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Iran Update

Iran Update, December 10, 2025

December 10, 2025

Iran Update, December 10, 2025

Toplines

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the Saudi-backed elements of the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) are each attempting to frame their respective coalitions as the most viable leaders for Yemeni efforts to counter the Houthi movement.[1] The STC is attempting to present itself as the sole organized and effective force that can fight against the Houthis while it simultaneously attempts to undermine and diminish the strength of Saudi-backed groups. STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous al Zubaidi characterized the STC’s recent seizure of key areas in Mahra and Hadramawt governorates as “a starting point for [a] serious battle” to eliminate Houthi control over northern areas of Yemen during a meeting with the ROYG’s Bayda governor in Aden on December 10.[2] The Houthis still control the majority of territory within Bayda Governorate, but the ROYG retains its own “governors-in-exile“ for northern Houthi-controlled governorates.[3] Zubaidi’s efforts to approach officials like the Bayda governor may be part of an effort to consolidate his and the STC’s legitimacy and forge unity among anti-Houthi players within these strategic governorates. Zubaidi added that the anti-Houthi coalition cannot counter the Houthis with ”a vulnerable rear” in eastern Yemen due to Houthi smuggling routes in these areas.[4] This statement about smuggling routes is both a justification for the STC seizure of eastern Yemen as well as an effort to delegitimize the ROYG forces previously controlling eastern Yemen by framing them as inept and unable to successfully prevent the Houthis from acquiring weapons and equipment. Smuggling across eastern Yemen is endemic, and the STC will have significant difficulty stopping smuggling if it tries to do so.[5] STC-affiliated media on December 10 called Zubaidi ”the right leader of this stage” and justified the STC‘s offensive in eastern Yemen as “necessary“ to save the people of eastern Yemen from ”further horrors.”[6]

Saudi-backed PLC leaders and non-UAE-backed actors continue to maintain that they are the rightful leaders of the ROYG and have continued to call for the withdrawal of STC forces from Mahra and Hadramawt governorates. Saudi-supported Yemeni President and PLC President Rashad al Alimi called on PLC members to meet in Riyadh “soon” to discuss eastern Yemen, according to a senior PLC official on December 10.[7]  The PLC official said that Alimi is also reportedly taking “all necessary measures to preserve unity” and to reject “unilateral actions” outside the agreed-upon PLC leadership framework.[8]

Saudi Arabia almost certainly backs Alimi’s summons in order to re-impose unity on Yemen’s disparate anti-Houthi factions. Yemeni actors will presumably view it as a summons from Saudi Arabia, given their past experiences with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia frequently uses the legitimacy of its Yemeni partners to provide a Yemeni veneer to Saudi political maneuvers. Saudi Arabia similarly gathered Yemeni factions in Riyadh in 2022 before using their presence to orchestrate the ouster of former Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and his replacement with Alimi.[9] Saudi Arabia could use the summons to reprimand the STC and attempt to compel it to de-escalate with Alimi and northern Yemeni factions within the ROYG.

Saudi Arabia is simultaneously engaging its partners located in Yemen. A Saudi delegation travelled to Mukalla City, Hadramawt Governorate, and met with local officials and Hadramawt Governor Salem al Khanbashi on December 9.[10] Delegation lead Major General Mohammed al Qahtani called on the STC to withdraw and for the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces to assume responsibility for security in Mahra and Hadramawt governorates.[11] Qahtani later told Yemeni media that the Saudi delegation‘s visit resulted in an agreement with all parties in Hadramawt, including the STC, on ”measures” to support de-escalation and stability.[12]  Another PLC member who has criticized the STC’s recent actions, Marib Governor Sultan al Arada, held two meetings with senior ROYG security and administrative officials in Marib City on December 9 and 10.[13] Arada is a key Yemeni government loyalist and anti-Houthi military and political leader who has defended Marib against successive Houthi attacks by uniting the governorate‘s various communities against the Houthis.[14]

The STC is also attempting to consolidate local control in Hadramawt Governorate amid Saudi and Saudi-backed groups’ efforts to force STC forces to withdraw from the area. STC Barshid Brigade Commander Abdul Daim al Shuaibi, who is currently based in Wadi Hadramawt, stated on December 10 that STC forces will not withdraw from Hadramawt Governorate after Qahtani’s remarks inspired speculation that the STC may withdraw.[15] Shuaibi even claimed that STC forces will advance to ”Zamakh, Manwakh, al Dhuwaibi, and all border regions,” which border Saudi Arabia and the Houthi-controlled territory in northeastern Yemen, to ”fulfill their national duty.”[16] The newly appointed Hadramawt Tribal Alliance head, Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed al Kathiri, who is also a member of the STC, separately asserted on December 10 that ”the people of Hadramawt” will now control the governorate’s security during a meeting with local tribal leaders.[17] The people of Hadramawt, coming from an STC official, is code for pro-South local leaders. Self-rule has been a long-held demand of some Hadrami tribal leaders, who have criticized both the Aden-based ROYG and Sanaa-based Houthis.[18] Other local Hadrami leaders have criticized the STC, and ROYG will almost certainly attempt to politically mobilize these leaders against the STC takeover. Kathiri proposed that all relevant Hadrami parties hold a dialogue to create a “roadmap” that guarantees consensus and unifies Hadrami actors.[19] STC National Assembly head and STC Presidency member Ali Abdullah al Kathiri also called for the Hadrami elite to align with STC forces at the meeting.[20] Khalid al Kathiri requested that the Saudi- and UAE-led contingents of the anti-Houthi coalition “adhere to the principles of local leadership.”[21] Another prominent STC leader, Fadi Hassan Baoum, separately discussed improving local services with Hadramawt Governorate’s representatives for the Yemen Gas Company and the tax office on December 10.[22] Baoum’s meetings indicate that the STC is attempting to assume control over administrative services within the governorate.

Key Takeaways

Iran

Iran is seeking to develop and acquire electronic warfare (EW) systems, probably to attempt to remedy deficiencies that Israel exploited during the June 2025 war. The Iranian Defense Ministry unveiled the new “Sayyad-4” EW system on December 10 that can reportedly disrupt enemy positioning and navigation capabilities, according to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated media.[23] This description suggests that this system is a GPS jamming system that can disrupt enemy precision targeting and target identification. Iran‘s unveiling of the Sayyad-4 system reflects continued Iranian investment in reconstituting its integrated air defense systems (IADS) in the wake of the Israel-Iran War. Iran has previously relied on Russia for EW systems such as the Krasukha-4, which were built to neutralize low earth orbit (LEO) spy satellites, ground-based radars, airborne surveillance radars, and radar-guided ordinance at ranges between 150 to 300 kilometers.[24] Israel possesses systems that can circumvent or suppress EW systems like the Krasukha.[25]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

An Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) official stated on December 8 that the Syrian transitional government has stopped importing oil from Kurdish-controlled fields.[26] The SDF began to supply oil from fields under their control in northeastern provinces to the Syrian government in February 2025.[27] It is unclear why the Syrian government stopped its oil imports from the northeast. The Syrian government’s decision may have been based on the government’s success in acquiring oil from other partners, including Saudi Arabia’s delivery of 1.65 million barrels of oil to Syria in November 2025.[28] The SDF was previously supplying Damascus with 5,000 barrels of oil per day, or roughly 150,000 barrels per month, since February.[29] The government’s suspension of oil imports is also a possible indicator that the Syrian government expects the SDF to imminently transfer the oil fields and their revenues to the Syrian government as part of an integration agreement. Both the Syrian and Turkish governments have maintained that the SDF must integrate into the Syrian state, which includes transferring control of all oil fields, by the end of the year.[30]

Arabian Peninsula

See the topline section.

Palestinian Territories & Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

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[1] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/understanding-military-units-in-southern-yemen

[2] https://www.4may dot net/news/152893

[3] https://www.mei.edu/publications/riyadh-agreement-yemens-new-cabinet-and-what-remains-be-done

[4] https://www.4may dot net/news/152893

[5] https://www.sabanew dot net/story/ar/126709; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1912247025283772843

[6] https://www.4may dot net/news/152897

[7] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84

[8] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84

[9] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-pushed-yemens-elected-president-to-step-aside-saudi-and-yemeni-officials-say-11650224802

[10] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1998367646442738113?s=20; https://www.alhadath dot net/yemen/2025/12/10/الوفد-السعودي-بحضرموت-المملكة-والامارات-تسعيان-لاحلال-السلام

[11] https://www.alhadath dot net/yemen/2025/12/10/الوفد-السعودي-بحضرموت-المملكة-والامارات-تسعيان-لاحلال-السلام; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/5217994-تأكيد-سعودي-على-ضرورة-إنهاء-التوتر-وفرض-الاستقرار-شرق-اليمن

[12] https://english.aawsat dot com/gulf/5218131-saudi-arabia-presses-easing-tensions-restoring-stability-east-yemen

[13] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1998801634068201669?s=20; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1998449924074254672?s=20

[14] https://www.yemenmonitor dot com/en/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/157810 ; https://www.arabnews dot com/node/1850766/middle-east ; https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11778 ;

[15] https://www.4may dot net/news/152919

[16] https://www.4may dot net/news/152919

[17] https://www.4may dot net/news/152890; https://aden-alhadath dot info/posts/130751

[18] https://en.barran dot press/news/6510; https://south24 dot net/news/newse.php?nid=4451

[19] https://www.4may dot net/news/152890

[20] https://www.4may dot net/news/152890

[21] https://www.4may dot net/news/152890

[22] https://smanews dot org/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a8%d9%8a/439639/; https://smanews dot org/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a8-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a8%d9%8a/439615/)

[23] https://farsnews dot ir/mohammadreza_dehghan/1765377860350615071

[24] https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/f039dd3d04fa0226088d1257319579a7

[25] https://defence-industry.eu/israeli-solutions-against-the-most-advanced-electronic-warfare-systems/

[26] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/12/year-after-assads-fall-divisions-grow-between-syria-kurds-damascus

[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-24-2025/; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-northeast-begins-supplying-oil-damascus-oil-ministry-says-2025-02-22/

[28] https://apnews.com/article/syria-saudi-crude-oil-d923ae1c8488ccdd7b2f921d60a788ce; https://www.arabnews dot com/node/2622974/saudi-arabia; https://www.aa dot com.tr/ar/الدول-العربية/سوريا-تتسلم-الدفعة-الثانية-من-منحة-النفط-السعودية/3752075

[29] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-northeast-begins-supplying-oil-damascus-oil-ministry-says-2025-02-22; https://shafaq dot com/en/Middle -East/SDF-revives-crude-gas-transfers-to-Damascus

[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/sectarian-violence-risks-dividing-syria-despite-sharaas-diplomacy-2025-09-15    

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