Toplines
Ukrainian forces appear to be shifting their counteroffensive tactics toward systematically targeting Russian efforts to reinforce initial Russian infiltrations rather than focusing on clearing the infiltrators immediately in various sectors of the frontline. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion reported on September 26 that the first phase of Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction focused on defeating Russian infiltration groups by targeting Russian mechanized all-terrain vehicle (ATV) and motorcycle assaults attempting to reinforce Russian infiltration groups stranded behind Ukrainian advances.[1] Ukrainian strikes on Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) disrupted Russian supply routes and left many Russian infiltration groups demoralized and without proper supplies. Ukrainian forces then focused on defeating those depleted Russian infiltration groups. The commander noted that operational surprise allowed Ukrainian forces to advance deep into the Russian rear, reaching drone operator and electronic warfare (EW) specialist positions. Ukrainian EW efforts, the destruction of Russian control positions, and “disinformation” also degraded Russian command and control during the first phase of Operation Vivaldi. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on September 26 that Ukrainian reconnaissance drones are identifying Russian personnel and resource supply routes, indicating the systematic pattern of Ukrainian forces targeting Russian reinforcements of infiltration groups across other sectors of the frontline.[2] Ukraine’s deliberate prioritization of advances and strikes against Russian GLOCs and tactical efforts to reinforce infiltrators demonstrates an innovative approach that may enable Ukrainian forces to continue breaking out of positional warfare and reintroduce elements of tactical maneuver on the battlefield.[3] It also likely facilitates Ukrainian defensive efforts by reducing the requirement to expend Ukrainian manpower on reducing Russian infiltration groups immediately or after they have been reinforced.
Russian milbloggers continue emphasizing how the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military is facilitating Ukrainian successes north and northeast of Lyman. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on September 25 that Ukrainian forces capitalized on the Russian military’s pervasive culture of lying and exaggerated reporting of Russian battlefield successes in Lyman during the counteroffensive in the Lyman direction.[4] The milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces are attempting to repel Russian forces across the Zherebets River and secure positions near Zarichne and Yampil (northeast and southeast of Lyman, respectively), threatening Russian positions in the Serebryanske forest. A commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the area similarly stated on September 25 that the Russian military command was unaware of Ukrainian preparations due to inaccurate reports of Russian advances near Lyman.[5] Inaccurate reporting within the Russian chain of command about the current state of the frontline consistently degrades Russian battlefield awareness and Russian commanders’ ability to disrupt advancing Ukrainian infantry and equipment.
Russian milbloggers are continuing to provide details on the current battlefield situation in the Lyman direction. One Russian milblogger noted that the high density of Ukrainian drones and infiltration groups is the main challenge for Russian forces while Ukrainian forces are infiltrating near Yampil, Ozerne (southeast of Lyman), and along the Siverskyi Donetsk River.[6] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces are withdrawing from southern Lyman to avoid an encirclement and maintain positions on the western bank of the Zherebets River near Ivanivka and Zarichne (both northeast of Lyman).[7] The source noted that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Dibrova (southeast of Lyman) and Yampil and are building up forces near Stavky (north of Lyman) and Lyman. Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps reported on September 17 that Ukraine’s systematic intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Luhansk Oblast strained Russia’s ability to use drones and EW to protect against Ukrainian drones.[8]
Ukraine’s 2026 battlefield successes may be forcing Russian President Vladimir Putin to rethink his theory of victory and rely on Russia’s long-range strike campaign to force Ukraine to surrender over the winter 2026-2027. Putin claimed on September 25 that Ukraine is pushing for a ceasefire of long-range strikes on energy infrastructure since Russian strikes are “so…destructive” and use modernized Geran drones, to which, Putin incorrectly claimed, Ukraine does not have countermeasures.[9] Putin claimed that Ukraine “must feel” Russia’s “retaliatory” strikes and understand that “provocative” Ukrainian actions will not lead to Ukraine’s desired results but will rather worsen the situation for Ukraine. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger doubled down on Putin’s statements and claimed that the best way to undermine Ukraine’s negotiating position is by striking Ukraine’s economic and production potential and noted that Russian strikes against Ukraine will continue.[10]
Putin articulated his theory in victory in June 2024 that assumed that continuous Russian advances — even if slow and gradual — would inevitably collapse Ukrainian defenses and force Ukraine to capitulate to Russian demands.[11] Russian forces have achieved near-zero net gains since March 2026, however, while Ukrainian forces have conducted successful counterattacks in the Kupyansk, Oleksandrivka, and Lyman directions since late 2025.[12] Putin has likely had a false perception of Russia’s battlefield successes based on Russian commanders’ exaggerated claims that have not, in fact, corresponded with reality.[13] Putin’s September 25 statement, however, suggests that public acknowledgements of Ukraine’s operationally- and strategically-significant advances north and northeast of Lyman over the past several months may be pushing Putin to reevaluate his original theory of victory and shift his rhetoric (and possibly his strategy) to focus on compelling Ukraine’s surrender using Russia’s long-range strike campaign. Putin is highly unlikely to agree to any US- and Ukrainian-proposed ceasefire of long-range strikes against energy infrastructure if he is indeed reevaluating his theory of victory in this way, as such an agreement would interfere with Russia’s strike campaign. Putin is also unlikely to agree to any meaningful progress or concessions in the negotiations process until the end of Russia’s long-range strike campaign over Winter 2026-2027.
A Russian theory of victory relying on long-range strikes of the current variety depends on Russia’s ability to use jet-powered Geran-type drones at scale and with relatively high penetration rates. Ukraine is actively developing countermeasures to these drones, but it is unclear how rapidly Ukraine will be able to use those countermeasures at scale to disrupt jet-powered drone strike packages. Putin is likely relying on Ukraine’s challenges in defending against Russia’s new jet-powered drones during the Winter 2026-2027 as Russia’s modernized jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones reach and sustain higher flight speeds than piston engine-driven drones, significantly complicating interception.[14] Russia has been prioritizing Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet drone strikes during daytime and nighttime long-range strikes against Ukraine, and particularly against Kyiv City, in recent months, causing significant civilian damage and disruptions in daily life and the Ukrainian economy.[15] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 26 that Russia plans to spend $12 billion on the production of jet-powered drones and loitering munitions alone.[16] Ukrainian companies have already successfully field-tested several interceptor drones that can intercept Russia’s jet-powered drones; Ukraine will continue to develop and scale its jet-powered interceptor drone production.[17]
Russian combined drone and missile strike packages have also relied on ballistic missiles to exploit Ukraine’s Patriot interceptor missiles shortage and cause significant damage, to be sure.[18] Russian forces will continue conducting large-scale destructive missile strikes against Ukraine this winter unless Ukraine can procure the necessary air defenses to effectively repel Russian ballistic missiles. Russia’s ballistic and quasi-ballistic missile stockpiles, however, are limited and their production cycle is longer and more complicated than that of Geran jet-powered drones. Russian forces will likely be unable to replicate the effects of combined jet-powered-drone-and-ballistic-missile strike packages relying largely or exclusively on ballistic missiles. Russian forces will seek to use combined jet-powered drone and ballistic missile strike packages to damage Ukraine’s critical infrastructure before Ukraine is able to deploy sufficient countermeasures, but the outcome of this aspect of the continuous offensive-defensive technological race that has characterized the war in Ukraine remains unclear.
US and Ukrainian officials denied reports that US President Donald Trump allegedly asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to travel to Moscow City for peace negotiations, following a Bloomberg article reporting on such request.[19]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces appear to be shifting their counteroffensive tactics toward systematically targeting Russian efforts to reinforce initial Russian infiltrations rather than focusing on clearing the infiltrators immediately in various sectors of the frontline.
- Russian milbloggers continue emphasizing how the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military is facilitating Ukrainian successes north and northeast of Lyman.
- Ukraine’s 2026 battlefield successes may be forcing Russian President Vladimir Putin to rethink his theory of victory and rely on Russia’s long-range strike campaign to force Ukraine to surrender over the winter 2026-2027.
- A Russian theory of victory relying on long-range strikes of the current variety depends on Russia’s ability to use jet-powered Geran-type drones at scale and with relatively high penetration rates. Ukraine is actively developing countermeasures to these drones, but it is unclear how rapidly Ukraine will be able to use those countermeasures at scale to disrupt jet-powered drone strike packages.
- US and Ukrainian officials denied reports that US President Donald Trump allegedly asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to travel to Moscow City for peace negotiations, following a Bloomberg article reporting on such request.
- Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai and a military industrial enterprise, energy infrastructure, and an air defense system in Russia overnight on September 25 to 26. Russian forces launched 162 drones during the day on September 25 and 173 drones against Ukraine overnight on September 25 to 26.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Slovyansk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight on September 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery near Ilsky, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 357 kilometers from the frontline).[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ilsky Oil Refinery has a processing capacity of about 6.6 million tons of oil per year. Ukrainian defense company Fire Point reported that Ukrainian forces struck the refinery’s three primary oil processing units and its oil tank farm, forcing the refinery to suspend operations.[21] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported that the Ukrainian strikes caused fires near the oil tank farm and at the refinery’s ELOU-AVT processing unit.[22]
Ukrainian forces also recently conducted long-range drone and missile strikes against a military industrial enterprise, energy infrastructure, and an air defense system in Russia. The SBU reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant in Azov, Rostov Oblast (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline) using Neptune cruise missiles and jet-powered drones, railway cars containing fuel and lubricants in Azov, and a Pantsir-S2 air defense system at an unspecified location in Rostov Oblast on September 25 or the night of September 25-26.[23] The SBU stated that preliminary reports indicate that Ukrainian strikes damaged the Azov Optical-Mechanical Plant’s optical and casting production facilities, an assembly area, a galvanic shop, and a printed circuit board manufacturing workshop. The SBU added that the plant is part of the Tactical Missiles Corporation and manufactures radar and infrared homing seekers for guided missiles, thermal imaging devices, and electronic systems for precision-guided artillery. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Gubinskaya oil depot near Dolgoye, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline).[24] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces also struck unspecified targets in the Black Sea.[25]
Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure continue to constrain Russia’s oil processing capabilities. Two industry sources told Reuters on September 25 that the Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Perm City, Perm Krai (roughly 1,449 kilometers from the Ukrainian border) suspended its operations following Ukrainian drone strikes on September 25.[26] The sources stated that the Ukrainian strikes caused a fire and damaged the refinery’s pipelines, storage, and technological units.
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in Ulanove (northwest of Sumy City), according to geolocated footage published on September 25, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[27]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to exaggerate the extent of Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed on September 26 that Russian forces seized Marine (east of Sumy City).[28] The Ukrainian 8th Air Assault Corps refuted the Russian MoD claim on September 26, stating that Ukrainian forces control all settlements in the 8th Air Assault Corps’ area of responsibility (AoR) in the north Slobozhansk direction, including Marine.[29] The 8th Air Assault Corps noted that the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement on May 19, 2025, but that Ukrainian forces have maintained control over the settlement continuously since May 2025.[30]
Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
Russian infiltration missions that bypass Ukrainian positions are very likely contributing to unrealistic Russian claims about Russian control of terrain (CoT) in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The spokesperson for the Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated on September 26 that small Russian infiltration groups are attempting to bypass Ukrainian positions in an effort to exploit weak points and gaps between them, forming a battlefield pattern resembling a chessboard.[31] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are also moving first-person view (FPV) drone launch points further into the contested “gray zone” to increase the range of the FPV drones into the Ukrainian rear. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces are conducting infiltration missions bypassing Ukrainian positions towards settlements in northern Kharkiv Oblast, a fact that Russian sources are using to claim the seizure of contested territory between individual settlements where Russian forces previously infiltrated in small groups but do not control. Russian forces have previously conducted infiltration missions toward Volokhivske (east of Vovchansk) and Ivashkyne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and are using dispersed Russian positions in these areas to claim that Russian forces have completed an encirclement of Ukrainian forces east of Vovchansk, but ISW has observed no evidence that Russian forces have any presence in the area between Volokhivske and Ivashkyne.[32]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position southeast of Zarubynka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk), according to geolocated footage published on September 25, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area contrary to Russian claims.[33]
Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration missions in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions northeast of Chuhunivka and in Dovzhanka (both northeast of Velykyi Burluk), according to geolocated footage published on September 25, after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[34] Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on September 26 that Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration missions in the Velykyi Burluk direction to gain footholds in windbreaks.[35]
Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River
Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Ukrainian counterattacks north of Kupyansk are increasing pressure on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) to dislodge Russian forces from the western bank of the Oskil River. Ukrainian Joint Forces Group Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on September 26 that Ukrainian forces continue to push Russian forces towards the Oskil River and are shrinking the Russian bridgehead on the river’s western bank.[36] Trehubov added that Ukrainian forces aim to push Russian forces beyond the Oskil River to reduce the Russian bridgehead north of Kupyansk and decrease the threat to the town itself. The Russian Western GoF is responsible for the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions. Its main effort has been conducting offensive operations in the Lyman direction, where it has been the target of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the past few months. The requirement to prioritize offensive operations in the Lyman direction, combined with Ukrainian counterattacks in both the Lyman and the Kupyansk directions, is likely degrading the ability of the Western GoF to defend its forward positions on the western bank of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction.[37]
A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 26 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[38]
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near Sievierodonetsk (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline) on September 25 or overnight on September 26.[39] A fire broke out at an electrical substation in Perevalsk (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 25, following reported Ukrainian strikes.[40]
Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest
Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements
See topline text for further information on Ukrainian tactics during counterattacks north of Lyman.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east
Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Slovyansk. Ukrainian forces cleared a Russian position in eastern Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk), according to geolocated footage published on September 26, an area where Russian forces previously conducted an infiltration mission.[41]
Russian forces continue to conduct glide bomb strikes in the Kramatorsk direction to set conditions for future ground operations. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported on September 26 that Russian forces are intensifying their use of guided glide bombs to strike civilian infrastructure in the area.[42] The commander noted that Russian forces are also increasing the number of infiltration attempts. Russian forces often conduct airstrikes against settlements in the near rear, in part to create ruins that Russian infantry can use for cover and concealment during subsequent infiltrations.[43]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south
Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces recently advanced in western Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces conducted an airstrike on a Russian position in western Kostyantynivka, according to geolocated footage published on September 25, indicating that there are likely no Ukrainian positions in the area.[44]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest
Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southeast of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember northeast of Chernihivka (southeast of Dobropillya), according to geolocated footage published on September 26, after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[45]
Russian commanders are falsely claiming that they have encircled Dobropillya in accordance with the Russian military plans for Fall 2026, but Ukrainian forces continue to control the town and approaches from multiple directions. The Ukrainian 1st Azov Corps reported on September 26 that Ukrainian forces continue to control Dobropillya and that Russian forces planned to encircle Dobropillya in Fall 2026.[46] The 1st Azov Corps stated that the encirclement of the town only exists in the Russian military’s false reports from the battlefield.
Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on September 25 and 26 but did not advance.[47]
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Oleksandrivka direction. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in southeastern Andriivka (south of Oleksandrivka) and in southern Nove Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Oleksandrivka), according to geolocated footage published on September 25, after what ISW assessed were Russian infiltration missions.[48]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr Grouping of Forces
A Russian milblogger continued to claim that Russian forces are advancing further west in the Hulyaipole direction than the area in which the Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Russian forces are attacking. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing west of Zorivka, Lisne, Rivne, and Kopani and northwest of Zarnytsya (all northwest of Hulyaipole).[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported, however, that Russian forces are attacking toward Rizdvyanka (south of Zorivka and southeast of Zirnytsya), Vozdvyzhivka (east of Lisne), and Kopani (south of Rivne) — areas further east than those in which the milblogger claimed Russian forces are advancing.[50]
Russian forces are reportedly using the dried-up Kakhovka Reservoir to reinforce infantry groups along the reservoir’s eastern bank and may try to leverage the reservoir to infiltrate northward toward Zaporizhzhia City during worsening autumnal weather conditions. The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported that dense vegetation, high humidity, and long fogs in the fall-winter period make it difficult for Ukrainian forces to scout and control the reservoir bed.[51] The commander reported that Russian forces took advantage of these conditions last year to enter Prymorske (along the reservoir and south of Zaporizhzhia City) but that Ukrainian forces have regained control over the settlement. The commander forecasted that Russian forces may again try to leverage changing weather conditions to infiltrate toward Zaporizhzhia City, an effort that the commander noted would not require the Russian military command to deploy more units to the area. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets also reported that Russian forces can only reinforce their limited positions in southern Prymorske with infantry via the reservoir bed, as Ukrainian forces control the northern half of Plavni (just south of Prymorske along the bank of the reservoir) and a section of the M-18 Melitopol-Zaporizhzhia City highway south of Prymorske.[52] Mashovets stated that a Russian infantry group was able to use the reservoir to infiltrate to Malokaterynivka (just north of Prymorske along the reservoir bank) about a week ago (roughly September 19). Mashovets added that Russian infiltrators are only present in the high-rise area of Stepnohirsk (just northeast of Plavni) and on the settlement’s northern outskirts. Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian commanders have commented throughout Summer 2026 that Russian forces were using the dried-up Kakhovka Reservoir for infiltration missions.[53]
Ukrainian forces have reportedly eliminated many of the Russian infiltration groups that were trying to advance northeast of Orikhiv to eventually encircle the town. Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces advanced west of Chervona Krynytsya (just northeast of Orikhiv) and Novoselivka (east of Chervona Krynytsya) as part of Russian efforts to encircle Orikhiv.[54] Mashovets stated, however, that Ukrainian forces eliminated several Russian groups that had infiltrated southeast of Chervona Krynytsya.[55]
Ukrainian forces are reportedly defending against Russian attempts to infiltrate into Orikhiv via its southern approaches. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are blocking up to three Russian small groups in the penal colony in Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and on the settlement’s northeastern and eastern outskirts.[56] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces have cleared Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv). Mashovets added that Ukrainian forces have “significantly thinned” the Russian forces that infiltrated into Orikhiv from the Novodanylivka direction, but that one Russian infiltration group continues to operate on Orikhiv’s southeastern outskirts. Mashovets also reported that Russian groups continue to hold several positions in forested areas northwest of Nesteryanka (just southwest of Orikhiv) and that one group remains in the area south of Pavlivka (west of Orikhiv).[57]
Ukrainian forces struck Russian communications towers in Kokhane (roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline), a counter-drone post along the H-30 Tokmak-Shyroke highway north of Tavriia (roughly 18 kilometers from the frontline), and vehicles along the highway just east of Tokmak (roughly 29 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on September 25.[58]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 26.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[59]
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine during the day on September 25 and on the night of September 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 162 Geran-type drones (including 76 jet-powered ones), Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions, and other unspecified drone types during the day on September 25; that Ukrainian forces downed 127 drones, including 44 jet-powered ones; that Russian air vehicles struck 27 locations; and that debris fell at four. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces subsequently launched 173 Shahed-type strike drones (of which over 50 were jet-powered), Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea overnight.[60] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 134 drones, that an unspecified number of aerial targets hit 19 locations, and that debris fell at eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, educational, commercial, and energy infrastructure in Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Mykolaiv, Vinnytsia, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[61]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/26/drugyj-sezon-pislya-zachystky-darvin-rozpoviv-yak-rozgortalasya-operacziya-vivaldi/; https://youtu.be/6aoKhXiaNJw?t=1391; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/26/eto-kakoye-to-yandeks-taksi-na-kolesah-okupanty-ne-zrozumily-shho-yide-na-nyh-pid-chas-vivaldi/; https://youtu.be/6aoKhXiaNJw?t=1503
[2] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/26/na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-namagayutsya-stvoryty-bufernu-zonu-prosochuyuchys-malymy-grupamy/; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/
[4] https://t.me/rybar/83482
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/25/vorog-paranoyidalno-brehav-nagoru-oficzer-125-yi-brygady-darvin-pro-pidgotovku-operacziya-vivaldi/; https://soundcloud.com/army_fm
[6] https://t.me/dva_majors/99564
[7] https://t.me/grvZapad/19890
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/udary-bpla-zmusyly-roztyagnuty-logistyku/
[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80839
[10] https://t.me/rybar/83483
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-6/; http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74234
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/;
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2026/;
[16] https://x.com/zelenskyyua/status/2103906828652282111?s=61&t=EIiKkgLAxjqEyvslu0uXeQ
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2100914347945984213?s=20; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2026/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/; ttps://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2026/
[19] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-25/trump-asked-zelenskyy-to-meet-putin-in-moscow-for-peace-talks; https://x.com/ChristopherJM/status/2103555247763272141; https://t.me/bbcrussian/99745
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42376
[21] https://t.me/firepointofficial/360
[22] https://t.me/SBUkr/18686
[23] https://t.me/SBUkr/18686
[24] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2850
[25] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2103785827595669842?s=20
[26] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-perm-oil-refinery-halted-operations-after-friday-drone-attack-sources-2026-09-25/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/
[27] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13044 ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/948101608351437
[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/67650
[29] https://www.facebook.com/8kuaairborne/posts/122191908728859069?ref=embed_post
[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2025/
[31] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/26/na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-namagayutsya-stvoryty-bufernu-zonu-prosochuyuchys-malymy-grupamy/; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w
[32] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2026/
[33] https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2103670261002445092?s=20 ; https://t.me/mod_russia_en/29619
[34] https://www.facebook.com/reel/2144087592808924; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2103625055200784758?s=20; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2103625062397964646 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13045; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13048
[35] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/26/%c2%abyih-tam-staye-menshe%c2%bb-shho-vidbuvayetsya-z-rosijskym-placzdarmom-bilya-kup%e2%80%99yanska/; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w
[36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/26/na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-namagayutsya-stvoryty-bufernu-zonu-prosochuyuchys-malymy-grupamy/; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w
[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2025/
[38] https://t.me/grvZapad/19890
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42377
[40] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2103808455928676740?s=20; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2103520560093520198?s=20
[41] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38544; https://t.me/bsp_donbas/1291;
[42] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/09/26/140-dvohsotyh-za-10-dniv-u-30-j-brygadi-rozpovily-pro-vtraty-voroga-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku/; https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM
[43] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2026/
[44] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2103534207503126974; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2103531444417220713; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/38542; https://t.me/soniah_hub/18377
[45] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2849; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13046
[46] https://azov dot army/news/defense-forces-continue-to-control-dobropillia/; https://t.me/skala425/995
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42373; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/123924 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/37203
[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13043; https://www.facebook.com/reel/3276557749221244
[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/21289
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42373; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42371 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21289
[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/09/26/golovna-zagroza-pryjde-razom-iz-tumanamy-perun-pro-plany-rosiyan-na-zaporizhzhi/; https://youtu.be/EHiuKvFUr2w
[52] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3613
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[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/21289; https://t.me/wargonzo/37203
[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3612
[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3612
[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3612; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3613
[58] https://x.com/markito0171/status/2103470155913191570?s=20; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2103508692826263945?s=20; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2103516072452505696?s=20 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2103526824261423190?s=20; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2103558668528889998?s=20
[59] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[60] https://t.me/kpszsu/80253; https://t.me/kpszsu/80156
[61] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2103773717520163244?s=20; https://t.me/synegubov/25984; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4669 https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4670 https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4672; https://t.me/synegubov/25952; https://t.me/synegubov/25953; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2960; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7632; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7635; https://t.me/odeskaODA/20901; https://t.me/odesaMVA/3359
