Key Takeaways
- Threat of Baloch Militant Groups to Iranian Regime Security: The newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front, which is a coalition of Baloch organizations, released a video on December 11 in which it called on Iranians to engage in protest activities against the Iranian regime.
- ISIS Activity in Syria: Syrian security forces detained a cell of Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) fighters in northern Idlib Province that has conducted at least three attacks targeting Syrian government forces along the M5 highway since November 28. This cell may have been operating in the southern Aleppo-northern Idlib countryside for some time, but its three most recent attacks are part of an increase in ISIS attacks targeting Syrian government forces since Syria joined the Global Coalition on November 10.
- Hezbollah Reconstitution: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) assessed that Hezbollah has likely not reconstituted its military capabilities and weapons stockpiles to the point that the group could conduct a large-scale attack on Israel at this time. The IDF did not specify whether its assessment only evaluated Hezbollah’s ability to conduct a large-scale attack against Israel from southern Lebanon or from any part of Lebanon.
Iran
The newly established Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF), which is a coalition of Baloch organizations, released a video on December 11 in which it called on Iranians to engage in protest activities against the Iranian regime.[1] Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi organization that operates in southeastern Iran, and several other Baloch groups established the MPF on December 10.[2] The MPF called on Baloch Muslims and all “freedom-seeking” Iranians to conduct “civil actions,” such as displaying MPF flags, sharing the MPF’s charter, and writing anti-regime slogans in public areas, to demonstrate their solidarity with the organization.[3] The MPF emphasized on December 11 that its flag is not intended to replace the Iranian national flag or the symbols of other Baloch movements.[4] The group added that participants should strictly observe security precautions while engaging in protest activities, including being aware of surveillance and security cameras, using safe routes, and using secure means of communication.[5] The group added that to use a variety of means to confront the regime, including “legitimate defense” and political, media, and diplomatic activities.”[6] This message indicates that the MPF seeks to cultivate legitimacy in Iran through sustained civil mobilization, public symbolism, and coordinated political, media, and messaging efforts.
Iranian oil exports slightly decreased between October and November 2025.[7] Iran exported around 61.3 million barrels of oil in November 2025, averaging around 2.04 million barrels per day (bpd), according to United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), citing Tanker Trackers, similarly reported that Iran exported around 61.8 million barrels in November, averaging around 2.06 million bpd.[8] Iranian oil exports averaged around 2.3 million bpd between the second week of October and the first week of November, in contrast.[9] Iran exported oil to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Malaysia, among other countries, and reportedly offered a 5 to 10 percent discount on the price of its oil in November.
Iraq
Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid announced on December 16 that the Iraqi parliament will hold its first session on December 29.[10] Rashid’s announcement comes after the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court ratified the November 2025 parliamentary election results on December 14, which officially began the constitutionally mandated government formation process.[11] Newly-elected parliamentarians will elect a parliament speaker and two deputies during the parliament’s first session.[12] The Iraqi parliament must then elect a new president within 30 days of the speaker’s election by a simple majority with a two-thirds quorum.[13] The new president will then have 15 days to select the candidate of the largest parliamentary bloc as prime minister designate, who will have 30 days to form a government.[14] The government formation process after the 2021 elections did not follow the constitutionally mandated timeline due to divisions between Iraqi political parties.[15] Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish political parties continue to negotiate over the selection of the next prime minister, parliament speaker, and president.[16]
Syria
Syrian security forces detained a cell of Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) fighters in northern Idlib Province that has conducted at least three attacks targeting Syrian government forces along the M5 highway since November 28.[17] Syrian Interior Ministry forces detained eight members of an ISIS cell in Maarat al Numan, Idlib Province, on December 16.[18] The fighters confessed to participating in the cell’s three recent drive-by shootings along the M5 highway in northern Idlib and southern Aleppo provinces in recent weeks.[19] The cell targeted Syrian government forces or personnel in all of the attacks, killing one 74th Division soldier, two Syrian customs officers, and four Interior Ministry officers.[20] CTP-ISW assessed on December 4 that the group’s attacks along the M5 suggested that an active ISIS cell or cells could continue to target Syrian government forces in this area.[21] Syrian forces seized explosives, silencers, and machine guns from the arrested cell that could have been used in future attacks.[22]
This cell may have been operating in the southern Aleppo-northern Idlib countryside for some time, but its three most recent attacks are part of an increase in ISIS attacks targeting Syrian government forces since Syria joined the Global Coalition on November 10.[23] A BBC Salafi-jihadi expert noted on December 13 that high-profile Islamic State (IS) supporters have encouraged ISIS sympathizers to conduct attacks against the Syrian transitional government “whenever and wherever possible” in the weeks since Syria joined the Global Coalition.[24] ISIS has increased the rate and geographic range of its attacks in government-controlled territory since November 10.[25] The Interior Ministry’s arrest of the ISIS cell in Maaran Numan follows an ISIS-aligned or -affiliated gunman’s attack on US and Syrian forces in Palmyra, Homs, on December 13 that killed two US servicemembers, one civilian interpreter, and one Syrian officer.[26]
Senior Kurdish officials directly involved in negotiations with the Syrian government have perceived a new Turkish approach toward the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its integration into the Syrian state. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi told Kurdish media on December 13 that “neighboring countries” are not “as hostile as before” toward the SDF and that the “SDF’s presence” is no longer an “excuse for war.”[27] Abdi was almost certainly referring to Turkey given that Turkey has used the presence of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) within the SDF to describe the SDF as a terrorist organization and conduct multiple offensives targeting the YPG along the Syrian-Turkish border.[28] The Turkish government has maintained this policy toward the SDF since the fall of the Assad regime and has emphasized that the SDF must integrate into the Syrian state in order for it to not be a threat to Turkish interests.[29] Abdi’s remarks to Kurdish media suggest that he believes that Turkey has softened this policy, particularly given that Abdi has consistently warned about Turkish political and military intervention in Syria throughout the months-long negotiation process between the SDF and Syrian government.[30] Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) Foreign Relations Department Co-Chair Ilham Ahmed also noted on December 6 that Turkey’s peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey have resulted in fewer attacks in northern and eastern Syria.[31] Turkey previously launched frequent airstrikes targeting alleged PKK targets in northern Syria.[32]
Any softening in Turkey’s position toward the SDF is notable given Turkish media’s circulation of threats that Turkey plans to conduct a military operation against the SDF if the SDF does not integrate into the Syrian state by December 31, 2025.[33] Turkish officials have not indicated that Turkey may relax any of its demands regarding the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state. Turkey has consistently demanded that the SDF integrate into the Syrian Army on an “individual basis” and not “as units” and refuses to allow YPG commanders to assume senior positions within the army.[34]
Arabian Peninsula
Nothing significant to report.
Palestinian Territories & Lebanon
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) assessed that Hezbollah has likely not reconstituted its military capabilities and weapons stockpiles to the point that the group could conduct a large-scale attack on Israel at this time. The IDF did not specify whether its assessment only evaluated Hezbollah’s ability to conduct a large-scale attack against Israel from southern Lebanon or from any part of Lebanon. The IDF assessed on December 16 that Hezbollah cannot currently conduct a large-scale attack against Israel because the group possesses only one-fifth of the arms that it had on October 7, 2023.[35] It is unclear what weaponry is included in this assessment and to what degree Hezbollah has rearmed given that Israeli intelligence reports have provided varying statistics on the status of Hezbollah’s rearmament.[36] This IDF assessment comes amid Israeli reports that Hezbollah is rapidly reconstituting its weapons stockpiles via smuggling and domestic production.[37]
Hezbollah’s concentrated smuggling and reconstitution efforts in northern Lebanon suggest that Hezbollah does not seek to rebuild its offensive capabilities in southern Lebanon to a level that would trigger an Israeli operation in Lebanon. Israeli officials told Israeli media on December 16 that Hezbollah is concentrating most of its rearmament activity north of the Litani River, including in the Beirut area and the Bekaa Valley, rather than in areas along the Israel-Lebanon border.[38] Syrian forces have interdicted several likely Hezbollah weapons shipments in Syria in recent months, the majority of which were interdicted in locations adjacent to Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley and other Hezbollah strongholds in northern Lebanon.[39] Hezbollah has reportedly moved its heavy weapons and medium-range weapons from southern Lebanon to areas north of the Litani River to avoid “testing” Israeli red lines.[40] Hezbollah also reportedly no longer holds visible permanent positions or outposts in southern Lebanon.[41] The IDF previously assessed in November 2025 that Hezbollah is “several months away” from crossing Israel’s “red line” on Hezbollah’s offensive capabilities.[42] Israeli officials have continued to indicate that any deployment of “high-quality weapons” or detection of Hezbollah activity south of the Litani River would be met with a direct Israeli response.[43]
[1] https://t.me/jmmfront/25 ; SITE Intelligence Group, “Recently Formed MPF Urges Balochs and Other “Freedom-Seeking” Iranians to Hold Lawful Civil Campaign Against Regime” December 16,2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.
[2] https://t.me/jmmfront/10 ; SITE Intelligence Group, “Charter of Jaysh al-Adl-Affiliated MPF Lists Constituent Member Groups, Mentions Goal as “Deep Political Change” in Iran,” December 12, 2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.
[3] https://t.me/jmmfront/25 ; SITE Intelligence Group, “Recently Formed MPF Urges Balochs and Other “Freedom-Seeking” Iranians to Hold Lawful Civil Campaign Against Regime” December 16,2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.
[4] https://t.me/jmmfront/25 ; SITE Intelligence Group, “Recently Formed MPF Urges Balochs and Other “Freedom-Seeking” Iranians to Hold Lawful Civil Campaign Against Regime” December 16,2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.
[5] https://t.me/jmmfront/25 ; SITE Intelligence Group, “Recently Formed MPF Urges Balochs and Other “Freedom-Seeking” Iranians to Hold Lawful Civil Campaign Against Regime” December 16,2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.
[6] https://t.me/jmmfront/25 ; SITE Intelligence Group, “Recently Formed MPF Urges Balochs and Other “Freedom-Seeking” Iranians to Hold Lawful Civil Campaign Against Regime” December 16,2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.
[7] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/november-2025-iran-tanker-tracker; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/12/04/irans-oil-exports-remained-near-peak-in-november/
[8] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/november-2025-iran-tanker-tracker; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/12/04/irans-oil-exports-remained-near-peak-in-november/
[9] https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/1987319645343449519?s=20
[10] https://almadapaper dot net/422119/
[11] https://t.me/IHECOfficail/5459
[12] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B3%D9%87 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7-%D8%B2-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/post-iraqi-election-disunity-among-iranian-backed-parties-could-threaten-their-influence-in-iraq/
[13] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/10/iraq-elections-2025-how-votes-are-won-and-what-results-could-mean-iraqs-fragile-stability; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B3%D9%87
[14] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/10/iraq-elections-2025-how-votes-are-won-and-what-results-could-mean-iraqs-fragile-stability
[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-lawmakers-approve-government-prime-minister-designate-sudani-2022-10-27/
[16] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/ال-طار-التنسيقي-يخفق-بحسم-ر-اسة-الحكومة-ويدعو-لانتخاب-ر-اسة-البرلمان-ولا ; https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/550058/15-يوماً-حاسمة-بعد-مصادقة-الاتحادية-الرئاسات-الثلاث-على-طاولة-التفاوض ; https://almadapaper dot net/421997/
[17] https://t.me/syrianmoi/27678
[18] https://t.me/syrianmoi/27678
[19] https://t.me/syrianmoi/27678
[20] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1995539255850885502; https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1995579112971206710; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1996316459845206496?s=20; https://www.enabbaladi dot net/788271/تنظيم-الدولة-يتبنى-استهداف-عناصر-أمن/
[21] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-4-2025
[22] https://t.me/syrianmoi/27678
[23] https://t.me/syrianmoi/27669;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/2000499118062600479;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1996328589193556126?s=20;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1994490522174722169;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1994015039162888307;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1994355022700667310;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1998328593244459469;
https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1997994485670662260
[24] https://x.com/Minalami/status/1999912368185160158
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-15-2025/
[26] https://t.me/SyPresidency/1954; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/syrian-who-killed-u-s-soldiers-was-security-force-member-officials-say-6c964c71?msockid=31724c4845486561027c583141486b0b
[27] https://npasyria dot com/228617
[28] https://www.mfa dot gov.tr/pkk.tr.mfa ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/2-syrian-army-soldiers-killed-in-sdf-attack-in-northeast/3748960 ; https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/politika/disisleri-bakani-fidan-turkiye-bekasina-yonelik-tum-tehditleri-kaynaginda-yok-etme-gucune-ve-kararliligina-sahiptir/3446537
[29] https://serbestiyet dot com/featured/sdg-10-mart-anlasmasina-uysun-turkiye-icin-teror-orgutu-olmaktan-cikar-225277; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-fears-military-buildup-by-turkey-signals-preparations-for-incursion-into-syria-1c2e88e9 ;
[30] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/21/drones-are-above-our-heads-kurdish-led-sdf-fights-for-survival-in-syria; https://medyanews dot net/mazloum-abdi-discusses-turkeys-aggression-us-policy-and-syrias-future-with-international-delegations; https://t.me/sohebb1993/21593; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/820456/sdf-commander-mazloum-abdi-rejects-disarmament
[31] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1997394047011377274?s=20
[32] https://www.newarab dot com/news/turkey-strikes-multiple-sdf-sites-across-northeastern-syria; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/830140; https://apnews.com/article/turkey-iraq-syria-pkk-sdf-ypg-airstrikes-infrastructure-0ab4779a09ef9b43128b6ebf9a4b8c65
[33] https://www.turkiyegazetesi dot com.tr/dunya/halk-meydanlarda-ordu-teyakkuzda-suriyede-80-bin-asker-operasyon-icin-hazir-1753948?s=4; https://www.turkiyegazetesi dot com.tr/gundem/suriyede-teror-orgutu-icin-son-25-gun-sdgye-operasyona-biz-de-destek-veririz-1753464?s=1
[34] https://www.aa dot com.tr/tr/gundem/msb-son-bir-haftada-4-pkkli-terorist-daha-teslim-oldu/3769269; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-gaza-administration-police-force-should-come-before-hamas-2025-12-06
[35] https://www.haaretz dot com/middle-east-news/2025-12-15/ty-article/.premium/idf-assesses-hezbollahs-capabilities-as-lebanese-army-struggles-to-seize-remaining-arms/0000019b-2382-dc39-abbb-fff21a590000
[36] https://blogs.timesofisrael dot com/hezbollah-reloaded-israels-darkest-war-looms/
[37] https://13tv dot co.il/item/news/politics/security/xitqh-904833282/?pid=523; https://www.maariv dot co.il/news/military/article-1247693; https://x.com/amiel_y/status/1985722924335317179
[38] https://www.haaretz dot com/middle-east-news/2025-12-15/ty-article/.premium/idf-assesses-hezbollahs-capabilities-as-lebanese-army-struggles-to-seize-remaining-arms/0000019b-2382-dc39-abbb-fff21a590000
[39] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1996199158638686404 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/71192 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1968336127376626145 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1971967810680008733 ; https://t.me/AlekhbariahSY/174888
[40] https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/981170/
[41] https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/981170/
[42] https://www.maariv dot co.il/news/military/article-1248575
[43] https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/981170/
