The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing updates Monday through Friday to provide analysis on the war with Iran and the broader Middle East. Weekday updates cover events from the past 24-hour period, whereas weekend updates are abbreviated and cover the Houthi-Saudi conflict and major breaking developments related to the war with Iran.
Key Takeaways
- The Houthis are reportedly reinforcing their positions and military capabilities along the Bab al Mandeb Strait in order to develop a long-term ability to threaten civilian vessels in the strait at close range. Unspecified military and local sources told UK-based, Qatari-owned media on November 21 that the Houthis are constructing a network of fortifications, including tunnels and berms, along the Bab al Mandeb at the southern edge of the Red Sea coastal plain.
- Iran continues to attack vessels along the US-backed route in the southern Strait of Hormuz, likely to undermine ship operators’ confidence in US escort operations and compel vessels to transit through Iranian territorial waters. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported two projectile attacks against tankers in and near the Strait of Hormuz, including one strike that hit an engine room 17 nautical miles east of Khasab, Oman, and another that hit a vessel’s stern 11 nautical miles north of Khasab.
Toplines
The Houthis are reportedly reinforcing their positions and military capabilities along the Bab al Mandeb Strait in order to develop a long-term ability to threaten civilian vessels in the strait at close range. Unspecified military and local sources told UK-based, Qatari-owned media on November 21 that the Houthis are constructing a network of fortifications, including tunnels and berms, along the Bab al Mandeb at the southern edge of the Red Sea coastal plain.[1] The sources claimed that these fortifications, particularly the tunnels, are designed to conceal and protect Houthi armored vehicles, military equipment, and weapons crews deployed to the area from Saudi airstrikes.[2] The sources added that the Houthis have begun to deploy radar systems to areas along the Bab al Mandeb in order to detect vessels transiting the strait and that recent Houthi construction work atop Jabal Kahbub could indicate plans to install missile and drone launchers overlooking the strait.[3] International media previously reported on September 19 that Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) operatives visited Houthi positions along the Bab al Mandeb to survey potential radar positions.[4]
ISW-CTP has assessed since September 2026 that consolidated Houthi control over terrain along the Bab al Mandeb would permit the movement to use a broader range of strike platforms to threaten shipping in the strait.[5] The withdrawal of Yemeni government-aligned forces from all positions within 65 kilometers of the Bab al Mandeb in recent days has insulated terrain and logistical lines on the coastal plain from potential ground or artillery attacks and enabled the Houthis to secure the area.[6] The Houthis are now likely exploiting this favorable operational environment to establish a fortified base for close-range strikes on vessels in the strait, if these reports are accurate. Radar arrays positioned along the Bab al Mandeb would likely enable the Houthis to track nearby vessels with greater accuracy and use short-range weapons, including artillery, to target them.[7] Recent Houthi promises to ensure safe passage for non-Saudi civilian vessels are in fact declarations of illegal authority over international shipping, and the Houthi movement is setting long-term conditions to control international maritime traffic with violent force.[8]
US and Partner Military Operations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Strike Campaign
Assessed Iranian War Aims:
- Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
- Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
- Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
- Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states
Iran continues to attack vessels along the US-backed route in the southern Strait of Hormuz, likely to undermine ship operators’ confidence in US escort operations and compel vessels to transit through Iranian territorial waters. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported two projectile attacks against tankers in and near the Strait of Hormuz, including one strike that hit an engine room 17 nautical miles east of Khasab, Oman, and another that hit a vessel’s stern 11 nautical miles north of Khasab.[9] Iran may have struck the Marshall Islands-flagged, Saudi-owned LUJAIN in the attack 17 nautical miles east of Khasab.[10] The strike on the engine room is consistent with a recent increase in Iranian attacks on vessels’ engine rooms. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran may be using drones or cruise missiles equipped with infrared terminal guidance systems rather than ballistic missiles to conduct these attacks because strikes against engine rooms almost certainly require projectiles that can approach a vessel along a horizontal flight path.[11] The strike on the vessel’s stern could also indicate the use of a drone or cruise missile because the stern sits close to the engine room and, therefore, its positioning may similarly require a projectile to use a horizontal flight path, depending on where the projectile landed on the stern. Iran may have intended to hit the engine room but struck the stern instead or, alternatively, deliberately targeted the stern to disable the vessel’s propulsion or steering systems. Both attacks nonetheless suggest that Iran may be continuing to employ more advanced weapons systems to conduct precise attacks against maritime targets.[12]
US-Iran Negotiations
Nothing significant to report.
Iranian Domestic Affairs
Nothing significant to report.
Lebanon
Nothing significant to report.
Iraq
Nothing significant to report.
Arabian Peninsula
Yemeni government-aligned forces are reportedly engaging Houthi fighters in northern and central Lahij Governorate in order to prevent Houthi advances toward Aden and infiltrations of the government’s exposed rear area. UK-based, Saudi-owned media reported on November 21 that Yemeni government-aligned forces engaged Houthi fighters in the vicinity of Mabaq, along the Taiz-Aden ground line of communication (GLOC) in Maqatirah District, northern Lahij Governorate.[13] An independent Yemeni journalist separately reported on November 21 that Yemeni government-aligned forces assaulted and recaptured several Houthi-held positions near Am Sarih, north of the Jabal Kharaz mountain in central Lahij Governorate.[14] The journalist also claimed that Yemeni government-aligned forces recaptured Jabal Habanan, which is a low mountain about 15 kilometers north of Am Sarih, and advanced into the nearby village of al Hanjarah.[15] ISW-CTP cannot verify any claims of Yemeni government advances in Lahij Governorate at the time of this writing, however.
The Yemeni government may be attempting to recapture Jabal Habanan and terrain surrounding Am Sarih in order to establish defensible positions and fire control over surrounding wadis and low valleys. Yemeni government-aligned forces could then use their control of those areas to attempt to slow or inhibit Houthi advances. Yemeni government-aligned forces have repeatedly demonstrated poor coordination and an inability to mount effective defenses in Lahij Governorate, however.[16] Yemeni government-aligned forces also face a high risk of overextension in Lahij Governorate from several Houthi offensive efforts.[17] Recent Houthi deployments and engagements indicate that the movement seeks to overwhelm government-aligned forces with simultaneous engagements along several GLOCs extending toward Aden.[18]
The Houthi movement likely targeted Saudi critical infrastructure on November 20 as part of its ongoing campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to end military operations in Yemen and accept Houthi economic demands. Saudi air defenses intercepted a Houthi drone over southern Saudi Arabia and three ballistic missiles over Riyadh on November 20.[19] Saudi air defenses intercepted another Houthi drone over Riyadh on November 21.[20] The Houthi movement has regularly attacked various Saudi critical infrastructure targets in Riyadh and throughout the country during the current conflict.[21] The Houthis seek to impose economic and political costs on Saudi Arabia to compel the kingdom to submit to Houthi demands, which include ending Saudi support for Yemen’s legitimate government, lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports, and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources.[22]

[1] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/تحصينات-للحوثيين-في-باب-المندب-وظهور-للمحرمي-في-عدن
[2] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/تحصينات-للحوثيين-في-باب-المندب-وظهور-للمحرمي-في-عدن
[3] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/تحصينات-للحوثيين-في-باب-المندب-وظهور-للمحرمي-في-عدن ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-8-2026/
[4] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/5320216-تقرير-خبراء-من-الحرس-الثوري-زاروا-باب-المندب-لتركيب-رادارات
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-16-2026/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-16-2026/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-11-2026/ ; https://www.globalmilitary.net/vehicles/d-20/ ; https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2015/09/pre-war-yemeni-fighting-vehicles_20.html
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-17-2026/ ; https://www.axios.com/2026/09/16/us-houthi-oman-to-discuss-red-sea-crisis ; https://www.saba dot ye/en/news3754303.htm
[9] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2124053952446730711?a=rFD6mxVQ2bQ-Oa56M-U&s=20 ; https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/2124045038141259888?a=DQauhAZzA20WdaoFJSM&s=20
[10] Starboard Maritime Intelligence. Available by subscription at https://www.starboardintelligence.com/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-21-2026/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-21-2026/
[13] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/5343982-معارك-في-لحج-وتعز-وضربات-جوية-لاستهداف-قدرات-الحوثيين
[14] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2124122652134556035
[15] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2124122652134556035
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-16-2026/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-20-2026/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-19-2026/ ; https://www dot alaraby.co.uk/politics/اليمن-سباق-تعزيزات-إلى-الشرق-ينذر-بمعارك-عنيفة ; https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/2123534670591897878?a=blCUw_L4BstuwnU0uW8&s=20 ; https://x.com/strategicbakery/status/2122904853634765291
[19] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2123924514803519845?a=cfFuOZmFIvp_EKl8-vs&s=20 ; https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2123947620989305066?a=PtSfcDQr9A5ihAdbRz4&s=20
[20] https://x.com/CJFCSpox/status/2124209585808421038?a=88LJIWbGHEVWsfNbzgE&s=20
[21] https://t.me/army21ye/4119 ; https://t.me/army21ye/4111 ; https://t.me/army21ye/4089
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-november-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-october-11-2026/ ; https://t.me/army21ye/3948

