Paul Conroy, Eloise Herdegen, Nate Trotter, Tetiana Trach, Sofia Walsh, Jennie Olmsted, Justin Young, and Kateryna Stepanenko

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on August 11. This report focuses on Russian force generation and excludes reports on Russian defense industrial base and technological adaptations. ISW will cover Russian technological adaptations in the upcoming Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations publication.

Russian law enforcement and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) may have coerced at least 20,000 Central Asian migrants to fight in Ukraine within the Russian military. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on August 1 that various estimates suggest that at least 20,000 Central Asia migrants are fighting in Ukraine.[1] Russian and international human rights activists told Verstka that Russian law enforcement and the MoD are recruiting Central Asian migrants by threatening to annul naturalized Russians’ citizenship and deport their families; coercing migrants in prison to sign military service contracts; and fabricating criminal cases against migrants, such as accusing them of illegal drug trafficking and extremism. Russian federal subjects reportedly have been recruiting naturalized citizens by conducting raids on migrant communities and identifying naturalized citizens who have not completed mandatory military registration with the state. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin notably stated on May 19 that Russian law enforcement detained 80,000 naturalized Russian citizens who did not register for military service and claimed that around 20,000 of these detainees are now fighting for Russia in Ukraine.[2] Verstka reported that police have conducted raids in Krasnodar Krai and Moscow and Saratov oblasts to identify naturalized citizens who have not registered for military service, and that police coerced these citizens to sign military contracts and serve at the front using physical force.

Russian officials and military commanders often mistreat Central Asian migrants and naturalized citizens without facing societal backlash, as these groups are legally and socially vulnerable in Russia. Verstka reported that Russian commanders send migrants to deadly assaults immediately upon their arrival on the frontlines and do not pay them as stipulated in contracts. Verstka noted that Russian legal services are often unwilling to help migrants and that migrants’ countries of origin also consider the migrants to be illegal mercenaries for their participation in combat operations in Ukraine.

Recent Kremlin anti-migrant, military registration, and extremism laws likely enable the Kremlin to coerce Central Asian migrants into fighting in Ukraine at scale on false premises. Verstka reported that Russian law enforcement has unrestricted authority to coerce migrants into contract military service since the adoption of anti-migrant laws. Russian human rights activists told Verstka that the typical bribes to avoid military service increased from 5,000 to 10,000 rubles ($63 to $126) to around 50,000 to 100,000 rubles ($625 to $1,261). Russian human rights activists say that typical fines for failing to undergo military registration increased to at least 40,000 rubles ($501), though Putin signed a law on July 7 that increased such fines up to 20,000 rubles ($250).[3] Putin recently signed a law on July 31 that expands the offenses for which Russian authorities can revoke acquired Russian citizenship, including extremism and “unlawful influence” on Russia’s information space.[4] The Russian State Duma is actively expanding the conditions under which the Kremlin may revoke acquired Russian citizenship.[5] The Russian State Duma adopted a law in July 2024 that forces recently naturalized citizens to register for military service immediately after receiving a passport.[6] The 2024 law also specified that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) will inform military registration offices about naturalized citizens who will soon be issued a Russian passport, and Russian officials have the power to revoke Russian citizenship from individuals who do not register.[7] These laws are likely enabling Russia to intensify coercive recruitment of Central Asian migrants under threat of arrest and deprivation of Russian citizenship.

Key Takeaways:

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts

• Russian law enforcement and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) may have coerced at least 20,000 Central Asian migrants to fight in Ukraine within the Russian military.
• Russian federal subjects and municipal officials are introducing new financial incentives to individuals who recruit volunteers from other Russian regions or foreign countries.

Russian Force Centralization

• The Russian MoD is reportedly failing to issue combat veteran statuses to Chechen Akhmat forces and other recruits who were involved in combat operations on the Ukrainian-Russian international border, possibly as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to decrease veteran support costs.

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring

• Russia is planning to reopen 15 higher military schools in order to expand the Russian officer class and grow the Russian military.

Integration of Veterans into Russian Society

• The Kremlin is setting conditions to use the state-controlled MAX messenger app to coopt and surveil Russian veteran civil society.

Militarization of Society and Youth

• The Kremlin launched an initiative to neurologically profile 10,000 Russian children and teenagers to identify leaders and anti-leaders and improve patriotism among the Russian youth.

Russian Discipline Problems

• Russian officers are continuing to create a culture in which Russian servicemen are afraid to report discipline problems within Russian military units.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Assessed Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization and undermining regime stability)

Russian municipal authorities are offering steep one-time enlistment bonuses to recruit conscripts to fight in Ukraine. Perm Krai’s Berezniki City Duma introduced a new provision on July 28, which extended the eligibility for conscripts to receive one-time enlistment bonuses upon the signing of military service contracts with the Russian MoD.[8] Russian independent investigative outlet 7×7-Horizontal Russia, citing data from the Perm Krai’s Representative Bodies of Municipal Formations Council, reported that conscripts in Berezniki will now receive an additional 250,000 rubles ($3,125) for signing military service contracts.[9] 7×7-Horizontal Russia clarified that mobilized servicemen, volunteers, and foreigners already have been eligible for these one-time municipal enlistment bonuses, and that Berezniki authorities are allocating the municipal bonuses in addition to payments of 1.5 million rubles ($18,928) from Perm Krai‘s budget and 400,000 rubles ($5,047) from Russia‘s federal budget.

Russian federal subjects and municipal officials are introducing new financial incentives to individuals who recruit volunteers from other Russian regions or foreign countries. Berezniki City Duma introduced a bonus payment of 50,000 rubles ($625) to any Berezniki resident who brings a Perm Krai resident to a military registration office to sign a contract with the Russian MoD, and a compensation of 100,000 rubles ($1,250) to a local who recruits a foreigner, resident from a different oblast, or a stateless person.[10] Siberian independent outlet Baikal People reported on July 28 that Chita City Administration officials in Zabaykalsky Krai will pay residents 50,000 rubles ($631) for recruiting their relatives or friends.[11] Independent media outlet Astra reported on August 3 that Ryazan Oblast authorities will pay 57,500 rubles ($720) to locals for recruiting a Ryazan Oblast resident who signs a military service contract by the end of 2025; 344,800 rubles ($4,317) for recruiting a resident of a different oblast, and 80,500 rubles ($1,008) for recruiting a foreigner.[12] Astra also reported that the Republic of Udmurtia offers locals 30,000 rubles ($375) for each recruit; Samara Oblast authorities will pay 100,000 rubles ($1,252); the Republic of Tatarstan increased its offer to 150,000 rubles ($1,878); and Ulyanovsk Oblast offers 200,000 rubles ($2,504). Russian federal subjects and municipal officials are likely expanding their recruitment efforts targeting stateless persons and foreigners under Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent order, which enabled the Russian MoD to recruit stateless persons and foreigners.[13] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported in June 2025 that Russian federal subjects, companies, and organizations have been increasingly offloading recruitment responsibilities on informal recruiters, likely because traditional recruitment methods are failing to meet the Kremlin’s quotas.[14] The average Russian monthly salary in 2025 is 87,952 rubles ($980), meaning that informal recruiters may make a significant profit by recruiting fellow Russians or foreigners.[15]

Russian federal subjects are continuing to increase one-time enlistment bonuses and benefits in an effort to recruit more Russians to fight in Ukraine. Press service of the Republic of Tatarstan President Rustam Minnikhanov announced on August 8 that the Republic of Tatarstan increased the regional one-time enlistment bonus for signing a contract with the Russian MoD from 2.1 million rubles ($26,392) to 2.7 million rubles ($33,932).[16] Russian recruits also receive an additional 400,000 rubles ($5,027) from the MoD’s federal budget, meaning that recruits who sign up in the Republic of Tatarstan can now receive a total of 3.1 million rubles ($39,000) in one-time enlistment bonuses.[17] The Republic of Tatarstan also offers a lump-sum payment of 2.5 million rubles ($31,398) to drone operators, a 210,000 ruble ($2,637) monthly base salary, and debt forgiveness up to 10,000,000 rubles ($125,641).[18] Minnikhanov’s press service added that the Republic of Tatarstan is one of the only regions recruiting for the Russian Africa Corps.[19]

Russian Force Centralization (Assessed Russian objective: Centralize the state’s control over informal volunteer-based units that emerged in early 2022 after the Kremlin failed to declare general mobilization

The Russian MoD is reportedly failing to issue combat veteran statuses to Chechen Akhmat forces and other recruits who were involved in combat operations on the Ukrainian-Russian international border, possibly as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to decrease veteran support costs. A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces (GOF) claimed on August 1 that Russian military officials stopped issuing combat veteran statuses to elements of the 51st Airborne Regiment (106th Airborne [VDV] Division, 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), and Chechen Akhmat forces.[20] Elements of the 51st Airborne Regiment notably participated in assaults in northern Sumy Oblast; elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and Akhmat forces operated in Kursk Oblast; and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade fought northeast of Belgorod City.[21] The milblogger stated that the Russian military command is not paying combat pay compensations to servicemen who participated in combat operations along the Ukrainian-Russian international border, citing a lack of necessary documentation. The milblogger also speculated that the Kremlin hopes that more servicemen die in combat to avoid having to compensate veterans.[22] The milblogger complained that Putin, in January 2025, classified combat service in Russia’s international border areas — Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk oblasts — as equivalent to service in Ukraine, but that Russian officials are failing to provide combat compensations accordingly. The Russian government granted veteran status to Russian military personnel and volunteer formations, such as Chechen Akhmat forces, that fought in Kursk Oblast on April 3.[23] The Kremlin is likely trying to avoid paying Russian forces who fought near the international border the steep financial benefits offered to recruits who fight in Ukraine, and to curb the increasing financial requirements of promised veterans’ benefits.

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring (Assessed Russian objective: Restructure the Russian military to maintain the war in Ukraine while preparing for a potential large-scale conventional war with NATO)

Russia is planning to reopen 15 higher military schools in order to expand the Russian officer class and grow the Russian military. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order on July 24 to establish the Nizhny Novgorod Higher Military Engineering Command School at the Russian MoD’s 210th Joint Regional Training Center and open it by September 1.[24] Russian state newspaper Izvestia, citing unnamed Russian MoD sources, reported on July 1 that the MoD plans to open 15 new higher military schools between 2025 and 2034 to address the current shortage of junior and field-grade officers.[25] Izvestia noted that the Russian MoD is opening the Saratov Higher Military Engineering School for Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense alongside the Nizhny Novgorod Higher Military Engineering Command School in 2025. Izvestia added that the Russian MoD is planning to open the Chelyabinsk Higher Tank School, Ulyanovsk Higher Military Aviation School, and Novocherkask Higher Military Command School of Communications in 2026; Moscow Oblast Higher Military School for Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in 2027; Omsk Higher Combined Arms Command School in 2028; Krasnoyarsk Higher Military School of Air Defense Radio Electronics in 2029; the Pushkin Higher Military School for Aerospace Defense in 2032; and the Tomsk Higher Military Command School of Communications in 2034. Izvestia noted that the Russian MoD proposed to open four new branches of the Russian Military Medical Academy in occupied Sevastopol in 2029; Samara City in 2032; Novosibirsk City in 2023; and Khabarovsk City in 2024. Izvestia noted that most of the higher military schools that the Russian MoD plans to reopen closed during the Russian military reforms after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russian military experts told Izvestia that Russia needs to address shortages of lower- and middle-level officers and to form new military units within the new Leningrad and Moscow military districts (LMD and MMD). Izvestia suggested that the Russian MoD could staff these schools by funding postgraduate education for veterans of Russia’s war in Ukraine and by educating foreign officers. The Russian MoD’s plans to open new military academies demonstrate how Russia is preparing for a future war against NATO.

Integration of Veterans into Russian Society (Assessed Russian objective: Mitigate the risk of veterans emerging as a political group in a way that could erode the stability of the Russian state)

The Kremlin is setting conditions to use the state-controlled MAX messenger app to coopt and surveil Russian veteran civil society. Arkhangelsk Oblast Governor Alexander Tsybulsky announced on July 24 the development of a “Return to Peaceful Life” app that has all information about Russian veterans, including their education, rehabilitation, and medical examination records.[26] Tsybulsky claimed that Russian government officials will have full access to all this information and will be able to monitor “the whole life” of each Russian veteran online. Tsybulsky claimed that Russian veterans could use the app to communicate with government officials and submit any comments, suggestions, and requests directly to them. Tsybulsky claimed that the app is developed in line with the Arkhangelsk branch of the federal Time of Heroes program — “Defenders. Under the Wing of the Archangel.” Tsybulsky claimed that Return to Peaceful Life will launch shortly and that the app is integrated with Russia’s national MAX messenger — a platform that the Kremlin launched in June 2025 in an effort to consolidate information control over Russian citizens.[27] Putin publicly supported the app’s development and its integration into the MAX messenger, likely in an effort to set information conditions for the creation of similar apps that intend to surveil Russian veteran communities.

The Russian MoD is actively leveraging veterans to work in military enlistment centers, likely as part of the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to augment the Russian military’s administrative capacity. The Russian MoD reported on August 2 that the Russian MoD’s Main Personnel Directorate Acting Head, Lieutenant General Yuri Bobrov, awarded Russian veterans with certificates of completion of the “Mobilization Work in Military Registration Offices” program.[28] The Russian MoD reported that graduates of the program have acquired special qualifications that allow them to continue to serve in new military positions within the Russian MoD after sustaining injuries in combat. ISW has recently observed the Kremlin’s efforts to extend the Russian military conscription administrative process from a semi-annual to a year-round cycle.[29] The proposed changes to the Russian conscription and draft systems would require a significant increase in the staffing levels in Russian military registration offices. The “Mobilization Work in Military Registration Offices” program for Russian veterans is likely a means to augment the administrative capacity of Russian military enlistment centers.

The Kremlin and Russian federal subjects continue efforts to reintegrate Russian veterans into the Russian economy and job market in an effort to mitigate Russia’s labor shortages. Putin signed a bill on July 31 that stipulates payments to wounded soldiers, volunteers, and family members of deceased soldiers within 30 days.[30] Kursk Regional Duma deputies supported a bill on July 30 that introduces fines for companies of over 100 employees that fail to meet veteran employment quotas.[31] The bill specifies that combat veterans must comprise at least 1.2 percent of a company’s staff. Russian daily newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported on August 1 that Russian majority-state owned Sberbank began to cooperate with the United Russia Party’s program “SVOy Business” — a play on Russia’s use of the euphemism “SVO” (special military operation or SMO) to avoid calling the war in Ukraine a war and the Russian word “svoy” (which means “one’s own”). Sberbank is reportedly offering mentorship and special training to Russian veterans who want to become entrepreneurs.[32] ISW has previously observed that Russia is suffering a labor shortage of 1.5 million people, and the ongoing Kremlin’s efforts to stimulate military personnel employment are likely an effort to address this issue.[33]

The Kremlin appears to be prioritizing distributing social benefits to Russian veterans via the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund at the expense of Russian orphans and disabled civilians. Russian opposition outlet 7×7-Horizontal Russia reported on July 24 that the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund helps Russian veterans receive benefits that Russian civilians struggle to receive, including: one-time payments of 200,000 rubles (about $2,523) for purchasing a plot of land; free social housing; indefinite disability status; state-funded university tuition for veterans’ children; expedited marriage certificates; modern wheelchairs; and adaptive clothing.[34] 7×7-Horizontal Russia noted that Russian orphans often wait over seven years for state-provided housing, and Russian officials commonly refuse to grant Russian civilians disability statuses in order to save money. 7×7-Horizontal Russia also noted that the price for paid education increased by 37 percent and the quota for free education decreased by 11.5 percent in Sverdlovsk Oblast since education administrators must allocate at least 10 percent of admissions to Russian veterans and their families. The Kremlin launched the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund in April 2023 to oversee social support for veterans, elevate veterans within Russian society, and monopolize control over veterans activities in Russia.[35] The Kremlin is likely prioritizing support for Russian veterans to increase their reliance on benefits from the Russian government and suppress domestic anti-Putin or anti-war movements.[36]

The Kremlin continues to appoint veterans to positions of power within the Russian education sector as part of a state campaign to indoctrinate Russian and Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to support Russia’s long-term war efforts. The Russian MoD reported on July 31 that the Republic of Sakha Head Aisen Nikolayev appointed Time of Heroes alumni and Russian veteran Major Igor Yurgin as the new director of the Department of State Policy in the spheres of education, supplementary education, and children’s recreation at the Russian Ministry of Education.[37] Yurgin’s appointment is the latest in a string of similar appointments of Time of Heroes alumni, including Yunarmiya Chief of the General Staff Captain Vladislav Golovin and Deputy Head of the Nizhny Novgorod City Administration Vladimir Anisimov, whom the Kremlin appointed to oversee youth-focused policy and initiatives.[38] ISW continues to assess that Putin established the federal Time of Heroes program in February 2024 to create a new social stratum of ultranationalist veterans who are loyal to the Kremlin and who will facilitate future militarization of Russia and occupied Ukraine.

Russia’s ruling United Russia Party reportedly nominated 951 veterans of its war in Ukraine for the 2025 elections as part of the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to coopt Russian veterans and militarize Russian society. General Council Secretary of the United Russia Party Vladimir Yakushev stated on August 5 that the party nominated 951 Russian veterans out of 45,000 nominees for the 2025 elections at all levels of government.[39] Yakushev claimed that veterans’ participation in the election campaigns underlines the Kremlin’s support for Russian veterans who are loyal to their “motherland” and willing to continue their service in peacetime in federal and municipal positions of power. ISW has observed that the Kremlin has revamped its efforts to integrate veterans in election campaigns since 2024 and has been increasingly using veterans’ reputations to promote the elections rather than appointing veterans to actual positions of power.[40]

Militarization of Society and Youth (Assessed Russian objective: Condition Russian society and youth for military service and raise societal support for Russian war efforts)

The Kremlin launched an initiative to neurologically profile 10,000 Russian children and teenagers to identify leaders and anti-leaders and improve patriotism among the Russian youth. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Sistema project published an investigation on July 24 detailing that Rospatriotstentr branch of the Russian Federal Agency of Youth Affairs (Rosmolodezh) launched a neuro profiling project under the federal We Are Together program, which aims to advance Russian “traditional, spiritual, and moral values” educate “a harmoniously developed personality” among Russian youth.[41] Sistema, citing the Russian government’s procurement documents, reported that Rospatriotstentr is attempting to create neurological profiles of 10,000 children and teenagers aged 12 to 18 from different Russian regions in order to identify 50 with “pronounced positive profiles,” who will then attend a five-day seminar in occupied Sevastopol. Rospatriotstentr stated that the project aims to transform the approaches to education, career guidance, and patriotic education of young people. Rospatriotstentr partnered with the private Russian company Persona, which specializes in DeepTech and human potential management using neurological profiling and Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, and sells neurological tests that claim to increase efficiency and team building via subconscious cognitive perceptions of visual symbols. Persona Head Vladimir Kozlov claimed that neurological profiling can help discover motivated Russian patriots. Sistema reported that Russia will conduct this neurological profile testing through August 2025 and then will hold the seminar at the New Chersonesus Museum and Temple Complex in September 2025, during which the organizer will identify leaders and anti-leaders who are prone to destructive behavior. The Kremlin continues efforts to widely militarize Russian youth to garner support for its long-term war effort in Ukraine and possible future armed conflicts with Western countries.[42]

Russian federal subjects and municipalities are continuing to expand regional military-patriotic education to indoctrinate and prepare children to support a protracted war effort in Ukraine and against NATO. On July 30, acting Sverdlovsk Oblast Governor Denis Pasler ordered the Sverdlovsk Oblast Ministry of Education to select three schools to launch a new basic military training and military-patriotic education program.[43] Pasler noted that he discussed this program with Time of Heroes participants, who interned in Sverdlovsk Oblast.[44] Perm City Administration announced on July 23 that the administration will establish six kindergartens where children can learn the basics of drone operations and develop engineering thinking.[45] Perm City Administration introduced this initiative to satisfy Putin’s order to ensure that children ages seven and up can participate in drone races by 2026.

Russian Desertion Reduction Measures (Assessed Russian objective: Reduce desertion rates among Russian servicemen by intensifying punishments and expanding law enforcement’s authority)

The Russian MoD is reportedly mislabeling deceased and wounded servicemen as absent without official leave (AWOL) in an effort to reduce state compensations to Russian families and manipulate statistics on Russian casualties. Russian opposition media outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on July 28 that Russian commanders are systematically declaring Russian servicemen to be AWOL rather than dead or missing.[46] Vazhnye Istorii recorded more than 50 complaints from relatives of soldiers serving in at least 25 different military units and originating from at least 11 Russian federal subjects and the occupied Donetsk Oblast. Vazhnye Istorii noted that complaints equally concern recruits who voluntarily signed military service contracts with the Russian MoD, prisoner recruits, mobilized servicemen, and prisoners of war (PoW). Vazhnye Istorii added that Russian military officials declare a majority of Russian recruits as AWOL within the first two to six months. Vazhnye Istorii reported that Russian families have written over 40,500 complaints to Putin regarding the search for missing servicemen since February 2022 and that these complaints have been in the top three issues Russians wrote to Putin about every month since July 2024. Russian opposition outlet Verstka previously reported on February 20 that Russian MoD officials ordered military commanders to mark deceased and wounded servicemen as AWOL, sometimes even before Russian servicemen left for combat missions.[47] Russia is likely designating servicemen as AWOL to reduce the volume of compensation paid to Russian families in the event of a serviceman’s death or injury. Designating servicemen as AWOL also enables the Russian MoD to manipulate statistics on battlefield casualties.

The Russian military command is systematically punishing deserters by committing them to frontline assaults without subjecting them to due legal process. Verstka reported on August 7, citing interviews with wives of Russian servicemen and human rights activists, that Russian servicemen are deserting from frontline positions or going AWOL due to untreated injuries or fatigue.[48] Russian servicemen reported inadequate medical treatment after suffering nerve damage, being hit with shrapnel, or developing chronic illnesses. Russian wives noted that Russian officials often send deserters back to the frontlines as punishment instead of properly prosecuting them in accordance with Russian law. Russian human rights activists told Verstka that Russian deserters who turn themselves in to Russian authorities are increasingly asking lawyers to help them secure a real sentence for desertion rather than a suspended sentence, likely in an effort to avoid being deployed to frontline assaults. Verstka reported that deserters can receive criminal sentences of five to 15 years and that the Russian MoD frequently tries to recruit deserters to sign military service contracts while they are serving sentences in prison. Verstka reported that deserters may also receive reduced sentences or bypass the court system and be sent directly to the frontlines. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported on June 26 that Russian courts have received more than 20,000 cases of refusal to serve from the beginning of the full-scale invasion to May 2025.[49] Mediazona reported that in Spring 2025, Russian courts handed down 700-800 sentences per month for refusal to serve.

Russian Discipline Problems (Russian discipline and morale issues that degrade Russian force effectiveness)

Russian officers are continuing to create a culture in which Russian servicemen are afraid to report discipline problems within Russian military units. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on August 1 that the Russian Armed Forces continue to suffer from a lack of command staff, leaving commanders unable to effectively manage their units.[50] The milblogger complained that the lack of a competent officer class discourages Russian servicemembers from reporting criminal activity due to fears of retaliation from their commanders or an “army mafia” in their unit. The milblogger noted that internal military politics allow well-connected commanders to avoid investigations or punishment even if Russian servicemembers launch formal complaints with sufficient evidence. Another Russian milblogger claimed on July 30 that the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 95th Motorized Rifle Regiment (5th Motor Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) disappeared after meeting with his regimental commander on July 28 and that he was the second battalion commander to disappear in this manner in five days.[51] The milblogger noted that the battalion commander was still missing as of July 31 and that unit members confirmed the commander of the 95th Motorized Rifle Regiment ordered him to report to regimental headquarters and declared him a deserter.[52] The milblogger claimed that former and current servicemembers of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade observed instances of drug trafficking, robberies, looting, extortion, theft of salaries, fuel, lubricants, humanitarian aid, and vehicles, and other criminal activities within the brigade. Former and current servicemembers added that personnel of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade are afraid to openly report criminal activity within the brigade due to fears of reprisals.

Russian Demographic Problems (Assessed Russian objective: Fix persistent demographic problems by incentivizing immigration, disincentivizing emigration, and promoting pronatalist policies to support long-term force generation and economic initiatives)

The Kremlin extended citizenship rights to families of deceased foreigners who fought on behalf of Russia in Ukraine in a likely effort to incentivize further recruitment among migrant communities. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a presidential decree on July 31 that allows spouses, children, and parents of foreign citizens killed while fighting in Ukraine alongside Russian forces to apply for Russian citizenship.[53] This decree will replace the previous guidelines from 2024, which stated that families of current foreign servicemen can apply for citizenship, but did not include the families of deceased servicemen.[54] The Kremlin likely made this change to further incentivize recruitment against migrants and foreign nationals, and to support long-term efforts to solve demographic problems.

Russian State Recognition of Officers and Military Units: (Assessed Russian objective: Honor specific Russian units for service, achievements, and hardships in Ukraine and incentivize service in distinguished units)

Putin awarded the Russian 337th Separate Helicopter Regiment and 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment the honorary guards titles on July 31.[55] The 337th Separate Helicopter Regiment is part of the 14th Air and Air Defense Forces Army, Central Military District (CMD), Russian Aerospace Forces. The 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment is part of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA), Eastern Military District (EMD). ISW last observed elements of the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment operating north of Zelene Pole in Donetsk Oblast as of July 17.[56]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://verstka dot media/kak-vyhodczy-iz-czentralnoi-azii-popadayut-na-voinu-i-s-chem-stalkivayutsya-na-fronte; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/7273 

[2] https://www.currenttime dot tv/a/rossiya-bastrykin-migranty-voyna-sk-grazhdanstvo/33419505.html; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025

[3] https://ria dot ru/20250707/zakon-2027689687.html

[4] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24681251; http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202507310064?index=1

[5] https://t.me/tass_agency/330403

[6] https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cv2gx42ypngo ; https://rg dot ru/2024/07/31/gosduma-obiazala-novyh-grazhdan-rf-vstavat-na-voinskij-uchet.html

[7] https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cv2gx42ypngo ; https://rg dot ru/2024/07/31/gosduma-obiazala-novyh-grazhdan-rf-vstavat-na-voinskij-uchet.html

[8] https://t.me/horizontal_russia/48214; https://berduma dot ru/solutions/the-decisions-taken/3939; https://www.idelreal dot org/a/v-gorode-berezniki-permskogo-kraya-soldatam-srochnoy-sluzhby-zaklyuchivshim-kontrakt-s-minoborony-rf-budut-platit-po-250-000-rubley/33486022.html; https://t.me/idelrealii/42018; https://t.me/horizontal_russia/48214; https://t.me/msu_pk/979

[9] https://www.idelreal dot org/a/v-gorode-berezniki-permskogo-kraya-soldatam-srochnoy-sluzhby-zaklyuchivshim-kontrakt-s-minoborony-rf-budut-platit-po-250-000-rubley/33486022.html; https://t.me/idelrealii/42018; https://berduma dot ru/solutions/the-decisions-taken/3939; https://t.me/horizontal_russia/48214; https://t.me/msu_pk/979

[10] https://www.idelreal dot org/a/v-gorode-berezniki-permskogo-kraya-soldatam-srochnoy-sluzhby-zaklyuchivshim-kontrakt-s-minoborony-rf-budut-platit-po-250-000-rubley/33486022.html

[11] https://t.me/Baikal_People/10698

[12] https://t.me/astrapress/88602

[13] https://www.euronews.com/2025/07/08/in-an-attempt-to-avoid-mobilisation-kremlin-now-allows-foreigners-to-serve-in-russian-army; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/55924

[14] https://verstka dot media/kak-rossiyane-zarabatyvayut-otpravlyaya-drug-druga-na-voinu 

[15] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2025/03/03/russian-wage-growth-hits-16-year-high-in-december-2024-a88227

[16] https://ria dot ru/20250808/tatarstan-2034101723.html

[17] https://www.idelreal.org/a/v-tatarstane-uvelichili-edinovremennuyu-vyplatu-za-podpisanie-voennogo-kontrakta/33497723.html

[18] https://t.me/milinfolive/154350

[19] https://www.idelreal.org/a/v-tatarstane-uvelichili-edinovremennuyu-vyplatu-za-podpisanie-voennogo-kontrakta/33497723.html

[20] https://t.me/severnnyi/4710

[21] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2025; https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20June%202%2C%202025%20PDF.pdf ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2025

[22] https://t.me/severnnyi/4710; https://t.me/severnnyi/4712

[23] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2025

[24] http://government dot ru/docs/55768/

[25] https://iz dot ru/export/google/amp/1912965

[26] kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77563 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/327231

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2025

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/55219

[29] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2025

[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/328521 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31928

[31] https://kursk-izvestia dot ru/news/227962/?ysclid=mdpt5bdy7e157797706; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/strana/central/news/2025/07/30/1128025-trudoustraivat-uchastnikov-spetsoperatsii

[32] https://www dot ng.ru/news/821315.html

[33] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[34] https://semnasem dot org/articles/2025/07/24/kak-rabotaet-fond-zashitniki-otechestva; https://t.me/zvezdanews/161377

[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2025

[36] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans

[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/55165

[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025

[39] https://er dot ru/activity/news/vladimir-yakushev-edinaya-rossiya-vydvinula-45-tysyach-kandidatov-na-edg-2025 ; https://t.me/rusvesnasu/31550

[40] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025

[41] https://t.me/systemasystema/239 ; https://zakupki.gov dot ru/epz/pricereq/card/common-info.html?priceRequestId=2418650 ; https://t.me/ros_patriot/6733 ; https://leader-id.storage.yandexcloud dot net/upload/2305325/4582a6ef-60b3-44c3-8287-2405614d84ac.pdf#page=5; https://myvmeste dot ru/programmy/

[42] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122124

[43] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/23450; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24666223

[44] https://t.me/sotaproject/101139 ; https://t.me/DVPasler/4681

[45] https://www.gorodperm dot ru/news/2025/07/23%2010:26:00+05/65847-id/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/87719 

[46] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/stories/2025/07/28/status-soch/index.html

[47] https://verstka dot media/propavshih-na-fronte-eks-zaklyuchennyh-massovo-priznayut-samovolno-ostavivshimi-chast-chtoby-lishit-vyplat

[48] https://verstka dot media/zhyony-rossijskih-voennosluzhashhih-rasskazyvayut-kak-ih-muzhya-pytayutsya-dezertirovat

[49] https://zona dot media/news/2025/06/26/20k500

[50] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2855

[51] https://t.me/petrlundstrem/30826

[52] https://t.me/petrlundstrem/30832

[53] https://t.me/tass_agency/328493 ; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202507310030

[54] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/news/2025/07/31/1128438-rodstvenniki-pogibshih

[55] publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202507310028 ; publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202507310029 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55163

[56] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2025