Toplines

Iran is reportedly prioritizing the rapid restoration of its ballistic missile production capacity over other aims, such as the reconstruction of its nuclear program. This prioritization signals that Iran views the restoration of its missile capabilities as an immediate strategic priority, likely because it is more readily achievable in the short term. A senior Israel Defense Forces (IDF) official told the Israeli Knesset on December 8 that Iran has resumed large-scale production of ballistic missiles.[1] Western diplomats also told Israeli media that Iran’s “top priority” is to restore the ballistic missile project, even if Iran does not appear to be advancing its nuclear program.[2] The diplomats also told Israeli media on December 8 that Iran is using older manufacturing methods to continue producing ballistic missiles.[3] Older manufacturing methods could refer to “trough-type mixers,” which are less efficient than the planetary mixers that Israel destroyed in October 2024, although CTP-ISW is unable to verify the type of mixers that Iran is currently using at the time of this writing.[4] Iran has begun rebuilding the Parchin and Shahroud missile production facilities, which Israel destroyed during the Israel-Iran War, since August 28 and September 5, respectively, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Associated Press.[5] Iranian officials have long considered the ballistic missile program to be a crucial deterrent to Israel and the United States.

The Iranian assumption that Israel will resume the Israel-Iran War in the short term is likely animating the decision to prioritize the Iranian missile program over other defense priorities. Iranian officials have repeatedly publicly stated that they expect the war between Iran and Israel to resume imminently since the war ended in June 2025.[6] Iranian officials continue to say that they view ballistic missiles as a key deterrent to Israeli strikes, despite the ineffectiveness of Iranian ballistic missiles in the Israel-Iran War. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued in October 2025 that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[7] Another former IRGC commander emphasized the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities played in its “success” during the war.[8] Iranian officials are likely calculating that rapidly increasing their ballistic missile stockpile will deter the Israelis from resuming the war despite the missiles’ failures in June 2025. Some Iranian officials appear to want to improve the technical capabilities of these missiles over time, but could calculate that the perceived immediacy of future Israeli strikes requires an expansion of the stockpile of current systems.[9]

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is part of the Yemeni government, said that it intends to establish an independent state in southern Yemen in the near future.[10] The STC is a UAE-backed political organization that controls some military forces in southern Yemen and has had long-standing secessionist aims. The STC launched an offensive in southern Yemen on December 3 to seize key areas of Wadi Hadramawt and confirmed on December 8 that it has successfully extended its presence to all eight governorates in southern Yemen.[11] These eight governorates previously comprised the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which controlled southern Yemen prior to Yemen’s unification in 1990. STC President and Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Aidarous Qassem al Zubaidi told STC leadership on December 9 that southern Yemen is currently at a critical transition period that the STC will manage.[12] He added that the next phase will require building the institutions required for a future independent state in southern Yemen. Anti-Houthi media reported that Zubaidi is expected to declare the south an independent state.[13] Hundreds of individuals continued to participate in likely STC-orchestrated demonstrations in southern Yemen for a third day on December 9, calling for the secession of southern Yemen.[14]

Saudi forces have continued to withdraw from positions in southern Yemen, including some positions near Houthi frontlines. Unspecified military sources told a Yemeni media outlet on December 8 that the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces (NSF) is preparing to withdraw from its positions in al Mudharabah and Ras al Arah districts in Lahij Governorate, which is near the Houthi frontlines.[15] A Yemen analyst reported that Saudi-backed forces withdrew from some positions in Aden and Lahij governorates to positions in Marib Governorate.[16] Marib is controlled by PLC Vice President and Marib Governor Sultan al Arada, who is a key Yemeni government loyalist and anti-Houthi military and political leader who has defended Marib against successive Houthi attacks by uniting the governorate‘s various communities against the Houthis.[17] The Yemen analyst added that Saudi forces have very likely also withdrawn from some positions in Mahra Governorate, including al Ghaydah Airport.[18] The STC will likely backfill these positions in Lahij, Aden, and Mahra governorates because they are located in southern Yemen, where the STC seeks to establish an independent state.

Saudi Arabia and several major Yemeni groups and organizations not backed by the UAE have criticized the STC offensive. Saudi Chairman of the Special Committee on Yemen Major General Mohammad Obeid bin Julaighm stated on December 9 that Saudi Arabia is calling for all STC forces to withdraw from Hadramawt and Mahra governorates during a meeting with Hadrami officials.[19] A Saudi delegation led by Julaighm has been in Hadramawt Governorate since December 3 to discuss the “eventual transfer of certain positions” to the NSF.[20] Consultation and Reconciliation Authority Vice President Abdulmalik al Makhlafi stated on December 8 that the STC offensive is a “coup, not a secession” and “is still incomplete from a legal and political standpoint, which makes it easier to reverse it.”[21] The Consultation and Reconciliation Authority was formed under former Yemeni President Mansour Hadi to support the PLC and unify the various actors within the anti-Houthi coalition.[22]

US and Western officials have reiterated their long-standing support for the unified Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) following meetings with Yemeni President and PLC President Rashad al Alimi and Saudi officials. Western officials, including the British and French ambassadors to Yemen and officials from the US Embassy in Yemen, reiterated their support for the ROYG and the PLC following their meeting with Alimi.[23] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio separately held a phone call with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan al Saud on December 9 to discuss the situation in Yemen.[24] The United States supports a unified Yemen under the ROYG, which is recognized by the UN.

The Houthis are using the STC offensive to continue to frame non-Houthi groups as proxies of foreign actors, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States. This messaging is consistent with the group’s continuous efforts to weaken the anti-Houthi coalition. Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Farah claimed on December 5 that the STC, ROYG, and the Saudi-backed militias serve foreign patrons and do not serve Yemeni interests.[25] Senior Houthi media advisor Ahmed al Shami published a video on X on December 5 of alleged damage caused by the STC takeover and claimed that the STC has “starved and abused” the Yemeni people.”[26] Other Houthi officials and pro-Houthi journalists have criticized the STC and NSF for allowing Saudi Arabia and the UAE to use Hahdramawt and al Mahra governorates as a battleground for their objectives.[27] This Houthi rhetoric is part of a long-standing Houthi information operation to frame non-Houthi groups as proxies of foreign actors and delegitimize the broader anti-Houthi coalition.

The Syrian government reportedly sent the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) a “revised” and “detailed” integration proposal on December 6 that likely Kurdish sources equated to the SDF’s “complete subjugation” to the Syrian army on Turkish terms.[28] Unspecified but “well-placed” sources told Al Monitor on December 8 that they believe that Turkey dictated the proposal‘s terms.[29] The sources did not provide specifics.[30] The unspecified sources are likely affiliated with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) or the SDF due to their knowledge of the proposal, their framing of its terms as “subjugation,” and their belief that Turkey is behind the proposal’s terms.[31] The Syrian government has not commented on the details of the proposal at the time of this writing. The Syrian government and SDF have engaged in months-long negotiations about the terms of the SDF’s military integration into the Syrian state. The two sides reached a ”verbal” and ”preliminary” agreement in October 2025 to integrate the SDF into the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) through several distinct formations, including at least three divisions and several independent brigades.[32] Syrian sources also suggested in October that the SDF would retain de facto security control over Hasakah Province.[33] Kurdish commanders and politicians publicly expressed their support for the informal understanding and sent Damascus a list of 70 Kurdish commanders for leadership positions within the army, General Staff, and elsewhere in the MoD in late October.[34] The characterization of the new proposal by Al Monitor’s sources, however, suggests that the December 6 proposal omits several or all of these details included in the October agreement.[35]

Turkey may have contributed to the reported changes within the Syrian government’s revised proposal, given that Turkey has vehemently rejected key elements of the October agreement between the Syrian government and SDF. Turkish security sources indicated on December 7 that Turkey seeks to bar SDF commanders from commanding any unit within the Syrian army, which suggests that Turkey has probably rejected most—if not all—of the 70 commanders that the SDF requested take up leadership positions in the MoD.[36] Turkey’s calls for SDF fighters to integrate into the MoD as individuals and demand for “one command structure” also suggest that Turkey has rejected the integration of SDF divisions into the MoD as blocs and opposes allowing former SDF commanders to lead any unit formed from individually integrated SDF personnel.[37]

The SDF is unlikely to accept any proposal that requires Kurdish fighters to join the Syrian army as individuals, which decreases the likelihood that the SDF will integrate into the state by the end of the year under terms acceptable to the Syrian and Turkish governments. The SDF has firmly maintained that there must be Kurdish formations within the new army in order to “preserve” elements of Kurdish security and autonomy.[38] The SDF has sought to join the Syrian army as a ”bloc” in order to maintain weapons and networks that would allow Kurdish fighters to defend against possible attacks from Sunni groups within the army—such as former Syrian National Army factions—that have previously attacked Kurdish fighters.[39] The Syrian and Turkish governments have given the SDF until the end of 2025 to complete its integration into the Syrian state.[40] An SDF rejection of a new government proposal decreases the feasibility that the SDF will integrate into the state under terms acceptable to both the Syrian and Turkish governments. Any delay in SDF integration also raises the risk of renewed conflict in northeastern Syria. Recent reported Turkish deployments, high-level meetings between Syrian and Turkish defense officials, and statements from Turkish officials and security sources suggest that Turkey is preparing for potential joint offensive operations against the SDF if the SDF does not fully integrate into the Syrian MoD by the end of the year.[41] The Syrian government has not explicitly acknowledged interest or intent to participate in such an operation, but news outlets affiliated with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have continued to allege that the Syrian army is preparing to launch a “large-scale operation” alongside Turkey after the end-of-year deadline expires.[42]