Publications

Iran Update, March 16, 2024

March 16, 2024 - ISW Press

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved plans on March 15 for a military operation into Rafah. The Prime Minister’s Office did not provide additional details. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters that the Biden administration has not seen the plan and the Biden administration does not know how Israel plans to protect civilians in Rafah. The IDF said on March 13 that it plans to move civilians from Rafah to “humanitarian enclaves” in the central Gaza Strip before any Israeli offensive into Rafah. There are approximately 1.4 million displaced Palestinian civilians currently in Rafah.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 16, 2024

March 16, 2024 - ISW Press

The Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU) reportedly conducted a series of successful drone strikes against three Russian oil refineries in Samara Oblast on March 16. Sources in Ukrainian special services told Ukrainian outlet RBK-Ukraine that the SBU struck the Novokuibyshevsky, Kuibyshevsky, and Syzran Rosneft oil refineries in Samara Oblast. RBK-Ukraine reported that the three refineries process an estimated 25 million tons of oil per year, or 10 percent of Russia’s annual oil refinement output. Geolocated footage published on March 16 shows a fire at the Syzran oil refinery following the drone strikes, and Samara Oblast Governor Dmytro Azarov stated that there was also a fire at the refinery in Novokuibyshevsky.

Iran Update, March 15, 2024

March 15, 2024 - ISW Press

Unspecified Iranian officials said that Iran could “intensify its proxy war” against Israel if Israel attacks Lebanese Hezbollah, which is consistent with Iran's decades-old use of its proxies.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 15, 2024

March 15, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian forces will likely continue ongoing offensive efforts to destabilize Ukrainian defensive lines in Spring 2024 while also preparing for a forecasted new offensive effort in Summer 2024. The provision of Western security assistance will likely play a critical role in Ukraine’s ability to hold territory now and to repel a new Russian offensive effort in the coming months.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 15, 2024

March 15, 2024 - ISW Press

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that it redefined its criteria for a “first strike” against PRC military assets, which now include a “first move” by PLA aircraft and vessels across Taiwan’s territorial boundaries. ROC Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng told Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan that Taiwan reserves the right to take military countermeasures if enemy military planes or ships enter Taiwan’s territorial waters or airspace and Taiwan fails to expel them by interception, identification, and warning. He did not clarify if the “first strike” concept applies to Taiwan’s outlying islands. Chiu said the MND’s definition of an enemy “first strike” before the policy change specifically referred to enemy artillery or missile fire at Taiwan. The reason for changing the definition was to counter the PRC’s “gray zone” operations around Taiwan. The CCP has not publicly commented on the policy change as of March 13.

Iran Update, March 14, 2024

March 14, 2024 - ISW Press

Hamas reportedly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City on March 13 likely as part of Hamas’ effort to reassert its authority in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas targeted the head and other members of the armed Dughmush clan amid local accusations that the clan stole humanitarian aid and cooperated with Israel. The clan responded to the killing by vowing to retaliate and declaring Hamas members and positions as “legitimate target[s].”[3] Hamas denied reports that its forces killed the clan members.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 14, 2024

March 14, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev posted a detailed call for the total elimination of the Ukrainian state and its absorption into the Russian Federation under what he euphemistically called a “peace formula.” Medvedev’s demands are not novel but rather represent the Kremlin’s actual intentions for Ukraine — intentions that leave no room for negotiations for purposes other than setting the precise terms of Ukraine’s complete capitulation.

Foreign Fighters and Jihadi Rivalry in the Sahel; Somalia Backslides

March 14, 2024 - ISW Press

ISSP has expanded its areas of control and established itself as a hub for foreign fighters from North Africa and Europe since early 2023, which increases the group’s transnational threat risk. ISSP began resurging in the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger after the withdrawal of French forces in 2021. The UN observed that the territory under ISSP control doubled between 2022 and the first half of 2023, including swaths of northeastern Mali that its al Qaeda–linked rivals and communal militias previously controlled.

Iran Update, March 13, 2024

March 13, 2024 - ISW Press

Israeli media reported on March 13 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Navy fired at two suspected Palestinian fighters in scuba gear approaching the border between the northern Gaza Strip and Israel. CTP-ISW has not recorded Palestinian fighters attempting to infiltrate into Israel from the Gaza Strip since early November 2023.[2] An IDF Navy helicopter destroyed an unspecified Palestinian vessel near Gaza City on March 11.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 13, 2024

March 13, 2024 - ISW Press

Ukrainian shortages of ammunition and other war materiel resulting from delays in the provision of US military assistance may be making the current Ukrainian front line more fragile than the relatively slow Russian advances in various sectors would indicate. Ukrainian prioritization of the sectors most threatened by intensive Russian offensive operations could create vulnerabilities elsewhere that Russian forces may be able to exploit to make sudden and surprising advances if Ukrainian supplies continue to dwindle. Russia’s retention of the theater-wide initiative increases the risks of such developments by letting the Russian military command choose to increase or decrease operations anywhere along the line almost at will.

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