Publications

Iran Update, February 24, 2023

February 24, 2023 - ISW Press

Iranian regime security forces escalated against prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid on February 24 after months of relative restraint. Security forces surrounded Zahedan’s Grand Makki Mosque, where Abdol Hamid gives his weekly Friday sermons, assaulted some nearby worshippers, and reportedly attempted to enter the mosque. The regime reportedly stationed snipers around Zahedan and disrupted local internet services as well. Abdol Hamid lamented on social media that he could not livestream his Friday sermon due to the severity of these restrictions. The regime has significantly increased its security presence in Zahedan since January 2023 to deter Abdol Hamid from criticizing the regime. However, these security forces have largely refrained from interfering with Abdol Hamid’s weekly sermon and the ensuing protests until this point, likely to avoid enflaming domestic unrest further. Security forces conducted a brutal crackdown against citizens in Zahedan on September 30, 2022, which was the initial driver of the weekly Friday protests during the last five months.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 24, 2023

February 24, 2023 - ISW Press

The Kremlin did not comment on the first anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, likely because Russia has failed to achieve any of its stated objectives and has not made significant territorial gains since July 2022. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his administration made no statements relating to the anniversary even though Putin has made numerous public appearances over the past three days. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev made inflammatory claims that Russia will win the war and reiterated that it is vital for Russia to achieve its goals to "push back the borders that threaten [Russia] as far as possible, even if they are the borders of Poland." ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin has been using Medvedev to sustain information campaigns targeting Western military support for Ukraine and to deflect attention from Russia's military failures.[3] Medvedev's statements highlight the fact that the Kremlin is continuing to pursue its unrealistic maximalist goals even though it has no meaningful successes to offer the Russian people after a year of costly war in Ukraine.

Op-ed: What the West Must Do Now to Help Ukraine Win the War

February 24, 2023 - ISW Press

Ukraine’s heroic resistance against the first year of Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine and Russian defeats continue to stun the world, but the outcome of the war remains in doubt. Ukraine achieved striking successes in 2022 through smart operational planning, the effective use of large-scale Western support, and the enduring will of the Ukrainian people. Ukraine has defeated Russia’s initial invasion, conducted several successful counteroffensives, and inflicted devastating losses on the Russian military. When Putin launched his full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, few predicted the magnitude of Ukraine’s successes one year on.

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, February 22, 2023

February 24, 2023 - ISW Press

Iraq. The Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) inability to defeat ISIS in the northern Baghdad Belts could allow ISIS to attack Baghdad itself. An ISIS attack against Baghdad would be a propaganda boon for the group, while possibly triggering sectarian violence and ISF command changes that could improve the group’s position. The level of ISF pressure on ISIS in the northern Baghdad Belts is likely sufficient to disrupt ISIS attacks against Baghdad, though ISIS is attempting to undermine ISF cohesion in the area. ISF is unlikely to defeat ISIS without a major operation involving capable Iraqi Army forces. ISIS will continue to be able to resupply its attack cells and attack ISF forces in the northern Belts without a major counter-ISIS operation.

Sahel. Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is likely consolidating control over rural areas of southeastern Burkina Faso. The group is likely using these expanded havens to increase activity in neighboring regions of Burkina Faso and the littoral states. A Burkinabe overemphasis on military solutions without successfully addressing underlying social issues risks backfiring, inflaming local tensions that feed JNIM recruitment in the area.

Pakistan. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) conducted its most deadly attack in Karachi in southeastern Pakistan since 2016, indicating an expansion of TTP attack zones and an increase in TTP capabilities in Karachi. Pakistani security forces will likely conduct counter-TTP operations in Karachi in the near term. Pakistan could strike TTP militants in Afghanistan in a less likely scenario. Pakistan continues to seek engagement with the Afghan Taliban on terrorism-related issues, and a Pakistani attack in Afghanistan could undermine discussions between the two sides.

Iran Update, February 23, 2023

February 23, 2023 - ISW Press

Senior regime officials are increasingly acknowledging that the Islamic Republic risks permanently alienating itself from its people and that the problem is urgent, but have seemingly drawn different conclusions about how to mitigate this risk. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei implicitly warned of increased rifts between Iranian leadership and its youth in a speech addressed to the Assembly of Experts on February 23. Khamenei described the assembly—a body of 88 clerics responsible for supervising, dismissing, and selecting Iran’s Supreme Leader—as a paragon of democracy. All elected assembly members must secure approval from a separate supervisory council, vetted by Khamenei, before running for office. Khamenei stressed the importance of “preserving”-- possibly implying that the regime risks losing--the Islamic Republic’s social capital and called on the assembly to increase political participation among Iranian youth, echoing similar calls from actors across the Iranian political spectrum in recent weeks.[2] Khamenei added that measures to increase social capital must occur within the ideological boundaries of the regime, and tasked the Assembly of Experts with “monitor(ing) and maintain(ing) the overall movement and important parts of the regime (so that) the revolution does not digress like other revolutions.” Khamenei also seemingly warned against public criticisms of the regime’s core ideology, stating: “no one should say online or elsewhere that the Islamic Republic has created an enemy for itself” and advised officials against “talking loosely and illogically.” Khamenei seemed to frame connecting with Iranian youth as an uphill battle and told his audience that “one should not be offended by doubt … one should be prepared to face doubt.” Khamenei additionally urged officials to “perform (their) duties seriously and without fatigue or weakness of action,” possibly an exhortation to President Ebrahim Raisi, who attended the meeting. It is noteworthy that Khamenei did not signal his desire to end calls for the impeachment of Raisi administration officials, which parliamentarians have made in recent days as Iran faces significant economic challenges. The Supreme Leader previously instructed parliament against impeaching former President Hassan Rouhani in 2020, making his silence in this context conspicuous.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 23, 2023

February 23, 2023 - ISW Press

The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for false flag operations on the Chernihiv Oblast international border and in Moldova ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian Northern Operational Command reported on February 23 that Russian forces are preparing possible false flag operations in the international border areas of Chernihiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Northern Operational Command stated that Ukrainian intelligence has already observed Russian convoys with unmarked military equipment and personnel dressed in uniforms resembling those worn by the Ukrainian military move to areas near the Chernihiv Oblast border. The Ukrainian Northern Operational Command stated that the purpose of these false flag operations would be to accuse Ukrainian forces of violating the territorial integrity of an unspecified country, very likely referring to Belarus. The Kremlin may be preparing false flag attacks to coerce Belarus into the war following Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's February 16 statement that Belarus would only enter the war if attacked by Ukraine. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense also notably claimed on February 21 that Belarusian forces observed a buildup of Ukrainian forces at its borders. ISW continues to assess that Belarusian or Russian attack on northern Ukrainian regions is highly unlikely, but Russia seeks to force Lukashenko’s hand or blame Ukraine for expanding the war to undermine support for Kyiv. Such a false flag operation could also aim to fix Ukrainian forces at the northern border in an effort to weaken Ukrainian defenses in eastern Ukraine and preparations for counter-offensive operations.

The Kremlin also appears to be setting information conditions to stage a false flag operation in occupied Transnistria, Moldova. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 23 that Ukrainian forces are planning to conduct an armed provocation against Transnistria in the near future. The MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces would dress as Russian military personnel and stage an alleged Russian offensive from positions in Transnistria. The Moldovan government denied the Russian MoD’s allegations. The MoD likely sought to foster this false narrative to twist Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky‘s warning to Moldovan President Maia Sandu that the Kremlin was preparing provocations in Moldova and his offer to help Moldova if Russian forces in Transnistria threaten the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The MoD’s dissemination of this false narrative does not indicate that Putin intends to attack Moldova—an undertaking for which he lacks military capability—although it points toward an escalation in his ongoing efforts to undermine the Moldovan state.

Iran Update, February 22, 2023

February 22, 2023 - ISW Press

Growing elements of the regime are publicly recognizing that the Islamic Republic has lost the confidence of its people as Iran faces a period of severe economic disruption that risks further popular discontent. CTP has previously assessed that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will tolerate limited criticisms of the regime, particularly those that pertain to Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions. Actors from across the political spectrum have subsequently acknowledged such issues and discussed the economy with urgency in recent days, suggesting that the regime must improve Iran’s economic conditions to regain the trust of an increasingly disillusioned populous. They have become increasingly vocal as the Iranian rial hit a new all-time low on February 21--valuing at around 500,000 for one US dollar--and as inflation rates hold at roughly 50 percent. The regime must implement significant economic reforms in order to meaningfully address Iran’s economic conditions, although it is presently unclear if Iranian officials have articulated and cohered around such a solution.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 22, 2023

February 22, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin revived his imperialistic narrative that Russia is fighting for Russia's "historic frontiers" on February 22, a narrative that he had similarly voiced in his speech before the re-invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Putin gave a four-minute speech at the rally for the Defenders of the Fatherland Day in Moscow, stating that there is currently "a battle going on for [Russia's] historical frontiers, for [Russian] people." Putin had similarly called territories adjacent to Russia "[Russian] historical land" when announcing Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Putin did not offer other notable remarks on the progress of the war or discuss concrete frontline objectives. The concept of Russia's "historical frontiers" could be used to justify aggression against almost any of Russia's neighbors, as well as Moldova and the Central Asian states that do not share a border with Russia, since all of them contain territory that belonged at one point to either the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire or both.

Iran Update, February 21, 2023

February 21, 2023 - ISW Press

The Mahsa Amini protest movement has likely entered a new phase, although it is unclear what pattern of anti-regime activity will characterize this new phase. Protest activity has increased substantially in recent days, including at least 15 protests on February 16, 12 protests on February 19, 14 on February 20, and seven on February 21. This increased turnout is the most that CTP has recorded since assessing that the Mahsa Amini movement culminated in January 2023. This renewed protest activity could indicate that the movement has regained momentum after what was in effect an operational pause. It is unclear if protest activity in this new phase will resemble the patterns that CTP first observed in the Mahsa Amini movement or what form acts of anti-regime defiance will take. It is also unclear how long this uptick in protest activity will last.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 21, 2023

February 21, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 21 address to the Russian Federal Assembly did not articulate specific goals or intentions for the war in Ukraine, instead reinforcing several long-standing rhetorical lines in an effort to buy Putin more space and time for a protracted war. Putin claimed that Russia began the “special military operation” in Ukraine a year ago in order to protect people in Russia’s “historical lands,” ensure Russian domestic security, remedy the threat posed by the Ukrainian “neo-Nazi” regime that he claims has been in place since 2014, and protect the people of Donbas. Putin virulently accused the collective West of arming Ukraine and deploying bases and biolabs close to Russian borders, thereby unleashing the war on Russia. Putin falsely analogized the Ukrainian Armed Forces with various Nazi divisions and thanked the Russian Armed Forces for their efforts in fighting the Nazi threat. The emphasis of a significant portion of the speech was on the supposed resilience of the Russian economic, social, and cultural spheres, and Putin made several recommendations for the development of occupied territories of Ukraine. Putin's speech notably re-engaged with several long-standing Russian information operations regarding the justifications of the war and did not present an inflection in Russia’s rhetorical positioning on the war. Putin could have used this event to articulate new objectives and means for achieving them, such as announcing another formal wave of partial mobilization, redefining the “special military operation” as an official war, or taking additional steps to mobilize the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) in a more concrete way. Instead, Putin said very little of actual substance, likely in order to set continued information conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine by not articulating specific temporal goals and framing the war as existential to the Russian domestic population.

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