Iran Crisis Update, January 23, 2023

Jan 23, 2023 - ISW Press

 

Iran Crisis Update, January 23, 2023

Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Dana Alexander Gray, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Nicholas Carl, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 23, 2023, 5:15 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Protest activity in Iran increased on January 23, particularly among current petrochemical employees and retired education and telecommunications workers, suggesting some degree of coordination among workers. This protest activity is the most that CTP has recorded since January 8.[1] Protesters reportedly gathered to demonstrate against delayed payments, benefits, and the impact of mounting inflation. CTP previously observed seven protests among a similar demographic—currently employed petrochemical employees—on January 17.[2] The worker-led demonstrations on January 17 and 23 suggest that these groups have the networks required to generate protests despite the regime’s continued crackdown on protest groups throughout the past several months. These worker groups could play an increasingly prominent role in coordinating protests as economic conditions in Iran worsen.[3] The Iranian rial reached a record low--selling for as much as 447,500 rials for one US dollar—on January 23.[4]

Parliament approved the outlines of the annual budget bill on January 22, allocating greater funds to the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) to improve efforts to impose social control.[5] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that the bill will include a 43 percent increase in funding for the LEC, a one-percent decrease from what Raisi proposed on January 11.[6] It is unclear whether Parliament approved similar increases in funding for other state security services. President Ebrahim Raisi proposed substantial increases in funding to the IRGC, Artesh, and Intelligence and Security Ministry on January 11, as CTP previously reported.[7]

The net increase in real purchasing power of this budget expansion is also unclear given the high rate of inflation in Iran. The Statistical Center of Iran estimated that the average inflation rate for the first nine months of the Persian calendar year (March 2022–March 2023) hit 45 percent overall.[8] Such a sharp increase in the prices of certain goods, in addition to the continued depreciation of the Iranian rial against other currencies, may negate the impact of some of the budgetary increases. Parliament will likely amend the budget before approving it as well, meaning these allocations could still change significantly.

Key Takeaways

  • Protest activity in Iran increased on January 23, particularly among current petrochemical employees and retired education and telecommunications workers, suggesting some degree of coordination among workers.
  • Parliament approved the outlines of the annual budget bill on January 22, allocating greater funds to the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) to improve efforts to impose social control.
  • An IRGC-affiliated news outlet speculated that Iran may receive advanced Russian attack helicopters under an Iranian-Russo military co-production agreement.
  • Information and Communications Technology Minister Isah Zareh Pour announced on January 21 that the regime will soon lift internet restrictions on some foreign platforms.
  • Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas met with Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran to discuss bilateral economic and military cooperation.

Anti-Regime Protests

At least 12 protests occurred in 11 cities across 11 provinces in Iran on January 23. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Ardabil City, Ardabil Province[9]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers
  • Notes: Demonstrated against delay in payment and benefits

Shahr-e Kord, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province[10]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers
  • Notes: Demonstrated against delay in payment and benefits

Rasht, Gilan Province[11]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers
  • Notes: Demonstrated against delay in payment and benefits

Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province[12]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers
  • Notes: Demonstrated against delay in payment and benefits

Bandar-e Imam Khomeini, Khuzestan Province[13]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Petrochemical workers
  • Notes: Demonstrated against delayed payments and benefits

Tehran City, Tehran Province[14]

  • Size: Medium
  • Demographic: Retired teachers
  • Location: In front of the Education Ministry
  • Notes: Demonstrated against low wages and the impact of inflation upon livelihood

Tehran City, Tehran Province[15]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers
  • Notes: Demonstrated against delay in payment claimed and benefits

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[16]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers
  • Notes: Demonstrated against delay in payment claimed and benefits. No footage documenting purported protest.

Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province[17]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers
  • Notes: Demonstrated against delay in payment claimed and benefits. No footage documenting purported protest. Social media users suggested that protest activity occurred in Kermanshah city, but it is unclear if this occurred in another city within Kermanshah Province.

Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province[18]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers
  • Notes: Demonstrated against delay in payment claimed and benefits. No footage documenting purported protest.

Khorramabad, Lorestan Province[19]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers
  • Notes: Demonstrated against delay in payment claimed and benefits. No footage documenting purported protest.

Yazd City, Yazd Province[20]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers
  • Notes: Demonstrated against delay in payment claimed and benefits. No footage documenting purported protest.

Iranian Ambassador to Afghanistan Hassan Kazemi Ghomi met with Afghan Taliban Foreign Affairs Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to discuss Helmand River water rights on January 22.[21] Ghomi’s visit follows reports of water shortages in the Iranian border town of Torbat-e Jam, Khorasan Razavi Province on January 18, highlighting the water-shortage problem even though Torbat-e Jam likely does not receive water from the Helmand River.[22] Torbat-e Jam additionally witnessed protests sparked by gasoline shortages on January 16, as CTP previously reported.[23] Iranian officials may increasingly seek to pressure Taliban officials to improve Iranian access to water from Afghan rivers to preempt further unrest, although the Taliban is facing similar water shortages and is unlikely to make significant concessions on this front.[24]

Information and Communications Technology Minister Isah Zareh Pour announced on January 21 that the regime will soon lift internet restrictions on some foreign platforms but will continue to restrict WhatsApp and Instagram.[25] Zareh Pour separately claimed that 16 million Iranians have joined the regime-backed messaging platform Eitaa within the past three months in a likely attempt to promote further domestic use.[26] Iranian authorities have long sought to replace Western social media platforms with indigenous alternatives to reduce public reliance on foreign networking services and expand cyber monitoring of the Iranian population.[27]

An IRGC-affiliated news outlet speculated that Iran may receive advanced Russian attack helicopters under an Russo-Iranian military co-production agreement. Tasnim News Agency published an article arguing that a Russo-Iranian helicopter co-production agreement would let Iran purchase Mi-28 and Ka-52 attack helicopters. The IRGC currently flies Russian Mi-17 transport helicopters and American AH-1J Cobra attack helicopters, the purchases of which precede the 1979 Iranian Revolution.[28] The IRGC could use modern attack helicopters to intimidate and disperse anti-regime protesters or conduct cross-border raids against anti-regime militants. A Russo-Iranian co-production agreement might additionally allow Iran to service its helicopter fleet without relying on Russia for spare parts depending on the details. IRGC-affiliated media have previously predicted Iran would receive Su-35 fighter aircraft before any official announcements, as CTP previously reported.[29]

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas met with Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran to discuss bilateral economic and military cooperation. Bagheri and Abbas called for joint military exercises between Iran and Syria and condemned Israeli military action in Syrian territory. It is unclear whether the Artesh or IRGC would participate in such services. Bagheri praised Syria for resisting alleged foreign conspiracies to destroy the Syrian state.[30]

[1] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-8

[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-17

[3] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-20

[4] www.bonbast dot com

[5] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202301226798

[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-11-2023 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/11/02/2840997/افزایش-43-درصدی-سهم-فراجا-در-لایحه-بودجه-پیشنهادی-1402

[7] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-11-2023

[8] https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-s-inflation-rate-topped-48-in-december/6903564.html

[9] https://twitter.com/Kolbarnews/status/1617462415959941120?s=20&t=iyuwM04ZUlBgxDbGFpm-Vg ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1617454642769858560?s=20&t=iyuwM04ZUlBgxDbGFpm-Vg

[10] https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1617460651491721216?s=20&t=eV6oNUNfDku-LbnZDvlypQ ; https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1617441666641858563?s=20&t=eV6oNUNfDku-LbnZDvlypQ ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1617450631064690688?s=20&t=eV6oNUNfDku-LbnZDvlypQ ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1617474593433997312?s=20&t=eV6oNUNfDku-LbnZDvlypQ

[11] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1617450050652876801?s=20&t=ynTFpJue7usUFvlI0Ag8Rg ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1617447704518434817?s=20&t=ynTFpJue7usUFvlI0Ag8Rg ; https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1617447642086408192?s=20&t=ynTFpJue7usUFvlI0Ag8Rg

[12] https://twitter.com/Kolbarnews/status/1617450866276982784?s=20&t=awJhUm-b9acGfh9k7nY0fw ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1617449057793753090?s=20&t=awJhUm-b9acGfh9k7nY0fw

[13] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1617611457054801923?s=20&t=nerWivTBFgMQTP-uT9kTCw

[14] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1617535837620822018?s=20&t=mBCP3ffF0nNGxEH8MWLMHA ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1617537160365879298?s=20&t=2M0-Vp9gyMc_h2YBy0tycQ ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1617505481332854784?s=20&t=BTIhEUvbtilB-6cy50uK2Q ; https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1617528540240699393?s=20&t=oTnESBIX79BPqDMM8_bz9A ; https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1617585016963227648?s=20&t=oTnESBIX79BPqDMM8_bz9A ; https://twitter.com/indypersian/status/1617558903088201740?s=20&t=oTnESBIX79BPqDMM8_bz9A

[15] https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1617500261026603011?s=20&t=r4UrjDtKA7YkD7UN21eg1w ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1617516319175475200?s=20&t=LVIRKAU6YqaTb5vmelaNHw ; https://twitter.com/VOAfarsi/status/1617582685953589253?s=20&t=LVIRKAU6YqaTb5vmelaNHw

[16] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1617459941727420418?s=20&t=ZHdvJm-PO2dkW6HcGE6Oug

[17] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1617498731821113346?s=20&t=tQO8kzWXpYSE02xKHJW5wg ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1617495704468873227?s=20&t=QDVoVei-Y9Hcg8JajzhAYA ;

[18] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1617475661312188417?s=20&t=YEwTyORQ_dIBMlhMSaMmAw

[19] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1617458059336617985?s=20&t=MctDcLWuLNXNp0bg3SFFAA

[20] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1617458231063859202?s=20&t=QDVoVei-Y9Hcg8JajzhAYA

[21] https://www dot mizan dot news/4606329/%d8%af%db%8c%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%b1-%da%a9%d8%a7%d8%b8%d9%85%db%8c-%d9%82%d9%85%db%8c-%d8%a8%d8%a7-%d9%85%d8%aa%d9%82%db%8c/

https://www dot pashtovoa dot com/a/qomi-to-supply-water-from-the-helmand-sea-to-iran-motaghi-we-are-facing-water-shortage/6929705.html?withmediaplayer=1

[22] https://t dot co/LffXvjUKrU

[23] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-16-2023

[24] https://www.pashtovoa.com/a/qomi-to-supply-water-from-the-helmand-sea-to-iran-motaghi-we-are-facing-water-shortage/6929705.html?withmediaplayer=1 ; https://twitter.com/SamriBackup/status/1551094801528922113?s=20&t=bktgkfhjJy2KL-kMEFFcqg

[25] https://www dot isna dot ir/news/1401110100218/%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AE%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%B7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A2%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87

[26] https://twitter.com/Entekhab_News/status/1617555907327434752

[27] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Whatever-it-takes-to-end-it.pdf

[28] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/11/02/2840386/میل28-و-کاموف52-در-سبد-خرید-بالگرد-از-روسیه-گمانه-زنی-درباره-خریدهای-تسلیحاتی-ایران

[29] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-december-9

[30] https://isna dot ir/xdNc8q ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85007428/تاکید-ایران-و-سوریه-بر-برگزاری-رزمایش-مشترک-نظامی