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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 26, 2023

Russia's likely capture of Marinka in Donetsk Oblast represents a limited Russian tactical gain and does not portend any operationally significant advance unless Russian forces have dramatically improved their ability to conduct rapid mechanized forward movement, which they show no signs of having done. Localized Russian offensive operations are still placing pressure on Ukrainian forces in many places along the front in eastern Ukraine, however, and can result in gradual tactical Russian advances.

Ukrainian forces conducted a successful missile strike that destroyed a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessel and potentially damaged port infrastructure in occupied Feodosia, Crimea on December 26. Russian forces have reportedly decreased the tempo of their operations on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, likely in connection with decreasing Russian aviation activity after Ukrainian forces recently shot down several Russian aircraft.

Iran Update, December 26, 2023

Hamas and other Palestinian militias are exploiting the Israeli hostages they are holding to ensure that Hamas and its partners are involved in any negotiations about the future of the Gaza Strip. Hamas having a role in the future of the strip is incompatible with Israel’s stated war objectives of destroying Hamas, demilitarizing Gaza, and deradicalizing “Palestinian society.”

Iran Update, December 24, 2023

Iran and the Houthis are functioning as a coalition to conduct combined military operations targeting international shipping in the Red Sea. Iran considers the Axis of Resistance as its unconventional alliance of state, semi-state, and non-state actors. Their anti-US and anti-Israeli ideology unites the Axis of Resistance, creating strategic alignment across its members. Multiple US officials have highlighted the role Iran plays in the targeting and execution of Houthi attacks against international shipping. Iran provides the weapons and uses advisers on the ground in Yemen and at least one spy ship anchored in the Red Sea to support its Houthi partners, who execute the attacks based on Iranian advice and intelligence.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 24, 2023

European Union (EU) Foreign Affairs High Representative Josep Borrell stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in a limited territorial victory in Ukraine and will continue the war “until the final victory.” Borrell reported on December 24 that Putin would not be satisfied with capturing a “piece” of Ukraine and allowing the rest of Ukraine to join the EU. Borrell added that Putin will not “give up the war” and called on the West to prepare for a “conflict of high intensity for a long time.” Borrell’s statements are consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russia is not interested in a ceasefire or good-faith negotiations with Ukraine but retains its maximalist goals of a full Russian victory in Ukraine.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23, 2023

The New York Times (NYT) - citing former and current senior Russian, US, and international officials - reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin is using back channels and intermediaries to signal his interest in a ceasefire, despite Putin’s recent public statements to the contrary. NYT reported that Western officials have been picking up renewed signals through backchannels since September 2023 that Putin is interested in a ceasefire that freezes the current frontlines, but noted that Western officials warned the backchannels could be “Kremlin misdirection” and may not reflect a “genuine willingness” to negotiate. NYT suggested several possible motivations Putin may have for his reported interest in a ceasefire: the upcoming March 2024 Russian presidential election, a desire to “keep his options open” regarding the war’s resolution and take advantage of perceived waning Western support for Ukraine, and the “distraction” of the Israel-Hamas war. All these motivations reflect temporary reasons why Putin might pursue a temporary ceasefire that would benefit Russia by allowing Russia the time to prepare for renewed aggression against Ukraine, as ISW has routinely assessed. The NYT noted that Putin’s public rhetoric, which has recently reasserted Russia’s maximalist objectives that are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender, is at odds with Putin’s reported private desire to “declare victory and move on.” Neither the NYT nor its sources offered any reason to believe Putin’s backchannel communications would be more reflective of his goals than his public speeches addressing domestic, Ukrainian, and international audiences. The NYT report also failed to make clear whether Putin’s alleged interest in a ceasefire is for a temporary pause or a permanent end to the war.

Iran Update, December 23, 2023

Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” are signaling their capability and willingness to attack maritime targets beyond just the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. A one-way drone struck a commercial vessel off the coast of India, causing structural damage to the ship, on December 23. The vessel is partially Israeli-owned. Israeli media reported that Iran was responsible for the attack, which is consistent with the ongoing anti-shipping campaign that Iran and the Houthi movement have conducted around the Bab al Mandeb in recent weeks. This attack follows the Islamic Resistance of Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claiming on December 22 that it conducted an unspecified attack on a “vital target” in the Mediterranean Sea. There is no evidence that the Islamic Resistance of Iraq conducted an attack into the Mediterranean Sea at the time of writing. The claim, nevertheless, signals the readiness of the Iraqi group to participate in the Iran-led attack campaign on maritime targets. Finally, a senior commander in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi, threatened to expand the anti-shipping campaign to the Mediterranean Sea and Strait of Gibraltar on December 23. Naghdi frequently makes inflammatory threats toward Iranian adversaries, but his statement is particularly noteworthy given the drone attack off the Indian coast and the claimed attack by the Islamic Resistance of Iraq. Iran and its Axis of Resistance are likely messaging their capability and willingness to widen geographically their anti-shipping attack campaign in response to the United States forming a multinational naval task force to safeguard commercial traffic around the Red Sea.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment: December 22, 2023

Ukrainian officials continue to warn that Russia maintains its maximalist objectives and additional goals for territorial conquest in Ukraine, despite recent comments made by Western officials suggesting that Russia is already defeated. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on December 22 that Russian President Vladimir Putin "has lost Ukraine altogether" and can "no longer achieve its war goals," which is a "major strategic defeat."

The High Price of Losing Ukraine: Part 2 — The Military Threat and Beyond

Allowing Russia to win its war in Ukraine would be a self-imposed strategic defeat for the United States. The United States would face the risk of a larger and costlier war in Europe. The United States would face the worst threat from Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as a victorious Russia would likely emerge reconstituted and more determined to undermine the United States — and confident that it can. A Russian victory would diminish America’s deterrence around the world, emboldening others with an explicit or latent intent to harm the United States. A Russian victory would create an ugly world in which the atrocities associated with Russia’s way of war and way of ruling the populations under its control are normalized. Most dangerous of all, however, US adversaries would learn that they can break America’s will to act in support of their strategic interests.

The Order of Battle of Hamas’ Izz al Din al Qassem Brigades Part 2

This report presents the order of battle (ORBAT) of the al Qassem Brigades at the brigade and the battalion level. The lack of adequate reporting on Hamas’ units at the company level and below precludes a more detailed presentation of those echelons. This ORBAT presents the formal structure of the al Qassem Brigades during the Israeli ground operation in Israel. The actual structure of the al Qassem Brigades may change as the ground operation progresses and Israeli forces destroy Hamas units or render them combat ineffective.

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