China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 4, 2025

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 4, 2025

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Frank Mattimoe of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek and Alex Chou of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: April 2, 2025

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways  

• Taiwan: Eight cases to recall legislators from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) advanced to the second stage. The mass recall campaigns against Taiwanese legislators have to this point only affected the KMT-led opposition coalition. Most of the recalls targeting the DPP will likely fail, however.
• China: The PRC published an article framing Taiwanese President Lai and his DPP as authoritarian oppressors. This framing is part of an information operation to discredit and undermine PRC critics in the Taiwanese political space.
• China: The PLA conducted a large-scale joint military exercise around Taiwan simulating a blockade. The PRC is normalizing stock blockade exercises as a regular feature in its coercion toolkit that it executes at a chosen time under the pretext of provocations by ROC President Lai Ching-te’s administration.
• China: The PRC is trying to exploit global dissatisfaction with newly imposed US tariffs to attract foreign investment and build relations with historic American allies, such as Canada, the European Union, Japan, and South Korea.
• China: The PRC placed under review a Hong Kong-based firm’s proposed sale of its Panama ports, among other assets, to a US firm. The PRC may consider the sale a threat to its economic security.
• Japan: Japan announced its first emergency evacuation contingency plan for civilians on its Sakishima Islands off the Taiwanese coast. The PRC criticized the plan, arguing that Japan is framing a hypothetical emergency around Taiwan as a threat to Japanese nationals.
• Philippines: The United States committed to deploy additional missiles systems to the Philippines and enhance bilateral defense industrial cooperation. The system is a ground-based, anti-ship missile that can hit targets up to 100 nautical miles away.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The Taiwanese Central Election Commission (CEC) advanced eight recall petitions targeting ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators. These are the first petitions against the DPP that have passed the first stage, as all other cases are against the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and KMT-aligned legislators. The CEC announced on March 28 that eight recall petitions against DPP legislators received signatures from at least one percent of eligible voters in their respective districts, meeting the threshold to move to the next stage. One of these petitions is against the DPP Legislative Caucus Secretary-General Rosalia Wu Tzu-yao.[1] Two other recall petitions against DPP lawmakers failed to get enough signatures, and the CEC is still reviewing petitions against seven other DPP lawmakers. The CEC also referred 19 recall petitions, including 16 against national legislators, to prosecutors for suspected fraud after finding invalid signatures from non-constituents, deceased individuals, or duplicate signers.[2]

Forty-three recall cases have advanced to the second stage at this point. The eight DPP recall cases join 34 recall cases against KMT legislators and one against a KMT-aligned independent legislator. The second stage of the recall process requires signatures from at least 10 percent of eligible voters in the targeted legislators’ district within 60 days to trigger a recall election. A special election to fill the vacancy will occur upon a successful recall.[3] Most of the recalls are likely to fail in the second stage as it requires 10 times the number of signatures compared to the first stage. The difficulty that the KMT has had in gathering signatures against DPP legislators from just one percent of their constituency for the first stage illustrates that the mass recalls are likely to benefit the DPP. The DPP must flip at least six seats in the Legislative Yuan to gain a majority.

DPP politicians and DPP-aligned activists initiated the recall campaigns after the KMT passed controversial budget cuts that would undermine many government functions and Taiwanese military readiness as well as a bill that functionally paralyzed the Taiwanese Constitutional Court. The paralysis of the Constitutional Court prevents the DPP from legally contesting the controversial budget cuts. The KMT responded with recall campaigns against the DPP politicians, which until now have failed to garner enough valid signatures to clear the first stage. Recalls have become increasingly common in Taiwan over the past decade after reforms to the Public Officials Election and Recall Act in 2016 made recall thresholds more attainable, and public discourse is increasingly concerned about the political weaponization of recalls.[4]

A Taipei District Court sentenced three former Presidential Office guards and a military communications officer to prison on March 26 for selling military intelligence to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).[5] These sentences highlight the PRC emphasis on infiltrating the Taiwanese military to gather intelligence and undermine the government. The PRC paid the officers up to 2 million New Taiwan Dollars (approximately 60,000 US dollars) for the information that they provided.[6] The court did not specify what information they shared but revealed that the transfer involved the use of cell phones to copy sensitive documents and pass them to PRC intelligence personnel.[7]

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te called attention to PRC efforts to recruit Taiwanese military personnel as spies during a March 13 speech that outlined measures to resist malign PRC influence.[8] Lai stated that Taiwan prosecuted 28 active and 15 retired military personnel in 2024 for spying for the PRC, accounting for 66 percent of all espionage cases that year.[9] A January 12 National Security Bureau (NSB) report identified five infiltration channels in Taiwanese society that the PRC exploits to recruit active-duty and retired military officers as agents and build spy networks with financial inducements.[10]

The NSB report also notes that PRC collusion with gangs presents the risk of armed groups assisting in military operations against Taiwan.[11] An AEI-ISW report from May 2024 on PRC short-of-war coercion against Taiwan highlighted the risks of co-optation of military personnel and organized crime elements as part of the PRC’s lines of effort to weaken Taiwan’s will and capacity to defend itself.[12] ROC authorities indicted retired Lieutenant General Kao An-kuo and six of his associates in January for spying for the PRC, making him the highest-ranking ROC military official to be tried for espionage.[13] Kao established the “Taiwan Military Government of the Republic of China” in 2018, which was an armed organization with that intended to subvert the government and act as an inside collaborator to help the PLA attack Taiwan.[14]

Taiwan’s Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee launched its first live civil defense drills on March 27.[15] The drills highlighted Lai's focus on integrating central and local governments to respond to emergencies, including civilian responses to wartime scenarios. The drills incorporated scenarios including a tsunami and an explosion at a port. Activities centered around Anping Port outside of Tainan—one of the locations of a designated “red beach” that the PRC could target in an invasion of Taiwan.[16] Civil society groups, firefighters, and medical personnel participated in drills that presumed no involvement from Taiwanese military forces.[17] Taiwanese Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim attended to inspect the drills. Taiwanese national security officials, including National Security Council members, Executive Yuan Minister Ji Lian-cheng and American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Director Raymond Greene, also attended.[18]

Lai created the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee in June 2024 with the aim of fortify Taiwan’s energy, cyber, financial, communications, and infrastructural resilience and supporting training for civic defense.[19] Lai’s administration has prioritized bolstering societal resilience against PRC threats, including malign influence, fifth column elements of Taiwanese society, and ensuring preparedness to respond to emergency scenarios in which the military is occupied. The committee first met in September 2024 and will reconvene in June 2025 to organize further civil defense drills that coincide with the Taiwanese military’s annual Han Kuang defense drills.[20] The live civil society drills follow an “immediate combat exercise” featuring a simulated PRC military-exercise-turned-attack as well as Lai’s decision to reinstitute peacetime military trials as a means of combating PRC espionage.[21]

The PRC framed a March 27 collision between a Taiwanese navy ship and a PRC fishing boat near Taichung as "malicious." Taiwan will investigate the collision but dismissed PRC criticisms, which echoed recent PRC rhetoric on other cross-strait incidents. The collision occurred in international waters approximately 45 nautical miles from Taiwan’s Taichung Port with no injuries reported.[22] The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) accused Taiwan of “malicious actions” in response to the incident.[23] Taiwanese Defense Minister Wellington Koo said that Taiwan would investigate the incident but noted that the TAO’s comments were standard rhetoric.[24]

The TAO regularly uses cross-strait incidents to delegitimize Taiwan and its governing officials, especially those representing the ruling DPP. The TAO frequently criticizes Taiwanese President Lai and frames PRC actions in the Taiwan Strait as reasonable responses to Lai’s behavior. The TAO framing of the collision aligns with TAO and broader PRC efforts to cast Taiwan as the aggressor in cross-strait affairs. This rhetoric aims to set informational conditions for PRC escalations in the strait, including military drills.

The TAO published an article framing the DPP as authoritarian oppressors as part of an information operation to discredit PRC critics in the Taiwanese political space. PRC TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua introduced the “Reporting Column on Persecution of Taiwan compatriots by ‘Taiwan Independence’ Prosecutors and Accomplices,” which accused the DPP of cracking down on freedom of speech and persecuting opposition political parties and individuals who promoted Taiwan’s “peaceful integration with the PRC.”[25] The article explicitly mentions Taiwanese officials and social media figures who are critical of the PRC. The column accused these individuals of “bad behavior,” such as fabricating charges to suppress the opposition party, threatening to dissolve pro-unification groups, detaining people who support the “peaceful development” of cross-strait relations, infringing on the legitimate rights and the interests of mainland spouses, and "hunting" mainland spouses.[26] This comes as Taiwan deported PRC nationals married to Taiwanese citizens for advocating for “reunification” on their personal social media accounts. [27]

The TAO’s explicit naming and shaming of Taiwanese individuals that it accuses of harming cross-strait relations represents an effort to intimidate those who support the DPP, and policies centered around resisting PRC influence. The TAO expanded its public list of “Taiwan independence diehards” in October 2024 to include twelve prominent individuals from or aligned with Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), including the current vice president and defense minister. The TAO’s accusations against specific individuals contribute to PRC efforts to deter Taiwanese people from associating with DPP policies for fear of reprisal by the PRC.

The TAO published the article as Taiwanese President Lai has embraced a “whole-of-society approach” to national security, which focuses on addressing PRC espionage and malign influence.[28] The Lai administration has strengthened the role of government agencies, including the Ministry of Interior, to work alongside local governments and media to counter PRC influence.[29] The TAO’s rhetoric suggests that the PRC is trying to exploit media events in Taiwan to discredit the Lai administration and DPP.[30] A Xinhua commentary published days later continued the line of attack against President Lai for his “green authoritarianism,” a reference to the DPP’s official colors and the historic White Terror period. The article claimed that Lai used these judicial procedures “to build an authoritarian system” and that he has “clamped down” on Taiwanese citizens’ freedom of speech by revoking the family-based residence permit of a PRC citizen.[31]

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) denied any persecution of political dissidents and accused the PRC of claiming jurisdiction over Taiwan.[32] An unnamed US State Department spokesperson criticized the TAO column, calling it “irresponsible” and part of the PRC’s “’intimidation campaign’ against Taiwan and its supporters.”[33]

The China Coast Guard (CCG) conducted four incursions into the restricted waters of Taiwan’s Kinmen Island in March 2025, a continuation of PRC efforts to normalize such incursions. The PRC typically sends four CCG ships to simultaneously enter Kinmen’s restricted waters for approximately two hours during each incursion. These efforts reduce Taiwan’s threat awareness and expend Taiwanese resources. Kinmen is a Taiwanese-administered archipelago two miles from the PRC city of Xiamen. Taiwan does not claim territorial or contiguous waters around Kinmen Island due to its proximity to the PRC, but it maintains “prohibited” and “restricted” waters that are functionally equivalent. The Taiwan Coast Guard Association (CGA) has reported a total of 64 incursions since these incursions began in February 2024.

 

PRC incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) spiked several times in March 2025. The PRC has normalized ADIZ incursions to signal disapproval of Taiwanese President Lai and erode Taiwan’s threat response capacity. Forty-three PLA aircraft crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s ADIZ on March 17, and 41 aircraft did so on March 21, coinciding with PLA joint combat readiness patrols near Taiwan.[34] The PLA sent 311 aircraft in total over the month, which is around the monthly average since Lai took office in May 2024. The PRC also sent high-altitude balloons into Taiwan’s ADIZ on six days in March. The Taiwanese National Defense Ministry spotted a one-day record of 11 high-altitude balloons on March 6 and reported the last balloon sighting of the month on March 19.[35] PRC balloons likely serve surveillance purposes and collect meteorological data that could be useful for planning strikes. They also harass the Taiwanese population, exhaust Taiwanese detection resources, and try to goad Taiwan into a response that the PRC could frame as escalatory.

The PRC likely intends its ADIZ incursions to signal displeasure with the Lai administration. ADIZ incursions notably spiked in May 2024 following Lai’s inauguration.[36] The high level of ADIZ incursions and military drills seen in March 2025 likely reflects the PRC response to Lai’s criticism of the PRC as a “foreign hostile force” and comments on PRC infiltration into Taiwan on March 13.[37] ADIZ incursions wear down Taiwanese threat awareness while attenuating resources and normalizing PRC aggression.

 

 

China

The PLA conducted large-scale joint military exercises encircling Taiwan on April 1 and 2. The exercises simulated a blockade around Taiwan and integrated the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force.[38] The exercises focused on assaulting ground and maritime targets, securing logistical routes, severing supply routes, and achieving “comprehensive superiority” across domains, according to the Eastern Theater Command (ETC), which is the primary military command responsible for Taiwan-related operations.[39]

The Taiwanese National Defense Ministry reported 135 PLA aircraft sorties across both days of exercises—68 of which crossed the median line—and 13 PLA Navy ships, which encircled Taiwan from all directions.[40] The ministry also observed 10 CCG vessels operating alongside the PLA Navy.[41] Four CCG vessels entered the restricted waters around Taiwan’s outer Dongyin and Wuqiu islands during the exercises on April 1.[42] Taiwan designates “prohibited” and “restricted” waters around its outer islands, which it treats as equivalent to territorial waters and a contiguous zone.

The PLA Shandong aircraft carrier and carrier strike group operated approximately 250 miles southeast of Taiwan, where the group focused on testing the “linkage internal and external lines, three-dimensional blockade and joint combat capabilities.”[43] PRC aircraft carriers have participated in previous blockade simulations from the same area.[44]

The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense (MND) stated on April 2 that the PLA used live fire in the East China Sea but not the Taiwan Strait. The Zhejiang Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) announced a no-sail zone from April 1-3 in a roughly 170-mile-long area off the coast of Zhejiang, which is likely the area where the PLA used live fire.[45]

The ETC released a slew of propaganda during the exercises, including vilifying depictions of Lai and videos that depicted the PLA destroying major Taiwanese cities.[46] Some of the content used traditional Chinese characters, implying a Taiwanese target audience. TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian said on April 1 that the exercises were punishment for Lai’s support of Taiwanese independence and a warning to separatist forces.[47] Zhu accused Lai of provocative rhetoric and policies after a March 13 speech by Lai that outlined measures for resisting PRC malign influence and coercion.[48] The PRC has previously justified its aggressive military behavior as a response to separatism.

This marks the third major encirclement exercise around Taiwan since Lai took office in May 2024. The PRC pretext for launching Joint Sword 2024A and 2024B was a reaction to claimed “provocations” by Lai in his inauguration speech and national day speech, respectively.[49]

This week’s exercises resembled other recent blockade exercises around Taiwan. The PRC used a new name for this exercise—Strait Thunder 2025A—instead of Joint Sword, the series of blockade exercises which debuted in 2023 and included two iterations in 2024. A TAO-run media outlet stated that the new name for the exercise signifies the PLA’s mastery of its ability to execute a Taiwan blockade as it normalizes and systematizes military exercises around the island.[50] Similar to the previous Joint Sword exercises, the “2025A” construction implies that it is only the first iteration of the exercise for the year.

The increasing frequency of stock blockade exercises suggests that such drills are pre-programmed plans that the PRC can execute at a chosen time in response to claimed provocations. This contrasts with the PRC’s framing of the exercises as an unprompted reaction to incitements by the Lai administration. The coordinated political warfare, assignment of letters to the exercises, and the brief interval between the claimed pretense and execution indicate that the blockade drills have become a standardized series that are now a part of the PRC’s coercion toolkit for it to use at will. The PRC has launched different exercises in reaction to other political events in Taiwan, including large-scale air and naval drills in the Taiwan Strait in December in response to Lai’s transit through Guam and Hawaii.

The PRC is leveraging global dissatisfaction with newly imposed American tariffs to build relations with historic American allies and attract foreign investment. The PRC will likely use the US announcement of additional tariffs on April 2 to strengthen the PRC framing of itself as the leading champion of multilateralism and global trade. The United States announced tariffs against all trade partners except Canada and Mexico with the PRC receiving an additional 34-percent tariff on top of the 20-percent tariffs implemented in February and March under the second Donald Trump administration.[51] Other notable tariff figures include 32 percent against Taiwan, 24 percent against Japan, 26 percent against South Korea, and 20 percent against the European Union. The PRC has exploited discontent regarding recent American tariffs to deepen cooperation with American allies, specifically Japan, South Korea, Canada, and the European Union.

The PRC, Japan, and South Korea held their first economic dialogue in five years on March 30, discussing a potential free trade agreement and the expansion of existing trade cooperation.[52] A CCTV state media-affiliated user posted to PRC-based social media app Weibo on March 31 stating that the three countries will jointly respond to US tariffs. [53] Japan’s Trade Minister Yoji Muto denied any official agreements, however, stating they were just “exchanging opinions.” [54] A Korean news outlet cited an unnamed Trade, Industry, and Energy Ministry official stating that “reports of the joint response to US tariffs are somewhat exaggerated.”[55] The PRC’s premature statement likely tried to drive a wedge in US relations with Japan and South Korea. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba expressed dissatisfaction and concern following President Trump’s April 2 announcement of reciprocal tariffs.[56]

The PRC is also seeking to deepen economic relations with the European Union and Canada. EU Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic visited Beijing March 28 and 29 and met PRC Vice-Premier He Lifeng and PRC Commerce Minister Wang Wentao.[57] Sefcovic stated the European Union is interested in “deepening trade and investment cooperation” with the PRC, and He reciprocated those statements.[58] US tariffs may complicate EU efforts to decouple its economy from the PRC. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated on February 4 that Europe would continue “de-risking” its economic relationship with the PRC despite it being a “vital trading partner,” but also stating “there is also room to engage constructively with China.”[59] PRC ambassador to Canada Wang Di expressed a similar desire to deepen economic relations with Canada on March 25 despite recent Chinese tariffs—100 percent on canola and 25 percent on pork—framed in retaliation against Canada’s 100-percent tariff on Chinese electrical vehicles.[60]

The PRC is using global economic uncertainty to encourage foreign investment in the PRC. PRC President Xi Jinping met with more than 40 global chairmen, CEOs, and business association representatives in Beijing on March 28 to discuss PRC efforts to open the economy and promote trade.[61] Some notable figures in attendance include the Saudi Aramco president, FedEx Group president, Blackstone chairman and CEO, Samsung Executive chairman, and Hitachi chairman. Xi highlighted the PRC’s economic stability in juxtaposition to American protectionism under the Trump administration—a veiled critique to disruptive tariff policies that have shocked the global economy.[62] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated on March 31 that this meeting is part of a “charm offensive” to attract foreign investment and emphasize that the PRC is “fertile ground” for investment and business opportunities.[63]

The PRC has continued to issue statements that trade wars have no winners and are in violation of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules in response to each round of American tariffs.[64] The PRC Commerce Ministry stated that “China firmly opposes this and will resolutely take countermeasures” in response to the reciprocal tariff announcement.[65]

The United States expanded its export controls Entity List to prevent PRC military modernization and technological advancements, among other reasons. PRC advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and hypersonic missiles are a significant threat to Indo-Pacific security, so these export controls are necessary to slow the growth of PRC military power. Fifty-three PRC entities were added to the Entity List along with entities from the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Iran, and Taiwan.[66]The US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced this move to hamper Chinese Communist Party (CCP) military development in computing, quantum technologies, and hypersonic weapons.[67] BIS also targeted entities associated with the Test Flying Academy of South Africa (TFASA), which it had previously sanctioned in June 2023 for allegedly training Chinese pilots, as well as entities providing Iran with military supplies. A significant theme in the Entity List revisions is preventing United States-origin items from aiding the PRC’s military modernization efforts and Iran’s defense capabilities. Notable entities targeted are the six subsidiaries of the PRC’s top cloud computing firm— Inspur Group which was added to the entity list in 2023— along with the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence and intermediaries supplying Huawei with American goods.[68] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a standard condemnation of the “illegal unilateral sanctions” in response to the announcement.[69]

US intelligence agencies published the Annual Threat Assessment on March 24 stating that the PRC aims to become the top AI power by 2030 and assessing that the PLA plans to use this technology for online disinformation campaigns.[70] Chinese AI models, such as DeepSeek and Alibaba’s Qwen, are challenging OpenAI and other American companies for market dominance, and the widespread use of AI technology in PRC governance, such as the ubiquity of facial recognition software, provides unparalleled access to data for the PRC’s AI models for training. The United States has continued to expand on its October 2022 efforts to prevent the PRC from acquiring advanced chips and semiconductors.[71] The PRC is also the global leader in hypersonic missile technology, which is able to bypass many current anti-missile defense systems due to their speed.[72] The United States is still testing its first hypersonic missile by contrast. These new export controls stymy the PRC’s technological growth and prevent the PRC from amassing enough military dominance to invade Taiwan.

The PRC placed Hong Kong firm CK Hutchison’s proposed sale of 43 ports, including two Panama Canal ports, under review. PRC officials’ efforts to block the sale may represent PRC efforts to entrench its economic security around Panama amid perceived threats. CK Hutchison initially planned to sell stakes in 43 global ports, valued at 22.8 billion dollars, to US asset management firm BlackRock.[73] These include two ports at either end of the Panama Canal as well as holdings throughout the Americas, Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.[74] The PRC State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) has placed Hutchison’s sale under an anti-trust review. Panamanian officials are auditing Hutchison’s concessions at the time of writing.[75]

Pro-PRC entities have criticized the sales for several weeks leading to these interventions. PRC government bodies have consistently expressed a neutral view on the sale of the ports, while Hong Kong government entities have made more outspoken statements of opposition. PRC-aligned Hong Kong newspaper Da Kung Pao has continuously published criticisms of the proposed port sales, which critics have implied run counter to PRC interests.[76] The PRC MFA noted in a March 31 press conference that SAMR “will conduct a review in accordance with the law to protect fair competition in the market and safeguard the public interest.”[77]

The PRC may view the port sales through an economic security lens. PRC trade represents the second-highest volume of transits through the Panama Canal in long tons, comprising 21.4 percent. US traffic represents 74.7 percent by comparison.[78] The Wall Street Journal cited unnamed sources claiming that PRC President Xi Jinping had planned to leverage the ports in negotiations with the United States.[79] The PRC may view the sale of its canal holdings as indicative of diminishing economic over an economically critical waterway. The PRC may also view its actions against CK Hutchison as an opportunity to entrench its domestic economic power by publicly centralizing Hong Kong firms’ decisions under PRC control. PRC supporters criticized CK Hutchison CEO Li Ka-shing for not taking a strong enough stance against Hong Kong’s 2019 protests.[80] Outlook Think Tank--an institute associated with the PRC government-affiliated media agency Xinhua--ran an article similarly criticizing Li’s business decisions as counter to PRC interests in 2015.[81] PRC officials may seek to punish Li and CK Hutchison as a means of entrenching control over Hong Kong corporations and civil society entities deemed disloyal to the CCP.

Northeast Asia

Japan

Japan announced its first major conflict evacuation plan for the Sakishima Islands near Taiwan. PRC state media criticized the plan as a political maneuver to tie Japan’s security with Taiwan’s, which the PRC claims to be an internal issue.[82] The plan, which is based on Japan’s Civil Protection Law, is Japan’s first major evacuation plan in response to a regional conflict. Although the Japanese government publicly stated that the evacuation plan “does not assume a particular incident,” Sakishima Islands’ proximity to Taiwan has led to speculations that the plan was designed with a Taiwan contingency in mind.[83] The plan calls for the evacuation of approximately 110,000 residents and 10,000 visitors from the municipalities of Ishigaki, Miyakojima, Taketomi, Yonaguni and Tarama over the course of six days. Ships and aircrafts operated by the Japan Self Defense Force, Japan Coast Guard, and the private sector will transport 20,000 evacuees to Kyushu per day. Charter buses will then transport the evacuees to one of the 32 municipalities in Kyushu region and Yamaguchi Prefecture. Japan seeks to finalize the plan by FY2026 and organize a large-scale evacuation exercise. Japan released guidelines for shelter construction in the five municipalities in 2024, and the Okinawan government, which oversees the Sakishima Islands, has conducted annual tabletop evacuation exercises since 2023, with the latest exercise taking place in January 2025.[84]

The Sakishima evacuation plan likely signals Tokyo’s commitment to fulfill the 2022 National Security Strategy’s pledge to ensure “prompt evacuation of residents, including those in the southwest region well in advance of an armed attack.”[85] The PRC has not officially responded to Japan’s announcement at the time of writing, but PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi has warned Japan against promoting the view that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency” in a press conference after the Two Sessions.[86] PRC Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Wu Qian commented that Japan is the “least qualified” to raise issues related to Taiwan.[87]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

The United States committed to deploy additional missile systems to the Philippines and enhance US-Philippine defense industrial cooperation amid PRC protests. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth visited Manila on March 27—his first visit to an Indo-Pacific ally and an indication of the strategic importance that the United States assigns to the Philippines.[88] Hegseth and Philippine National Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro pledged to “re-establish” deterrence through joint defense industrial cooperation, foreign military financing, and the US provision of drones to the Philippine military.[89] Hegseth also promised the deployment of the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) during the Balikatan 2025 military exercises. NMESIS is a ground-based, anti-ship missile capable of hitting targets up to 100 nautical miles away.[90] The Philippine military has stated that Balikatan 2025 will host a “Full Battle simulation” across the Philippine archipelago and South China Sea and will include international participants from Australia, Japan, and the United States.[91] Balikatan 2025 will be one of the largest and most intensive iterations of the 40-year exercise series, likely as a reflection of increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and a desire by the Philippines and its regional allies to send a message of strength and unity to the PRC.

The US Army’s 3rd multi-domain task force (MDTF) unit began preparing a second Typhon battery “for deployment in the Pacific theater” in March 2025.[92] The US Army has not stated whether it will be deployed in the Philippines. US Army 3rd MDTF commander Michael Rose indicated that the Typhon would support this year’s Operation Pathways—a series of year-round exercises that encompass Balikatan and other US-Philippine bilateral drills. Hegseth’s statements in Manila could indicate that the Philippines will host a Second Typhon missile system despite PRC protests.[93] The PRC launched a series of protests following the April 2024 deployment of one Typhon unit to Northern Luzon.[94] The Typhon unit can launch missiles with a range of up to 2,500 km, reaching areas in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

PRC MFA spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated that the United States and Philippines were undermining regional stability and provoking tensions in the South China Sea.[95] PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Xiaodong made similar statements prior to Hegseth’s visit to Manila and urged for the South China Sea issue to be resolved by claimant parties.[96] PRC statements concerning Hegseth’s visit follow standard rhetoric surrounding US-Philippine alliance-building measures and military cooperation. The actions of the United States, Philippines, and their Indo-Pacific allies indicate a desire to jointly defend against PRC aggression.

[1] https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/6074220

https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202503280205.aspx

[2] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202504010132.aspx

[3] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/03/10/2003833190

[4] https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/03/20/taiwans-democratic-uncertainty-in-the-face-of-recall-elections/

[5] https://money.udn dot com/money/story/5613/8408429

[6] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6069026

[7] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6069026

[8] https://www.president dot gov.tw/NEWS/39105

[9] https://www.president dot gov.tw/NEWS/39105

[10] https://www.nsb dot gov.tw/zh/assets/documents/%E6%96%B0%E8%81%9E%E7%A8%BF/ed8fddb8-3d99-4d3f-9414-c9b360f2df5a.pdf

[11] https://www.nsb dot gov.tw/zh/assets/documents/%E6%96%B0%E8%81%9E%E7%A8%BF/ed8fddb8-3d99-4d3f-9414-c9b360f2df5a.pdf

[12] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/From-Coercion-to-Capitulation-How-China-Can-Take-Taiwan-Without-a-War.pdf?x85095

[13] https://udn dot com/news/story/7321/8567543

[14] https://udn dot com/news/story/7321/8567543

[15] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/paper/1698762

[16] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2025/03/28/2003834194; https://www.newsweek.com/taiwan-beaches-higher-risk-invasion-china-1851899

[17] https://www.ft.com/content/5b29ba68-b24f-40a2-948f-c28b56eac1fe

[18] https://www.president.gov dot tw/NEWS/39151

[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0s8MAb4MHMY

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-9-2025

[21] https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Taiwan-tensions/Taiwan-s-new-civil-defense-drill-prepares-for-worst-from-nature-or-China; https://www.ft.com/content/5b29ba68-b24f-40a2-948f-c28b56eac1fe 

[22] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3304344/beijing-accuses-taiwan-malice-after-warship-and-mainland-chinese-fishing-boat-collide?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection

[23] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3304344/beijing-accuses-taiwan-malice-after-warship-and-mainland-chinese-fishing-boat-collide?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-dismisses-china-complaint-about-navy-ship-trawler-collision-2025-03-28/

[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-dismisses-china-complaint-about-navy-ship-trawler-collision-2025-03-28/

[25] http://tw.people dot com.cn/n1/2025/0326/c14657-40447177.html

[26] http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202503/t20250326_12692209.htm

[27] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202503260022

[28] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/feat/archives/2025/03/27/2003834127

[29] https://www.president dot gov.tw/NEWS/39105

[30]https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202503310006

[31] http://www.news dot cn/tw/20250330/e71abdb99ca44a3882a0dbf5f226f3cd/c.html

[32] https://inf dot news/en/military/170145d16e4519e160bce5e32f556c2b.html

[33] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202503310006

[34] https://x.com/detresfa_/status/1907019244937879638; https://x.com/mondefense 

[35] https://x.com/MoNDefense/status/1902525504969744539; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-14-2025 

[36] https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-escalates-cross-strait-military-activity-under-taiwan-president-william-lai

[37] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-president-says-china-has-deepened-influence-campaign-infiltration-against-2025-03-13/

[38] https://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/J7iAC2b2hm9pqlUxmFiGiw

[39] https://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/J7iAC2b2hm9pqlUxmFiGiw

[40] https://mna.mnd dot gov.tw/news/detail/?UserKey=fb6dc6cf-e59e-4ddb-98b4-0591ce91d925

[41] https://mna.mnd dot gov.tw/news/detail/?UserKey=db7c3438-ee24-448e-a3ca-709efba2e12b

[42] https://www.cga dot gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=164700&ctNode=650&mp=999

[43] https://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/Yi3WexMRCeJBwZKlMt1qmg

[44] https://news.usni.org/2023/04/10/u-s-chinese-aircraft-carriers-operating-near-taiwan-chinese-carrier-shandong-launched-80-fighter-missions-in-weekend-drills

[45] https://www.msa dot gov.cn/page/article.do?articleId=4BC8DFC7-605B-4A68-9E59-39EE46FBA655&channelId=8E10EA74-EB9E-4C96-90F8-F891968ADD80

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https://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/Ift9bEBSXNuayfR1m_cLWg

https://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/8pJgx7NwJm_rdVBuk5x_kw

https://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/I5m_eZPZ06lhONngBo38zQ

https://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/KyLMhpjG0sSJObHq2CoOMQ

https://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/6eQbPGB5h2-2Ig7_VB0JTQ

https://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/Ift9bEBSXNuayfR1m_cLWg

[47] http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/m/fyrbt/202504/t20250401_12693172.htm

[48] https://www.president dot gov.tw/NEWS/39105

[49] https://mp.weixin.qq dot com/s/IP3mCFhmNf0ESLaiJ_Zm9w

http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202410/t20241010_12655319.htm

[50] http://www.taiwan dot cn/plzhx/plyzl/202504/t20250402_12693460.htm

[51] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/02/business/economy/trump-tariffs.html

[52] https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2024/03/20250330001/20250330001-a.pdf
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-china-japan-agree-promote-regional-trade-trump-tariffs-loom-2025-03-30/

[53] https://www.reuters.com/world/china-japan-south-korea-will-jointly-respond-us-tariffs-chinese-state-media-says-2025-03-31/

https://weibo dot com/7040797671/Pl8M6aEgf

[54] https://www.reuters.com/world/china-japan-south-korea-will-jointly-respond-us-tariffs-chinese-state-media-says-2025-03-31/

https://www.meti.go.jp/speeches/kaiken/2025/20250401001.html

[55] https://www.reuters.com/world/china-japan-south-korea-will-jointly-respond-us-tariffs-chinese-state-media-says-2025-03-31/

https://www.g-enews dot com/article/Global-Biz/2025/04/2025040120282355569a1f309431_1

[56] https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20250403/k10014768641000.html

https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20250403_23/

[57] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3304180/eu-trade-commissioner-says-bloc-seeks-deepen-cooperation-china?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection

https://www.reuters.com/world/china-eu-discuss-level-playing-field-trade-eus-sefcovic-says-2025-03-29/

[58] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3304180/eu-trade-commissioner-says-bloc-seeks-deepen-cooperation-china?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection

https://english.news dot cn/20250327/4b808c2357bd49919ac636105666f878/c.html

[59] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/hu/speech_25_404

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-says-it-is-willing-work-with-eu-global-challenges-2025-02-05/

[60] https://www.baystreet.ca/articles/economiccommentary/109953/032625

[61] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202503/t20250328_11583710.shtml

[62] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-28/xi-meets-global-business-leaders-as-china-seeks-to-woo-investors

[63] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202503/t20250331_11585142.shtml

[64] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202504/t20250403_11588114.shtml

[65] https://www.mofcom dot gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2025/art_8448f88e6ce0414db6ecabe46beb28ba.html

[66] https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/bis-adds-53-companies-entity-list-advancing-chinese-tech

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-adds-dozens-entities-export-restriction-list-2025-03-25/

[67] https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-further-restricts-chinas-artificial-intelligence-advanced-computing-capabilities

[68]

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/28/2025-05427/additions-to-the-entity-list

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/28/2025-05426/additions-and-modifications-to-the-entity-list

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-adds-dozens-entities-export-restriction-list-2025-03-25/

https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/26/us-blacklists-50-chinese-companies-in-bid-to-curb-beijings-ai-chip-capabilities.html

https://apnews.com/article/china-us-sanctions-entity-trump-inspur-44c6a0fd445814a4b5fa40c7baa178ca

[69] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202503/t20250326_11582373.shtml

[70] https://www.reuters.com/world/china-presents-top-military-cyber-threat-united-states-us-report-says-2025-03-25/

[71] https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3158-2022-10-07-bis-press-release-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor-manufacturing-controls-final/file

[72] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-03-12/bloomberg-evening-briefing-china-leads-the-world-in-hypersonic-technology

[73] https://www.newsweek.com/map-hutchison-ports-panama-canal-sale-blackrock-us-china-trump-2053193

[74] https://www.newsweek.com/map-hutchison-ports-panama-canal-sale-blackrock-us-china-trump-2053193

[75] https://www.newsweek.com/map-hutchison-ports-panama-canal-sale-blackrock-us-china-trump-2053193

[76] https://www.reuters.com/business/ck-hutchison-shares-set-open-down-45-china-state-media-blasts-port-deal-2025-03-31/

[77] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202503/t20250331_11585142.shtml

[78] https://www.pancanal dot com/estadisticas/

[79] https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-xi-is-angered-by-panama-port-deal-that-trump-touted-as-a-win-9a0c22fe?msockid=0345a436d1226b453808b0efd0956ab6

[80] https://apnews.com/article/hong-panama-ports-hutchison-china-shing-9edc99b46ee671d76d360d3b9bd506da

[81] https://reuters.com/article/world/asias-richest-man-li-voices-support-for-chinas-leadership-idUSKCN0RT174/; http://fgw.hunan.gov dot cn/xxgk_70899/gzdtf/gzdt/201509/t20150916_2057363.html; https://theinitium dot com/zh-hans/opinion/20150917-opinion-likashing; https://baike.baidu dot com/item/%E7%9E%AD%E6%9C%9B%E6%99%BA%E5%BA%93/16472560?fromModule=lemma_inlink; 

[82] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202503/1331117.shtml

[83] https://english.kyodonews dot net/news/2025/03/7958db5c7f8f-japan-draws-up-plan-to-evacuate-120000-okinawa-islanders-near-taiwan.html

[84] https://www.asahi dot com/ajw/articles/15215063 ; https://asia.nikkei dot com/Politics/Defense/Okinawa-holds-tabletop-evacuation-drill-with-eye-on-Taiwan-tensions

[85] https://www.cas.go dot jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf

[86] mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjbz_673089/xghd_673097/202503/t20250307_11570197.shtml

[87] mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/xwfyr/lxjzh_246940/16377224.html

[88] https://news.usni.org/2025/03/28/secdef-hegseth-announces-marine-anti-ship-missile-deployment-to-balikatan-defense-industrial-base-cooperation-with-manila-in-philippines-visit

[89] https://media.defense.gov/2025/Mar/28/2003677420/-1/-1/1/JOINT-VISION-STATEMENT-ON-U.S.-PHILIPPINE-DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-COOPERATION.PDF; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-defense-secretary-reaffirms-ironclad-commitment-philippines-2025-03-28/

[90] https://breakingdefense.com/2021/09/what-is-nmesis-the-marine-corps-new-ship-killer/

[91] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3304255/hegseth-visits-manila-beijing-warns-outsiders-against-meddling-south-china-sea?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection

[92] https://www.defensenews.com/land/2025/03/17/us-army-readies-second-typhon-battery-for-pacific-deployment/

[93] https://www.scmp dot com/week-asia/politics/article/3303967/philippines-set-host-second-typhon-missile-system-signalling-trumps-defence-pledge; https://asiatimes.com/2025/04/hegseth-dangles-second-typhon-missile-system-for-philippines/#

[94] http://eng.mod.gov dot cn/xb/News_213114/NewsRelease/16369714.html;

[95] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202503/t20250328_11583947.shtml

[96] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3304255/hegseth-visits-manila-beijing-warns-outsiders-against-meddling-south-china-sea?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection