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Ukrainian forces continue operations on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast amid reported difficult conditions in the area as part of an apparent effort to set conditions for future Ukrainian operations and the resettlement of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. The New York Times published a series of interviews with Ukrainian military personnel operating on the east bank and along the Dnipro River on December 16, wherein the commander of a Ukrainian regiment stated that Ukrainian drone strikes have heavily suppressed Russian long-range artillery on the east bank in recent months. Ukrainian officials previously stated that Ukrainian forces established several bridgeheads on the east bank as part of an operation that aims to push Russian forces out of artillery range of west bank Kherson Oblast. The reported suppression of long-range Russian artillery may allow Ukrainian forces to operate more freely in near rear areas in west bank Kherson Oblast, which may partially explain intensified Russian glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian targets on the west bank.The much more abundant 152mm tube artillery systems that Russian forces widely operate in Ukraine have an approximate range of 25km, although Russian forces are unlikely to deploy these systems to immediate frontline areas due to the threat of Ukrainian counterbattery fire.

German outlet BILD stated on December 14 that unspecified intelligence findings and sources indicate that Russia plans to occupy Ukrainian territory beyond the four (illegally) annexed Ukrainian oblasts throughout 2024-2026. BILD stated that Russia plans to capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and up to the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast by the end of 2024.

Russian President Vladimir Putin displayed notable confidence in publicly discussing Russia’s war on Ukraine during a joint event combining his annual press conference and “Direct Line” forum on December 14 but did not clearly define his envisioned end state for the full-scale invasion he launched on February 24, 2022. The “Direct Line” is an annual highly staged forum in which Putin answers pre-selected questions from the Russian public. Putin notably skipped the “Direct Line” in 2022, the first time he did not hold it since 2012. Putin routinely abstained from discussing the war in depth at high profile events throughout 2022, suggesting that he was uncertain about his ability to shape the Russian information space on this topic. Putin used the December 14, 2023, event to discuss his objectives in Ukraine, specific operational and tactical situations along the front, and specific concerns from Russian military personnel and volunteers in a much more public and prolonged fashion than in his previous statements about the war since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s willingness to center large portions of the event on the war in Ukraine suggests an increased confidence in his ability to address the Russian public on the subject, which may be indicative of his own personal confidence in Russia’s prospects in Ukraine following the relatively successful Russian defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and perceived wavering Western support for Ukraine. Putin did not offer a new approach to the war, describe how Russia intends to achieve victory in Ukraine or specify what a Russian victory would look like. Many of Putin’s statements on December 14 are similar to the boilerplate claims about the Russian war in Ukraine that he made during a speech at a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium meeting almost a year ago, for example.

DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te made significant gains in the polls while support for KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih plateaued. A December 10 Taiwan News Poll of Polls showed that in a weighted average of polls from the past ten days, Lai had 38.06% support, Hou had 31.27%, and Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je had 18.48%. These numbers show a nearly 5 percentage point jump from 33.2% for Lai since the December 5 Poll of Polls, a 2% rise from 29.3% for Hou since then, and a 3.5% drop from 22.0% for Ko. This is the first time Lai has surpassed 35% support since the Poll of Polls’ first data point on September 1. It is also Ko’s worst performance in the Poll of Polls since October 16. The Poll of Polls normally aggregates polls from the previous 15 days.