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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 11, 2023

Ukrainian forces made tactically significant advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 11. Geolocated footage published on August 11 confirms that Ukrainian forces reached the northern outskirts of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast, though the permanence and extent of these positions are currently unclear. Ukrainian forces have conducted regular ground attacks towards Robotyne for weeks as part of their operations aimed at degrading Russian defenses. The Ukrainian forces’ ability to advance to the outskirts of Robotyne — which Russian forces have dedicated significant effort, time, and resources to defend — remains significant even if Ukrainian gains are limited at this time. Geolocated footage published on August 11 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced into Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces back into the settlement on August 10 and 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut, Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area), and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 10, 2023

The Kuomintang (KMT) has echoed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) attacks on Lai Ching-te’s association with “Taiwan independence” in the lead up to his mid-August US transit. High-profile KMT parroting of PRC talking points indicates the success of the PRC's efforts to influence discourse in Taiwan and could advance its goal of broadening support for peaceful unification.

The Republic of China (ROC) arrested active-duty Republic of China Army (ROCA) personnel for allegedly passing on national security secrets to China. The pattern of ROC military personnel spying for China in conjunction with light espionage punishments indicates the ineffectiveness of current ROC laws in deterring potential spies.

Iran Update, August 10, 2023

Syrian President Bashar al Assad downplayed the importance of relations with the Arab states while stressing relations with Iran and Russia during an interview with the UAE-based Sky News Arabic on August 9.

Iran’s Foreign Affairs Ministry is continuing its diplomatic campaign to convince BRICS countries to admit Iran as a BRICS member ahead of the organization’s 15th annual summit in Johannesburg, South Africa on August 22-24.

Iran and the United States reached an agreement on August 10 for the release of five US nationals detained in Iran. The United States will release six billion dollars of frozen Iranian assets and release several Iranian prisoners as part of the agreement. The release of six billion dollars would be a significant boost for Iran’s struggling economy.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2023

The Wagner Group continues to maintain a presence at facilities in Belarus and the status of its rumored withdrawal to Russia remains unclear. Satellite imagery collected on August 9 shows a significant number of vehicles at the Wagner camp in Tsel, Asipovichy, Belarus, and may even indicate that more vehicles have arrived at the base between August 1 and August 9. Ukrainian sources continue to report about expanding Wagner activity in Brest Oblast, and a Wagner-affiliated source posted footage on August 10 showing that Wagner instructors continue to train Belarusian military personnel. The Wagner-affiliated source amplified a denial from an alleged Wagner fighter wherein the fighter stated that the speculations are “fantasies,” although he acknowledged that many Wagner fighters themselves often do not learn about their deployments until the last moment. ISW has not observed counter-indicators that would refute recent speculation from August 8 that Wagner bussed 500 to 600 personnel from Belarus to Krasnodar Krai and Voronezh and Rostov oblasts, however. Russian sources speculated that Wagner forces plan to conduct the second stage of their alleged withdrawal from Belarus on August 13 but that a small group of Wagner instructors would remain in Belarus to train Belarusian forces.

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, August 9, 2023

The Nigerien junta plans to use the Kremlin-funded Wagner Group and local volunteer militias to bolster security in the capital and may intend to use both against Salafi-jihadi insurgents after securing its hold on power. Relying on these auxiliary forces risks increasing human rights abuses and exacerbating communal tensions, which would create opportunities that Salafi-jihadi groups have historically exploited.

Iran Update, August 9, 2023

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut on August 6 according to Israeli and Arab media.

The IRGC Quds Force is pressuring local Syrians to join Iranian-backed militias by only providing medical services to families tied to these militias. Increased recruitment into Iranian-backed militias could provide the IRGC Quds Force additional manpower for counter-US and counter-ISIS missions in eastern Syria.

Iranian state media claimed on August 9 that Iran has developed supersonic cruise missile technology. Iran possibly developed this technology with Russian assistance.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian traveled to Pretoria, South Africa on August 9, likely as part of the Raisi administration’s ongoing efforts to convince BRICS members to accept its request to join this organization.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 9, 2023

Speculations about the Wagner Group’s withdrawal from Belarus suggest that aspects of the deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24 have collapsed. A Russian insider source claimed on August 8 that Wagner forces are conducting their first stage of withdrawal from Belarus by bussing groups of 500 to 600 personnel from Belarus to Krasnodar Krai and Voronezh and Rostov oblasts and that the second stage will begin after August 13. The insider source and a Wagner-affiliated source speculated that Wagner forces may be leaving Belarus because Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko refused to finance Wagner when he discovered that Russia would not be paying for Wagner as he had evidently expected. Putin and Lukashenko allowed Wagner forces and Prigozhin to continue to operate in Belarus after the armed rebellion. The insider source claimed that a small group of Wagner instructors would remain in Belarus to train Belarusian forces. ISW has not observed visual evidence of Wagner forces moving out of Belarus, however. The insider source claimed on August 6 that Wagner forces that did not deploy to Libya “urgently” went on leave in Russia, and that Wagner's command called on their fighters to keep in touch because new orders could come at any time. Wagner-affiliated sources claimed that the main Wagner forces will “activate” at the end of August but did not elaborate on the statement. Claims that Wagner forces are moving out of Belarus — a relatively safe haven for Wagner and Prigozhin — back to Russia, Wagner command’s mentions of new orders, and claims of the future “activation” of Wagner forces at the end of August likely suggest that aspects of the deal that allowed Wagner to move to Belarus and continue operations there and in Africa have collapsed.

People’s Republic of China Framing Lai’s US Transit as a Crisis

Republic of China (Taiwan) Vice President and presidential candidate Lai Ching-te will transit through the United States on August 12 and 16. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is framing Lai’s transit as a provocative crisis, which is messaging intended to justify greater People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval and aerial activity around Taiwan. The normalization of such military activity around Taiwan in response to the ROC’s leadership transits through the United States would support a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) coercion campaign to induce unification on the PRC’s terms.

Iran Update, August 8, 2023

Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah continued to circulate false claims that the US-led International Coalition is preparing to attack Syrian regime-controlled territory in eastern Syria. Their messaging is part of a coordinated Iranian, Russian, and Syrian regime coercion campaign to expel US forces from Syria. Several senior Iranian and Syrian officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani, have traveled to eastern Syria since July 31 to assess military positioning.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 8, 2023

Ukrainian forces appear to have conducted a limited raid across the Dnipro River and landed on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, although it remains unclear whether Ukrainian troops have established an enduring presence on the east bank. Several Russian milbloggers reported on August 8 that Ukrainian forces landed up to seven boats, each carrying around six to seven people, on the east bank of the Dnipro near the settlement of Kozachi Laheri, broke through Russian defensive lines, and advanced up to 800 meters deep. A Russian milblogger noted that the Russian command recently redeployed a “prepared grouping” of Russian airborne (VDV) personnel from the Kozachi Laheri area to Zaporizhia Oblast and replaced them with mobilized fighters from an unspecified unit, thereby weakening Russian defensive power in this area. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo downplayed reports of the Ukrainian landing and claimed that Russian artillery fire repelled the Ukrainian boats and that there are no Ukrainian troops near Kozachi Laheri. However, the majority of prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces managed to utilize tactical surprise and land on the east bank before engaging Russian forces in small arms exchanges, and Saldo was likely purposefully trying to refute claims of Ukrainian presence in this area to avoid creating panic in the already-delicate Russian information space.

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