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Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, February 8, 2023

February 9, 2023 - ISW Press

Yemen. Escalating competition within the Yemeni government will reduce counterterrorism pressure on al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen and allow the group to increase its influence in the country’s south. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) support different groups with divergent political objectives in Yemen, and recent Saudi efforts to arm a Yemeni ally may increase discord and infighting within the Yemeni government. This infighting will in turn draw Yemeni security forces away from managing the Salafi-jihadi threat in southern Yemen.

Somalia. A decrease in al Shabaab bombings in central Somalia likely indicates a lull rather than the end of the group’s counteroffensive against the Somali government. Somali forces initiated an offensive to recapture al Shabaab–controlled areas in central Somalia’s Galgudud and Hirshabelle regions in January 2023. Al Shabaab surged explosive attacks in January and early February 2023 in response. The group tends to launch explosive attacks in clusters, so the current decline in attacks may indicate preparations for a larger counterattack.

Mali. Al Qaeda’s Sahel branch is taking advantage of the lack of counterterrorism pressure and state presence in northern Mali to position itself as the primary power broker in the area, including striking agreements with local groups that previously collaborated with French counterterrorism forces. Militants are simultaneously pressuring Mali’s junta with increased attacks in southern Mali. Meanwhile, Mali’s relationships with its foreign partners continue to deteriorate. The junta’s pressure on the United Nations mission in Mali will likely push major contingents to withdraw in the near term, worsening the security vacuum that Salafi-jihadi militants will fill in the country’s north.

Afghanistan. The Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISKP) is isolating the Taliban government by targeting its diplomatic relations. This campaign has included both online propaganda and attacks on diplomatic facilities and foreign citizens in Kabul. ISKP attacks delegitimize the Taliban by targeting areas of Kabul that are meant to be highly secure, and the likely presence of ISKP informants in the Taliban government hinders an effective response. Internal tensions in the Taliban government will increase as its isolation and resourcing challenge grows.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 8, 2023

February 8, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian forces have regained the initiative in Ukraine and have begun their next major offensive in Luhansk Oblast. The pace of Russian operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line in western Luhansk Oblast has increased markedly over the past week, and Russian sources are widely reporting that conventional Russian troops are attacking Ukrainian defensive lines and making marginal advances along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border, particularly northwest of Svatove near Kupyansk and west of Kreminna. Geolocated combat footage has confirmed Russian gains in the Dvorichne area northwest of Svatove. Russian military command additionally appears to have fully committed elements of several conventional divisions to decisive offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line, as ISW previously reported. Elements of several regiments of the 144th and 3rd Motor Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) and a regiment of the 90th Tank Division (Central Military District), supported by elements of the 76th Airborne Division and unspecified Southern Military District elements, are conducting offensive operations along the entire Svatove-Kreminna line and are reportedly advancing against Ukrainian defenses.

Iran Update, February 8, 2023

February 8, 2023 - ISW Press

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Aleppo City, Syria on February 8. Iranian state media reported on Ghaani’s visit and published a video of him overseeing humanitarian operations in response to the February 6 earthquake that has devastated southern Turkey and northwest Syria. A pro-regime social media account also posted images of Ghaani meeting with an unspecified Iranian field commander.

Iran Update, February 7, 2023

February 7, 2023 - ISW Press

Multiple Iranian political factions, including hardliners, are coalescing around the assessment that the regime has lost touch with its people. Former moderate President Hassan Rouhani continued to frame the deepening divides between Iranian leadership and its population as an urgent threat and suggested that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has failed to sufficiently address such divides on February 7. Rouhani described Khamenei’s efforts to grant amnesty to and commute the sentences of “tens of thousands” of prisoners and arrested protesters as “a starting point.” Rouhani called on the regime to pursue policies aimed at addressing protester grievances, including reviving the Joint Comprehensive Joint of Action and easing ongoing internet restrictions. Rouhani also stated that actions that damage “human dignity. . . go against national security and public interests,” inverting the regime’s narrative that anti-regime dissidents and critics threaten Iranian internal security. Rouhani previously criticized the regime for marginalizing moderate and reformist actors in the Iranian political sphere in an interview on February 1, as CTP previously reported.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 7, 2023

February 7, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu held a press conference on the status of the war on February 7, likely in an attempt to posture the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as an effective and involved leadership apparatus as the Russian military prepares for a renewed major offensive in Ukraine. Shoigu claimed that Russian forces are successfully developing operations near Bakhmut and Vuhledar and claimed that Russian troops have recently taken control of Soledar, Klishchiivka, Pidhorodne, Krasnopolivka, Blahodatne, and Mykolaivka in the Bakhmut area and Lobkove in Zaporizhia Oblast. Shoigu likely held this press conference in order to create the guise of formality and legitimacy for the Russian MoD as it continues efforts to reform the Russian military, prepare for a renewed offensive, and set conditions for prolonged operations in Ukraine. ISW has previously noted that Russian officials are preparing for an imminent Russian offensive in Ukraine in the coming months, and that these preparations are also happening on the strategic level with Russian command structures.

Iran Update, February 6, 2023

February 6, 2023 - ISW Press

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has taken several public-facing measures in recent days likely to alleviate public frustrations toward the regime. Khamenei met with a group of schoolgirls on February 3, during which he celebrated the role of women of Iranian history and society. Iranian state-run media widely promoted images from the event, showcasing a particularly ham-fisted regime propaganda effort. Khamenei was likely responding in part to the public criticisms of the regime mistreatment of women during the Mahsa Amini protests. Khamenei separately granted amnesty to and commuted the sentences of “tens of thousands” of protesters on January 6. The regime will require eligible detainees to “express remorse,” essentially pleading guilty, according to some reports. It is unclear on what charges and legal grounds the regime had detained these protesters to this point. The Iranian constitution requires that law enforcement agencies submit to judicial authorities an explanation of the charges for each individual no more than 24 hours after their arrest, but it is unclear whether the regime has followed such standards in its detention of thousands of protesters.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 6, 2023

February 6, 2023 - ISW Press

Ukrainian officials assess that Russian forces are preparing to launch a large-scale decisive offensive in eastern Ukraine in mid-to-late February. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov stated on February 5 that the Ukrainian military is expecting Russia to start its decisive offensive around February 24 to symbolically tie the attack to the first anniversary of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Reznikov also clarified that the Ukrainian military has not observed the formation of Russian offensive groups in the Kharkiv and Chernihiv directions or Belarus; Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk noted that Russian forces are likely concentrating on launching offensive operations in the east rather than in southern Ukraine. An unnamed advisor to the Ukrainian military told Financial Times that Russia intends to launch an offensive in the next 10 days (by February 15), a timeline that would allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian positions before the arrival of Western tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are continuing to deploy reserves to Luhansk Oblast to strike after February 15.

Russian Offensive Campaign Update, February 5, 2023

February 5, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decisions regarding Ukraine since his initial flawed invasion on February 24, 2022, indicate a likely disconnect between his maximalist objectives and his willingness to take the likely high-risk decisions necessary to achieve them. Putin likely operated under the flawed assumption that Russian forces could force Kyiv to capitulate without any significant military sacrifices and saw Russia’s invasion as a limited and acceptable risk. Captured Russian military plans, for example, revealed that the Kremlin expected Russian forces to capture Kyiv in days, Russian intelligence services reportedly expected the Ukrainian military to collapse, and Kremlin propagandists preemptively published a prewritten article extolling Russia’s “victory” on February 26, 2022. Reports that Putin dismissed the Russian Central Bank’s prescient warnings in February 2022 of the effect of a war in Ukraine on the future of the Russian economy under harsh Western sanctions likely suggest Putin wrongfully assumed the West would not impose major costs on his invasion. The failure of Russian forces in the Battle of Kyiv—and with it the Kremlin’s war plan—forced Putin to face complex decisions as the Kremlin fought an increasingly costly and protracted conventional war. Putin, however, has remained reluctant to order the difficult changes to the Russian military and society that are likely necessary to salvage his war.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 4, 2023

February 4, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian decisive offensive operations are unlikely to target Zaporizhia City from the western Donetsk–Zaporizhia frontline as the Russian military continues to prepare for an offensive in western Luhansk Oblast. Advisor to the exiled Ukrainian mayor of Mariupol, Petro Andryushenko, stated that Russian soldiers in Mariupol are telling residents that the Russian military ordered offensive operations against Vuhledar, areas southwest of Bakhmut, Zaporizhia City and Zaporizhia Oblast. Andryushenko added that Russia is also building up forces at barracks and settlements on roads leading to frontline positions, and that Russia had brought an extra 10,000–15,000 troops to Mariupol and its outskirts. Andryushenko noted the Russian forces reportedly have 30,000 troops in the greater Mariupol area. ISW continues to assess that Russia is concentrating troops and military equipment to stage a decisive offensive on the western Luhansk Oblast and Bakhmut areas.

Iran Crisis Update, February 3, 2023

February 3, 2023 - ISW Press

The Iranian regime is in a steady pattern of escalation with prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid, which risks stoking sectarian tensions in Iran. Abdol Hamid is an outspoken regime critic who has used his Friday sermons in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province to inspire weekly demonstrations criticizing regime mistreatment of Iranian Baloch and mistreatment of protesters. Abdol Hamid began facilitating these demonstrations initially in response to the Bloody Friday event in Zahedan on September 30, in which security forces attacked protesters and killed around 100 individuals. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei responded by trying to organize an effort to discredit Abdol Hamid, according to a leaked Fars News Agency bulletin, and dispatching a personal delegation to meet with him in November 2022. Both efforts failed to silence Abdol Hamid and his supporters.

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