Publications

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8, 2023

Russian forces have reportedly made notable changes to their command and control (C2) in Ukraine to protect command infrastructure and improve information sharing, although Russian force deployments are likely still exacerbating issues with horizontal integration. Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) Deputy Director of Analysis Magarita Konaev and CSET Fellow Owen Daniels stated on September 6 that Russian forces moved headquarters out of range of most Ukrainian strike systems and have placed forward command posts further underground and behind heavily defended positions. It is unclear if Russian forces have employed this more protected command infrastructure throughout Ukraine and to what degree these defensive efforts have impeded Ukraine’s ongoing interdiction campaign. Konaev and Daniels stated that Russian forces have improved communications between command posts and units at the front by laying field cables and using safer radio communications. The Royal United Services Insitute (RUSI) stated on September 4 that Russian forces are also trying to improve signals through the wider use of application-based C2 services that require less training. Konaev and Daniels noted that signals at the battalion level downward are still often unencrypted and that Russian personnel still frequently communicate sensitive information through unsecure channels.

Iran Update, September 7, 2023

Key Takeaways

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has sent over 60 Iranian-backed militants to Daraa Province to prevent the expansion of the ongoing, anti-Syrian regime protests in southern Syria.

Leaders from Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad met in Beirut and echoed Iranian leaders’ calls for greater cooperation among these groups against Israel.

Iranian authorities are continuing to take measures to deter and prevent anti-regime protests ahead of the anniversaries of Mahsa Amini’s death and the “Bloody Friday” incident on September 16 and 30, respectively.

Syria Protest Update, August 29—September 4

Anti-regime protests have grown and become more organized in Suwayda Province while declining in the rest of Syria. Suwayda Province has become the well-organized center of the anti-regime protest movement as organizers demonstrate a greater ability to direct and sustain constant demonstrations and issue new demands. ISW recorded two instances of limited regime intimidation in Suwayda Province such as threats and firing into the air throughout the movement. Regime suppression and a lack of organizational networks outside the province have resulted in a decline in protest span, frequency, and turnout, however. ISW recorded 11 protests in the rest of regime-held Syria between August 29 and September 4 compared to 43 during the previous week. This updates ISW’s assessment that anti-regime protests are gaining traction in Syria and that the protests could expand during the coming weeks.

Iran Update, September 6, 2023

Russia directed local tribes to attack the US-led International Coalition and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria likely part of a coordinated effort with Iran and the Syrian regime to expel the United States from Syria.

Iranian-backed militias relocated personnel and military equipment to southern Syria from Deir ez Zor on September 4, possibly to secure the Syrian regime as anti-regime protests continue.

Iranian protest organizations are planning demonstrations to commemorate the regime’s killing of Mahsa Amini on September 16 and may generate protest turnout across Iran. The regime is taking steps to preempt protests that commemorate the death of Mahsa Amini and will likely crack down on demonstrations that occur.

Senior Iranian officials outlined the regime’s policy perspective on Iran-Turkey bilateral relations during their meetings with Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Tehran on September 3.