth in Russia and occupied Ukraine ahead of the Kremlin's upcoming "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" in 2025.
• Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on December 21.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Pokrovsk and Kurakhove.
• Ukrainian forces regained lost territory near Pokrovsk.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to exalt its efforts to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces following Russian President Vladimir Putin's official order to establish the new combat arms branch.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 20, 2024

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Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, Olivia Gibson, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 20, 2024, 4:10pm

Russian ballistic missile strikes damaged several embassies in central Kyiv on the morning of December 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five Iskander-M/North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles at Kyiv City on the morning of December 20 and that Ukrainian forces downed all five, but that missile debris damaged infrastructure in Kyiv City and caused civilian casualties.[1] Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi stated that the Russian missile strike damaged multiple embassies in a single building, including the embassies of Albania, Argentina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Palestine, and Portugal.[2] Kyiv City officials reported that debris from Russian missiles damaged warehouses and infrastructure in Kyiv City.[3] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile, a Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and 65 Shahed and other drones at Ukraine overnight on December 19 to 20, of which Ukrainian air defenses downed 40 drones and electronic warfare (EW) interference caused 20 drones to become lost.[4] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the overnight drone and missile strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Sumy oblasts.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted their first attack solely using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and first-person view (FPV) drones, highlighting Ukraine's ongoing efforts to leverage technological innovation into ground operations. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on December 20 that Ukrainian forces conducted their first ground attack exclusively using robotic systems instead of infantry on an unspecified date near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and successfully destroyed unspecified Russian positions during the attack.[5] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces conducted the attack with dozens of UGVs equipped with machine guns and also used the UGVs to lay and clear mines in unspecified positions in the area. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly highlighted Ukraine's efforts to utilize technological innovations and asymmetric strike capabilities to offset Ukraine's manpower limitations in contrast with Russia's willingness to accept unsustainable casualty rates for marginal territorial gains.[6]

Ukraine also continues to innovate aerial drone production. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian officials completed tests of a drone attached to fiber optic cables that will be more resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference.[7] Russian forces have recently fielded such drones in Kursk Oblast and Ukraine.[8] A Ukrainian drone company reported that it recently assembled a prototype of the first FPV drone made exclusively from components manufactured in Ukraine.[9]

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his intention to orient Russia's political and ideological priorities for 2025 around Russian veterans. Putin proposed on December 20 that Russia declare 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" to honor Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine and veterans of all other Russian wars.[10] Putin notably made this proposal while at a Russian State Council meeting discussing state support for families, which was the Kremlin's defined priority for 2024—the "Year of the Family."[11]

The Kremlin has lately taken several steps to cater to and empower Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine. The "Time of Heroes" program, for example, seeks to place veterans of the war in Ukraine into local and federal government positions for a two-fold effect—on one hand to appease a growing portion of the Russian population that has fought in Ukraine, and on the other to install militaristic ideals at all levels of governance.[12] Putin's focus on 2025 as the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" is likely meant to further appease the veteran class and to proliferate organizations and programs such as the "Time of Heroes." Putin likely understands that in order to sustain the manpower requirements of his war in Ukraine, he cannot disenfranchise the growing veteran class, and the Kremlin's defined 2025 ideological priorities are likely intended to curry favor with and even coopt this population as the war continues.

The Kremlin continues to scapegoat Kursk Oblast civil servants for its failure in responding to Ukraine's Kursk Oblast incursion. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 20, citing law enforcement sources, that Russian authorities detained the state-owned Kursk Oblast Development Corporation General Director Vladimir Lukin on December 20 under suspicion of abuse of power for embezzling 173.2 million rubles (about $1.6 million) for the construction of fortifications in the Kursk Oblast border area.[13] Russian authorities also detained Kursk Oblast Development Corporation former Deputy Director Igor Grabin on similar charges on December 9.[14] The Kremlin recently scapegoated former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, likely to appear dedicated to solving social issues in Kursk Oblast and quelling local protests while distracting from Russia's failure to repel the Ukrainian incursion.[15]

Roman Alekhin, a Russian milblogger and advisor to the Kursk Oblast Governor, commented on Lukin's arrest and stated that the civil servants working for the Kursk Oblast Development Corporation should not bear responsibility for Russia's failure to defend the Kursk Oblast border, but rather that blame should fall on the entities responsible for Russian border security in wartime including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Federal Security Service's (FSB) Border Guard Directorate.[16] The Kremlin continues to indicate that it has no intention of actually solving these issues in Kursk Oblast, however.

Russian President Vladimir Putin dedicated a portion of his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19 to discussing his plans to conduct major housing and infrastructure reconstruction projects in occupied Ukraine, attention that the Kremlin is not affording to its territory in Kursk Oblast.[17] New Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein, whom Putin appointed to replace Smirnov, stated on December 20 that the Russian state will not assume all costs of restoring Kursk Oblast facilities destroyed in the war due to the high degree of damage and the state's other financial obligations, including social guarantees and continuing to fund the war in Ukraine.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian ballistic missile strikes damaged several embassies in central Kyiv on the morning of December 20.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted their first attack solely using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and first-person view (FPV) drones, highlighting Ukraine's ongoing efforts to leverage technological innovation into ground operations.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his intention to orient Russia's political and ideological priorities for 2025 around Russian veterans.
• The Kremlin continues to scapegoat Kursk Oblast civil servants for its failure in responding to Ukraine's Kursk Oblast incursion.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, near Kupyansk, within Toretsk, and in the Vuhledar direction.
• Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported on December 20 that it has confirmed that at least 20,364 Russian soldiers have been killed in action (KIA) in Ukraine since January 1, 2024.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 19, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, Olivia Gibson, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 19, 2024, 10:20 pm ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin said that he should have violated the ceasefire he had imposed on Ukraine in 2014 by launching a full-scale invasion even earlier when asked to reflect on his 2022 decision to attack. Putin responded to a media question during his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19 on whether he would change his decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine if he had it to do over again, stating that he should have made this decision earlier.[1] Putin added that Russia should have systematically prepared ahead of the full-scale invasion and falsely claimed that Russia "spontaneously" invaded Ukraine in 2022 after Ukraine "directly" announced that it would not abide by the Minsk II Accords.

The Minsk II Accords were extremely favorable to Russia, imposing a set of commitments on Ukraine that surrendered core elements of Ukrainian sovereignty and allowing Russian proxies supported by Russian military forces to continue to occupy the areas they had seized during their initial invasions in 2014. The accords imposed no obligations on Russia — which was party to the negotiations as an alleged neutral mediator.[2] They established a "ceasefire" that Russian proxies continually violated with Russian support.[3] The Minsk II Accords also accepted the false Russian narrative that Russian proxies in Ukraine were independent of Moscow, and Putin insisted that Ukraine uphold its commitments even as the proxies, operating directly on orders from Moscow, violated their own obligations.[4] The Minsk II Accords did not require Russia to withdraw its armed forces from occupied areas of Ukraine, and Russia used positions in the occupied areas as staging areas for the 2022 full-scale invasion.

Putin insisted that negotiations with Ukraine must be based on the same demands he made before the invasion and at the moment of Russia's greatest territorial gains, despite the fact that Ukraine has secured Kyiv and liberated much of the territory his forces held at that time. Putin said during Direct Line that he is ready to hold talks with Ukraine without preconditions, that any talks must be based on what Russia and Ukraine had agreed upon during negotiations in Istanbul in March 2022, when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv and throughout eastern and southern Ukraine, and on "the realities that are developing on the ground today."[5] Putin reiterated that the demands he made at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in June 2024 — that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before Russia can agree to a ceasefire or peace negotiations — still stand.[6] The draft treaty that resulted from the Ukraine-Russia negotiations in Istanbul in March 2022 stated that Ukraine would be a permanently neutral state that could not join NATO, and imposed limitations on the Ukrainian military similar to those imposed by the Treaty of Versailles on Germany after World War I, restricting Ukraine's armed forces to 85,000 soldiers.[7] Russia's demands at Istanbul were mainly more detailed versions of the demands that Putin made in the months before he launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022, including Ukraine's "demilitarization" and neutrality.[8]

Putin's reference to conditions he attempted to impose on Ukraine when he believed his invasion could succeed in a few days and then, later, as his forces were still driving on Kyiv, reflects his projected confidence that he can completely defeat Ukraine militarily despite the tremendous setbacks Ukraine has inflicted on Russian forces since then.  Russian forces were driving on Kyiv and advancing in southern, eastern, and northern Ukraine while the Istanbul negotiations were ongoing in March 2022.[9] Ukrainian forces have since pushed Russian forces away from Kyiv and secured the city and its environs from ground attack while conducting counteroffensives that pushed Russian forces away from Kharkiv City and liberated Kherson as well as much other territory. Kremlin officials have repeatedly invoked the concept of the "realities on the ground" in reference to Russian gains on the battleground, but realities on the ground reflect Ukraine's demonstrated ability to stop Russian advances and reverse them.[10]

Putin's insistence on Ukraine's complete surrender reflects his belief that Russia is winning and will outlast Ukrainian and Western resolve. Putin will not likely accept a lesser settlement unless Ukrainian forces inflict other significant battlefield setbacks on Russia and demonstrate to him that he cannot win militarily. Putin claimed during Direct Line that Russia's combat readiness is the highest in the world and that Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) is producing everything that the Russian military needs.[11] Putin claimed that the battlefield situation is changing significantly in Russia's favor and that Russian forces are advancing across the entire frontline. Putin bragged that Russian forces are not advancing in "100, 200, 300 meters" but in square kilometers and that Russian forces are advancing to accomplish the goals that Putin has established for the war. Russian forces' rate of advance in Kursk Oblast and Ukraine has recently slowed, however, Putin's rhetoric notwithstanding. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced at a rate of roughly 27.96 square kilometers per day in November 2024 but have only advanced at a rate of roughly 17.1 square kilometers per day between December 1 and December 18.

Putin's articulated theory of victory assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful, operationally significant counteroffensive operations against Russian forces, and will win a war of will and attrition against Ukrainian forces.[12] This theory of victory rests on Putin's assumptions that Russia can outlast and overcome Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukraine's ongoing efforts to man and equip its military and that the West will abandon Ukraine. Western decision-makers can invalidate these assumptions and compel Putin to negotiate on bases acceptable to the United States, Ukraine, and Europe by proving their will to continue supporting Ukraine and enabling Ukrainian forces to inflict significant battlefield setbacks on Russia.

Putin reiterated the false narrative that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's presidency is illegitimate, in part, to blame Ukraine for delaying negotiations and garner support for full Ukrainian capitulation among a Russian population that increasingly wants the war to end. Putin falsely claimed that Zelensky is the illegitimate president of Ukraine and that any governmental body formed under his presidency is by extension illegitimate.[13] Putin also reiterated the claim that the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada is the only legitimate governing body in Ukraine.[14] ISW has previously observed that Kremlin officials are using a false reading of the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law to delegitimize Ukraine's government and sovereignty.[15] Putin has claimed that the Ukrainian government has been illegitimate since the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution and has used this false assertion to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[16] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 19 that the most popular question that Russian citizens submitted to the Direct Line press conference asked when the war would end.[17] Putin is likely promoting the false narrative about Zelensky's illegitimacy to Russia's war fatigued domestic population in order to set conditions to blame Ukraine — and not Russia — for the lack of negotiations to end the war on his terms and to garner support for the removal of the legitimate Ukrainian government — one of Russia's ongoing maximalist demands. ISW observed polling published in October and November 2024 indicating that the Russian population is increasingly interested in ending the war in exchange for Russian territorial concessions, and ISW assessed that Russian authorities are increasingly concerned about waning public support for the war.[18]

Putin continues to justify his decision to prioritize Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast over expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast. Putin claimed during the Direct Line that he has no doubt that Russian forces will push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast and promised the restoration of all settlements to Russian control but refused to provide an exact timeline for the completion of the Russian operation to re-take the remainder of Kursk Oblast.[19] Putin claimed that he refuses to provide an exact timeline because Russian servicemembers will hear him and immediately begin more aggressive and costly efforts to retake the remainder of Kursk Oblast regardless of manpower losses, which Putin absurdly insinuated is against the Russian military's code of conduct. Putin's claim that Russian officials care about manpower losses is ironic considering that Russia has suffered an estimated 125,800 casualties in September, October, and November 2024 in exchange for just over 2,000 square kilometers of gains — roughly 53 casualties per square kilometer gained.[20] The Russian military command has prioritized offensive operations and advances in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka directions over the last five months (since about July 2024) at the expense of expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast, and Putin's claim about wanting to avoid increased manpower losses in Kursk Oblast is likely aimed at justifying Russia's delayed efforts to retake Kursk oblast to the Russian public.

Putin is apparently embarrassed to admit his need for North Korean forces to push Ukrainian forces out of Russian territory, despite his openness about the Russia-North Korea relationship. Putin notably did not mention North Korea during the entire four and a half hours of his Direct Line press conference and instead highlighted the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) for its participation in combat operations in Kursk Oblast.[21] Russian milbloggers have recently attributed the seizure of Plekhovo, Kursk Oblast in part to elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and North Korean forces, and one milblogger claimed that elements of two unspecified Russian brigades have claimed responsibility for the seizure even though North Korean forces had seized the settlement with no assistance from Russian forces.[22] North Korean forces reportedly trained at Russian military facilities in Primorsky Krai, including in Vladivostok where the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade is based.[23] Putin's decision not to recognize North Korean forces' contributions to combat operations is likely placing limits on the extent of the aid that Russia can get from North Korea as Putin tries to minimize evidence of their help. The Kremlin would very likely struggle to conceal larger numbers of North Korean forces fighting within Kursk Oblast or in Ukraine itself, for example.

Putin continues to fixate on the Russian "Oreshnik" ballistic missile as part of his non-nuclear deterrent aimed at simultaneously forcing the West to make decisions favorable to Russia and providing Putin with an off-ramp from his failed nuclear saber-rattling narrative. Putin claimed that the Oreshnik is a "medium and shorter" range missile with a range somewhere between 1,500 and 5,500 kilometers and that modern Western air defense systems cannot intercept the Oreshnik.[24] Putin has leaned into highlighting the Oreshnik missile's technical specifications in recent weeks, likely to create fear and uncertainty about the damage that the Oreshnik can inflict and to pressure Ukraine's partners to limit Ukrainian strikes against military targets in Russia with Western-provided weapons.[25] Putin has emphasized recently the Oreshnik's non-nuclear capabilities, likely to provide an off-ramp from his nuclear posturing as Ukrainian and Western actions have challenged the Kremlin's nuclear saber-rattling every time the Kremlin has employed it. ISW has previously assessed that there is nothing particularly new about the Oreshnik's capabilities, and Russia already possesses missiles that Western air defenses likely cannot reliably shoot down.[26]

Putin's boasting about Russia's military capabilities ignores the reality of the serious and unsustainable losses that Russia has suffered to advance relatively more rapidly in Donetsk Oblast in recent months. Russian forces advanced more rapidly in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in September, October, and November 2024 than during the first eight months of 2024 — but Russian forces simultaneously sustained increased losses during this period as well.[27] The United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces reached an average of 1,523 personnel casualties per day and over 45,000 per month in November 2024 as Russia prioritized advances in eastern Ukraine - a new high for the war thus far.[28] Russia has also reportedly expended a significant percentage of its operational reserves on its 2024 offensive campaign in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on December 19 that Russian forces expended a significant part of their operational reserves that Russia accumulated in 2024 in pursuit of gains in the Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vremivka directions, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported in October 2024 that Russian forces had intended to commit most of their operational reserves formed from the Northern Grouping of Forces and Central Military District (CMD) to these directions.[29] Russian forces still need to seize over 8,000 square kilometers to achieve Russia's long-standing objective of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast and will likely continue to suffer significant manpower losses if Russia continues to conduct intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast in 2025.

Putin continues to falsely posture the Russian economy as strong and stable while deflecting blame for economic issues onto the Russian Central Bank. Putin characterized the Russian economy as "stable and reliable" but acknowledged that inflation rates have reached 9.2 to 9.3 percent and ordered the Central Bank to "bring these rates down to earth."[30] Putin claimed that Russia is a strong state that is only becoming stronger and more independent in the last two or three years of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russia is able to "stand confidently on its own two feet" in terms of its economy and noted that Russia remains one of the world's main food exporters, neglecting to mention Russia's continued illegal export of stolen grain from occupied Ukraine. Putin insinuated that the Russian Central Bank and its head, Elvira Nabiullina, mishandled rising Russian interest rates and noted that the Russian government's economic policies had "some shortcomings," likely in an attempt to deflect blame for rising interest rates and inflation on another Russian official. In reality, Putin's personal desire to insulate the Russian people from the economic and other impacts of the war in Ukraine is likely hindering the Central Bank's ability to respond to the economic pressures of Western sanctions and rising labor shortages.

The Ukrainian government, in contrast, appears to be addressing the economic impacts of the war more effectively than Russia, despite also suffering devastating economic consequences from the same war. The Economist reported on December 19 that Ukraine's currency conversion rates are currently stable and that the Ukrainian Central Bank forecasts that Ukraine's GDP will grow by four percent in 2024 and 4.3 percent in 2025.[31] The Russian Central Bank, in comparison, recently announced that it expects Russia's GDP to grow by 0.5 to 1.5 percent in 2025.[32] Ukraine's interest rate is currently at a 30-month low at 13.5 percent compared to Russia's current high interest rate of 21 percent, which some Russian sources have speculated will rise to 23 percent following a Russian Central Bank meeting on December 20.[33]

Putin attempted to balance among Russian ultranationalist demands for restrictions against migrants, Russia's reliance on migrants to address labor shortages and long-term demographic issues, and the need to posture Russia as an ethnically diverse and harmonious country. Putin expressed his support for requiring migrant children to pass a Russian language exam in order to attend school in Russia.[34] Putin further claimed that Russia needs to work with Central Asian countries to prepare migrants who are interested in moving to Russia to adapt to Russian language, culture, and law and supported the creation of a separate center within the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) responsible for migration issues in the future.[35] Putin acknowledged that Russia suffers a labor shortage in the "hundreds of thousands" but noted that Russia would rather offset these shortages with new technology that boosts labor productivity instead of unskilled migrant labor.[36] Putin responded to a request from a German citizen living in Russia to receive Russian citizenship, claiming that Russia is interested in attracting highly qualified specialists who are "compatriots abroad" — whom Putin defined as Russian language speakers and individuals who consider themselves a part of Russian culture — to live and work in Russia.[37] Putin has used the "compatriots abroad" framework to justify Russian involvement and influence in post-Soviet countries, including Central Asian states, but notably chose to make an example during Direct Line of a "compatriot" from a European background. Putin acknowledged Russian long-term demographic challenges and claimed that the number of women in Russia of childbearing age has decreased by 30 percent.[38] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is trying to leverage migrants to offset labor shortages and long-term demographic decline but that the Kremlin will face challenges balancing these efforts with xenophobic Russian ultranationalist efforts to restrict migration from Central Asia.[39]

Putin continues attempts to promote multicultural and interreligious unity among ethnic minorities living in Russia, however. Kremlin newswire TASS notably highlighted Direct Line attendees who attended the press conference wearing traditional cultural attire of Russia's ethnic minorities.[40] One man whom TASS filmed was wearing traditional attire and held up the banner of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade behind Putin during the press conference.[41] Putin's support for harsher restrictions against migrants and promotion of ethnic minorities living in Russia continues to indicate that Putin is attempting to placate the xenophobic pro-war Russian ultranationalist community that demands crackdowns against migrants while attempting to foster civic Russian nationalism and posture Russia as a harmonious, diverse society.

Putin attempted to frame Russia's strategic political defeat in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime as a victory, as Moscow continues to negotiate with the interim Syrian government on the status of Russia's military bases in the country. Putin claimed during the Direct Line that Russia "achieved [its] goal" in Syria, in an attempt to frame Russia's failure to secure Bashar al Assad's regime — the reason Moscow intervened in the Syrian Civil War in 2015 — as a victory.[42] Putin claimed that Russia maintains relations with "all the groups that control the situation" in Syria and that an "overwhelming majority" — but not all — of these groups are interested in the Russian military retaining its bases in Syria. Putin claimed that Russia has proposed using its Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus to bring humanitarian aid into Syria. Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) has reportedly already refused Moscow's offers of humanitarian aid, and Putin's statements suggest that talks are ongoing between Moscow and the interim Syrian government about Russia's bases but have not finalized any possible agreements.[43]

Putin framed the recent Ukrainian assassination of Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant as a terrorist attack enabled by Russian law enforcement's failures rather than a consequence of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin responded to a journalist's question during Direct Line about Kirillov's assassination on December 17, stating that Russian security services missed Kyiv's "terrorist attacks" and called on Russian law enforcement agencies to improve their operations in order to prevent similar incidents in the future.[44] Putin also emphasized that Ukrainian "terrorist acts" could impact Russian civilians' lives but omitted the fact that the assassination targeted a high-ranking Russian military official who was responsible for Russian chemical weapons attacks and information operations against Ukraine.[45] Putin's efforts to blame the incident on the negligence of Russian internal security and law enforcement services is notable, as the Russian ultranationalist community demanded after the assassination that Russia retaliate by escalating its missile and drone strike campaign against the Ukrainian military-political leadership.[46] Putin's response to the assassination during Direct Line was also extremely brief, possibly in an attempt to downplay the embarrassment of such a high-profile assassination.

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery in Rostov Oblast on the night of December 18 to 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and other Ukrainian forces struck infrastructure and production facilities at the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery is the only operational oil refinery in Rostov Oblast, and that it refines up to 7.5 million tons of fuel per year and supports the Russian military. Geolocated footage published on December 18 shows a fire at the refinery.[48] Rostov Oblast Acting Governor Yuri Slyusar acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at the refinery and claimed that Ukrainian forces used three unspecified missiles and more than 30 drones to facilitate the strike.[49] Ukrainian forces last targeted the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Refinery on March 13, 2024, and it reportedly temporarily stopped refining after that strike.[50]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin said that he should have violated the ceasefire he had imposed on Ukraine in 2014 by launching a full-scale invasion even earlier when asked to reflect on his 2022 decision to attack.
• Putin insisted that negotiations with Ukraine must be based on the same demands he made before the invasion and at the moment of Russia's greatest territorial gains, despite the fact that Ukraine has secured Kyiv and liberated much of the territory his forces held at that time.
• Putin's insistence on Ukraine's complete surrender reflects his belief that Russia is winning and will outlast Ukrainian and Western resolve. Putin will not likely accept a lesser settlement unless Ukrainian forces inflict other significant battlefield setbacks on Russia and demonstrate to him that he cannot win militarily.
• Putin reiterated the false narrative that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's presidency is illegitimate, in part, to blame Ukraine for delaying negotiations and garner support for full Ukrainian capitulation among a Russian population that increasingly wants the war to end.
• Putin continues to justify his decision to prioritize Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast over expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.
• Putin is apparently embarrassed to admit his need for North Korean forces to push Ukrainian forces out of Russian territory, despite his openness about the Russia-North Korea relationship.
• Putin continues to fixate on the Russian "Oreshnik" ballistic missile as part of his non-nuclear deterrent aimed at simultaneously forcing the West to make decisions favorable to Russia and providing Putin with an off-ramp from his failed nuclear saber-rattling narrative.
• Putin's boasting about Russia's military capabilities ignores the reality of the serious and unsustainable losses that Russia has suffered to advance relatively more rapidly in Donetsk Oblast in recent months.
• Putin continues to falsely posture the Russian economy as strong and stable while deflecting blame for economic issues onto the Russian Central Bank.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, and Robotyne.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued efforts to evade blame for ongoing systemic payment issues impacting Russian servicemembers fighting in Kursk Oblast caused by his decision to downplay Ukraine's incursion into the region as a "counterterrorism operation" by scapegoating the Russian Ministry of Defense.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin called on Mariupol occupation officials to redistribute illegally confiscated Ukrainian apartments during his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19, signaling Russia's continued efforts to forcibly repopulate occupied areas of Ukraine with Russians to fundamentally alter Ukraine's demographics.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 18, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, Olivia Gibson, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 18, 2024, 7:15pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00 pm ET on December 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Rostov Oblast on December 18. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that unspecified actors struck the Kamensky Chemical Plant and that the plant produces rocket fuel, explosives, and ammunition components and disposes of spent rocket systems.[1] Acting Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar claimed that Russian forces downed 10 missiles over Rostov Oblast, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used Storm Shadow or ATACMS missiles in the strike.[2] Russian sources amplified footage purportedly showing Russian air defenses downing the missiles, and a Russian insider source claimed that Ukrainian forces also targeted the Taganrog Metallurgical Plant.[3]

Ukraine's European allies continue to provide monetary and defense industrial support to sustain Ukraine's war effort. German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced on December 17 that the company will supply Ukraine with nine million euros ($9.34 million) worth of 155mm propellant charge modules of various types in January 2025.[4] Rheinmetall will deliver tens of thousands of propellant charges as part of the contract and is also planning to produce unspecified artillery ammunition and produce and deliver an unspecified number of Lynx infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine in the future. Global propellant charge shortages may be limiting Ukraine's ability to produce ammunition domestically, and the delivery of additional modules will likely support Ukraine's ongoing efforts to expand its domestic ammunition production capabilities.[5] The European Commission reported on December 18 that it disbursed nearly 4.1 billion euros ($4.25 billion) worth of grants and loans to Ukraine as part of the second payment of the European Union's (EU) Ukraine Facility program.[6] Reuters reported on December 17 that an unspecified source stated that NATO recently began overseeing coordination of Western military assistance to Ukraine.[7]

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov heavily inflated alleged statistics about Russian territorial gains in 2024. Gerasimov claimed on December 18 that Russian forces seized roughly 4,500 square kilometers in 2024.[8] ISW has observed confirmation that Russian forces have only seized 3,306 square kilometers in 2024, however. Gerasimov's exaggerated figures contrast with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's more accurate statements to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) board meeting on December 16. Belousov claimed, for example, that Russian forces' average daily rate of advance is about 30 square kilometers.[9] ISW observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced at a rate of roughly 27.96 square kilometers per day in November 2024.[10] Belousov also claimed that Russian forces have seized roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 70 percent of Donetsk Oblast, roughly 74 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast, and roughly 76 percent of Kherson Oblast.[11] ISW assesses that Russian forces occupy roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 66 percent of Donetsk Oblast, and 73 percent of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts each.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced on December 18 that Russian authorities detained the suspect who planted the improvised explosive device (IED) that killed Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his aide, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow on December 17.[12] The FSB claimed that the alleged perpetrator is a 29-year-old citizen of Uzbekistan who claimed that Ukrainian special services recruited him to place an IED planted in an electric scooter near Kirillov's residence in exchange for money and permission to live in the European Union.[13] The Uzbek Embassy in Moscow stated on December 18 that it is in contact with Russian law enforcement to clarify information about the alleged suspect.[14] ISW cannot independently confirm if the suspect was involved in Kirillov's and his assistant's death. Russian milbloggers seized on the suspect's Central Asian origins to call for harsher migration laws and restrictions against migrants.[15] Russian milbloggers' hyperfocus on the alleged perpetrator's ethnic origins highlights the polarizing debate over the role and treatment of migrants and ethnic minorities in Russian society, suggesting that the Kremlin is increasingly struggling to foster civic Russian nationalism and portray Russia as inclusive and harmonious multicultural country.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Rostov Oblast on December 18.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide monetary and defense industrial support to sustain Ukraine's war effort.
• Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov heavily inflated alleged statistics about Russian territorial gains in 2024.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced on December 18 that Russian authorities detained the suspect who planted the improvised explosive device (IED) that killed Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his aide, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow on December 17.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Kreminna, and Pokrovsk.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is increasingly tricking conscripts into signing military service contracts to fight in Ukraine likely in an effort to generate more assault forces and maintain the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 17, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, Olivia Gibson, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 17, 2024, 7:15 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on December 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) killed Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow on December 17. SBU sources confirmed to various Ukrainian and Western outlets that the SBU carried out a "special operation" to kill Kirillov, whom the SBU sources described as a "legitimate target" for his war crimes and use of banned chemical weapons against the Ukrainian military.[1] Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Representative Svetlana Petrenko announced that Sledkom's Main Investigative Department for Moscow launched an investigation into Kirillov's and Polikarpov's deaths after an improvised explosive device (IED) planted in a scooter remotely detonated near a residential building on Ryazansky Prospect.[2] Russian sources released later geolocated footage of the IED attack and its aftermath, showing a badly damaged entrance to the building and blown out windows.[3] The SBU notably charged Kirillov in absentia on December 16 for being responsible for the mass use of banned chemical weapons in Ukraine and reported that Russian forces carried out over 4,800 attacks with chemical weapons in Ukraine under Kirillov's command.[4]

The Kremlin and Russian propagandists overwhelmingly attempted to frame Kirillov's assassination as an unprovoked terrorist act, rather than a consequence of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Kirillov's responsibility for Russian chemical weapons attacks and information operations against Ukraine. Petrenko announced that Sledkom designated Kirillov's and Polokarpov's deaths as a terrorist act, and Russian officials such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasized Kirillov's prominent role in spreading numerous (false) narratives about Ukraine's and NATO's alleged use of chemical and biological weapons.[5] Kirillov spread several false narratives over the years, such as nonsensically claiming that the United States established "biolabs" in Ukraine and other countries around Russia and that the Pentagon deliberately destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) to spread contagious diseases via insects.[6] The Kremlin notably used the false claims of Ukrainian use of biolabs as a pretext for Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[7] Federation Council Committee of Defense and Security Member Vladimir Chizhov among other Russian officials and propagandists claimed that Western and Ukrainian security officials hated Kirillov for "exposing" Western provocations in Russia.[8]

The Russian ultranationalist information space overwhelmingly called on the Kremlin to retaliate against Ukraine by targeting its military-political leadership and indirectly criticized the Kremlin's decision to not recognize the war in Ukraine as a full-scale war that also impacts the Russian rear.[9] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger called on the Kremlin to target Ukrainian commanders instead of "launching 100 missiles at [Ukrainian] energy infrastructure."[10] The milblogger added that the war is only eight hours from Moscow and cautioned that Russia remains vulnerable to Ukrainian agents working inside Russia.[11] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev attempted to appease the Russian ultranationalist crowd by claiming that the Russian military will avenge Kirillov's death by targeting Ukraine's military-political leadership--which the Kremlin has long been seeking to do.[12] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger noted that Kirillov's assassination once again showed that Ukrainian forces are able to conduct intricate operations despite Russian gains on the frontlines, and implied that more Russians should stop treating Russia's war in Ukraine as just a war in Donbas.[13] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russia cannot win this war simply by launching unguided aerial bombs and Oreshnik ballistic missiles at Ukraine and that Russia needs to destroy Ukrainian military-political leadership, effectively undermining the Kremlin's recent attempts to present Oreshnik as Russia's "latest powerful weapon."[14]

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby confirmed on December 16 that North Korean forces are engaged in combat operations and suffering losses in Kursk Oblast as Russian official sources continue to avoid reporting on or confirming the deployment of North Korean forces to combat in Russia.[15] Kirby stated that the US has observed North Korean soldiers moving from the "second lines" of the battlefield in Kursk Oblast to the frontline over the past several days. Pentagon Spokesperson Major General Patrick Ryder stated on December 16 that North Korean military personnel have been killed and wounded in combat operations in Kursk Oblast but did not specify how many casualties North Korean personnel have suffered.[16] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 16 that the Russian military is attempting to conceal North Korean personnel losses and is burning the faces of killed North Korean soldiers to conceal their presence in Russia.[17] Zelensky added that the Russian military forbids North Korean personnel from showing their faces while training in Russia and attempted to remove any video evidence of North Korean soldiers operating in Russia. Ukrainian military officials and intelligence sources have previously noted that the Russian military attempted to disguise North Korean soldiers as Russian forces from the Republic of Buryatia.[18] ISW has not observed Russian officials and state media acknowledging the presence of North Korean forces in Russia or their participation in combat operations in Kursk Oblast. The Kremlin will likely continue to avoid reporting on the deployment of North Korean forces in Kursk Oblast as doing so would tacitly acknowledge that Russia needs foreign troops to recapture its own territory and invalidate Russian President Vladimir Putin's claims that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast resulted in high Russian recruitment rates.[19]

Neither the Kremlin nor the interim Syrian government appear sure of the future of Russian bases in Syria, likely accounting for Russia's continued visible preparations at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus to withdraw forces despite claims and reports that the interim Syrian government might extend Russian basing rights. Various Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated sources have given Western media outlets conflicting statements about the status of Russian bases—suggesting that there is likely some dissonance even within the transitional Syrian government about its plan regarding Russian bases. The Economist cited an HTS source on December 17 saying that Russia and HTS have "now entered negotiations" and that HTS "has conceded that it will probably allow Russia to keep some or all of its bases."[20] UK-based, Qatari-owned news outlet Al Araby al Jadeed reported on December 16, in contrast, that sources "close to the [HTS-led] military operations department" in Syria stated that Russia will withdraw all its military forces from Syria within one month, as ISW reported.[21] The divergent HTS-affiliated reporting suggests that HTS itself has not come to a decision on Russian basing yet, and HTS is likely facing substantial international pressure to fully remove the Russian presence from Syria. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas stated on December 16 that the EU will raise the possibility of closing all Russian bases in Syria "with the country's new leadership."[22] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) noted on December 16 that Russia is "closely monitoring" developments in Syria and that Moscow believes that there is a path to a "sustainable normalization of the situation in Syria...through the launch of an inclusive intra-Syrian dialogue."[23]

Visual evidence and Syrian reporting continue to indicate that Russian forces are preparing to either significantly draw down or fully withdraw from Syria, however. A well-placed Damascus-based outlet reported on December 17 that Russian forces were evacuating their positions in Latakia (Hmeimim Air Base) and preparing a large military convoy to leave via the Port of Tartus.[24] Maxar satellite imagery from December 15-17 shows a Russian Il-76 transport aircraft and dozens of military vehicles on the tarmac at Hmeimim Airbase and dozens of Russian military vehicles assembled at the Port of Tartus (see embedded images below). Russia is likely adopting this tentative posture and withdrawing some assets on the chance that HTS decides deny Russia a continued military presence in Syria, but it remains unclear what HTS intends to do.

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) killed Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow on December 17.
• The Kremlin and Russian propagandists overwhelmingly attempted to frame Kirillov's assassination as an unprovoked terrorist act, rather than a consequence of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Kirillov's responsibility for Russian chemical weapons attacks and information operations against Ukraine.
• The Russian ultranationalist information space overwhelmingly called on the Kremlin to retaliate against Ukraine by targeting its military-political leadership and indirectly criticized the Kremlin's decision to not recognize the war in Ukraine as a full-scale war that also impacts the Russian rear.
• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby confirmed on December 16 that North Korean forces are engaged in combat operations and suffering losses in Kursk Oblast as Russian official sources continue to avoid reporting on or confirming the deployment of North Korean forces to combat in Russia.
• Neither the Kremlin nor the interim Syrian government appear sure of the future of Russian bases in Syria, likely accounting for Russia's continued visible preparations at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus to withdraw forces despite claims and reports that the interim Syrian government might extend Russian basing rights.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin is scaling up the intended effects of its "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government officials, by tasking Russian regional governments to create more localized analogues.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 16, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, William Runkel, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 16, 2024 8:40PM ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:50 pm ET on December 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's continued fixation on the Russian "Oreshnik" ballistic missile and Russia's non-nuclear deterrents suggests that the Kremlin may be searching for off-ramps from its continued nuclear saber-rattling narrative. Putin addressed the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) board on December 16 and discussed Russian military developments in 2024 and Russia's military goals for 2025.[1] Putin stated that Russia is developing military capabilities and technologies alongside its nuclear triad and emphasized that the Oreshnik ballistic missile is Russia's "latest powerful weapon," of which Russia will soon serialize production. Putin also notably claimed that if Russia were to use the Oreshnik in a "complex manner" in tandem with other non-nuclear munitions, the resulting strike would be "comparable in power to the use of nuclear weapons." Putin noted that the Oreshnik does not have a nuclear payload and therefore does not create nuclear contamination, emphasizing that the Oreshnik's non-nuclear nature "is a very important element when deciding what means of armed struggle" Russia will employ. Putin has previously lauded the technical specifications of the Oreshnik ballistic missile, including by comparing it to a nuclear weapon or a meteorite in terms of the damage it can cause.[2]

Putin's recent emphasis on the purported power of Oreshnik is notable and suggests that the Kremlin may seek an off-ramp from the intense nuclear saber-rattling it has employed thus far in the war. Putin's December 16 MoD address, his statements at the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) Security Council in Astana, Kazakhstan, on November 28, and his speech to the MoD on November 22 all appear to be trying to establish the Oreshnik as the bastion of Russia's non-nuclear deterrent.[3] Russia has repeatedly invoked the threat of nuclear retaliation in order to force Ukraine and the West into self-deterrence, but Ukrainian and Western actions have challenged Kremlin's nuclear narrative every time the Kremlin has employed it, constantly undermining Russia's self-defined thresholds for nuclear use.[4] ISW has previously assessed that there is nothing particularly new about the Oreshnik's capabilities, so Putin is likely extolling its technical specifications in order to create fear and uncertainty about the damage the Oreshnik can inflict and to pressure Ukraine's partners to push Ukraine to limit its strikes against Russia out of fear that he will actually conduct retaliation.[5] Putin likely introduced the Oreshnik as a new element in the Kremlin's wider reflexive-control toolkit as the Kremlin increasingly comes to terms with the fact that Putin's unwillingness to follow through on hints of nuclear threats is devaluing them such that he must find a rhetorical off-ramp in order to maintain its credibility in the international information space.

Putin once again reiterated the false Russian narrative that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is illegitimate—firmly establishing that the deposition of Ukraine's legitimate, democratic government is one of the Kremlin's prerequisites for a negotiated settlement to the war. Putin falsely claimed on December 16 that the Ukrainian Constitution only provides for the extension of powers of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) and does not extend the president's power, even under martial law.[6] Ukraine's constitution and domestic martial law legislation stipulate that presidential, parliamentary, and local elections cannot occur under martial law, and Ukraine has been under martial law since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.[7] Zelensky was legally required to suspend Ukrainian elections in 2024 under these provisions and did so.[8] Kremlin officials have previously invoked this false narrative to claim that Zelensky is illegitimate and lacks power and to suggest that the Ukrainian Rada is the only legitimate actor with which Russia can negotiate.[9] ISW has previously assessed that Kremlin officials are using a gross misrepresentation of the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian domestic law to further this claim, which is consistent with Russian decade-long efforts to rhetorically delegitimize Ukraine's government and sovereignty.[10] Putin very likely resurrected this narrative—which has been largely dormant since early Summer 2024—in order to reiterate that the Kremlin views regime change in Kyiv as a necessary precondition to "negotiate" with Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Russia has no interest in engaging in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and will only sit down at the negotiating table if and when it feels it has secured maximalist concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty, including by removing Ukraine's legitimate government and cutting Ukrainian actors out of the conversation entirely.[11]

Russian Defense Minister Belousov also used the December 16 Russian MoD board meeting to reiterate Putin's previously stated territorial objectives in Ukraine as another Kremlin prerequisite to a negotiated settlement to the war. Belousov reiterated that Russia can only ensure victory in its war in Ukraine by achieving the goals that Putin set out in his June 2024 speech to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), wherein Putin stated that Ukrainian forces must "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before Russia would agree to enter into negotiations.[12] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev similarly invoked Putin's June 2024 speech on December 12, indicating that the Russian occupation of all four oblasts – including the territory that Russian forces do not currently occupy – remains the Kremlin's current territorial objective and that the Kremlin is undertaking a concerted effort to publicly promote this position throughout various branches of Russian government.[13] Kremlin officials' recent emphasis on Putin's territorial demands, coupled with Putin's continued claim that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate, demonstrate that the Kremlin is demanding that other negotiating parties hand over sovereign Ukrainian territory, including some that Russia has been unable to seize militarily to Russia without Ukraine's consent.

Belousov also used his December 16 address to posture as an effective and innovative manager—sharply contrasting his leadership of the MoD with that of former Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu. Belousov highlighted the Russian military's recent investment in technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and quantum computing, and noted that the MoD is following Putin's directive to make the Russian Armed Forces more flexible and receptive to innovation.[14] Belousov claimed that the Russian logistics and supply system faced "practically no disruptions" in 2024 and that the Russian MoD "regularly" meets with Russian military correspondents, after which the MoD has relayed issues raised by such correspondents to relevant military command bodies.[15] Belousov also notably acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes on the Russian rear have forced Russian military authorities to respond by taking "priority measures" to protect arsenals and fuel depots and reviewing how Russian forces organize and disperse storage and logistics bases.[16] Several Russian milbloggers and insider sources praised Belousov's speech and noted that it is reflective of a new era of Russian MoD leadership that aims to eliminate the bureaucratic barriers and inefficiency characteristic of Shoigu's MoD.[17] Milbloggers also noted that Belousov does not cover up issues but is willing to discuss shortcomings within the Russian military, such as obliquely acknowledging that Ukrainian strikes on the Russian rear have driven Russian command to make difficult decisions—praise that contrasts with a common critique of Shoigu and the policies he encouraged while at the head of the MoD.[18] Shoigu long faced accusations of corruption, bureaucratic inertia, and organizational incompetence, and Belousov appears to be trying to set himself apart from that legacy.[19]

Putin ordered the MoD to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces as part of continued efforts to centralize control over Russian irregular drone units. Belousov stated that Putin issued the order to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military and that the MoD will complete its formation in the third quarter of 2025 — consistent with ISW's recent assessment that this reorganization will take at least six to twelve months.[20] Belousov described the Unmanned Systems Forces as a combat arms branch (род войск; rod voysk), while Putin previously described the Unmanned Systems Forces as a separate branch (отдельный род; otdelnyi rod).[21] The organization of the Unmanned Systems Forces within the larger Russian military remains unclear given the differences between Putin's and Belousov's descriptions. ISW has previously reported on the Russian MoD's efforts to largely centralize control over its informal and ad-hoc drone units to free up manpower for infantry assaults, and ISW continues to assess that this reorganization may impact the Russian tactical reconnaissance strike complex (the integration of electronic warfare [EW] and unmanned systems with ground-based fires and attack drones) and reduce the cohesion between assault, drone, and artillery elements.[22]

Belousov's statements confirm that the Russian military is recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recent casualty rates, but intensified offensive operations have and will likely continue to strain the efficacy of Russia's cryptomobilization efforts. Belousov claimed that the Russian military has recruited over 427,000 volunteer servicemembers so far in 2024, a daily average of more than 1,200 people.[23] US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated on October 31 that Russian forces are suffering roughly 1,200 casualties per day, and the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently observed that Russian forces suffered record-high casualty rates in November 2024 with an average 1,523 casualties per day – notably higher than Belousov's claimed 1,200 recruits per day.[24] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on December 16 that data from federal budget expenditures on one-time payments to those who sign military service contracts with the Russian MoD indicate that between 215,700 and 249,000 people signed contracts in the first three quarters of 2024.[25] Vazhnye Istorii noted that the Russian government has not published data from the fourth quarter of 2024 yet but that at least 178,000 people would have had to have signed contracts between October 2024 and mid-December 2024 in order to reach Belousov's 427,000 figure. ISW cannot independently verify Russia's recruitment rates, and the Russian government may be delaying or even refusing to pay one-time payments to recruits such that the expenditure data does not reflect actual recruitment rates. ISW has recently observed indications that the Russian military has been struggling to recruit enough soldiers to replace its frontline losses.[26] Continued intensified offensive operations in Ukraine, particularly in western Donetsk Oblast, have put an unsustainable strain on Russia's force generation apparatus and economy. Russian authorities will likely have to balance mounting personnel losses and the growing pressure to enact a deeply unpopular partial involuntary reserve callup.

Russia continues to negotiate with the interim Syrian government to maintain its military presence at the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus in Syria, but Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's recent appeals to Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) suggest that talks may have hit a snag. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 16 that there are "no final decisions" about Russia's military bases in Syria and that Moscow is in contact with "representatives of the forces that currently control the situation" in Syria — likely referring to HTS.[27] Kadyrov claimed on December 15 in a post in both English and Arabic that Russian President Vladimir Putin has "always treated the Syrian people with respect and compassion" and that Russia considers it a duty to stand by Russia's "brotherly people" in Syria.[28] Kadyrov emphasized Russia's efforts to restore mosques in Syria and provide humanitarian aid to the country. Kadyrov also applauded the interim Syrian government on December 16 for its efforts to bring stability and peace to the country."[29] Kadyrov claimed that it will be difficult to achieve stability "without the help of partners," however, and highlighted Russia's "strength and means" that can help prevent a humanitarian crisis from developing in the country. Kadyrov called on Russia to remove HTS from Russia's list of terrorist organizations and create a Russian-HTS contact group, which should also involve Syrians who have been living in Chechnya. Kadyrov has previously used his position as a leader of the Russian Muslim community to reach out to the Arab world.[30] The relatively late timing of Kadyrov's overtures to HTS — one week after the fall of the Assad regime and days into reported Russian-HTS talks — and his overt emphasis on how the interim Syrian government can benefit from cooperation with Russia suggest that Russian-HTS talks may have hit obstacles and that the Kremlin is trying to use alternative channels to appeal to HTS.

Russia continues to withdraw elements of its force grouping in Syria to the western coast amid limited reports that Moscow plans to fully withdraw within one month. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) stated on December 15 that Russian forces are withdrawing from the Russian bases near Manbij, Kobani, and Qamishli and that Russian negotiations with HTS are not covering these other bases.[31] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 16 that Russian military transport aircraft, including three Il-76MD and two An-124 transport aircraft, are flying from Syria to Chkalovsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and Makhachkla, Republic of Dagestan as Russian forces in Syria continue to withdraw westward to Hmeimim and Tartus.[32] CNN reported on December 16 that two US officials and one Western official familiar with intelligence on the matter stated that Russia has been withdrawing a large amount of military equipment and soldiers from Syria but that it is not clear if the withdrawal is intended to be permanent.[33] The two US officials reportedly stated that Russia has started to move naval assets from Syria to Libya, with another defense official stating that Russia is increasing pressure on Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar in order to secure Russia's use of a port in Benghazi. The Financial Times reported on December 15 that Kamal Lababidi, a member of the political bureau of HTS who has been involved in the HTS-led Syrian Salvation Government, stated that Russia, in coordination with HTS, recently evacuated at least 400 soldiers from Qudsayya near Damascus to Hmeimim, from where the Russian personnel flew back to Russia.[34] Lababidi reportedly stated that Russia is withdrawing forces to Hmeimim from elsewhere in Syria but is not currently evacuating Hmeimim.

UK-based, Qatari-owned news outlet Al Araby al Jadeed reported on December 16 that sources "close to the [HTS-led] military operations department" in Syria stated that Russia will withdraw all its military forces from Syria within one month.[35] The SZRU reported on December 15 that Russia is "urgently" transferring large landing ships from the Baltic and North seas to Syria for evacuations and that Russia is also chartering ships flagged in unspecified countries to load equipment from the Port of Tartus.[36] The GUR stated on December 12 that Russia was moving two landing ships from its Northern Fleet to Tartus and that the ships were in the Norwegian Sea at the time.[37] It will likely be weeks before the landing ships reach the Mediterranean Sea and the Port of Tartus, but Russia may be able to evacuate limited military assets with other chartered ships. OSINT analyst MT Anderson reported that satellite imagery captured on December 16 shows that the Russian vessels that recently left the Port of Tartus, including some that were in a holding pattern off the coast as of December 15, have yet to return.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin's continued fixation on the Russian "Oreshnik" ballistic missile and Russia's non-nuclear deterrents suggests that the Kremlin may be searching for off-ramps from its continued nuclear saber-rattling narrative.
• Putin once again reiterated the false Russian narrative that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is illegitimate—firmly establishing that the deposition of Ukraine's legitimate, democratic government is one of the Kremlin's prerequisites for a negotiated settlement to the war.
• Russian Defense Minister Belousov also used the December 16 Russian MoD board meeting to reiterate Putin's previously stated territorial objectives in Ukraine as another Kremlin prerequisite to a negotiated settlement to the war.
• Belousov also used his December 16 address to posture as an effective and innovative manager—sharply contrasting his leadership of the MoD with that of former Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu.
• Putin ordered the MoD to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces as part of continued efforts to centralize control over Russian irregular drone units.
• Belousov's statements confirm that the Russian military is recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recent casualty rates, but intensified offensive operations have and will likely continue to strain the efficacy of Russia's cryptomobilization efforts.
• Russia continues to negotiate with the interim Syrian government to maintain its military presence at the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus in Syria, but Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's recent appeals to Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) suggest that talks may have hit a snag.
• Russia continues to withdraw elements of its force grouping in Syria to the western coast amid limited reports that Moscow plans to fully withdraw within one month.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Russian government appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov as the Chairperson of the Supervisory Board of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Construction Company, likely as part of ongoing anti-corruption efforts within the Russian MoD.

Click here to read the full report

Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, Brian Carter, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 15, 2024 4:45pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on December 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Siversk direction following a recent reported command change of the Russian forces operating near Siversk. Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported on December 15 that Russian forces conducted a three-pronged mechanized assault with over 400 personnel, up to 30 armored vehicles, 13 buggies, and 60 motorcycles north, east, and south of Siversk on December 14.[1] Geolocated footage published on December 15 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced during a roughly company-sized mechanized assault north of Vesele (south of Siversk) — likely a component of the larger attack.[2] Butusov reported that Russian forces managed to wedge into four Ukrainian defensive positions and drop infantry but that Ukrainian drone and artillery fire as well as close combat ultimately repelled the assault.[3] Butusov stated that Russian forces aimed to wedge two to three kilometers into Ukrainian defenses, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced two kilometers in depth from the direction of Zolotarvika (east of Siversk).[4] ISW is currently unable to confirm the extent of Russian advances in this assault, and additional footage of the Russian assault will likely emerge in the coming days. Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Anastasiya Bobovnikova stated on December 14 that Russian forces fielded more than 100 pieces of equipment in a recent assault in the Siversk direction and noted that there were 55 combat engagements in this direction on December 13 — a significant increase in tempo in this area of the frontline.[5]

The recent Siversk assault indicates that Russian forces appear to be learning to conduct more effective assaults but remain far from restoring maneuver to the battlefield. This Russian assault was much larger and more coherent than most Russian assaults in the Siversk direction, and Butusov assessed that Russian forces carefully prepared this assault.[6] Butusov noted that Russian forces specifically coordinated interactions between assault units and communications, electronic warfare (EW), and drone operations – all elements of command and control (C2) with which the Russian military command has historically struggled to conduct effectively.[7] A more prepared Russian assault may be the result of the recent reported command changes in the area. Russian forces near Siversk have especially struggled to conduct effective assaults, as a failed Russian mechanized assault northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka in early November 2024 and exaggerated claims of success in the area contributed to the Russian military command's reported removal and arrest of several brigade commanders within the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]).[8] A Russian insider source who has previously correctly predicted Russian command changes claimed on December 13 that the Russian military command recently removed 3rd CAA Commander Major General Dmitry Ovcharov.[9] A Russian milblogger rejected this claim on December 15, instead claiming that Major General Alexei Kolesnikov was the most recent commander of the 3rd CAA and that Kolesnikov recently took up a new, unspecified position.[10]

North Korean forces are reportedly facing expected struggles with high casualties and poor communication with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast, likely disrupting coordination between North Korean and Russian personnel and undermining Russian military operations. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 14 that North Korean forces operating in Kursk Oblast recently fired at Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz battalion vehicles and killed eight Chechen personnel in a friendly fire incident, likely due to the language barrier between the Russian and North Korean forces.[11] The GUR noted that the language barrier also hinders effective combat coordination between Russian and North Korean forces.[12] The GUR reported that a contingent consisting of Russian and North Korean servicemen in Kursk Oblast lost 200 personnel as of December 14 and that Ukrainian drones swarmed a North Korean position, which is consistent with recent reports of North Korean forces engaging in attritional infantry assaults.[13] The poor integration and ongoing communication problems between Russian and North Korean forces will likely continue to cause friction in Russian military operations in Kursk Oblast in the near term.

Russia's immediate plans for its military assets in Syria remain unclear as reports continue that Russia has secured agreements to keep its main military bases in western Syria while also withdrawing from its other bases in the country. NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP's December 15 Iran Update. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 15 that rumors are circulating among Russian troops that the Kremlin and unspecified Syrian actors agreed to allow Russia to maintain its military presence at the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia with up to a total of 3,000 Russian military personnel.[14] The GUR also reported that Russian military personnel at the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base and on nearby ships "in the region" are having problems with drinking water and food supplies and are awaiting food deliveries from Russian military transport aircraft involved in Russia's evacuation of military assets from Syria. Reports that Russian military personnel are awaiting additional food supplies suggest that the Kremlin may not plan or is unable to fully evacuate the bases in the immediate future. OSINT analyst MT Anderson reported on December 15 that satellite imagery captured on December 15 shows the Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate and possibly the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate still in a holding pattern roughly 15 kilometers away from the Port of Tartus.[15] The satellite imagery does not include the other vessels in the Russian Mediterranean Sea Flotilla that have recently been offshore.[16]

The GUR also reported on December 15 that unspecified armed groups that fought against the Assad regime are accompanying Russian forces as they withdraw from "remote areas" of Syria, likely towards the western coast.[17] A Syrian anti-Assad regime media outlet claimed on December 15 that Russian forces withdrew from the Tiyas Air Base (west of Palmyra and in Homs Governorate) toward Hmeimim Air Base.[18] The GUR reported on December 14 that some Russian soldiers were waiting at the Tiyas Air Base while a Russian military commander attempted to negotiate security guarantees for the Russian soldiers from military contingents of other unspecified states.[19] Russia has also reportedly recently withdrawn from a series of bases in the Manbij and Kobani areas in northern Syria amid the ongoing Turkish-backed offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).[20] Russia will probably withdraw from its last sizeable base in northern Syria, Qamishli, because Turkey and the groups on the ground in Syria—including Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA)—do not appear to be prepared to allow Russia to remain there. Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler also offered on December 15 to ”support” Russia’s consolidation at Hmeimim and Tartus, suggesting Turkey will not support other Russian bases.[21]

A Russian insider source claimed on December 15 that Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin may have fallen out of favor with Russian President Vladimir Putin following the Assad regime's collapse since Putin reportedly recently rescinded a decree to present Naryshkin with a state award.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Siversk direction following a recent reported command change of the Russian forces operating near Siversk.
• The recent Siversk assault indicates that Russian forces appear to be learning to conduct more effective assaults but remain far from restoring maneuver to the battlefield.
• North Korean forces are reportedly facing expected struggles with high casualties and poor communication with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast, likely disrupting coordination between North Korean and Russian personnel and undermining Russian military operations.
• Russia's immediate plans for its military assets in Syria remain unclear as reports continue that Russia has secured agreements to keep its main military bases in western Syria while also withdrawing from its other bases in the country.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.  
• Russian sources continue to complain about the Russian military's insufficient training system and inept military instructors.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 14, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

December 14, 2024 5:45 pm ET

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 14 that the Russian military had deployed North Korean soldiers in infantry assaults in Kursk Oblast.[1] Zelensky stated that the Russian military is incorporating "a significant number" of North Korean soldiers into Russian units operating in Kursk Oblast and that North Korean soldiers have already sustained "noticeable" losses. Zelensky noted that Russian forces have only deployed North Korean soldiers to offensive operations in Kursk Oblast but may use them in other unspecified areas of the frontline in the future. This is the first time a Ukrainian official has reported that North Korean forces are conducting assault operations since Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced in an interview with South Korean national broadcaster KBS on November 5 that Ukrainian forces engaged in "small-scale" clashes with North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast.[2] Russian milbloggers recently acknowledged that North Korean forces are involved in assaults in Kursk Oblast and claimed on December 12 and 13 that North Korean soldiers participated in the seizure of Plekhovo (south of Sudzha) on December 6.[3] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that North Korean special forces seized Plekhovo with no assistance from Russian forces, but one milblogger characterized the assault as a joint Russian-North Korean operation.[4] Geolocated footage published on December 14 shows roughly 40 infantry personnel conducting an assault east of Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo), and some sources claimed that the footage shows North Korean troops, although ISW cannot independently verify if the footage shows North Korth or Russian personnel.[5] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 14 that elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (a mobilized element of the Russian Territorial Troops) advanced near Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha) with support from North Korean personnel.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]), and "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA]) trained North Korean personnel operating in Kursk Oblast for "many weeks."[7] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi amplified several Ukrainian sources on December 14 claiming that North Korean soldiers conducted infantry assaults across open terrain in groups of 20 to 30 personnel in unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast.[8] ISW cannot independently verify any of these claims, however. ISW previously noted that North Korea's ability to learn and integrate lessons from fighting alongside Russia is likely to be significantly degraded if the Russian military command uses North Korean troops in the same highly attritional infantry-led assaults that it uses most Russian personnel.

The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 14 that "hundreds" of Russian soldiers cannot reach Hmeimim Air Base from Homs Governorate out of fear that Russian forces will come under fire from unspecified actors.[9] The GUR stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Africa Corps arrived in Syria to protect Russian forces moving towards Russia's bases on the western coast and that Russian Colonel Dmitry Motrenko is negotiating with military contingents in Syria from other unspecified states in order to secure guarantees of "immunity" for Russian soldiers waiting at the Tiyas Air Base west of Palmyra. The GUR also stated that roughly 1,000 Russian personnel left Damascus on December 13 in a column heading towards the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base, and ISW observed footage on December 13 of Russian military convoys moving from Damascus and other areas in southern Syria, likely towards the two main Russian bases.[10] Reuters reported on December 14 that a "Syrian security official" stationed near Hmeimim Air Base stated that at least one cargo plane flew out of the base on December 14 bound for Libya.[11] Syrian military and security sources reportedly stated that Russia is withdrawing some heavy equipment and senior officers from the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to Moscow but is currently not planning to permanently pull out of the Port of Tartus or Hmeimim Air Base. A Russian milblogger posted photos and footage on December 14 purportedly showing Russian military assets still operating at the Russian helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria, and a Russian source claimed on December 14 that Russian forces have withdrawn from their base in Kobani in northern Syria.[12]

The complex nature of the interim Syrian government is likely resulting in conflicting reports about whether Russia is engaged in talks with Syrian opposition groups. Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) controls the Syrian interim government, but HTS and the interim government do not yet have complete control over the disparate groups that helped overthrow the Assad regime. Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with HTS.[13] Reuters reported on December 14 that a Russian source stated that discussions between Russia and the interim Syrian government are ongoing.[14] A "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" told Reuters, however, that the issue of Russia's military presence in Syria and Russia's previous agreements with the Assad regime are "not under discussion" and that talks at an unspecified time in the future will address this matter. The official reportedly stated that the "Syrian people will have the final say." Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that Mohammed Sabra, a Syrian politician who represented the Syrian opposition's High Negotiations Committee at the 2016 Geneva peace talks on the Syrian Civil War, similarly stated that there should be a referendum in the future to allow the Syrian people to approve any foreign military presence in Syria.[15] It is unclear if Reuter's "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" who denied talks between Russia and the interim government is a member of HTS or another Syrian opposition group.[16] It remains unclear if Russia is in contact with all the Syrian opposition groups necessary to guarantee the short- and long-term safety of its military bases and select opposition groups may be unaware that Russia is in discussion with other groups. Russian state media has notably not differentiated between different opposition groups when reporting on the situation in Syria, possibly as part of efforts to present the interim government as more united so as to increase the legitimacy of any agreements Russia reaches with one or some of the groups.[17]

Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Oryol Oblast on the night of December 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that units of Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) and the Ukrainian Armed Forces struck the "Steel Horse" Oil Depot near Oryol City and caused a fire at the facility.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the oil depot supplies products to the Russian military and noted that Ukrainian forces are still conducting a battle damage assessment (BDA). Footage published on December 13 and 14 shows the aftermath of the strike and the fire at the facility, and Russian officials acknowledged the strike and the resulting fire.[19]

The new Georgian Dream-dominated parliament and other government bodies elected Georgian Dream's candidate, Mikheil Kavelashvili, as Georgian President on December 14.[20] Kavelashvili received the votes from the members of parliament and other government bodies required to meet the two thirds threshold to be president despite Georgian the fact that opposition parliament members boycotted the vote.[21] Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili continues to contest the legitimacy of the Georgian Dream party's parliamentary electoral victory and stated that "nobody elected anyone" in response to Kavelashvili's election.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 14 that the Russian military has deployed North Korean soldiers in infantry assaults in Kursk Oblast.
• The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue.
• The complex nature of the interim Syrian government is likely to result in conflicting reports about whether Russia is engaged in talks with Syrian opposition groups.
• Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Oryol Oblast on the night of December 13 to 14.
• The new Georgian Dream-dominated parliament and other government bodies elected Georgian Dream's candidate, Mikheil Kavelashvili, as Georgian President on December 14.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Torestk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Robotyne.
• Ukrainian forces regained lost positions near Vovchansk within the past several weeks.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to exalt the "Time of Heroes" veteran program and use it to militarize the Russian government and society.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 13, 2024

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Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 13, 2024, 7:45 pm ET

Russian forces conducted their largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine since the start of the war overnight on December 12 to 13, largely targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 94 missiles and 193 Shahed and other drones at Ukraine, including four Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missiles; two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, one KN-23 ballistic missile, 55 Kh-101 and Kh-55SM cruise missiles, 24 Kalibr cruise missiles, seven Iskander-K cruise missiles, and one Kh-59/69 cruise missile.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Ukrainian forces downed 80 Kh-101, Kh-55SM, Kalibr, and Iskander-K cruise missiles; one Iskander-M; and 80 drones and that 105 other drones became "lost" due to Ukrainian countermeasures and six drones flew into Russian and Belarusian airspace as of 1130 local time.

Ukrainian energy operator DTEK reported that the strike caused severe damage to DTEK's thermal power plants (TPPs), and Ukrainian authorities reported that the Russian strikes targeted energy and critical infrastructure in Kyiv, Odesa, Chernihiv, Vinnytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil oblasts.[2] Ukrainian authorities reported rolling blackouts throughout much of the country following the strike.[3] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that five of the nine nuclear reactors in Ukrainian-controlled territory reduced their output due to the Russian strikes, of which two nuclear reactors were already producing power at a reduced output due to the residual effects of Russian strikes in late November 2024 and the remaining three returned to full capacity on December 13.[4]

Russia's strike series targeting Ukrainian energy facilities is part of a broader campaign aimed at freezing out Ukraine in Winter 2024-2025 and compelling Ukraine and the West to self-deter into making policy decisions that benefit Russia. Russia has repeatedly targeted Ukrainian infrastructure during the fall and winter since launching the full-scale invasion in 2022 and conducted large-scale strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure on November 16 to 17 and 25 to 26.[5] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted the December 12 to 13 strike in retribution for a Ukrainian strike against Taganrog, Rostov Oblast on December 11 using Western-provided ATACMS, although Russian forces were likely planned to conduct such a strike regardless and are conveniently using the December 11 strike to justify ongoing Russian strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure.[6] This Russian messaging is likely aimed at assuaging the Russian ultranationalist community's calls for retribution for Ukrainian strikes into Russia and intended to support the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign aimed at compelling Western countries to make decisions about Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons and future peace negotiations that benefit Russia.[7]

Ukrainian strikes against military airfields in Russia and Russian air defense systems in near rear areas may be prompting a decrease in Russian air operations and glide bomb strikes against Ukraine. Russian forces launched a total of 431 glide bombs in the first 12 days of December 2024 according to data from the Ukrainian General Staff after reportedly launching 1,472 glide bombs in the first 12 days of November 2024 and over 3,300 glide bombs total throughout November 2024.[8] Russian forces are thus currently on track to launch only a third of the total number of glide bombs that Russian forces launched in November 2024 this month.

Russian opposition news outlet Agentstvo noted on December 12 that Russian glide bomb strikes significantly decreased after Ukraine conducted its first strikes into Russia using Western-provided long-range weapons systems in mid-November 2024.[9] Ukrainian forces conducted the first ATACMS strike on Russian territory on the night of November 18 to 19 and a Storm Shadow strike on Russian territory on the night of November 19 to 20, and data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Russian forces began consistently launching fewer than 100 glide bombs per day on November 22.[10]

The threat of Ukrainian strikes against Russian airfields within ATACMS and Storm Shadow range may be forcing the Russian military to base aircraft at airfields further within Russia and complicating Russia's ability to conduct glide bomb strikes on Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have also undertaken a concerted campaign to strike Russian radars and air defense systems in occupied Ukraine and near rear areas of Russia since late October 2024.[11] This campaign could be degrading Russia's air defense umbrella, particularly over occupied Ukraine, to the point that Russian pilots are increasingly unwilling to operate and conduct glide bomb strikes against frontline areas and rear Ukrainian cities.

Ukrainian human rights organization Truth Hounds estimated in a recent report that Ukrainian forces destroyed at least 33 Russian Su-34 fighter aircraft between February 2022 and September 2024, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) previously estimated that Russia has approximately 112 various Sukhoi fighter aircraft.[12] ISW is unable to confirm or verify the Truth Hounds' report. The destruction of nearly 30 percent of Russia's Sukhoi aircraft, could, if true, also impact Russia's ability to conduct glide bomb strikes against Ukraine, although it is unclear when these losses took place relative to the recent drop in glide bomb attacks.

Russia is evacuating elements of its force grouping in Syria while continuing negotiations with select Syrian groups about Russia's longer-term military presence in the country. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that an unspecified source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is currently negotiating with unspecified new Syrian "authorities" about maintaining Russia's military presence at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus.[13] The source reportedly stated that Russia has only secured "temporary security guarantees" but that the two military bases are "functioning as usual." Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), which currently controls the areas at Hmeimim and Tartus, and the TASS source is likely referring to ongoing Russian talks with HTS.[14]

Maxar satellite imagery from December 13 shows two Russian An-124 military transport aircraft preparing to load cargo while a Ka-52 helicopter and elements of an S-400 air defense system are likely undergoing preparations for transport at Hmeimim Air Base (see embedded imagery below). The Maxar imagery also shows two Russian frigates still offshore of the Port of Tartus. Drone footage reportedly of Hmeimim Air Base shows An-72, An-26, and Il-76 transport aircraft; Ka-52 and Mi-8 or Mi-17 helicopters; and at least four Su-34, seven Su-24M2, and four Su-35S fighter jets under hangars.[15] Geolocated footage published on December 13 shows a Russian military convoy moving from Hisyah (south of Homs) along the M5 highway.[16] Additional footage published on December 13 reportedly shows Russian military convoys moving from Talkalakh (west of Homs), Homs, and Damascus.[17]

It is unclear if the convoys are heading toward the Port of Tartus or Hmeimim Air Base, but the reported movement of Russian military assets indicates that Russia is pulling some of its forward assets in southern Syria to the western coast. At least four Russian landing ships and cargo ships are reportedly heading from Russian ports to the Port of Tartus but will likely not reach Syria for weeks.[18]

Russia is likely evacuating forces from its two main bases in Syria while negotiations are ongoing with new Syrian authorities as the outcome of these negotiations and Russia's longer-term presence at the bases are still unclear. Russia would be able to relatively quickly reestablish its military presence in Syria after evacuating from Hmeimim and Tartus should Moscow be able to secure more permanent agreements with the current Syrian authorities.

The status of Russia's helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria remains unclear, however. A Kurdish journalist stated on December 11 that Russian forces were withdrawing from the Qamishli base after unspecified authorities granted them safe passage out of Syria.[19] However, photos from December 12 show Russian equipment, helicopters, and personnel at the Qamishli base, and a Russian source claimed on December 12 that Russia maintains a presence at Hmeimim Air Base, the Port of Tartus, Qamishli, and other unspecified sites in Syria.[20] It is unclear if Russia is preparing to withdraw assets from Qamishli in the near future. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently control Qamishli, and Russian officials have only stated that Moscow has established contacts with HTS, which controls the area of the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus.[21] ISW has not observed reports that Russia is trying to separately negotiate with the SDF about Russia's continued presence at the Qamishli base, and it is unclear if Russian forces intend to or will be able to remain at the base.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on December 12 a new military aid package for Ukraine valued at $500 million.[22] The package includes counter-drone munitions; High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs); unmanned aerial systems (UAS); Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs); High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs); light tactical vehicles; Tube-launched, Optically-guided, Wire-tracked (TOW) missiles; and Javelin and AT-4 anti-tank equipment and munitions.

CNN reported on December 12 that a senior Biden administration official stated that the Biden administration is working to surge weapons deliveries to Ukraine before the administration leaves office in January 2024.[23] The official reportedly stated that the US DoD expects to deliver hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds, thousands of rockets, hundreds of armored vehicles, and other critical capabilities to Ukraine between mid-December 2024 and mid-January 2025. ISW continues to assess that sustained US assistance to Ukraine will empower Ukrainian forces to maintain the current tempo of operations across the theater of war, which is degrading Russian combat power and Russia's economy at a rate that Moscow will be unable to sustain long-term.[24]

A Russian insider source who has previously correctly predicted command changes within the Russian military responded to recent claims that the Russian military command removed 3rd Combined Arms Army (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps) commander Major General Dmitry Ovcharov.[25] The insider source claimed that some sources are falsely reporting that the Russian military command removed Ovcharov for lying to his superiors about the rate of Russian advances in his area of responsibility (AoR) but that the actual reason for his removal was due to the recent Ukrainian capture of a Russian T-90M tank in the Russian rear after a Russian crew allegedly abandoned the tank. The insider source claimed that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov ordered an inspection of the Southern Military District (SMD), whose AoR includes the Siversk direction where the 3rd CAA, after the Russian military command became aware of the incident.[26]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on December 13 of Belousov meeting with Eastern Grouping of Forces commander Lieutenant General Andrei Ivanayev – officially confirming Ivanayev's new position.[27] A source close to the Russian MoD told Russian state outlet RBK on November 26 that the Russian military command appointed Ivanayev as commander of the Eastern Military District [EMD] after the previous EMD commander, Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik, became the SMD commander.[28] Ivanayev previously served as commander of the 20th Combined Arms Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]), which has been operating along the Kupyansk-Svatove line.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted their largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine since the start of the war overnight on December 12 to 13, largely targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
• Russia's strike series targeting Ukrainian energy facilities is part of a broader campaign aimed at freezing out Ukraine in Winter 2024-2025 and compelling Ukraine and the West to self-deter into making policy decisions that benefit Russia.
• Ukrainian strikes against military airfields in Russia and Russian air defense systems in near rear areas may be prompting a decrease in Russian air operations and glide bomb strikes against Ukraine.
• Russia is evacuating elements of its force grouping in Syria while continuing negotiations with select Syrian groups about Russia's longer-term military presence in the country.
• The status of Russia's helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria remains unclear, however.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on December 12 a new military aid package for Ukraine valued at $500 million.
• A Russian insider source who has previously correctly predicted command changes within the Russian military responded to recent claims that the Russian military command removed 3rd Combined Arms Army (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps) commander Major General Dmitry Ovcharov.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Vuhledar.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov with the Hero of Russia award.

Click here to read the full report.

Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Nate Trotter, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 12, 2024, 6:40pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on December 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia has reportedly reached an agreement with select elements of the Syrian opposition about control over Russian military bases in Syria, but it remains unclear if the alleged agreement ensures the security of Russia's bases in Syria in the long-term. Bloomberg reported on December 12 that unspecified sources with knowledge of the matter stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) thinks it has an "informal understanding" with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) that would allow Russian forces to stay at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus but noted that the situation could change due to instability in Syria.[1] Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with HTS in Damascus and that Russian bases "continue to be located on Syrian territory."[2] Bogdanov expressed hesitancy in response to a question about whether Russia expects its bases to remain in Syria, stating that the bases will "probably" remain but that there are no other decisions yet on the matter.[3] Bogdanov implied that Russia's continued presence in Syria is important for the ongoing fight against terrorism in the country, likely as part of efforts to convince Syrian authorities to allow Russia to continue to operate its bases in the long-term. Russia has been using the cover of "fighting terrorism" as an excuse for military activities primarily aimed at supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime since it entered the Syrian Civil War in 2015.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 11 that Syrian "militants" have surrounded Hmeimim Air Base and are periodically attempting to conduct provocations and shell the facility.[5] The milblogger claimed that Russia reached a "preliminary" agreement about the continued presence of Russian forces in Syria but that the agreement only lasts for 75 days, after which Russia will withdraw from Syria. It is unclear if the reported Russian agreement with Syrian authorities is permanent or temporary. The Syrian opposition encompasses several factions with varying ideologies and political objectives, and it is unclear if Russia is in contact with all the Syrian opposition factions necessary to guarantee the safety of Russian military bases in Syria.[6]

Russia is reportedly moving four ships from Russian ports to Syria, possibly to facilitate evacuations —further demonstrating the Kremlin's current cautious response to the developing situation in Syria. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 12 that Russian forces from throughout Syria are withdrawing to Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus and that Russian forces are flying four to five miliary transport sorties daily between Hmeimim and unspecified airfields in Russia.[7] The GUR stated that Russia is moving its Ivan Gren Ivan Gren-class large landing ship and the Aleksandr Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship to Tartus to evacuate weapons and equipment. The GUR stated that the two ships are currently in the Norwegian Sea and are scheduled to pass the English Channel in "a few days." The GUR stated that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships also left Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast and St. Petersburg, respectively, and are heading to Tartus. It will likely be weeks until these ships reach the Mediterranean Sea and arrive at the Port of Tartus, and Russia may be moving these ships as a precaution should Moscow decide to conduct wider evacuations of the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base in the coming weeks. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is very likely hesitant to completely evacuate all military assets from Syria in the event that it can establish a relationship with Syrian opposition forces and the transitional government and continue to ensure the security of its basing and personnel in Syria.[8]

Ukrainian officials denied Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's claim that Ukraine rejected his offer to mediate a Christmas ceasefire and a large-scale prisoner of war (POW) exchange with Russia. Orban accused Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on December 11 of rejecting his proposal for a ceasefire and POW swap with Russia — a statement that Russian authorities subsequently used to forward Russia's ongoing information operation portraying Ukraine as unwilling to engage in POW exchanges and broader peace talks.[9] Ukrainian presidential aide Dmytro Lytvyn responded on December 12, stating that Hungarian officials did not discuss anything with Ukraine or inform Ukraine about Orban's December 11 call with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[10] Lytvyn added that Ukraine has been negotiating with Russia for two weeks about a large-scale POW exchange at the end of 2024.[11] Zelensky criticized Orban's direct engagement with Putin without consulting Ukraine and stated that Orban is undermining European unity around support to Ukraine.[12] Russia — not Ukraine — has previously demonstrated an unwillingness to conduct POW exchanges, as Russia reportedly rebuffed Ukrainian overtures for exchanges for months before the start of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[13]

People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping continues to provide Kremlin officials with a platform from which to articulate their uncompromising demands on Ukrainian sovereignty. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev met with Xi in Beijing on December 12.[14] Xi and Medvedev discussed the situations in Syria and Ukraine and highlighted the bilateral Russia-PRC relationship and their cooperation in multilateral institutions. Xi reiterated the PRC's standard stance on the war in Ukraine, calling for "de-escalation" and advertising the PRC's "Friends of Peace" Initiative with Brazil.[15] Medvedev later told Russian media on December 12 that he and Xi discussed potential settlements in Ukraine and claimed that Russia is "ready to resume negotiations with Ukraine" but only if "Ukraine understands the realities that have developed ... on the ground."[16] Medvedev explicitly invoked Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 14, 2024 speech at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), wherein Putin stated that Ukrainian forces must "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before Russia would agree to enter into negotiations.[17] Kremlin officials have long used the expression "realities on the ground" to refer to Russian gains on the battlefield, albeit largely incremental and gradual, and to force Ukraine and its partners to make concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty by recognizing the territories that Russia has illegally occupied and annexed as part of Russia including those that Ukrainian forces still hold.[18] Russia's version of "negotiations" that take into account the "realities on the ground" call for Ukraine to surrender nearly 20 percent of its territory and millions of its people living under Russian occupation. Xi and the PRC have continually provided Kremlin officials with a platform to advocate for this desired end-state to the war, as ISW has previously reported.[19]

India continues to preserve and enhance its economic relations with Russia despite recent efforts to reduce its reliance on Russia as a security partner. Reuters reported on December 12 that Russian state oil company Rosneft and Indian refining company Reliance Industries have signed a historic 10-year deal through which Russia will supply 500,000 barrels of oil daily to India, valued at approximately $13 billion annually.[20] India has benefitted from cheap Russian energy supplies since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions, ultimately becoming the largest importer of Russian oil.[21] ISW has recently noted India's efforts to reduce its reliance on Russian military cooperation, strengthen ties with the West, and distance itself from explicitly pro-Russian rhetoric on the war in Ukraine, but India nevertheless continues to balance these moves by maintaining strategic economic relations with Russia that are in India's interest.[22]

Russian authorities are set to equate the violation of Russian censorship laws with extremism and terrorism, furthering the Kremlin's effort to establish a pseudo-state ideology. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its second and third readings on December 12 that expands the legal grounds for putting individuals on the legal list of terrorists and extremists to include disseminating "fake" information or discrediting the Russian military in violation of Russia's censorship laws.[23] This bill is the latest Kremlin measure to legally equate opposition to its war in Ukraine and criticism of Russia's methods of waging the war with behavior that is illegal and undesirable in Russian society.[24] These measures to create a de-facto state ideology through the Russian legal system notably bypass the Russian Constitution, as Article 13 forbids the Russian state from establishing an official state ideology and commits Russia to recognizing ideological diversity.[25] The Russian State Duma passed a bill on December 10 that would remove the Taliban from the register of extremist and terrorist organizations.[26]

Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the Russian “Golden Star” Medal to a military correspondent for the first time since World War II as the Kremlin continues to use state awards to co-opt milbloggers and gain control over the Russian information space. Putin awarded the “Golden Star” Medal — a medal awarded for an "act of heroism in service to the Russian government and people" and that accompanies the Hero of Russia title — to Russian milblogger and Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny on December 12 and thanked other Russian military correspondents and journalists for covering the war in Ukraine and for their “faith in Russia.”[27] Putin awarded the Hero of Russia title to Poddubny in September 2024 for injuries that Poddubny sustained while reporting from Kursk Oblast in August 2024, and ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin has been increasingly trying to use Poddubny to disseminate official narratives in the Russian ultranationalist information space since late 2022.[28] Putin has also recently awarded prominent Russian milblogger and founder of the Rybar Telegram channel Mikhail Zvinchuk, who was initially critical of Russia’s military performance during its full-scale invasion, with the less prestigious Russian Order of Merit of the Fatherland Second Class part of continued Kremlin efforts to incentivize Russian milbloggers to be loyal to the Kremlin.[29]

Actors affiliated with Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) likely assassinated the Deputy General Designer and Functional Software Department Head of the Russian Rosatom-owned “Mars” design bureau Mikhail Shatsky in Russia on December 12. GUR sources told Ukrainian media outlet Suspilne that GUR actors may have been involved in the murder of Shatsky in Kotelniki, Moscow Oblast.[30] GUR sources alleged that Shatsky was working to modernize Russian Kh-59 cruise missiles into Kh-69 missiles and implementing artificial intelligence (AI) technology into Russian drones and other Russian military aerospace systems. ISW cannot confirm these reports.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia has reportedly reached an agreement with select elements of the Syrian opposition about control over Russian military bases in Syria, but it remains unclear if the alleged agreement ensures the security of Russia's bases in Syria in the long-term.
• Russia is reportedly moving four ships from Russian ports to Syria, possibly to facilitate evacuations — further demonstrating the Kremlin's current cautious response to the developing situation in Syria.
• Ukrainian officials denied Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's claim that Ukraine rejected his offer to mediate a Christmas ceasefire and a large-scale prisoner of war (POW) exchange with Russia.
• People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping continues to provide Kremlin officials with a platform from which to articulate their uncompromising demands on Ukrainian sovereignty.
• India continues to preserve and enhance its economic relations with Russia despite recent efforts to reduce its reliance on Russia as a security partner.
• Russian authorities are set to equate the violation of Russian censorship laws with extremism and terrorism, furthering the Kremlin's effort to establish a pseudo-state ideology.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the Russian “Golden Star” Medal to a military correspondent for the first time since World War II as the Kremlin continues to use state awards to co-opt milbloggers and gain control over the Russian information space.
• Actors affiliated with Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) likely assassinated the Deputy General Designer and Functional Software Department Head of the Russian Rosatom-owned “Mars” design bureau Mikhail Shatsky in Russia on December 12.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and in the Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Svatove.
• The Russian military command's efforts to ensure operational security amongst Russian forces continue to draw ire from select milbloggers, who derided these efforts as disruptive overreach.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 11, 2024

click here to read the full report

Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, Grace Mappes, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 11, 2024, 5:30pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:40am ET on December 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces continue to make tactical gains south of Pokrovsk as they attack into Ukrainian weak points and attempt to conduct a turning maneuver to directly assault Pokrovsk from the south. Geolocated footage published on December 10 indicates that Russian forces have advanced in western Novyi Trud and along the E50 highway south of Dachenske, narrowing the small pocket west of the E50 highway and south of the Novyi Trud-Dachenske line.[1] This advance places Russian forces about six kilometers south of Pokrovsk. Russian forces will likely continue efforts to close the pocket between Novyi Trud and Dachenske in the coming days, as doing so will provide them a stronger position from which to assault Shevchenko (just northwest of Novyi Trud and southwest of Pokrovsk). Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Nazar Voloshyn noted on December 11 that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian fortifications west of Novyi Trud, south of Novotroitske (southwest of Shevchenko), and on the southwestern outskirts of Shevchenko itself. Voloshyn reported that Ukrainian forces lost two positions during these attacks and are working to restore them.[2] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating near Pokrovsk characterized the situation in this direction as "critical," largely because each Russian battalion-sized formation receives about 200 fresh personnel per month.[3] The Ukrainian commander also emphasized that Russian forces are attacking Ukrainian positions up to 30 times per day and have an advantage in artillery fires—suggesting that Russian forces are currently relying on a superior number of personnel and artillery ammunition to secure tactical gains in the Pokrovsk direction. ISW recently assessed that the Russian command has resumed offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk via a turning maneuver from the south, but that this maneuver is coming at a massive cost to Russian manpower and equipment.[4] Another Ukrainian brigade officer reported that Russian forces lost nearly 3,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction in two weeks.[5] Continued Russian losses at this scale will impose a mounting cost on Russia's already-strained force generation apparatus. Russian forces may well continue making gains towards Pokrovsk, but the losses they are taking to do so will temper their ability to translate these gains into more far-reaching offensive operations.

US intelligence had warned that Russia may fire a second "Oreshnik" ballistic missile at Ukraine in the near future, likely in a continued effort to dissuade the West from providing further military assistance to Ukraine. Bloomberg, citing an unspecified US official, reported on December 11 that Russia may conduct a new Oreshnik ballistic missile strike against Ukraine in "the coming days."[6] Russia first employed the Oreshnik missile in a strike against Dnipro City on November 21, 2024. ISW assesses that Russian Oreshnik strikes against Ukraine and the rhetoric surrounding Russia's use of the missile are part of a broader Russian reflexive control campaign aimed at forcing the West and Ukraine into self-deterrence.[7] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov previously undermined this sustained Kremlin information operation, however, by claiming that Russia had planned the Oreshnik missile launch well ahead of the US decision to allow Ukraine to strike military targets in Russia with US-provided ATACMS.[8] Russian officials are likely to amplify similar narratives about the Oreshnik if Russian forces use it again.

Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Bryansk Oblast and an aircraft repair plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast on the night of December 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 11 that units of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck a loading point for the Druzhba oil pipeline in Bryansk Oblast, causing a massive fire.[9] The pipeline receives, stores, and distributes fuel and supplies to Russian forces, and the strike caused a massive fire. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 14 Ukrainian drones over Bryansk Oblast, and Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike against an unspecified industrial facility in Bryansk Oblast caused a fire.[10] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces also launched six ATACMS missiles at the Taganrog military airfield in Rostov Oblast, that Russian Pantsir air defenses downed two missiles, and that Russian electronic warfare (EW) "deflected" four missiles.[11] The Russian MoD claimed that falling missile fragments damaged two buildings near the airfield, three military vehicles, and cars in the nearby parking lot.[12] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on December 11 that it geolocated footage of the strike to the area near the Taganrog 325th Aircraft Repair Plant.[13] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported that the plant repairs Russian A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft, Il-76 military transport aircraft, Il-38 maritime patrol aircraft, among other foreign aircraft.[14] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched "Palyanitsa" drone missiles at Taganrog, and residents purportedly reported sounds of at least 10 explosions.[15] ISW has not observed confirmation of which systems Ukrainian forces used in the strikes.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to make tactical gains south of Pokrovsk as they attack into Ukrainian weak points and attempt to conduct a turning maneuver to directly assault Pokrovsk from the south.
• US intelligence had warned that Russia may fire a second "Oreshnik" ballistic missile at Ukraine in the near future, likely in a continued effort to dissuade the West from providing further military assistance to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Bryansk Oblast and an aircraft repair plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast on the night of December 10 to 11.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and in the Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.
• The Kremlin continues to leverage its "Time of Heroes" program to integrate Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine into leadership positions within Russian regional administrations. 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 10, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 10, 2024, 5:30pm ET

Russia's force posture around Syria continues to reflect the Kremlin's current cautious and indecisive response to the fall of Bashar al Assad's regime. Sentinel-2 satellite imagery from December 10 shows that Russian ships have still not returned to Syria's Port of Tartus and that the Russian Mediterranean Sea Flotilla is still in a holding pattern about eight to 15km away from Tartus.[1] Open-source analyst MT Anderson identified four Russian ships within this radius as of December 10—the Admiral Golovko Gorshkov-class frigate, the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, the Novorossiysk Improved Kilo-class submarine, and the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler.[2] Satellite imagery from December 9 indicated that the Admiral Grigorovich, Novorossiysk, and Vyazma were in the same holding pattern as they are as of December 10.[3] Other open-source analysts noted that the Baltic Fleet's Alexander Shabalin Project 775 large landing ship exited the Baltic Sea maritime zone on December 10, potentially to facilitate the removal of some Russian military assets from Tartus to the Mediterranean (potentially Tobruk, Libya).[4] A Russian milblogger claimed that as of the end of the day on December 9 "the status of Hmeimim (Air Base) and Tartus is up in the air," and Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov emphasized that it is "difficult to predict" what will happen in Syria but that Russia will continue a dialogue with all countries that share interests with Russia.[5] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 10 that Russian forces are still disassembling equipment and weapons and removing troops from Hmeimim in An-124 and Il-76 military transport aircraft and are "dismantling" equipment at Tartus under the supervision of recently-deployed Russian Spetsnaz.[6] Maxar satellite imagery from December 10 shows that Russian aircraft, helicopters, and associated military equipment remain in place at the Hmeimim Air Base (see embedded imagery below). The continued lack of a coherent Russian response, both in terms of military posture and rhetorical overtures, suggests that the Kremlin is still waiting to formulate a path forward in Syria as it observes the situation on the ground. The Kremlin is very likely hesitant to completely evacuate all military assets from Syria in the event that it can establish a relationship with Syrian opposition forces and the transitional government and continue to ensure the security of its basing and personnel in Syria.[7]

Russia intends to supply North Korea with fighter jets amid growing military partnership between the two countries. US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) commander Admiral Samuel Paparo revealed on December 10 that Russia and North Korea struck a deal in which Russia agreed to send MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter aircraft to Pyongyang in exchange for North Korea deploying troops to Russia to support Russia's war in Ukraine.[8] Paparo highlighted that North Korea's receipt of these aircraft will enhance its military capabilities and that Pyongyang likely expects additional military equipment and technologies from Russia, including ballistic missile reentry vehicles, submarine technologies, and air defense systems, as part of the agreement. Paparo noted that North Korean soldiers remain in combat zones, likely in reference to Kursk Oblast, but are not yet actively fighting. South Korean network TV Chosun published an exclusive report on October 21 stating that North Korea dispatched an unspecified number of fighter pilots to Vladivostok before the deployment of ground troops to Russia in early October likely in an effort to train its pilots to fly Russian fighter jets.[9] North Korean pilots are trained on Russian Su-25 attack aircraft (which are already part of the Korean People's Army [KPA] Air Force fleet) further indicating that a Russian delivery of fighter jets will benefit and expand North Korea's military capabilities, especially in the air domain.[10] ISW continues to assess that military cooperation between Russia and North Korea has particularly intensified since the two countries signed their Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in June 2024, and especially since it entered into force on December 4.[11]

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh in Moscow on December 10 as India continues efforts to balance military technical cooperation with Russia and maintain good relations with key Western allies.[12] Singh announced the commissioning of a Russian-produced "Tushil" Project 1135 Burevestnik Krivak-class frigate into the Indian Navy at the Yantar Shipbuilding Plant in Kaliningrad Oblast on December 9.[13] Indian outlet The Sunday Guardian reported on December 8 that India and Russia are finalizing a deal for India to purchase a Russian-made early warning radar system with a range of over 6,000 kilometers, possibly a Voronezh radar.[14] The Sunday Guardian noted that it is unclear exactly which radar system Russia intends to sell to India and that Indian officials may have requested an upgraded version of the Voronezh radar. Bloomberg reported on December 3 that India has sharply reduced its defense equipment orders from Russia and has started purchasing defense equipment from Western suppliers, however, emphasizing the tenuous balance that India is striking between Russia and its Western partners.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia's force posture around Syria continues to reflect the Kremlin's current cautious and indecisive response to the fall of Bashar al Assad's regime.
• Russia intends to supply North Korea with fighter jets amid a growing military partnership between the two countries.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh in Moscow on December 10 as India continues efforts to balance military technical cooperation with Russia and maintain good relations with key Western allies.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Vuhledar direction, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Kharkiv oblasts and in the Svatove, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka directions.
• The Russian government continues efforts to formalize irregular Russian military units and veterans from the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics army corps (DNR and LNR ACs) and formally integrate them under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Russia continues to utilize Western-produced high-tech components in Russian weapons systems despite Western sanctions against Russia and cobelligerent states.
• A Russian insider source who has previously correctly predicted command changes within the Russian MoD claimed on December 9 that Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted the Russian Deputy Defense Minister, Pavel Fradkov, to the rank of Major General.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 9, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Nate Trotter, Kateryna Stepanenko, William Runkel, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 9, 2024, 6:30pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on December 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin continues to cautiously signal that it can ensure the security of Russian military bases in Syria in the short-term but notably has expressed uncertainty about the long-term future of the military bases against the backdrop of the volatile and rapidly evolving political situation in Syria. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 9 that the Russian military is taking all necessary precautions to ensure the security of Russian military bases in Syria and that Russia is "doing everything possible" to establish contact with those who can ensure the safety of Russian military personnel in Syria.[1] Peskov noted that the Kremlin will host "serious discussions" with the future Syrian authorities about Russia's military bases in Khmeimim and Tartus at an unspecified future date but noted that it is currently too early to discuss maintaining these bases since such a discussion involves "those who will lead Syria."[2] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 9, citing an unspecified source in Latakia Governorate, that Syrian opposition forces have full control over Latakia Governorate and Tartus City, but that Syrian opposition forces have not and do not intend to "invade" the Russian Khmeimim Air Base near Latakia City and the naval base at the Port of Tartus.[3] The source added that both Russian bases are functioning normally. Russian state outlet RBK reported on December 9 that the Syrian National Coordination Committee's Foreign Relations Head Ahmed al Asrawi stated during a discussion about Russia's military bases in Syria that Syria would continue to uphold agreements that are in Syria's interest and would "never" take a hostile position toward Russia or any other friendly country.[4] Russian milbloggers continued to debate the future of the Russian bases in Syria on December 8 and 9, expressing uncertainty about whether Russian forces will be able to maintain their presence in the country or will have to conduct a full evacuation.[5] The Critical Threats Project (CTP) continues to assess that the potential loss of Russian bases in Syria will have major implications for Russia’s ability to project power in the Mediterranean Sea, threaten NATO's southern flank, and operate in Africa.[6]

Russia has removed some vessels from the Port of Tartus to a nearby area offshore. Satellite imagery taken on December 9 shows that all Russian ships and submarines have left the Port of Tartus.[7] OSINT analyst MT Anderson reported that satellite imagery taken on December 9 also shows that Russian vessels — likely the Admiral Gorshkov Gorskhov-class frigate, Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, Novorossiysk Kilo-class submarine, and Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler – are in a holding pattern in the roadstead about eight kilometers west of the port.[8] The location of the other ships that were reportedly previously docked in the Port of Tartus, including the Admiral Golovko Gorskhov-class frigates and the Yelnya Altay-class oiler, is unclear.[9] Syrian opposition leaders reportedly guaranteed on December 8 the security of Russian military institutions in Syria, and Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al Jalali stated on December 8 that the new Syrian authorities would make the decisions about the future of Russia's military bases in Syria.[10] The current and future security of the Russian military bases in Syria remains unclear as Moscow continues to hold talks with the new Syrian authorities, and it is also unclear at this time if Russia is removing the vessels from the Port of Tartus as part of a wider evacuation or to better protect these military assets.

The Syrian Embassy in Moscow confirmed to Kremlin newswire TASS on December 9 that former Syrian President Bashar al Assad is in Moscow.[11] Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is the sole authority able to grant Assad asylum in Russia but did not specify if Putin actually granted Assad asylum. TASS reported on December 8 that a Kremlin source stated that Assad and his family fled to Moscow and that Russian authorities granted them asylum.[12]

Russia continues to face staggering costs required to maintain its war effort against Ukraine, with mounting economic strain, labor shortages, and systemic corruption threatening the sustainability of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reported on December 7 that Russia has spent over $200 billion on its war in Ukraine and suffered at least 700,000 casualties since February 2022, with recent losses averaging 1,000 soldiers per day.[13] The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation reported on December 9 that Russia's liquid assets in its National Welfare Fund dropped from $140 billion in February 2022 to $53.8 billion by December 1, 2024.[14] The Center noted that Russia increasingly relies on Chinese yuan reserves and gold sales to cover its budget deficit and is committing a third of its national budget for 2025-2027 to defense spending, indicating an unsustainable prioritization of the war at the expense of economic stability.[15] Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov claimed on December 9 that corruption crimes, including bribery, increased by nearly 30 percent in 2024 over 2023, with Russian authorities having disciplined over 30,000 Russian officials for corruption violations in 2024.[16] Russia's mounting economic pressures stemming from the war, paired with widespread corruption, labor shortages, and inefficiencies in Russia's DIB, will likely compound the cost of Russia's war and further undermine its ability to effectively sustain DIB operations while maintaining economic stability. ISW has previously observed reports of similar trends and statistics in the Russian economy, indicating that Russia's economic trajectory is unsustainable in the mid- to long-term and will increasingly strain its capacity to wage war against Ukraine.[17]

Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov amid ongoing Kremlin efforts to shift blame for Russia's inadequate response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast onto local government officials and away from the military. Putin promoted Alaudinov to the rank of lieutenant general and Yevkurov to the rank of army general, likely in an effort to reward Alaudinov for leading Chechen Akhmat forces that have been fighting in Kursk Oblast and to reward Yevkurov for his role as the Deputy Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) “Coordinating Council” for military and security issues in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts.[18] Putin recently replaced former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov with Russian State Duma Information Policy Committee Head Alexander Khinshtein, likely in an attempt to scapegoat Smirnov for Russia’s failure to properly respond to the Ukrainian incursion.[19] Russian authorities arrested former Deputy Director of the Corporation for the Development of Kursk Oblast Igor Grabin on December 9 for mismanaging funds intended for defensive fortifications in the oblast.[20] The Kremlin appears to be punishing Kursk Oblast government officials while awarding Russian military officials responsible for Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.

The Russian government claimed to have returned the bodies of deceased Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) who were allegedly killed in the January 24 Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft crash in Belgorod Oblast.[21] Russian Human Rights Ombudsman Tatyana Moskalkova claimed on December 9 that Russian officials transferred the bodies of the alleged Ukrainian POWs on an unspecified date.[22] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs announced that Russian officials transferred remains during the recent POW exchange on November 29 but that these remains require additional identification.[23] The Coordination Headquarters added that experts are currently determining whether these remains actually belong to Ukrainian servicemembers. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 24 that the Il-76 was carrying 65 Ukrainian POWs and accused Ukraine of striking the plane with two unspecified missiles.[24] Ukrainian officials opened an investigation into the circumstances of the crash on January 25.[25] ISW continues to offer no assessment of the circumstances of the Il-76 crash at this time and cannot independently verify Russian or Ukrainian statements on the incident.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to cautiously signal that it can ensure the security of Russian military bases in Syria in the short-term but notably has expressed uncertainty about the long-term future of the military bases against the backdrop of the volatile and rapidly evolving political situation in Syria.
• Russia has removed some vessels from the Port of Tartus to a nearby area offshore.
• The Syrian Embassy in Moscow confirmed to Kremlin newswire TASS on December 9 that former Syrian President Bashar al Assad is in Moscow.
• Russia continues to face staggering costs required to maintain its war effort against Ukraine, with mounting economic strain, labor shortages, and systemic corruption threatening the sustainability of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov amid ongoing Kremlin efforts to shift blame for Russia's inadequate response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast onto local government officials and away from the military.
• The Russian government claimed to have returned the bodies of deceased Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) who were allegedly killed in the January 24 Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft crash in Belgorod Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to highlight Russian officials who sponsor Russian volunteer units in Ukraine and the "Time of Heroes program," which places veterans of the war in Ukraine in leadership positions within the Russian federal and regional governments.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 8, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, and George Barros

December 8, 2024, 4:50 pm ET

The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria – a regime that the Kremlin helped prop up since 2015 – is a strategic political defeat for Moscow and has thrown the Kremlin into a crisis as it seeks to retain its strategic military basing in Syria. Russia intervened on behalf of former Syrian President Bashar al Assad in 2015 in order to secure Assad's regime after mass protests began in 2011 as part of the larger Arab Spring movement, which triggered the Syrian Civil War and threatened to oust Assad.[1] Russian President Vladimir Putin has long viewed the "color revolutions" that ushered in new democratic governments in former Soviet states as a threat to his own regime's stability and security.[2] Putin has also more widely opposed democratic movements to oust Kremlin-allied authoritarian rulers worldwide as he views these movements as hindering his efforts to create his envisioned multipolar world where Russia and Russia's key authoritarian allies and partners play a major role.[3] Russia's inability or decision to not reinforce Assad's regime as the Syrian opposition offensive made rapid gains throughout the country will also hurt Russia's credibility as a reliable and effective security partner throughout the world, which will in turn negatively affect Putin's ability to garner support throughout the world for his desired multipolar world.

Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 8 that a Kremlin source stated that Assad and his family fled to Moscow and that Russian authorities granted them asylum.[4] Putin has been able to ensure the survivability of Assad himself, but Putin intervened in the Syrian Civil War with the primary objective of bolstering Assad's regime and preventing his loss of power – an objective that the Kremlin has failed to achieve. Putin also intervened on behalf of Assad in 2015 to secure Russian military bases in Syria, support Russia's wider efforts to project power in the Mediterranean and Red Seas, increase its global footprint in the Middle East and Africa, and threaten NATO's southern flank. Russia is attempting to secure its bases in Syria as opposition forces come to power, but Russia's continued military presence in the country is not guaranteed, especially as Russia's actions in support of Assad over the past nine years have likely undermined Moscow's ability to form a lasting, positive relationship with ruling Syrian opposition groups.[5]

The Kremlin reportedly secured an agreement on December 8 with unspecified Syrian opposition leaders to ensure the security of Russian military bases in Syria, but the contours of this arrangement and its longevity remain unclear given the volatile and rapidly evolving political situation on the ground in Syria. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 8 that a Kremlin source claimed that unspecified Syrian opposition leaders guaranteed the security of Russian military and diplomatic institutions in Syria.[6] TASS's source did not specify if the Syrian opposition leaders only guaranteed the security of Russia's two main military bases in Syria - Khmeimim Air Base near Latakia City and the naval base in the Port of Tartus - or other military bases and tactical outposts such as the Russian military base at the Qamishli Airport in northeastern Syria. Saudi-owned outlet al Arabiy reported on December 8 that Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al Jalali stated that the new Syrian authorities would make the decisions about the future of Russia's military bases in Syria.[7] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on December 8 that it was in contact with "all Syrian opposition groups" and noted that while all Russian military bases were on "high alert," there were "no serious threats" to their safety.[8] Russian authorities have notably softened their language about Syrian opposition groups, with the Russian MFA referring to the actors opposing Assad's Syrian Arab Army (SAA) as "opposition groups" - a notable shift from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's reference to such groups, including Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), as "terrorists" a day earlier on December 7 at the Doha Forum.[9] Russian state outlet RIA Novosti also notably referred to Syrian opposition groups as "armed opposition" in articles published on December 8 despite calling them "terrorists" in articles published on December 7.[10]

The Syrian opposition is not a monolith; it encompasses several different factions with varying ideologies and political objectives, and no single opposition faction controls the territory around all of Russia’s military bases and outposts in Al-Hasakah, Homs, Latakia, and Tartus governorates and beyond. It remains unclear how long cooperation amongst all the various Syrian opposition factions will last. It is also unclear if Moscow is in contact with all of the Syrian opposition factions necessary to guarantee the safety of Russian military bases in Syria. ISW previously observed reports that the Russian military redeployed some of its air defense assets protecting Khmeimim Air Base, indicating that the Russian command in Syria previously assessed that Russian military assets in Syria were not all secure.[11]

ISW has collected strong indicators that Russia has been setting conditions to evacuate its military assets from Syria and that Russian military basing is not secure. Satellite imagery collected on December 7 shows three Il-76 and one An-124 military transport aircraft at Russia's Khmeimim Air Base, possibly in order to evacuate limited amounts of Russian military assets from the country.[12] The Kremlin would likely need to conduct a substantial number of airlift sorties to properly evacuate Syria. Geolocated footage published on December 6 showed Russian forces transporting S-300 or S-400 and Tor-M1 air defense systems near Baniyas along the M1 Lakatia-Tartus highway, possibly as part of a tactical redeployment or for evacuation out of Syria.[13] A Russian source claimed on December 8 that Russian forces "are leaving Syria completely" and withdrawing from Khmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus.[14] Russian milbloggers, including a servicemember in the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), claimed that some Russian forces withdrew to Latakia and Tartus governorates a few days ago and are leaving from the Port of Tartus and Khmeimim Air Base but that at least one group of Russian personnel were encircled in an unspecified area of Syria and awaiting help or a negotiated exit corridor, indicating that Russian forces abandoned tactical positions beyond the main Russian bases at the port in Tartus and Khmeimim Air Base.[15] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on December 8 that Russian operational groups withdrew from Deir ez Zor and the Kuweires Air Base east of Aleppo City and that the status of Russian forces operating near the oil fields near Palmyra remains unclear.[16] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GUR] stated on December 8 that Russia's Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate and Engineer Trubin cargo ship left the Port of Tartus and that Russian forces are evacuating weapons from Khmeimim Air Base by air.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Turkey is allowing Russia to fly through Turkish airspace to evacuate Russian military assets from Syria.[18] It is unclear whether Russia will conduct withdrawals and evacuations from Syria following the TASS reporting on the evening of December 8 that Russia had secured guarantees for Russia's military bases from Syrian opposition leaders. Even if Russia maintains some or all of its bases in Syria, it is a major geopolitical loss for Moscow, as Russia’s continued basing in Syria will be at the mercy of Syrian opposition groups that the Kremlin previously used to call terrorists.

The loss of Russian bases in Syria will have major implications for Russia’s global military footprint and ability to operate in Africa. Russia has leveraged its Tartus naval base to project power in the Mediterranean Sea, threaten NATO's southern flank, and link its Black Sea assets to the Mediterranean Sea.[19] The loss of Russian bases in Syria will likely disrupt Russian logistics, resupply efforts, and Africa Corps rotations, particularly weakening Russia’s operations and power projection in Libya and sub-Saharan Africa. Russia could seek to leverage its presence in Libya or Sudan as alternatives, but the lack of formal agreements with these countries and insufficient infrastructure makes them inadequate substitutes. The collapse of Assad's regime and Russia’s inability to preserve the regime will also damage Russia’s global image as a reliable ally, threatening its influence with African autocrats whom Russia seeks to support and its broader geopolitical objective to posture as a global superpower.

The paragraph above was adapted from the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) December 4 Africa File Special Edition.

Russian ultranationalist milbloggers – many of whom fought in or covered the Syrian war – are upset about the fall of the Assad regime, criticizing it as yet another failure of Russian foreign policy to exert and maintain influence in areas of strategic importance. The Russian ultranationalist community broadly criticized the Assad regime for becoming complacent in recent years by allowing its military to degrade and rely on other countries, including Russia and Iran, to provide the Assad regime with defensive capabilities.[20] The milbloggers largely focused on the impact the regime's collapse has on Russia, however, with some describing the fall of the Assad regime as a significant Russian foreign policy failure as Russia did not consistently work to increase Russian influence in the region or push the Assad regime to conduct governmental reforms under the Kremlin's direction.[21] Some milbloggers criticized the Kremlin for not realizing that Assad's military was degraded and that the opposition groups in Syria would likely someday renew offensive operations to exploit Russia's "mistakes" in Syria, with one milblogger noting that Assad's two major allies, Russia and Iran, are currently focusing on the wars in Ukraine and Israel and Lebanon, respectively.[22] One milblogger claimed that many Russian independent analysts and military correspondents had been warning about this possible course of action for years and reiterated longstanding ultranationalist complaints about the lack of a meaningful civil society in Russia to help avoid significant foreign policy failures.[23] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger bemoaned the impact on Russia's global image, claiming that Russia's reputation is now entirely dependent on the outcome of its war in Ukraine, which is "more important [to Russia] than anything now."[24]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on December 7 an additional military aid package for Ukraine worth $988 million.[25] The package includes High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) ammunition; equipment and spare parts for artillery systems, tanks, and armored vehicles; and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The US military aid package and continued Western support to Ukraine will help Ukrainian forces sustain the current tempo of operations across the theater of war which is destroying Russian combat power and degrading Russia’s economy at a rate Russia cannot afford to sustain across the long term.

Russian authorities detained alleged terrorists in the Republic of Dagestan on December 7 amid growing Russian milblogger claims that the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime in Syria will foster terrorism in Russia. Russian media reported on December 7 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) detained 12 members of an alleged terrorist cell group in the Republic of Dagestan who were reportedly planning a major terrorist attack in an unspecified location in Russia.[26] Russian authorities reportedly seized two improvised explosive devices and over one ton of ammonium nitrate, weapons, and ammunition.[27] These arrests notably follow a test of the Russian sovereign internet on December 7, which prevented users in the Republic of Dagestan from accessing foreign websites and messaging services, including Telegram and WhatsApp.[28] The arrests also come amid Russian milblogger reactions to recent events in Syria claiming that the fall of the Assad regime will serve to inspire and export terrorism globally, including to Russia.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that this particular terrorist group in Dagestan was likely inspired by the situation in Syria, cautioning that terrorism recruitment may increase in the North Caucasus, particularly among Central Asian migrants.[30] ISW assesses that Russian authorities continue to grapple with the need to foster domestic stability and growing anti-migrant ultranationalist sentiments in Russia while relying on migrants to address Russia’s labor shortages.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria – a regime that the Kremlin helped prop up since 2015 – is a strategic political defeat for Moscow and has thrown the Kremlin into a crisis as it seeks to retain its strategic military basing in Syria.
• The Kremlin reportedly secured an agreement on December 8 with unspecified Syrian opposition leaders to ensure the security of Russian military bases in Syria, but the contours of this arrangement and its longevity remain unclear given a volatile and rapidly evolving political situation on the ground in Syria.
• ISW has collected strong indicators that Russia has been setting conditions to evacuate its military assets from Syria and that Russian military basing is not secure.
• The loss of Russian bases in Syria will have major implications for Russia’s global military footprint and ability to operate in Africa.
• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers – many of whom fought in or covered the Syrian war – are upset about the fall of the Assad regime, criticizing it as yet another failure of Russian foreign policy to exert and maintain influence in areas of strategic importance.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on December 7 an additional military aid package for Ukraine worth $988 million.
• Russian authorities detained alleged terrorists in the Republic of Dagestan on December 7 amid growing Russian milblogger claims that the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime in Syria will foster terrorism in Russia.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and the Pokrovsk and Vuhledar directions.
• One of Russia's largest microchip manufacturers has reportedly begun bankruptcy proceedings.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 7, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and George Barros

December 7, 2024, 6:00 pm ET

Russian forces have resumed their offensive operations directly aimed at seizing Pokrovsk through a turning maneuver from the south after successfully widening their salient south and southeast of the town. Russian forces, including elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), began advancing further west and northwest of Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) along the Petrivka-Pustynka-Zhovte line south of Pokrovsk in late November 2024 after mainly focusing their offensive efforts on widening the salient south of Selydove and eliminating the Ukrainian pockets north and south of Kurakhove.[1] Russian forces recently seized Novopustynka (southwest of Pokrovsk and west of Zhovte) and advanced near the southern outskirts of Shevchenko (north of Zhovte), and geolocated footage published on December 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Novotroitske (just west of Novopustynka) and along the T-05-15 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynopil highway towards Shevchenko.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed on December 6 and 7 that fighting is ongoing towards Shevchenko and within the center of the settlement and that Russian forces have either advanced into northern Novotroitske or seized the entire settlement.[3] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces have resumed attacks east of Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk) near Hrodivka and Mykolaivka, are advancing southeast of Pokrovsk near Dachenske (east of Shevchenko), and are attacking with armored vehicle support near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka (both northeast of Dachenske).[4] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in late November 2024 that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) — a formation that the Russian military command often redeploys to priority sectors and uses to exploit tactical gains — are attacking along the Novotroitske-Ukrainka line.[5] Russian forces' turn north towards Shevchenko marks a notable inflection in the orientation of the Russian attacks in this area, as Russian forces mainly focused on advancing further west of Selydove in November 2024. The redeployment of elements of the 90th Tank Division and intensified Russian assaults near Dachenske and east of Myrnohrad further indicate a reprioritization of this sector of the frontline.

The Russian military command likely assesses that they have allocated sufficient manpower and materiel to the efforts to seize Kurakhove and seize or bypass Velyka Novosilka and level the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast in the coming weeks. Mashovets stated on December 6 that Russian forces likely seized Stari Terny (northwest of Kurakhove and on the northern shore of the Kurakhivske Reservoir), suggesting that Russian forces have likely almost completely eliminated the Ukrainian pocket north of the reservoir.[6] Russian forces have continued to use frontal mechanized and dismounted infantry assaults to advance slowly but gradually into eastern and central Kurakhove and south of Kurakhove into Dalne, which supports larger Russian efforts to eliminate the remaining Ukrainian pocket between Dalne and Kurakhove.[7] The Russian command may be satisfied with recent Russian advances northwest of Vuhledar into Kostyantynopolske and Uspenivka and up to Sukhi Yaly (all along the C-051104 highway) such that the Russian military command assesses that Russian forces will be able to close the Ukrainian pocket extending from Kostyantynopolske to Dalne and level the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast along the Dachne-Sukhi Yaly line in the coming weeks.[8] Russian forces have also advanced north, east, and south of Velyka Novosilka in recent weeks as part of their ongoing efforts to envelop the settlement.[9] The Russian military command likely assesses that Russian forces can now relaunch offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk due to Russian tactical gains in collapsing the Ukrainian pockets north and south of Kurakhove and north of Vuhledar.

Russian forces are likely attempting to flank Pokrovsk from the west and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to minimize Russia's need to conduct frontal assaults on the towns’ eastern and southern approaches. The Russian military command initially identified a direct assault on Pokrovsk as its primary offensive effort for its Summer-Autumn 2024 campaign but later amended their campaign design after assessing that Russian forces would be unable to seize Pokrovsk in a frontal assault.[10] The Russian military command instead appeared to identify the elimination of the Ukrainian pockets near Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and later Velyka Novosilka as prerequisites for enveloping Pokrovsk from the south via Selydove.[11] Russian forces likely intend to advance from the Novotroitske-Novopustynka area towards Udachne (west of Pokrovsk) and Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) in order to envelop Pokrovsk from the south and west. Russian forces likely intend to interdict the T-05-15, T-04-06, and M-30 highways southwest and west of Pokrovsk in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad without having to conduct costly, frontal assaults on the towns.

The Russian military command may redeploy forces from the Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka directions, including additional elements of the 90th Tank Division or elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), to reinforce the Russian units that are currently operating south of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command will likely only redeploy forces from the Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka directions after Russian forces seize or bypass tactical objectives in those areas to provide Russian forces with a preferable battlefield geography. The Russian forces currently operating in the Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka directions are likely fatigued from months of fighting and may struggle to exploit initial tactical advances in the Pokrovsk direction. Efforts to flank Pokrovsk will require significantly more time, manpower, and armored vehicles than conducting frontal assaults on the town, as Russian forces will have to advance over extended distances and seize additional settlements. Ukrainian forces will likely attempt to mount an extensive defense in the area, with one Russian milblogger expressing concern on December 7 that well-established Ukrainian defensive positions and effective drone operations near Shevchenko and Novotroitske may complicate future Russian advances in the area.[12] Ukrainian drone units played a critical role in limiting Russia's ability to conduct mechanized operations in the Pokrovsk direction in mid-2024 and prompted the Russian military command to abandon a frontal assault on Pokrovsk in late Summer 2024.[13] Continued successful Ukrainian drone operations may again force Russian forces to conduct attritional, infantry-led assaults through Pokrovsk's urban areas in the future if Ukrainian forces can sufficiently delay and disrupt Russian efforts to envelop Pokrovsk.

The Russian military command will likely continue to trade Russian materiel and manpower for tactical territorial gains at an unsustainable rate during their offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk into 2025. The Kremlin is unlikely to abandon its costly offensive on Pokrovsk, which supports the broader Russian longstanding objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.[14] Russian forces will likely continue to pursue the seizure of Pokrovsk beyond Winter 2024-2025 and into Spring 2025. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently observed that Russian forces suffered record-high casualty rates in November 2024, averaging 1,523 casualties daily and over 45,000 total casualties for the month.[15] Continued intensified offensive operations in Ukraine, particularly in western Donetsk Oblast, have put an unsustainable strain on Russia's force generation apparatus and economy. Russian authorities will likely have to balance mounting personnel losses and the growing pressure to enact a deeply unpopular partial involuntary reserve callup - which would further strain Russia's labor shortages and economy — against the desire to seize Pokrovsk and the rest of Donetsk Oblast.

Ukrainian forces continue to use drone strikes to contest Russia's presence in the northwestern Black Sea, including near gas extraction platforms. The Ukrainian Navy published footage that was subsequently geolocated on December 7 showing Ukrainian naval drones destroying Russian surveillance systems on gas platforms off the west coast of occupied Crimea in the Black Sea.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces use the gas platforms as visual and radar observation points and that Ukrainian forces used traditional naval drones as well as those modernized to carry first-person view (FPV) drones that can independently strike targets.[17] Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a naval drone strike against occupied Crimea on the night of December 5 to 6, and a Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on December 6 that some of the Ukrainian naval drones "disappeared" during the multi-wave overnight strike.[18] The milblogger claimed that some of the Ukrainian naval drones had mounted machine guns that allowed the Ukrainian drones to return fire at Russian forces dispatched to intercept the drones.

Ukrainian forces will reportedly receive increased access to Starshield, a more secure satellite network for Starlink terminals, which may give Ukrainian forces an advantage in the technological innovation arms race in which Ukrainian and Russian forces are currently engaged. Bloomberg reported on December 6 that SpaceX recently received a Pentagon contract to increase Ukraine's access to Starshield, an encrypted version of the Starlink satellite network that can transmit classified data and is more difficult to jam or hack.[19] The US Space Systems Command's Commercial Satellite Office stated that 3,000 Ukrainian Starlink terminals will gain access to the more secure network — an increase from the 500 Ukrainian terminals that were previously connected to Starshield. Russian and Ukrainian forces have been engaged in an offense-defense race to adapt and innovate their strike and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. Ukrainian military personnel have recently reported that Russian forces are increasingly using Starlink terminals to fix their combat coordination and communications and to improve the precision of Russian tactical fires.[20] The Associated Press also recently reported that Russia is using Starlink systems to make Russian drone variants more resistant to jamming.[21] Ukraine's increased access to the more advanced and more secure Starshield network may afford Ukrainian forces a technological edge to conduct more effective combat coordination and field new developments in their tactical reconnaissance strike complex (TRSC) ahead of Russian forces.

Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor appears to be testing the Russian sovereign internet in Russian regions populated by ethnic minorities. Dagestani telecom operator Ellko reported that Roskomnadzor conducted a test to revoke Republic of Dagestan residents' access to foreign websites and applications from December 6 to 7, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Caucasus service reported that users in Dagestan also experienced issues accessing WhatsApp and Telegram social media and messaging services.[22] Dagestani publication Chernovik reported that users in the Chechen and Ingushetian republics also experienced issues accessing foreign and some domestic websites and online services, including YouTube, Google, and some services of Russian internet giant Yandex — even with virtual private networks (VPNs).[23] Roskomnadzor confirmed on December 6 the test in the Republic of Dagestan and stated that the test is to ensure that "key replacement infrastructure" can function if Roskomnadzor deliberately disconnects Russia from the global internet.[24] Roskomnadzor likely intended in part to test its ability to successfully disconnect Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia — Russian federal subjects with Muslim-majority populations and recent histories of instability — from services like Telegram in order to control the information space in the event of instability in the future. Roskomnadzor previously attempted to disconnect users in the Dagestan, Sakha, and Bashkortostan republics from Telegram during antisemitic pogroms in November 2023 and protests in January 2024.[25] The Kremlin has recently invested roughly 59 billion rubles (about $648 million) into developing its technical capabilities to restrict internet traffic and has devoted efforts to compelling Russians to migrate from Western social media platforms to domestic platforms that the Kremlin can more easily control.[26]

Roskomnadzor indicated that it may intend to force Russians to migrate their websites from Western hosting providers to Russian hosting providers likely to better enforce Russian censorship laws. Roskomnadzor also warned on December 7 that it could block eight foreign web service hosting providers, including Amazon Web Services (AWS), GoDaddy, and HostGator, from operating in Russia due to noncompliance with Russian censorship laws.[27] Roskomnadzor has previously issued such warnings ahead of blocking Western websites and online services likely to test the reaction to these blocks before implementing them and pressure Russians to switch to domestic, Kremlin-approved and -controlled platforms and services.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have resumed their offensive operations directly aimed at seizing Pokrovsk through a turning maneuver from the south after successfully widening their salient south and southeast of the town.
• The Russian military command likely assesses that they have allocated sufficient manpower and materiel to the efforts to seize Kurakhove and seize or bypass Velyka Novosilka and level the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast in the coming weeks.
• Russian forces are likely attempting to flank Pokrovsk from the west and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to minimize Russia's need to conduct frontal assaults on the towns’ eastern and southern approaches.
• The Russian military command will likely continue to trade Russian materiel and manpower for tactical territorial gains at an unsustainable rate during their offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk into 2025.
• Ukrainian forces continue to use drone strikes to contest Russia's presence in the northwestern Black Sea, including near gas extraction platforms.
• Ukrainian forces will reportedly receive increased access to Starshield, a more secure satellite network for Starlink terminals, which may give Ukrainian forces an advantage in the technological innovation arms race in which Ukrainian and Russian forces are currently engaged.
• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor appears to be testing the Russian sovereign internet in Russian regions populated by ethnic minorities.
• Roskomnadzor indicated that it may intend to force Russians to migrate their websites from Western hosting providers to Russian hosting providers likely to better enforce Russian censorship laws.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and reportedly advanced near Velyka Novosilka while Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to forcibly impress migrants into signing military service contracts with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) as part of ongoing cryptomobilization efforts.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 6, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, Olivia Gibson, William Runkel, and George Barros

December 6, 2024, 9:30pm ET

Russian forces have not yet evacuated the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria as of December 6, but it remains unclear whether Russia will keep its vessels at the port as Syrian rebels continue to advance swiftly across regime-held territory. Former Norwegian Navy officer and independent OSINT analyst Thord Are Iversen assessed that the Russian Novorossiysk Kilo-class submarine, a Gorshkov-class frigate, the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, and possibly the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler have returned to the port in Tartus based on satellite imagery collected on December 6.[1] Satellite imagery collected on December 3 showed that Russia had removed all of its ships stationed at Tartus - the Admiral Grigorovich frigate, the Novorossisysk submarine, the Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Golovko Gorskhov-class frigates, and likely the Vyazma oiler and the Yelnya Altay-class oiler - from the port sometime between December 1 and 3.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 3 that ten Russian naval vessels, including the Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Golovko frigates and Novorossiysk submarine, participated in hypersonic and cruise missile launch exercises in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov reportedly informed the US about Russian exercises in the Mediterranean during a call on November 27.[3] It is unclear if Russia removed the Admiral Grigorovich and the two oilers from Tartus as part of the exercise as well. Some of the vessels that Russian forces removed from Tartus between December 1 and 3 have not returned to port as of December 6.

Bloomberg reported on December 6 that a person close to the Kremlin stated that Russia does not have a plan to save Syrian President Bashar al Assad and that Russia is unlikely to create such a plan as long as pro-regime forces continue to abandon their positions.[4] The Russian Embassy in Syria notably announced on December 6 that Russian citizens living in Syria should leave the country on commercial flights due to the "difficult military and political situation" in Syria.[5] It remains unclear whether Russia plans to continue to maintain all of these vessels at Tartus or is planning to evacuate all or some of them elsewhere.

Russia appears to be redeploying at least some of its air defense assets that were defending Russia's Khmeimim Air Base in Syria, but the reason for this redeployment remains unclear at this time. Geolocated footage published on December 6 shows Russian forces transporting S-300 or S-400 and Tor-M1 air defense systems near Baniyas along the M1 Lakatia-Tartus highway.[6] A Russian milblogger posted the same footage on December 6 and claimed that it showed Russian forces moving an S-400 system and a Tor-M2 system that Russian forces had deployed near Masyaf (about 50 kilometers southeast of Khmeimin Air Base) in 2017 to protect Khmeimin Air Base.[7] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are either redeploying the air defense systems to Khmeimim Air Base or Tartus due to Syrian rebel groups' recent seizure of Hama City (roughly 35 kilometers east of Masyaf). It is unclear if Russian forces are redeploying the air defense systems to new positions within western Syria in order to improve their survivability or if Russian forces are moving the air defense systems for evacuation from Syria through Tartus.

The Kremlin continues to advance its strategic effort to de facto annex Belarus and further expand the Russian military’s presence in Belarus through the Union State framework. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed a new Union State treaty on security guarantees at a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State in Minsk, Belarus on December 6.[8] Lukashenko made a public appeal to Putin that Russia deploy Oreshnik ballistic missiles to Belarus under the condition that the Belarusian military-political leadership would determine the Oreshnik's targets should the missile ever launch from Belarusian territory.[9] Putin responded to Lukashenko's request by stating that Russia could deploy Oreshnik systems to Belarus by mid-2025 on the grounds of the new Union State agreement on security guarantees and as Russia scales up the production of Oreshnik ballistic missiles.[10] Putin noted that the new security treaty allows Russia and Belarus to use "all available forces and means" as part of Russia’s and Belarus’ mutual defense obligations.[11]

The treaty also requires Russia and Belarus to ensure the security of the Union State's borders, and Putin emphasized that the new document includes the potential use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus in the event of aggression against Belarus.[12] The agreement follows the release of Russia's updated nuclear doctrine on November 19, which formally placed Belarus under Russia's nuclear umbrella and consistent with Russia’s existing treaty obligations with Belarus.[13] The deployment of Oreshnik ballistic missiles to Belarus would further increase Russia’s military footprint in Belarus and advance the Kremlin’s longstanding strategic effort to erode Belarusian sovereignty and de facto annex Belarus through the Union State framework.

Russia and Belarus also signed 10 other Union State documents, including a Union State security concept, a decree on uniform rules in the field of consumer rights protection, a decree on joint measures to combat smuggling, an agreement on the formation of a common electric energy market, a resolution on the cancellation of mobile device roaming, and a resolution celebratory event for 80th anniversary of victory in World War II, among other Union State matters.[14]

Lukashenko is likely trying to preserve Belarusian sovereignty against Moscow by advocating that Belarus control Russian weapons deployed in Belarus – an endeavor Lukashenko has historically failed at. Lukashenko publicly requested that Minsk have the right to decide on how to use Oreshnik missiles in Belarus likely in an attempt to preserve Belarus' sovereignty within the Union State and buttress his negotiating position against further Union State integration.[15] Lukashenko has long attempted to compete against the Kremlin to determine whether Belarus can assert control over Russian military assets - such as advanced S-400 air defense systems - deployed to Belarus.[16] Belarusian Security Council State Secretary Alexander Volfovich similarly baselessly claimed that only Lukashenko can issue the order to use the Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus.[17] Lukashenko noted that the Russian military personnel will continue to operate the Oreshnik system in Belarus, which indicates that Moscow will retain control over any Oreshnik ballistic missiles deployed to Belarus.

The deployment of the Oreshnik missiles to Belarus does not significantly increase the immediate risks of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strikes against Ukraine or NATO states despite the Kremlin’s intensified nuclear saber-rattling. Putin once again tried to flaunt the Oreshnik missile and Russian missile capabilities during the Union State Supreme State Council meeting as part of the Kremlin's reflexive control information operation. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly attempted to frame the Oreshnik strike against Dnipro City on November 21 as Russia's readiness to use any means to prevent the West from strategically defeating Russia in an interview with an American media personality on December 5.[18] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin's constant flaunting of the Oreshnik missile is unlikely to presage the development of particularly novel Russian deep-strike capabilities.[19] Russia's deployment of Oreshnik missiles to Belarus does not significantly change the threat to Ukraine or NATO given that the Russian military has long had nuclear weapons in mainland Russia and the enclave of Kaliningrad capable of striking targets in Ukraine and NATO. Russian forces fire nuclear-capable Iskander ballistic missiles, Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable Kh-101 cruise missiles against Ukraine on a regular basis.[20]

The Kremlin is scapegoating former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov for Russia's failure to adequately respond to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on December 5 stating that Smirnov resigned "at his own request" and appointed Russian State Duma Information Policy Committee Head Alexander Khinshtein as acting Kursk Oblast governor.[21] Putin held a publicized meeting with Khinshtein on December 5 in which Putin offered Khinshtein the post of acting governor and emphasized the importance of crisis management in Kursk Oblast.[22]

Khinshtein's appointment comes after weeks of protests from Kursk Oblast residents for additional government assistance for housing and amid Russian forces' continued failure to repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast that began in early August 2024.[23] Putin appointed Smirnov as acting head in May 2024 before Kursk Oblast residents formally elected Smirnov as head in September 2024. Russian state news wire TASS noted that Smirnov only served as head of Kursk Oblast for 205 days, of which he only spent 80 days as elected governor.[24] The Kremlin likely refrained from replacing Smirnov during the September 2024 election to downplay the societal impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.[25]

Other senior Russian officials - including Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin, and Russian Transport Minister and Smirnov's predecessor Roman Starovoit - emphasized that Putin appointed Khinshtein because Smirnov was not adequately communicating with or supporting Kursk Oblast residents regarding housing issues and praised Khinshtein as capable of solving these issues.[26] Putin likely replaced Smirnov with Khinshtein now to appear dedicated to solving social issues in Kursk Oblast and quell local protests while distracting from Russia's failure to repel the Ukrainian incursion.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used his interview with an American media personality to reiterate Kremlin talking points that are intended to shape American foreign policy and achieve a US-Russia reset detrimental to US interests and on the Kremlin's terms. Lavrov stated during the interview published on December 5 that the Kremlin wants "normal" relations with the United States and reiterated longstanding Kremlin rhetorical lines attempting to blame the United States and NATO for undermining relations with Russia. Lavrov's statements largely aligned with Russian President Vladimir Putin's November 7 talking points that also advocated for a US-Russia reset on Russia's terms.[27] Lavrov also indicated that the Kremlin still has no intentions to negotiate on any terms other than its own and falsely claimed that Russia wants to end the war in Ukraine on the basis of the United Nations (UN) Charter - despite Russia's continuing to violate the UN Charter by waging its illegal war of conquest against Ukraine in violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity, and Russia‘s previous treaties with Ukraine. Lavrov rejected any notion of Russian forces withdrawing from occupied Ukraine and falsely claimed that Russia is not attempting to "exterminate" the Ukrainian people. Lavrov's statements are part of the Kremlin's continued effort to shape American foreign policy so the United States engages with Russia on terms favorable to the Kremlin without offering any concessions favorable to the United States or conceding any of the Kremlin's maximalist objectives either in Ukraine or globally.[28]

Western sanctions are reportedly degrading the overall quality of Russian drones, indicating that targeted sanctions are having some negative effects on the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). The Washington Post reported on December 5 that Western sanctions are forcing Russia to purchase poorer quality steering motors for drones from the People's Republic of China (PRC), which is increasing the failure rate of Russian-produced Shahed drones as they have in-flight maneuverability issues.[29] Soldiers told the Washington Post that Russian Shaheds have started to spin out of control after making sharp turns, causing some of the drones to crash. ISW has observed Ukrainian official reports of Russian drones increasingly becoming "locally lost" during Russia's almost daily overnight strike series against Ukraine, and the reported lower-quality steering motors may be contributing to this phenomenon.[30]

Russia is reportedly also struggling to procure sufficient quantities of basic supplies, such as high-performance lubricants needed for operating tanks in colder weather or computerized machine tools necessary for building drone airframes and missiles.[31] ISW previously reported on Russia’s increasing efforts to expand bilateral relations with the PRC in order to circumvent Western sanctions, with Ukrainian officials stating that the PRC provides approximately 60 percent of all the foreign components found in the weapons that Russia uses against Ukraine.[32] ISW previously assessed that Russia is prioritizing materiel quantity over quality and that Russia’s increased DIB production is likely not sustainable in the medium- and long-term as Russia is unable to completely compensate for the military and dual-use items it can no longer acquire due to sanctions.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have not yet evacuated the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria as of December 6, but it remains unclear whether Russia will keep its vessels at the port as Syrian rebels continue to advance swiftly across regime-held territory.
• Russia appears to be redeploying at least some of its air defense assets that were defending Russia's Khmeimim Air Base in Syria, but the reason for this redeployment remains unclear at this time.
• The Kremlin continues to advance its strategic effort to de facto annex Belarus and further expand the Russian military’s presence in Belarus through the Union State framework.
• Lukashenko is likely trying to preserve Belarusian sovereignty against Moscow by advocating that Belarus control Russian weapons deployed in Belarus - an endeavor Lukashenko has historically failed at.
• The deployment of the Oreshnik missiles to Belarus does not significantly increase the immediate risks of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strikes against Ukraine or NATO states despite the Kremlin’s intensified nuclear saber-rattling.
• The Kremlin is scapegoating former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov for Russia's failure to adequately respond to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used his interview with an American media personality to reiterate Kremlin talking points that are intended to shape American foreign policy and achieve a US-Russia reset detrimental to US interests and on the Kremlin's terms.
• Western sanctions are reportedly degrading the overall quality of Russian drones, indicating that targeted sanctions are having some negative effects on the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.
• The Russian military continues to lose parts of its officer corps, a resource that is difficult to replenish, as part of Russia's ever-increasing casualties.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 5, 2024

click here to read the full report

Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, Nate, Trotter, William Runkel, and George Barros

December 5, 2024, 6:30pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00pm ET on December 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is continuing to suffer significant manpower losses to make tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast at the expense of Russia's ongoing war effort and the medium-term viability of the Russian economy. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD), citing data from the Ukrainian General Staff, reported on December 5 that the average daily Russian personnel casualties reached a new all-time high of 1,523 casualties per day in November 2024.[1] The UK MoD noted that Russian forces suffered just over 2,000 casualties in a single day for the first time on November 28, 2024. Russian forces suffered an estimated 45,690 total casualties throughout November 2024, and the UK MoD noted that November 2024 was the fifth consecutive month that Russian casualties increased. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced at a rate of roughly 27.96 square kilometers per day and seized a total of 839 square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in November 2024. ISW previously reported that Russian forces suffered increased casualties in September and October 2024 as well and that Russian casualties totaled an estimated 80,110 troops in exchange for roughly 1,517 square kilometers of gains in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in those two months.[2] Russian forces have thus suffered an estimated 125,800 casualties during a period of intensified offensive operations in September, October, and November 2024 in exchange for 2,356 square kilometers of gains. (Or approximately 53 Russian casualties per square kilometer of Ukrainian territory seized.)

Russia's constrained labor pool is likely unable to sustain this increased casualty rate in the medium-term, and continued Western military support for Ukraine remains vital to Ukraine's ability to inflict losses at this rate. US officials reportedly estimated in late October 2024 that Russia's current recruitment rate was between 25,000 and 30,000 new soldiers per month.[3] Ukrainian military observer Petro Chernyk stated on December 3 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would have to increase its monthly recruitment rates from 40,000-42,000 recruits to 50,000 recruits in order to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast while maintaining their current casualty rate.[4] Chernyk's statement suggests that Russia may have increased its recruitment rate in recent weeks, although this recruitment rate appears to be thousands of troops short of Russia's ever-increasing monthly casualty totals. The Kremlin's commitment to maintaining the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine and continuing to advance in eastern Ukraine has created dueling demands on Russia's labor pool. Additional efforts to increase Russian force generation rates risk further destabilizing the Russian economy as Russia continues to grapple with domestic labor shortages and rising inflation.[5] Russians can either serve in uniform in Ukraine, or work in Russia’s domestic economy, but they cannot do both simultaneously. The Kremlin is unlikely to sufficiently meet its needs for labor in both the military and Russia’s domestic economy in the near future, and additional months of intensified offensive operations in Ukraine in 2025 and beyond will only further compound Russian resourcing dilemmas. US President Joe Biden's commitment to providing the remainder of available US aid to Ukraine and the continued, regular provision of Western military assistance to Ukraine remains crucial to Ukraine's ability to continue defending against Russian offensive operations and inflicting unsustainable losses on the Russian military in 2025.[6]

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov undermined the Kremlin's information operation to portray Russia's November 21 Oreshnik ballistic missile strike against Ukraine as a defensive response to the US permitting Ukraine to conduct strikes in Russia with US-provided ATACMS missiles. US officials confirmed that Gerasimov called US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Charles Q. Brown Jr. on November 27.[7] The New York Times (NYT) reported, citing unspecified officials, that Gerasimov told Brown that Russia had planned the Oreshnik missile launch well ahead of the US decision to allow Ukraine to strike military targets in Russia with US-provided ATACMS.[8] Western media noted that Gerasimov also warned Brown about Russian military exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, but that Gerasimov did not "explicitly mention" that Russian forces would launch hypersonic missiles during the exercises. US military spokespeople confirmed to Western media that the call occurred but did not provide details on the conversation. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials have notably attempted to use the Oreshnik ballistic missile and its test launch on November 21 as part of an information operation that Russia is escalating the war in Ukraine in response to the US lifting its restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons against military targets in Russia.[9] Gerasimov's statement to Brown, if accurate, directly undermined this ongoing information operation by admitting that the Oreshnik launch was not connected to Ukrainian strikes into Russia with Western-provided weapons as Putin explicitly claimed in an emergency address immediately following the strike.[10]

Russian-North Korean military cooperation will likely continue to intensify in the coming months following the formal commencement of their comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on December 4. North Korean and Russian state media reported that the strategic partnership agreement ensuring "international strategic stability" and a “fair world order” between North Korea and Russia entered into force on December 4.[11] Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un signed the strategic partnership agreement in Pyongyang on June 19 and Putin and Jong-un ratified the strategic partnership agreement on November 9 and 11, respectively.[12] ISW has extensively reported on the strengthening of Russian-North Korean bilateral relations since late 2022 that began with Russia discreetly purchasing missiles and ammunition from Pyongyang, to then facilitating performative diplomatic engagements, and most recently resulting in North Korea's deployment of over 10,000 North Korean soldiers to fight alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.[13] Russia and North Korea are likely to leverage the commencement of their strategic comprehensive partnership agreement to formalize and expand their avenues of cooperation in the coming months.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues to publicly position himself as a defender of migrants and Russian ethnic minorities in opposition to other senior Russian security officials, suggesting that senior Russian officials may be increasingly divided over Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to promote an inclusive Russian civic nationalism that ensures interethnic and interreligious harmony in Russia. Kadyrov accused Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Head Vladimir Kolokoltsev on December 5 of not fulfilling the objectives that Putin tasked them with in response to a case involving a Chechen minor accused of hooliganism in Moscow City.[14] Kadyrov criticized Kolokoltsev and Bastrykin for failing to protect Russian ethnic minorities and accused them of not listening to the Russian public.[15] Kadyrov further claimed that Kolokoltsev ordered Russian law enforcement services to beat foreigners and drive them out of Russia, despite Russia's need for migrants and allies.[16] Kadyrov previously clashed with Bastrykin in June 2024 over disagreements in addressing religious extremism in Russia, and Bastrykin and Kolokoltsev have been outspoken ultranationalist voices advocating for crackdowns against Russian migrants and ethnic minorities.[17] Public disagreements between senior Russian officials regarding the role and treatment of migrants and ethnic and religious minorities in Russian society suggest that there may be an increasing opposition among certain Kremlin officials to Putin's long-term efforts to portray Russia as an inclusive and harmonious multicultural Russian state and foster civic nationalism instead of ethno-religious nationalism.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is continuing to suffer significant manpower losses to make tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast at the expense of Russia's ongoing war effort and the medium-term viability of the Russian economy.
• Russia's constrained labor pool is likely unable to sustain this increased casualty rate in the medium-term, and continued Western military support for Ukraine remains vital to Ukraine's ability to inflict losses at this rate.
• Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov undermined the Kremlin's information operation to portray Russia's November 21 Oreshnik ballistic missile strike against Ukraine as a defensive response to the US permitting Ukraine to conduct strikes in Russia with US-provided ATACMS missiles.
• Russian-North Korean military cooperation will likely continue to intensify in the coming months following the formal commencement of their comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on December 4.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues to publicly position himself as a defender of migrants and Russian ethnic minorities in opposition to other senior Russian security officials, suggesting that senior Russian officials may be increasingly divided over Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to promote an inclusive Russian civic nationalism that ensures interethnic and interreligious harmony in Russia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk and northern Kharkiv oblasts, and Russian forces advanced in the Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.
• Russian forces are reportedly increasingly recruiting women for combat and logistics functions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 4, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Kateryna Stepanenko

December 4, 2024, 6:30pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:00am ET on December 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Mounting evidence continues to personally implicate Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Kremlin officials in the forced deportation and "re-education" of Ukrainian children in Russia. The US Department of State and Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab published a report on December 3 detailing the role of Putin, Kremlin Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, members of Russia's ruling United Russia party, Russia's Ministry of Education, and occupation officials in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in at least 314 confirmed cases of child deportation from occupied Ukraine.[1] The report states that Putin maintains primary control over and is the main decision-maker for Russia's deportation program and that Lvova-Belova acts as Putin's executive officer who oversees the implementation of the program. The report notes that Russian authorities have used military transport aircraft and aircraft under Putin's personal control to deport children from occupied Ukraine to intermediary holding facilities in Russia. The report states that Russian and occupation authorities have primarily deported to Russia children whom Russian authorities claim to be orphans or children without parental care and that Russian authorities have placed most of the children in Russian foster or adoptive families. The report assesses that it is highly likely that most, if not all, deported Ukrainian children have been naturalized as Russian citizens and that Russian authorities force the children to participate in a patriotic re-education program intended to Russify, militarize, and indoctrinate them into Russian cultural and historical narratives and forcibly separate them from their Ukrainian heritage. The report notes that the true number of Ukrainian children that Russia has forcibly deported to Russia remains unclear and that the number is significantly higher than the 314 children identified in the report. ISW has reported extensively on Russia's crimes in occupied Ukraine, including the forced deportation of Ukrainian youth to Russia.[2] The Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines "forcibly transferring children of a group to another group" as an act constituting genocide.[3]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to posture Russian economic stability and growth while high interest rates and efforts to combat inflation suggest that the Kremlin is worried about economic stability in the long-term. Putin claimed at the Russian state-owned bank VTB Bank's investment forum on December 4 that the Russian economy will grow by four precent by the end of 2024 and that Russia's GDP grew by 4.1 percent from January to October 2024.[4] Putin is likely attempting to posture economic stability despite reports that Russia may raise key interest rates to 25 percent in December 2024, after the Russian Central Bank already raised the key interest rate to 21 percent in October 2024.[5] Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina stated on December 4 that the Central Bank may raise the key interest rate at the upcoming Central Bank's board of directors meeting.[6] Putin tacitly acknowledged some economic problems on December 4 by calling on the Central Bank to contain inflation.[7] Russian state outlet RBK reported on December 4, citing Central Bank data, that Russians' cash savings have fallen to a historical low and that cash rubles account for only 15 percent of Russian citizens' savings.[8] VTB Banks Deputy Chairperson Georgy Gorshkov assessed that cash savings may fall by "a couple" percentage points by the end of 2024.[9] Putin also suggested that the Russian economy is growing by boasting a record low country-wide unemployment rate of 2.3 percent and claiming that unemployment rates, particularly for Russians 25-years-old and younger, have decreased significantly.[10] Putin failed to note that unemployment rates are likely at a record low for youth as many young Russian men are fighting in Ukraine and that Russia is suffering significant labor shortages.[11]

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on December 4 that Armenia has effectively reached "the point of no return" in its ties with the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[12] Pashinyan criticized CSTO allies for failing to respond to Azerbaijan's encroachment on Armenia's internationally recognized territory in 2021 and 2022 - likely referring to encroachments into Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces - despite prior assurances that any violation of Armenia's territorial integrity was a "red line" for the CSTO.[13] Pashinyan stated that the CSTO lacks credibility because it does not have a clearly defined zone of responsibility in Armenia — despite Armenia still formally being a member state - and emphasized that Armenia's issues with the CSTO are not necessarily related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Pashinyan indicated that Armenia no longer participates in CSTO activities or policymaking. ISW continues to observe souring Armenian-Russian bilateral relations and assesses that a formal Armenian withdrawal from the CSTO would serve as another blow to Russian power projection across the countries that the Soviet Union once colonized.[14]

Key Takeaways:

• Mounting evidence continues to personally implicate Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Kremlin officials in the forced deportation and "re-education" of Ukrainian children in Russia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to posture Russian economic stability and growth while high interest rates and efforts to combat inflation suggest that the Kremlin is worried about economic stability in the long-term.
• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on December 4 that Armenia has effectively reached "the point of no return" in its ties with the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Toretsk and near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar, near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in leadership positions within the Russian government and major state companies.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 3, 2024

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Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Nate Trotter, Olivia Gibson, William Runkel, and Karolina Hird

December 3, 2024, 6:30 pm ET

Russia is evacuating naval assets from its base in Tartus, Syria, which may suggest that Russia does not intend to send significant reinforcements to support Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime in the near term. OSINT analyst MT Anderson reported on December 2 that satellite imagery from November 30 and December 1 showed that the Russian Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Golovko Gorskhov-class frigates, the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, the Novorossiysk Kilo-class submarine, the Yelnya Altay-class oiler, and the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler were at the Russian base in Tartus.[1] Anderson then reported that satellite imagery from December 3 showed that Russia removed the three frigates, the submarine, and two unnamed auxiliary vessels (likely the Yelnya and Vyazma) from the base — amounting to all of the vessels that Russia had stationed at Tartus.[2] Russia cannot redeploy these vessels to its Black Sea ports because Turkey is enforcing the Montreux Convention, which prevents Russian warships from passing through the Turkish Straits.[3] Russia will likely therefore redeploy the vessels to its bases in northwestern Russia and Kaliningrad Oblast. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 3 that the Russian military command has likely deployed a force grouping of an unspecified size from its Africa Corps — the organization that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) created to supplant the Wagner Group's operations in Africa following Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's death in August 2023 — to Syria.[4] ISW cannot independently confirm reports of Africa Corps elements deploying to Syria, but these reports, if true, would indicate that the Russian military command is avoiding redeploying regular Russian military forces from its priority theater in Ukraine to Syria. The Russian evacuation of Tartus and the reported deployment of Africa Corps forces to Syria suggest that Russia is worried that Syrian opposition forces may advance southward to Hama (roughly 80 kilometers northeast of Tartus) and threaten the Tartus base but that the Russian military command will not deploy significant reinforcements to Syria in the near term to prevent such advances. The Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File will cover Syria's impact on Russian activity in Africa and the Mediterranean in its upcoming update.

The United States announced additional military assistance worth $725 million for Ukraine on December 2.[5] The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced its 71st tranche of military assistance under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), including Stinger man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) missiles; HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) equipment and munitions; and AT-4 and Javelin anti-armor systems.[6] US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated on December 2 that US President Joe Biden has asked the DoD to deliver the aid rapidly and that the United States "will deliver hundreds of thousands of additional artillery rounds, thousands of additional rockets, and other critical capabilities" to Ukraine between early December 2024 and mid-January 2025.[7]

Russian officials continue to perpetuate information operations about prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges in order to portray Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate and to undermine Ukrainians' trust in their government. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on November 27 that Russia has a list of 630 Ukrainian POWs that Russia is "immediately" ready to swap in a one-to-one exchange.[8] Russian Human Rights Ombudsman Tatyana Moskalkova published the list of the alleged 630 Ukrainian POWs on December 2 and claimed that Ukraine refused the swap after Russia suggested it.[9] Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs Secretary Brigadier General Dmytro Usov stated on December 3 that Russian authorities have not submitted requests for such POW exchanges through official channels and that the published list includes civilians and POWs whom Ukraine has already returned home.[10] Usov noted that Russian authorities are only interested in exchanging POWs that Ukrainian forces captured in Kursk Oblast. Usov stated that the Russian officials who are publicly claiming that Ukraine is undermining POW exchanges are attempting to discredit the Ukrainian government. A Russian insider source similarly noted on November 29 and December 3 that Zakharova's and Moskalkova's statements about Russia's alleged willingness to conduct a large POW exchange are an attempt to present the false narrative that Ukrainian leadership is unwilling to negotiate to Ukraine's Western partners and allies, while falsely portraying Russia as the party interested in negotiations.[11] ISW continues to assess that Kremlin information operations centered around POWs are likely intended to distract from the Kremlin's own efforts to disrupt the POW exchange process and from consistent reports of Russian human rights abuses, including executions, perpetrated against Ukrainian POWs.[12] Russia — not Ukraine — has previously demonstrated an unwillingness to conduct POW exchanges, as Russia reportedly rebuffed Ukrainian overtures for exchanges for months before the start of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[13]

India is reportedly attempting to decouple its defense industry from Russia as it increases cooperation with Western defense companies and builds up its own defense industrial base (DIB). Bloomberg reported on December 3 that senior Indian officials stated that India has sharply reduced its defense equipment orders from Russia and instead started purchasing defense equipment from Western suppliers.[14] The officials reportedly stated that India canceled plans to jointly develop and manufacture helicopters and advanced fighter jets with Russia "some time ago" and that India is unlikely to move forward with plans to lease a Russian nuclear-powered submarine to train Indian crews as India is building its own submarines. One unnamed senior Indian official reportedly stated that Russian-made weapons are often cheaper than Western weapons but need frequent repairs, which increases their long-term costs. ISW has previously reported on other sources of increased tensions within the Russia-India relationship, including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's August 23 visit to Ukraine and the reported transfer of Indian artillery shells through European intermediaries to Ukraine.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is evacuating naval assets from its base in Tartus, Syria, which may suggest that Russia does not intend to send significant reinforcements to support Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime in the near term.
• The US announced additional military assistance worth $725 million for Ukraine on December 2.
• Russian officials continue to perpetuate information operations about prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges in order to portray Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate and to undermine Ukrainians' trust in their government.
• India is reportedly attempting to decouple its defense industry from Russia as it increases cooperation with Western defense companies and builds up its own defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and regained lost positions near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian forces reportedly continued to suffer significant personnel and armored vehicle losses throughout November 2024 as they attempted to maintain intensified offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.
  

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 2, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and George Barros

December 2, 2024, 5pm ET

Prominent voices within the Russian information space continue to emphasize that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine that results in anything less than total Ukrainian capitulation. Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch and Orthodox nationalist and founder of the ultranationalist Tsargrad outlet Konstantin Malofeev told the Financial Times (FT) in an interview published on December 2 that Putin will likely reject any plan for peace negotiations that US President-elect Donald Trump puts forth unless the plan accounts for Russia's "security concerns."[1] Malofeev claimed that the Kremlin will only consider peace negotiations with the Trump administration if Trump reverses the US policy allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided long-range weapons to strike into Russia; "removes" Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from office; and agrees to meet with Putin to discuss the situation in Ukraine, the future European security, the conflict in the Middle East, and Russia's growing alliance with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Putin may intend to use such a meeting to extract future US policy concessions on these issues from Trump. Malofeev also claimed that the war in Ukraine has helped strengthen Russia's relationships with the PRC, Iran, and North Korea and has revitalized Russia’s economy and defense industry. However, ISW continues to observe macroeconomic indications that Russia's economy is struggling to bear the weight of inflation, ongoing international sanctions, and labor shortages and will face significant challenges in 2025 assuming Russia’s war in Ukraine continues at the current tempo.[2]

Putin and other senior Russian officials have recently issued similar statements. Malofeev's interview further indicates that the Kremlin is not interested in good faith negotiations, no matter who mediates such talks.[3] Malofeev does not currently hold an official position within the Russian government, but his rhetoric is important given his relationships with high-level Kremlin officials and the influence of Tsargrad among Russian ultranationalists.[4] Malofeev has previously used Tsargrad to promote Kremlin narratives justifying Russia's invasion and occupation of Ukraine and continues to be an outspoken supporter of Putin.[5] Zelensky recently acknowledged that Ukraine must find diplomatic solutions to end the war and secure the return of some parts of occupied Ukraine (including Crimea) in the future, but Malofeev's comments indicate that Putin remains averse to good faith negotiations and is committed to destroying the Ukrainian state through military means.[6]

Russia's increased domestic production of Shahed-type drones has allowed Russia to increase the number of drones it is using in strike packages launched at Ukraine, but Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations are enabling Ukrainian forces to more effectively respond to Russian strike packages. Ukrainian military expert Petro Chernyk told Ukrainian military-focused outlet ArmyInform on December 2 that Russia has increased the production of Shahed drone airframes while continuing to rely on Iranian or Chinese imports for other drone components.[7] Chernyk's statements accord with ISW's October 2024 assessment that Russia is leveraging its domestication of Shahed-type drone production to increase the number of Shahed-type drones it launches at Ukraine.[8] This dynamic is reflected in the composition of the strike packages that Russia launched at Ukraine between October and November 2024, as it has become more common for Russian forces to launch between 80 to 100 (or more) Shahed and decoy drones as part of their larger strike packages.[9] Russian forces launched 110 Shahed drones and other unspecified drones, likely decoys, at Ukraine on the night of December 1 to 2, for example.[10] Russian forces most likely use large numbers of Shahed-type drones and decoy drones to detect and overwhelm Ukrainian air defense and mobile fire groups; Russian forces most frequently launch Shaheds alongside more limited numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles.

Ukraine appears to be responding to this influx of Shahed drones in kind, however. The number of Shahed or decoy drones that are reportedly "lost" (do not reach their intended targets) due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference increased significantly over the course of October and November 2024. Russia launched 105 Shahed-type drones at Ukraine on October 2, 78 of which Ukrainian forces directly shot down and 23 of which the Ukrainian Air Force reported were "lost" due to EW interference (22 percent).[11] In contrast, Russian forces launched 110 Shaheds and decoys at Ukraine on the night of December 1 to 2, 50 of which were "lost" due to Ukrainian EW interference (45 percent), and 52 of which Ukrainian forces shot down.[12] Chernyk noted the high Ukrainian shoot-down rate and also emphasized that Ukraine has improved its EW capabilities to the extent where Ukrainian forces can either "ground" the Shaheds, cause them to get "lost," or cause them to deviate their paths and fly into Russian or Belarusian airspace.[13] Ukrainian EW interference is significantly impacting the performance of these Russian strike packages and notably adding an increased burden on the joint Russian-Belarusian air defense umbrella. Independent Belarusian monitoring group Hajun Project reported on November 25 that 38 Russian Shahed drones entered Belarusian airspace on November 24 and 25 – a record number of Russian drones violating Belarusian airspace.[14] Belarus scrambled jets to respond to the airspace violation—suggesting that Belarus was unprepared to receive errant Russian drones and that Russia had not anticipated the impacts of Ukrainian interference or communicated them to Belarus in advance.

The Kremlin continues efforts to minimize the war’s social impacts on the Russian populace while tacitly resetting the goalposts for what the Kremlin initially defined as victory in Ukraine. Russian business outlet Kommersant, citing internal sources, reported on December 1 that Russian officials, including those from the Presidential Administration, have set the following goals for the leading United Russia party for the 2026 legislative elections: achieving 55 percent of voter turnout and obtaining 55 of the total votes; surpassing United Russia's 2021 election figures; and emphasizing the need for positive framing of a possible conclusion to the war in Ukraine.[15] Kommersant also noted that the Presidential Administration is trying to frame "the future results" of the war as a "victory" in a way that is palatable to both pro-war ultranationalists and less ideologically-concerned Russian "liberals," by focusing the framing of the war's outcome in a way that's acceptable to Russia's "silent majority." The Kremlin is seeking to frame any outcome of the war as a victory for the whole Russian populace. The Kremlin will likely focus on spinning rhetorical and abstract achievements that are difficult to concretize, like the "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine alongside the retention of annexed Ukrainian territories while deemphasizing negative sentiments concerning the return of traumatized and injured war veterans, regardless of how the war plays out for Russian forces on the battlefield.

Kommersant also noted that the Russian Presidential Administration is concerned with the rehabilitation and reintegration of traumatized Russian veterans into Russian society, indicating that Russian authorities are aware of the potential domestic ramifications the return of a large number of discontented veterans could have on Russian society. Russia’s unemployment rate is currently very low, and many Russian war veterans may find themselves underemployed if they return to civilian life. The Kremlin's relatively broad and ill-defined domestic informational efforts suggest that the Kremlin is still unsure of how the war will end and is therefore trying to set pre-emptive societal conditions to deal with the long-term effects of the war, including finding a way to sell Russia’s strategic and operational battlefield failures as victories. Russia has not achieved its self-defined objectives of “denazifying” or “demilitarizing” Ukraine or seizing all Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.

Pro-Kremlin Russian Telegram channel operators continue to resist Russian government efforts to deanonymize Russian social media accounts. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on December 2 that almost 90 percent of the largest pro-Russian government Telegram channels have not yet registered with Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor as of December 1, despite the Russian Ministry of Digital Development requiring social media channels with over 10,000 subscribers to register with the Russian government by January 1, 2025.[16] Verstka assessed that 82 of the top 100 most popular Telegram channels, according to the TGStat catalog of Telegram channels, are pro-Russian government channels and that only 10 of these 82 channels have registered with Roskomnadzor.[17] The Russian government is requiring such channels to provide "minimal" personal information about the identity of their operators via a special platform or risk restrictions on advertising and their right to be reposted by other channels.[18] Verstka reported that the top five most popular Telegram channels – Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, a pro-war Russian military blogger and news aggregator, Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, and Kremlin-awarded channel Rybar – have not yet registered with Roskomnadzor, possibly because they are already Kremlin-aligned and do not threaten the Kremlin’s deserved control over public discourse in Russia.[19] Russian milbloggers previously criticized the deanonymization effort and will likely continue to resist ongoing Russian government efforts to monitor and control the Russian information space.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Prominent voices within the Russian information space continue to emphasize that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine that results in anything less than total Ukrainian capitulation.
• Russia's increased domestic production of Shahed-type drones has allowed Russia to increase the number of drones it is using in strike packages launched at Ukraine, but Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations are enabling Ukrainian forces to more effectively respond to Russian strike packages.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to minimize the war’s social impacts on the Russian populace while tacitly resetting the goalposts for what the Kremlin initially defined as victory in Ukraine.
• Pro-Kremlin Russian Telegram channel operators continue to resist Russian government efforts to deanonymize Russian social media accounts.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian military command is focusing on training additional Russian forces and improving Russian forces' tactical assault operations.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 1, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and George Barros

December 1, 2024, 3:40pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on December 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly replaced Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel with Colonel General Alexander Chaiko who will reprise his previous assignment as commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria, though it remains unclear how Russian operations in Syria may change. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, including the Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel, claimed on November 30 and December 1 that the MoD removed Kisel as Commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria and replaced him with Chaiko.[1] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 1 that Chaiko replaced Kisel and that Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev arrived in Tartus, Syria.[2] Chaiko served as chief of staff of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria from 2015 to 2017 and served as overall commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria in September 2019 to November 2020, February to June 2021, and September to December 2022.[3] It is unclear what Chaiko’s assignment was between December 2022 until present. Kisel has reportedly commanded the Russian Force Grouping in Syria since at least May 2024.[4] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Kisel's removal will not significantly change the situation or Russian operations in Syria because the Russian military command has routinely rotated commanders to positions in Syria after battlefield failures in Ukraine.[5] ISW is unable to independently confirm this reported command change at this time.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree approving the 2025 federal budget and the 2026–2027 draft federal budget on December 1.[6] The 2025 budget allocates about 41 percent of Russia's annual expenditures to national security and defense.[7] ISW continues to assess that the increased Russian defense spending, while dangerous, does not necessarily equate to a one-to-one increase in Russian military capabilities, especially given that significant funding is going towards paying benefits to Russian soldiers, veterans, and their families.[8] Russia's continued focus on defense spending is likely also affecting the effectiveness and sustainability of Russian social programs, which may affect the Kremlin's ability to sustain its war in Ukraine, given mounting pressures on the Russian economy and Putin’s observed tendency to avoid risking his regime's stability.

Russian state media reported that the Russian military command appointed Colonel General Rustam Muradov as the First Deputy Commander of the Russian Ground Forces. Russian state outlet RBK reported on December 1 that a source close to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed Muradov's appointment.[9] The head of Tabasaransky Raion in the Republic of Dagestan, Magomed Kurabanov, reported about Muradov's appointment on November 28.[10] The Russian MoD has yet to publicly confirm the appointment.

The Georgian opposition continues to contest the legitimacy of Georgia's ruling Georgian Dream party's electoral victory following Georgian Dream's suspension of Georgia's European Union (EU) membership accession talks. Georgian Dream announced on November 28 that it will suspend the country's EU accession negotiations and will reject EU grants following a European Parliament resolution deeming the largely contested the October 26 Georgian parliamentary elections as "neither free nor fair."[11] The Georgian constitution has an enshrined aspiration to join the EU, and Georgian Dream's suspension of EU membership talks contradicts the constitution and the demonstrated will of most Georgians who have strived for EU accession for decades.[12] The Georgian opposition - comprised of opposition parties, Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili, and Georgian civil society - immediately called for protests and continued to contest the legitimacy of the Georgian Dream party's electoral victory and its actions. Zourabichvili stated on November 30 that she would remain the sole legal authority of the Georgian government until new elections are held and that the new Georgian Dream-dominated parliament has no right to elect a new president in December 2024, as they intend to do.[13] Georgian presidential elections are currently scheduled for December 14.[14] The Georgian opposition has been protesting Georgian Dream's decision to suspend efforts for EU membership halt across Georgia since November 28, and Georgian riot police have violently suppressed peaceful protestors using, water cannons, beatings, and other violent tactics.[15] Various Georgian ambassadors have resigned in protest of Georgian Dream's actions, including Georgian Ambassador to the US David Zalkaliani.[16] The US State Department announced on November 30 that it is suspending the US-Georgia Strategic Partnership in response to Georgian Dream's "various anti-democratic actions", while European officials have criticized Georgian Dream's actions, voiced solidarity with the protesters, and suggested sanctioning Georgian authorities.[17] ISW previously assessed that a Georgian Dream parliamentary victory would likely derail Georgia's EU and NATO accession aspirations and degrade Georgia’s relationships with its Western partners.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly replaced Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel with Colonel General Alexander Chaiko who will reprise his previous assignment as commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria, though it remains unclear how Russian operations in Syria may change.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree approving the 2025 federal budget and the 2026–2027 draft federal budget on December 1.
• Russian state media reported that the Russian military command appointed Colonel General Rustam Muradov as the First Deputy Commander of the Russian Ground Forces.
• The Georgian opposition continues to contest the legitimacy of Georgia's ruling Georgian Dream party's electoral victory following Georgian Dream's suspension of Georgia's European Union (EU) membership accession talks.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.