Publications

Iran Update, March 10, 2023

The Iranian regime is continuing efforts to dissuade Iranian citizens from celebrating Chahar Shanbeh Souri to forestall potential protests on that holiday. Iranians traditionally celebrate Chahar Shanbeh Souri—the last Wednesday of the Persian calendar year—by gathering in streets and jumping over fires. The regime fears that the combination of celebratory gatherings, fires, and a generally lively atmosphere on this holiday will create an environment conducive to unrest. Friday prayer leaders throughout Iran used their sermons on March 10 to discourage celebrations for Chahar Shanbeh Souri. Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Khatami warned Iranians during his sermon that many people have “lost their lives, eyes, and limbs” while celebrating Chahar Shanbeh Souri. Khatami added that this holiday is an “unwise custom” and called on Iranian youth to listen to his “heartfelt speech.” Sanandaj Friday Prayer Leader Mamosta Faegh Rostami separately warned that Iranians should not allow the “fleeting pleasures” of Chahar Shanbeh Souri to cause a “lifetime of regret” during his sermon. Abadan Friday Prayer Leader Abdol Hossein Ghobishavi additionally called on parents to “manage” their children on Chahar Shanbeh Souri, echoing Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan’s warning to parents on March 7 that they must control their children’s “enthusiasm” during this holiday. This coordinated rhetoric from Friday prayer leaders suggests that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his inner circle are directing this messaging campaign. Friday prayer leaders receive guidance for the content of their Friday sermons from the Office of the Supreme Leader. The regime’s continuing efforts to prevent Chahar Shanbeh Souri festivities validate CTP’s previous assessment that the regime is using the recent chemical attacks to set conditions to securitize the country ahead of major national holidays.

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, March 8, 2023

Syria. ISIS has increased its attacks in Syria’s central desert since early February, likely to secure resources and ISIS supply lines between northeast and central Syria. The group focused on targeting civilians for economic gain in central Syria, while targeting regime and Iran-backed forces closer to the Euphrates River to maintain supply lines. The corresponding decrease in ISIS attacks in northeastern Syria is not due to counterterrorism pressure or the group giving lower priority to northeastern Syria, but instead may have been preparation for a major attack targeting detention facilities.

Somalia. The Somali Federal Government (SFG) will begin a major offensive targeting al Shabaab–controlled areas of southern Somalia in the coming months. The SFG will likely be able to contest significant portions of southern Somalia’s Lower Jubba region during the offensive because it has competent and well-equipped clearing forces. It is highly unlikely that the SFG will penetrate the al Shabaab heartland in the neighboring Middle Jubba region, because of strong al Shabaab resistance. However, the offensive could still weaken al Shabaab and set conditions for future offensives by targeting al Shabaab logistical nodes in Lower Jubba. The SFG will likely struggle to hold newly contested areas in the long term because of a lack of adequate holding forces.

Afghanistan. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) may be shifting its attack pattern to increasingly target civilians associated with the Taliban government. The Taliban may respond to increased ISKP attacks targeting civilians by carrying out more aggressive counter-ISKP operations in suspected ISKP support areas. These Taliban counter-ISKP operations will likely cause significant civilian casualties. In the most dangerous scenario, this could foment further instability in Afghanistan and increase support for ISKP.

India. ISKP may be unable to replace its leader for India operations, Ejaz Ahangar, for several months. The Afghan Taliban killed the leader in Kabul, Afghanistan, on February 14. ISKP claimed two attacks in India in 2022 on March 4, possibly to highlight its capabilities and offset the effects of Ahangar’s death on the group’s recruitment from India. ISKP is likely overstating its role in these attacks to benefit its India recruitment.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 9, 2023

Russian forces conducted the largest missile strike across Ukraine of 2023 so far on March 9, but the attack likely only served Russian state propaganda objectives. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces targeted Ukrainian critical infrastructure with 84 different missiles including 28 Kh-101/Kh-555 and 20 Kalibr cruise missiles, six Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, six Kh-47 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, two Kh-31P supersonic anti-ship missiles, six Kh-59 guided missiles, and at least 13 S-300 air-defense missiles. Russian forces also attacked Ukraine with eight Iranian-made Shahed–136 drones, which Ukrainian officials noted likely sought to distract Ukrainian air defense systems before the missile strikes. Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down 34 of the 48 Kalibr and Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles and four Shahed-136 drones. Ukrainian officials also noted that all eight of the Kh-31P and Kh-59 missiles did not reach their intended targets. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat noted that Ukrainian forces did not have the capacity to shoot down some of the Russian missiles—likely referring to Kinzhal and S-300 missiles. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted “high precision long range air, sea, and land-based missile strikes” targeting Ukrainian military infrastructure, military-industrial complexes, and energy infrastructure supporting the Ukrainian military as retaliation for the alleged incursion into Bryansk Oblast on March 2.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 8, 2023

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced on March 8 that Russian forces captured all of eastern Bakhmut, a claim consistent with available visual evidence. ISW assessed on March 7 that Ukrainian forces completed a controlled withdrawal from eastern Bakhmut across the Bakhmutka River. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control between 45 to 52 percent of Bakhmut as of March 7. This figure is reasonable; ISW assesses that Russian forces now occupy at least 50 percent of Bakhmut as of March 8. Russian forces will likely intensify attacks in northwestern and southwestern Bakhmut (north from Opytne and south from Yahidne, respectively) to circumnavigate the Bakhmutka River.