Analysis

Impacts on Civilian Life in Near-Rear Areas

Russian forces are conducting near-rear FPV strikes on a range of civilian targets across the entire Ukrainian theater. While the majority of the “human safari” discourse since 2024 has focused on Russian FPV strikes on civilian targets along the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine, ISW’s analysis shows that this practice is not geographically isolated and is in fact pervasive across the entire frontline in Ukraine. During the August to December 2025 timeframe, ISW identified 47 FPV strikes against civilian targets in Kharkiv Oblast; 27 in Donetsk Oblast; 11 in Sumy Oblast; 6 in Chernihiv Oblast; 15 in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 10 in Zaporizhia Oblast; and one in Kherson Oblast. ISW has observed substantial evidence of extensive Russian FPV strikes against civilians in Kherson Oblast, despite the fact that this reality was not reflected in the limited sample set.[12] The concentration of FPV strikes in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts largely mirrors the pace of offensive operations in the theater — Russian forces are concentrating offensive efforts in the nexus area between Kharkiv-Luhansk-Donetsk oblasts and in western Donetsk Oblast near the Ukrainian Fortress Belt and the Pokrovsk area. This offensive concentration may in part correlate to the increased number of FPV strikes in these corresponding areas, as the Russian military command has prioritized deploying manpower and equipment, including tactical drones and drone units, to these sectors of the frontline.

The set of civilian targets ISW identified is diverse across the entire theater, but can generally be categorized as individual civilians (individuals generally walking along roads or open spaces); moving or stationary four-wheeled civilian vehicles (including cars and buses); residential infrastructure (individual homes or apartment blocks); emergency service vehicles (fire services, ambulances, police cars); energy infrastructure (including utility repair infrastructure); clearly marked humanitarian vehicles or convoys; motorcycles; and bicycles.

A primary goal of these FPV strikes is to make civilian life in near-rear areas untenable. Ukrainian civilians living in near-rear areas across the entire frontline have described a pervasive fear that a drone might strike at any time.[13] This constant sense of fear, exacerbated by the high levels of drone saturation in low-altitude air space, creates an impression that civilians cannot leave their homes to fulfil even the most basic tasks, such as picking up food, water, or collecting pension payments. Frequent Russian FPV strikes against residential infrastructure, including instances of FPV drones flying directly into the windows of homes and apartment buildings, also solidifies the sense that civilians are not safe in their own homes.[14] FPV strikes against emergency services and first responders significantly complicate rescue efforts following Russian missile or drone strikes — instilling fear amongst first responders and civilians who require their aid.[15] The frequent targeting of humanitarian aid and evacuation vehicles also contributes to a sense of hopelessness and isolation in near-rear areas.

The instillation of fear is not a side-effect of Russian FPV strikes — it is their precise intention. Russian FPV strikes against civilian targets in the near rear are intended to render civilian life untenable in order to drive civilians out of frontline-adjacent areas. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine submitted the results of an investigation to the United Nations (UN) Secretary General on October 21, 2025 that found that Russian short-range drone strikes in frontline areas of Ukraine are part of an intentional and coordinated policy and have “created a coercive environment compelling thousands to flee.”[16] The purposeful depopulation of near-rear areas facilitates tactical Russian frontline advances, as it is relatively easier for Russian forces to infiltrate or advance into empty settlements. The UN Commission concluded that these short-range strikes constitute crimes against humanity, such as murder and forcible population transfer, due to their persistent creation of civilian harm.

Civilian Harm as a Component of Russia’s Battlefield Air Interdiction Campaigns

Intentional and indiscriminate civilian harm has become a core component of Russia’s wider battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts. BAI is the use of airpower to strike targets in the near rear of the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the immediate term.[17] BAI is premised on the isolation of the battlespace from critical logistics routes in the rear and traditionally focuses on military and dual-use infrastructure. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have begun operationalizing short- to mid-range drone strikes to generate BAI effects since the second half of 2025. Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies have become particularly critical in the Russian execution of its BAI campaigns in Ukraine.[18] Rubikon Center drone strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) began to generate BAI-like effects and enable Russian ground advances in eastern Ukraine, including around the hotly contested town of Pokrovsk, in August 2025.[19] Russian forces, however, have adopted a particular approach to BAI that rests on perpetrating indiscriminate civilian harm and killing, which stands in opposition to BAI’s traditional focus on military and dual-use infrastructure. Russian FPV drone strikes against civilians are a core component of this approach to BAI.

The majority of civilian targets represented in ISW’s FPV drone strike dataset are civilian vehicles, including cars, buses, bikes, scooters, and motorcycles, moving along roadways. Roadways are properly considered to be dual-use infrastructure, which Ukrainian armed forces do use for logistics purposes, but Russian FPV strikes appear to disproportionately target civilian vehicles on these roadways rather than the roadways themselves. The technical specifics of FPV drones should enable drone operators to visually see and distinguish between military transport and civilian vehicles, but Russian forces frequently hit clearly civilian vehicles on roadways — indicating intentionality.[20] Ukrainian officials routinely have to restrict civilian access to roads and highways due to the elevated risk of Russian drone strikes on these routes, which has the effect of further isolating frontline and near-rear communities and inhibiting vital civilian logistics functions.[21] Persistent Russian strikes on emergency vehicles also inhibit first responders from traveling to the sites of previous strikes and carrying out life-saving medical care.

The intended depopulation effect of FPV strikes in the near rear also supports Russian BAI efforts. BAI leverages strikes in the near and mid-rear to isolate the battlespace and accomplish frontline effects. Purposeful FPV strikes intended to drive civilians away from their homes in near-rear areas generate a specific frontline effect — they make these areas and settlements generally easier for Russian forces to infiltrate or advance into or otherwise exert control over. Russia’s BAI campaign purposefully isolates frontline communities in order to support military objectives by shaping the wider battlespace.

Russian efforts to adapt and innovate their FPV capabilities to optimize BAI campaigns significantly scale up the potential for civilian harm beyond frontline communities and near-rear areas. Russian forces began employing “mothership drones” at scale since at least August 2025 to greatly extend the range at which FPV drones can operate. Russian mothership drones transport smaller FPV drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear, overcoming range limitations and potential electronic warfare (EW) interference.[22] Russian forces used mothership drones to strike Zaporizhzhia City (about 45km from the frontline) in August 2024 and a civilian dormitory in Kharkiv City (over 35km from the frontline) in October 2025.[23] Russian forces also began targeting Ukrainian vehicles, including civilian ones, traveling on highways 25 to 100 kilometers from the frontline using Molniya-2 FPVs equipped with Starlink terminals in January 2026.[24] ISW reported in early February 2026 that Russian forces have also begun using Gerbera drones, which have a range of 300 to 600 kilometers, as mothership drones for FPVs — which will significantly extend the range at which Russian forces can threaten civilians in the Ukrainian deep rear. Russian drone adaptations have allowed Russian forces to strike civilian targets even further in the Ukrainian rear, further blurring the line between military and civilian objectives.

The integration of civilian harm into Russia’s BAI doctrine is a clear violation of international legal principles. International humanitarian law rests on three foundational principles when it comes to the issue of civilian harm in combat: distinction between civilians and combatants; proportionality in the use of force; and military necessity bounded by humanitarian considerations. Russia’s use of FPV drones to strike civilian targets as part of its BAI campaign violates the requirement to strike defined military objectives. The systematic targeting of residential infrastructure, civilian transportation routes, and first responders undermines the principle of distinction. Russia’s use of FPV drones — drones that specifically enable the operator to see the target in real time —suggests that Russian forces are aware that they are causing civilian casualties, which further renders the FPV campaign against civilian infrastructure indiscriminate. The persistent incorporation of civilian harm into Russia’s execution of BAI campaigns indicates that civilian harm is not incidental to Russia’s military objectives but rather a core component of Russia’s operational approach to BAI — elevating these violations to a pattern of unlawful conduct as opposed to individual ad hoc indiscretions. The Rubikon Center’s involvement in executing BAI campaigns, including its perpetration of strikes against civilian infrastructure, suggests that the Russian military is seeking to institutionalize these practices into a formal part of the Russian force structure. These FPV strikes therefore likely constitute various war crimes (such as the war crimes of attacking civilians, civilian infrastructure, and medical/humanitarian infrastructure) and various crimes against humanity (such as the crimes against humanity of murder and forcible population transfer).[25]

The proliferation of FPV drone strikes against civilians and the integration of these strikes into Russia’s wider BAI template are emblematic of a culture within the Russian Armed Forces that legitimizes and encourages the intentional generation of civilian harm as a method of warfighting. Persistent FPV strikes against civilian targets are a uniquely Russian phenomenon — not a simple consequence of drone saturation throughout the theater. The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) found that 95 percent of the civilian harm resulting from drone strikes in January 2025 occurred in Ukrainian-held territory, despite relative parity in drone saturation between Ukrainian and Russian forces.[26] The fact that these types of drone strikes are occurring throughout the entire theater suggests that these practices are not siloed within specific drone units or other Russian formations — they are more likely institutionalized throughout the entire Russian force. Different Russian groupings of forces are responsible for the units conducting tactical FPV strikes across the theater, meaning that these practices are not unique to any one unit.

Russian milblogger discourse surrounding such FPV strikes seeks to justify intentional civilian harm in the wider Russian information space, further suggesting that these strikes are part of the Russian military culture and modus operandi. These informational justifications often come from Russian drone units themselves. The Fobos drone group (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District), which is operating in the Kherson direction, has posted frequent warnings to its official Telegram channel telling civilians living in frontline areas to “avoid” moving around frontline settlements in cars or on bicycles or risk facing drone strikes and claiming that “any vehicle” that in the kill-zone area is a “legitimate target.”[27] Russian milbloggers have termed the kill-zone the “red zone” in their online discourse and frequently claim that any movement in the “red zone” constitutes a legitimate military target.[28]  This blanket warning is of course inconsistent with international legal requirements on targeting but seeks to legitimize even strikes on clearly civilian targets in the kill-zone. A November 2025 report by Ukrainian organization Truth Hounds found that Russian milbloggers frequently invoke the concept of the “red zone” to justify any and all attacks in the near rear, including those against civilians.[29]

Russian milbloggers consistently weaponize dehumanizing rhetoric when discussing FPV strikes against civilian targets, incorporating such rhetoric into Russia’s wider military narrative. In one instance, a prominent milblogger with over 50,000 subscribers posted FPV footage in October 2025 showing a drone dropping a munition on a civilian near their home in Kherson Oblast.[30] The footage shows the civilian drop to the ground and writhe in pain. The milblogger posted a caption with the video calling the civilian a “pig” and boasting that they bled out for 15 minutes before dying. Milbloggers frequently use similar derogatory terms for Ukrainians when posting videos of deadly FPV strikes in an attempt to dehumanize and depersonalize the strikes and justify them. The ultimate effect is that milblogger reporting on FPV strikes has normalized this practice within the Russian informational narrative. This normalization has a direct bearing on Russian military culture. Milblogger dissemination of this type of footage may also be a distinct war crime of “outrage upon personal dignity,” according to a United Nations commission report from May 2025.[31]