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Iran Update, October 22, 2023

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani arrived in Syria on October 21 to monitor Iranian-backed militias on the Israel-Syria border, according to Israeli media. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this report. Iranian-backed militias have concentrated in southern Lebanon and southwestern Syria in recent days as part of Iran-led preparations for the war to expand into a regional conflict. An Iranian state-affiliated journalist previously claimed that Ghaani warned Syrian President Bashar al Assad on October 15 that Iran intends to use Syria as a second front if the Israel-Hamas war expands. An unspecified Iranian intelligence official claimed that Iran would start a ”limited” ground operation from Syria into the Golan Heights and notably not from Lebanon if the situation escalates to protect LH.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 22, 2023

Russian forces are funneling additional forces to the Avdiivka front despite ongoing challenges with frontal mechanized assaults and the failure of a renewed push on October 19-20. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that there were no significant changes along the front in the Avdiivka direction on October 22. Russian forces are likely once again pausing following a failed major push which suffered heavy losses. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces “unexpectedly” counterattacked in the direction of Pisky (8km southwest of Donetsk City) and pushed Russian forces from positions in the area. Another milblogger stated that claims of Ukrainian advances near Pisky and Opytne (4km south of Avdiivka) are false. Another Russian source allegedly serving in the Avdiivka direction claimed that Ukrainian forces did not conduct counterattacks in his unspecified sector of the front. Geolocated footage published on October 21 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal advances southeast of Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka). A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not completely cleared the Avdiivka waste heap area and that the area is currently a contested “gray zone.”

Iran Update, October 21, 2023

Palestinian militias continued indirect fire at their usual rate into Israel on October 21. These attacks continued to strike civilian and military targets. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed ten rocket attacks The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine—claimed two rocket attacks. The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—conducted one rocket attack. The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—claimed two mortar attacks, marking the second time that CTP-ISW has recorded them launching attacks into Israeli territory since the war began. The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades claimed one mortar attack into Israeli territory on October 12. The attacks recorded on October 21 and throughout the war underscore the reality that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is facing a loose coalition of several Palestinian militias rather than just Hamas

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 21, 2023

Ukrainian forces have likely repelled another intensified Russian offensive effort towards Avdiivka in the past several days and inflicted further heavy personnel and equipment losses on Russian troops in the area. Ukrainian and Russian sources indicated that Russian forces mounted another offensive push on Avdiivka between October 19 and 20, and geolocated footage posted on October 21 confirms that Russian forces did make marginal gains northwest of Avdiivka in the waste heap area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are gradually advancing north of Avdiivka near the waste heap towards Berdychi (5km northwest of Avdiivka). A Ukrainian military observer noted that Russian forces are attacking towards Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), towards Novokalynove (7km north of Avdiivka), and towards the waste heap from the Krasnohorivka-Vesele area. However, Ukrainian military officials noted that Russian forces have somewhat decreased the pace of offensive operations near Avdiivka on October 21, and reiterated earlier Ukrainian reporting that Russian forces lost 50 tanks, 100 armored vehicles, and 900 personnel during attacks on Avdiivka on October 19.

Iran Update, October 20, 2023

Palestinian militias continued indirect fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel on October 20. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas' militant wing—claimed ten rocket, mortar, and drone attacks. Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad—claimed responsibility for another seven rocket attacks. This rate of attacks is consistent with the rates that CTP-ISW has observed in recent days. Both groups continue to frame these attacks as being in response to Israeli “massacres” against civilians.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 20, 2023

Russian forces launched a renewed offensive push near Avdiivka on October 20 and marginally advanced, indicating that the Russian military command remains committed to offensive operations in the area despite heavy materiel and personnel losses. Geolocated footage published on October 20 shows that Russian forces secured minor advances west of Krasnohorivka (5km north of Avdiivka). Russian milbloggers and a Ukrainian military observer claimed that Russian forces captured a Ukrainian stronghold near the waste heap just northeast of Avdiivka, advanced to a rail station north of Avdiivka, and advanced near the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant south of Avdiivka. One prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), south of Avdiivka, near Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka), and near Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka), however. Other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to one kilometer on the Stepove-Berdychi line (8-10km northwest of Avdiivka) on October 19 and that fighting is ongoing near Berdychi on October 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Avdiivka, Novokalynove, Stepove, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Sieverne.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 19, 2023

The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) agreed to debates between their presidential candidates and will likely form a joint presidential ticket before the January 13 election. Officials from the parties agreed on October 14 to hold three debates between KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih and TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je to determine who should lead a joint presidential ticket. The parties still need to resolve disagreements over the method of selecting a presidential candidate, however. Forming a joint ticket would enable the parties to combine their support and mount a challenge to the leading Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-te. The agreement to hold the debates is consistent with ISW’s standing assessment that the KMT and TPP could form a joint presidential ticket before the January election.

Iran Update, October 19, 2023

The Iranian-backed Iraqi groups and Houthis are behaving as if the United States has crossed their stated red lines of intervening in the war to support Israel. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah (KH)’s military spokesperson said that the United States is an “essential partner in killing [Gazans]” and must “bear the consequences” on October 18. KH’s military spokesperson also said that the United States is “aware of the capabilities of the Iraqi Resistance” and that the Iraqi resistance can target anywhere in Iraq. Other Axis of Resistance factions have also expressed this risk since October 7. The Houthi Movement’s supreme leader said on October 10 that his forces would respond with missiles and drones if the United States intervened in the conflict.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 19, 2023

Russian sources continued to discuss larger-than-usual Ukrainian ground operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 19, and Ukrainian forces likely maintain a limited presence in some east bank areas near the Dnipro River shoreline and the Antonivsky railway bridge. The prominent Russian milblogger who initiated Russian discussion of Ukrainian assaults on the east bank on October 18 claimed on October 19 that two Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups of a Ukrainian naval infantry brigade crossed the Dnipro River, overwhelmed the Russian troops in the area, and gained a foothold in the village of Krynky (30km east of Kherson City and about 2km inland from the Dnipro River shoreline). The milblogger claimed that Russian infantry counterattacked and pushed Ukrainian forces back towards the outskirts of the village but noted that Ukrainian troops still control some houses in Krynky and are waiting for reinforcements to arrive in the area. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces used more manpower in attacks on Krynky than in previous attacks. Several Russian sources, including Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo, claimed that Russian forces managed to push Ukrainian forces back from the Poyma-Pishchanivka-Pidstepne area (15km east of Kherson City) to the Dnipro River shoreline and to positions under the Antonivsky railway bridge, where they claim Ukrainian forces are trying to rest and regroup under constant Russian air and artillery strikes.

Iran Update, October 18, 2023

Two Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted separate attacks on US forces stationed at the al Harir airbase and Ain al Asad airbase in Iraq on October 18. CTP-ISW previously reported that elements of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, have threatened to attack US forces if the United States intervenes in the Israel-Hamas war. It is unclear if the two attacks were coordinated or if the IRGC Quds Force ordered the attacks.

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