Kateryna Stepanenko, Tetiana Trach, Nate Trotter, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, and Jessica Sobieski

June 18, 2025, 9:30am

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1 pm ET on June 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the next Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Report.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his commitment to raising a new elite comprised of loyal veterans via the Time of Heroes federal program, which appoints veterans into positions of federal, regional, and municipal power. Putin met with Time of Heroes participants on June 11 to commemorate Russia Day and stated that he had created the Time of Heroes program to ensure that future Russia is connected to Russian veterans.[1] Putin stated that 65,000 veterans applied to participate in the first two cohorts of the Time of Heroes program, and that 45 of the first 83 Time of Heroes participants received various appointments. Time of Heroes alumnus Captain Vladimir Saibel, who now serves as the Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Presidential Veterans’ Issues Commission, addressed the crowd by extolling the Time of Heroes participants and underscored the program’s ability to act as a vehicle for social mobility. Saibel notably pointed out his affiliation with the Russian Railways state company and noted that the Russian Railways is the largest company in Russia that supports Russian veterans and their families. Saibel’s mention of Russian Railways is likely part of the ongoing Kremlin effort to pressure Russian companies to hire Russian veterans and bear the burden of reintegrating Russian veterans into society.[2] Putin’s statements indicate that the Kremlin is prioritizing the Time of Heroes program’s focus on reintegrating servicemen to mitigate risks associated with veterans of the war in Ukraine returning to civilian life aggrieved and to bolster civil-military relations in an effort to sustain support for the war.[3]

Putin continued to elevate veteran influence in Russian society and signaled that military service in Ukraine is a core prerequisite for joining the Kremlin’s new elite. Putin also told Time of Heroes alumnus and the Commander of the 9th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), Major General Timur Kurilkin, that veterans like himself were part of his “team” since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in response to Kurilkin’s remark on how Time of Heroes program allowed him to join Putin’s team. Putin likely made this statement as a way to suggest that participation in the Russian war effort is one of the ways to join Putin’s inner circle. The Kremlin likely designed the Time of Heroes program to establish a cadre of militarized, loyal elites that will promote and safeguard the Kremlin’s interests.

Putin implied that Russian veterans would need to acquire a significant amount of experience before the Kremlin could entrust them with federal-level appointments, likely setting informational conditions to deny immediate integration of Russian veterans into Putin’s inner circle. Time of Heroes alumnus and former airborne (VDV) serviceman Nursultan Mussagalyeev told Putin that the Time of Heroes program enabled him to first become the deputy minister of Orenburg Oblast’s information policy and later assume a municipal head post in Novosergeyevsky Raion, Orenburg Oblast. Mussagalyeev restated Putin’s justification for empowering Russian veterans, arguing that military service proves that Russian veterans are not afraid to take on responsibility and make important decisions as part of the new elite. Putin responded by agreeing with Mussagalyeev but implied that veterans need to learn and improve their competencies, skills that Russian veterans can acquire at the municipal level.

Senior Kremlin officials reportedly stated that some Time of Heroes alumni and veterans are already making steep demands to be appointed to senior Kremlin positions. Putin may be introducing some barriers to temper veterans’ expectations and prevent veterans from making lofty demands. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated on June 9 that organizers of the Time of Heroes program, such as Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko said that there are problems with the program and that not all Russian veterans can adapt to their new appointments in the public administration or economy sectors.[4] The milblogger claimed that Time of Heroes participants face problems such as having their curators or responsibilities change, or having to undergo additional education. The milblogger claimed that some veterans are already demanding promotions to high-ranking positions as regional governors or federal ministers and that the Kremlin has to explain to veterans that their professional development as military personnel will differ from the civilian career paths in the government. The milblogger explained that the Russian MoD has a linear promotion trajectory where officers receive promotions based on an outlined hierarchy and time spent within the Russian Armed Forces. The milblogger noted that the Russian government does not have a linear promotion trajectory and often promotes people based on their unique professional and educational backgrounds. The milblogger noted that the Kremlin administers the Time of Heroes program in person and online and that some veterans need to undergo additional training to receive further promotions.

The Kremlin may once again inadvertently nurture a threat to Putin’s regime stability by emboldening veterans who may use their influence to advance their personal, financial, or political ambitions at the expense of Putin’s regime. Putin is platforming veterans and transforming this demographic into one of the most influential groups in Russia in an effort to buttress credibility for Putin’s regime and its war efforts. Putin’s continued rhetorical emphasis on veterans’ authority in Russia may backfire, however, by enabling empowered Russian veterans to blackmail the Kremlin. Putin may be less likely to publicly punish or demote veterans in positions of power, as such a decision would undermine the Kremlin’s effort to retain veterans’ loyalty to the regime and manufacture public support for the war. This strategy comes with risk, however. Putin’s previous accommodation of niche organizations fostered threats to Putin’s power vertical. Putin’s decision to empower Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and grant the Wagner Group special permissions and privileges ultimately created the conditions that enabled Prigozhin to weaponize and leverage the Kremlin’s reliance on Wagner forces to Prigozhin’s selfish ends.[5] Putin’s empowerment of Russian veterans runs the risk of following a similar path if the Kremlin does not control veterans’ expectations and demands early on. 

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his commitment to raising a new elite comprised of loyal veterans via the Time of Heroes federal program, which appoints veterans into positions of federal, regional, and municipal power.
• Senior Kremlin officials reportedly stated that some Time of Heroes alumni and veterans are already making steep demands to be appointed to senior Kremlin positions. Putin may be introducing some barriers to temper veterans’ expectations and prevent veterans from making lofty demands.
• The Kremlin may once again inadvertently nurture a threat to Putin’s regime stability by emboldening veterans who may use their influence to advance their personal, financial, or political ambitions at the expense of Putin’s regime.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts 

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly recruited almost 90,000 personnel during the first three months of 2025 by exceeding the federal recruitment budget for 2025.

Russian Involuntary Military Service

• Russian officials denied the need to conduct another mobilization wave in response to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov’s call on the Kremlin to mobilize 500,000 to one million soldiers.

Russian Force Centralization

• Russia’s crowdfunding efforts in support of the Russian military have dramatically declined in 2024, likely as a direct result of the Kremlin’s growing restrictions on Russian crowdfunding efforts since early 2023.

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring

• Putin confirmed that Russia is forming a separate military branch for unmanned systems called the Unmanned System Forces (USF) and attempted to deflect criticism for the belated establishment of this branch.

Russian Defense Industrial Base

• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec for failing to reverse engineer Western-provided Ukrainian weaponry.

Technological Adaptations

• The Russian Cabinet of Ministers announced on June 13 that Russian developers tested laser anti-drone systems, which will reportedly make up Russia’s universal air defense system.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Assessed Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization and undermining regime stability)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly recruited almost 90,000 personnel during the first three months of 2025 by exceeding the federal recruitment budget for 2025. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) reported on June 9, using the data on Russian federal budget expenditures, that 89,600 people signed military contracts with the Russian MoD in the first quarter of 2025, which is 22 percent more than Russia recruited in the same period in 2024 when Russia reportedly recruited 73,400 personnel in the first quarter of 2024.[6]  IStories estimated that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent estimate that Russia recruits 50,000 to 60,000 per month is 1.8 times higher than the monthly recruitment rate from the first quarter, which is about 29,766 recruits per month. ISW previously assessed that the Russian MoD may be misrepresenting by presenting inflated Russian recruitment rates, which may explain the discrepancy in official recruitment rates.[7]

IStories reported that the Kremlin allocated 35.8 billion rubles ($455.3 million) from the federal budget to compensate recruits who signed military service contracts with the Russian MoD. IStories observed that the Kremlin had already exceeded the 30 billion ruble ($381.5 million) federal budget allocated for 2025.[8] Russian federal subjects have been increasingly offering steep one-time enlistment bonuses to attract recruits in late 2024 and early 2025, which may explain the comparative spike in recruitment during the first quarter.[9] The BBC Russian Service calculated on June 16 that at least 26 Russian federal subjects increased one-time payments to recruits at least once in 2025.[10] BBC Russian Service reported that Moscow and Tula oblasts offer the highest regional enlistment payments, which amount to 2.6 million rubles ($33,128). BBC Russian Service also reported that 37 Russian federal subjects are offering recruits over two million rubles ($25,475) in one-time enlistment bonuses, which include federal, regional, and municipal payments.[11] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin’s intensified but unsustainable recruitment tactics, such as providing increased enlistment bonuses and other deceptive measures, could result in a decline in Russian recruitment rates in the long term.[12] Russia’s recruitment efforts continue to prove costly and may be unsustainable in the future unless Russia’s economy and society undergo significant sacrifices to sustain the war effort.

Russian military recruitment centers are relying on local officials and civilians to informally recruit personnel into the Russian military. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on June 11 that Russian recruitment centers are paying Russian citizens — including mothers, military personnel, and former human resources managers — anywhere from 5,000 to 300,000 rubles (roughly $63 to $3,815) to informally recruit other Russian citizens remotely through Telegram channels into the Russian military.[13] Verstka also reported that Russian recruitment centers are actively relying on young women to advertise military contract service with the Russian MoD online. ISW previously reported that municipalities in Vladimir Oblast and the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug signed contracts with Russian patriotic centers in a similar attempt to shift the recruitment burden away from Russian military recruitment centers.[14]

The Kremlin continues to set legal conditions to permit Russia to recruit military personnel from former Soviet Union countries into the Russian military. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on June 12 authorizing military personnel from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries to remain in Russia without the typical processing measures, such as a medical examination, photographing, and fingerprinting.[15] Russian opposition outlet Sota assessed that the presidential decree will facilitate the Russian military’s covert recruitment in support of Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.

Russian Involuntary Military Service (Assessed Russian objective: Expand Russia’s inactive reserve via conscription and enhance Russian administrative capacity regarding military mobilization)

Russian officials denied the need to conduct another mobilization wave in response to the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov’s call on the Kremlin to mobilize 500,000 to one million soldiers. Alaudinov called on the Kremlin on June 13 to conduct a compulsory reserve call-up of 500,000 to one million Russian men against the backdrop of Israel’s air campaign targeting the Iranian nuclear program.[16] Russian officials immediately rejected Alaudinov’s calls, likely to prevent panic in Russian society, which remains averse to involuntary military mobilization. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Viktor Zavarzin claimed on June 13 that the Russian military now has “strategic successes” on the frontline in Ukraine and that there is no need for Russia to mobilize personnel.[17] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Putin decided not to mobilize additional personnel because Russian soldiers currently fighting in Ukraine are well-trained.[18] Kolesnik argued that each Russian soldier in the field is worth 10 newly mobilized men in terms of experience and mental stamina, falsely implying that the current Russian military is a professional and volunteer force.[19] Russian officials’ statements are in line with Putin’s recent reiteration that the Russian state is committed to continuing volunteer and crypto recruitment as the main method of generating forces, likely to preserve Putin’s regime stability, as ISW previously observed.[20]

Force Retention (Assessed Russian objective: Set conditions that would allow the Russian military to retain its mobilized personnel, contract soldiers, and irregular forces over the long term)

Select Russian federal subjects and municipal administrations may be failing to provide promised one-time enlistment bonuses to mobilized personnel who sign military service contracts. A local Krasnoyarsk Krai Telegram channel reported on June 12 that a mobilized serviceman from Krasnoyarsk City signed a military service contract with the Russian MoD in February 2024, after which he was supposed to receive federal, regional, and municipal payments.[21] The channel reported that the serviceman did not receive regional or municipal payments from Krasnoyarsk Krai officials. The channel reported that the serviceman appealed to two regional military courts to no avail and finally turned to the Russian General Prosecutor’s Office. Russian milbloggers previously complained about the Russian MoD failing to offer mobilized servicemen sufficient financial and career incentives to retain these forces in the Russian military, should the Russian military demobilize.[22]

Russian Force Centralization (Assessed Russian objective: Centralize the state’s control over informal volunteer-based units that emerged in early 2022 after the Kremlin failed to declare general mobilization)

Russia’s crowdfunding efforts in support of the Russian military have dramatically declined in 2024, likely as a direct result of the Kremlin’s growing restrictions on Russian crowdfunding efforts since early 2023. Verstka reported on June 16 that Russian volunteers, activists, and organizations donated 39.1 billion rubles ($498.1 million) to Russian soldiers in 2023.[23] Verstka reported that Russian civil society donated only 11.8 billion rubles ($150.3 million) to Russian forces in 2024, which is 3.5 times less than the amount that Russians crowdfunded in 2023. Verstka reported that the number of Telegram crowdfunding posts decreased only marginally from 13,700 posts in 2023 to 13,100 posts in 2024. Verstka reported that Russians are struggling to incentivize Russians to donate money in support of the war effort. Verstka also reported that the Kremlin does not support independent crowdfunding efforts because they expose deficiencies in Russian military procurement and sustainment. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 29 that Russian volunteers only aid individual Russian soldiers because Russian military commanders punish servicemen who appeal to volunteers for humanitarian assistance.[24] ISW recently observed that the Kremlin announced the introduction of separate charitable accounts for personal donations in an effort to centralize state control over crowdfunding.[25] The Kremlin has been increasingly imposing restrictions on the use of personal vehicles on the frontlines to inhibit informal crowdfunding efforts that organically emerged in 2022.[26]

The Russian State Duma introduced a bill that would offer military ranks to Russian volunteers, possibly further degrading the professionalism of the Russian military. The Russian Government submitted a bill to the Russian State Duma that seeks to amend the law “On Military Duty and Military Service,” to allow volunteers in the Russian inactive reserve (zapas) to obtain military ranks without participating in reserve call-ups.[27] The amendment would allow citizens who served for at least six months in volunteer formations and in the zapas to receive military ranks without undergoing involuntary military reserve call-ups. The Kremlin had been increasingly simplifying eligibility requirements for professional military service in an effort to attract more recruits at the expense of the Russian military’s professionalism.[28]

The Russian government is failing to distribute state compensation to former Wagner Group personnel who fought in Ukraine, which the Kremlin promised when it dismantled and reestablished administrative control over the Wagner Group as part of its centralization effort. Relatives of Wagner Group personnel from Omsk Oblast appealed to Putin on Russia Day on June 12 for help in their efforts to receive state veteran benefits. The family members claimed that Russian officials are denying Wagner personnel promised compensation, claiming that Wagner personnel are legally classified as “volunteers” of an illegal Russian private military company (PMC) and therefore not entitled to any payments. Putin and the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund have repeatedly assured the families that authorities will allocate state benefits to Wagner personnel who fought in Ukraine and their families. Putin explicitly stated in December 2024 that Russian authorities would ensure that all Russian servicemembers, including former Wagner PMC forces, would receive combat veteran status and the corresponding benefits.[29] The Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund and the Russian MoD previously agreed in June 2024 to coordinate efforts to “restore the rights” of veterans who served in the Wagner Group to receive the same benefits as other veterans of the war in Ukraine.[30]

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring (Assessed Russian objective: Restructure the Russian military to maintain the war in Ukraine while preparing for a potential large-scale conventional war with NATO)

Putin confirmed that Russia is forming a separate military branch for unmanned systems called the Unmanned System Forces (USF) and attempted to deflect criticism for the belated establishment of this branch. Putin announced on June 12 during a meeting on the Russian State Rearmament Program for 2027-2036 that Russia is forming the USF as a separate military branch and indirectly rejected criticisms that Russia is belatedly forming the USF.[31] Putin claimed that he does not think that Russia is late in developing the USF and that Russian forces have gathered enough experience with drone operator training and drone production that will support the formation of these forces. Ukraine notably began forming its own separate unmanned systems branch within the Ukrainian Armed Forces in February 2024, and the Kremlin only signaled the intent to form the Russian USF in November 2024.[32] Putin noted that Russian drone operators are responsible for destroying and damaging up to 50 percent of Ukrainian equipment and facilities and that the effectiveness of Russian drone operators is constantly growing. The Russian MoD has reportedly been removing drone operators who organically emerged as informal units within the Russian military since August 2024, likely as part of the Kremlin’s campaign to form centralized drone units as part of the USF. The Russian MoD and the Kremlin’s efforts to centralize control over informal drone units may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slow the Russian unmanned systems innovation cycle, as the decentralized nature of drone operations has given both Russian and Ukrainian drone operators advantages in developing combat techniques and technological adaptations.[33]

The Russian 88th “Hispaniola” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly recently formed a naval detachment. Russian milbloggers claimed on June 7, 8, and 10 that elements of the “Hispanola” Volunteer Brigade’s naval detachment were striking Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicles (USV) near the coast of occupied Crimea.[34]

Luhansk Oblast occupation officials reportedly formed three new Cossack Cadet Corps since 2023. The Ataman of the All-Russian Cossack Society Vitaly Kuznetsov told Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik on June 11 that occupied Luhansk Oblast is the only occupied territory to form three Cossack Cadet Corps since 2023.[35] Pasechnik noted that over 19,000 Cossacks are currently fighting for Russia in Ukraine. ISW previously reported on Russia’s reliance on the Cossack Cadet Corps to build out its active reserves over the long term.[36] The strength of these new cadet corps is unknown, though they are likely smaller than typical Russian regular ground forces corps.

Integration of Veterans into Russian Society (Assessed Russian objective: Mitigate the risk of veterans emerging as a political group in a way that could erode the stability of the Russian state)

The Russian government continued efforts to appease veterans and their families by offering payments and other government compensation. The Russian State Duma adopted a law on June 10 simplifying inheritance registration for relatives of Russian soldiers and other persons who died in a combat zone.[37] The law will come into effect on July 15, 2025.

Russian authorities are reportedly threatening relatives who seek to verify the cause of death and the identities of Russian soldiers killed in action (KIA). Radio Svoboda stated on June 14 that Russian authorities are delivering bodies of KIA Russian soldiers to their relatives in sealed coffins without medical certificates or personal belongings. Russian authorities are also reportedly threatening relatives with prosecution if they attempt to open the coffins for autopsies and identification.[38] Relatives of KIA Russian soldiers told Radio Svoboda that authorities often fail to provide information or formal documentation regarding the circumstances of their relatives’ deaths and characterized medical paperwork as “worthless” due to its lack of specific death certification information. A Russian widow of a KIA Russian soldier reported that she conducted an autopsy despite threats from officials and that this autopsy indicated that the body repatriated to her by Russian authorities was not the body of her husband.

Russian Command Changes and Chain of Command (Russian command appointments, dismissals, and casualties among senior Russian military commanders)

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov recently inspected the performance of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF). The Russian MoD claimed on June 13 that Gerasimov traveled to an unspecified frontline command post of the Western GoF, inspected the Western GoF, and received briefings from Western GoF Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlyev and other officials.[39] Gerasimov reportedly congratulated the Western GoF for its success in the war against Ukraine, presented Russian servicemembers with awards, and provided instructions for the Western GoF’s further military operations against Ukraine. Gerasimov reportedly previously visited the Southern GoF command post on the frontlines in Ukraine in February 2025 and inspected unspecified Russian positions in occupied Ukraine in late March 2025.[40]

Russian Defense Industrial Base (Assessed Russian objective: Increase Russia’s defense industrial base production to support Russian war efforts)

Russian President Vladimir Putin recently outlined Russia’s 2027-2036 armament program priorities possibly in preparation for a conflict with NATO. Putin opened the June 12 round of government discussions on the Russian State Rearmament Program for 2027-2036, which focused on the modernization and improvement of Russian air defense, space, drone, and robotic systems.[41] A Russian source reportedly affiliated with the Kremlin claimed on June 12 that Putin’s statements regarding defense systems for Russian airbases indicate that Russian defense planning is expanding beyond the current war against Ukraine and moving into strategic planning for the next decade.[42] The source claimed that Russia’s military is adapting to a new reality of modern warfare, in which the quantity of materiel reserves matters less than the ability to quickly deploy equipment to the frontlines without sustaining losses of manpower or materiel. The source also claimed that the Kremlin signaled its intent to maintain high defense spending even if the intensity of Russia’s war against Ukraine decreases. It remains unclear how Russia will finance large-scale force reconstitution and modernization if the international community continues to sanction Russia and Russia continues to lose significant resources from its war in Ukraine.

Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec for failing to reverse engineer Western-provided Ukrainian weaponry. Rostec Head Sergey Chemezov stated in an interview with a Russian magazine Razvedchik on June 10 that Rostec specialists carefully examine all foreign equipment captured on the battlefield in Ukraine.[43] Chemezov said that not all foreign weaponry designs are applicable for reverse engineering and reproduction by Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB), however. Chemezov stated that the German-made Leopard tank, the US-made Abrams tank, and Bradley armored fighting vehicle (AFV) do not have any technological innovations and that Rostec has nothing to learn from reverse engineering these vehicles. A Russian milblogger responded to Chemezov’s statements on June 11 by claiming that Soviet specialists meticulously examined even the least technologically developed foreign equipment, implying that Rostec should pay more attention to analyzing foreign designs for Russian production.[44] Another Russian milblogger implied on June 14 that Rostec failed to thoroughly inspect Bradleys and implied that Rostec specialists have a restricted vision of military development and fail to respond to modern realities.[45]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Assessed Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces likely used the new jet-powered Geran-3/Shahed-238 drone variant to strike Kyiv City on June 11. Ukrainian military outlet Defense Express reported on June 11 that Russia presumably used a new jet-powered Geran-3 drone (a Russian name for the Shahed-238 drone that Iran first presented in November 2023) to strike Kyiv City on June 11.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 12 that jet-powered Geran-3 drones have a shorter flight range than typical Geran drones but can reach higher speeds and more easily outmaneuver air defense systems.[47] ISW previously reported that Russian forces first utilized the Geran-3 to conduct strikes against Ukraine on January 8 and most recently to conduct a massive strike against Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18 as part of Russia’s continued efforts to innovate their long-range drone strike tactics to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems.[48]

Russian forces appear to be repurposing Kerch Airport in occupied Crimea to launch Shahed drones against Ukraine. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Schemy investigative unit published satellite imagery on June 12 that shows fortifications and camouflaged structures at Kerch Airport, indicating that Russia likely recently converted the airport to support military operations.[49] Schemy reported that the new construction is likely designed for storing anti-aircraft missile systems such as the Pantsir-S1 or Tor-M2 and for manning, storing, and launching long-range UAVs. Schemy also reported that a Russian State Register of Real Estate document claimed that Russian occupation officials indefinitely transferred the ownership of some of the airport’s land plots to the Russian MoD on March 4.

Russian developers tested a new long-range drone prototype in Tomsk Oblast. Russian local TV channel TV2 reported on June 6 that the Tomsk-based Russian Scientific Production Center “BAS TO” tested a long-range drone prototype at the Golovino Airfield in Golovina, Tomsk Oblast, and the flight-testing complex in Parabel, Tomsk Oblast. The Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) reportedly manages the Golovino Airfield. TV2 reported that Russian developers are planning to gradually increase UAV’s dimensions with the goal of increasing its flight range to 1,000 kilometers and payload to 200 kilograms. TV2 reported that Tomsk Oblast officials allocated 2.5 billion rubles ($31.8 million) to establish the Russian Scientific Production Center “BAS TO.”

Russian developers continue to modify drones with fiber-optic cables.  Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov published a photo on June 12 of a Russian fiber-optic drone equipped with a landing mount that enables the drone to loiter for extended periods of time before striking a target.[50]

A Russian milblogger implied that Russian forces successfully extended the range of the Lancet loitering munition to over 50 kilometers. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 11 that footage indicates that Russian forces have struck multiple Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicles (USV) in the Black Sea with Lancet drones, including several at a range of over 50 kilometers.[51]

The Russian Cabinet of Ministers announced on June 13 that Russian developers tested laser anti-drone systems, which will reportedly make up Russia’s universal air defense system.[52]  The Russian Cabinet of Ministers claimed that Russian developers tested the laser systems at an unspecified specialized training ground and that Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov participated in the laser testing. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers added that the Russian Military-Industrial Complex Board, the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, and subsidiary companies within Rostec and the Russian state atomic energy corporation Rosatom organized the testing session. Russian developers tested the laser’s reaction speed against moving air targets, performance in different weather conditions, destruction range, and guidance accuracy. Russian developers reportedly tested eight anti-drone laser systems with various powers against small-sized commercial UAVs, reconnaissance drones, and decoy long-range strike drones. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on June 9 that Ukraine does not have information that Russia is using laser weapons against Ukraine, but noted that there is a possibility of future laser weapons use.[53] Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces tested laser air defense systems to shoot down Ukrainian drones.[54]

Significant Russian Military Exercises (Assessed Russian objective: Build force capabilities, improve interoperability among Russian military units, exchange combat experience, and achieve informational objectives by publicly projecting Russian military capabilities.)

The Russian Pacific Fleet is conducting a training exercise in the Pacific Ocean. The Russian MoD announced on June 15 that Russian Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief Admiral Viktor Liina will lead the Pacific Fleet’s planned exercises at the fleet’s operational zone in the Pacific Ocean, including in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, from June 16 to 30.[55] The Pacific Fleet is deploying up to 40 ships, including boats and support vessels, over 30 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, and over 5,000 military personnel and civilian specialists, including Bastion coastal missile systems combat crews for the exercise. ISW previously reported that the Northern, Pacific, and Baltic fleets and the Caspian Flotilla conducted planned naval exercises on July 30, 2024, with 300 surface vessels, submarines, and other support vessels; 50 aircraft; 200 units of special equipment; and 20,000 military and civilian personnel.[56]

Russian State Recognition of Officers and Military Units: (Assessed Russian objective: Honor specific Russian units for service, achievements, and hardships in Ukraine and incentivize service in distinguished units)

Donetsk Oblast occupation officials recently awarded combat veteran statuses to elements of the “Kaskad” Separate Combat Tactical Formation, likely as part of the Kremlin’s force centralization effort. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin and the Russian National Defense Control Center’s Deputy Head Lieutenant General Yuri Korsachev awarded combat veteran certificates to 30 servicemen of the “Kaskad” Separate Combat Tactical Formation who participated in the seizure of Mariupol and combat operations in the Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, Volnovakha, and Kherson directions.[57] ISW most recently observed elements of the “Kaskad” formation near Korenevo, Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[58] Pushilin noted that the awards granted state benefits to “Kaskad” servicemen, and ISW previously reported that “Kaskad” servicemen complained about the Russian MoD’s unwillingness to grant them combat veteran certificates and monetary and social benefits due to “Kaskad’s” status as an irregular unit.[59] ISW previously reported that the ”Kaskad” formation was part of the DNR Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD), but the Russian military command dissolved the ”Kaskad” formation in late December 2023, likely as part of the Russian MoD and Kremlin’s efforts to formalize control over irregular forces.[60]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77178 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53712

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans

[4] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13382

[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2

[6] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/news/2025/06/09/v-pervom-kvartale-2025-goda-kontrakt-s-minoboroni-podpisali-pochti-90-tis-rossiyan/index.html ; https://t.me/istories_media/9758

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025

[8] https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/news/2024/10/04/rossiya-planiruet-nabrat-na-kontrakt-s-minoboroni-ne-menee-255-tisyach-chelovek-v-blizhaishie-tri-goda/index.html?tg_rhash=a8983ea609be7d

[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-15-2025

[10] https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cm2kl410w00o

[11] https://t.me/severrealii/30729

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025

[13] https://verstka dot media/kak-rossiyane-zarabatyvayut-otpravlyaya-drug-druga-na-voinu

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025

[15] https://t.me/sotaproject/99114; http://publication dot pravo dot gov dot ru/document/0001202506120001?pageSize=10&index=1

[16] https://t.me/AptiAlaudinovAKHMAT/11388

[17] https://rtvi dot com/news/v-gosdume-otreagirovali-na-prizyv-alaudinova-mobilizovat-500-tys-chelovek/

[18] https://aif dot ru/politics/v-gosdume-zayavili-chto-v-rossii-ne-planiruetsya-novoy-volny-mobilizacii

[19] https://aif dot ru/politics/v-gosdume-zayavili-chto-v-rossii-ne-planiruetsya-novoy-volny-mobilizacii

[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025

[21] https://t.me/typkra/29650 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/23090

[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025

[23] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6998 ; https://verstka dot media/my-sami-sebya-obespechivaem-kak-v-rossii-tri-goda-sobirayut-dengi-na-vojnu

[24] https://t.me/romanov_92/47373

[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-30-2025

[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations

[27] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24179363

[28] https://www.currenttime dot tv/a/russian-contractees/31915617.html; https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-61712941

[29] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024

[30] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2024

[31] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77180

[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations

[33] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations

[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/72953; https://t.me/dva_majors/72954; https://t.me/dva_majors/73153; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93123

[35] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/3876

[36] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2024

[37] http://duma.gov dot ru/news/61579/; https://t.me/sheremet_82/15340 ; https://t.me/er_molnia/14379

[38] https://t.me/idelrealii/41492; https://www.svoboda dot org/a/semyam-pogibshih-rossiyskih-voennyh-zapreschayut-vskryvat-groby/33440725.html

[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/53730

[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/49210; https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2025-03-21/russian-military-chief-gerasimov-inspects-forces-in-ukraine-tass-says

[41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061325

[42] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/17893

[43] https://rostec dot ru/media/news/sergey-chemezov-doveriya-k-zapadnym-partneram-bolshe-net-i-ne-budet-nikogda/#start ; www dot svr.gov.ru/upload/iblock/b60/10062025.pdf

[44] https://t.me/iron_wind/1377

[45] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2559

[46] https://defence-ua dot com/news/pid_chas_ataki_po_kijevu_rf_vikoristala_novij_reaktivnij_shahed_virogidno_rosijskogo_virobnitstva_geran_3-19140.html ; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1933095087543669056 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93305

[47] https://t.me/milinfolive/150287; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russians-demonstrate-jet-version-of-shahed-kamikaze-drone/  

[48] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2024

[49] https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/news-skhemy-aeroport-kerch-bpla/33440974.html

[50] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5750 ; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02s8kVV2ZHZBZLDvSMWmZ66z1zGmw6Hozg3JnjX2W5LcPScnm9HnKdyBDCtRBsm5z7l

[51] https://t.me/rusich_army/24075; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/168043

[52] https://t.me/tass_agency/319835; https://t.me/tass_agency/319847 ; https://belta dot by/tech/view/v-rossii-uspeshno-ispytali-perspektivnye-lazernye-sistemy-protivodejstvija-bpla-720824-2025/ ; https://t.me/basurin_e/19322; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24211901; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93417; https://t.me/bazabazon/38253; https://t.me/astrapress/83792https://t.me/astrapress/83792; http://government dot ru/news/55350/

[53] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025

[54] https://isw.pub/ForceGen060625

[55] https://t.me/mod_russia/53824

[56] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2024

[57] https://t.me/PushilinDenis/6691

[58] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2024

[59] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2024

[60] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-30-2023