Publications

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 26, 2024

March 26, 2024 - ISW Press

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said that the Crocus City Hall attackers originally fled toward Belarus not Ukraine, directly undermining the Kremlin narrative on Ukraine’s involvement, possibly to head off questions about why the attackers headed toward Belarus in the first place. During a visit to Belarus’ northwestern Ashmyany raion on March 26, Lukashenko reported that the Crocus City Hall attackers may have been planning to escape Russia’s Bryansk Oblast to Belarus, but that Belarus introduced a heightened security regime that forced the attackers to change course towards the Russia-Ukraine border. Lukashenko stated that the attackers “couldn’t enter Belarus” and praised high levels of cooperation between Russian and Belarusian special services for leading to the attackers’ arrests.

Iran Update, March 25, 2024

March 25, 2024 - ISW Press

Shin Bet announced on March 25 that the IDF seized a “significant amount of advanced arms from Iran” that Iran had smuggled into the West Bank to support Palestinian militia attacks targeting Israel. The captured arms included 83 small arms, five anti-tank mines, four grenade launchers, 15 RPGs, and 25 kilograms of plastic explosives. Shin Bet also said that a Fatah official based in Lebanon and affiliated with Lebanese Hezbollah and the IRGC assisted the Iranian effort to smuggle arms into the West Bank, but Shin Bet did not provide further details. Shin Bet added that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force organized the effort to smuggle Iranian weapons into the West Bank, which is consistent with previous Western reporting.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 25, 2024

March 25, 2024 - ISW Press

The March 22 Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall is a notable Russian intelligence and law enforcement failure, and explaining currently available open-source evidence does not require any wider and more complicated conspiracy theory either within or against the Russian state. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during an address on March 25 that “radical Islamists” committed the attack, but immediately and baselessly accused the United States of trying to cover the “Ukrainian trace” of the attack, directly accusing Ukraine of being the “customer” of the attack. ISW continues to assess that the attack itself, as well as the claim pattern following the attack, is highly consistent with the way IS conducts and claims such incidents and has observed no evidence that Ukraine was involved in the attack.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 24, 2024

March 24, 2024 - ISW Press

Ukrainian forces struck a Black Sea Fleet communications center in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, and reportedly struck an oil depot and at least partially damaged two BSF landing ships on the night of March 23.

Iran Update, March 24, 2024

March 24, 2024 - ISW Press

The Israel Defense Forces engaged Palestinian militias north of Gaza City. Local Palestinian sources reported that Israeli armor entered eastern Beit Hanoun on March 23. The IDF acknowledged on March 24 that its forces are operating in Beit Hanoun, saying that the IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike on a target in Beit Hanoun that “posed a threat to the forces operating in the area.”

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 23, 2024

March 23, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian authorities claimed to have arrested the four attackers and seven others involved in the March 22 “Crocus City Hall” concert venue attack, which Russian authorities reported killed at least 133 civilians. ISW assesses that the Islamic State (IS) is very likely responsible for the Crocus City Hall attack. The Kremlin nevertheless and without evidence quickly attempted to tie Ukrainian actors to the Crocus City Hall attack but has yet to formally accuse Ukraine of involvement in the attack. Russian ultranationalists responded to the attack by reiterating typically xenophobic calls for anti-migrant policies, reflecting the growing tension in Russian society over the mistreatment of migrants and the impacts migrant disenfranchisement could have on expanding a viable recruitment base in Russia for Salafi-Jihadi groups.

Iran Update, March 23, 2024

March 23, 2024 - ISW Press

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a weeklong operation in and around al Shifa Hospital on March 23. Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters during a raid targeting an unspecified “wanted individual” in Tulkarm in the West Bank on March 22. Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 22. CENTCOM reported that the Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles into the Red Sea but added that the Houthi attacks did not damage any military or commercial vessels.

Iran Update, March 22, 2024

March 22, 2024 - ISW Press

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 22. The IDF 401st and Nahal Brigades (162nd Division) and Israeli special operations forces have killed approximately 150 Palestinian fighters in the hospital area since the operation began on March 18.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 22, 2024

March 22, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian forces conducted the largest series of combined drone and missile strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure since the start of the full-scale invasion during the night of March 21-22.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 22, 2024

March 22, 2024 - ISW Press

The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) expanded its efforts to erode the Republic of China's (ROC) sovereignty around Kinmen Island. Four CCG ships operated in Taiwan’s territorial waters around Kinmen Island for two consecutive days for the first time on March 15 and 16. One of the ships was a converted naval corvette that conducted the passage with its gun covers removed. The CCG framed its operations as legitimate law enforcement to safeguard Chinese fishermen, including those from Taiwan. The CCG’s removal of its gun covers during its passage through Taiwan’s waters illustrates its offensive posturing, indicating its actions are intended to intimidate the Taiwanese Coast Guard rather than uphold a safe maritime environment. CCG ships have previously used this tactic to intimidate rival law enforcement in contested waters, including the Philippines Coast Guard around Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.

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