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The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Marshall Islands-flagged, US-owned, Greek-operated Chem Ranger commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden on January 18. The missiles landed in the water near the ship but did not damage the ship or its crew. This attack marks the third Houthi attack on a US-owned ship this week.
The Nigerien junta is continuing to grow closer to the Kremlin and may deploy Russian mercenaries in Niger to respond to the deteriorating security situation in the country in the coming months. A significant number of Russian mercenaries would enable the junta to divert Nigerien troops away from the capital to counter al Qaeda–affiliated militants who are strengthening support zones in areas that are enabling attacks within 25 miles of the capital. The Russian mercenaries would likely be more focused on advancing the Kremlin’s strategic aims of regime security and resource plunder than counterterrorism operations. The junta could alternatively pursue a more traditional defense partnership with Russia and rely on civilian militias to augment its capacity outside the capital. The uses of Russian mercenaries and civilian militias are not mutually exclusive, but either option will likely exacerbate human rights abuses that push locals to ally with insurgents for protection.
Russia is conducting an information operation to misrepresent NATO’s defensive "Steadfast Defender 2024" exercises — a response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Russian threats directed towards NATO members — as provocative. NATO’s Steadfast Defender 2024 exercises begin this week and will continue through May 2024.
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te won the Taiwanese presidential election on January 13. Lai won by a margin of nearly seven percentage points over the second-place Kuomintang (KMT) candidate. Lai’s election signals continuity with the cross-strait policy and diplomatic strategy of the incumbent administration of Tsai Ing-wen, during which Taiwan has favored closer cooperation with the United States at the expense of relations with the PRC.
The Pakistani armed forces conducted cross-border attacks targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran, on January 17.[1] Pakistan announced that it fired a combination of drones, rockets, and air-launched standoff munitions to target Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF) sites in Iran.[2] The BLA and BLF are Baloch ethno-separatist groups that maintain ongoing insurgencies inside Pakistan. Pakistan framed the strikes as responses to Iran’s failure to prevent Baloch separatist groups based in Iran from conducting attacks inside Pakistan.[3] Pakistani media reported that the strikes killed and/or injured seven BLF fighters.[4] Pakistani Foreign Affairs Ministry officials emphasized that the strikes did not target the Iranian regime. The Pakistani strikes follow the IRGC’s drone and missile strikes on two Jaish al Adl headquarters in Koh Sabz, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan on January 16.[5]
The battlespace in Ukraine continues to be the center of the technological offense-defense race between Russian and Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on January 18 that Russian forces "learn quickly enough" and have completely adapted the Kh-101 air-launched cruise missile compared to the model that Russia used in 2022. Skibitsky stated that new Kh-101s are equipped with an active electronic warfare (EW) system and "thermal traps" to prevent the missiles from emitting trackable heat signatures. Skibitsky noted that Ukrainian forces need to innovate and adapt in response to Russian adaptations to "prevent the loss of territories." The GUR assessment of Russian technological innovation in the air domain is consistent with ISW's previous observations that Russian forces are adapting their methods and means for conducting strikes on Ukraine, and that Ukraine in turn must adapt and innovate with Western support to respond to such strikes. Moscow Duma Deputy Andrei Medvedev identified similar adaptation-response dynamics in a January 18 post where he discussed the use of drones by both Russian and Ukrainian forces. Medvedev stated that Russia has opted for the mass production of drones, leading to the production of large numbers of drones that lack the technological adaptations needed to compete with Ukrainian drones based on battlefield experience. Medvedev noted that Ukrainian forces are constantly improving their drones and warned that constant Ukrainian innovation may eventually make Russian mass-produced drones ineffective. Medvedev's discussion of the importance of constant technological adaptation and innovation on the battlefield emphasizes ISW's assessment that Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in a technological and tactical offense-defense race.
Palestinian fighters are attacking Israeli forces in areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces conducted clearing operations previously. CTP-ISW reported on January 16 that Palestinian militias have renewed attacks in the northern Gaza Strip, particularly around Jabalia and Sheikh Radwan. Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, conducted five attacks in Jabalia, Sheikh Radwan, and Karama neighborhoods on January 17. The self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and small arms at Israeli forces in Karama as well. A Palestinian journalist reported on January 17 that Israeli forces entered Rimal neighborhood in southwestern Gaza City. CTP-ISW assessed on January 16 that Palestinian militias are likely reinfiltrating this area. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on January 17 that its forces directed an airstrike that targeted two Palestinian fighters in Sheikh Ijlin neighborhood in southwestern Gaza City. The IDF also found large amounts of weapons in the area.
A Ukrainian intelligence official reported that Russian forces lack the necessary operational reserves to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts in more than one direction in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on January 17 that Russia does not have enough reserves to conduct large-scale offensive operations in several directions at the same time. Skibitskyi stated that it is impossible for Russian forces to conduct strategically or operationally significant offensive operations without “powerful” reserves and implied that Russia does not have such reserves. Skibitskyi noted that mobilization measures are ongoing in Russia, likely referring to the current Russian crypto-mobilization campaign that relies heavily on volunteer recruitment and the coercive mobilization of convicts and migrants.
Palestinian militias are likely re-infiltrating into areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. CTP-ISW has observed renewed militant activity in several neighborhoods across the northern part of the strip in recent weeks, as Israeli forces have transitioned to less intense fighting there. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed on December 31, 2023, that it withdrew five brigades from the northern Gaza Strip and said that it would transition to targeted raids with its remaining forces. CTP-ISW assessed on January 2 that the IDF transitioning to this new phase of operations will very likely enable Hamas to reconstitute itself militarily.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to demonstrate that Russia is not interested in negotiating with Ukraine in good faith and that Russia’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine – which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender – remain unchanged. Putin claimed on January 16 during a meeting with Russian municipal heads that “Ukrainian statehood may suffer an irreparable, very serious blow” if the current battlefield situation continues. Putin also reiterated Kremlin allegations of the prevalence of Nazism in Ukraine and claimed that ”such people...cannot win.” Russia’s continued calls for Ukraine’s “denazification” are thinly veiled demands for the removal of the elected Ukrainian government and its replacement with a government acceptable to the Kremlin. Putin reiterated the Kremlin narrative that Ukraine – not Russia – is to blame for the absence of negotiations, claiming that Ukraine’s “peace formula” is actually a continuation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ban on negotiating with Russia and amounts to “prohibitive demands” on the negotiation process. Putin claimed that any negotiation process is an “attempt to encourage [Russia] to abandon gains [it] has made in the past year and a half” and that this is “impossible.”