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Africa File, January 30, 2025
Jan 30, 2025 - ISW Press
Africa File, January 30, 2025: Rwandan-Backed M23 Captures Goma; SAF Breakthroughs in Khartoum; IS Sahel Linked to Angola Plot Targeting Biden Visit; IS Calls for Jihad in Sudan; Somalia Agrees with Egypt in AUSSOM
Authors: Kathryn Tyson, Liam Karr, and Yale Ford
Data Cutoff: January 30, 2025, at 10am ET
The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
Key Takeaways:
DRC. The Rwandan-backed M23 rebels seized control of Goma for the first time since 2012 and are continuing their advance southward toward the South Kivu provincial capital of Bukavu. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) called Rwanda’s support for M23 “a declaration of war” and has sought to rally domestic support and increase pressure on the international community to take coercive measures against Rwanda. The international community has widely condemned M23’s occupation of Goma and called for the resumption of peace talks, but only a handful of countries have explicitly condemned Rwanda or considered sanctioning Rwanda. International leaders have called for renewed dialogue between Rwanda and the DRC, but there is no indication that the DRC is willing to pursue a diplomatic solution despite the fall of Goma.
Sudan. The SAF will likely continue to advance in Khartoum as it sets conditions to push the RSF west of the Nile River with the long-term objective of expanding operations westward toward Darfur. The recapture of Khartoum is a strategic objective for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) that supports the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) conducted its largest attack to date on the SAF in western Sudan between January 21 and 25 as the RSF tries to respond to its setbacks in Khartoum. The RSF may face greater pressure from the United Arab Emirates, the RSF’s main foreign military backer, to retake strategic areas from the SAF in western Sudan. The uptick in fighting in Khartoum and al Fasher will worsen humanitarian conditions for civilians in these areas.
Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Sudan. The Islamic State called for jihad in Sudan in its most recent weekly newsletter. Salafi-jihadi networks already have roots in Sudan, but IS’s call highlights the continued risk that Salafi-jihadi insurgents could take advantage of the civil war in Sudan to strengthen and potentially operationalize these networks.
Sahel. IS Sahel Province likely supported a thwarted attack plot in Angola on the US embassy and other high-value targets when then US President Joe Biden visited Angola in December 2024. The Angola plot is the latest indicator that IS Sahel Province’s growing strength in the Sahel has increased its ability to support the Islamic State’s external attack activity.
Somalia. Egypt and Somalia are moving ahead with an agreement to deploy Egyptian troops to Somalia through the new African Union mission in Somalia, but potential troop shortages and political tensions continue to create gaps for al Shabaab to exploit. Political tensions between the Egyptian and Ethiopian governments and last-minute changes to the mission force composition may complicate the execution of the new mission.
Assessments:
DRC
The Rwandan-backed M23 rebels seized Goma for the first time since 2012 and are continuing their advance southward toward the South Kivu provincial capital of Bukavu. M23 forces first entered Goma on January 26 and had gained control of most of the city aside from pockets of resistance in the northern outskirts by January 28.[1] Thousands of Congolese army (FARDC) soldiers, allied militia fighters, and at least 280 foreign mercenaries surrendered to M23 after M23 issued an ultimatum demanding that all enemy forces stand down, while other UN peacekeepers and Burundian and FARDC soldiers fled to Bukavu.[2] UN troops and soldiers from the Southern African Development Community initially supported the FARDC against M23 but retreated into a defensive posture after the multilateral forces suffered significant casualties, including the deaths of 17 South African soldiers.[3]
Figure 1. M23 Advances Toward Goma and Masisi
Note: The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in eastern DRC and “de facto control” M23 operations.
M23 seeks to set up an administration to govern Goma as it has in other areas of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) under its control.[4] The UN reported in December 2024 that cadres from M23 and the group’s wider political coalition Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), “systematically held meetings in newly conquered territories to promote its narrative, recruit new members, and consolidate parallel administration.”[5] These efforts included sophisticated, “state-like” administrations in key areas, such as mineral-rich areas around Rubaya.[6] The administration in Rubaya involved a mining ministry that awarded permits to, enforced taxes on, and paid salaries to traders and miners in the area.[7] M23 militants also patrolled the town to ensure compliance with the administration’s rules on selling minerals exclusively to M23.[8] M23 and AFC spent 2024 strengthening its capacity to replicate this administrative system. This effort included recruiting and training police, intelligence services, and political leaders.[9]
The seizure of Goma is the culmination of a series of offensives and counteroffensives that began in December 2024. M23 launched concerted offensives in mid-December in the Lubero and Masisi districts. Congolese forces eventually halted the rebel group’s offensive in Lubero on December 24, but M23 captured Masisi town in early January.[10] M23 then captured several key towns on Lake Kivu on January 21 after a failed FARDC counteroffensive to secure key supply lines connecting Goma and Masisi district in mid-January.[11]
Figure 2. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC
Note: The UN reports that 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops are fighting alongside M23 in eastern DRC and “de facto control” M23 operations.
Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
M23 previously captured and held Goma in 2012 for 10 days before international action helped FARDC retake the city. Coordinated international sanctions led Rwanda to cut its support to M23 in the aftermath of the 2012 seizure, and a UN-backed intervention force helped FARDC degrade the group’s capabilities.[12] An M23 representative told the French magazine Jeune Afrique that “2025 is not 2012” and that the group plans “to administer the city [Goma] and continue the march toward Kinshasha.”[13]
M23 forces have continued to push southward toward the South Kivu provincial capital Bukavu. M23 took control of Kiniezire and Mukwidja towns in Kalehe district on January 29 and moved toward Kalehe town, which lies 20 miles (32 kilometers) north of Kavumu and is the last major FARDC defensive point before Kavumu.[14] Kavumu is a major operational objective for M23 because of the Burundian-FARDC military base in the town and the nearby airport that lies 15 miles (24 kilometers) north of Bukavu.[15] Local reports warned of the presence of hostile drones over the Kavumu airport on January 29.[16] The South Kivu governor outlawed civilian boat traffic on Lake Kivu and enacted heightened security measures in Bukavu on January 29 in anticipation of M23’s advance.[17] Independent French journalist Christophe Rigaud reported that M23 had repositioned troops from nearly a dozen towns that it controls in Rutshuru territory for the offensive in South Kivu after the group seized Goma.[18]
The DRC called Rwanda’s support for M23 “a declaration of war” and has sought to rally domestic support and increase pressure on the international community to take coercive measures against Rwanda. DRC Foreign Minister Thérèse Wagner and UN officials in northern Goma said on January 26 that Rwandan reinforcements had entered the Goma area from the border with Rwanda in recent days.[19] French media reported the presence of Rwandan special forces in Goma and said Kigali had deployed an additional 500 to 1,000 troops to support M23 in its offensive.[20] The UN reported in December 2024 that Rwanda already had 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandan troops in the eastern DRC fighting alongside M23, and the US condemned Rwanda on December 20 for continuing to provide artillery, troop reinforcements, and resupply convoys to the rebel group.[21]
Wagner called the attack on Goma “a declaration of war” and condemned Rwanda’s support for the group during two UN Security Council sessions on January 26 and January 29.[22] Wagner has demanded stronger action from the international community and “targeted sanctions” on Rwandan military and political leaders.[23] Wagner has also called for an international embargo on Rwandan exports of coltan and gold, an arms embargo on Rwanda, and the revocation of Rwanda’s status as a troop contributor to UN peacekeeping missions.[24]
The DRC government has contributed to sometimes violent anti-Rwandan and anti-Western protests with its efforts to mobilize the Congolese population. [25] Congolese government officials and civilians in at least half a dozen DRC provinces have called for popular demonstrations against Rwanda.[26] Thousands of civilians marched on the streets of Bukavu in South Kivu on January 27 to demand punitive measures on Rwanda.[27] Protestors attacked the embassies of Belgium, France, Japan, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and the United States in Kinshasa on January 28.[28]
The international community has widely condemned M23’s occupation of Goma and called for the resumption of peace talks, but only a handful of countries have explicitly condemned Rwanda or considered sanctioning Rwanda. Most members of the UN Security Council along with the EU and the African Union have strongly condemned M23’s attack on Goma and called on Rwanda to end its support for M23 and withdraw from the eastern DRC.[29] South African president Cyril Ramaphosa said that continued attacks on South African troops in the eastern DRC would be considered “a declaration of war.”[30] The United States and China released individual statements that condemned M23 and Rwanda and called for an immediate ceasefire.[31] Russia, Guyana, and three African countries on the UN Security Council—Algeria, Sierra Leone, and Somalia—condemned “external support” for M23 as part of a Security Council statement and referred to the UN report that linked Rwanda to M23 but refrained from criticizing Rwanda directly.[32]
The United Kingdom has been the most vocal of a handful of countries that have discussed imposing new sanctions on Rwanda. The UK ambassador to the UN said that Rwanda Defence Force and M23 attacks on UN forces “can be considered war crimes punishable by sanctions,” and the UK foreign secretary warned Rwandan President Paul Kagame that Rwandan actions had put Rwanda’s global aid under threat during a phone call on January 26.[33] Germany canceled foreign aid–related talks with Rwanda and demanded that M23 and Rwanda withdraw its troops from the eastern DRC.[34] The Guardian reported that France is considering sponsoring a UN resolution that names Rwanda explicitly as a supporter of M23.[35] Both the EU and US said that they would examine all means necessary to punish Rwanda for M23’s attack on Goma without explicitly mentioning any sanctions.[36] Belgian politicians had previously been strongly critical about Rwanda’s activity in eastern DRC and urged EU-wide sanctions on Rwanda.[37]
Rwandan officials have pushed back on the international condemnation and framed Rwanda’s recent military activity as part of Rwanda’s long-standing security concerns in the eastern DRC. Rwandan officials said that fighting near Rwandan border towns represented a “serious threat to Rwanda’s security and territorial integrity” that necessitated “a sustained defensive posture.”[38] Kigali has blamed the FARDC for causing the heavy fighting around Goma and inflicting the South African and UN casualties.[39] Rwanda echoed its long-standing accusations that international statements condemning M23 have failed to sufficiently criticize the FARDC and UN troops for their association with DRC ethnic militia groups like the Rwandan genocide-linked Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, and foreign military contingents such as SADC forces, Burundian troops, and French Foreign Legion-trained mercenaries.[40]
International leaders have called for renewed dialogue between Rwanda and the DRC, but there is no indication that the DRC is willing to pursue a diplomatic solution over a military one despite the fall of Goma. Turkish officials offered to mediate the conflict between the DRC and Rwanda during a summit between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Kagame on January 25, but the DRC declined.[41] DRC President Félix Tshisekedi dropped out of an emergency videoconference with Kagame to be mediated by Kenyan President William Ruto and the East African Community on January 29.[42] Ruto had called for a diplomatic solution to the current crisis and said that the “direct involvement of the M23 and all other actors” in eastern DRC is a necessity.[43] Tshisekedi has previously criticized Ruto for “mismanaging” the peace process in the DRC.[44]
The DRC has repeatedly refused to negotiate directly with M23. This position has been an insurmountable obstacle to the Kenyan-mediated peace talks between the DRC and armed groups in the eastern DRC and to Angolan-mediated peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda. Angolan-mediated talks between the DRC and Rwanda under the Luanda Process broke down in mid-December after Rwanda insisted that the DRC enter into direct negotiations with M23.[45] Kinshasa has labeled M23 as “terrorists” and said that direct talks with M23 representatives is a “red line” that the DRC would never cross.[46] The New York Times reported that M23, after attacking Goma, are once again “demanding direct peace negotiations” with the Congolese government.[47] Congolese officials have said that M23 only exists with Rwandan military backing and as a tool for Rwanda to expropriate the DRC’s mineral resources.[48]
Congolese officials have sought to surge recruits and funds to the FARDC to support a wartime posture. DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and other Congolese policymakers have called for young civilians to “enlist massively in the army” and for increased funding and a swift reorganization of the FARDC in North Kivu.[49] DRC Transport Minister Jean Pierre Bemba said that he wanted 20,000 civilians from each of the country’s 26 provinces to immediately enlist in the army, but the DRC likely lacks the capacity to train and equip 520,000 soldiers quickly.[50]
Sudan
The SAF will likely continue to advance in Khartoum as it sets conditions to push the RSF west of the Nile River with the long-term objective of expanding operations westward toward Darfur. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have rapidly retaken key areas from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum since mid-January. The SAF broke the siege on the SAF headquarters in Khartoum on January 24 when SAF units at the SAF Signal Corps and SAF Headquarters linked up.[51] The SAF advanced from northern Khartoum, also known as Bahri, and south from River Nile State and captured the al Jaili oil refinery on January 25.[52] An SAF engineer said that the refinery is severely damaged but that the SAF is attempting to restore operations.[53] The RSF had used the refinery as a base and fuel source since the early phases of the civil war in 2023.[54] The SAF’s advances in Khartoum secured supply routes to link its forces in Khartoum, River Nile State, and Port Sudan.[55] The SAF has continued to push south toward Khartoum and to capture areas from RSF control, including the Shambat neighborhood and parts of the Kafouri neighborhood on January 28.[56]
Figure 3. SAF Seizes Bridges in Surprise Attack, September 26, 2024
Source: Sudan War Monitor.
The SAF has deployed reinforcements to the capital for further operations against the RSF.[57] Sudanese media reported that the SAF entered a “third phase” of operations against the RSF on January 26 that includes operations against the RSF in Khartoum and in rural and remote areas outside of the city.[58] One aim of the operations is to disrupt external supply lines to the RSF to prevent the RSF from resupplying and reorganizing.[59] Sudanese and Egyptian media reported on January 26 that the RSF has retreated to areas in eastern Khartoum as well as East Nile State after the SAF advances.[60] SAF Chief General Abdel Fatteh al Burhan visited the SAF Headquarters for the first time since August 2023 on January 26.[61] Burhan said that the SAF is working to secure the remaining RSF-controlled areas of Khartoum and Omdurman in the coming days and eventually “eradicate” the RSF “in every corner of Sudan.”[62]
SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and prepare for future offensives that aim to defeat the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan. The SAF advanced in North Kordofa, western Sudan, and captured Umm Rawaba on January 30.[63] The RSF would struggle to recross the Nile as the SAF controls several key bridges on the river.[64] The Jabal Awliya Dam Bridge in southwestern Khartoum is the RSF’s last remaining route into and out of the city.[65] Khartoum also has airports and military infrastructure that are more centrally located than the SAF’s current command and logistics hub in Port Sudan, which is over 400 miles from Khartoum on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.
The recapture of Khartoum is a strategic objective for the SAF that supports the SAF’s grand strategic aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. SAF control over Khartoum would be a political victory that would boost the SAF’s claim to be Sudan’s only legitimate force. Burhan has conducted several regional and international tours since 2023 to garner international support. Burhan met with the leaders of Egypt, Qatar, South Sudan, and Turkey in 2023 in a bid to boost SAF legitimacy in the international community.[66] Burhan took a diplomatic tour of West Africa in mid-January 2025 for the first time since the war began in 2023 to boost regional support for the SAF.[67] Burhan has also attempted to delegitimize the RSF and called for the RSF to be designated as a terrorist group during a speech to the UN in September 2024.[68]
The RSF conducted its largest attack to date on the SAF in western Sudan between January 21 and 25 as the RSF tries to respond to its setbacks in Khartoum.[69] The RSF has besieged the SAF’s base in al Fasher, the SAF’s last stronghold in the Darfur region, since May 2024.[70] The RSF has intensified attacks on al Fasher since mid-January and conducted a major assault on al Fasher on January 24 after it issued an ultimatum for the SAF to leave the city on January 22.[71] The RSF has advanced within one kilometer of the SAF base in the town as of January 26.[72] Al Fasher sits on a major east–west highway that links major cities in the Darfur region and acts as a strategic crossroads to reach other parts of Darfur.[73] Darfur is a vital economic and political support base for the RSF due to significant family and socio-ethnic ties throughout the region.[74] The RSF also earns revenue from gold mining in Darfur and seeks to maintain supply lines between Darfur, Libya, and Chad.[75]
The RSF may face pressure from the UAE, the RSF’s main foreign military backer, to retake al Fasher. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) threatened to withdraw support for the RSF in November 2024 if the RSF did not retake al Fasher, according to a Chadian source that spoke to Sudanese media.[76] The UAE has been facing political pressure to withdraw military support for the RSF from the United States and UN in recent months.[77] Two US lawmakers said on January 24 that they are attempting to block arms sales to the UAE in response to the UAE’s continued support for the RSF.[78]
The increased fighting in Khartoum and al Fasher will worsen humanitarian conditions for civilians in these areas. Humanitarian organizations have declared a famine in al Fasher and said that fighting between the RSF and SAF has prevented humanitarian groups from delivering aid to the city.[79] The RSF implemented a blockade on the city to force the SAF to surrender.[80] Sudanese state-affiliated media said the RSF launched a drone strike on al Fasher’s last operational hospital that killed over 70 civilians.[81] The RSF’s presence about 1.5 miles (2.5 kilometers) away from the Zamzam Refugee Camp threatens to trap the more than 400,000 refugees at the camp.[82] The UN has warned of the risk of ethnically motivated violence in al Fasher if the RSF captures the city, and the United States said in early January that the RSF has committed genocide in Sudan.[83] Both the RSF and SAF have committed ethnically based violence against civilians since the war began.[84]
The ongoing fighting in Khartoum and the SAF’s alleged use of chemical weapons also puts civilians at significant risk. US intelligence officials told The New York Times that the SAF could soon use chemical weapons in northern Khartoum and other densely populated areas.[85] The American officials added that the United States had detected numerous SAF chemical weapons tests in 2024 and that the SAF has used chemical weapons against the RSF at least two times since October 2024 in remote areas of Sudan.[86] The SAF previously used chemical weapons against civilians in Darfur in 2016, according to a report by Amnesty International.[87] SAF attacks against the RSF in densely populated areas would almost certainly cause widespread harm to civilians.
Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Sudan
The Islamic State called for jihad in Sudan in its most recent weekly newsletter. The editorial said that “both warring parties are clear enemies of Islam and Muslims, as each has an ignorant project supported by disbelieving external powers” that conspire to “wage war against Muslims, plunder their wealth, and tear apart their lands.”[88] The newsletter went on to shame Muslims for being “negative and uncaring” about Sudan and declared that “supporting the Muslims in Sudan is the duty of every capable Muslim, just as is the case in Iraq, Sham, Yemen, Palestine, and elsewhere.”[89] The segment concluded by noting that the only way to effectively support the Sudanese is to wage jihad and explicitly called on Muslims “to exploit events for the benefit of jihad, through promotion, recruitment, preparation, and readiness to establish a nucleus for jihad that confronts the imminent dangers and establishes a long-term jihad.”[90]
Salafi-jihadi networks already have roots in Sudan, but IS’s call highlights the continued risk that Salafi-jihadi insurgents could take advantage of the civil war in Sudan to strengthen and potentially operationalize these networks. The UN reported in 2023 that IS had a network in Sudan that consisted of 100 to 200 people led by an Iraqi relative of former IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.[91] Al Qaeda– and IS-affiliated escapees from prisons in Khartoum in the early days of the civil war in April 2023 may have bolstered these numbers.[92] The UN said that IS used Sudan as a logistic and financial base that supported the rest of the IS network in Africa. Al Qaeda has a long history in Sudan, including several years in the 1990s when Osama bin Laden and other leaders were based in Sudan, but has been less active in recent years. A Sudanese al Qaeda veteran with personal ties to bin Laden called for jihad in Sudan in 2022, prior to the outbreak of the civil war.[93]
There is an already-existing pool of Sudanese jihadists who could return to Sudan who are currently part of other Salafi-jihadi groups in Africa. There are a significant number of Sudanese nationals in IS Somalia Province (ISS).[94] Some Sudanese fighters occupy leadership positions in ISS, as evidenced by a United States Special Forces raid in Somalia that killed high-ranking and US-sanctioned Sudanese financier Bilal al Sudani. The United States said that Sudani oversaw a sprawling financial and logistic support network with ties to Islamic State affiliates in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique.[95] Sudanese militants were prominent in IS Libya, although the IS network in Libya is heavily degraded.[96]
Al Qaeda and the Islamic State both took advantage of the Libyan civil war to strengthen their presence in Libya in the early 2010s and eventually transition their presence in Libya into an attack role. Al Qaeda created a Libyan-based affiliate during the 2011 Libyan revolution that eventually carried out the 2012 Benghazi attack.[97] IS built up its Libyan affiliate by sending envoys to Libya in 2013 and returning Libyan fighters from Syria to Libya through preexisting transnational crime and Salafi-jihadi networks.[98] This pattern serves as a warning for the future of al Qaeda and IS in Sudan.
Sahel
IS Sahel Province likely supported a thwarted attack plot in Angola that aimed to target the US embassy and other high-value targets when then US President Joe Biden visited Angola in December 2024. Angolan defense officials announced that Angolan security forces disrupted a terrorist cell with ties to Burkina Faso in November that had planned attacks in high-importance areas during US President Joe Biden’s visit in December 2024.[99] Biden postponed his visit to Angola in October due to a hurricane in Florida, and it is unclear whether the attackers were prepared to carry out its attacks during the original date in October.[100] The cell intended to target a combination of the Luanda refinery, the electrical substation in the Belém area in Huambo, the headquarters building of the Criminal Investigation Service in Huambo province, the facilities of national oil company Sonangol, the US embassy, and the Intercontinental Hotel.[101] The cell’s leader and at least half of the cell were Angolan, but the group intended to send at least 13 people to Burkina Faso to train in preparation for the attacks and received funding from unspecified locations abroad.
The Angola plot is the latest indicator that ISSP growing strength in the Sahel has increased its ability to orchestrate and support the Islamic State’s external attack activity. The UN reported that IS Sahel Province (ISSP) doubled the territory that it controls in Mali between 2022 and 2023.[102] The group consolidated control over that territory and expanded further into Niger during 2023 and 2024.[103] ISSP now controls a significant portion of the Mali-Niger border and is increasing pressure on district capitals near the Burkina Faso–Niger border.[104] The group can leverage the space, time, and resources at its disposal to support external attacks, such as hosting foreign fighter training camps as it likely planned to do as part of the Angola plot. The UN Security Council reported in July 2023 that IS recruiters and facilitators in the Sahel had established transit corridors between southern Europe and the Sahel and had established an attack cell that operated out of Morocco and Spain.[105]
Figure 4. Salafi-Jihadi Areas of Operation Across West Africa
Source: Liam Karr.
ISSP has strengthened its ties to the regional IS office for West Africa, which is part of the IS institution responsible for external attack planning. Multiple UN reports since 2023 have highlighted that ISSP has strengthened its ties with IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad Basin, which hosts the al Furqan office.[106] The al Furqan office is part of the General Directorate of Provinces, which coordinates IS external activity.[107] The General Directorate of Provinces has regional offices that help coordinate this activity on the regional level, such as al Furqan.[108] IS has repeatedly used these offices to coordinate resources from multiple provinces to help fund, recruit, or otherwise facilitate external activity. ISWAP demonstrated its interest in attacking the United States when the group was likely behind a credible security threat to the US embassy in Nigeria in 2022.[109]
Somalia
Egypt and Somalia are moving ahead with an agreement to deploy Egyptian troops to Somalia through the new African Union mission in Somalia, but potential shortfalls in troop numbers and political tensions continue to pose obstacles for the mission. Egyptian and Somali officials agreed on Egypt’s participation in the new Africa Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) to combat al Shabaab on January 26.[110] The discussions came after Egyptian President Abdel Fateh al Sisi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed a bilateral agreement in Cairo on January 23 to increase military cooperation.[111] Sisi and Mohamud agreed to build on a military agreement from August 2024 that allowed for nearly 10,000 Egyptian troops to deploy to Somalia.[112] Somali media reported in September 2024 that Egypt would contribute 5,000 troops to AUSSOM and 5,000 other troops as part of other bilateral agreements.[113]
Haphazard changes to the countries that are contributing troops risk creating internal tensions and gaps for al Shabaab to exploit. Burundi withdrew from AUSSOM days before the mission began on January 1 after Somalia allocated Burundi 1,000 soldiers to the mission, a figure that Burundian officials said was half of what was necessary to ensure adequate force protection.[114] The Somali Federal Government has not publicly specified what troops, if any, will replace the Burundian forces. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed in early January 2025 that Ethiopia would contribute an unspecified number of troops to AUSSOM after a visit by a high-level Ethiopian delegation to Somalia.[115] Ethiopia and Somalia’s agreement on AUSSOM came after Turkey mediated the Ankara Declaration in December 2024.[116] The Ankara Declaration eased a yearlong dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia over a naval port deal that Ethiopia signed with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region in January 2024.[117]
Ongoing political tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia may create obstacles within AUSSOM. Somalia’s Foreign Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi said the Somali government is under “pressure” to exclude Egyptian forces from AUSSOM, presumably referring to Ethiopia.[118] Egypt and Ethiopia are at odds over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and the planned deployment of both Egyptian and Ethiopian forces could stir further political conflict in the region. Ethiopia views Egypt’s military presence on its border in Somalia as a national security risk and has warned against Egyptian military participation in AUSSOM due to Egypt’s threats against Ethiopia over the dam.[119] Egyptian officials have expressed their disapproval of Ethiopia gaining sea access via agreements with Somalia. The Egyptian foreign minister disputed a deal between Ethiopia and Somalia from December 2024 that allows Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through Somalia and Ethiopian participation in AUSSOM.[120] The Egyptian foreign minister said that Egypt would reject any non-littoral states’ access to the Red Sea during a press conference with Eritrea and Somalia on January 11.[121]
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