Publications

Interactive Map and Assessment: Verified Ukrainian Partisan Attacks against Russian Occupation Forces

November 1, 2022 - ISW Press

Effective Ukrainian partisan attacks are forcing the Kremlin to divert resources away from frontline operations to help secure rear areas, degrading Russia’s ability to defend against ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensives, let alone conduct their own offensive operations. Poor Russian operational security has enabled Ukrainian partisan attacks. Russia’s increasing manpower shortages are likely degrading Russian forces’ ability to effectively secure Russian rear areas against partisan attacks and simultaneously defend against Ukrainian counteroffensives. The Kremlin still has not effectively countered Ukraine’s organized partisan movement and is unlikely to have the capabilities to do so.

Indicators and Thresholds for Russian Military Operations in Ukraine and/or Belarus

November 24, 2021 - ISW Press

UPDATED January 21, 8:00pm
Russia is setting conditions to conduct military operations against Ukraine and/or in Belarus in the coming weeks or months. The Russian Federation has positioned military forces around Ukraine’s border and near the border with Belarus able to initiate offensive operations on very short notice with very little warning. Russian officials and media outlets have been setting conditions in the information space to support such operations. This document is not intended as a forecast or an assessment of the likelihood of any such Russian activities, all of which are also consistent with Russian non-military lines of effort against Ukraine, Belarus, the US, and NATO.

If the West Cuts Aid to Ukraine, Russia Will Win. If the West Leans in, Ukraine Can Win.

November 15, 2023 - ISW Press

The positional war in Ukraine is not a stable stalemate. It is not the result of fundamental realities in modern warfare that can only be changed with a technological or tactical revolution, as was the First World War’s stalemate. Neither does it rest on a permanent parity in military capacity between Russia and Ukraine that will continue indefinitely regardless of Western support to Kyiv. It results, on the contrary, from self-imposed limitations on the technologies the West has been willing to provide Ukraine and constraints on the Russian defense industrial base largely stemming from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unwillingness so far to commit Russia fully to this war. The current balance is thus, in fact, highly unstable, and could readily be tipped in either direction by decisions made in the West.

How the Ukraine Counteroffensive Can Still Succeed

August 3, 2023 - ISW Press

The situation in Ukraine still favors Kyiv despite the limited progress made in the counteroffensive so far. Ukrainian forces attempted a limited mechanized penetration of prepared Russian defenses in the south in early to mid-June, but failed to break through the Russian lines. They then switched to slower and more careful operations while disrupting Russian rear areas with long-range precision strikes. Ukraine began the next, reportedly main, phase of its counteroffensive on July 26 with a determined drive to penetrate Russian lines in western Zaporizhia Oblast. It’s far too soon to evaluate the outcome of that effort, which is underway as of the time of this writing, but it is vital to manage expectations. Ukrainian forces are fighting now to break through the first line of long-prepared Russian defenses. Several lines lie behind it, stretching for many miles. Ukrainian progress will very likely alternate periods of notable tactical advances with periods, possibly long periods, of pause and some setbacks. Much as we might hope that the road to the Sea of Azov will simply open for Ukrainian forces the odds are high that fighting will remain hard, casualties high, and frustration will be a constant companion. All of which is normal in war.

How Russia controls American policy

February 12, 2016 - Kimberly Kagan

We’ve seen this movie—now playing in Syria-- before. The Russians have developed a way of getting the U.S. formally to permit offensive Russian military operations against American partners on the ground, all the while calling it a ceasefire.

Far-Right Riot at Ukraine’s Parliament

September 1, 2015 - Hugo Spaulding

Far-right groups launched a violent riot on August 31 outside Ukraine’s parliament during its review of controversial constitutional amendments that would acknowledge the special status of separatist-held southeastern Ukraine. The riots demonstrate the growing challenge to stability that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko faces from the far-right, a threat that could present new vulnerabilities that the Kremlin may exploit.

Fact Sheet: US Assistance to Ukraine

February 8, 2024 - ISW Press

US aid to Ukraine does not lack oversight nor has corruption in Ukraine diverted it.

America’s NATO and Asian allies and other European states have committed more money to support Ukraine than the United States.

Ukraine is not a “forever war” for the United States because Americans are not fighting this war.

Sending military aid to Ukraine increases America’s military readiness and reduces the risk that the United States will have to fight Russia itself.

The United States is not sending Ukraine a “blank check.”

Fact Sheet: The Kremlin's Occupation Playbook: Coerced Russification and Ethnic Cleansing in Occupied Ukraine

February 20, 2024 - ISW Press

Russia’s war in Ukraine is a war for people, not just land. The lives, freedom, and identities of nearly five million Ukrainians currently under Russian occupation and the nearly five million more whom the Kremlin has illegally deported to Russia, as well as the millions who have fled their homeland to other parts of Ukraine or abroad are at stake.

Explainer on Russian Conscription, Reserve, and Mobilization

March 5, 2022 - ISW Press

The Russian military is a hybrid format combining a traditional cadre-and-reserve conscript system and a contract-professional system. While the Russian Army has made efforts to professionalize its ranks, particularly in the last 15 years, it remains reliant on conscripts, both for its active-duty force and for its reserve forces in the event of general mobilization. Most combat units must be filled out by conscripts or mobilized reservists in order to be combat-capable. Contract soldiers are concentrated in the cadre and elite units, especially the airborne units.

Erdogan Seeks to Upend Kremlin-Backed Status Quo in Nagorno-Karabakh

October 12, 2020 - ISW Press

Turkey and Azerbaijan may have jointly planned the Azerbaijani offensive to contest Armenia’s control of Nagorno-Karabakh that reignited that simmering conflict. Tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed, Armenian-held region of Nagorno-Karabakh escalated into conventional combat on September 27. International media coverage has largely portrayed the ongoing conflict as the result of a spontaneous escalation. But Turkish-Azerbaijani military cooperation, drone sales, and force mobilization indicate Azerbaijan prepared – with Turkish support - to dispute Armenia’s presence in Nagorno-Karabakh prior to September 27.

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