Toplines
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov outlined 10 priority objectives for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) during the Russian MoD Collegium on August 29.[1] These objectives indicate that the Kremlin is committed to its war in Ukraine and may be preparing for a larger confrontation with NATO in the medium term. Belousov stated that the MoD’s first objective is to achieve victory in Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war goals, and defined recruitment as a key issue for Russia’s ability to sustain offensive operations. Belousov claimed that Russia has successfully increased contract service recruitment in 2025 but indicated that Russia still needs to improve the Russian tactical groups’ rate of advance. Belousov claimed that the MoD plans to increase tactical drones and electronic warfare (EW) supply to frontline units, improve logistics support, improve drone training, and address Russia’s tactical battlefield awareness problems via the newly created Svod situational awareness system, which will undergo combat testing between September and November 2025.[2] Belousov defined Russia’s rearmament of strategic nuclear forces and space, air defense, EW, signals, unmanned and robotic artificial intelligence (AI) systems by 2036 as the MoD’s second priority objective.[3] The Russian MoD’s focus on unmanned systems and other emerging technologies indicates that the Kremlin is preparing to incorporate its combat lessons and technological innovations from its war in Ukraine into future military confrontations.
Belousov stated that the Russian MoD will modernize the Russian officer training protocols within the framework of the “Military Education – in the Service of the Fatherland” project, likely in an effort to address the Russian military command’s challenges with integrating new technologies.[4] Belousov stated that the MoD aims to update the list of Russian military specializations by the end of 2025 to account for assessed future military conflicts, the updated Russian Armed Forces structure, and new military equipment. Belousov stated that three unspecified Russian military academies will train officers in 11 new specialties, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and robotic systems. Russian MoD sources revealed in late July 2025 that Russia plans to reopen 15 higher military schools by 2034, including the Moscow Oblast Higher Military School for Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in 2027.[5] Putin notably ordered Belousov on August 21 to develop a counter-drone training course for Russian servicemen and volunteers by October 1.[6] The Russian MoD and the Kremlin are likely trying to address a persistent problem of the Russian military command being unable to effectively integrate emerging technologies, such as drones, into combat operations, because many Russian commanders are not tech-savvy.[7] A former Russian Storm Z instructor and milblogger noted that Russian military commanders often undermine the effectiveness of Russian drone units (which are reportedly banned from independently selecting their areas of responsibility and targets) because the commanders are not familiar with technological planning considerations such as EW coverage, radio horizons, and how weather conditions impact drones.[8]
Belousov stated that the Russian MoD plans to increasingly staff Russian combat medical units with civilian doctors and medical professionals, likely to mitigate acute shortages of medical personnel and casualties in the Russian military.[9] Belousov claimed that the MoD successfully integrated some medical volunteers into detachments, and noted that the MoD should expand such staffing practices across all Russian military districts as its fourth priority. Putin previously indicated on August 21 that the Kremlin is considering deploying Russian doctors to frontline hospitals without requiring them to sign military service contracts with the Russian MoD.[10] Belousov added that the MoD supplied all Russian units with first aid kits and is introducing new means for medical evacuation, and that Putin increased compensation for medical workers and doctors by 100 to 200 percent to expand staffing in medical units. Belousov claimed that 97 percent of wounded Russian servicemen currently return to the battlefield and attributed this trend to new medical technologies and the employment of medical professionals on the battlefield. Russian military commanders, however, have been steadily committing wounded personnel into assault operations without proper prior medical treatment and neglecting to evacuate wounded personnel in time.[11] ISW, for example, recently observed appeals from relatives of servicemen of the 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) complaining that Russian servicemen die on the battlefield due to a lack of medical assistance and evacuations.[12]
Belousov implied that the Russian MoD would continue to increasingly regulate the distribution of Russian state benefits to servicemen, veterans, and their families as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to minimize the economic burden of unregulated social benefits on the Russian federal budget.[13] Belousov claimed that the MoD significantly reduced the bureaucratic requirements necessary to receive regional and federal state benefits via the Vitrina Dannykh (Data Showcase) digital application. Belousov claimed that Russian officials administered over 300,000 documents via Vitrina Dannykh since May 2025 and will connect 25,000 Russian federal and regional authorities to the application by the end of 2025 to allow servicemen, veterans, and their families to obtain necessary documentation for state benefits. The Kremlin has recently begun to regulate the distribution of state benefits and is finding new pretexts to avoid allocating compensation to wounded and deceased personnel. The Main Military Investigative Department of the Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) reportedly concluded an investigation in late August 2025 against former 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade Commander Colonel Artem Gorodilov and former brigade Special Operations Group Chief Lieutenant Colonel Konstantin Frolov, who were arrested in June and July 2024 for allegedly running a state benefits corruption scheme.[14] Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) deputies proposed a bill on August 20 that would punish “black widows”—women who marry Russian servicemen fighting in Ukraine to take advantage of servicemen’s death benefits.[15] Russian commanders reportedly have systematically misreported deceased and wounded servicemen as absent without official leave (AWOL) in an effort to reduce state compensations to Russian families and manipulate statistics on Russian casualties.[16]
Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD is establishing a new system to silence Russian forces’ public appeals in the Russian information space.[17] Belousov stated that the MoD’s sixth objective is to reform a communications system between the MoD and Russian servicemen to record and address personnel problems on an individual level. Belousov claimed that the MoD created the Military Social Center to process personnel complaints. Belousov notably met with Russian milbloggers on August 14, likely as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to co-opt Russian ultranationalists who have routinely amplified servicemen’s complaints online.[18] The establishment of the MoD-controlled complaint system may allow the MoD and the Kremlin to silence or punish Russian servicemen who share their complaints via the server or in the Russian information space.
The Russian MoD remains committed to improving the Russian military’s administrative capacity by digitizing the Russian military registration system, which may allow the Kremlin to significantly expand the rate at which Russia can call up a larger volume of conscripts and reservists.[19] Belousov stated that the MoD’s tenth priority is to establish a unified digital system and announced that Russia has successfully established the Russian Unified registry for Military Registration, which is responsible for distributing conscription notices electronically. Belousov claimed that the Russian MoD undertook measures to speed up the development of the Alushta resource support software as part of the digitization effort. The Russian government reportedly activated the Russian Unified Registry for Military Registration in early May 2025, likely as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to reform the Russian conscription and mobilization apparatus and enhance Russia’s mobilization potential.[20] Russian officials already used the digital military registration system to ban a Russian military-aged man from leaving Russia in early September 2025 for the first time.[21]
Key Takeaways
- Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov outlined 10 priority objectives for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) during the Russian MoD Collegium on August 29. These objectives indicate that the Kremlin is committed to its war in Ukraine and may be preparing for a larger confrontation with NATO in the medium term.
- Russian authorities and informal recruiters continue to employ financial incentives, deception, and coercion to generate the manpower necessary to maintain Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and build out an active strategic reserve.
- The Kremlin has yet to address all bureaucratic problems that have emerged as a result of its use of irregular volunteers and conscripts in combat operations in Ukraine and Russia.
- Abusive leadership, extortion, and poor treatment of wounded soldiers continue to plague various Russian military units across the front line in Ukraine.·
- The Kremlin remains concerned that the mass return of Russian veterans from Ukraine may destabilize the regime.
Russian authorities and informal recruiters continue to employ financial incentives, deception, and coercion to generate the manpower necessary to maintain Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and build out an active strategic reserve. The Republic of Tatarstan and other Russian recruiters are targeting financially vulnerable recruits by offering debt relief of up to 10 million rubles ($119,547) in addition to promised multi-million regional enlistment bonuses, monthly salaries, and municipal compensations.[22] Russian federal subjects are also launching recruitment efforts targeting individuals with prior experience in Russian security structures and niche skill sets, with Saratov Oblast extending additional compensation of 500,000 rubles ($6,222) on top of regional and federal one-time bonuses to former security and emergency service employees who sign military service contracts between August 1 and December 31, 2025.[23] Russian recruiters are offering drone operators and drivers up to six million rubles ($71,731) in compensation for the first year of service and are also advertising 705,500 to over one million rubles ($8,427 to $12,497) in monthly salaries and six-month bonuses of 620,000 rubles ($7,412) to newly recruited Shahed drone operators.[24] Russia’s national average monthly salary is 103,000 rubles ($1,231) as of Summer 2025.[25] Russian officials are also continuing to deceive and coerce conscripts and foreigners to sign military service contracts with the Russian MoD.[26] Ukrainian forces captured a Kenyan athlete in Kharkiv Oblast who Russian recruiters deceived into military service in a unit alongside mostly Russian and some Belarusian and Tajik recruits.[27] The Ukrainian Khochu Zhyt (I Want to Live) initiative reported that 1,257 citizens of Central Asian countries are currently fighting for Russia in Ukraine.[28]
Russian recruiters are reportedly increasingly recruiting volunteers with HIV and hepatitis, further degrading Russian recruitment standards. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii uncovered dozens of advertisements for contracted military service on a Russian online job bulletin recruiting volunteers with HIV, hepatitis, and other medical conditions to operate in the rear and combat roles.[29] Recruiters told Vazhnye Istorii that Russian officials are only recruiting volunteers with HIV in Nizhny Novgorod City and are forming a separate detachment or a battalion for these volunteers, and a Russian milblogger confirmed that these recruits will participate in combat operations within these separate units.[30] Recruiters in cities of Ufa, Vologda, Cheboksary, and Voronezh are also reportedly targeting residents with hepatitis.
Russian force generation efforts are increasingly resembling complex business models rather than an ideologically driven recruitment campaign. Municipal authorities across Russia continue to offer financial incentives to residents to act as informal recruiters and bring civilians into military enlistment offices to sign military service contracts.[31] Cherdyn municipal authorities in Perm Krai and the Usolya-Sibrsk administration in Irkutsk Oblast, for example, are offering residents tens of thousands of rubles for any recruit that signs a military service contract.[32] Russian federal subjects’ distribution of financial incentives to informal recruiters not formally affiliated with the Russian MoD is creating new business and possible corruption schemes in Russia. A Russian source reportedly affiliated with Russian security services claimed that Yaroslavl City district administration officials are earning up to a million rubles ($12,445) weekly for recruiting manpower from pre-trial detention centers and that the Yaroslavl Oblast offers steep compensation to pre-trial detention leadership for each recruit.[33] A Russian political commentator claimed that the Kremlin’s force generation system relies on a competition in offered one-time enlistment bonuses between federal subjects because patriotic rhetoric and moral appeals are insufficient to maintain the necessary recruitment levels.[34] The commentator added that the Kremlin is using dynamic pricing for one-time enlistment bonuses to mitigate the financial burden that constantly growing compensations might have on the Russian federal budget.
Some Russian federal subjects, however, still appear to be unable to meet the Russian MoD’s recruitment quotas. A Yekaterinburg local outlet, citing sources in the Ural Federal Okrug, reported on September 2 that governors of the okrug’s federal subjects complained that they are unable to fulfill the Russian MoD’s recruitment plans.[35] The sources claimed that the Russian MoD reached a compromise with the regional leader to reduce punishments for failure to meet these recruitment quotas.
The Kremlin has yet to address all bureaucratic problems that have emerged as a result of its use of irregular volunteers and conscripts in combat operations in Ukraine and Russia. The Russian government extended on August 21 combat veteran statuses to security elements in the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Rosgvardia, and other non-military elements who defended against Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in 2024.[36] The Russian State Duma also approved on September 17 the extension of combat veteran statuses to volunteers in assault formations, likely referring to irregular forces such as prisoners.[37] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin also announced on August 28 that the Russian government approved a bill that would extend veteran statuses for Russian volunteers who signed military service contracts between October 2022 and September 2023, possibly referring to prisoners and recruits who fought in the Wagner Group and other irregular formations.[38] Russian conscripts who defended against Ukraine’s incursions into Russian border areas in 2024 continued to complain about not receiving appropriate compensation for their participation in combat operations.[39] The Kremlin has been balancing the need to compensate recruits within informal structures like private military companies (PMCs) and conscripts without directly acknowledging that these elements participated in Russian combat operations. The Kremlin does not want to acknowledge that these irregular elements and conscripts participated in combat operations to maintain a facade that Russia’s professional and volunteer-based military is fighting in Ukraine and minimize societal backlash over the use of these informal elements.
Russia likely still lacks the necessary administrative and training capacity to process a large number of mobilized servicemen while sustaining conscription and the current tempo of operations in Ukraine. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers adjusted the conscription regulations on August 29, allowing military-aged men who underwent conscription eligibility screening but were not selected for service to be conscripted without repeat screening for up to one year.[40] Russian State Duma deputies claimed that the bureaucratic processes for conscription will now occur on a year-long basis but that the deployment of conscripts to permanent duty stations will continue to take place over two three-month periods in the Fall and Spring.[41] The new regulations aim to alleviate bottlenecks in the Russian military administrative structures during these six months, which lack the necessary staff to select, examine, and deploy conscripts to their units. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik argued that Russia introduced the year-long conscription process because Russian medical institutions are overwhelmed, likely due to shortages of medical personnel in the Russian military and in Russia in general.[42] Russian Defense Committee Deputy Chairman Alexei Zhuravlyov similarly announced that Russian reservists can receive military ranks without undergoing prior military drills, which are normally necessary to confirm the reservists’ eligibility for military ranks.[43] Zhuravlyov’s statement indicates that the Kremlin may be considering removing the requirement of military drills for reservists to alleviate strains on the Russian training system.
The Kremlin is trying to address its force retention problems via increased financial incentives and coercion. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers announced on September 11 that Russian servicemen who signed military service contracts with the Russian MoD, conscripts, Rosgvardia elements, and employees of the MVD and Russian fire service will receive raises starting October 1, 2025.[44] The Russian government will reportedly increase the salary indexation from 4.5 percent to 7.6 percent.[45] The Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) proposed amendments on August 19 that would enable Russian military commanders to retain recruits past the maximum age for military service without undergoing the previously required medical examination.[46] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 22 that Russian commanders continue to coerce mobilized servicemen into signing military service contracts with the Russian MoD and are threatening them with deployments to assault units.[47] ISW previously observed reports that the Russian MoD considered partial demobilization of Russian servicemen to eliminate the mobilized servicemen as a class of forces and has been increasingly trying to find ways to retain mobilized and recruited personnel in the event of such demobilization.[48]
Abusive leadership, extortion, and poor treatment of wounded soldiers continue to plague various Russian military units across the front line in Ukraine. The Russian Ekho Moskvy radio station reported that Russian servicemen are complaining en masse about a growing number of extortion and corruption cases in the Russian military.[49] Ekho Moskvy reported that Russian military commanders, on average, demand that Russian servicemen pay 200,000 to 500,000 rubles ($2,383 to $5,959) to leave the front lines and threaten to commit Russian servicemen to deadly assaults in case they refuse to pay. Ekho Moskvy added that Russian commanders formed separate cells within military units for servicemen who refuse to pay and deprive servicemen of state benefits if they complain about extortion by declaring them as absent without official leave (AWOL). Russian independent investigative project Okno reported that Russian officials discharged a serviceman of the Russian 104th Regiment (military unit #54740) who regularly complained about constant physical abuse and extortion.[50] Russian officials reportedly falsely claimed that the serviceman had never fought in Ukraine because he was hospitalized in a psychiatric hospital, which effectively deprived him of veteran state benefits.
Commanders of the 3rd Assault Company of the 1st Battalion in the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), a regiment that ISW observed operating in the Lyman direction, reportedly physically assaulted a Russian serviceman after he refused to bribe the command to receive leave.[51] Servicemen of the 1st Mobile Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Central Military District [CMD]) published an appeal asking the Kremlin to investigate the brigade’s commander and other senior leaders for systemic theft, abuse of power, and corruption schemes involving state compensation for wounded personnel.[52] Russian sources also accused the military command of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD])—a regiment that ISW observed operating in the Sumy direction—of corruption, alcohol abuse, deliberate withholding of leave, and committing military specialists to attritional assaults as a punishment for witnessing the command’s corruption schemes.[53] Russian sources similarly accused recently dismissed 44th AC Commander Major General Alexander Dembitsky of committing elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division) to assaults to eliminate witnesses of his involvement with the Yastreb private military company (PMC).[54] ISW recently observed elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in the Sumy direction.[55]
A Russian serviceman complained that Russian military commanders of the 12th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], MMD) – which ISW observed operating in the Borova direction – committed servicemen to assaults without proper equipment.[56] Ukrainian forces published footage reportedly showing the command of the 155th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) executing a wounded Russian serviceman following a failed assault in the Kursk direction, and relatives of servicemen of the 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade published an appeal complaining that the Russian military command is not evacuating wounded personnel.[57] Russian sources also reported abuses of power in the newly formed 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC) operating in the Kharkiv direction; physical abuse and extortion in 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72th Motorized Rifle Division) in the Kharkiv direction; alcohol abuse and cruel punishment in the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division; threats of violence against servicemen of 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA) for refusing to return to combat due to previously sustained injuries and diagnosis with hepatitis.[58] A source reportedly affiliated with Russian security services reported that nearly 70 percent of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) new recruits have alcohol and drug addictions and that these recruits staff key positions in the BSF.[59] The source added that the BSF command actively punishes these recruits by transferring them to the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade, effectively degrading the brigade’s professionalism and its ”elite” status in the Russian Armed Forces.
The Kremlin remains concerned that the mass return of Russian veterans from Ukraine may destabilize the regime. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasiliy Anokhin discussed Smolensk Oblast’s efforts to establish a new psychiatric facility and other healthcare support for Russian veterans on September 10.[60] Putin frequently uses his meetings with governors to set information conditions for the Kremlin’s main objectives and policies, and the emphasis on veteran affairs indicates that the Kremlin remains worried about the need to reintegrate thousands of wounded and traumatized veterans into Russian society. Russian Federation Council Vice Speaker Vladimir Yakushev claimed that the Russian government adopted over 140 bills to support Russian servicemen, veterans, and their families over the past three years, and the Kremlin is likely introducing these laws because it is concerned that a growing civil society of disgruntled veterans may threaten the regime‘s stability.[61] Former Russian space agency Roscosmos head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin argued on September 15 that the Kremlin needs to actively consider the problem of reintegrating veterans into the Russian society and develop new jobs for them after the war.[62]
The Kremlin appears to be struggling to incentivize the Russian society to support the protracted war effort in Ukraine via volunteer movements. Russian opposition outlet The Insider, citing conversations with Russian crowdfunders, reported on August 25 that Russian society appears to be tired of the war and is less interested in donating supplies to Russian forces because of international discussions of a ceasefire or peace in Ukraine.[63]
[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/56033; https://t.me/mod_russia/56034; https://t.me/mod_russia/56035; https://t.me/mod_russia/56036; https://t.me/mod_russia/56038; https://t.me/mod_russia/56039; https://t.me/mod_russia/56040; https://t.me/mod_russia/56041 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/56042 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/56043
[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/56033
[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/56034
[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/56035
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-13-2025/
[6] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/68a714429a7947d0b3c5d61f; https://t.me/Lunay14/30234; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176806
[7] https://t.me/philologist_zov/3040 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3039 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3038 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3037 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3036 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3035 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3034 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3033 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3032 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3031
[8] https://t.me/philologist_zov/3040 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3039 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3038 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3037 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3036 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3035 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3034 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3033 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3032 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/3031
[9] https://t.me/mod_russia/56036; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67561; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22999
[10] https://t.me/tass_agency/332648; https://t.me/tass_agency/332649 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/332650; https://t.me/tass_agency/332652
[11] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/23726; https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/22/europe/russia-wounded-troops-frontline-latam-intl; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UsueXLIUnq0; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/11/odnogo-muhy-z%ca%bcyily-zazhyvo-poloneni-vorozhi-rozvidnyky-rozpovily-pro-realiyi-svoyeyi-sluzhby/; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1961353923995795602
[12] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/23726
[13] https://t.me/mod_russia/56038
[14] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7974835; https://gvs–spb dot sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&name_op=case&case_id=869726602&case_uid=57edc9b9-b3a7-4c33-934d-f91ce6bb73dd&delo_id=1610001&case_type=0&new=0&srv_num=1; https://235gvs–msk dot sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&name_op=case&case_id=1868228&case_uid=b0fefff1-1479-4469-9afa-c31ba755136d&delo_id=1610001&case_type=0&new=0&srv_num=1
[15] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/08/20/26531960.shtml; https://www.pnp dot ru/social/chernykh-vdov-boycov-svo-predlozhili-sazhat-v-tyurmu-na-10-let.html
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-13-2025/; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1965267131035254988
[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/56039
[18] https://t.me/wargonzo/28470
[19] https://t.me/mod_russia/56043
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025/
[21] https://t.me/pogranichnyi_control/3847; https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2025/09/12/fsb-nachala-zapreschat-viezd-za-granitsu-voennoobyazannim-a174271; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russians-eligible-for-military-service-are-being-blocked-from-traveling-abroad/; https://t.me/pogranichnyi_control/3847 ; https://t.me/istories_media/10366; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/09/12/voennoobyazannym-rossiyanam-nachali-zapreschat-vyezd-iz-strany-na-osnove-otmetok-v-elektronnom-reestre-voinskogo-ucheta
[22] https://t.me/milinfolive/156354; https://t.me/milinfolive/156008 ; https://t.me/idelrealii/42465; https://t.me/idelrealii/42462
[23i] https://t.me/sotaproject/101785 ; https://t.me/mininform_saratov/13657
[24] https://t.me/milinfolive/156008; https://t.me/stalins_sokol/88 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41870
[25] https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/wages
[26] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9697; https://t.me/severnnyi/5045 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22741
[27] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LpTgtPD0qu4; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-forces-capture-kenyan-citizen-forcibly-mobilized-by-russian-army/
[28] https://t.me/radiosvoboda/85256; https://t.me/severrealii/31369
[29] https://t.me/istories_media/10317; https://t.me/severrealii/31492; https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/news/2025/09/05/geroi-bez-ogranichenii/index.html; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/23712
[30] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1963213143976382549
[31] https://t.me/idelrealii/42374
[32] https://t.me/idelrealii/42374; https://t.me/sotaproject/102710 ; https://t.me/Baikal_People/11337
[33] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/4399
[34] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/18463
[35] https://t.me/uralinfozavod/2941
[36] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24844525
[37] https://t.me/tass_agency/338144
[38] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/25079329; https://t.me/tass_agency/334098
[39] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/7499
[40] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24908339 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/334345 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/23661
[41] https://fedpress dot ru/article/3401900.
[42] https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gosdume-obyasnili-dlya-chego-nuzhen-kruglogodichnyj-prizyv-v-armiyu
[43] https://realnoevremya dot ru/news/356464-prava-zapasnikov-kontraktnikov-poluchenie-zvaniy-bez-sborov
[44] https://ruinformer dot com/page/na-skolko-vyrastut-zarplaty-voennyh-s-1-oktjabrja-2025-goda
[45] https://t.me/tass_agency/337048
[46] https://t.me/sotaproject/101923; https://regulation dot gov.ru/projects/159466
[47] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13895
[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-23-2025
[49] https://echofm dot online/news/rossijskie-voennye-massovo-zhaluyutsya-na-vymogatelstva-v-armii; https://t.me/echoonline_news/16879; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/7543
[50] https://okno dot group/psih-war/
[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/78457; https://t.me/pionergrupa/8030?single; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2025/; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22602; https://t.me/pionergrupa/8030; https://t.me/dva_majors/78452
[52] https://t.me/ne_zhdi_novosti/3629; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22999; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/23797; https://t.me/severnnyi/4910
[53] https://t.me/severnnyirezerv/52; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2025/; https://t.me/severnnyi/4971; https://t.me/severnnyi/4972; https://t.me/severnnyi/4910; https://t.me/severnnyi/4990; https://t.me/severnnyi/5127
[54] https://t.me/severnnyi/4843; https://t.me/severnnyi/4789; https://t.me/severnnyi/4813; .https://t.me/severnnyi/5125
[55] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2025/
[56] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22989; https://t.me/ne_zhdi_novosti/3628
[57] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22543; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/23726; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/23726
[58] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/4305; https://t.me/severnnyi/4950; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22445; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/23633; https://t.me/severnnyi/4959; https://t.me/severnnyi/4835
[59] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/4874
[60] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/page/2
[61] https://t.me/tass_agency/338061
[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/79483; https://t.me/rogozin_do/7602
[63] https://theins dot ru/confession/283938
