China–Taiwan Weekly Update, November 30, 2023

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 30, 2023 

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War 

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute 

Data Cutoff: November 29 at Noon ET 

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments. 

Key Takeaways

1. Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou Yu-ih and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je registered as separate presidential candidates on November 24. A fragmented opposition is advantageous for Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and frontrunner Lai Ching-te but does not guarantee his victory.
2. A US congressional decision not to renew funding for the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) would severely undermine American and Taiwanese national security in the Pacific.
3. A new “action plan” for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the next ten years emphasizes cooperation in green and digital development.
4. People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized economic cooperation and dialogue during a November 24 meeting with French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna, likely to persuade individual European countries not to coalesce around European Union (EU) investigations targeting the PRC.
5. The PLA conducted live-fire exercises near its border with Myanmar to strengthen border security and deter an escalation of violence in northern Myanmar.
6. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented an Israeli–Palestinian peace plan to the United Nations Security Council on November 29. Wang’s proposal is consistent with the PRC’s efforts to use the Israel-Hamas War to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States. The proposal itself is tantamount to Israeli defeat, however.

Taiwan

Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou Yu-ih and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je registered as separate presidential candidates on November 24. The parties reconvened for eleventh hour talks on November 23 in a final effort to agree on who would lead a KMT-TPP joint presidential ticket before the November 24 candidate registration deadline.[1] The failure of negotiations ended hopes for a joint ticket. Independent candidate Terry Gou, who mediated the negotiations, dropped out of the race on November 24.[2] Hou and Ko both announced their running mates on the morning of their November 24 registration. Hou’s vice-presidential pick is media personality and former legislator Jaw Shaw-kong.[3] Ko’s vice-presidential pick is TPP legislator Cynthia Wu.[4]

• Jaw founded the pro-unification New Party in 1993, which formalized the separation of the New Kuomintang Alliance faction from the KMT.[5] The New Party has not had representation in the Legislative Yuan since 2012. Jaw reinstated his KMT membership in 2021.[6]
• Wu is a current TPP legislator who Ko appointed to the Legislative Yuan in 2022 after the resignation of founding member Tsai Pi-ru.[7]

A fragmented opposition is advantageous for Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and frontrunner Lai Ching-te but does not guarantee his victory. The KMT’s and TPP’s failure to unite their support bases reduces the opposition’s ability to garner enough support to unseat the DPP. The latest polls show Lai’s previously wide lead of five to ten percentage points has narrowed to just a few percentage points over Hou, however.[8] Three trends have likely contributed to Hou’s rise in support. First, Hou has likely benefited from Gou’s withdrawal from the race.[9] Gou is a former KMT member whose policy platform most closely aligns with Hou. Second, Ko’s corresponding drop in polls suggests that the KMT-leaning portion of his support base is rallying back to Hou as the novelty of the TPP’s presidential debut wears off.[10] A February poll showed that 47 percent of Ko’s supporters would support Hou, with only 32 percent supporting Lai.[11] Third, Hou’s designation of Jaw as vice-presidential candidate is another contributing factor. Jaw is a high-profile figure who commands strong support in the KMT. Jaw’s public-facing roles as the host of the popular talk show Shaw-kong War Room and Chairman of the Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC) make him a recognizable candidate.[12]

The dominant election narrative continues to focus on cross-strait relations. The KMT is doubling down on the narrative that the election is a choice between war and peace. Jaw joined the chorus of KMT voices pushing this narrative during a campaign event on November 25.[13] The DPP is burnishing its reputation as the defender of democracy and freedom. A group of three DPP legislative candidates referred to themselves as the “Taiwan Defense Team,” emphasizing their commitment to rejecting interference from the PRC in Taiwan’s elections and protecting democracy.[14] Lai’s choice of former Taiwanese Representative to the US Hsiao Bi-khim as his running mate buttresses this election narrative. The DPP’s prioritization of strong ties with the US signals its desire for support in the face of threatening rhetoric and intimidation from the CCP. Lai has touted Hsiao’s foreign policy credentials and her strong relationship with the US as the pair’s biggest strength.

Compacts of Free Association

A US congressional decision to not renew funding for the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) would severely undermine American and Taiwanese national security in the Pacific. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while also granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[15] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[16] The signed agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[17] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion USD spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[18]

These three island countries control key sea-lanes that provide a secure route connecting American allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, to the United States territory of Guam and state of Hawaii. Palau and the Marshall Islands are two of the 13 countries that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[19] This international diplomatic recognition is critical to demonstrating the false nature of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) claims that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China. The loss of COFA funding would present an opportunity for the CCP to expand its economic influence with these strategically vital countries in the Pacific.

China

A new “action plan” for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the next ten years emphasizes cooperation in green and digital development. The State Council’s Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative released a document entitled “Vision and Actions for High-Quality Belt and Road Cooperation: Brighter Prospects for the Next Decade” on November 24. The document said that the BRI’s second decade would focus on international cooperation in new fields such as green and digital development, scientific and technological innovation, and health. The document also said the BRI should prioritize "small but beautiful" projects and engage in more projects with "small investment, quick results, and good economic, social and environmental benefits.” The document set five broad objectives for the next decade: building a more efficient connectivity network, deepening comprehensive and practical cooperation, enhancing the sense of gain for participating countries' peoples, establishing a new system to support China's open economy, and promoting the vision of a global community of shared future. The BRI will continue to promote its original five priorities: policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people ties.[20]

• People’s Daily and Qiushi, which are CCP publications targeted at party cadre, both stressed on November 26 the need to expand the breadth and depth of cooperation in building the Belt and Road, improving the development of China–Europe freight trains, and promoting green development.[21]

New adjustments to BRI priorities partly reflect problems the initiative has faced related to environmental concerns and investment risks. The PRC has invested over one trillion dollars in various Belt and Road infrastructure projects in around 150 countries since 2013.[22] The PRC has also faced both criticism and financial risks from massive and often unprofitable BRI infrastructure projects that have burdened developing countries with debts they are unable to repay.[23] The PRC announced at the 2021 UN General Assembly that it would cease construction of overseas coal plants and increase investments in renewable energy.[24] It has adjusted to focus on “small but beautiful” projects,[25] tightened standards to improve debt sustainability,[26] and pursued less resource-intensive priorities such as the Digital Silk Road.[27]

People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized economic cooperation and dialogue during a November 24 meeting with French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna, likely to persuade individual European countries not to coalesce around European Union (EU) investigations targeting the PRC. Colonna pledged an increase in the number and duration of visas issued to Chinese students studying in France as part of an effort to facilitate Sino–French people-to-people exchanges. Colonna also stated that France counted on “the vigilance of the Chinese authorities so that no structure in China … contributes directly or indirectly to Russia’s illegal war effort in Ukraine.”[28] PRC MFA spokesman Wang Wenbin stated in a November 27 press conference that China and France agreed to deepen cooperation in economics, cultural exchanges, and emerging scientific technologies.[29]

Colonna’s meetings in the PRC are part of a larger trend of Sino-European engagement throughout 2023. French President Emmanuel Macron and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping previously emphasized the importance in the same areas of cooperation in their April meeting in Beijing.[30] EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen expressed displeasure at unfair Chinese trade practices during the April EU-French joint visit to the PRC.[31] Chinese Premier Li Qiang similarly emphasized economic cooperation with German and French officials in late June during a visit to France and Germany.[32] Li told audiences of German politicians and business figures that Germany and China do not have “fundamental conflicts of interest” and that “risk prevention and cooperation are not mutually exclusive.”[33] He also called for a “more resilient” Sino-French industrial supply chain while in France.[34] The targeted PRC efforts to increase economic cooperation with Germany and France aim to buttress an ailing Chinese economy while also preventing an EU consensus on “de-risking” from materializing and threatening Chinese financial and supply chain interests. Von der Leyen previously announced an investigation into electric vehicle subsidies in China as part of this de-risking effort during her September 15 State of the Union speech.[35] A divided EU would suit CCP objectives vis-à-vis Europe ahead of an excepted December 7–8 summit between European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President Charles Michel, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, and Premier Li Qiang.

The prolific CCP state media coverage of an upsurge in respiratory illnesses in northern China indicates that the party is fearful of appearing to be incompetent public health managers to its own citizenry in the aftermath of the pandemic. The state health apparatus responded publicly shortly after the current disease outbreak came to light, in marked contrast to the CCP’s delayed response after the start of COVID-19. Deputy Director of the Beijing Center for Disease Control and Prevention Wang Quanyi advised the wearing of face masks beginning on November 24.[36] The National Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) urged the PRC populace on November 26, particularly children and the elderly, to receive vaccinations against respiratory diseases.[37] English and Chinese language state media reported that this upsurge occurred due to the circulation of known pathogens among the populace. It further stated that these pathogens cause diseases such as influenza, adenovirus, and mycoplasma pneumonia.[38]

The guidance to wear masks aims to prevent disease spread and demonstrate that the CCP-controlled governmental organs can effectively manage initial disease outbreaks without worldwide consequences like COVID-19. The public governmental response differed from the party’s response at the beginning of COVID-19, when the Public Security Bureau investigated whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang before he died from COVID-19 in February 2020.[39] The CCP’s English- and Chinese-language messaging indicate that the party aims to avoid recreating the image of irresponsible negligence that it endured in the aftermath of Li’s death.

The PLA conducted live-fire exercises near its border with Myanmar to strengthen border security and deter an escalation of violence in northern Myanmar. The PLA Southern Theater Command announced the start of three days of live-fire military drills in southwest Yunnan Province near the border with Myanmar on November 25.[40] The PLA deployed multiple types of artillery and counter-battery radars as part of the drills. It claimed that these exercises were intended to test rapid maneuvering, border blockade, and fire strike capabilities.[41] A PLA Daily editorial on November 26 called for an immediate ceasefire in northern Myanmar. This call is consistent with statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 16, 20, and 28.[42] Northern Myanmar has been engulfed in violence since a “brotherhood alliance” of three ethnic rebel groups launched attacks on Myanmar’s military junta government on October 27.[43] The violence has nearly ended legal PRC–Myanmar cross-border trade,[44] caused an unknown number of Chinese casualties,[45] and sent thousands of refugees to seek safety in the PRC.[46]

• One of the rebel groups claimed to have seized a key border gate and trading point on November 25, the same day the PLA exercises began.[47] About 120 trucks in a convoy carrying building materials and consumer goods from the PRC into Myanmar were destroyed by fire on November 24 in what the Myanmar government called a “terrorist attack.”[48] Local insurgents denied responsibility.[49]

Israel-Hamas War

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented an Israeli–Palestinian peace plan to the United Nations Security Council on November 29. The PRC is president of the UN Security Council for the month of November.[50] Wang called for implementing a “comprehensive cease-fire” and releasing “people in captivity,” providing humanitarian supplies to Gaza, and pursuing the two-state solution.[51] His proposal came after CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping stated his desire on November 21 for “all parties” to implement an immediate ceasefire, end collective punishments against the people of Gaza, allow the flow of humanitarian relief, and prevent the conflict from spreading across the Middle East.[52]

Wang’s proposal is consistent with the PRC’s efforts to use the Israel–Hamas war to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and state propaganda outlets have repeatedly condemned violence between Palestine and Israel since October 7 but never condemned Hamas. They continue to call for an immediate ceasefire and promote a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.[53] The PRC’s targeted criticism of Israel and call for an immediate ceasefire align with the views of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Arab states.[54] The PRC MFA and state-owned outlets, such as the Global Times, previously criticized US support for Israel and claimed that the PRC has no “selfish interest” in the conflict and is committed to bringing peace and justice.[55] The PRC proposal would be tantamount to a defeat for Israel, as CTP and ISW reported on November 29.[56]

[1] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20231124001626-260407?chdtv

https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/en/news/5045883

[2] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202311240023

https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4500361

[3] http://www.kmt dot org.tw/2023/11/blog-post_56.html

http://www.kmt dot org.tw/2023/11/blog-post_24.html

[4] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202311240006

https://www.tpp dot org.tw/newsdetail/3082

[5] http://www.np dot org.tw/%E6%96%B0%E9%BB%A8%E6%AD%B7%E5%8F%B2/

http://www.np dot org.tw/%e6%96%b0%e9%bb%a8%e7%90%86%e5%bf%b5/

[6] https://news.ltndot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3428398

[7] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2022/10/15/2003787077

[8] https://udn dot com/news/story/123307/7602775

https://cc.tvbs dot com.tw/portal/file/poll_center/2023/20231127/f3e9d45d6ee011ac6c413d80d55eba71.pdf

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[9] https://udn dot com/news/story/123307/7602775

[10] https://www.mnews dot tw/story/20231127nm003

https://www.ettoday dot net/news/20231125/2630280.htm

[11] https://www.tpof dot org/%e9%81%b8%e8%88%89/%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e9%81%b8%e8%88%89/%e5%a6%82%e6%9e%9c%e6%9f%af%e6%96%87%e5%93%b2%e9%80%80%e5%87%ba2024%e7%b8%bd%e7%b5%b1%e5%a4%a7%e9%81%b8%ef%bc%882023%e5%b9%b42%e6%9c%8821%e6%97%a5%ef%bc%89/

[12] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/en/news/5046220

[13] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202311250092.aspx

[14] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20231128003104-260407?chdtv

[15] https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-witnesses-the-signing-of-the-u-s-palau-2023-agreement-following-the-compact-of-free-association-section-432-review/

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-signs-agreement-continue-micronesia-assistance-under-strategic-pact-2023-05-23/

[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-negotiator-expects-sign-new-deal-with-strategic-marshall-islands-monday-2023-10-16/

[17] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12194#:~:text=In%202003%2C%20the%20United%20States,years%20(FY2004%2DFY2023).

[18] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12194#:~:text=In%202003%2C%20the%20United%20States,years%20(FY2004%2DFY2023).

[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/palau-says-committed-supporting-taiwan-despite-mounting-aggressions-2022-10-06/

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/marshall-islands-says-strongly-committed-taiwan-ties-2022-03-22/

[20] https://www.yidaiyilu dot gov.cn/p/0F1IITOI.html

https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202311/1302470.shtml

[21] http://cpc.people dot com.cn/n1/2023/1126/c64387-40125889.html

 http://www.qstheory dot cn/qshyjx/2023-11/26/c_1129993989.htm

[22] https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative

[23] https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/10/why-china-rebooting-belt-and-road-initiative

[24] http://www.news dot cn/english/2021-09/22/c_1310201218.htm

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/xi-says-china-aims-provide-2-bln-vaccine-doses-by-year-end-2021-09-21/

[25] https://www.gov dot cn/yaowen/liebiao/202310/content_6909921.htm

[26] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-revamps-debt-appraisal-framework-belt-road-programme-2023-10-20/

http://www.news dot cn/2023-10/19/c_1129925229.htm

[27] https://merics.org/en/tracker/china-inc-recalibrating-its-approach-its-overseas-footprint-bri-turns-10-years-old

https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-s-BRI-isn-t-going-away-it-s-getting-smaller-and-greener

[28] https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/chine/evenements/article/chine-conference-de-presse-conjointe-de-catherine-colonna-ministre-de-l-europe

[29] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202311/t20231127_11187816.shtml

[30] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202304/t20230406_11055496.html

[31] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_2147

[32] https://apnews.com/article/germany-china-new-premier-li-qiang-visit-82c31dad749a40cfc8a7b4b8c83d57de

[33] http://cpc dot people.com.cn/n1/2023/0620/c64094-40017513.html

http://cpc.people dot com.cn/n1/2023/0620/c64094-40017507.html

[34] http://cpc.people dot com.cn/n1/2023/0622/c64094-40019238.html

[35] https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/13/eu-launches-anti-subsidy-probe-in-chinese-evs.html

[36] http://www.news dot cn/health/20231124/8add4e074b984c20b3f7313606e2f7a8/c.html

[37] http://www.news dot cn/health/20231127/328bac75fc114cf8a59fce925e25bbe8/c.html

http://www.nhc dot gov.cn/xwzb/webcontroller.do?titleSeq=11538&gecstype=1

[38] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202311/1302543.shtml

https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202311/1302400.shtml?id=11

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https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202311/1302474.shtml?id=11

[39] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51403795

[40] http://www.news dot cn/politics/2023-11/25/c_1129993112.htm

[41] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202311/1302588.shtml

[42] http://www.news dot cn/politics/2023-11/26/c_1129993940.htm

https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202311/t20231120_11183598.shtml

https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202311/t20231128_11188500.shtml

https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202311/t20231116_11181657.shtml

[43] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-army-seeks-restore-order-rebel-alliance-launches-surprise-attacks-2023-10-27/

[44] https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-china-border-105-mile-trade-zone-offensive-327c5fdc12245f136106ecf36d777ca0

[45] https://www.irrawaddy dot com/news/burma/beijing-confirms-chinese-casualties-in-myanmar-border-battle.html

[46] https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/shortages-11032023145928.html

[47] https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-china-border-105-mile-trade-zone-offensive-327c5fdc12245f136106ecf36d777ca0

[48] https://www.gnlm dot com.mm/mndaa-tnla-pdf-terrorists-attack-with-drop-bombs-near-myanmar-china-border/

[49] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinas-myanmar-envoy-holds-high-level-talks-after-signs-strained-ties-2023-11-24/

https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-says-drone-attack-by-ethnic-groups-destroyed-120-trucks-/7368319.html

[50] https://press.un.org/en/2023/231101_sc.doc.htm

[51] https://english.news dot cn/20231129/16da322f0e66490eba95020b65acc3a4/c.html

[52] https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/zyxw/202311/t20231121_11184740.shtml

https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/zyxw/202311/t20231122_11184862.shtml

[53] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202311/t20231113_11179210.shtml

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https://www.fmprc dot gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202311/t20231115_11180738.shtml

[54] https://www.voanews.com/a/arab-islamic-leaders-condemn-idf-operations-in-gaza-call-for-cease-fire-/7351502.html

https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202311/1301749.shtml

[55] https://www.fmprc dot gov dot cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202311/t20231101_11171773.html

https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202311/1301296.shtml

https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202311/1301042.shtml

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-29-2023