Toplines
Russia is blocking WhatsApp and other Western social media platforms, media outlets, and means of bypassing internet restrictions as part of an intensification of the Kremlin’s campaign to reassert control over the Russian information space and prevent access to the global internet.[1] Meta-owned messaging application WhatsApp reported on the evening of February 11 that the Russian government attempted to fully block access to WhatsApp and isolate over 100 million users.[2]Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed on February 12 that Russia began restricting WhatsApp due to Meta’s alleged unwillingness to comply with Russian laws, likely referring to Russia’s heavy censorship laws.[3] Peskov stated that Russia would only remove the restrictions on WhatsApp if Meta is willing to comply with Russian laws and engage with Russian authorities.
Russian opposition outlets reported on February 11 that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor blocked WhatsApp, YouTube, Facebook, Facebook Messenger, Instagram, the Tor browser, the BBC, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), RFE/RL’s Systema investigative project, Deutsche Welle, the Moscow Times, virtual private network (VPN) service Windscribe, and a site for installing applications onto Android smartphones to bypass application stores.[4] The opposition outlets reported that Roskomnadzor removed these sites from Russia’s National Domain Name System (NSDS), part of Russia’s sovereign “RuNet” internet system that uses state-controlled domain name servers (DNS) to match IP addresses with domain addresses and connect users with websites. Russian telecommunications providers are legally required to use the NSDS, therefore routing internet traffic through the RuNet-controlled DNS and prevent users from accessing websites not on the NSDS.[5] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii noted that it is unclear when Roskomnadzor removed these websites from the NSDS and that users can manually bypass these blocks by changing the DNS server their devices use to browse the internet.[6] Vazhnye Istorii reported that Roskomnadzor only blocked the WhatsApp web browser and that many users are still able to send messages through the WhatsApp application on their devices. Vazhnye Istorii reported that Roskomnadzor began throttling WhatsApp in December 2025 and that while there have been spikes in reports of issues with WhatsApp and YouTube in recent days, these spikes are still relatively small and do not suggest widespread issues accessing the services.
The Kremlin’s restrictions against WhatsApp and other Western social media platforms, news outlets, and online services follow Russian throttling of Telegram on February 9 and 10.[7] The Kremlin is likely intensifying efforts to restrict access to Telegram, WhatsApp, and other Western social media platforms, news sites, and internet services in order to incentivize Russians to switch to state-controlled messenger app Max, as previous Russian efforts to do so have been largely ineffective.[8] ISW will outline the Kremlin’s intensified efforts to regain control over the Russian information space and dismantle the open internet in Russia in a forthcoming special report.
Ukrainian forces are conducting localized and opportunistic counterattacks near the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border, likely to take advantage of recent blocks on Starlink terminals and Telegram. Geolocated footage published on February 12 shows Russian strikes against static Ukrainian positions east of the Haichur River, including east of and in southern Dobropillya and north of Varvarivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[9] This footage indicates that Ukrainian forces likely maintained control of these positions prior to February 12 and are likely using localized counterattacks to reconnect these frontline positions to each other. Russian forces likely bypassed these Ukrainian positions during infiltration missions to exaggerate the extent of Russian gains in the area. ISW began observing reports of limited and localized Ukrainian counterattacks near the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border on February 9.[10] Russian milbloggers initially portrayed these counterattacks as a broader Ukrainian “counteroffensive,” but Ukrainian military sources and some Russian milbloggers have since indicated that the Ukrainian counterattacks are limited in scale and span.[11] Russian milbloggers have continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting counterattacks north and northwest of Hulyaipole, but noted that the situation on the ground is unclear due to degraded Russian communications on the frontline.[12]
Ukrainian tactical counterattacks in this area are likely an opportunistic response to favorable battlefield conditions. A senior NATO official told the BBC’s Russia service on February 11 that at least some of the Ukrainian battlefield successes in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast are due to SpaceX’s efforts to prevent Russian forces from using Starlink terminals in early February 2026.[13] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there are “new complicating factors” to Russian communication issues from restrictions on Russian Starlink access.[14] The milblogger is likely alluding to Russia’s restrictions on the use of Telegram since February 9, which Russian forces on the frontline have also used for communications. Russian milbloggers have been warning that the Kremlin’s decision to block Telegram at the same time as SpaceX’s restrictions on Russian Starlink usage will severely impact Russian communications in the near-term.[15] Ukrainian counterattacks in the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area likely seek to exploit these recent Russian communication and command-and-control (C2) challenges.
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Russian military, defense industrial, and oil infrastructure on the night of February 11 to 12, including with Ukrainian-produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a FP-5 Flamingo strike on an arsenal of the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) near Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast (roughly 320 kilometers from the international border).[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the GRAU arsenal near Kotluban is one of Russia’s largest storehouses for ammunition, missiles, and other explosives and that the strike caused secondary detonations. Geolocated footage published on February 12 shows fires and secondary detonations near the Kotluban GRAU arsenal.[17] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) facility near Kotluban, likely in reference to the GRAU arsenal.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Ukhta Oil Refinery in Komi Republic (roughly 1,750 kilometers from the international border), causing fires near the AVT crude processing units and the visbreaker processing units.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukhta Oil Refinery can process up to 4.2 million tons of oil per year and supplies the Russian military. Geolocated footage published on February 12 shows smoke plumes at the Ukhta Oil Refinery.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Michurinsk Progress Plant, which produces advanced equipment for aviation and missile control systems, in Michurinsk, Tambov Oblast, causing fires.[21] Geolocated footage shows Ukrainian drones striking the Michurinsk Progress Plant.[22] Tambov Oblast Governor Yevgeny Pervyshov acknowledged that the Ukrainian strike hit a Magnit store immediately next to the Progress plant in Michurinsk and caused a fire.[23]
Available independent reporting continues to indicate that 2025 was the deadliest year for Ukrainian citizens since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The open-source project Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) reported on February 9 that the Russians caused conflict-related violence in Ukraine, including in occupied areas, killed at least 2,919 civilians, and injured 17,775 in 2025 — increases of 12 percent and 25 percent, respectively, from 2024.[24] The CIT reported that drone strikes killed at least 1,376 civilians and injured at least 10,089 — more casualties than all other types of weapons combined and almost three times higher than the civilian casualty rates resulting from drone strikes in 2024. These numbers are consistent with findings from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) and a reported European government assessment of 2025 civilian casualties from January 12.[25] The UN HRMMU noted that Russian strikes against Ukrainian-controlled areas caused 97 percent of the total civilian casualties in 2025. The CIT noted that Russian strikes inflicted the highest civilian casualties in Kherson Oblast, killing 359 civilians and injuring 2,903 in 2025 — an increase of 24 percent and 35 percent from 2024, respectively. This increase in civilian casualties is notable despite the lack of large-scale combat activity in the Kherson direction. Russian forces pervasively employ “human safari” tactics in Kherson Oblast using tactical drones, especially first-person view (FPV) drones, to strike civilians and civilian infrastructure.[26] Russian forces have also integrated intentional civilian harm into their wider operation battlefield air interdiction (BAI) template, indicating that the Russian military is using FPV drones to weaponize civilian harm as an intentional tool of war.[27]
The United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands announced new military aid, particularly to support Ukrainian air defense. UK Defense Secretary John Healey announced on February 11 and 12 that the UK is providing Ukraine with a new aid package worth about £540 million (about $735.5 million).[28] Healey stated that the UK is joining the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), which funds NATO states’ purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine, and that the UK is allocating £150 million (about $204 million) to this effort.[29] Healey announced that the other £390 million (about $531 million) of this package is funding 1,000 UK-manufactured Lightweight Multirole Missiles to help Ukraine counter Russian drone and missile strikes.[30] Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans announced on February 12 that the Netherlands will transfer F-16 flight simulators to Ukraine to accelerate pilot training and expand Ukraine’s ability to generate qualified F-16 aircrews.[31] Ukraine continues to require a well-provisioned and holistic air defense umbrella, comprised of both high-end US-made Patriot air defense systems and fighter jets, as well as lower-cost interceptor drones and missiles, in order to defend against increasingly intense and diverse Russian strike packages.[32]
Key Takeaways
- Russia is blocking WhatsApp and other Western social media platforms, media outlets, and means of bypassing internet restrictions as part of an intensification of the Kremlin’s campaign to reassert control over the Russian information space and prevent access to the global internet.
- Ukrainian forces are conducting localized and opportunistic counterattacks near the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border, likely to take advantage of recent blocks on Starlink terminals and Telegram.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Russian military, defense industrial, and oil infrastructure on the night of February 11 to 12, including with Ukrainian-produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles.
- Available independent reporting continues to indicate that 2025 was the deadliest year for Ukrainian citizens since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
- The United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands announced new military aid, particularly to support Ukrainian air defense.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Slovyansk.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text for reports on Ukrainian strikes in Russia.
Ukrainian military sources provided additional battle damage assessments (BDA) for recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 12 that Ukraine’s February 10 to 11 overnight strike against the Volgograd Oil Refinery in Volgograd City damaged the refinery’s ELOU-AVT-1 primary crude oil processing unit, elements of the AVT-3 crude oil processing unit, and other infrastructure, halting secondary processing at the facility.[33]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers on February 12 claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Oleksiivka and south of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[34]
Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City toward Korchakivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on February 11 and 12.[35] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Krasnopillya Raion (southeast of Sumy City).[36]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Sumy direction.[37]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Zybyne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[38]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Hrafske, Starytsya, Symynivka, and toward Okhrimivka on February 11 and 12.[39]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Okhrimivka and Volokhivka (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[40] Drone operators and other elements of the 288th Artillery Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and of the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 60th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (both of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kharkiv direction.[41]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on February 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Kolodyazne on February 11 and 12.[42]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (14th AC, LMD), including its 1st Battalion, are striking Ukrainian forces near Virivka (northwest of Velykyi Burluk) and Riznykove (north of Velykyi Burluk).[43]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 12 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novoosynove (southeast of Kupyansk).[44]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Novoosynove; and south of Kupyansk towards Kivsharivka on February 11 and 12.[45]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on February 12 that Ukrainian forces maintain physical control over Kupyansk and have surrounded a limited number of Russian forces in high-rise buildings at the center of the city.[46] Trehubov reported that Russian forces use drones to resupply servicemembers in Kupyansk, but cannot move reinforcements into Kupyansk. Trehubov reported that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to advance east of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk), despite Russian claims as of January 27 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[47]
Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Borova direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in southern Bohuslavka (north of Borova).[48]
Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka; and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka on February 11 and 12.[49]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[50]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[51]
Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova and Serednie; north of Lyman near Drobysheve and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Zakitne and Dronivka; east of Lyman near Maslyakivka; southeast of Lyman near Ozerne; east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka, Platonivka, and Svyato-Pokrovske; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka and Fedorivka Druha on February 11 and 12.[52]
Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on February 12 that Russian forces conducted two FAB-250 glide bomb strikes against Kramatorsk, damaging residential and commercial infrastructure and injuring two civilians.[53] Slovyansk Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported on February 11 that Russian forces conducted ten FAB-250 glide bomb strikes against Slovyansk, damaging residential, commercial, religious, educational, and rail infrastructure.[54]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on February 12 that Russian forces continue to infiltrate into Zakitne, attacking on the flanks and taking advantage of frozen parts of the Siverskyi Donets River to cross over the river.[55] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on February 12 that Russian forces have accumulated a large number of infantry in the Lyman direction to support high offensive intensity in the area and that Russian forces are attacking both with and without armored vehicle support.[56] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are suffering losses up to ten times higher than those of Ukrainian forces.
Order of Battle: Artillery elements and drone operators of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces east of Riznykivka[57] Drone operators of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[58]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on February 12 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novomarkove (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[59]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka on February 11 and 12.[60]
Geolocated footage published on February 12 shows Russian forces conducting FAB-3000 glide bomb and Kh-38 air-to-surface missile strikes against Ukrainian bridges along the H-20 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and in northern Kostyantynivka.[61] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are targeting bridges in the near rear as part of their ongoing battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign aimed at facilitating subsequent Russian offensive operations by degrading Ukraine’s ability to sustain frontline defenses.[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on February 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Toretske, Nove Shakhove, and Novyi Donbas on February 11 and 12.[63]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 12 but did not make confirmed advances.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers south of Dorozhnie (north of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[65]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka and Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on February 11 and 12.[66]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 268th Artillery Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating within Pokrovsk.[67]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne on February 11 and 12, but did not advance.[68]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on February 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka on February 11 and 12 but did not advance.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) and Berezove (south of Velykomykhailivka).[70]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
See topline text for reports on recent Ukrainian advances in the Hulyaipole direction.
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Tsvitkove, Staroukrainka, Kosivtseve, and Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya; northeast of Dobropillya near Zlahoda and Rybne; south of Dobropillya near Dorozhnyanka; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne on February 11 and 12.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ternuvate and Kosivtseve.[72]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.[73]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[74]
Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove and Prymorske and northwest of Orikhiv near Richne, Lukyanivske, Novoyakovlivka, and Novoboykivske on February 11 and 12.[75] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lukyanivske.[76]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces successfully used an interceptor drone to shoot down a Russian Klyn one way attack drone in the Orikhiv direction for the first time.[77]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[78] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction, including near Prymorske.[79] Elements of the 239th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[80]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of February 11 to 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition depots near occupied Terpinnya (roughly 63 kilometers from the front line) and Rozivka (roughly 40 kilometers from the front line).[81]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on February 9 and 10 but did not advance.[82]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kherson Oblast.[83]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 11 and 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 24 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Bryansk, Voronezh, and Rostov oblasts; one Kh-59/69 cruise missile from occupied Donetsk Oblast airspace; and 219 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which roughly 150 were Shaheds — from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[84] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 15 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 surface-to-air missiles, one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and 197 drones; that nine missiles and 19 drones struck 13 locations; and that drone and missile debris fell on 14 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, civilian, and energy infrastructure in Kyiv, Odesa, and Dnipro cities and in Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Kyiv oblasts.[85]
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes left 10,000 residences in Dnipro City and over 3,700 apartment buildings in Kyiv City without heat, and 2,600 buildings in Kyiv City without power.[86] Ukraine’s largest energy company, DTEK, reported that the strikes caused power outages for 107,000 residents of Kyiv Oblast.[87]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2026/
[2] https://x.com/WhatsApp/status/2021749165835829485
[3] https://www.kp dot ru/online/news/6816009/
[4] https://istories dot media/news/2026/02/11/domeni-whatsapp-youtube-i-yeshche-neskolkikh-saitov-propali-iz-serverov-rkn/; https://meduza dot io/amp/news/2026/02/12/eto-shag-nazad-kotoryy-mozhet-privesti-tolko-k-snizheniyu-bezopasnosti-lyudey-whatsapp-zayavil-chto-v-rossii-popytalis-polnostyu-zablokirovat-messendzher; https://doxa dot team/news/2026-02-12-whatsapp-blokirovka
[5] https://www.rbc dot ru/technology_and_media/10/02/2026/698b42499a79471c03a2bb74
[6] https://istories dot media/news/2026/02/11/domeni-whatsapp-youtube-i-yeshche-neskolkikh-saitov-propali-iz-serverov-rkn/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2026/
[9] https://x.com/Danspiun/status/2021875738761216374?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2021884239906845143?s=20; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/2021847369378050522?s=20; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2021860036117500091?s=20; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/33915; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2021738692197708179?s=20; https://t.me/Kuban_Z/9498; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2021860041649742173?s=20
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2026/
[11] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/109030; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0qNzhTyUoXCJcazVKknvhoBKhh3kphZpTY1nYTADGUJopBkEhMXi8ULCNZsw4qCEdl?__cft__[0]=AZa0WtWOc04rTqCLQHm-09hrLOSuNM99nYW3HU6qd6ecEvOFLRG2TqHupn6m9E-HfQxo6REpeXVfYXMqFR9nhAtjAv8ssLNV9H25wXnWsW4PLMgZ57VVJKBeYuAFX4QgBh6q7wmcP7uELqjQ2RgJD941Rd1PJTcjn9lRCpolCh9XKgKfaKPZJKu5rZEQ1GB_giA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/milinfolive/166012; https://t.me/rusich_army/28242;
[12] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/109030; https://t.me/milinfolive/166012; https://t.me/rusich_army/28242; https://t.me/wargonzo/32258; https://t.me/rybar/77439
[13] https://t.me/bbcrussian/91141
[14] https://t.me/rybar/77439
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2026/
[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34951
[17] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2021854866721673431;https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2021854866721673431; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/2021889610809499786; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/2021967370768790001 ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2021879642580463837
[18] https://t.me/vlgchp/40055
[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34952
[20] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12555; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2021910049191604522
[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34951
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34951 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2021765121832628602?s=20; https://x.com/VyshnyaOstap/status/2021716901064290410?s=20; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/2021727536338939926?s=20;
[23] https://t.me/tass_agency/361023
[24] https://notes dot citeam.org/strikes-2026-en
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2026/
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/
[28] https://suspilne dot media/1238134-velika-britania-nadast-ukraini-500-mln-funtiv-sterlingiv-na-ppo-britanskij-ministr-oboroni-gili/; https://x.com/JohnHealey_MP/status/2021897283319533664
[29] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/brytaniya-vydilyt-205-mln-dolariv-na-zbroyu-dlya-ukrayiny/; https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-join-nato-us-weapon-scheme-war-ukraine/; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/4090360-britania-vidilae-150-miljoniv-dla-ukraini-za-programou-purl.html
[30]https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/2021888583758471668?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E2021888583758471668%7Ctwgr%5Ece8c17921180df02aa8759c2ca1082ebf892b396%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsuspilne.media%2F1238464-velika-britania-peredast-ukraini-tisacu-bagatocilovih-raket-ppo%2F; https://suspilne dot media/1238464-velika-britania-peredast-ukraini-tisacu-bagatocilovih-raket-ppo/ ; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-urgent-new-air-defence-package-for-ukraine-worth-over-half-a-billion-pounds ; https://x.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/2021895202345021768
[31] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/niderlandy-ukrayina-symulyator-f-16/ ; https://suspilne dot media/1238346-niderlandi-peredadut-ukraini-simulatori-f-16-dla-pidgotovki-pilotiv-ministr-oboroni-kraini/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/niderlandy-ukrayina-symulyator-f-16/
[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2025/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34951 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2026/
[34] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/197770 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/6731
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34953 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/88010 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32246
[36] https://t.me/severnnyi/6731
[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39677
[38] https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/2021697118415515909?s=20; facebook.com/reel/844833361853873/?rdid=Dh1ktsL2hcSxGXoN&share_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fshare%2Fv%2F1B3xuKBSs2%2F#
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34953; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34935; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34933; https://t.me/wargonzo/32246; https://t.me/severnnyi/6731
[40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/197726; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/197745
[41] https://t.me/mod_russia/61105; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/197702
[42] https://t.me/severnnyi/6731 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34953
[43] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/15390; https://t.me/Osintpen/2530; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/15399; https://t.me/Osintpen/2534
[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/197770
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34953; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34935; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34933; https://t.me/wargonzo/32246; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/197770; https://t.me/gvZapad/17740
[46] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/12/pivnichnyj-koreyecz-bagato-vazhyt-shhob-jogo-perekynuty-u-kupyansku-otocheni-rosiyany-dosi-zhyvi-zavdyaky-dronam/
[47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/
[48] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2021967219391926536?s=20; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e_S2Oyb9T0k; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2021975347450024270?s=20
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34935; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34933; https://t.me/wargonzo/32246; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39705
[50] https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/779; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11259
[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/197770
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34933; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34935; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20050; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34953; https://t.me/wargonzo/32246; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39705
[53] https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/13629
[54] https://www.facebook.com/Vadymlyakh/posts/pfbid0aJSaqUqnpSsRHrz8UeHo8sxFQT9TjmTHN8LAq5qzXtp97w6ce2VY6ynwTbki41m5l?rdid=5DYaFO4EMzBdfymX#
[55] https://youtu.be/tgS919Tita8?t=1625 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/12/bigayut-z-tm-kamy-u-kontakt-ne-vhodyat-na-slovyanskomu-napryamku-ye-speczializovani-mali-grupy-voroga/
[56] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2hOkfqqeJJk ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/12/taktyka-salyami-taktyka-tysyachi-poriziv-poblyzu-lymana-fiksuyut-vysoku-intensyvnist-vorozhyh-shturmiv/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1238110-u-voroga-nemae-instinktu-samozberezenna-rosijska-armia-ne-zmensue-sturmiv-bila-limana-popri-morozi-recnik-60-ombr/
[57] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2021829097769574529?s=20; https://t.me/zarya_1msb/173; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/197748
[58] https://t.me/kotjambo/4178
[59] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/197770
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34953 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34935 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34933
[61] https://t.me/Osintpen/2531; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/28031; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2021962566071664960?s=20; https://x.com/RedHibana/status/2021877311092433170?s=20
[62] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025/
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34935 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34933 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32246
[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/88029
[65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11265; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/1638
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34953 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34935 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34933 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/88010 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32246
[67] https://t.me/heroesofZ/1937; https://t.me/mod_russia/61104
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34953 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34935 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34933
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34953 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34935 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34933
[70] https://t.me/rybar/77439
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34953 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34935 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34933 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32246 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32258
[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/88010 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32258 ; https://t.me/rybar/77439 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/18643 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/88042
[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/18640
[74] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/197770
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34935 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/88010 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32246 ;
[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/88010
[77] https://www.facebook.com/reel/806636795779825?locale=uk_UA; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/ukrayinski-zenitnyky-zbyly-dron-klyn/
[78] https://t.me/wargonzo/32263 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/88000
[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/61093 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39673 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39689 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39702 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39704
[80] https://t.me/sashakots/59720
[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34951
[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34935 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34933
[83] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39677 ; https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/3284; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/32653
[84] https://t.me/kpszsu/55398
[85] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17948; https://suspilne dot media/1237974-provedenna-se-odnogo-raundu-peremovin-ukraini-i-ssa-rf-vdarila-po-supermarketu-na-harkivsini-1450-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1770909358&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/6191https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/02/12/u-kyyevi-dvoye-lyudej-postrazhdaly-vnaslidok-nichnoyi-ataky-voroga/;
[86] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1237994-vibuhi-u-dnipri-vnaslidok-ataki-poskodzeni-budinki/; https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/8152; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/6196 ;
[87] https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1238084-u-kievi-ponad-100-tis-rodin-timcasovo-buli-bez-svitla-vnaslidok-ataki-rf-dtek/
