Israel–Hamas War (Iran Updates)

 

 

Iran Update, November 21, 2024

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Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) censure resolution against Iran on November 21.[1] The resolution censured Iran for failing to cooperate with the IAEA and comply with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.[2] The resolution requires that the IAEA to produce a "comprehensive report" on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[3] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran--known as "snapback" sanctions.[4] The censure resolution comes after the IAEA issued a report on November 19 showing that Iran has increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium since August 2024.[5] The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Mohammad Eslami responded to the censure resolution by ordering the activation of a ”large collection of new and advanced centrifuges of various types."[6] The AEOI stated that Iran will continue to cooperate with the IAEA, though it remains unclear to what extent. CTP-ISW will provide further assessments and details in the coming days.

The United States and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), prior to the IAEA Board of Governors vote on the censure resolution, called on Iran to "immediately dispose" of its highly enriched uranium stockpile on November 21. US Ambassador to the IAEA Laura Holgate said that Iran should stop producing uranium enriched up to 60 percent and "downblend its 60 percent [enriched uranium] stockpile entirely."[7] Downblending is the process of converting highly enriched uranium into low-enriched uranium.[8] The E3 issued a joint statement similarly requesting that Iran “immediately dispose of its high enriched uranium stockpile.”[9] Iran previously offered to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent at 185 kilograms in exchange for the IAEA Board of Governors rejecting the censure resolution.[10] The E3 stated that a cap of 185 kilograms would mean Iran still "retain[s] an excessively large stockpile of high enriched uranium as well the capability to resume enrichment to 60 percent at any point," however.[11] 185 kilograms of 60-percent enriched uranium is enough, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[12]

Lebanese officials have reportedly proposed several changes to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah.[13] Unspecified sources speaking to Lebanese media outlet al Akhbar claimed that Lebanese officials requested that the ceasefire agreement refer to the Blue Line—the UN-drawn provisional border—as the official Israel-Lebanon border. Lebanese officials demanded that a date for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to withdraw be announced in conjunction with the ceasefire and that the IDF conduct a “complete, simultaneous, and rapid withdrawal” from Lebanon. The Lebanese officials also demanded that the IDF release all Hezbollah fighters detained in southern Lebanon. Al Akhbar claimed that the language regarding Israel-Lebanon border and clauses on whether Israel would retain the right to respond to ceasefire violations with force in Lebanon remain sticking points between the parties. The US-proposed ceasefire agreement initially allowed Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fail to enforce the ceasefire.[14] Hezbollah has rejected the possibility that the IDF retain the right to operate in Lebanon, however.[15]

A senior Israeli security source said that Hamas wants a ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip.[16] Israeli military correspondents, citing the source, reported that Hamas is prepared to accept a deal even if it fails to meet Hamas’ repeated demand for a permanent end to the war.[17] The source added that the deal being considered includes a 42-day ceasefire, the release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, and other “heavy prices that Israel will be required to pay.”[18] This report marks the first suggestion that Hamas may break from the maximalist demands that it has maintained throughout most of the ceasefire-hostage negotiations. Hamas last reiterated its maximalist demands on November 10.[19]

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III said on November 20 that the Houthis increasingly see themselves as a partner to Iran rather than a subordinate.[20] This framing is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the Axis of Resistance is more accurately described as an unconventional, Iran-led alliance rather than a constellation of Iranian proxies and partners across the Middle East. Iran considers itself a core part and the leader of the Axis of Resistance but does not outright command many of the other members. Rather, they often compromise and negotiate with one another. Iran does, however, frequently leverage its materiel support to the Axis of Resistance to leverage the decision-making of other members.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 21 for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the starvation of civilians.[21] ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan submitted an application to the court to obtain arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant in May 2024.[22]

The ICC issued an arrest warrant for deceased Hamas military leader Mohammad Deif on November 21 for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, including extermination, murder, torture, and sexual violence.[23] The ICC stated that it issued this arrest despite reports that Deif died. The IDF has stated that it killed Deif in an airstrike in the southern Gaza Strip in July 2024.[24] ICC Chief Prosecutor Khan submitted an application to obtain arrest warrants for deceased Hamas leaders Deif, Yahya Sinwar, and Ismail Haniyeh in May 2024.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The IAEA Board of Governors approved a censure resolution against Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with international nuclear inspectors. This resolution could lead to the reimposition of international sanctions on Iran. Iran responded to the resolution by ordering the activation of recently installed advanced centrifuges at its nuclear facilities.
• Lebanon: Lebanon reportedly proposed several changes to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah. Lebanese media reported that one of the main sticking points is whether Israel will retain the right to strike Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire.
• Gaza Strip: A senior Israeli security source told Israeli military correspondents that Hamas wants a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the Gaza Strip. The source added that Hamas is prepared to accept a deal even a guarantee of a permanent ceasefire, which has been a continuous Hamas demand throughout talks.
• Yemen: US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that the Houthis increasingly view themselves as a partner to Iran rather than a subordinate. This characterization is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the Axis of Resistance is an unconventional, Iran-led alliance rather than a constellation of Iranian proxies and partners across the Middle East.

Iran Update, November 20, 2024

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Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Buckley DeJardin, Michael Weiner, Kyle Moran, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

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Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem announced in a November 20 speech that Hezbollah would require a permanent ceasefire and the preservation of Lebanese sovereignty in any agreement with Israel.[1] Qassem clarified that maintaining Lebanese sovereignty requires preventing Israel from operating in Lebanon “whenever [Israel] wants” and refuted that Israel could “impose its conditions” on Hezbollah.[2] Qassem is referring to the current US-proposed ceasefire agreement that would allow Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fail to enforce the ceasefire.[3] The draft agreement includes a clause that states that Israel retains its right to self-defense, and the United States sent to Israel a side letter that stipulates US support for the Israeli right to respond with force to Hezbollah threats.[4] Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar and Defense Minister Israel Katz reiterated on November 20 that Israel requires that it retain its ability to “act and defend Israeli citizens from Hezbollah” in any agreement.[5]

Removing these clauses from the ceasefire agreement would likely enable Hezbollah to gradually re-arm and re-entrench itself in southern Lebanon. The current ceasefire agreement provides no other sufficient mechanisms to ensure that Hezbollah remains disarmed in southern Lebanon.[6] UNIFIL and the LAF would be the only other parties responsible for observing and enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon. CTP-ISW continues to assess that it is extremely unlikely that UNIFIL or the LAF would be willing or able to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament given their previous failures to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006. The LAF, which would be responsible for dismantling Hezbollah infrastructure and enforcing disarmament, is particularly unlikely to directly confront Hezbollah.[7]

US special envoy Amos Hochstein met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri for a second day in Beirut to discuss the Hezbollah response to the US-proposed agreement.[8] Hochstein returned to Israel and will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for further consultations on November 21.[9]

Qassem, in his speech, continued trying to project Hezbollah strength and resilience against Israeli operations in Lebanon.[10] Qassem promised to attack “the center of Tel Aviv” in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes in northern and central Beirut.[11] Qassem reiterated that Hezbollah is not a regular standing army and that the group will rapidly attack and ambush Israeli forces as they enter Lebanon.[12] Qassem also continued to grossly exaggerate the success of Hezbollah operations in Israel and the number of IDF casualties and material damage.[13] Qassem asserted that Hezbollah would survive politically after the war and work with the LAF and people to rebuild Lebanon.[14]

Iranian officials are continuing to broadcast their enduring support for Hezbollah. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a message of support to the Lebanese people on November 19.[15] Separately, Khamenei’s senior security adviser, Ali Larijani, during his trip to Beirut on November 15 reportedly promised continued Iranian support and a commitment to help the Hezbollah rebuild its forces as they recover from the war.[16]

Documents that the IDF seized from the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hezbollah and Hamas. An Israeli think tank close to the Israeli defense establishment released a report on November 18 detailing the Iranian role in establishing the "Palestinian project" in Lebanon, citing documents that the IDF seized from the Gaza Strip.[17]  Senior Hamas official Khaled Meshaal met with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force officer responsible for Palestine in May 2022, during which they agreed to begin working to establish a Hamas presence in Lebanon. Two thousand Hamas fighters, according to the plan, would have integrated into Hamas special operations forces (SOF) units that would have participated in any Hezbollah ground assault into Israel. The IRGC and Hamas ultimately sought to expand the number to ten thousand Hamas fighters integrated into Hezbollah SOF. Hamas would be tasked with recruiting fighters from the Sunni population in Lebanon, according to the documents.[18] Iran would be primarily responsible for funding Hamas activities in Lebanon, including armament and training.[19] CTP-ISW cannot confirm whether the 2,000 Hamas fighters ever deployed to Lebanon, but Hamas does have a limited presence in southern Lebanon. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—has claimed at least 20 attacks into Israel from Lebanon since October 2023.[20]

Hamas still retains small forces outside the Gaza Strip that its external leaders can use as a cadre to rebuild Hamas militarily. Hamas' severely degraded position in the Gaza Strip and the failure of its war against Israel suggest that both Iran and Hamas may recognize that accomplishing their objective of destroying Israel is not feasible from the Gaza Strip.[21] Hamas will want to rebuild after the October 7 war, and it has several potential avenues for doing so. The Iran-Hamas project outlined in the letter indicates that both parties could view Lebanon as a viable option for Hamas’ reconstitution.[22] Iran’s financial support for Hamas in Lebanon and its strong ties with Hezbollah would give Iran significant influence over Hamas’ military wing there. Promoting cohesion between Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon is part of broader Iranian efforts to increase interoperability across the Axis of Resistance.

The United States and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on November 19 in response to Iran not fully cooperating with the IAEA.[23] The IAEA Board of Governors is expected to vote on the resolution on November 21.[24] The proposed censure resolution comes after the IAEA issued a report on November 19 showing that Iran has increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium since August 2024.[25] The IAEA reported that Iran possessed 182.3 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent as of late October 2024.[26] This amount marks a 17.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent since August 2024.[27] The IAEA added that Iran possessed a total of 6,604.4 kilograms of enriched uranium, which marks an 852.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian total enriched uranium stockpile since August 2024.[28] A US weapons expert reported on November 19 that Iran’s breakout timelines have thus reduced significantly since August 2024.[29] The expert stated that Iran can make enough weapons-grade uranium, which is uranium that is enriched to 90 percent purity, to produce almost 10 nuclear weapons in a month, 13 in two months, 14 in three months, 15 in four months, and 16 in five months.[30]

Iran is trying to prevent the IAEA Board of Governors from approving the censure resolution by offering to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent and threatening unspecified consequences if the IAEA censures Iran. Iran offered to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent at 185 kilograms in exchange for the IAEA rejecting the censure resolution.[31] Iran notably did not offer to reduce the amount of 60 percent enriched uranium that it currently possesses but instead only offered to not further increase its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile. 185 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[32] Senior Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, have warned that Iran will respond “appropriately and proportionately” if the IAEA censures Iran.[33] An Iranian outlet claimed on November 19 that Iran could retaliate by activating a “significant number” of advanced centrifuges.[34] The outlet may have been referring to the IR-6 centrifuges that Iran has installed at Fordow in recent months.[35] The IAEA confirmed in August 2024 that Iran installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow but that the centrifuges were not yet operational.[36] Iran previously installed new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow in response to an IAEA censure resolution in June 2024.[37]

The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent additional Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against Israel in order to avoid Israeli strikes on Iraq. Saudi media reported on November 20 that an Israeli attack targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias is “imminent” unless the Iraqi federal government prevents further militia attacks on Israel, citing unspecified sources.[38] Saudi media added that the United States informed the Iraqi federal government that it has “exhausted all levers of pressure” to try to prevent Israel from striking Iraq.[39] This report comes after Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar wrote a letter to the president of the UN Security Council on November 18 in which he emphasized the Israeli right to defend itself against Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks.[40] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani chaired an emergency National Security Ministerial Council meeting on November 19 during which he ordered Iraqi security forces to “prevent and pursue any military activity outside the control of the state.”[41] Iraqi security forces reportedly secured sites used by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to launch drones and missiles at Israel following the meeting.[42] It is unclear whether the Sudani administration can prevent further Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel given that it has thus far failed to reign in these militias. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, increased its rate of attacks by nearly 150 percent between September and October 2024 and has claimed 59 attacks in November 2024 thus far.[43] 

Israel is exploring options to improve the distribution of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip in the wake of increased looting of humanitarian aid trucks by armed groups. Axios reported on November 20 that a US-based national security consulting company, Orbis, has proposed a plan to Israel to securely deliver humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.[44] Orbis outlined a pilot project that includes establishing a humanitarian aid hub in an area cleared of Hamas.[45] The aid hub will be established by a private aid organization, according to Orbis. The project would also involve a third-party private contractor securing the aid hub in coordination with the IDF.[46] The proposed p project is likely aimed at establishing the humanitarian aid hub in Jabalia, in the northern Gaza Strip, where the IDF has been conducting clearing operations since October 6.[47] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz reviewed the proposed plan.[48] The establishment of the aid hub will require additional IDF operations in Jabalia, which could take three months to fully clear the area of Hamas and secure the area.[49] Israel is exploring methods to distribute aid in the northern Gaza Strip following a rise in armed groups looting humanitarian aid trucks in the strip in recent days.[50] The IDF has taken several steps in recent days to increase the flow of aid in the Gaza Strip following pressure from the United States, including plans to reopen the Kissufim border crossing to facilitate the transfer of aid trucks into the northern Gaza Strip.[51]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the Netzarim Corridor to conduct a situational assessment on November 20 and announced a reward of five million US dollars and safe passage out of the Gaza Strip to any individual who frees an Israeli hostage.[52] Netanyahu, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, and IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi met with the commanders of the IDF 99th Division IDF Southern Command in the corridor to review IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[53]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah is trying to remove a clause in a US-proposed ceasefire agreement that allows Israel to strike Hezbollah targets if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire. Removing these clauses would enable Hezbollah to gradually re-arm and re-entrench in southern Lebanon.
• Lebanon: Documents seized by the IDF in the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The documents depict Iran-Hamas discussions to send thousands of Hamas fighters to Lebanon to integrate into Hezbollah SOF units. These units are trained to conduct ground attacks into Israel.
• Iran: The United States and E3 submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors in response to Iran's refusal to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Iran is trying to prevent the censure resolution from passing by threatening unspecified retaliation.
• Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Israel in order to prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi attacks on Israel increased by almost 150 percent between September and October 2024.
• Gaza Strip: Israel is exploring options to improve the distribution of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip. These considerations come amid an uptick in armed Palestinian gangs interdicting aid convoys and looting them.

 

Iran Update, November 14, 2024

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Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Israeli forces have likely disrupted Lebanese Hezbollah’s ability to fire into Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported the daily rate of Hezbollah attacks have declined on average over the “past few weeks” and have decreased by half in the past week.[1] The IDF also reported that it is targeting stockpiles of observed and unobserved indirect fire systems that are difficult to reach with airstrikes.[2] The IDF added that approximately 60 percent of Hezbollah indirect fire launches use small single- or triple-barreled launch systems.[3] The stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced citizens safely to their homes in northern Israel requires stopping Hezbollah rocket fire into Israel. The recent relaxation of IDF restrictions for gatherings in northern Israel indicates the reduced threat of Hezbollah rocket fire.[4] The IDF reported that Hezbollah has also struggled to conduct large, coordinated rocket attacks into Israel, suggesting that Hezbollah is cannot easily communicate across tactical units or operational-level headquarters.[5] Israeli forces continue to exploit this disruption and have expanded clearing operations up to five to six kilometers into “second line” of Lebanese towns.[6]

Unknown gunmen shot at a UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrol in southern Lebanon after the patrol discovered an ammunition cache on November 14.[7] UNIFIL stated that its forces informed the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and shortly thereafter came under fire from two or three individuals.[8] UNIFIL requested that Lebanese authorities fully investigate the incident.[9] The LAF would be responsible for enforcing the disarmament of Hezbollah during a ceasefire with Israel, according to a leaked US-proposed draft.[10]

The IDF reported that it is facing a severe shortage of soldiers.[11] The IDF published data showing that it is currently has only 83 percent of the combat manpower that it requires. The IDF accordingly urged the government to increase the required time for mandatory IDF regular military service to three years, a jump from the current requirement of two and a half years for men and two years for women.[12] The IDF also urged the government to approve a service extension law. The IDF added that recruitment of ultra-Orthodox soldiers has increased in recent years but that it still fell short of the IDF goal of recruiting 1,300 ultra-Orthodox Israelis in the July-October 2024 recruitment cycle. The IDF reported that combat unit reservists served an average of 136 days in 2024 and are projected to serve an average of 70-72 days in 2025. The IDF data revealed that approximately 40,000 reservists in combat and combat-support roles did not respond to reserve duty call ups during an unspecified period. Senior Israeli officers previously attributed the fall off in participation to burnout after over a year of war.[13] Israeli media reported that the failure of the Israeli government to enact policy to draft the ultra-Orthodox Israeli population contributed to the reduced reservist responses to the call ups.[14]

Iranian leaders appear concerned about the possibility of the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggering international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters that the E3 are drafting a resolution to present at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting in Vienna from November 18 to 22 to “pressure Tehran over its poor cooperation” with the IAEA.[15] The resolution would require the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities in addition to its regular quarterly ones. The report would likely lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions because the report would almost certainly confirm--as previous IAEA reports have already--Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[16] The sanctions would target Iran’s nuclear and missile program and arms transfers.[17] The most recent IAEA report in August 2024 concluded that Iran continues to develop its nuclear program outside the parameters of the JCPOA.[18] The IAEA report stated that Iran possesses 164.7 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, marking a 22.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since May 2024.[19] The report also verified that Iran has installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow and 10 out of 18 planned cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[20] Iran also continues to severely limit the ability of the IAEA to conduct various verification and monitoring activities related to the JCPOA.

Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program since the IAEA published its last verification and monitoring report in August 2024. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on November 14 that high resolution satellite imagery from October 2024 shows new construction at a former Iranian nuclear weapons development site at Golab Dareh.[21] The imagery reveals new trench excavations and cabling that can be used to implement new security measures at the site, including alarms and surveillance cameras. ISIS previously reported renewed activity at another Iranian nuclear site at Sanjarian, citing imagery from September 2024.[22]

Iran’s clear and explicit violations of the JCPOA could prompt the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran. Telegraph reported on November 2 that the United Kingdom is “prepared” to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran due to Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA.[23] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Mohammad Eslami stated that “any resolution on Iran’s nuclear affairs will face Iran’s immediate response” during a press conference with IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi, likely referring to the E3 resolution and sanctions.[24] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran would send a message to the E3 through Grossi about Tehran's seriousness to resolve its nuclear standoff, likely to try to convince the E3 not to trigger the snapback mechanism.[25] Senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, similarly emphasized Iran’s willingness to cooperate with the IAEA during separate meetings with Grossi on November 14.[26]

The United States sanctioned on November 14 a Syrian network involved in selling oil to the Syrian regime and China and generating revenue for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force and Houthis.[27] The sanctions targeted 26 companies, individuals, and vessels associated with the al Qaterji Company.[28] The company finances and maintains a militia in Syria and is connected to Hezbollah Unit 4400, which is involved in arms smuggling.[29] The IDF killed one of the company’s founders in an airstrike in July 2024.[30] The United States previously designated al Qaterji Company as a terrorist financing entity in 2022 after it facilitated trade between the Syrian regime and Islamic State.[31] The United States stated that al Qaterji Company executives met directly with senior IRGC Quds Force officers as well as a sanctioned Iranian-backed Houthi financial official, Said al Jamal.[32] The United States previously sanctioned al Jamal and affiliated companies facilitating Iranian oil trade to support the funding of Iranian proxy and partner militias.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF has likely disrupted the ability of Lebanese Hezbollah to fire into Israel. Hezbollah is struggling to conduct coordinated, large-scale attacks into Israel, suggesting challenges communicating across tactical units or operational-level headquarters.
• Iran: Iranian leaders appear concerned that the E3 could trigger international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 has expressed concern, as Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program in violation of the JCPOA.
• Syria: The United States sanctioned a Syrian network involved in selling oil to the Syrian regime and China and generating revenue for the IRGC Quds Force and Houthis. Some of the designated entities are tied to Syria militias and Lebanese Hezbollah arms smuggling.

Iran Update, November 13, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The damage caused by Israel’s October 25 strike targeting Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran’s decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely. Iran could use a smaller number of long-range systems combined with a larger number of shorter-range systems fired from Iraq, however. Iran conducted two major strikes on Israel on April 13 and October 1.[1] Iran used 30 ballistic missiles in the April 13 strike and 180 ballistic missiles on October 1. Israel’s October 25 strikes targeting Iranian ballistic missile production facilities severely damaged Iran’s ability to produce long-range ballistic missiles, according to an Israeli intelligence assessment quoted by a Netanyahu-leaning Israeli outlet.[2]  These Israeli assessments are consistent with previous reports that the IDF destroyed mixing equipment used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[3] The assessments also estimate that Iran still has “several hundred long-range missiles” and that Iran is “unlikely to launch all of the missiles at Israel simultaneously.[4] Iran will likely seek to preserve the remainder of its diminishing ballistic missile stockpile rather than further depleting this stockpile by launching another large-scale missile attack on Israel, assuming the Israeli assessments are accurate.

US and Israeli officials are in the "final stages” of drafting language for a ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials.[5] Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer recently met with US Special Envoy for Lebanon Amos Hochstein and US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.[6] An unspecified US official said that Dermer’s meetings with Hochstein and Sullivan were “productive” and narrowed the gaps between US and Israel on the language of the ceasefire proposal and a “side letter” that would guarantee US support for Israeli freedom of military action against threats from Hezbollah.[7] Hochstein told Axios on November 12 that he believes "there is a shot" of securing a ceasefire deal in Lebanon soon.[8]  Hochstein is expected to travel to Beirut to discuss the proposal draft with Lebanese officials once US and Israeli negotiators have finalized the proposal and side letter’s language.[9]

Israel will likely need to compel Hezbollah to agree to the US-Israeli proposal. Hezbollah may outright reject Israel’s terms or refuse to join negotiations altogether. Hezbollah’s ceasefire demands are directly at odds with Israel’s insistence that the IDF retains the ability to act militarily in Lebanon to thwart Hezbollah threats. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem recently said that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks and stated that Hezbollah would require the “full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction” in negotiations.[10] This suggests that Hezbollah will not permit foreign forces to operate in southern Lebanon in any way that is beyond UNIFIL’s current mandate. If indirect negotiations between Hezbollah and Israel break down, the IDF is likely to continue its air and ground campaign, as Israeli military and political officials have indicated in recent days.[11]

Hezbollah may choose accept Israel’s ceasefire terms in order to preserve its forces north of the Litani River, given the damage Hezbollah has suffered throughout Lebanon since the Israeli campaign began. The ceasefire terms, if consistent with current US and Israeli discussions, would allow Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah fighters and targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the LAF fail to enforce the ceasefire’s terms.[12] Hezbollah may calculate, however, that agreeing to a ceasefire soon would allow it to preserve its forces and infrastructure north of the Litani, enabling it to rebuild its forces and ensure its survival in the long term. It is extremely unlikely that UNIFIL or the LAF would be willing to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament in the south, given their failure to enforce UNSCR 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006. The details of the speed of the LAF’s deployment to southern Lebanon following a ceasefire are reportedly still up for discussion, with Lebanese sources indicating that the LAF may not be able to deploy as quickly as the US would prefer.[13] Slow LAF deployment would only make it more difficult for the LAF and UNIFIL to support any ceasefire.

Russia refused to block the transit of Iranian supplies to Hezbollah via Syria. The Russian Presidential Special Envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on November 13 that Russia could not guarantee that it would block the transit of Iranian materiel to Hezbollah through Syria.[14] Lavrentyev said that monitoring Iranian-backed efforts to transfer materiel is the responsibility of Lebanese and Syrian authorities.[15] These authorities are fully unwilling and unable to block these Iranian-backed and Hezbollah-enabled efforts. Lavrentyev’s comments follow Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer’s recent visit to Russia to discuss a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon.[16] Israeli Army Radio reported on November 12 that Israel is seeking for Russia to guarantee that the Syrian regime will prevent Iranian-backed networks from transferring weapons through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[17] It is unclear why Russia would prevent Hezbollah from rearming given that Russian forces in Syria have enabled Hezbollah to arm up to this point by allowing Iranian material transfers through Syria to Lebanon.[18]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published a video of an Israeli hostage giving coerced testimony to degrade Israeli public support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Russian hostage Alexander “Sasha” Turbanov urged Israelis to demonstrate weekly against IDF operations in the Gaza Strip in the video that was filmed under PIJ coercion.[19] The video is almost certainly timed to exploit Israeli domestic discontent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5 for Gallant’s support of a ceasefire with Hamas.[20] Gallant identified his support for a ceasefire deal that would return the hostages as one of three reasons that caused Netanyahu to dismiss him. Gallant‘s firing caused an initial, short wave of protests, and 55% of Israelis opposed Netanyahu’s move to fire Gallant.[21] An earlier Netanyahu attempt to fire Gallant during the 2023 Judicial Protests failed after protesters demonstrated in support of Gallant. Hamas has previously released propaganda videos of hostages to trigger domestic Israeli pressure on Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire with Hamas by reinforcing that Israel can only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations rather than military operations.[22] PIJ is likely releasing this video now to capitalize on the renewed Israeli domestic discontent over the lack of a ceasefire-hostage deal after Netanyahu’s dismissal of Gallant.[23]

An IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria.[24] The IDF spokesperson was responding to statements from the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). UNDOF’s Chief Mission Support Bernard Lee told the BBC on November 12 that Israel had dug two major lines of trenches along the Israeli border with the demilitarized zone.[25] UNDOF said that some of the trenches cross into the demilitarized zone and that Israeli armor and personnel had crossed into the zone during the construction of the trenches.[26] Commercially available satellite imagery confirms UNDOF’s characterizations of the Israeli construction. Syrian media claimed on October 15 that four Israeli tanks, excavators, and about 50 IDF personnel have been operating within the demilitarized zone near al Asbah and al Rafid in Quneitra Province since October 2024.[27]

Israeli media reported in September 2024 that Israeli defense officials were concerned about a potential Iranian-backed attempt to launch a ground attack into Israel from Syria.[28] Iranian-backed groups have previously shown interest in conducting such attacks.  The IDF recently captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria.[29] This Iranian-led intelligence effort was likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to conduct small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation Against Israel: The damage caused by Israel’s October 25 strike targeting Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran’s decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely. Iran could use a smaller number of long-range systems combined with a larger number of shorter-range systems fired from Iraq, however.
• Lebanon Ceasefire Talks: US and Israeli officials are in the "final stages” of drafting language for a ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials. Israel will likely need to compel Hezbollah to agree to the US-Israeli proposal.
• Hezbollah’s Ceasefire Considerations: Hezbollah may outright reject Israel’s terms or refuse to join negotiations altogether. Hezbollah’s ceasefire demands are directly at odds with Israel’s insistence that the IDF retains the ability to act militarily in Lebanon to thwart Hezbollah threats. Hezbollah may choose to accept Israel’s ceasefire terms to preserve its forces north of the Litani River, given the damage Hezbollah has suffered throughout Lebanon since the Israeli campaign began.
• Russia in the Middle East: Russia refused to block the transit of Iranian supplies to Hezbollah via Syria. The Russian Presidential Special Envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on November 13 that Russia could not guarantee that it would block the transit of Iranian materiel to Hezbollah through Syria.
• Ceasefire-Hostage Negotiations in the Gaza Strip: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published a video of an Israeli hostage giving coerced testimony to degrade Israeli public support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. The video is almost certainly timed to exploit Israeli domestic discontent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5 for Gallant’s support of a ceasefire with Hamas.
• Syria: An IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria. Iranian-backed groups have previously shown interest in conducting ground attacks into Israel, and a recent Israeli raid captured a Syrian man who had been collecting intelligence on Israeli border security along the Israeli-Syrian border.

 

Iran Update, November 12, 2024

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Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Alexandra Braverman and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Newly-appointed Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reaffirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will continue its operation in Lebanon until it accomplishes its mission.[1] Katz made these comments during a meeting with the IDF General Staff. Katz replaced Yoav Gallant as defense minister on November 8 and was formerly foreign minister.[2] Katz affirmed that Israel would “continue to hit Hezbollah with full force” to capitalize on past successes like the killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and “realize the fruits of victory.”[3] He stressed that Israel would not agree to any ceasefire agreement that does not “guarantee Israel’s right to enforce and prevent terrorism on its own,” in addition to other war aims of disarming Hezbollah, forcing a Hezbollah withdrawal north of the Litani River, and returning northern Israeli residents safely home.[4]  Katz’s vision is largely consistent with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has said that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” and that any agreement must include measures to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament.[5]

Israel’s limited operation in frontline border towns of southern Lebanon will not alone accomplish Katz’s outlined goals. The IDF has especially focused on degrading the Hezbollah Radwan special operations forces during the clearing operations.[6] Eliminating the threat of ground attacks is critical to achieving the stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced civilians safely to their homes in northern Israel. Eliminating the threat of ground attacks will not move Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River or prevent rocket attacks from longer-range systems, however. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.[7] An Israeli journalist reported that Israel recently informed the United States that its operation in southern Lebanon is “coming to an end” and that Israel is interested in reaching an agreement within a few weeks.[8]  US special envoy to Lebanon Amos Hochstein also said on November 12 that "there is a chance to reach a ceasefire in Lebanon soon."[9] Hezbollah does not yet appear willing to agree to a ceasefire on terms desirable to Israel, however. Hezbollah leadership would moreover likely experience command and control challenges and struggle to enforce a full ceasefire, withdrawal, and disarmament terms among its rank-and-file members—many of whom live south of the Litani River.[10]

A likely Hezbollah drone struck a kindergarten in the Haifa suburb of Nesher on November 12. The drone struck outside the kindergarten while the children were in a bomb shelter and did not cause casualties.[11] Israeli journalists reported that the IDF alert system did not sound in Nesher but did activate in neighboring areas.[12] Hezbollah did not claim a drone attack at the same time or area as the strike, nor did it explicitly acknowledge the strike. Hezbollah similarly did not claim its rocket attack that struck a soccer field of Druze children in Majdal al Shams on July 27.[13] It is more likely that Hezbollah’s Majdal al Shams strike was unintentional and caused by technical failures inherent to rockets. One-way-attack drones, however, are much more accurate than rockets. Drones can still suffer failures and miss their intended targets as a result of electronic warfare or a partial interception. Hezbollah’s decision in early 2024 to transition from less-sophisticated rocket and anti-tank guided missile systems to more advanced and deadly rockets, one-way attack drones, and anti-tank guided missile systems increased the risk that a Hezbollah attack would cause significant Israeli casualties, either intentionally or due to a miscalculation.[14]

Iran and Russia have taken the first steps to create a banking network that circumvents international sanctions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin announced on November 11 that Iran and Russia have implemented a new interbank network to circumvent the SWIFT system, which is based on the US dollar.[15] Iran’s Shetab interbank network now works with Russia’s Mir system, which means Iranians can now use Iranian bank cards and withdraw money in Russia.[16] The Shetab-Mir network will also enable Iranians to make online purchases in Russia. Iranian state television channel IRINN stated that this plan will be implemented in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey as well.[17] The creation of this network and its emphasis on reducing dependence on the US dollar is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy by building relations with regional and international states.

Growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus represent fissures in the bilateral relationship, but both states will likely attempt to prevent the Caucasus issue from derailing wider Iranian or Russian policy objectives. The New York Times published an article on growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus that included an interview with the Iranian ambassador to Armenia.[18] The ambassador argued that Iran and Russia ”are not allies” and that they have ”some differences” and  ”some mutual interests.” This is in part a reference to the disagreements between Russia and Iran over the Zangezur Corridor project, which is a Turkish project that seeks to connect Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.[19] Such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia at a time when Iran hopes to expand trade with Armenia and Europe.[20] This disagreement is unlikely to derail broader Iranian and Russian efforts to deepen bilateral ties, however. Iran would certainly prioritize sanctions mitigation over secondary policy objectives like the Zangezur Corridor. Iran views sanctions mitigation as a way to enhance regime security by improving its economy.

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli War Aims in Lebanon: Newly-appointed Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reaffirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will continue its operation in Lebanon until it accomplishes its mission. Katz said that Israel would not agree to any ceasefire agreement that does not “guarantee Israel’s right to enforce and prevent terrorism on its own.” Israel’s currently limited operation in frontline border towns of southern Lebanon will not alone accomplish Katz’s vision.
• Iran-Russia Relations: Iran and Russia have taken the first steps to create a banking network that circumvents international sanctions. The creation of this network and its emphasis on reducing dependence on the US dollar is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy by building relations with regional and international states.
• Iran and Russia in the Caucasus: Growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus represent fissures in the bilateral relationship, but both states will likely attempt to prevent the Caucasus issue from derailing wider Iranian or Russian policy objectives. The disagreements between the two countries over the Caucasus is unlikely to derail broader Iranian and Russian efforts to deepen bilateral ties. Iran would certainly prioritize sanctions mitigation through a stronger Russo-Iranian relationship over secondary policy objectives like the Zangezur Corridor. Iran views sanctions mitigation as a way to enhance regime security by improving its economy.
• Hezbollah Attack Campaign in Israel: A likely Hezbollah drone struck a kindergarten in the Haifa suburb of Nesher on November 12. The drone struck outside the kindergarten while the children were in a bomb shelter and did not cause casualties. One-way-attack drones are much more accurate than rockets. Drones can still suffer failures and miss their intended targets as a result of electronic warfare or a partial interception.

Iran Update, November 11, 2024

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Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

Iran Update, November 7, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Victoria Penza, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Hezbollah executed a prepared but limited defense of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from October 28 to 31.[1] Hezbollah’s Operations Room claimed that the group prevented an Israeli force from seizing and controlling terrain in Khiam by executing a “fire defense,“ which likely refers to a prepared but limited defense that involved pre-registering targets for indirect fire while committing only a small amount of infantry.[2] This requires a certain level of preparation by Hezbollah but it is limited because a small amount of infantry could not hope to hold Khiam against an Israeli mechanized assault. Hezbollah fighters conducted 70 attacks over the IDF’s three-day advance towards Khiam. Most of these attacks were indirect fire attacks using rockets, thus supporting the theory that Hezbollah planned a defense centering on indirect fire.[3] Hezbollah did not claim small arms engagements with Israeli forces during this period, suggesting that Hezbollah commanders used light infantry fighters sparingly, if at all. Lebanese sources reported small arms engagements between Hezbollah fighters and the IDF but did not specify at what range the engagements occurred.[4] The low number of small arms engagements suggests that Hezbollah commanders were either unwilling or unable to deploy many infantrymen during the IDF advance into Khiam and preferred to deplete stocks of rockets, anti-tank guided missiles, and mortar shells.

Hezbollah’s prepared fire-heavy defense also suggests that Hezbollah commanders were focused on inflicting casualties rather than holding ground. This would be consistent with a defense that prioritizes the attrition of enemy forces and thus the enemy’s will to fight over holding ground. The IDF advanced at least five kilometers from Israel towards and into Khiam during the three-day operation. Hezbollah claimed that the IDF withdrew into northern Israel from Khiam on October 31 but did not provide additional evidence.[5]

Hezbollah’s defense of Khiam has been the most organized defense of a southern Lebanon village since the IDF began its ground operation in Lebanon in early October. Hezbollah commanders may have chosen to defend this area given that Khiam is located on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into northern Israel. Khiam, moreover, grants Hezbollah a vantage point from which it could observe Israeli forces and other targets around the Galilee Panhandle. The IDF never confirmed that it operated in Khiam and did not publicize Hezbollah equipment or infrastructure seized there. Geolocated footage posted on November 6 showed the IDF 8th Armored Brigade (res.) (91st Division) operating in Khiam in recent days, however.[6]  Israeli forces destroyed firing points aimed toward northern Israeli towns and located and destroyed weapons, including Kornet missiles, grenades, and explosives in Khiam.[7] The IDF killed the commander of Hezbollah’s local unit in Khiam unit on November 3 after the IDF withdrew from the town.[8] The IDF continued artillery shelling of Khiam and its outskirts post-withdrawal.[9]  The fact that Hezbollah’s tactical command echelons near Khiam managed to execute a defense is not a strong indicator that Hezbollah’s higher command echelons have recovered from the severe degradation caused by Israeli air and ground operations. The defense of Khiam could be planned and executed at a relatively low echelon of command.

Recent statements by senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders suggest that the IRGC may conduct a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory in response to the October 25 Israeli strike targeting Iran. These IRGC commanders have warned in recent days that Iran will conduct a third “True Promise Operation” against Israel. “True Promise Operation” refers to the previous large-scale Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024, which Iranian officials refer to as True Promise Operation 1 and True Promise Operation 2, respectively.[10] Senior IRGC commanders, including IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi and IRGC Second Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Ali Fazli, have recently warned that Iran will “certainly” launch a third “True Promise Operation” against Israel.[11]

Iran may conduct a smaller-scale direct attack on Israel than it did in April and October 2024 in order to preserve its diminishing long-range missile stockpile. Iran used a total of around 300 long-range ballistic missiles in its attacks on Israel earlier this year.[12] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) damaged mixing equipment and facilities used to produce long-range ballistic missiles in its strikes into Iran on October 25, which will likely disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture ballistic missiles.[13] This disruption could cause the Iranian regime to refrain from conducting a large-scale missile attack on Israel since it might currently lack the capability to readily replace the missiles it would use in such an attack. Iran could conduct a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel in order to preserve its long-range missile stockpile, however. Unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios on November 5 that the IRGC has been transferring drones and ballistic missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias since the Israeli strikes on October 25.[14]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the features a future supreme leader should embody during his first public meeting with the Assembly of Experts on November 7.[15] Khamenei stated that the Assembly should select a leader who embodies the revolution and carries it forward to maintain the revolution’s “main goal” of “implementing the religion of Islam in the country and in people‘s lives.”[16] Khamenei notably did not reveal any specific details about his successor. The Assembly of Experts is the regime body constitutionally responsible for monitoring and selecting the supreme leader. The newest Assembly was elected in March 2024 and will serve until 2032.[17] This iteration of the Assembly will likely be the Assembly that chooses the next Supreme Leader following Khamenei’s death.

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on November 7 that the reelection of former US President Donald Trump does not impact the Houthis’ campaign against shipping or Israel.[18] Abdulmalik said that Houthi fighters will continue to attack merchant vessels and US and Royal (UK) Navy vessels transiting through the Red Sea.[19] He also said that the Houthis would continue direct attacks on Israel. Abdulmalik added that they have experienced Trump before.[20] CTP-ISW has observed over 270 Houthi attacks targeting commercial vessels since November 2023.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Operations in Lebanon: Hezbollah executed a prepared but limited defense of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon against the IDF from October 28 to 31. The group said that it prevented an Israeli force from seizing and controlling terrain in Khiam by executing a “fire defense,“ which likely refers to a prepared but limited defense that involved pre-registering targets for indirect fire while committing only a small amount of infantry.
• Iranian Retaliation Against Israel: Recent statements by senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders suggest that the IRGC may conduct a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory in response to the October 25 Israeli strike targeting Iran. Iran may conduct a smaller-scale direct attack on Israel than it did in April and October 2024 to preserve its diminishing long-range missile stockpile.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the features a future supreme leader should embody during his first public meeting with the Assembly of Experts on November 7.
• Houthi Response to US Election: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on November 7 that the reelection of former US President Donald Trump does not impact the Houthis’ campaign against shipping or Israel. Abdulmalik said that Houthi fighters will continue to attack merchant vessels, US and Royal (UK) Navy vessels transiting through the Red Sea, and Israel itself.

Iran Update, November 6, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem claimed that Hezbollah would outlast Israel in a “war of attrition” in a speech on November 6.[1] Qassem said that Hezbollah was “ready” for a war of attrition and that Israel would “not win, even if it takes a long time.”[2] The speech marked the 40-day death anniversary of former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and was Qassem’s second public statement since taking over as head of Hezbollah.[3]

Qassem did not tie a Lebanon ceasefire to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip, a notable shift from Nasrallah’s position before the ground operation.[4] Qassem said that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks through Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabhi Berri, who is a Hezbollah ally.[5] Qassem said that the ”ceiling” for negotiation would be the ”full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction,” suggesting that Hezbollah will not permit foreign forces to operate in southern Lebanon in any way that is beyond UNIFIL’s current mandate.[6]

Qassem implicitly threatened the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) against collaboration with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).[7] Qassem implied that LAF allowed an Israeli naval raid into Batroun, north of Beirut by saying that “today I will not accuse” but ”demand” an answer.[8] Qassem further demanded that the LAF protect Lebanese maritime borders.[9] Qassem appears to be implying that Hezbollah would not sit idle while the LAF coordinates with the IDF and could set the tone for LAF activities in southern Lebanon after the end of the Israeli ground operation. Israeli Army Radio reported that senior Hezbollah naval official Imad Amhaz surrendered without resistance to Israeli naval special operations forces in Batroun on November 1.[10] Qassem’s comments are notable given that the LAF is the security force responsible for enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon, according to leaked copies of a late October ceasefire proposal.[11] The leaked text stipulates that LAF would deploy 10,000 troops to southern Lebanon, monitor the Israel-Lebanon border and all land, sea, and air crossings, and dismantle all non-state military infrastructure while confiscating arms.[12] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the success of this proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation with the LAF, making Qassem’s threats notable.[13]

Qassem grossly exaggerated the number of IDF injuries, deaths, and material damage caused by Hezbollah.[14] He falsely claimed that Hezbollah has killed and wounded over a thousand Israeli soldiers over the last 40 days.[15] The IDF has announced that it has suffered 38 soldiers killed in action in southern Lebanon and northern Israel since the start of the ground operation.[16]

Qassem continued to extol Hezbollah’s strength after Israeli operations without providing any evidence. Qassem said that Hezbollah’s weapons stockpiles are not low.[17] The IDF has seized tens of thousands of anti-tank guided munitions from Hezbollah warehouses near the Israel-Lebanon border.[18] The IDF said that it had destroyed 70 percent of Hezbollah drones and 80 percent of Hezbollah rockets through its ground and air campaign.[19] Qassem also claimed that Hezbollah has tens of thousands of fighters in reserve who are ready to engage the IDF.[20] The IDF assessed that it has killed at least 3,000 Hezbollah fighters since October 7, 2023.[21] Israeli operations, including the pager and radio attacks, have injured thousands of additional Hezbollah fighters.[22] Western estimates of Hezbollah’s fighting force range from 20,000 to 50,000 fighters.[23] 

IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.[24] Halevi said that the IDF will develop plans to “expand and deepen” ground operations and activate those plans as needed.[25] Halevi noted that these plans will be formulated alongside efforts to pursue a diplomatic agreement in Lebanon.[26]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba threatened to target US bases in Iraq and Syria on November 4, likely to pressure the US to prevent potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Political Council leader Sheikh Ali al Asadi threatened that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—would target US bases in Iraq and Syria if the Iraqi government discovered that Israel used Iraqi airspace to attack Iran on October 25.[27] The IDF struck several locations in Iraq and Syria on October 25 before launching strikes into Iran.[28] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias falsely believe that the United States can control Israeli actions and have often attacked US bases in Iraq and Syria as a retaliation against Israeli action. Both Israel and the United States have reportedly warned Iraq that Israel may strike targets in Iraq if Iranian-backed Iraqi groups target Israel from Iraqi territory.[29] These Israeli threats may have led Iraqi militias to attempt to deter Israel, including by pressuring the United States under the false assumption that the United States can prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq.

The Biden Administration has conveyed to the Iraqi government that the United States will not be able to prevent an Israeli strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory. The US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan told the Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani that Israel will almost certainly strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory, according to Axios.[30] Sullivan and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also pressured Sudani to limit Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria, something Sudani has so far failed to prevent.[31]  Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Ansar Allah al Awfiya leader Ali al Fatlawi also told Lebanese outlet al Akhbar on November 5 that the Iraqi militias have the right to support the Iranian response against Israel, further underscoring Sudani’s failure to prevent militia attacks.[32]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is reportedly transferring ballistic missiles and drones and planning a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel, further suggesting Iran will retaliate for Israel’s October 25 strikes in Iran from Iraqi territory. Two unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on October 1 that Iraqi militias may soon attack Israel using ballistic missiles and drones.[33] The IRGC has probably shipped some of these missiles and drones in components to Iraqi militias, allowing the groups to assemble the systems themselves possibly with Houthi support, as CTP-ISW suggested on November 5. This collaboration could have also extended into rudimentary drone production.

Iranian media claimed that Iran and Pakistan conducted a joint airstrike attack against Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia on November 5.[34] Jaish al Adl acknowledged that two high-ranking commanders and 12 fighters were killed in what it said was a joint Iranian-Pakistani airstrike.[35] The Pakistani officials have not confirmed the joint military action with Iran, however. The IRGC conducted drone and missile strikes in January 2024 on two Jaish al Adl headquarters in Koh Sabz, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan, on January 16 without Pakistan's permission. Pakistan responded by launching combination of drones, rockets, and air-launched standoff munitions targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran, on January 17.[36] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Pakistan on November 4 to meet with high-ranking Pakistani officials. Araghchi's trip likely aimed, in part, to express Iran's concerns regarding border security.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba threatened to target US bases in Iraq and Syria on November 4, likely to compel the US to prevent potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. The Biden Administration has conveyed to the Iraqi government that the United States will not be able to prevent an Israeli strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory.
• Iran in Iraq: The IRGC is reportedly transferring ballistic missiles and drones and planning a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel, further suggesting Iran will retaliate for Israel’s October 25 strikes in Iran from Iraqi territory.
• Hezbollah: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem claimed that Hezbollah would outlast Israel in a “war of attrition” in a speech on November 6. Qassem did not tie a Lebanon ceasefire to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip, a notable shift from Nasrallah’s position before the ground operation.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.
• Anti-Regime Militancy in Iran: Iranian media claimed that Iran and Pakistan conducted a joint airstrike attack against Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia on November 5.

Iran Update, November 5, 2024

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Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Kelly Campa, Victoria Penza, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Fatah is attempting to extend its control over the Gaza Strip after the October 7 War, but Fatah’s lack of pro-Fatah Palestinian Authority (PA)-affiliated military forces in the Gaza Strip will make this extremely difficult. Fatah and Hamas have met in Cairo for the past several days to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and reportedly agreed in principle to form an administrative committee to manage civil affairs, including humanitarian aid.[1] Hamas reportedly demanded that the committees only include PA civilian employees and remain independent of the PA itself.[2] Fatah Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas demanded in response to Hamas that the committee must be administratively and financially subordinate to the PA or Fatah would not agree to a deal.[3] Either plan will not lead to renewed PA control in the Gaza Strip, however. Hamas guerrilla cells remain active across the Strip, and these cells would attack any attempt by the PA to replace Hamas’ political control with Fatah-affiliated or -dominated PA political control. Hamas likely continues to believe that controlling these committees would enable it to preserve its influence in the Strip.

 

Fatah likely views the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Hamas’ weakened military position as an opportunity to confront Hamas over Hamas efforts to maintain control in the Gaza Strip. An anonymous PA official noted that the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on October 16 has created an opening for further discussions with Hamas or alternative governance plans for the post-war Gaza Strip.[4] It does not appear that Hamas has altered its position vis-a-vis political control in the Gaza Strip since Sinwar’s death.[5] Hamas has long attempted to maintain control or influence over any post-war political organization in the Gaza Strip.[6]

 

Israeli forces are conducting a major clearing operation across the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt militia reconstitution efforts. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 5 that the IDF has stationed forces along two separate corridors north and south of Gaza City, isolating North Gaza Governorate from the rest of the Gaza Strip, and Gaza City from the southern Gaza Strip and the North Gaza Governorate.[7] The 162nd Division has reportedly stationed forces along a corridor running from the Black Arrow monument, west of Mefalsim, Israel, to the Gazan coast.[8] The corridor separates Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia, and Jabalia from Gaza City. The IDF stated that it intends to completely clear the northern Gaza Strip of all Palestinian fighters above and below ground. The 162nd Division reported it has evacuated approximately 60,000 Palestinians from the northern Gaza Strip. Approximately 1,000-1,300 Palestinians remain in Beit Lahia, “a few hundred” remain in Beit Hanoun, and “a few hundred” remain in Jabalia. The IDF plans to evacuate the remaining Palestinians in the northern Gaza Strip to the south in the coming days.

 

The IDF has conducted two previous clearing operations in Jabalia, where it faced some of the most intense fighting between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters during the war.[9] The IDF stated during its May 2024 clearing operation that Hamas turned civilian infrastructure in Jabalia into a “fortified combat complex.”[10] Palestinian fighters also maintained an unusually high rate of attacks targeting Israeli forces throughout IDF clearing operations in Jabalia.[11] Palestinian militia elements could continue attacks in Jabalia after the IDF withdrew in May 2024, though it was unclear how effective the Hamas military organization in Jabalia would continue to function. Hamas’ military wing has probably attempted to rebuild itself where possible in Jabalia since May 2024. It is unclear how successful these efforts would have been, however, given Hamas’ inability to resupply its fighters and attrition during Israeli operations in May.[12]

 

Palestinian militias have claimed near-daily attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in the northern Gaza Strip since October 6.[13] The IDF reported it has killed approximately 1,000 Palestinian fighters and detained approximately 700 since the latest clearing operation began on October 6.[14] The IDF reported its fighters also located and destroyed approximately 200 buildings rigged with explosives during this time.

 

The commander of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada boasted about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia ballistic missile capabilities on November 5, likely to deter potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada commander and Popular Mobilization Forces official Abbas al Zaidi said that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have “underground factories” for an advanced ballistic missile industry during an interview with an Iraqi television program on November 5, in response to a political analyst who said that Iraq does not have defense capabilities like Iran.[15] Iranian officials, Iraqi intelligence sources, and Western intelligence sources told Reuters in 2018 that Iran was helping Iranian-backed Iraqi militias start to “make their own” short-range ballistic missiles. This insight was likely a reference to an Iranian effort designed to improve the ability of the militias to assemble the technical components of the missiles rather than manufacture them completely.[16] UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported on November 2 that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.[17] These Israeli threats may have led Iraqi groups to attempt to deter the Israelis. The Elaph report followed an earlier Axios report that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel in response to Israel’s recent October 25 strikes targeting Iran.[18]

 

Zaidi and the other Iranian-backed Iraqi groups probably also seek to message their strength to gain more influence within the Axis of Resistance amid the severe weakening of the Axis’ previous crown jewel, Hezbollah. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[19] Zaidi’s comments about the militias’ missile production are also likely meant to fulfill a dual effect of emphasizing the militias’ ability to produce more missiles if needed, while also highlighting the militias’ perceived closeness with Iran to develop this capability. Zaidi’s comments have the added effect of illustrating the defiance of the Iraqi groups in the face of Israel. Only the Houthis have withstood Israeli attacks while maintaining a defiant face to date, and the Iraqi groups have presumably observed the regional legitimacy this has brought the Houthis in certain pro-Iran circles.

 

The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deepened collaboration with the Houthis since October 7, 2023, which could give Iraqi militias access to the knowledge necessary to do rudimentary ballistic missile production.[20] A Houthi drone expert responsible for training Iranian-backed Iraqi militants in drone tactics died in a US self-defense strike on an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facility in Iraq in July 2024.[21] The Houthis have learned to locally assemble drones and ballistic missiles from key components smuggled into Yemen by the IRGC.[22] Increased cooperation between the Houthis and the Iraqi militias, combined with the Houthis’ ability to locally assemble missiles, suggests that the Houthis may have had a role in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias learning to assemble ballistic missiles.

 

Russia launched the Iranian Kowsar high-resolution sensing satellite and Hodhod communications satellite into orbit using a Russian Soyuz rocket on November 5, which Iran could use to collect imagery on US and Israeli assets and bases in the region.[23] Iranian media claimed that a “private” company—Omid Faza—designed and built the satellites.[24] The head of the Iranian Space Agency, which operates under the Iranian Information and Communications Technology Ministry, stated on November 5 that the agency signed a contract with the Omid Faza Company to buy satellite images.[25] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media previously reported in July 2020 that the IRGC uses satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region, underscoring the importance of satellites to Iran’s military forces.[26]

 

Omid Faza’s founder, Hossein Shahrabi Farahani, who previously headed US-sanctioned Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) Space Group, created the company in 2018 with several unspecified Amir Kabir University students.[27] The United States sanctioned IEI in 2008 for being “owned or controlled” by the Iranian Defense Ministry.[28] IEI produces electronic warfare equipment, military tactical communication systems, and missile launchers, among other equipment.[29] The launch of the Kowsar satellite into orbit is particularly noteworthy as Iranian officials continue to emphasize that Iran will respond to the recent IDF strikes into Iran.[30]

 

This launch also highlights how Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen space cooperation.[31] Russia previously launched Iranian satellites into orbit in August 2022 and February 2024.[32]

 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5.[33] Netanyahu explained his decision by citing a "crisis of trust” that had emerged between him and Gallant.[34] Netanyahu and Gallant, who served on Netanyahu's war cabinet, have publicly disagreed on numerous issues since October 7, 2023, including Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip and Israel‘s approach to negotiating a ceasefire-hostage deal.[35] Gallant’s positions—and particularly the positions that put him at odds with Netanyahu—frequently aligned with those of the IDF.[36] Netanyahu appointed Foreign Minister Israel Katz to replace Gallant as defense minister.[37] Katz lacks significant security or defense experience and previously led several non-defense portfolios in the Israeli government, including transportation, foreign affairs, and intelligence.[38] Katz is seen as a ”long-time ally” to Netanyahu.[39] Minister without a portfolio Gideon Sa’ar will succeed Katz as the new Israeli Foreign Minister.[40]

 

Gazans protested price gouging of humanitarian aid and goods in Deir al Balah, central Gaza Strip, on November 4 and 5.[41] A Palestinian journalist claimed that the Hamas-run Ministry of Economy implemented a 35% tax on goods entering Gaza, though CTP-ISW has not observed proof of a tax and cannot confirm whether this is an official tax or merely Hamas-guided price gouging.[42] The journalist and protesters claimed that local merchants and Hamas have coordinated to control the price of goods.[43] CTP-ISW observed over 100 Palestinian protesters demonstrating against the price gouging in Deir al Balah on November 4 and 5.[44] It is notable that Palestinian civilians are protesting in Deir al Balah given that it remains a Hamas stronghold. These protests suggest that some Gazans are no longer fearing Hamas’ internal security apparatus and willing to break previous taboos by protesting. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated during a briefing on September 4 that Hamas often steals humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip, hoards goods, and gouges prices to raise funds to support its operations.[45]

 

Key Takeaways:

 

• Post-War Control in the Gaza Strip: Fatah is attempting to extend its control over the Gaza Strip after the October 7 War, but Fatah’s lack of pro-Fatah Palestinian Authority (PA)-affiliated military forces in the Gaza Strip will make this extremely difficult. Fatah likely views the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Hamas’ weakened military position as an opportunity to confront Hamas over Hamas efforts to maintain control in the Gaza Strip.
• Israeli Military Operations in the Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are conducting a major clearing operation across the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt militia reconstitution efforts. Palestinian militia elements could continue attacks in Jabalia after the IDF withdrew there in May 2024, though it was unclear how effective the Hamas military organization in Jabalia would continue to function. Hamas’ military wing has probably attempted to rebuild itself where possible in Jabalia since May 2024. It is unclear how successful these efforts would have been, however, given Hamas’ inability to resupply its fighters and attrition during Israeli operations in May.
• Iraqi Militias and Ballistic Missiles: The commander of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada boasted about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia ballistic missile capabilities on November 5, likely to deter potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. The Iranian-backed Iraqi groups probably also seek to message their strength to gain more influence within the Axis of Resistance amid the severe weakening of the Axis’ previous crown jewel, Hezbollah. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deepened collaboration with the Houthis since October 7, 2023, which could give Iraqi militias access to the knowledge necessary to do rudimentary ballistic missile production.
• Russia Launches Iranian Satellites: Russia launched the Iranian Kowsar high-resolution sensing satellite and Hodhod communications satellite into orbit using a Russian Soyuz rocket on November 5, which Iran could use to collect imagery on US and Israeli assets and bases in the region. Omid Faza’s founder, Hossein Shahrabi Farahani, who previously headed US-sanctioned Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) Space Group, created the company in 2018 with several unspecified Amir Kabir University students.
• Israeli Defense Minister Fired: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5. Netanyahu explained his decision by citing a "crisis of trust” that had emerged between him and Gallant.
• Hamas Price Gouging Aid in the Gaza Strip: Gazans protested price gouging of humanitarian aid and goods in Deir al Balah, central Gaza Strip, on November 4 and 5. It is notable that Palestinian civilians are protesting in Deir al Balah given that it remains a Hamas stronghold.

Iran Update, November 4, 2024

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Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Anthony Carrillo, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iran reportedly warned some Arab countries that it will conduct a complex attack on Israel in retaliation for the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes on Iran.[1] Unspecified Arab and Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal that the upcoming Iranian attack will include drones and missiles and that some will have heavier payloads than those which Iran has previously fired at Israel. Western and Iranian analysts have noted that Iran could use the Khorramshahr-4 liquid-fueled, medium-range ballistic missile, which purportedly carries a payload of 1,500 kilograms and has a range of 2,000 kilometers.[2] The Arab and Iranian officials also told the Wall Street Journal that Iran will use other weapons beyond drones and missiles and will include the conventional Iranian military, known as the Artesh, in the attack. The inclusion of the Artesh would mark the first time that it has attacked Israel; the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has taken lead on attacking Israel up until this point. The Artesh would participate presumably because the IDF killed four Artesh officers in its recent strikes on Iran.[3] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly told senior regime officials that the IDF strikes were ”too large to ignore.”[4] The Artesh has some means of supporting an attack on Israel, such as one-way attack drones, decades-old combat aircraft, and ship-launched missiles, though it remains far from clear that these systems would perform well against Israeli defenses.[5]

Hamas and Fatah officials met in Cairo on November 2 to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and agreed to form an administrative committee to manage borders and other civil affairs.[6] Hamas in the meeting reportedly presented a detailed blueprint for organizing the committee and comprising it of technocrats.[7] Fatah reportedly agreed in principle and asked to review the plan further, particularly who would lead the committee. This meeting comes as Hamas and Fatah have negotiated for months over establishing a national unity government in the Gaza Strip. A Palestinian source told Reuters in October 2024 that Hamas and Fatah may explore the possibility of forming a committee to govern the Gaza Strip if they failed to agree on a national unity government.[8] Hamas seeks to establish an intra-Palestinian government in the Gaza Strip as an alternative to an Emirati-proposed plan that would exclude Hamas from post-war governance. Hamas likely calculates that it could subvert, infiltrate, and ultimately control a national unity government and thus allow Hamas to remain politically dominant in the Gaza Strip. That Hamas developed the plan for an administrative committee indicates that Hamas still this approach as viable toward preserving its influence in the strip. This Cairo meeting notably comes after Hamas asked Russia to pressure the Palestinian Authority (PA) into negotiating further over a national unity government.[9]

A female Iranian student removed some of her clothing in protest after being reportedly harassed and assaulted by regime security forces on campus.[10] The student, named Ahoo Daryaei, was targeted for improperly adhering to the mandatory hijab law. Some Iranian sources stated that Daryaei removed her clothing after security forces tore it.[11] Security forces arrested Daryaei, and Iranian media later reported that she has been hospitalized for being mentally ill.[12] This incident is one of several in which the regime has labeled women mentally ill for protesting the hijab requirement.[13] Human rights organizations called for the immediate and unconditional release of Daryaei.[14] She has rapidly become an online symbol of the Iranian protest movement standing against regime oppression and efforts to enforce behavioral standards on the Iranian population. This protest movement has a long legacy of strong female icons, especially following the regime killing Mahsa Amini in September 2022.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Israel conflict: Iran reportedly warned some Arab countries that it will conduct a complex attack in retaliation for the recent IDF strikes on Iran. Tehran reportedly plans to use drones and missiles, some of which will have heavier payloads than what Iran has previously fired at Israel. The upcoming attack will reportedly include the IRGC and conventional Iranian military.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas and Fatah officials met in Cairo to discuss post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and agreed to form an administrative committee to manage borders and other civil affairs. Hamas seeks to establish an intra-Palestinian government that Hamas can ultimately control as an alternative to a UAE plan that would exclude Hamas from post-war governance in the strip.
• Iran: A female Iranian student removed some of her clothing in protest after being reportedly harassed and assaulted by regime security forces. She has rapidly become an online symbol of the Iranian protest movement standing against regime oppression and efforts to enforce behavioral standards on the Iranian population.

Iran Update, November 3, 2024

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Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Israeli Defense Minister emphasized that Iran is “pouring everything [it] can” into the West Bank, indicating that Iran will very likely attempt to pursue a different strategy when rebuilding Palestinian militias to fight Israel again.[1] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Iran is looking for additional routes to destabilize Israel and incite terrorism, particularly utilizing the West Bank, due to the IDF's degradation of Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Iran and Hamas have observed the military degradation of Hamas’ units in the Gaza Strip. Hamas, however, is likely trying to reconstitute regardless of how badly the IDF defeated it as defeat is a temporary condition.[2] It does not follow that Iran and Hamas will decide to rebuild Hamas and other Palestinian militias in the same way again. Iran and Hamas have almost certainly learned many lessons from the October 7 War, including the difficulty of rearming and rebuilding militias in an area that can be easily isolated, such as the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ severe degradation in the Gaza Strip and the difficulty in rebuilding Hamas’ military wing isolated there could cause Iran and Hamas to redouble their efforts to strengthen Hamas and Palestinian military organizations elsewhere, including in the West Bank. Iran has increased its efforts to smuggle weapons and other materiel into the West Bank in recent years.[3] Iran’s efforts have so far had only limited success.

The IDF captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria. This Iranian-led intelligence effort is likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to undertake small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.[4] The IDF said on November 3 that the Egoz Unit captured Ali Suleiman al Asi in Saida, Daraa Province, in recent months.[5] The IDF said that al Asi collected intelligence on Israeli operations along the Syrian border with the Golan Heights for “future terror activity” on behalf of Iran.[6] The IDF “closely monitor[ed]” al Asi before his capture.[7] The IDF did not specify when the raids took place, but Israeli special operations forces (SOF) have conducted numerous covert raids into Lebanon to disrupt Hezbollah border infrastructure since October 2023.[8] The IDF said that Aadi’s capture prevented a future attack and exposed Iranian attempts to gather intelligence on the Syria-Golan Heights border.[9]

Iran’s intelligence collection about Israeli border movements on the Syrian-Golan Heights border is consistent with previous Iranian-backed efforts to gather intelligence to inform future ground attacks. Hamas undertook similar intelligence-gathering exercises ahead of the October 7 attacks.[10] Hezbollah observers on the Israel-Lebanon border likely monitored Israeli border patrols and movements in planning Hezbollah’s ground infiltration into Israel.[11] The intelligence collection effort on the Syrian border could support future ground attacks or small-scale incursions, including the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” to achieve Israel's stated war aims.[12] Israel’s stated war aim is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions.[13] Current Israeli operations in southern Lebanon are unlikely to achieve these war aims, though it does not follow that future Israeli operations will fail to achieve the Israeli objectives. Netanyahu made these remarks during a visit to the Israel-Lebanon border on November 3 to meet with IDF commanders.[14] Israel has designed its current ground operations to dismantle border infrastructure and prevent Hezbollah from conducting direct fire and ground attacks into Israel.[15] These operations do not seek to physically push Hezbollah fighters north of the Litani River and have not done so.

Israel is currently engaged in indirect negotiations with Hezbollah to obtain a ceasefire deal that may require Hezbollah military forces to withdraw north of the Litani.[16] The language of the deal from a recently leaked draft stipulates that Lebanese army “forces, infrastructure and weapons will be the only armed groups and assets deployed” south of the Litani River following the ceasefire.[17] It is unclear if Hezbollah will accept a deal that would call for its forces to move north. Hezbollah has not fulfilled its obligations under UNSC Resolution 1701, which required its forces to withdraw from areas south of the Litani River. The implementation of a large-scale Hezbollah withdrawal is extremely complicated, particularly given that many Hezbollah fighters were born and raised in the area that they would then need to leave.

UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.[18] Unspecified Israeli sources stated that the IDF has identified more than thirty “legitimate targets” in Iraq should Israel decide to launch an attack against the militias. Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on October 31 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel in response to Israel’s recent strikes on Iran using a large volume of drones and ballistic missiles in the coming days.[19] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[20] CTP-ISW recorded that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq increased its rate of attacks by approximately 106 percent between September and October 2024.[21]

Unspecified military officials told Elaph that Israel and the United States have been using satellites to monitor Iranian attempts to transfer ballistic missiles and other unspecified but related equipment from Iran to Iraqi territory.[22] Iran began supplying Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with short-range ballistic missiles, including Zelzal, Fateh-110, and Zolfaghar missiles, in 2018, but the militias have not used ballistic missiles to attack Israel in the October 7 War thus far.[23]

The United States warned Iran against launching another attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel’s strikes into Iran on October 25 because the United States would not be able to restrain Israel’s response.[24] An anonymous US official told Axios that the United States sent this message to Tehran through the Swiss diplomats, adding that the United States cannot confirm that Israel’s next attack will be as ”calibrated and targeted” as before. The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond.[25]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that B-52 strategic bombers arrived in the Middle East on November 3.[26] This is part of a larger US military effort to increase its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.[27]

US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla met with IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi in Israel between November 2 and November 3.[28] The IDF stated that the assessment focused on joint preparations against regional threats, especially against threats from Iran. Kurilla toured the US THAAD missile defense system battery during his trip to Israel.

Key Takeaways:

• West Bank: The Israeli Defense Minister emphasized that Iran is “pouring everything [it] can” into the West Bank, indicating that Iran will very likely attempt to pursue a different strategy when rebuilding Hamas to fight Israel again.
• Syria: The IDF captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria. This Iranian-led intelligence effort is likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to undertake small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The Israeli prime minister stated that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” to achieve Israel's stated war aims, which is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions. Current Israeli operations in southern Lebanon are unlikely to achieve these war aims, though it does not follow that future Israeli operations will fail to achieve the Israeli objectives
• Iranian Retaliation against Israel: UK-based Saudi outlet Elaph reported that Israel warned the Iraqi government that if Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to attack Israel from Iraqi territory, Israel may strike predetermined targets in Iraq.
• US Diplomatic Efforts: The United States warned Iran against launching another attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel’s strikes into Iran on October 25 because the United States will not be able to restrain Israel’s response.
• US Posture in the Middle East: US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that B-52 strategic bombers arrived in the Middle East on November 3. US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla met with IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi in Israel between November 2 and November 3.
• Saudi Arabia: The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, an Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia, claimed its second attack since announcing its existence.

Iran Update, November 2, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond. Western officials believe that the regime is debating how and whether it should respond to the strikes, according to the Wall Street Journal.[1] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned on November 2 that Iran will give a “tooth-breaking response” to Israel and the United States.[2] This warning comes after Khamenei issued an order on October 29 to the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is Iran’s highest defense and foreign policy body, instructing the SNSC to prepare a retaliatory attack on Israel, according to the New York Times.[3] Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer and Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Esmail Kowsari claimed on November 2 that the SNSC agreed on a “military response” to Israel that will involve Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[4] It is more likely that Kowsari would have insight into the SNSC’s decision-making due to his deep personal relationships with top IRGC commanders rather than due to his position in the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee.[5] Kowsari’s claim is consistent with Western media reports that Iran’s retaliation could include Iranian-backed Iraqi militia drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel.[6] Unspecified Iranian sources speaking to Qatari-owned, London-based al Araby al Jadeed denied on November 2 that Iran will launch an attack from Iraq, instead insisting that Iran will respond from Iranian territory.[7] These differing statements from Iranian officials likely reflect current debates within the regime about how the regime should respond to the Israeli strikes.

The United States military is increasing its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.[8] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered the deployment of an unspecified number of additional ballistic missile defense destroyers, fighter squadron and tanker aircraft, and several U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers to the Middle East. AP reported, citing unspecified US officials, that the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group is scheduled to leave the Middle East in the middle of November and return to its home port in San Diego.[9] The United States will still maintain the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in Israel and the Amphibious Ready Group Marine Expeditionary Unit in the eastern Mediterranean area despite the imminent departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln.[10] Pentagon Press Secretary Major General Pat Ryder stated that these new deployments demonstrate the “flexible nature of U.S. global defense posture” to deploy world-wide on short notice.[11]

The IDF deployed an additional brigade to Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on November 2.[12] The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade started clearing operations in Jabalia on November 2. The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade is the IDF’s largest infantry brigade, consisting of five battalions.[13] The 900th Infantry Brigade specializes in operations in urban environments against ”guerilla” cells in the West Bank.[14] This is notable because Hamas’ military wing in the Gaza Strip has been reduced to operating in small, independent guerilla cells. This makes the 900th Infantry Brigade well-suited to the task of destroying these cells, particularly within Jabalia City and Refugee Camp.

The IDF is sending small units far ahead of the main Israeli force. That the IDF has the confidence to operate regular units in this way is a reflection is Hezbollah’s relatively ineffective defense in these areas. Israeli forces killed the commander of Hezbollah’s coastal sector Mein Musa Az al Din and the commander of Hezbollah’s Coastal Sector Artillery forces Hassan Majed Diab around Tyre on November 1.[15] Hezbollah previously claimed on November 1 that it blocked an Israeli reconnaissance force advancing through the Wadi Hamoul area, north of Alma al Shaab.[16] Commanders may choose to assign reconnaissance units to penetrate deeper into enemy territory due to ”a decision to accept risk due to a low threat level.”[17] CTP-ISW has previously observed that Hezbollah has mounted a disorganized and ineffective defense across southern Lebanon.[18]
Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation against Israel: The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will respond to the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25, although the regime does not appear to have decided how it will respond.
• US Posture in the Middle East: The United States military is increasing its presence in the Middle East ahead of the departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group from the region in the next few months.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF deployed the 900th Infantry Brigade to Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on November 2. This brigade, which specializes in operations against “guerilla” cells in the West Bank’s urban environments, would be well-suited to operations in Jabalia’s urban environment, where Hamas has been reduced to operating in small, independent guerilla cells.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF is sending small units far ahead of the main Israeli force. That the IDF has the confidence to operate regular units in this way is a reflection is Hezbollah’s relatively ineffective defense in these areas.
• Israeli Raids in Lebanon: Israeli naval special operations forces captured a senior member of Hezbollah’s naval forces in Batroun, central Lebanon, according to an unspecified Israeli official.

Iran Update, November 1, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Western media reported that Iran will retaliate for the recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes around Iran, possibly by launching one-way attack drones and ballistic missiles from Iraq.[1] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the Iranian Supreme National Security Council on October 29 to plan a retaliatory attack on Israel, according to the New York Times.[2] Unspecified Israeli sources told Axios that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may attack Israel using a large volume of drones and ballistic missiles in the coming days.[3] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, has repeatedly attacked Israel in recent months, primarily using the following weapons systems:

• Shahed-101 drone. The Iranian-made Shahed-101 has a range of around 600 kilometers.[4]
• Shahed-136 drone. The Iranian-made Shahed-136 reportedly has a range of 2,500 kilometers.[5]
• KAS-04 drone. The KAS-04 is a variant of the Iranian-designed, long-range Samad drone.[6]
• Al Arfad drone. The al Arfad is a variant of the KAS-04 drone.[7]
• Arqab cruise missile. These are Iranian Paveh missiles with a range of around 1,650 kilometers.[8]

Iran also began supplying Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with short-range ballistic missiles, including Zelzal, Fateh-110, and Zolfaghar missiles in 2018, but the militias have not used ballistic missiles to attack Israel in the October 7 War thus far.[9]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has increased its rate of attacks, in particular drone attacks, targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[10] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed nine drone attacks targeting unspecified locations across Israel on October 31 and November 1.[11] A source close to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq recently warned that the group plans to double its rate of attacks targeting Israel in November 2024.[12] The recent Islamic Resistance in Iraq drone attacks likely served in part as reconnaissance-in-force operations, which are “designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[13] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq could use these attacks to test and learn how to better bypass Israeli air defenses. An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack against Israel, as opposed to a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory, would benefit Iran by allowing Tehran to preserve its dwindling long-range missile stockpile. Iran launched over 400 cruise and ballistic missiles at Israel in its April and October 2024 attacks.[14]

That Khamenei ordered retaliation against Israel corroborates CTP-ISW's assessment that the recent IDF strikes on Iran inflicted significant damage to Iranian military and defense infrastructure. Three Iranian officials told the New York Times on November 1 that Khamenei ordered retaliation after he reviewed a “detailed report. . . on the extent of the damage” of the IDF strikes.[15] The sources added that Khamenei determined that the scope of the strikes was “too large to ignore” and that failing to retaliate “would mean admitting defeat.”[16] Senior US and Israeli officials recently confirmed that the IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[17] The S-300 is Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates. The IDF strikes also successfully targeted two Iranian Ghadir passive array detection radar sites, advertised as being capable of detecting ballistic missiles and stealth aircraft.[18] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the damage to the air defenses has likely seriously degraded the Iranian ability to defend against further Israeli attacks.[19] The IDF strikes also inflicted significant damage on facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs, which CTP-ISW previously assessed could disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture drones and ballistic missiles for itself and its partners, such as Russia.[20]

That Iran could direct an attack against Israel via its proxies in Iraq highlights the extent to which Iran has increased its military and political control over federal Iraq. Iran has increasingly infiltrated Iraqi military and political institutions—such as the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Iraqi Judiciary—in recent years.[21] The most recent example of Iran’s growing influence in Iraq was the election of Shia Coordination Framework-backed politician Mahmoud al Mashhadani as Parliament Speaker on October 31.[22] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties. Mashhadani received 181 votes, which is 16 votes more than the absolute majority required to become parliament speaker.[23] Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri emphasized after Mashhadani’s election that all Shia Coordination Framework leaders, including State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali, back Mashhadani.[24]

Iran’s growing military and political control over federal Iraq appears to be part of a broader Iranian strategy to turn the country into a base of operations from which Iran and its Axis of Resistance can conduct future operations and attacks against Israel. Iraq has increasingly become a focal point for cooperation and coordination among Axis of Resistance groups in recent months. A Houthi drone expert responsible for training Iranian-backed Iraqi militants died in a US self-defense strike in Iraq in July 2024, highlighting increased cooperation between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi groups.[25] The Houthis and Hamas have separately opened political offices in Iraq in recent months, and Emirati media reported in June 2024 that Hamas was planning to relocate its political leadership to Baghdad.[26] Growing Iranian influence in Iraq will threaten US and Israeli security and interests in the region, particularly as the United States is considering withdrawing its forces from Iraq.[27]

Israeli forces engaged Lebanese Hezbollah while advancing around the tactically significant town of Khiam in southern Lebanon.[28] Israeli forces began advancing toward Khiam on October 28. Hezbollah claimed two rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces in the area on November 1.[29] Lebanese media reported small arms combat there as well.[30] Khiam is located on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into northern Israel. Khiam, moreover, grants Hezbollah a vantage point from which it could observe Israeli forces and other targets around the Galilee panhandle. Despite the tactical significance of Khiam, Hezbollah does not appear to be mounting a particularly effective defense of the area. This behavior is consistent with CTP-ISW’s observation that Hezbollah has mounted a disorganized and ineffective defense across southern Lebanon.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran will reportedly retaliate for the recent IDF strikes across Iran. Iran would be responding to the significant damage that the IDF inflicted upon Iranian air defenses and missile production facilities.
• Iraq: Iran may retaliate by ordering its Iraqi militias to fire a large volume of drones and missiles at Israel. That Iran is considering this option highlights the extent to which Iran has expanded its military and political influence in Iraq.
• Lebanon: The IDF engaged Lebanese Hezbollah while advancing around the tactically significant town of Khiam in southeastern Lebanon. The town is on high ground from which Hezbollah could fire into Israel and observe the IDF and other targets in the area.

 

Iran Update, October 31, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Israeli state-owned broadcaster Kan published a US-drafted ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon.[1] The draft proposes that international mediators determine a date to begin the ceasefire and commence a 60-day “implementation period.” During this period, Lebanese Hezbollah would cease attacks against Israel and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would cease offensive operations in Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would gradually deploy 10,000 troops to southern Lebanon before the implementation period ends. The LAF would be responsible for monitoring the Israel-Lebanon border and all land, sea, and air crossings. The LAF would also dismantle all non-state military infrastructure and confiscate arms.

The United States, Israel, and Lebanon, according to the proposal, would establish a "monitoring and enforcement mechanism” to address reported ceasefire violations. The United States will administer the mechanism, which would—in addition to Israel and Lebanon—include the United Nations and European and regional countries. The mechanism would develop measures to address ceasefire violations, such as sanctions packages. The mechanism would assess progress at the end of the implementation period and institute a permanent ceasefire. The IDF would at this point conduct a complete withdrawal from Lebanon within seven days. The United States and United Nations would separately facilitate Israel-Lebanon negotiations to achieve the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which prohibits Hezbollah from operating south of the Litani River. Hezbollah has violated UNSCR 1701 repeatedly over many years.

US, Israeli, and Lebanese officials are currently discussing the ceasefire proposal. Senior US officials Amos Hochstein and Brett McGurk met with Israeli leaders in Jerusalem on October 31 to that end.[2] Hochstein previously spoke with Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati on October 30.[3] Israeli Army Radio reported that there has been ”real progress” toward an agreement.[4]

The success of this proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation.[5] The proposal, in its current form, requires Hezbollah to cease attacks against Israel but does not explicitly require Hezbollah to disarm—only that the LAF must dismantle military infrastructure and confiscate weapons. The agreement could still be viable, however, so long as Hezbollah leaders accept the agreement and get their lower echelons to adhere to it. There is a risk that Hezbollah leaders cannot ensure that some of the rank-and-file militants stop attacks and surrender their weapons to the LAF, especially given the severe disruption to the Hezbollah command-and-control network. There may even be some exchanges of fire during the implementation period. This fighting would not necessarily mean that the ceasefire failed.

The LAF would need to disarm other non-state militias in southern Lebanon based on the text of the proposal. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) maintain cells in Lebanon, particularly in the south, and Hezbollah commonly allows these and other Palestinian groups to launch attacks into Israel from Hezbollah-controlled territory.[6] The presence of these armed groups could complicate Hezbollah efforts to honor the ceasefire.

The proposal does not explicitly require Hezbollah forces to withdraw from south of the Litani River.[7] The proposal instead stipulates that the LAF should be the only military force in the area.[8] This language is remarkably similar to that of UNSCR 1701, which calls for southern Lebanon to be “free any armed personnel, assets, and weapons” other than those of the Lebanese state.[9] UNSCR 1701 called in spirit for a Hezbollah withdrawal but fell short of providing for it explicitly.[10] Requiring Hezbollah to leave southern Lebanon would be extremely complicated given that many of Hezbollah militants were born and raised in the area that they would then need to leave.

Israel is seeking for the United States to guarantee its support for Israeli military action in Lebanon if the ceasefire fails.[11] The United States agreed to give Israel a “side letter” that would give assurances of US support if the LAF or UNIFIL fails to meet their respective obligations.[12] Maintaining the option to operate in Lebanon is consistent with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu saying on October 31 that the main Israeli priorities are to “enforce security, thwart attacks against [Israel], and act against the arming of our enemies despite all the pressures and constraints.”[13]  The side letter requests that Israel consult the United States before any Israeli strikes in Lebanon and that the strikes try to minimize harm to civilians.[14] The United States also requested that Israeli flights over Lebanon be used only for intelligence collection and refrain from breaking the sound barrier.[15]

Senior Lebanese officials are expressing optimism publicly about the feasibility of a ceasefire. Lebanese Prime Minister Mikati said on October 30 that a deal could be announced “in the coming hours or days.”[16] Lebanese officials are reportedly avoiding criticizing any parts of the proposal publicly in order to provide space for continued negotiations.[17] The proposal published by Israeli media is dated October 26, but anonymous officials familiar with the negotiations have said that no major changes have been made since then.[18]

The IDF will establish a new division to counter threats around the Israel-Jordan border.[19] The division will include a quick reaction force to counter anti-Israel militancy in the Jordan Valley and to interdict weapons smuggling. The division will be subordinate to the IDF Central Command and cooperate with the Jordanian Army to secure the border region.[20] The establishment of this new division comes amid IDF concerns about Iran trying to smuggle weapons into Israel and the West Bank via Jordan.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israeli media published a US-drafted ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon. The success of the proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation. The proposal does not explicitly require Hezbollah to withdraw from south of the Litani River.
• Lebanon: Israel is seeking for the United States to guarantee its support for Israeli military action in Lebanon if the ceasefire fails. Senior Lebanese officials are expressing optimism publicly about the feasibility of a ceasefire.
• Israel: The IDF will establish a new division to counter threats around the Israel-Jordan border. The establishment of this division comes amid IDF concerns about Iran trying to smuggle weapons into Israel and the West Bank via Jordan.

 

Iran Update, October 30, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem reiterated normal Hezbollah themes and ideological points in his first speech as secretary general on October 30, suggesting his appointment will not spur drastic organizational change. Hezbollah’s Shura Council appointed Qassem on October 29 to replace Hassan Nasrallah, who Israel killed on September 27.[1] Qassem’s speech echoed similar topics to his speeches delivered after Nasrallah’s death but before Qassem’s appointment.[2]

Qassem continued to attempt to obfuscate the reality that Hezbollah’s military forces are failing in Lebanon. Qassem bragged about Hezbollah's capabilities and fighting prowess, stating his intent to continue to “implement the war plan” against Israel that Nasrallah created.[3] Qassem called on Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon to “reduce [Israeli] losses” and threatened that Israel would soon pay an “unprecedented price.”[4] Qassem continued to assert that Hezbollah fighters were successful on the battlefield and that “all the required capabilities are available to the resistance fighters on the front lines, and they are steadfast and capable.”[5] He also noted that Hezbollah fighters continue to launch attacks into northern Israel despite the widespread airstrikes targeting launch sites.[6] He emphasized that Hezbollah is “hurting” Israel, using the Binyamina base drone attack that killed four IDF personnel and injured 60 others as proof.[7] Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Northern Command said on October 21 that Hezbollah “fails to carry out effective reinforcements and does not fight as a system” in southern Lebanon border villages where the IDF is operating, however.[8] It is also notable that though Hezbollah is firing between 100 and 200 rockets into Israel every day, pre-war estimates indicated Hezbollah would be able to fire well over 1,000 rockets into Israel every day.[9] This indicates that Hezbollah is either unwilling or unable to launch rockets into Israel at a higher rate.

Qassem hinted at a possible shift in Hezbollah policy that would allow a Lebanon ceasefire to be separated from Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. The new secretary general was less absolute regarding a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip than Nasrallah had been before his death. Nasrallah had previously said that a ceasefire in Lebanon would have to be contingent on halting Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Qassem appeared less resolute by saying that Hezbollah would accept “appropriate” ceasefire conditions but insisted that "the basis for any negotiations is a ceasefire first."[10] Qassem indicated on October 8 that the group may be open to a ceasefire that is not linked to the Gaza Strip.[11] Nasrallah had previously been very explicit that Hezbollah would not stop indirect fire attacks into Israel until the IDF withdrew from the Gaza Strip.[12] Nasrallah held this unambiguous position before Israel began ground operations in southern Lebanon, however. The shift in Hezbollah’s position may be a result of both new Hezbollah leadership and the escalation of a war that has temporarily degraded Hezbollah's command, control, and logistical networks. Qassem said he believes that Hezbollah, not an international resolution, expelled Israel from Lebanon in 2006 and 2000, suggesting his reluctance to enter into a ceasefire agreement.[13]

Qassem expressed considerable skepticism that Israel would abide by a ceasefire agreement, citing what he sees as past Israeli violations of UNSCR 1701 and Israel’s vision for Lebanon. Qassem alleged that Israel regularly violated UNSCR 1701, but Hezbollah has violated the resolution since the end of the 2006 war by building massive military sites south of the Litani River that Israeli forces are now operating inside of Lebanon to destroy.[14] Qassem described Hezbollah's activities in southern Lebanon as a “proactive defense” against an Israeli intent to “eliminate” the resistance and “our people in the region.”[15] A “proactive” Hezbollah defense including ground forces designed to attack Israel is a violation of UNSC Resolution 1701. He claimed that Israel always intended to invade Lebanon and that Hezbollah “harass[ment]” of northern Israeli towns with daily rocket and drone attacks did not cause Israel’s current operation.[16] This statement by Qassem is false. Israel’s stated war aim is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions.[17] Tens of thousands of Israeli civilians left northern Israel border villages and towns shortly after Hezbollah began attacking Israel with rockets, drones, and other systems on October 8, 2023.[18]

Qassem distanced himself and Hezbollah from Iran, stating that Hezbollah is not pursuing an Iranian project but is executing its plan to protect and liberate Lebanese land.[19] He praised Iran for its “financial, media, and political support” and the “heavy price” that it pays for that support and its stance on Palestine.[20] Emirati media cited an Iranian source that said that Qassem fled Lebanon on October 5 aboard the Iranian foreign minister’s plane.[21] CTP-ISW is unable to independently confirm this report. Qassem also thanked other Axis of Resistance groups for their support of Hezbollah and Palestine, singling out the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[22] Qassem’s praise for these groups is particularly notable given that several Houthi and Iraqi fighters have died in southern Lebanon since the Israeli campaign accelerated in late September 2024.[23]

Israel's retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 significantly degraded Iran's integrated air defense system and made subsequent Israeli strikes on Iran easier and less risky. Senior US and Israeli officials confirmed that the IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable, likely by destroying the radars that the systems rely on.[24] The S-300 is the collective name for a number of individual platforms. Destroying the radars that the S-300 uses to engage targets, for example, would render the entirety of the S-300 system unable to engage air targets. The strikes also successfully targeted two Iranian Ghadir passive array detection radar sites, advertised as being capable of detecting ballistic missiles and stealth aircraft in Iranian airspace.[25] It is not clear how well or how reliably these passive array detection radars can detect stealth aircraft in particular. Israeli media reported on October 28 that Israel is planning to retaliate separately against Iran for the Lebanese Hezbollah attack that targeted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 19.[26] The damage to Iran's air defenses has likely seriously degraded Iran’s ability to defend against further Israeli attacks.

The IDF is signaling that it is preparing to end its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon. IDF officials told senior Israeli officials that it is an opportune time to obtain a diplomatic solution to end fighting with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and avoid a longer conflict in Lebanon during an Israeli cabinet meeting on October 29, according to unspecified Israeli officials.[27] The Israeli officials said that the IDF is “very close” to ending its initial phase of ground operations in Lebanese border villages.[28] This reporting is consistent with recent reports that the IDF Northern Command expects to finish its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon within a few weeks.[29] Israel and Lebanon are reportedly currently “in advanced stages” of ceasefire negotiations, which would involve a 60-day ceasefire followed by negotiations for a new mechanism to supervise southern Lebanon.[30] Senior US officials Amos Hochstein and Brett McGurk will arrive in Israel on October 31 to meet with Israeli officials to discuss the most recent ceasefire proposal.[31]

Israeli movement to secure a ceasefire suggests that the IDF believes it has achieved the military objectives dictated to it by Israeli political leadership, not that the ground operation has “failed.” Israeli ground and air operations have degraded Radwan special operations forces (SOF) assets to eliminate the threat of a Hezbollah ground infiltration into Israel. The IDF began its ground operations in southern Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities to conduct an October 7-style offensive and direct fire attacks into northern Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north. The IDF said that the Radwan forces aimed to “infiltrate Israeli territory and occupy [Israeli territory] near the northern border."[32] Israeli operations along the Israel-Lebanon border have focused on removing Hezbollah Radwan SOF infrastructure that could have been used to launch ground attacks into Israel.[33] These raids have likely severely degraded if not destroyed Radwan infrastructure in border towns. The IDF recently announced that it “destroyed” Hezbollah’s ability to conduct a ground infiltration into Israel from Kfar Kila.[34] Israeli forces have destroyed at least seven major Radwan SOF sites during operations in southern Israel.[35]

The IDF Air Force also struck and killed Hezbollah’s Radwan SOF deputy commander Mustafa Ahmed Shahadi in the Nabatieh region of southern Lebanon on October 30.[36] The IDF said that Shahadi managed the Radwan Force’s combat plans in southern Lebanon.[37] Shahadi is the latest of at least ten Radwan SOF leaders that Israel has killed in Lebanon in 2024.[38] The IDF has also detained Radwan fighters during ground operations in southern Lebanon.[39]

The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations and seize terrain along the Lebanese border to disrupt Hezbollah artillery observers’ ability to support indirect rocket and mortar attacks into northern Israel.[40] Israeli armor advanced towards Khiam on October 28, which is located on hilly terrain that would enable Hezbollah to direct these types of attacks with a view of northern Israel.[41] Israeli forces are currently continuing clearing operations in Kfar Kila, Aitaroun, Dahyra, and Oum Touteh.[42]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant assessed that IDF operations have destroyed around 80 percent of Hezbollah’s pre-October 7 rocket capabilities.[43] Gallant said that Hezbollah is not currently organized in a way that would allow it to fire large barrages of rockets at northern Israel.[44] Pre-war IDF estimates from 2016 suggested that Hezbollah may launch up to 1,500 rockets and missiles daily into northern Israel in the event of an Israel-Hezbollah war.[45] Hezbollah's volume of rocket fire does not approach pre-war estimates of Hezbollah’s capabilities, although Israeli estimates have reported that Hezbollah’s daily average of fire into Israel is four times greater than the daily average before Israel’s ground operations.[46] CTP-ISW estimates that Hezbollah has launched a daily average of 75 rockets into northern Israel between October 22 and October 29.[47] This suggests that Israeli operations degraded Hezbollah’s rocket assets, which is a necessary step to remove the threat that Hezbollah poses to northern Israeli towns. An Israeli think tank estimated on October 28 that Hezbollah still likely retains up to 25,000 short-range rockets and up to 2,000 rockets and medium-range missiles.[48]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah: Qassem continued to attempt to obfuscate the reality that Hezbollah’s military forces are failing in Lebanon. Qassem alleged that Israel regularly violated UNSCR 1701, but Hezbollah has violated the resolution since the end of the 2006 war by building massive military sites south of the Litani River that Israeli forces are now operating inside of Lebanon to destroy.
• Israeli Airstrikes Targeting Iran: Israel's retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 significantly degraded Iran's integrated air defense system and made subsequent Israeli strikes on Iran easier and less risky.
• Ceasefire in Lebanon: The IDF is signaling that it is preparing to end its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon. Israeli movement to secure a ceasefire suggests that the IDF believes it has achieved the military objectives dictated to it by Israeli political leadership, not that the ground operation has “failed.”
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations and seize terrain along the Lebanese border to disrupt Hezbollah artillery observers’ ability to support indirect rocket and mortar attacks into northern Israel.

Iran Update, October 29, 2024

click here to read the full report

Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The precise nature of the recent Israeli strikes into Iran has partially obscured the serious damage these strikes inflicted on critical Iranian defense and military infrastructure. These strikes could disrupt Iranian ballistic missile production and leave Iran more vulnerable to future strikes, however. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted precise and calculated strikes targeting Iranian military and defense industrial infrastructure to avoid collateral damage and casualties. The result of these precise strikes is that the damage to Iranian military infrastructure appears minimal. The Israeli strikes could disrupt Iran’s ability to manufacture advanced ballistic missiles and leave Iran more vulnerable to future strikes, however.[1] Commercially available satellite imagery published on October 28 shows that the IDF likely struck a Ghadir radar site approximately 15 kilometers north of Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[2] The Ghadir radar system, along with the Russian-made S-300, is an important component of the Iranian integrated air defense system.[3] The Ghadir radar system can reportedly detect ballistic missiles from a distance of 1,100 kilometers and aircraft from a distance of 600 kilometers.[4]

Commercially available satellite imagery published on October 29 separately shows damage to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Shahroud Missile Facility in Semnan Province, which is used to build solid-propellant ballistic missiles and launch Space Launch Vehicles (SLV) into orbit.[5] The IRGC previously launched the Soraya and Chamran-1 satellites into orbit from the Shahroud Missile Facility using the Ghaem-100 SLV in January and September 2024, respectively.[6] A missile expert told AP News on October 29 that the IRGC Shahroud Missile Facility is likely involved in “solid propellant mixing and casting operations.”[7] The same missile expert reported on October 28 that the Taksaz Industrial Innovators Engineering Company (TIECO) factory that Israel struck on October 25 in Tehran has designed and developed “mixers for high-viscosity materials” since the early 1990s.[8] The expert noted that the company could use this technology to produce solid-propellant mixers. The fact that Israel targeted mixing equipment used to make solid fuel highlights that Israel sought to degrade Iran’s ability to produce advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to attack Israel directly. Unspecified Israeli sources previously told Axios that Iran will likely need at least a year to acquire new mixing equipment.[9]

An Israeli official stated on October 26 that the IDF hit approximately 20 targets in Iran.[10] Below are the confirmed locations in Iran that the IDF hit in its October 25 retaliatory strikes:

Tehran Province

• Parchin Military Complex, Tehran.[11] Parchin is one of Iran’s most expansive and sensitive defense industrial sites. Iran has used the site to develop and manufacture explosive materials and advanced munitions, including drones and missiles.[12] Iran has reportedly produced and tested chemical and nuclear weapons at the Parchin complex.[13] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors found particles of man-made uranium at the Parchin site in 2015, indicating the presence of a larger quantity of uranium at one point, although Iran denied that the facility was tied to the nuclear program.[14] Former UN Weapons inspector David Albright said the buildings that the IDF hit at Parchin were used for mixing solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[15]
• Khojir Military Complex, Tehran.[16] Khojir is a missile production complex tied to the Parchin facility that is involved in the production of liquid- and solid-fuel missiles for the IRGC. Reuters reported satellite imagery revealed significant expansions at the site in July 2024.[17] The Khojir site is tied to various state-owned defense companies including Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG).[18] SHIG is one of Iran’s “primary entities responsible for ballistic missile development and production,” according to the US. SHIG has been sanctioned by the US, EU, and the UN for its role in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.[19] Commercially available satellite imagery showed that the IDF destroyed two buildings in the Khojir complex.[20]
• S-300 surface-to-air missile battery, Imam Khomeini International Airport, Tehran.[21] The Russian-made S-300 air defense system at the Imam Khomeini International Airport provides air defense cover for Tehran city.[22]
• S-300 surface-to-air missile battery, Hazrat Amir Brigade Air Defense Site, Elamshahr.[23] The IDF struck an S-300 site near the Hazrat Amir Brigade Air Defense Site. The Amir ol Momenin Air Defense Brigade manages the S-300 equipment at the site.[24] The brigade is part of the Artesh, Iran’s conventional military.
• Parand Military Site, Tehran.[25] Unspecified Iranian and Israeli officials told the New York Times that the IDF targeted the Parand military site with drones.[26] Western media reported that the IDF hit this site, but there is no publicly available information on the purpose of this site at the time of writing.[27]
• Taksaz Industrial Innovators Engineering Company (TIECO) Factory, Shams Abad.[28] See above for details.

Khuzestan Province

• Abadan oil refinery, Khuzestan.[29] This is Iran’s largest oil refinery located near the Persian Gulf.[30] The United States Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Abadan Oil Refining Company, located at the Abadan oil refinery, in 2020 for facilitating revenue for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[31]
• Bandar Imam Khomeini Petrochemical Complex, Khuzestan.[32] The IDF struck Iranian defense systems at the Petrochemical Complex.[33] This complex is Iran’s largest petrochemical compound and generates ”millions of tons of petroleum-based products” for exporting purposes annually.[34]
• Bandar Imam Khomeini Port, Khuzestan.[35] The IDF struck the Port adjacent to the Bandar Imam Khomeini Petrochemical Complex. This port serves as a major economic port on the Persian Gulf.
• Ghadir Early Detection Radar, Ahvaz.[36] See above for details.

Ilam Province

• Tang-eh Bijar Gas Field, Ilam.[37] The IDF struck air defense systems at the refinery for the Tang-eh Bijar gas field.[38]

Semnan Province

• IRGC Shahroud Missile Facility / Shahroud Space Center, Semnan. See above for details.

Israeli media reported on October 28 that Israel is planning to retaliate separately against Iran for the October 19 Lebanese Hezbollah drone attack that targeted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[39] Israeli media reported that the IDF strikes into Iran on October 25 were only in response to the large-scale Iranian ballistic missile attack against Israel on October 1 and that Israel is preparing a separate retaliation for the Hezbollah attack that targeted Netanyahu.[40] The Israeli security cabinet reportedly convened for six and a half hours on October 27 to discuss, among other topics, the October 19 Hezbollah attack.[41] An Israeli journalist emphasized that the Israeli response to the October 19 Hezbollah attack “is not expected to be similar” to the Israeli strikes in Iran on October 25.[42]

Hezbollah’s Shura Council appointed Naim Qassem as the new Hezbollah secretary general, on October 29.[43] Qassem replaces former Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, who Israel killed on September 27.[44] Qassem is a founding member of Hezbollah and has been Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general since 1991.[45] Qassem focused on political issues while serving as deputy secretary general but he has assumed a more public-facing role since Nasrallah’s death.[46] Emirati media cited an Iranian source that said that Qassem fled Lebanon on October 5 aboard the Iranian foreign minister’s plane.[47] CTP-ISW is unable to independently confirm this report. The IDF killed Nasrallah’s presumed successor Hashem Safi ed Din on October 3, likely increasing the urgency for Hezbollah and Iran to move possible leaders out of Beirut.[48] The IDF has killed the majority of Hezbollah’s senior leadership by airstrike in Beirut. Qassem is a less popular and charismatic figure than Nasrallah but will likely have success in consolidating internal support to effectively lead the movement due to his long history with the movement.

Qassem’s October 15 speech offers insights into his strategy and vision of the war.[49] Qassem viewed Hezbollah’s war with Israel as existential and said that he believes the United States and Israel seek to shape Lebanon and “run it as they wish.”[50] He also dismissed Israeli claims that Hezbollah fighters are failing to defend against Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon.[51] Qassem indicated that Israel’s ground and air operations have not changed Hezbollah’s willingness to negotiate a political settlement or ceasefire.[52] Qassem announced a new war “phase” designed to inflict high casualties on Israel. Hezbollah has likely implemented this phase, given that it conducted a record number of attacks for the war on October 25 and struck Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's home with a drone.[53] Qassem’s statements suggest that Hezbollah will not temper its goals or military operations under his leadership.

Israeli forces have advanced at least four kilometers into southern Lebanon towards the southeastern outskirts of Khiam.[54] This is the IDF’s deepest advance into Lebanon since ground operations began on October 1. Lebanese media reported that numerous IDF tanks entered Lebanon from near Metula on October 28 and advanced north to Tal al Hamamis and into Khiam’s southeastern outskirts.[55] Geolocated footage also showed an IDF vehicle driving north on the southeastern outskirts of al Khiam on October 29.[56] Lebanese state media reported that Israeli tanks advanced at least six kilometers into Khiam’s outskirts, although CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim.[57] Lebanese sources reported that IDF airstrikes, artillery shelling, and illumination rounds targeted the Khiam area during the IDF’s advance, which would have supported Israeli ground forces’ movements.[58] The IDF 98th and 91st divisions have operated south of Khiam in recent weeks.[59]

Khiam’s terrain provides an expansive view of northern Israel and would enable Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel. Observers can directly view a large swath of territory in the Galilee panhandle, Shebaa Farms, and Golan Heights from Khiam, including several IDF Northern Command bases. Positions in Khiam and on nearby hills could enable Hezbollah artillery observers to direct rocket and mortar attacks into northern Israel. The IDF has likely already seized terrain on Tal al Hamamis, located between Metula and Khiam, which would prevent Hezbollah from using the elevated terrain to conduct direct fire or support indirect fire attacks into the Upper Galilee from there.[60] The IDF began ground operations to eliminate Hezbollah’s ability to conduct indirect fire attacks into northern Israel from positions in Lebanon. The IDF has previously seized hills in southern Lebanon that would enable Hezbollah to direct attacks targeting Israel to this end, including in Maroun al Ras, Mays al Jabal, and Odaisseh.[61]

Hezbollah and Lebanese media reported a high volume of engagements between Hezbollah fighters and Israeli armor advancing towards Khiam.[62] Hezbollah fighters reportedly fired anti-tank guided missiles, rockets, and mortars at Israeli forces advancing in numerous locations, including south, southeast, and southwest of Khiam.[63] A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent also reported that Hezbollah fighters engaged Israeli forces in Khiam’s southern neighborhoods.[64]

Israel and Lebanon are reportedly “in advanced stages” of reaching a ceasefire agreement.[65] Senior Israeli officials speaking to Ynet said on October 29 that the deal would begin with a 60-day “acclimation period” ceasefire during which mediators would consider a “new mechanism” to supervise southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding military infrastructure there.[66] The IDF would withdraw most of its forces from southern Lebanon and only remain in certain areas where it still needs to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure.[67] This deal appears to attempt to more successfully implement UNSCR 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon.[68] To enforce UNSCR 1701 the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would deploy thousands of additional soldiers to southern Lebanon.[69] UNIFIL forces would be increased and bolstered by additional French, German, and British troops.[70] The plan proposes that Israel retains the right to take “prolonged action” in Lebanon to remove Hezbollah threats that Lebanese and international forces fail to address.[71] Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced on October 24 that his government plans to recruit more LAF troops and possibly deploy 8,000 soldiers to southern Lebanon.[72] The agreement would finally include a ban on military imports to Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah from rearming.[73]  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office has previously insisted that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) be allowed to engage in “active enforcement” near the Israel-Lebanon border and to maintain “freedom of operation” in Lebanese airspace.[74] Israeli media did not include Israeli access to Lebanese airspace in their most recent reporting about the proposal.[75]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a security meeting with senior military officials on October 29 to discuss the possible ceasefire terms.[76]  Hezbollah has not commented on the negotiations and has not indicated if it would accept the deal. Hezbollah had previously made stopping its operations against Israeli forces contingent on halting Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[77] Hezbollah’s new Secretary General Naim Qassem indicated on October 8 that the group may be open to a ceasefire that is not linked to the Gaza Strip.[78] A successful implementation of the above ceasefire framework that pushes Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure north of the Litani River would reduce the threat of a Hezbollah October 7–7-style offensive into northern Israel. The terms would likely be insufficient to stop rocket fire into Israel due to the range of Hezbollah’s rocket and missile arsenal, however.[79]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Strike on Iran: The precise nature of the recent Israeli strikes into Iran has partially obscured the serious damage these strikes inflicted on critical Iranian defense and military infrastructure. These strikes could disrupt Iranian ballistic missile production and leave Iran more vulnerable to future strikes, however.
• Israeli Retaliation Against Iran and Hezbollah: Israeli media reported on October 28 that Israel is planning to retaliate separately against Iran for the October 19 Lebanese Hezbollah drone attack that targeted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
• Hezbollah’s New Leader: Hezbollah’s Shura Council appointed Naim Qassem as the new Hezbollah secretary general, on October 29. Qassem’s October 15 speech offers insights into his strategy and vision of the war. Qassem viewed Hezbollah’s war with Israel as existential and said that he believes the United States and Israel seek to shape Lebanon and “run it as they wish.”
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: Israeli forces have advanced at least four kilometers into southern Lebanon towards the southeastern outskirts of Khiam. Khiam’s terrain provides an expansive view of northern Israel and would enable Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel.
• Lebanon Ceasefire: Israel and Lebanon are reportedly “in advanced stages” of reaching a ceasefire agreement. This deal appears to attempt to more successfully implement UNSCR 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon.

Iran Update, October 28, 2024

click here to read the full report

Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Senior Israeli officials stated that Israel’s retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 "severely damaged" Iran's air defense capabilities, which would make Iran more vulnerable to future attacks. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes "severely damaged” Iran’s air defense and missile production capabilities.[1] Unspecified sources within the Israeli defense establishment reported that Israel’s attack destroyed all of Iran’s long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and long-range detection radars, leaving Iran with only domestically produced short-range defense batteries.[2] Western reporting has confirmed damage at a storage unit within the Abadan oil refinery in Khuzestan province and a TIECO oil and gas machinery factory in Tehran province, among others, following the IDF strikes.[3] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant called the strikes on Iran the most significant IDF Air Force operation since the Six-Day War in 1967, emphasizing that their impact represents "a change in the balance of power.”[4] Gallant stated that the damage from the strikes puts Iran at a “huge disadvantage” when it comes to future Israeli attacks.[5]

Unspecified Iranian sources told Israeli media that Israel also targeted and breached Iranian radar systems in Syria before launching its attack on Iran.[6] The sources noted that the radar screens in Iran’s defense systems “froze“ before the IDF strikes.[7] CTP-ISW previously reported that the IDF likely targeted Iran’s early detection network in Syria and Iraq that would have given Iran advanced notice of the incoming Israeli attack.[8]

Constrained Russian manufacturing capacity for new ground-based air defense systems and Russia’s demand for these systems in Ukraine may limit Iran’s ability to acquire new S-300s in the near term. CTP-ISW previously reported that Israeli strikes in Iran have targeted four S-300 air defense systems in Iran.[9] Israeli sources reported that Iran had only four S-300 batteries, suggesting that Iran does not have any functional S-300 batteries right now.[10] The Russian-made S-300 is the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates.

Senior Iranian defense and political officials are downplaying the extent of the strike’s damage while simultaneously threatening a response.[11] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh claimed on October 28 that the Israeli attack caused only “minor” damage that Iran has since repaired.[12]

Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group—killed ten Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers in an attack on a police patrol unit in Taftan County, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 26.[13] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces regional headquarters responsible for Sistan and Baluchistan Province “destroyed” the team responsible for the attack on October 27.[14] The IRGC Ground Forces regional headquarters reported that its forces killed four Jaish al Adl fighters and arrested four additional fighters. IRGC Ground Forces troops injured an unspecified number of fighters as they attempted to withdraw. This activity is part of a general increase in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[15]

Mossad head David Barnea met with CIA Director Bill Burns and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Doha on October 27 and 28 to continue ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[16] Israeli media reported that mediators attempted to combine a “small” Egyptian proposal with a comprehensive, multi-stage US-Qatar settlement.[17] CTP-ISW has not seen the details of this US-Qatar settlement. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi publicly proposed an initial two-day ceasefire in which four Israeli hostages would be exchanged with an unidentified number of Palestinian prisoners.[18] This would be followed by 10 days of further negotiations. Sisi’s proposed plan bears a resemblance to the proposal of Egyptian General Intelligence Service head Hassan Rashad on October 22 for a “small” ceasefire-hostage deal that would facilitate negotiations for a more comprehensive ceasefire-hostage deal.[19] A Palestinian source close to the negotiations told Reuters that Hamas would ”listen” to new offers but remains committed to achieving a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[20] Hamas likely believes that it can survive and recover in the Gaza Strip by waiting out the Israelis, making it unclear why a smaller ceasefire-hostage deal would facilitate successful talks.[21] 

An Israeli source told Israeli media on October 27 that Netanyahu is willing to conclude the IDF operations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon in exchange for a diplomatic resolution that guarantees Israel’s war aims are achieved.[22] Israeli media reported that Israeli officials intend to host a follow-up summit soon to continue negotiations, with the involvement of Egyptian Intelligence chief Hassan Rashad, and potentially Hamas.[23]

Hamas has attempted to coerce Palestinian civilians against leaving the northern Gaza Strip since IDF operations in Jabalia resumed on October 6, including by shooting civilians in the legs. The IDF said that civilian evacuations have taken longer than expected due to Hamas physically preventing Palestinians from leaving the north, including by shooting some civilians in the legs.[24] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson similarly said on October 23 that Hamas is physically assaulting Palestinian civilians evacuating Jabalia to discourage them from evacuating the area.[25] Israeli media reported on October 28 that 50,000 Palestinian civilians from the northern Gaza Strip have evacuated south since the IDF began clearing operations in Jabalia on October 6.[26] The IDF has repeatedly warned civilians to travel to al Mawasi humanitarian zone in the southern Gaza Strip and expanded the humanitarian zone eastward on October 26, likely to accommodate an increased flow of internally displaced Palestinians from the northern Gaza Strip.[27]

The US Treasury Secretary and seven of her foreign counterparts warned Israel that its decision to withhold payments from Israel to the Palestinian Authority risks an economic collapse in the West Bank that would be detrimental to Israeli security interests.[28] Israel must approve an extension to allow Palestinian banks in the West Bank to maintain ties with Israeli banks by October 31. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and seven foreign counterparts wrote a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 25 and warned that Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s decision to not approve the extension may lead to the collapse of the Palestinian economy.[29] Smotrich has threatened to withhold his approval to extend a waiver that allows payments from Israel to the Palestinian Authority for the import of food, water, electricity, and other services in the West Bank.[30] The restriction on the extension would cut Palestinian banks off from over $13 billion in trade with Israel, thus “damaging Israel’s economy and exacerbating an already dire economic situation in the West Bank,” according to the letter.[31] Yellen and her counterparts also added that the collapse of the Palestinian economy would threaten Israeli security interests in the region.[32] Smotrich has so far refused to renew the waiver but has until October 31 to do so.[33] US officials told Axios that the Biden administration recently told Israel that it had determined that Palestinian banks met Smotrich’s conditions for renewal.[34]

A Yemeni journalist reported that five Houthi fighters died in southern Lebanon fighting alongside Hezbollah, suggesting that Houthi fighters are embedded within Hezbollah there.[35] A Yemeni journalist reported on October 26 that five Houthi fighters died in southern Lebanon fighting alongside Hezbollah.[36] The Houthi fighters killed in southern Lebanon are from Saada Governorate in Yemen. Houthis from Saada Governorate are often given preferential treatment due to their close family ties and long-time service within the Houthi movement.[37] Fighters from Saada, given their loyalty, would be the most likely choices for important foreign missions like advising Hezbollah.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Israeli officials stated that Israel’s retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 "severely damaged" Iran's air defense capabilities, which would make Iran more vulnerable to future attacks. Constrained Russian manufacturing capacity for new ground-based air defense systems and Russia’s demand for these systems in Ukraine may limit Iran’s ability to acquire new S-300s in the near term. Some Israeli strikes targeted Iran’s S-300s on October 25.
• Gaza Strip: Mossad head David Barnea met with CIA Director Bill Burns and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Doha on October 27 and 28 to continue ceasefire-hostage negotiations.
• West Bank: The US Treasury Secretary and seven of her foreign counterparts warned Israel that its decision to withhold payments from Israel to the Palestinian Authority risks an economic collapse in the West Bank that would be detrimental to Israeli security interests.
• Yemen: A Yemeni journalist reported that five Houthi fighters died in southern Lebanon fighting alongside Hezbollah, suggesting that Houthi fighters are embedded within Hezbollah there.

 

Iran Update, October 27, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) inflicted serious damage to the Iranian integrated air defense network during its strikes on Iran on October 25. The IDF struck and disabled air defense command-and-control sites and radars, including at some S-300 sites.[1] The S-300 is Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates. The IDF struck three or four S-300 sites, including one at the Imam Khomeini International Airport near Tehran.[2] Three unspecified Iranian officials told the New York Times that the IDF strikes have caused major alarm among Iranian leaders.[3]

Some of the air defense sites that the IDF struck were protecting critical energy infrastructure in western and southwestern Iran. Western media confirmed that IDF struck air defense sites around the Abadan oil refinery, Bandar Imam Khomeini energy complex and port, and the Tang-eh Bijar gas field.[4] Degrading the air defenses around these sites could leave them more vulnerable to future strikes.

CTP-ISW previously reported on how the IDF strikes could also disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and transfer them to partners abroad, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis. The IDF strikes—in addition to targeting air defense sites—hit drone and missile production facilities across Iran.[5] Commercially available satellite imagery revealed significant damage at the Parchin military complex, for example. The Parchin complex is one the most expansive and secretive Iranian missile production facilities. Some of the targets that the IDF targeted at the missile facilities were sophisticated mixing machines used to make solid fuel for advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to attack Israel directly.[6] Iran will likely need months or possible a year or more to acquire new mixing equipment.[7]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said that, despite Israeli efforts to "magnify these actions for its own specific agenda”, it would be “misguided” for Iran to overlook the attacks during a speech in Tehran on October 27.[8] Khamenei emphasized that Iranian officials will “assess and precisely apprehend what needs to be done” to show Israel "who the Iranian people are.” The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry called on October 26 for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council.[9] UN Security Council President Pascale Christine Baeriswyl announced that the council will convene on October 28 to discuss the IDF strikes on Iran.[10]

Hamas has rejected a deal with Israel that would grant Hamas leaders safe passage from the Gaza Strip in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages. Hamas’ rejection indicates that the group has not accepted defeat and calculates that it can survive and recover in the Gaza Strip. Mossad Director David Barnea proposed the deal in a recent meeting with Egyptian officials.[11] Senior Hamas official Khalil al Hayya rejected the proposal and reiterated Hamas’ intent to continue fighting for influence in the Gaza Strip.[12] Hamas is exploiting the lack of a post-war plan for the Gaza Strip by lobbying for the establishment of a national unity government with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Hamas likely calculates that it could slowly coopt and control any unity government with the PA and thereby retain a prominent role in post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas rejecting the deal that would protect its leaders supports CTP-ISW's assessment that the death of Yahya Sinwar is unlikely to prompt a shift in Hamas strategy in the war. Sinwar similarly rejected a deal with Israel that would grant him safety in September 2024.[13] CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Sinwar would almost certainly reject the deal due to his deep commitment to fighting and destroying Israel.[14] Hamas will likely continue to engage in ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Israel in order to secure its maximalist demands, such as the IDF withdrawing completely from the Gaza Strip. Hamas officials and international negotiators are currently in Doha for further talks.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The IDF inflicted serious damage to the Iranian integrated air defense network in its strikes on October 25. This is in addition to the disruption that the IDF may have imposed on the Iranian ability to build missiles.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas rejected a deal with Israel that would grant Hamas leaders safe passage from the Gaza Strip in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages. Hamas’ rejection indicates that the group has not accepted defeat and calculates that it can survive and recover from the war.

Iran Update, October 26, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted three waves of strikes into Iran on October 25. The strikes were in response to the large-scale ballistic missile attack that Iran launched against Israel on October 1. The IDF targeted around 20 locations around Tehran and western Iran, including vital air defense assets and facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs.[1]  The IDF in particular struck four S-300 air defense batteries, which are Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates.[2] That the IDF hit these batteries highlights the relative vulnerabilities of the S-300, especially against advanced platforms like the F-35 fighter jet. The IDF separately struck prominent defense industrial sites, such as the Parchin and Khojir complexes outside Tehran.[3] These complexes are managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry. The regime uses these facilities to develop and manufacture advanced weapons systems, including solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Iran has used the Parchin complex previously for high explosives testing in support of its nuclear weapons program.[4] International inspectors found traces of uranium there in 2015, indicating that a larger quantity of uranium was there at some point, despite Iranian officials denying that the complex was involved in nuclear activities.[5] Although there are no known nuclear activities currently at the Parchin and Khojir complexes, the IDF strikes could impede Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, given the role that these complexes could play in building a delivery system.

The IDF strikes could also disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and send some to its partners, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Three unspecified Israeli sources told Axios that the IDF targeted sophisticated mixing equipment used to make solid fuel for advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to attack Israel directly.[6] Commercially available satellite imagery confirmed that the IDF destroyed several buildings at the Parchin and Khojir complexes. The imagery shows no signs of secondary explosions, which is consistent with the IDF targeting industrial mixers rather than weapons storage facilities. The IDF strike on the Khojir complex comes after the regime began expanding the facilities there in August 2023 in order to increase the Iranian capacity to build missiles.[7] The Israeli sources speaking to Axios said that Iran will need to buy new mixers from China.[8] Doing so could take months or possibly a year or more, hampering the Iranian ability to replenish its missile stockpiles and those of its allies in the Axis of Resistance.

The IDF struck several locations in Iraq and Syria immediately before launching strikes into Iran.[9] The IDF was likely targeting early warning radars and sensors that would have given Iran advanced notice of the incoming Israeli attack. Iran has in recent years worked to build an early detection network across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in order to better defend against Israeli airstrikes.

Iranian officials and state media have downplayed the amount of damage that the IDF inflicted. The regime boasted that it prevented IDF aircraft from entering Iranian airspace and that the strikes caused only limited damage. The strikes did kill four Artesh officers, however, presumably at the air defense sites that the IDF struck.[10] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry responded to the IDF strikes saying that Iran has the ”right and duty to defend itself against foreign acts of aggression.”[11]

A new Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia announced its existence on October 25.[12] The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques claimed that it launched a drone attack targeting an unspecified ”vital site” in Israel. The naming of the group appears inspired by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that has conducted regular drone and missile attacks on Israel in recent months. The IDF has not commented on the claimed drone attack at the time of this writing.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The IDF conducted three waves of strikes in Iran targeting air defenses and facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs. These strikes could disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and send some to its partners, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis.
• Saudi Arabia: A new Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia announced its existence. The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques claimed that it fired a drone toward Israel.
• Lebanon: The IDF destroyed a large underground Lebanese Hezbollah complex in southeastern Lebanon. The location, size, sophistication, and structure of the complex suggested that it was meant for offensive operations against Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 162nd Division reportedly continued operations around Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on October 26. A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles northwest of Jabalia and within Jabalia camp.[13] Palestinian militias conducted multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces around Jabalia on October 26, including Hamas detonating a rigged house north of Jabalia refugee camp.[14] Hamas claimed to kill and wound Israeli forces in this attack.[15]

Palestinian militias claimed to have conducted two attacks targeting IDF command-and-control sites around the Netzarim Corridor since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 25.[16] The IDF 252nd Division operates around the Netzarim Corridor.[17]

The IDF expanded al Mawasi humanitarian zone eastward on October 26.[18] The IDF has repeatedly released evacuation orders for Palestinian civilians in Jabalia and the surrounding areas, telling residents to travel south to al Mawasi humanitarian zone.[19] The IDF continues to operate in the northern Gaza Strip since it launched a new clearing operation into Jabalia refugee camp on October 6 in order to disrupt Hamas reconstitution efforts.[20]

The IDF 252nd Division destroyed Palestinian militia infrastructure and killed Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on October 26.[21] The 5th Brigade (252nd Division) directed an airstrike to destroy a militia observation post.[22] The strike caused secondary explosions, indicating the presence of munitions at the site. The 454th Fire Brigade (252nd Division) separately directed a strike that destroyed an observation post and a weapons depot.[23] A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles around Nuseirat and Bureij refugee camps.[24] The National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli personnel and vehicles southeast of al Bureij camp.[25]

The IDF 933rd Brigade (143^rd Division) continued operations in Rafah on October 26.[26] Israeli forces destroyed Palestinian militia infrastructure and killed Palestinian fighters. Israeli forces also located a rocket-propelled grenade launcher.[27] A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from IDF vehicles west of Rafah on October 25 and 26.[28]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces killed local Hamas commander in Tulkarm, Islam Jamil Odeh, on October 25.[29] Israeli forces surrounded Odeh in a building and used a “pressure cooker“ tactic to force him out.[30] Odeh opened fire on Israeli forces before he was killed.[31] The IDF identified weapons in his vehicle, including materials for assembling explosives.[32] Odeh assumed command of Hamas in Tulkarm after the IDF struck and killed his predecessor, Zaher Yasser Aoufi, on October 4.[33] Odeh was responsible for planning attacks, including attacks planned for the anniversary of October 7.[34] A Hamas official and other Tulkarm militias mourned Odeh’s death.[35]

Palestinian fighters have attacked Israeli forces in at least three locations in Tulkarm since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on October 25.[36] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting Israeli soldiers in Tulkarm.[37]

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Israeli forces destroyed a “strategic” underground Hezbollah complex in Rab el Thalathine, southeastern Lebanon, on October 26.[38] The IDF 98th Division and Yahalom Engineering Unit used 400 tons of explosives to destroy the “largest” Hezbollah complex ever found in southern Lebanon.[39] The detonation triggered earthquake alerts across northern Israel.[40] Israeli forces spent two weeks securing the area and mapping the complex.[41] The tunnel had weapons and supplies for hundreds of Hezbollah militants.[42] IDF officers at the complex said that they encountered some resistance from Hezbollah militants guarding the complex in the first two days of operations.[43] Hezbollah and local sources have reported consistent engagements with Israeli forces in Rab el Thalathine but few were close quarters combat.[44]

Hezbollah likely built the compound in Rab el Thalathine for offensive operations against Israel. Hezbollah had built the over one-and-a-half-kilometer-long complex over the past 15 years.[45] The complex had rooms large enough for a company of Radwan special operations forces (SOF) to gather and receive orders.[46] The size, sophistication, and supply stocks in the compound—coupled with its very close proximity to the Israel-Lebanon border—suggest that Hezbollah could have used this tunnel in its planned ”Conquer the Galilee” ground attack into Israel.[47] Hezbollah planned for “Conquer the Galilee” to be a similar offensive to Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack and to target northern Israeli towns.[48] The compound is about five kilometers from the over 20,000 Israelis living in Kiryat Shmona and would have allowed Hezbollah militants to rapidly mobilize and launch an attack against the town and surrounding areas. 

The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon. The 98th Division directed strikes on Hezbollah military buildings, militants, and anti-tank missile firing sites.[49] Division forces also located several rocket launchers aimed and primed for launch at northern Israel.[50] Hezbollah has claimed at least two attacks targeting Israeli forces in the 98th Division’s area of operations in southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on October 25.[51]  

The IDF 91st Division continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon. The 91st Division engaged Hezbollah militants and seized weapons, including four loaded rocket launchers mounted on trucks capable of firing 160 rockets into Israel.[52] The IDF 288th Infantry Division (Res.) directed strikes on a Hezbollah squad operating from a munitions warehouse.[53]

The IDF 146th Division continued clearing operations in southwestern Lebanon on October 25. The 146th Division killed several Hezbollah militants in ground and air engagements.[54] Hezbollah claimed that it fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in Ras Naqoura.[55]

The IDF continued its air campaign to targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leaders on October 26. The IDF Air Force struck over 70 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon, including anti-tank positions, ammunition depots, and military headquarters.[56] The IDF Air Force struck multiple weapons manufacturing sites and the headquarters of Hezbollah’s intelligence division in southern Beirut.[57] The IDF issued warnings to residents of Burj al Barajneh and Haret Hreik to evacuate at least 500 meters from Hezbollah infrastructure prior to attacking the area.[58] The IDF also struck a Hezbollah air defense cell that had launched a missile targeting an Israeli drone near Kfar Fila, north of the Litani River.[59]

Hezbollah has conducted at least 25 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 25.[60] Hezbollah conducted four drone and rocket attacks into central and northern Israel under its ”Khaybar“ campaign, which is meant to respond to Israel killing Hassan Nasrallah.[61] Khaybar operations often target deeper and more militarily significant sites in Israel, such as Tel Nof Airbase near Tel Aviv.[62]Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces along the Israel-Lebanon border in eight separate incidents.[63]  Hezbollah claimed a record of 48 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Lebanon and sites in Israel on October 25.[64]

Hezbollah told the residents of 25 northern Israeli towns and cities to evacuate “immediately.”[65] Hezbollah stated that the towns had become legitimate targets for attacks due to the presence of Israeli soldiers there staging operations into Lebanon.[66] Israel has repeatedly issued similar evacuation notices for Lebanese residents ahead of airstrikes.[67] Hezbollah has expanded its target list over the past month to include these towns and regularly fires drones and rockets at these civilians areas.[68] These towns are outside Israel’s closed military zones and do not border Lebanon.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed one attack targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 25. The group claimed to launch a one-way attack drone targeting an unspecified military site in Acre.[69] The group added that it would attack Israel at an ”escalating pace.”

Iran Update, October 25, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Anthony Carillo, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Note: CTP-ISW is tracking early reports that Israel has launched airstrikes in Iran in retaliation for the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1. CTP-ISW will continue to track these developments and report on them further in the coming days.

Four unspecified Iranian officials outlined to Western media how Tehran could retaliate in response to an Israeli strike on Iran.[1] These comments were likely an information operation meant to coerce Israel into limiting its strike on Iran. The Iranian officials, which included two Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officers, told the New York Times that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the Iranian armed forces to develop multiple retaliatory options.[2] The officials claimed that if Israel inflicts “major harm,” such as by targeting energy and nuclear infrastructure or senior Iranian officials, the retaliatory options would include firing as many as 1,000 ballistic missiles at Israel, increasing Iranian-backed militia attacks across the Middle East, and disrupting commercial traffic in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.[3] The threat against global shipping comes as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have threatened to start an “energy war” in the Middle East.[4] The Iranian officials also claimed that Tehran could refrain from retaliating if Israel only strikes military targets—rather than energy or nuclear infrastructure or senior Iranian officials.[5]

US Air Force F-16s from the 480th Fighter Squadron arrived in the Middle East on October 25.[6]

Two unspecified Hamas officials claimed that Hamas will replace its leader, Yahya Sinwar, with a five-person committee based in Doha.[7] The committee was reportedly formed after Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024. The committee was meant to facilitate decision-making when Sinwar was out of contact in the Gaza Strip, which happened regularly. The committee is led by Khalil al Hayya, who represents Hamas in the Gaza Strip on the committee. The committee also includes Zaher Jabarin, who represents the West Bank, Khaled Meshal, who represents the Palestinian diaspora, Mohammad Darwish, who is the Hamas Shura Council head, and the secretary of the Hamas Political Bureau, whose identity is unknown.

Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist demands for a ceasefire-hostage agreement with Israel on October 24, reflecting how Hamas's strategy is unlikely to change significantly following the death of Sinwar.[8] Hayya discussed the maximalist demands in a meeting with Egyptian intelligence director Hassan Mahmoud Rashad. The meeting comes as Egypt proposed a new “small” ceasefire-hostage deal that would require Hamas to release a “small” number of Israeli hostages for a “few” days ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[9]

Russia has provided the Houthis with targeting intelligence to support their attacks targeting international shipping, according to the Wall Street Journal.[10] The IRGC reportedly facilitated the transfer of the intelligence to the Houthis at some unspecified point in 2024, helping the Houthis to target vessels that had deactivated their radio signals. The US Maritime Administration in March 2024 advised vessels to deactivate their radios when transiting near Yemen in order to protect themselves from Houthi attacks.[11] Iran has separately tried to broker a deal between Russia and the Houthis that would transfer Russian anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis, further enabling attacks on international shipping.[12] There is no evidence that Russia has sent missiles to the Houthis at this time, however, according to the Wall Street Journal.[13]

Lebanese Hezbollah has killed nine Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers in southern Lebanon since October 24.[14] The IDF 2nd Carmeli Brigade (Res.) (146th Division) encountered Hezbollah militants during clearing operations in a forested area in southwestern Lebanon on October 24.[15] The Hezbollah militants emerged from a tunnel shaft and threw grenades at Israeli forces.[16] Hezbollah killed four reservist soldiers in an exchange of fire and injured six others.[17] The IDF assessed that the Hezbollah militants were also killed in the exchange.[18] The IDF has continued to encounter and directly engage Hezbollah forces, typically in small groups of fighters, during clearing operations.[19] Hezbollah also conducted an indirect fire attack and killed five reservists from the 8th Armored Brigade (91st Division).[20] Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah launched a barrage of rockets targeting an area near a building where 8th Armored Brigade soldiers were staying.[21] An IDF logistics convoy unit was also present in the building.[22] The attack injured 24 other IDF soldiers.[23] Hezbollah has primarily targeted Israeli forces in southern Lebanon with indirect fire.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Four unspecified Iranian officials outlined to Western media how Tehran could retaliate in response to an Israeli strike on Iran.
• Hamas: Two unspecified Hamas officials claimed that Hamas will replace its leader, Yahya Sinwar, with a five-person committee based in Doha.
• Houthis: Russia has provided the Houthis with targeting intelligence to support their attacks targeting international shipping, according to the Wall Street Journal.
  

Iran Update, October 24, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hamas is seeking Russian support in pressuring the Palestinian Authority (PA) to negotiate over a national unity government with Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[1] Hamas Political Bureau member Mousa Abu Marzouk met with Deputy Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow on October 23 to request that Russia pressure PA President Mahmoud Abbas to negotiate with Hamas over a national unity government.

Hamas is likely responding to the Emirati-proposed plan for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.[2] The plan would involve appointing a reformed PA led by an independent prime minister to administer the Gaza Strip, leaving Hamas excluded from post-war governance. Negotiating a national unity government with the PA, on the other hand, would allow Hamas to retain a role in post-war governance. Hamas would likely exploit the establishment of a national unity government to gradually expand its control and influence in the Gaza Strip.

US and Israeli officials will resume negotiations in Qatar on a ceasefire-hostage agreement for the Gaza Strip in the coming days.[3] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Qatari Foreign Affairs Minister Mohamad bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced the plans on October 24. Al Thani added that Qatar has reengaged Hamas since Israel killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.[4] A Hamas delegation separately traveled to Egypt on October 24.[5] Senior Hamas official Khalil al Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist negotiating position on October 18.[6]

PA President Mahmoud Abbas has “poured” forces into Tubas in the West Bank in recent weeks in order to crack down on the Palestinian militias there.[7] This PA effort is meant to diminish the influence of the militias in the northern West Bank in response to Iranian efforts to empower the militias and undermine the PA. PA forces have arrested at least three Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters in Tubas during this period.[8] Residents have reported violent clashes between PA forces and militias there in recent weeks as well.[9] Palestinian militias, including Hamas and PIJ, have accused the PA of serving Israeli interests and called on militants to confront the PA forces in Tubas.[10] The PA operation into Tubas came as Israeli forces conducted their own campaign in August and September 2024 to degrade Palestinian militia across the West Bank in recent months.[11]

Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said that all relevant parties have fully implemented UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon. Berri’s assertion ignores the extensive, decades-long Hezbollah efforts to entrench itself militarily in southern Lebanon. CTP-ISW has previously argued that the UN Interim Force in Lebanon has largely failed to undertake its assigned tasks, which includes enforcing UNSCR 1701.[12] Berri reportedly made the assertion that all relevant parties are adhering to UNSCR 1701 during a meeting with senior US official Amos Hochstein in Beirut on October 21.[13] Hochstein has reportedly suggested amending UNSCR 1701 by expanding the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to southern Lebanon.

Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati separately announced on October 24 that his government plans to recruit more LAF troops and possibly deploy 8,000 soldiers to southern Lebanon.[14] The LAF currently has about 5,000 personnel in southern Lebanon.[15] It is unclear whether the 8,000 number is the envisioned end strength for the LAF in southern Lebanon or would be in addition to the 5,000 soldiers already there. Increasing the LAF force size is unlikely to improve the enforcement of UNSCR 1701, however, so long as the Lebanese state and LAF are unwilling to prevent Hezbollah activity in the area.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Hamas is seeking Russian support in pressuring the PA to negotiate over a national unity government with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is responding to an Emirati-proposed plan for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, which would marginalize Hamas.
• Gaza Strip: US and Israeli officials will resume negotiations in Qatar on a ceasefire-hostage agreement for the Gaza Strip in the coming days. Qatar has reengaged Hamas since Israel killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.
• West Bank: PA President Mahmoud Abbas has “poured” forces into Tubas in the West Bank to crack down on Iranian-backed militias there. The PA effort is meant to diminish the influence of the militias in the northern West Bank.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said that all relevant parties are adhering to UNSCR 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah activity in southern Lebanon. Berri ignored the decades-long Hezbollah efforts to entrench itself militarily there.

Iran Update, October 23, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Annika Ganzeveld, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23.[1] Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Russo-Iranian economic and strategic relations on the sidelines of the summit.[2] Pezeshkian stated that the two officials will finalize and sign memorandums soon, suggesting that both states will sign the new comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.[3] Putin authorized the signing of the deal on September 18.[4]

It is within Iran’s interests to have a formalized agreement with Russia. Iran presumably will seek greater international support as Israel’s ground and air offensives on the Gaza Strip and Lebanon have disrupted some elements of Iran’s proxy network. This is particularly notable given that Hezbollah’s capabilities—which now appear disrupted by Israeli action at a minimum—have long served as Iran’s principal deterrence against Israeli attack.[5] Russia has discouraged Israeli attack on nuclear facilities, demonstrating the advantages of strong Iranian relations with Russia.[6] The Pezeshkian administration’s policy continues former President Ebrahim Raisi’s “neighborhood policy.” This policy is centered on building relations with regional and extra-regional states, thus demonstrating the administration’s efforts to mitigate the impact of international sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy. The regime calculates that mitigating the impact of sanctions increases domestic stability and regime credibility.[7] Russo-Iranian cooperation has accelerated since the start of Russia’s offensive campaign in Ukraine due to Iran’s military support in the war.

Pezeshkian also met with PRC President Xi Jinping on October 23.[8] This meeting’s details are not publicly available, but the officials probably discussed regional developments and growing Sino-Iranian strategic partnership, including Iranian oil exports to the PRC.[9] Iranian Energy minister Abbas Aliabadi separately discussed trade and foreign capital investment with member countries of the Belt and Road Forum in Qingdao, China.[10]

Pezeshkian emphasized the need for BRICS countries to pursue economic cooperation that undermine the US dollar, almost certainly to achieve Iran’s economic goal of mitigating international sanctions on the Iranian economy through its neighborhood policy.[11] It is unlikely that Pezeshkian’s conversations with Putin and Xi Jinping will result in BRICS taking any tangible steps to undermine the US dollar in the near future. Russian and Iranian officials have used this de-dollarization rhetoric before, but this rhetoric has historically not resulted in any tangible movement against the dollar.[12] Pezeshkian underlined the urgency in which BRICS countries need to create an integrated trade system with new mechanisms and technologies, which is a reference to an alternative to the SWIFT international messaging system, as proposals in his speech at the summit.[13] Pezeshkian explicitly stated that these would address sanctions and prevent future sanctions and even to counter the US dollar.[14]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed the death of Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut on October 3.[15] Safi ed Din was leader of Hezbollah’s executive council and a member of Hezbollah’s political-military Shura Council.[16] Hezbollah confirmed his death on October 23, several hours after Israel released its statement.[17] Hezbollah similarly only confirmed the deaths of other senior Hezbollah leaders, like Hassan Nasrallah and Fuad Shukr, after Israel confirmed their deaths.[18] Israeli officials, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have alluded to Safi ed Din’s death over the past three weeks.[19] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi accused Hezbollah of hiding the deaths of top commanders on October 18.[20]

Hashem Safi ed Din’s confirmed death will impact Hezbollah’s political succession but will not further affect Hezbollah’s immediate tactical decisions. Safi ed Din was dead for 20 days before both sides formally acknowledged his fate, meaning Hezbollah leadership has very likely recovered from the initial disorder caused by Safi ed Din’s death and adapted to his absence.[21] Safi ed Din was very well positioned to take over control of Hezbollah from Nasrallah given the IDF reports that Safi ed Din “carried out [Nasrallah’s] duties” when Nasrallah was outside of the Lebanon or out of communication.[22] Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem said on October 8 that Hezbollah would wait to appoint a new Secretary General but that there is not a leadership vacuum.[23] Another Hezbollah leader said that the group had a “joint command in place.”[24]

The IDF confirmed that it killed several other high-level Hezbollah commanders in the October 3 strike in Beirut. The IDF said that over 25 Hezbollah intelligence personnel were present in the underground bunker during the strike.[25] Several senior Hezbollah intelligence officers died in the strike, including Hezbollah’s aerial intelligence collection leader and intelligence head in Syria.[26] The overall chief of Hezbollah’s intelligence staff, Ali Hussein Hazima, also died in the strike.[27] The deaths of Hezbollah’s top intelligence officers were more likely to have an immediate impact on Hezbollah’s operations in southern Lebanon and northern Israel than Safi ed Din’s death, though Hezbollah has presumably adapted to the loss of these leaders. Safi ed Din’s death will have ramifications for Hezbollah’s long-term trajectory, however.

The 146th Division continued to locate and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and weapons during clearing operations in Marwahin, southwestern Lebanon on October 23.[28] The 205th Armored Brigade (Res.) located a large cache of weapons inside a mosque. The IDF reported that the cache of weapons included long-range sniper equipment, night vision goggles, rocket-propelled grenades, various grenade launchers, shoulder-fired missiles, and Kornet missiles.

Hezbollah fighters, if they had withdrawn from the area in an orderly fashion, would have presumably withdrawn with high-end weapons systems like Kornets and equipment like night vision goggles. This suggests that Hezbollah fighters—rather than seeking to delay Israeli forces in an organized fashion by slowly withdrawing—instead fled their positions. CTP-ISW noted on October 10 that Hezbollah fighters do not appear to be defending against Israeli forces in these villages, as the Israeli forces have consistently encountered weapons caches and infrastructure formerly used by Hezbollah fighters that ”left the area.”[29] CTP-ISW assessed that the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon has likely severely disrupted the strategic- and operational-level military leadership in Hezbollah and impeded Hezbollah‘s ability to conduct and sustain coherent military campaigns at least in the short term.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23. Pezeshkian emphasized the need for BRICS countries to pursue economic cooperation that undermine the US dollar, almost certainly to achieve Iran’s economic goal of mitigating international sanctions on the Iranian economy through its neighborhood policy.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed the death of Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut on October 3. Hashem Safi ed Din’s confirmed death will impact Hezbollah’s political succession but will not further affect Hezbollah’s immediate tactical decisions. The IDF confirmed that it killed several other high level Hezbollah commanders in the October 4 strike in Beirut.
• Israeli Ground Operation in Lebanon: An IDF armored brigade captured a large stock of high-end Hezbollah equipment, including night vision goggles and Kornet missiles, in southwestern Lebanon. Hezbollah fighters, if they had withdrawn from the area in an orderly fashion, would have presumably withdrawn with high-end weapons systems like Kornets and equipment like night vision goggles. This suggests that Hezbollah fighters—rather than seeking to delay Israeli forces in an organized fashion by slowly executing an orderly delay—instead fled their positions.

Iran Update, October 22, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

A senior Israeli intelligence official told Iranian anti-regime media that Israel’s recent operations in Lebanon have disrupted Iran’s ability to provide funds to Hezbollah.[1] The source stated that Israeli operations targeting key Hezbollah leadership and the Israeli air campaign have significantly disrupted Hezbollah funding. The official stated that Iran used Syria as a conduit to provide Hezbollah with $50 million in cash each month prior to the start of the Israeli operations in Lebanon. IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari stated that Iran transfers money to Hezbollah through the transfer of oil and money from Iran to Syria through Hezbollah’s Unit 4400.[2] Hezbollah Unit 4400 is responsible for the transfer of funds and weapons from Iran to Hezbollah.[3] Israel killed the commander of Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, and his subsequent replacement on October 1 and October 21.[4] This report follows recent IDF airstrikes targeting branches of a Hezbollah-affiliated financial institution in Beirut in recent days.[5]

Hezbollah’s chief media official said that Hezbollah is attempting to capture Israeli soldiers.[6] The spokesperson noted in a press conference on October 22 that Hezbollah fighters had come “close” to seizing Israeli soldiers over the past several days but had not yet succeeded.[7] Hezbollah has a long history of taking Israeli soldiers prisoner to exchange for Hezbollah fighters held by Israel.[8] The spokesperson confirmed that Israel had detained Hezbollah fighters since beginning operations in southern Lebanon.[9] The IDF said that it has detained many Radwan fighters and has published clips of their testimony, including statements from fighters that many Hezbollah fighters fled southern Lebanon after Hassan Nasrallah’s death.[10] The Hezbollah official said that “after the war there will be indirect negotiations to recover our prisoners,” suggesting that Hezbollah wants to capture Israeli soldiers for future negotiations.[11]

Hezbollah’s chief media official also noted that Hezbollah had increased the pace of offensive and defensive operations against Israel.[12] Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem said on October 15 that Hezbollah would initiate a new phase of the war designed to inflict high casualties on Israel.[13] Hezbollah’s Operations Room also noted on October 17 that Hezbollah would “escalate” its attacks in the coming days.[14] Hezbollah has since expanded the scope and pace of operations into Israel, including by targeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s home in Tel Aviv with an attack drone on October 19.[15] Hezbollah has consistently claimed ground engagements in southern Lebanon at a higher rate since the first week of Israeli ground operations, although this may be a result of increased proximity between Israeli and Hezbollah forces as Israeli forces operate in additional areas of southern Lebanon.[16]  Hezbollah has conducted at least 39 attacks on Israeli forces, towns, and air assets over the past day.[17] Hezbollah officials have consistently argued that Hezbollah command, control, and logistical networks have returned to full operational capacity after being degraded by Israel’s air campaign in late September 2024.[18]

Hezbollah formally claimed responsibility for the October 19 drone attack on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Caesarea, Israel.[19] Hezbollah took “full and sole responsibility” for the attack.[20]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on October 22.[21] Blinken urged Netanyahu to “capitalize” on Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death to secure a ceasefire and hostage release deal in the Gaza Strip.[22] Blinken and Netanyahu also discussed ongoing diplomatic efforts to end the fighting in Lebanon and enable civilians to return to their homes along the border.[23] 

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi obliquely threatened Arab states hosting US forces on October 21, which is probably an attempt to pressure Arab states to discourage the United States from using its forces in the region to support an Israeli retaliation against Iran. Araghchi said that the Iranian military is monitoring all US troop movements on the ground and air regionally.[24] Araghchi’s warning probably seeks to pressure Arab states to discourage the United States from using its forces based in Arab countries to support Israeli retaliation against Iran and Israeli defense against Iranian attacks. This effort also supports Iran’s larger grand strategic objective of expelling US forces from the Middle East by subtly prodding these countries to constrain US efforts in the region. Araghchi also met with Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa and Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al Zayani in Manama, Bahrain, on October 21.[25] Araghchi met with Kuwaiti Prince Sheikh Sabah Khaled al Hammad al Dabah and Foreign Minister Abdullah Ali al Hiyaya in Kuwait City on October 22.[26] Araghchi warned during a press conference in Kuwait that Israel knows what Iran can do in response if Israel attacks Iran’s critical infrastructure.[27]

The Israeli Police arrested seven individuals in East Jerusalem on October 22 on suspicion of planning and supporting attacks for Iran.[28] The Shin Bet and Israeli Police stated in a joint statement that Iran directed the suspects to assassinate a senior Israeli nuclear scientist and the mayor of an undisclosed large city in central Israel.[29] Iran also instructed the individuals to photograph various undisclosed locations, vandalize sites in Jerusalem, and post graffiti calling for the release of the Hamas-held Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip. This is likely part of an Iranian effort to sow division in Israeli society and increase pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The joint statement confirmed that Israeli security forces arrested the 23-year-old “leader of the ring” who had recruited the six additional members.[30] A security official stated that the seven individuals worked as an “organized cell.”[31] Six of the suspects are Israeli citizens, and the seventh suspect is an Israeli permanent resident.

This report comes one day after Israeli authorities arrested a separate Iranian spy network comprised of seven Israeli citizens who were given “hundreds of tasks” including observing Israeli military facilities.[32] Israeli police arrested an Israeli citizen in September accused of participating in an Iranian plot to assassinate Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[33] Israeli media reported that this is the fifth public case of Iranian espionage attempts in Israel in the past month.[34]

Geolocated imagery posted on October 21 showed Israeli forces evacuating Palestinians from and distributing water in the area surrounding a former UNRWA medical clinic in northern Jabalia.[35]  The 460th Armored Brigade (162nd Division) engaged Palestinian fighters on October 14 who used the former UNRWA medical facility as a weapons storage and base of operations.[36] The IDF reported that it detained Palestinian fighters who were attempting to retreat south by hiding among civilians as they evacuated south.[37] The IDF reported that ”thousands” of civilians were evacuated from the area south to Gaza City.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Air Campaign: A senior Israeli intelligence official told Iranian anti-regime media that Israel’s recent operations in Lebanon have disrupted Iran’s ability to provide funds to Hezbollah.
• Hezbollah Operations in Lebanon: Hezbollah’s chief media official said that Hezbollah is attempting to capture Israeli soldiers. The Hezbollah official said that "after the war there will be indirect negotiations to recover our prisoners,” suggesting that Hezbollah wants to capture Israeli soldiers for future negotiations. Hezbollah’s chief media official also noted that Hezbollah had increased the pace of offensive and defensive operations against Israel.
• Blinken’s Regional Visit: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on October 22.
• Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi obliquely threatened Arab states hosting US forces on October 21, which is probably an attempt to pressure Arab states to discourage the United States from using its forces in the region to support an Israeli retaliation against Iran.
• Iranian Intelligence Efforts in Israel: The Israeli Police arrested seven individuals in East Jerusalem on October 22 on suspicion of planning and supporting attacks for Iran.
• Gaza Strip: Geolocated imagery posted on October 21 showed Israeli forces evacuating Palestinians from and distributing water in the area surrounding a former UNRWA medical clinic in northern Jabalia.

 

Iran Update, October 21, 2024

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Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Anthony Carrillo, Kyle Moran, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office recently gave US officials a document detailing Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire and diplomatic solution to end the war with Hezbollah. Axios reported that Israel insisted that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) be allowed to engage in “active enforcement” to prevent Hezbollah from rearming and rebuilding infrastructure near the Israel-Lebanon border.[1] Israel also demanded that the IDF Air Force enjoy “freedom of operation” in Lebanese airspace.[2] US special envoy Amos Hochstein arrived in Beirut on October 21 to discuss Israel’s conditions with senior Lebanese officials.[3]

Lebanon, the United Nations, and the international community are highly unlikely to accept any Israeli conditions that would allow for continued Israeli operations in Lebanese territory, according to US officials.[4] Hezbollah is equally unlikely to accept these conditions, and Hezbollah leadership has previously indicated that it remains unwilling to agree to a separate deal that does not include an end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[5] This would rule out an agreement to return to UNSC Resolution 1701 without a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[6] An unspecified Israeli official said that Israel’s conditions resemble UN Resolution 1701 with “increased enforcement.”[7]

UNIFIL has largely failed to undertake the tasks given to it under its mandate. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and to “take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities, which would include Hezbollah‘s extensive development of military infrastructure.[8] CTP-ISW has previously stated that Netanyahu’s demand to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament are provisions that are already in part enshrined in UN Resolution 1701 and should have been enforced by UNIFIL.[9] UNIFIL has failed to execute this mandate and prevent Hezbollah from re-establishing military infrastructure south of the Litani River. US officials, such as Amos Hochstein, have reportedly expressed interest in amending UN Resolution 1701 by expanding the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in southern Lebanon.[10] Increasing the LAF’s force size is unlikely to enable the LAF to better enforce UN Resolution 1701, however, if Lebanese soldiers and their government (of which Hezbollah is a part) are unwilling to prevent Hezbollah fighters from operating in the area.

The IDF is attempting to erode the Lebanese Shia community’s support for Hezbollah by targeting a Hezbollah-affiliated financial institution in Lebanon. The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting at least nine branches of al Qard al Hassan in Beirut’s southern suburbs and across Lebanon on October 20.[11] Al Qard al Hassan is one of Hezbollah’s main financial assets in Lebanon, providing financial services such as loans or ATM deposits and withdrawals to over 300,000 members of Lebanon‘s Shia population.[12] Israeli Army Radio reported that al Qard al Hassan also manages Hezbollah’s banking system, including its payroll for Hezbollah fighters.[13] Al Qard al Hassan reportedly receives direct funding from Iran.[14] Lebanese sources reported that the IDF targeted al Qard al Hassan branches in Laylaki, Chiyah, and Burj al Barajneh in Beirut’s southern suburbs and in Nabatieh, Tyre, Shehabieh, Baalbek, Hermel, and Rayak, in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.[15] An unspecified senior Israeli official said that the objective of Israel’s ”broad wave of attacks” targeting al Qard al Hassan is to undermine Hezbollah’s economic stability and erode the trust that the Lebanese Shia community, including Hezbollah’s rank-and-file, holds in Hezbollah.[16] This will degrade Hezbollah’s ability to function during the war and ability to “rebuild and rearm on the day after,” according to the Israeli official.[17] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has previously expressed that Israel seeks to obtain a postwar agreement that would prevent Hezbollah from reorganizing and rearming and from continuing to threaten Israel in the long term.[18]

The IDF’s effort to erode the Shia population’s trust in Hezbollah is consistent with previous Israeli efforts to do so. Netanyahu recently asked the Lebanese people to “take back [their] country” from Hezbollah, for example.[19] It is unclear at this time if this strategy has successfully diminished public support for Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a senior member of Lebanese Hezbollah’s financial system in Damascus, Syria, on October 21.[20] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari stated that the IDF targeted the head of Hezbollah’s financial arm responsible for “funneling cash from Iran to Hezbollah.”[21] Hagari did not state the specific individual’s name or position but stated that the individual had only been in the position for a “few weeks since his predecessor was killed.”  IDF has conducted various strikes targeting the Hezbollah financial system in Lebanon in recent days. Syrian state media stated that the airstrike killed at least two people.[22]

Military officials assessed that IDF operations have destroyed around two-thirds of Hezbollah’s rocket capabilities since the IDF began ground operations on September 30.[23] The IDF Northern Command said that Hezbollah continues to fire from its ”residual rocket capabilities” but that this is not ”significant” fire.[24] The IDF air campaign has concentrated its efforts on targeting Hezbollah rocket assets and weapons stockpiles. Degrading Hezbollah’s rocket assets is a necessary step to remove the threat that Hezbollah poses to northern Israeli towns. Hezbollah has continued to fire large barrages of daily rockets into northern and central Israel despite IDF operations targeting its rocket capabilities, however.[25] Hezbollah launched over 170 rockets on October 20, for example.[26] An Israeli think tank reported that Hezbollah’s daily average of fire into Israel is four times greater than the daily average before Israel’s ground operations.[27]

Israeli military officials indicated that the IDF expects to finish its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon within a few weeks and would soon achieve the conditions to return northern residents to their homes.[28] Israeli forces have raided and seized terrain in border towns and areas over the past three weeks to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks and ground attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north.[29] While these raids have led to the likely severe degradation of Hezbollah capabilities in border towns, it is unclear how IDF strikes deeper into Lebanon have succeeded in degrading Hezbollah’s longer-range rocket and missile assets. These capabilities will continue to threaten residents of northern and central Israel.

The IDF has seized several hills and villages in southern Lebanon that would allow Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces on Jabal Kahil on October 20, north of Maroun el Ras, indicating that Israeli forces had seized and were operating on the hill.[30] The IDF has similarly seized hills in Mays al Jabal, Odaisseh, and Blida. A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent reported that Israeli forces have conducted operations in some border villages that are only visible from Israeli territory and ”not seen” by Hezbollah forces.  These positions on hills and in towns overlooking northern Israel would enable Hezbollah artillery observers to support rocket and mortar attacks into northern Israel. The correspondent claimed that Hezbollah fighters have conducted rocket attacks that have deterred Israeli forces from seizing the ”second line” of border towns.[31] Israeli forces have entered one “second-line“ village but have not attempted to seize other ” second-line” towns.[32] The fact that Israeli forces have entered one of these villages indicates that the IDF is not ”deterred.” It is highly unlikely that intermittent shelling would deter a combat-experienced force such as the IDF units operating in southern Lebanon.

Iran is attempting to use spies in Israel to observe Israeli military facilities and possibly to support targeting efforts. The Shin Bet and Israeli police arrested seven Israeli Jewish citizens of Azeri heritage in Haifa and northern Israel on charges of espionage for “hundreds of tasks” for Iranian intelligence agencies in a counterintelligence operation.[33] The suspects had been in contact with Iranian agents, and the Israeli State Attorney’s Office called this the most serious case they have investigated in recent years.[34] The suspects were reportedly recruited using financial inducements that were routed through Russian intermediaries who traveled to Israel.[35]

The suspects reportedly photographed and collected information on key sites in Israel, indicating that Iran may have been using these suspects to support effective targeting of Israel with missiles and drones. Prosecutors stated that police and the Shin Bet accused the suspects of photographing and collecting information on Israeli energy and port infrastructure, IDF base and facilities, including the Kirya defense headquarters in Tel Aviv, Nevatim and Ramat David air bases, and Iron Dome battery sites, for Iran for around two years.[36] The suspects’ handlers also sent maps of certain sites to the suspects, including a map of the Golani Training Base, which Hezbollah struck with a drone on October 13.[37] The fact that the base’s dining facility was struck at dinner time with a Hezbollah drone suggests that some intelligence asset had observed patterns of life and understood the exact layout of the base and specific buildings within the base. Hezbollah has also targeted Iron Dome batteries with drone attacks, which this Iranian-led intelligence effort may have enabled.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated on October 21 that the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system in Israel is “in place.”[38] Austin declined to confirm if the anti-missile system was fully operational but said that it could be put into operation ”very quickly.” The US deployed the THAAD anti-missile system and US military personnel to operate the system to Israel on October 13 to bolster Israeli air defenses following the April 13 and October 1 Iranian attacks on Israel. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is set to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on October 22.[39]

The White House National Security spokesperson claimed that armed gangs and criminal groups are preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Gaza Strip, suggesting that Hamas control over internal security and governance in the southern Gaza Strip is weakened. White House spokesperson John Kirby claimed that armed gangs and criminal groups are preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom border crossing, which connects Israel and Rafah Governorate.[40] The presence of armed gangs and criminal groups controlling the flow of aid could indicate decreasing Hamas internal control and governance capabilities, given that controlling the movement of humanitarian aid and distributing it to Hamas supporters is one way by which Hamas could maintain control in the Gaza Strip. Armed gangs and criminal groups could still cooperate with Hamas, however. Kirby noted that Israel had allowed 120 trucks of aid into the Gaza Strip over the last few days.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered an increase in humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip to 250 trucks per day on October 19.[41] Netanyahu’s decision followed a letter from the United States to senior Israeli officials on October 13 warning that the Biden administration would be forced to take unspecified steps, implying the withholding of military aid to Israel, if aid was not delivered to non-combatants in the Gaza Strip.[42]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Goals in Lebanon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office recently gave US officials a document detailing Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire and diplomatic solution to end the war with Hezbollah. Lebanon, the United Nations, and the international community are highly unlikely to accept any Israeli conditions that would allow for continued Israeli operations in Lebanese territory, according to US officials.
• Israeli Air Campaign: The IDF is attempting to erode the Lebanese Shia community’s support for Hezbollah by targeting a Hezbollah-affiliated financial institution in Lebanon. The IDF separately conducted an airstrike targeting a senior member of Lebanese Hezbollah’s financial system in Damascus, Syria, on October 21.
• Israeli Military Assessments of Ground Operations: Israeli military officials assessed that IDF operations have destroyed around two-thirds of Hezbollah’s rocket capabilities since the IDF began ground operations on September 30. Israeli military officials indicated that the IDF expects to finish its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon within a few weeks and would soon achieve the conditions to return northern residents to their homes.
• Israeli Ground Operation in Lebanon: The IDF has seized several hills and villages in southern Lebanon that would allow Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel.
• Iranian Intelligence Efforts in Israel: Iran is attempting to use spies in Israel to observe Israeli military facilities and possibly to support targeting efforts. Israel arrested seven suspects who reportedly photographed and collected information on key sites in Israel for Iranian handlers, indicating that Iran may have been using these suspects to support effective targeting of Israel with missiles and drones.
• Gaza Strip: The White House National Security spokesperson claimed that armed gangs and criminal groups are preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Gaza Strip, suggesting that Hamas control over internal security and governance in the southern Gaza Strip is weakened.

Iran Update, October 20, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Palestinian fighters killed an IDF brigade commander in Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip. Palestinian fighters recently detonated a pre-planted improvised explosive device (IED), killing IDF 401st Armored Brigade Commander Colonel Ehsan Daqsa.[1] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Daqsa is the most senior IDF officer killed in the Gaza Strip since the October 7 war began.[2] Daqsa, the 52nd Battalion commander (401st Armored Brigade), and two other officers activated a trip wire after they moved about 20 meters from their tanks towards an observation post in Jabalia. The trip wire detonated an IED that killed Daqsa.[3] The 52nd Battalion commander was seriously injured and the other two officers sustained light to moderate injuries.[4] The IDF appointed 162nd Division Deputy Commander Colonel Meir Biderman as the acting commander of the 401st Brigade.[5]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with senior Hamas leadership in Istanbul, Turkey, on October 19.[6] Araghchi discussed recent ceasefire efforts in a meeting with Hamas’ Shura Council head Mohammad Ismail Darwish.[7] Darwish thanked Araghchi for Iran’s continued support and stated that the Palestinian militias will continue their fight against Israel. Araghchi separately met with Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya and senior Hamas official Mousa Abu Marzouk.[8] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Hayya is Sinwar’s most likely successor as Hamas political leader.[9] Araghchi stated in an interview with Turkish media following the meetings that Iran has already identified its targets in Israel for a potential retaliatory strike should Israel attack Iran.[10] Araghchi implied that Iran would only target military targets in Israel in such a retaliation. Araghchi traveled to Turkey to attend the 3+3 meeting with Russian, Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Armenian officials to discuss the south Caucasus in Istanbul on October 18.[11]

The IDF thwarted a weapons smuggling attempt from Egypt into Israel on October 19.[12] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF intercepted a small quadcopter drone that crossed into Israel from Egypt.[13] The IDF reported that the drone was ferrying eight handguns and an unspecified amount of ammunition.[14]

Israeli Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar traveled to Cairo, Egypt, to discuss renewing hostage negotiations with incoming Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Mahmoud Rashad on October 20.[15]

The Israeli security cabinet convened in Tel Aviv on October 20 after the Hezbollah attack on the residence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[16] The Israeli security cabinet met in the command bunker in the Kirya instead of in its normal meeting room inside the base.[17] The cabinet discussed several ”sensitive issues including the Iranian issue.”[18] Earlier reports stated that the security cabinet was expected to discuss increasing humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and vote on whether to approve finding an armed contracting group to distribute humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip.[19] This meeting also comes as Israel continues preparations for a possible retaliation to Iran’s October 1 ballistic missile attack.[20]

An Israeli airstrike killed three Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers in a military vehicle on October 20 in southern Lebanon.[21] The LAF announced on X that the airstrike targeted an LAF vehicle on a road between Ain Ebel and Hanine in Bint Jbeil District.[22] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF confirmed that it conducted the airstrike.[23] The IDF said that the Lebanese soldiers were driving in an unmarked vehicle towards an area where Israeli forces were operating and the IDF decided to strike the truck.[24] The IDF clarified that “the Lebanese army and the objectives of the Lebanese state are not a target as far as we are concerned.”[25]

The IDF targeted and killed three senior Hezbollah officers in Tibnin, Bint Jbeil District, on October 20.[26] The IDF killed a senior member of Hezbollah's southern front headquarters Hajj Abbas Salameh.[27] Salameh conducted operations in the Bint Jbeil area and has held several positions previously on the southern front.[28] The IDF also killed Hezbollah radio communications expert Reza Abbas Awada and Ahmad Ali Hussein, the head of Hezbollah’s strategic weapon production unit.[29] The IDF said that Hussein had completed "in-depth training" in Iran.[30]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters killed an IDF brigade commander in Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip.
• Iran and Hamas: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with senior Hamas leadership in Istanbul, Turkey, on October 19.
• Weapons Smuggling on the Egypt-Israel Border: The IDF thwarted a weapons smuggling attempt from Egypt into Israel on October 19.
• Ceasefire Talks: Israeli Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar traveled to Cairo, Egypt, to discuss renewing hostage negotiations with incoming Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Mahmoud Rashad on October 20.
• Hezbollah Drone Strike Targeting Netanyahu: The Israeli security cabinet convened in Tel Aviv on October 20 after the Hezbollah attack on the residence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
• Israeli Operations in Lebanon: An Israeli airstrike killed three Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers in a military vehicle on October 20 in southern Lebanon. The IDF said that the Lebanese soldiers were driving in an unmarked vehicle towards an area where Israeli forces were operating and the IDF decided to strike the truck. The IDF clarified that “the Lebanese army and the objectives of the Lebanese state are not a target as far as we are concerned.”

 

Iran Update, October 19, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter

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Hezbollah likely conducted a drone attack targeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Caesarea, Israel, on October 19. Three drones crossed into Israeli territory from Lebanon on October 19.[1] The IDF said that one of the drones "hit a building“ in Caesarea with no casualties.[2] Israeli residents reported hearing a large explosion following the drone’s impact.[3] Neither Netanyahu nor his wife were at the residence at the time of the impact, according to the Prime Minister’s Office.[4] Leaked images of the residence show damage to the side of a building.[5] Netanyahu warned in a statement that the Iranian-backed groups that tried to ”assassinate” him made a ”grave mistake.”[6]

Hezbollah likely intended to kill Netanyahu by using drones to evade Israeli air defenses. Drones pose substantial challenges for IDF air defenses, though the IDF is gradually improving its counter-drone capabilities. The IDF intercepted the other two drones that crossed from Lebanon and triggered warning alarms in Glilot, north of Tel Aviv.[7] CTP-ISW is unable to assess what the targets of these two drones may have been. Hezbollah most recently penetrated Israeli air defenses when a drone struck the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade’s training camp south of Haifa on October 13. Hezbollah combined short-range, imprecise rockets with drones and missiles during the October 13 attack. There have not been indications that Hezbollah also used imprecise indirect fires, such as rockets, in the October 19 attack targeting Netanyahu. Hezbollah has used single drones to penetrate Israeli air defenses in the past, however, by flying the drones at a low altitude and through challenging terrain to prevent radar detection.[8]

Hezbollah may have decided to target higher-value Israeli officials in response to recent Israeli operations that have killed multiple senior Axis leaders. These Israeli operations resulted in the deaths of Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah has not claimed or acknowledged the attack as of this writing, but Hezbollah’s operations did announce on October 18 that it would “transition to a new and escalating phase” in its attacks on Israel.[9] Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem also said on October 15 that Hezbollah would initiate a new phase of the war designed to inflict high casualties on Israel.[10]

Israeli operations temporarily disrupted the operations of Hezbollah’s drone unit in late September, according to an unspecified Israeli official. An unspecified Israeli intelligence official told the Wall Street Journal that Hezbollah drone attacks are increasing in frequency following a brief lull caused by the death of Hezbollah’s drone unit commander in an Israeli strike in Beirut on September 26.[11] The Israeli intelligence official said that Unit 127—Hezbollah’s drone unit—is composed of a “few dozen” fighters and that the unit ”suffered” after Israel killed its commander.[12] CTP-ISW observed a brief interval for six days after the commander’s death on September 26 in which Hezbollah fired no drones or a single drone into Israeli territory.

Hezbollah’s drone unit appears to have reconstituted and overcome the temporary disruption caused by the loss of its commander. Hezbollah drone attacks have increased in recent days in both frequency and deadliness. Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah has launched about thirty drones into Israel in the past week.[13] A Hezbollah drone killed four IDF personnel and injured over 60 more in Binyamina on October 13, and another drone attack could have killed Netanyahu on October 19.[14] The IDF has continued targeting tactical-level Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon, which CTP-ISW has assessed may be diminishing the combat effectiveness of some Hezbollah units.[15] The effects generated by the removal of Hezbollah commanders is a temporary effect, however. Hezbollah forces remain structured as a conventional fighting force. Military organizations are designed to absorb casualties and rapidly replace commanders to overcome temporary disruptions caused by the loss of leaders.[16]

Some recent Hezbollah attacks, such as the drone strike on the 1st Infantry Brigade’s base, indicate that Hezbollah has rebuilt at least some of its communications structure that the IDF campaign previously severely degraded. Hezbollah launched a combined offensive of rockets, missiles, and drones in the 1st Infantry Brigade attack, suggesting that Hezbollah had restored some communication between its rocket, missile, and drone units in order to coordinate the simultaneous launches.[17]

Two unspecified Hamas officials cited by the BBC on October 19 stated that Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya is considered a strong candidate for Sinwar’s replacement.[18] CTP-ISW has assessed that Hayya is Sinwar’s most likely successor as Hamas political leader.[19] The Hamas officials said that Hamas will begin discussions to determine Yahya Sinwar’s successor “very soon.”[20] 

A separate unspecified Hamas official speaking to the BBC said that Hamas’ conditions for a ceasefire-hostage deal have not changed despite Sinwar’s death, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment.[21] Hayya and an accompanying Hamas delegation met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on October 19 to discuss the October 9 meeting between Hamas and Fatah in Cairo addressing post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and recent "developments.”[22] Hayya—who, like Sinwar, is close to Iran—has shown little willingness to moderate his positions.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Drone Strike Targeting Netanyahu: Hezbollah likely conducted a drone attack targeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Caesarea, Israel, on October 19. Hezbollah likely intended to kill Netanyahu by using drones to evade Israeli air defenses. Hezbollah may have decided to target higher-value Israeli officials in response to recent Israeli operations that have killed multiple senior Axis leaders.
• Hezbollah Drone Operations: Israeli operations temporarily disrupted the operations of Hezbollah’s drone unit in late September, but Hezbollah’s drone unit appears to have reconstituted and overcome the temporary disruption caused by the loss of its commander.
• Sinwar Succession: Two unspecified Hamas officials cited by the BBC on October 19 stated that Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya is considered a strong candidate for Sinwar’s replacement. A separate unspecified Hamas official speaking to the BBC said that Hamas’ conditions for a ceasefire-hostage deal have not changed despite Sinwar’s death, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The 91st Division continued operations in Mhaibib, southern Lebanon, on October 19. The IDF 8th Armored Brigade and Yahalom combat engineers demolished a Radwan SOF tunnel north of Mhaibib. Part of the complex ran underneath a Lebanese school.

Iran Update, October 18, 2024

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Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

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The IDF Chief of Staff estimated that Israeli forces have killed at least 1,500 Hezbollah fighters since beginning operations against the group, which is consistent with CTP-ISW estimates.[1] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi told Israeli forces in southern Lebanon that 1,500 is a conservative estimate.[2] CTP-ISW has independently tallied about 1,450 Hezbollah fighter deaths since October 8, 2023.[3] IDF operations, including the widespread September pager and radio attacks, have almost certainly seriously injured thousands of other Hezbollah fighters and rendered them unable to fight.[4] Halevi said that Israeli operations had struck Hezbollah’s entire senior leadership to ”wipe out” the chain of command.[5] The IDF has exclusively killed Hezbollah’s senior leadership through airstrikes.[6] Halevi added that Israeli ground operations in Lebanon were decimating Hezbollah’s local leadership.[7] This pattern of targeting means that Hezbollah very likely retains tactical-level commanders in its rear areas away from Israel’s current ground operations, particularly in the northern Bekaa Valley. The IDF Air Force frequently targets sites in the Bekaa Valley but the intensity of operations against Hezbollah’s northern units is significantly less than along the Israel-Lebanon border.[8]

Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist negotiation position during a speech mourning Yahya Sinwar on October 18.[9] Hayya declared that Hamas would not release the Israeli hostages until the IDF completed a full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and released Palestinian prisoners.[10] Hamas’ maximalist position has consistently demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi Corridor along Gaza’s border with Egypt, which Hamas has used to develop its military capabilities over the past decades.[11] Hamas has also insisted on a permanent ceasefire, the release of high-value Palestinian prisoners, the unimpeded return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip, and full reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.

Israeli and US officials confirmed on October 18 that mediators are not close to resuming talks in Doha or Egypt.[12] Unspecified Israeli officials said that Israel would likely need to wait for Hamas to appoint a new leader before resuming negotiations.[13] CTP-ISW has assessed that Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya is Sinwar’s most likely successor as Hamas political leader.[14] Hayya was reportedly one of only a few exiled leaders whom Sinwar trusted, and he has played a key role in ceasefire negotiations.[15] Hayya has a much stronger relationship with Hezbollah and Iran than other options for the top Hamas leadership role, like Khaled Meshaal.[16] Hayya also presumably took over many of Haniyeh’s duties—such as engaging with foreign partners—that Sinwar could not perform due to his physical position in the Gaza Strip.

Israeli officials are considering the impact of Yahya Sinwar’s death on hostage negotiations.[17] Israeli officials are reportedly concerned that Yahya Sinwar’s death will inspire Hamas to execute the Israeli hostages that it holds.[18] Israeli media reported that senior Israeli officials spoke with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about how to prevent Hamas from retaliating against Israeli hostages for Sinwar’s death.[19] Hamas previously used its execution of Israeli six hostages to conduct a series of information operations designed to degrade Israeli will and force Israel to end the war on terms favorable to Hamas, which would ultimately lead to an Israeli defeat.[20]

Israeli military operations over the last year, particularly Israeli subterranean operations, deliberately created the conditions that led to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death on October 16. Sinwar had previously hidden underground in Hamas’ vast tunnel network in Khan Younis until January 2024 and then in tunnels in Rafah until at least August 2024.[21] IDF clearing operations throughout the last year have attempted to destroy these tunnel networks throughout the Strip.[22] These operations enabled the IDF to force Sinwar from his tunnel complex in Khan Younis in January 2024 and then caused Sinwar to move above ground in Rafah after IDF operations there destroyed a number of tunnels.[23] Forcing Hamas leaders like Sinwar above ground by destroying the tunnel networks was part of a deliberate IDF operational design. The discrete tactical engagement that led to Sinwar’s death was a chance encounter, but the broader Israeli campaign was intentionally designed to force Hamas rank-and-file and leaders above ground where they could be sought out and destroyed. Sinwar’s death was therefore not a matter of chance, but rather the outcome of a deliberate campaign designed to eventually eliminate all of Hamas’ senior leadership.

The IDF stated that Mohammed Sinwar assumed the duties of Hamas’ military wing after the IDF killed Mohammad Deif in July 2024.[24] Read more CTP-ISW analysis of Yahya Sinwar’s succession here: Sinwar’s Death Will Not End Israeli Operations in the Gaza Strip by Brian Carter.

Two Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members infiltrated Israeli territory near the Dead Sea and fired small arms targeting Israeli soldiers on October 18. The involvement of two Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members demonstrates potential opportunities for Iran and the Axis of Resistance to recruit Jordanians to target Israel.[25] The Jordanian fighters infiltrated multiple meters beyond the Jordan-Israel border.[26] Israeli forces killed the Jordanian fighters following an exchange of fire that injured two Israeli soldiers near Neot Hakikar, south of the Dead Sea.[27] The Israeli Army Radio reported that the fighters carried a map, a compass, and an Arabic-Hebrew dictionary.[28] The IDF blocked roads near the area and conducted aerial and ground scans to confirm that additional fighters did not also infiltrate Israeli territory.[29] The fighters reportedly wore Jordanian military uniforms but were not Jordanian soldiers.[30] Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood spokesperson Moaz al Khawaldeh claimed that the fighters were Muslim Brotherhood members who regularly participated in events in support of Gaza and the resistance.[31] Multiple Palestinian militias have released statements praising the attack.[32]

This attack, like the Jordanian truck driver attack that killed three Israeli citizens at the Allenby border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8, reflects anti-Israel sentiments in Jordan that can be manipulated by Iran and the Axis of Resistance.[33] Both Jordanian and Israeli police have thwarted several attempts in recent months by Iran and its partners to conduct attacks within the kingdom or smuggle weapons into the West Bank.[34] Iranian efforts to manufacture weapons, arm Jordanian agents, and undermine the Jordanian state are consistent with CTP-ISW's previous assessments that Iran is adopting a more confrontational approach towards Jordan in its regional strategy.[35] It is also notable that this attack occurred one day after the IDF announced it had killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in the Gaza Strip, given Hamas’ historic and ideological ties with the Muslim Brotherhood.[36]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The IDF Chief of Staff estimated that Israeli forces have killed at least 1,500 Hezbollah fighters since beginning operations against the group, which is consistent with CTP-ISW estimates.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist negotiation position during a speech mourning Yahya Sinwar on October 18.
• The Death of Yahya Sinwar: Israeli military operations over the last year, particularly Israeli subterranean operations, deliberately created the conditions that led to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death on October 16. The discrete tactical engagement that led to Sinwar’s death was a chance encounter, but the broader Israeli campaign was intentionally designed to force Hamas rank-and-file and leaders above ground where they could be sought out and destroyed.
• Jordan: Two Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members infiltrated Israeli territory near the Dead Sea and fired small arms targeting Israeli soldiers on October 18. The involvement of two Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members demonstrates potential opportunities for Iran and the Axis of Resistance to recruit Jordanians to target Israel.

Iran Update, October 17, 2024

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Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Andie Parry, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

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Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Yahya Sinwar in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip on October 16. Sinwar’s death is unlikely to change Hamas’ maximalist negotiating position meaningfully. Israeli officials confirmed on October 17 that the IDF 828th Infantry Brigade killed Sinwar in Tal al Sultan, Rafah Governorate.[1] IDF soldiers located three fighters inside of a building, one of whom was later identified as Sinwar, and fired a tank round at the building. The IDF had previously assessed that Sinwar was likely using Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip as a “human shield” after Israeli forces found Sinwar’s DNA samples in a tunnel where six hostages were killed on August 31.[2] The IDF did not report the presence of Israeli hostages with Sinwar at the time of his death, however.

Sinwar’s death is unlikely to meaningfully change Hamas’ negotiating position because Hamas aims to exploit the hostages it still holds to compel Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire that would enable Hamas to rebuild. Hamas executed six hostages who had been traveling with Sinwar in late August 2024 and publicized propaganda videos of the hostages.[3] These videos were intended to trigger domestic Israeli pressure on Netanyahu in order to compel his government to agree to a ceasefire with Hamas. Khalil al Hayya, Sinwar’s deputy and chief negotiator, will probably take over Hamas’ political affairs in the interim period.[4] Hayya—who, like Sinwar, is close to Iran—has shown little willingness to moderate his positions.

Mohammad Sinwar is the most likely replacement for Yahya Sinwar in the Gaza Strip, but he will likely split his military duties with other commanders.[5] Hamas is unlikely to immediately publicly appoint a new political chief in the Gaza Strip, given the reality that Hamas' political organization is under extreme pressure in the Strip right now.[6] Mohammad Sinwar’s military control of the group would at least in theory give him control over the hostages, though given the severely degraded state of Hamas’ command and control, it is far from clear that any single Hamas commander could be aware of the locations of hostages. Other commanders, like Gaza City Brigade Commander Izz al Din al Haddad, will also probably assume some of Yahya’s and former Hamas military wing commander Mohammad Deif’s responsibilities if they have not done so already.[7] Mohammad Sinwar also has the requisite experience as a military commander that would enable him to rebuild Hamas, however, if allowed to do so. Mohammad Sinwar has served in many capacities for Hamas’ military wing, including as logistics and manpower chief and a brigade commander.[8] He was also part of Yahya’s inner circle as a war planner and strategist.[9] These skills will be extremely sought-after by Hamas’ leadership if it emerges from this war able to rebuild in the Gaza Strip.

The death of Yahya Sinwar and the transition to new commander(s) will have minimal impact on Hamas’ command and control structure, however. Israeli ground and air operations in the Gaza Strip have defeated or severely degraded Hamas units across the Gaza Strip.[10] This reality means that Mohammad Sinwar and others, like Izz al Din al Haddad, will be unable to immediately influence dynamics on the ground. Hamas fighters are currently fighting in small cells. The value of Mohammad Sinwar and Izz al Din al Haddad will come if they manage to survive this war and if the end of this war enables Hamas to reinvest in its military wing in the Gaza Strip to rebuild. Their military experience under those conditions would be invaluable to rebuilding Hamas.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Egypt on October 16, marking the first time an Iranian official has visited Egypt since 2014.[11] Araghchi’s visit is likely part of ongoing Iranian-backed efforts to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.[12] Araghchi and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi discussed the need to “intensify efforts towards ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon.”[13] Araghchi separately called on regional countries to “redouble” their efforts to stop Israeli “aggression” in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Lebanon during a meeting with his Egyptian counterpart, Badr Abdelatty.[14] Egypt—along with Qatar and the United States—has mediated ceasefire and hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas in recent months. Araghchi’s visit to Egypt is noteworthy given that Iran and Egypt do not have formal diplomatic ties. Iran has increased its efforts to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt in recent years, however.[15]

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi appointed Hassan Rashad as chief of the General Intelligence Service on October 16.[16] Rashad replaced Abbas Kamel, who had served as the Egyptian intelligence chief since 2018.[17] Kamel worked closely with the heads of the CIA and Mossad, as well as the Qatari prime minister, to try to secure a ceasefire and hostage deal between Israel and Hamas throughout the October 7 War.[18] Rashad has a long history of working in Egypt’s intelligence services and previously served as Kamel’s deputy.[19] Rashad has also overseen Egypt’s relationship with Iran and its proxies.”[20]

The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted multiple precision airstrikes in unspecified locations in Houthi-controlled Yemen on October 16 targeting Houthi underground weapons storage facilities that contained “various advanced conventional weapons.” [21] CTP-ISW reported on October 15 that Houthi efforts to build an extensive tunnel network in the Houthi-controlled mountainous region between Sanaa and Sa’ada have intensified.[22] This was the first time that the US Air Force used B2 Spirit long-range stealth bombers against Houthi targets. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III called the CENTCOM strikes “a unique demonstration of the United States’ ability to target facilities that our adversaries seek to keep out of reach.”[23] Austin added that the US will continue to “degrade Houthis‘ capability to continue their destabilizing behavior“ attacking vessels in the Red Sea.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Yahya Sinwar in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip on October 16. Sinwar’s death is unlikely to change Hamas’ maximalist negotiating position meaningfully.
• Sinwar’s Succession: Mohammad Sinwar is the most likely replacement for Yahya Sinwar in the Gaza Strip, but he will likely split his military duties with other commanders. Hamas is unlikely to immediately publicly appoint a new political chief in the Gaza Strip, given the reality that Hamas' political organization is under extreme pressure in the Gaza Strip right now. The death of Yahya Sinwar and the transition to new commander(s) will have minimal impact on Hamas’ command and control structure, however, given the degraded state of Hamas’ military organization.
• Iranian Diplomatic Efforts: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Egypt on October 16, marking the first time an Iranian official has visited Egypt since 2014. Araghchi’s visit is likely part of ongoing Iranian-backed efforts to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.
• Yemen: The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted multiple precision airstrikes using B2 Spirit stealth bombers in unspecified locations in Houthi-controlled Yemen on October 16. The strikes targeted Houthi underground weapons storage facilities that contained “various advanced conventional weapons.”
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: Israeli media reported on October 17 that Hezbollah fighters killed five 1st Infantry Brigade soldiers during clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon on October 16.

Iran Update, October 16, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Kyle Moran, Adiv Kuray, and Brian Carter

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The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to seize terrain in several Lebanon towns along the Israel-Lebanon border. Israeli forces have previously seized or partially secured terrain in Maroun al Ras, Yaroun, and Blida in southeastern Lebanon.[1] Geolocated footage and commercial satellite imagery on October 16 show that Israeli forces have recently seized terrain along the western axis of advance in Mhaibib and along the eastern axis of advance in Ramyeh.[2] A Lebanese social media user confirmed imagery and other reports that the IDF had “taken control” over the two villages.[3] Israeli forces continued to operate in both areas on October 16.[4] A force seizes terrain by killing or capturing all enemy forces and preventing the enemy from firing on the area.[5] Israeli forces are likely currently conducting clearing operations in Mhaibib and Ramyeh, as indicated by engagements with Hezbollah fighters and the destruction of Hezbollah infrastructure. Hezbollah fired rockets and anti-tank guided missiles targeting Israeli armor in Ramyeh, and Lebanese media reported heavy exchanges of fire between Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters in the village on October 16.[6] The IDF 91st Division destroyed an underground Radwan tunnel complex beneath Mhaibib on October 16 that Radwan forces used as a headquarters.[7] Israeli forces are seizing and clearing terrain in border towns and areas to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks and ground attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north.

Hezbollah fighters continued to engage Israeli forces in unsecured border areas. Hezbollah fighters and Israeli forces exchanged small arms fire in Qouzah and Aita al Shaab, near Ramyeh, according to Hezbollah-affiliated sources.[8] Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting Israeli personnel between Markaba and Odaisseh.[9] A Lebanese social media user noted that Hezbollah continues to control Odaisseh, which is in a small valley that runs east-to-west away from the Israeli border and is overlooked by two steep hills.[10] The IDF operated on the southern hill and engaged Hezbollah fighters there earlier in the war. IDF officers have consistently remarked that their forces are engaging Hezbollah fighters at longer ranges or that Hezbollah fighters have fled altogether, indicating that Hezbollah forces have not yet become decisively engaged with IDF units in some sectors.[11] Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem claimed on October 16 that this is an intentional strategy on Hezbollah’s part and that the group intends to rapidly attack and ambush Israeli forces when they enter Lebanese territory rather than confront them as a regular standing army might.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on October 15 that Israel would reject any ceasefire that would enable Hezbollah to reorganize and rearm.[12] Netanyahu told French President Emmanuel Macron that Israel would not accept a ceasefire agreement that would allow for Lebanon’s “security situation” to return to how it was before the IDF’s offensive.[13] Netanyahu also said that Israel would not be able to return northern residents to their homes while Hezbollah maintains a presence along the Israel-Lebanon border.[14] Netanyahu has previously declared that Israel seeks to return its citizens to the north by “defeat[ing] Hezbollah.”[15] Israeli ground and air operations are presumably designed to defeat Hezbollah by rendering it unable or unwilling to continue the fight, thereby forcing Hezbollah to end its attacks and allowing Israeli citizens to return to the north. The Hezbollah that would emerge from such a war would be severely damaged and unable to execute the activities it traditionally has—at least for a time. Netanyahu’s demands for ceasefire stipulations to prevent Hezbollah from reorganizing and rearming would prevent Hezbollah from continuing to threaten Israel in the long term.

Netanyahu’s demand to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament are provisions that are in part enshrined in UN Resolution 1701. UN Resolution 1701 requires the disarmament of armed groups between the Litani River and the Israel-Lebanon border.[16] The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and to “take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities, which would include Hezbollah‘s extensive development of military infrastructure.[17] Hezbollah’s investment in military infrastructure in southern Lebanon was designed to be used in future wars against Israel. Several of these Hezbollah positions, including the tunnel complex the 91st Division destroyed in Mhaibib on October 16, were located within a few kilometers of UNIFIL outposts.[18]

Israeli media reported that Israel decided on the targets it could “potentially strike” in Iran on October 16.[19] The IDF presented a list of potential targets to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and began finalizing preparations including “sensitive coordination” with other regional countries. The report stated that Israel “described its general attack plans” to the United States without providing an update on specific targets. An unspecified Israeli source stated that Israel could change its targeting decisions “at the 11th hour.”[20] Unspecified American officials told CNN that they expect Israel will retaliate before the US presidential election on November 5.[21]

A senior Iranian defense official downplayed the US decision to send a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system to Israel. Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh dismissed this deployment as “psychological warfare” and claimed that the system does not present a “particular problem” for Iran.[22] An Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps–affiliated outlet similarly argued on October 13 that the THAAD system will not be effective against Iranian ballistic missiles, including the Fatah missile used in Iran’s October 1 attack.[23] The American-made THAAD system is “highly effective” and “combat-proven” against short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, according to US manufacturer Lockheed Martin.[24] The THAAD system successfully intercepted Houthi ballistic missiles targeting the United Arab Emirates in 2022.[25]

An unspecified “informed” source told Iraqi news outlet Baghdad Today that an American delegation arrived in Baghdad unannounced on October 16 to prepare for “indirect negotiations” with Iran.[26] The source claimed that Washington has pressured Iraqi mediators to open negotiations with Iran amid concerns of potential regional escalation.[27] The source also claimed that members of the US delegation are holding meetings with “elite” Iraqis on an ongoing basis to advance negotiations. These reports come as Iranian officials have been conducting “urgent diplomacy” with Middle Eastern countries to try to reduce the scale of Israel’s retaliation.[28] Senior Israeli officials guaranteed senior American officials that Israel will target Iranian military and defense sites instead of nuclear or oil facilities in its retaliatory strike on Iran.[29]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi continued his diplomatic tour of Middle Eastern countries to persuade their leaders to bar Israel from using their airspace in Israel’s retaliation against Iran.[30] Araghchi met with the Jordanian King Abdullah II and the Jordanian Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ayman Safadi separately in Amman on October 16 to discuss ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, humanitarian aid, and Israel‘s retaliation against Iran[31] Safadi reiterated that Jordan will not allow Jordanian airspace to be violated.[32] Iran’s two attacks on Israel on April 13 and October 1 resulted in many Iranian projectiles violating Jordanian airspace.[33] Jordan is not to prevent Israel from launching an attack over Jordanian airspace. King Abdullah II also met with a US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee delegation led by Representative Mike Rogers in Amman on October 15.[34] This committee is responsible for designating funds for the US defense authorization bill, including financial assistance abroad.[35] Jordan receives financial assistance money through the defense authorization bill. Araghchi will similarly meet Egyptian officials in Cairo on October 17.[36] Araghchi will attend the 3+3 Summit in Istanbul on October 18, where he will meet with Russian, Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Armenian officials.[37]

Iranian Parliamentarian Ali Asghar Nakhaei Rad urged the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) to ask Khamenei to reconsider his 2003 fatwa banning nuclear weapons.[38] Nakhaei Rad emphasized that “time and place” affects fatwas and “Shia jurisprudence is dynamic,” suggesting that current regional conditions could justify a shift in Iran’s nuclear doctrine. Nakhaei Rad was among the thirty-nine Iranian parliamentarians who signed a letter to the SNSC calling for a revision of Iranian "defense doctrine" and for the SNSC to "issue permission and provide facilities for the production of nuclear weapons."[39] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the letter was likely sent to the SNSC to encourage them to persuade Khamenei to reconsider his fatwa, as he has ultimate authority to revoke it.[40]

US officials are considering improving and endorsing a UAE-proposed post-war plan for the Gaza Strip after the US presidential election. Axios reported on October 16 that the Israeli strategic affairs minister and Emirati foreign affairs minister met with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to discuss a UAE-proposed plan for the Gaza Strip after the war.[41] Blinken is now reportedly considering this plan, having concluded that there is “no deal in sight” for a hostage release and ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel. The UAE plan, which was initially laid out in July 2024, would include the deployment of a temporary international mission to the Gaza Strip that would “deliver humanitarian aid, establish law and order, and lay the groundwork for governance in the Strip.”[42] Part of the UAE’s plan involves appointing a reformed Palestinian Authority led by an independent prime minister to govern the post-war Gaza Strip.[43] The Palestinian Authority dismissed the UAE proposal because it is in conflict with the Chinese-mediated Hamas-Fatah deal that would establish a “national unity government” including Hamas that would govern both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[44] The United States views UAE’s plan as a potential alternative that aims to lay out a possible path forward to the post-war governance structure for the Gaza Strip.

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to seize terrain in several Lebanon towns along the Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah fighters continued to engage Israeli forces in unsecured border areas.
• Israeli Policy in Lebanon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on October 15 that Israel would reject any ceasefire that would enable Hezbollah to reorganize and rearm. Netanyahu’s demand to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament are provisions that are in part enshrined in UN Resolution 1701. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and to “take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities, which would include Hezbollah’s extensive development of military infrastructure.
• Israeli Retaliation Against Iran: Israeli media reported that Israel decided on the targets it could “potentially strike” in Iran on October 16. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi continued his diplomatic tour of Middle Eastern countries to persuade their leaders to bar Israel from using their airspace in Israel’s retaliation against Iran.
• Iranian Nuclear Policy: Iranian Parliamentarian Ali Asghar Nakhaei Rad urged the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) to ask Khamenei to reconsider his 2003 fatwa banning nuclear weapons. Nakhaei Rad was among the thirty-nine Iranian parliamentarians who signed a letter to the SNSC calling for a revision of Iranian "defense doctrine" and for the SNSC to "issue permission and provide facilities for the production of nuclear weapons."
• Postwar Plans in the Gaza Strip: US officials are considering improving and endorsing a UAE-proposed post-war plan for the Gaza Strip after the US presidential election. US officials are now reportedly considering this plan, having concluded that there is “no deal in sight” for a hostage release and ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel.

Iran Update, October 15, 2024

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Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kyle Moran, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem gave a speech detailing Hezbollah’s strategy and vision of the war on October 15.[1] This was Qassem's third speech since Israel struck and killed Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on September 27.[2] Qassem has taken on Nasrallah’s role as the public face of the organization. Qassem may be among the candidates considered to replace Nasrallah given that he has formal seniority in the organization and has appeared as the public face of the group in these difficult circumstances.

Qassem dismissed Israeli claims that Hezbollah fighters are failing to defend against Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon.[3] Qassem said that Hezbollah’s organizational model and goals are not those of a regular standing army, but that the group instead intends to rapidly attack and ambush Israeli forces when they enter Lebanese territory.[4] This suggests that Hezbollah decided to avoid becoming decisively engaged in an area defense along the border.[5] Qassem moreover claimed that Hezbollah has ”regained” its operational strength, restored its organizational capabilities, and put in place alternatives for its command-and-control structure.[6] This suggests Hezbollah has reestablished operational control, though Qassem has significant motive to lie or exaggerate to present Hezbollah as a resilient organization to both its followers and its adversaries.

Israeli clearing operations have seized a significant amount of Hezbollah’s Radwan SOF assets that the group would likely try to retain if it was able, thus indicating that Qassem is exaggerating the degree of Hezbollah’s continued strength.[7] IDF officers have consistently remarked that their forces are engaging Hezbollah fighters from a far distance with medium-range weapons or that Hezbollah fighters have fled altogether, rather than decisively engaging IDF units.[8] 

Qassem framed Hezbollah’s war with Israel as existential and said that he believes the United States and Israel seek to shape Lebanon and “run it as they wish.”[9] He assessed Israel is implementing a three-pronged plan: to strike Hezbollah’s leadership and capabilities so that Hezbollah is unable to resist Israeli operations “to end Hezbollah’s existence.”[10] Qassem said that the final stage of Israel’s plan is to shape Lebanon’s government to “run it as [Israel wishes]” in collaboration with the United States.[11]  The United States is considering pushing for the Lebanese Parliament to elect a president in the coming days, according to US officials speaking to Axios.[12] US officials reportedly believe that Hezbollah influence in the Lebanese political system can be reduced while the group‘s leadership is weak, and its forces are preoccupied with fighting the IDF.[13] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also addressed the Lebanese people directly, saying that Hezbollah is “weaker today than it has been for many years” and calling for the Lebanese people to “take back [their] country” from Hezbollah.[14]

Qassem’s statements indicated that Israel’s ground and air operations have not changed Hezbollah’s willingness to negotiate a political settlement or ceasefire.[15] Qassem said that he has no faith that Israel will abide by an agreement with Hezbollah, or that international institutions can protect Lebanon from Israel.[16] He also indicated that Hezbollah leadership remains unwilling to agree to a separate deal that does not include an end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[17] Qassem said that Hezbollah rejected appeals from international mediators earlier this year that called for Hezbollah to remove its forces 10 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border.[18] Accounts from Israeli soldiers fighting in Lebanon suggest that most Hezbollah fighters have moved five to ten kilometers north of the border after Israeli ground operations began.[19] IDF commanders fighting in Lebanon acknowledged that the IDF’s current operations are destroying Hezbollah’s ability to conduct ground operations into Israel, but that other operations or diplomatic agreements will halt Hezbollah rocket fire into northern Israel.[20] Qassem noted that the only solution to return northern Israel’s residents to their homes is a ceasefire but did not express faith in the plausibility of a negotiated settlement.[21] Such a ceasefire would presumably include a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, given Qassem’s previous statements.

Qassem announced a new war “phase” designed to inflict high casualties on Israel.[22] He said that Hezbollah has altered its strategy to conduct attacks that can maximally “hurt the enemy.”[23] Hezbollah and Israel have historically engaged in a “tit-for-tat" attack balance and escalation ladder, but that framework has degraded over the past several months.[24] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hezbollah’s October 13 drone attack targeting an IDF base was likely part of an effort to impose costs on Israel as Hezbollah faces operational challenges in southern Lebanon.[25] These attacks also could have an outsized effect in the Israeli domestic political space as well, and Hezbollah may calculate that continued attacks on rear IDF bases that kill even small numbers of IDF soldiers will cause Israeli public support for the ground campaign in Lebanon to decline. Hezbollah’s October 13 attack demonstrates that Hezbollah can precisely target IDF rear positions in northern Israel at least intermittently. A similar attack on October 14 using three surface-to-surface missiles failed.[26]

Senior Israeli officials guaranteed senior American officials that Israel will target Iranian military and defense sites instead of nuclear or oil facilities in its retaliatory strike on Iran.[27] Unspecified US officials told the Wall Street Journal that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pledged not to target nuclear or oil facilities in a phone call with US President Joe Biden on October 9.[28] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant made a similar promise to US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in recent days. Unspecified Israeli officials briefed on the planning process told the New York Times that Israel could target missile and drone launchers, missile and drone storage sites, military bases, or major government buildings.[29] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office released a statement that Israel will “listen to the opinion of the United States” but ultimately will make its final decision based on Israeli national interests.[30] Unspecified officials told the Washington Post that Netanyahu softened his stance regarding the retaliation following the US decision to send a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system to Israel.[31] The US Defense Department announced that the initial components of the THAAD battery and an advance team of US military personnel arrived in Israel on October 14.[32]

A recent IDF investigation revealed the role that Hamas’ international and West Bank attack cells play in terrorist attacks targeting Israeli civilians. Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar ordered a return to terrorist attacks targeting Israel after he assumed control of the organization in Summer 2024.[33] Sinwar likely made this calculation given Hamas’ decreasing military capabilities during Summer 2024, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed. Hamas has historically used its capabilities--primarily rockets--to target Israeli civilians and impose costs on Israeli civilians for the actions of the Israeli state. An Israeli investigation into the Hamas’ attempted suicide attack in August 2024 revealed that Hamas used a Nablus attack cell to plan and conduct the attack in Tel Aviv, while a Hamas office in Turkey provided funding and training for the Nablus cell.[34]  The IDF also confiscated two improvised explosive devices (IEDs), four kilograms of explosive materials, and 111,000 Israeli shekels, and detained several Hamas members from the Nablus cell. This underscores the role Hamas’ international and West Bank network plays in terrorist operations.[35] Positioning key Hamas facilitators overseas gives the group’s top financiers and trainers some level of protection against Israeli security services that these individuals would not have in the Gaza Strip or even in the West Bank.

The West Bank provides Hamas cells considerable advantages over the Gaza Strip for the planning and execution of attacks into Israel. The 700 km-long Israel-West Bank boundary consists of “hundreds” of breach points, according to a report by an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.[36] Hamas previously used one of these breach points in the Israel-West Bank boundary to carry out a shooting attack in Jaffa on October 11.[37] Entering Israel from the West Bank is also more logistically feasible for small attack teams, given that Israel has historically allowed some Palestinians to transit between the West Bank and Israel for work. The West Bank itself is also home to many Israelis in outlying and relatively isolated settlements that could be more exposed to larger attacks, should Hamas’ capabilities in the West Bank expand.

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah’s View of the War: Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general framed Hezbollah’s war with Israel as existential and said that he believes the United States and Israel seek to shape Lebanon and “run it as they wish.” He also indicated that Hezbollah leadership remains unwilling to agree to a separate deal that does not include an end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Qassem did not express faith in the plausibility of a negotiated settlement.
• Hezbollah Operations in Lebanon: Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general dismissed Israeli claims that Hezbollah fighters are failing to defend Lebanese territory, adding that the group intends to rapidly attack and ambush Israeli forces when they enter Lebanese territory. This suggests that Hezbollah decided to avoid becoming decisively engaged in an area defense along the border.
• Israeli Operations in Lebanon: Elements of a brigade assigned to the 210th IDF Division entered Lebanon. There are now elements of five IDF divisions in Lebanon.
• Israeli Retaliation Against Iran: Senior Israeli officials guaranteed senior American officials that Israel will target Iranian military and defense sites instead of nuclear or oil facilities in its retaliatory strike on Iran.
• West Bank: A recent IDF investigation revealed the role that Hamas’ international and West Bank attack cells play in terrorist attacks targeting Israeli civilians.

Iran Update, October 14, 2024

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Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hezbollah’s October 13 drone attack targeting an IDF base is likely part of an effort to impose costs on Israel as Hezbollah faces operational challenges in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah conducted a drone attack on October 13 targeting a training camp south of Haifa for the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade that killed four IDF soldiers and injured 61 others.[1] Hezbollah said that the strike was targeting soldiers as they prepared for operations in Lebanon, and the IDF assessed that Hezbollah deliberately targeted an IDF dining facility during a period in which Hezbollah expected soldiers to be eating.[2] This strike is likely an effort to impose costs on Israel at a time when Hezbollah can conduct only limited defensive operations in southern Lebanon. The Israeli air campaign has severely disrupted Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures, and Israeli forces have observed Hezbollah fighters fleeing or only observing Israeli troops from a distance rather than decisively engaging IDF units.[3] The IDF continues to seize terrain and towns, demonstrating that it can act with impunity in southern Lebanon.[4] Hezbollah attacks into Israel allow it to claim that it is ”resisting” Israeli forces despite being unable or unwilling to defend southern Lebanon.[5]

This attack is part of a possible broader campaign that Hezbollah described on October 12. Hezbollah claimed on October 12 that its fighters continued to target IDF rear positions in northern Israel and “support lines” as part of its defense against Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon.[6] Attacks on IDF support elements are meant to degrade the IDF’s ability to conduct effective ground operations, though it is unclear what military effect these attacks will have if any at all. Hezbollah’s decision to target a training camp for the 1st Infantry Brigade—a unit currently operating in southern Lebanon—likely falls within this framework.[7] These attacks also could have an outsized effect in the Israeli domestic political space as well, and Hezbollah may calculate that continued attacks on rear IDF bases that kill even small numbers of IDF soldiers will cause Israeli public support for the ground campaign in Lebanon to decline. Hezbollah’s October 13 attack demonstrates that Hezbollah can precisely target IDF rear positions in northern Israel. The attack also demonstrates that Hezbollah‘s command-and-control network is sufficiently intact to order and execute these sorts of coordinated rocket and missile attacks (see below).

Hezbollah has almost certainly adopted a new tactic in an attempt to evade Israeli air defenses. The development of this tactic is a byproduct of Hezbollah’s year-long learning process during its fires campaign targeting civilian and military sites in northern Israel since October 2023. A preliminary IDF Air Force investigation indicated that Hezbollah launched a combined offensive of drones, rockets, and three precision missiles targeting Haifa at the same time it launched the drone targeting Binyamina.[8] The IDF Navy and Iron Dome intercepted two of the drones near Nahariya and Acre but detection systems lost track of a third drone, a Shahed 107—which ultimately impacted in Binyamina.[9] This tactic of using imprecise indirect fires to distract air defenses and then using precision weapons to strike targets has become common across Iran and its Axis of Resistance in recent years. Hezbollah has used this tactic to distract Israeli air defenses on numerous occasions to allow low-flying drones to enter northern Israel during its year-long campaign.[10] These drone attacks have previously proved difficult for Israeli air defenses to intercept. [11]

Hezbollah likely attempted to replicate the successful October 13 attack by launching three surface-to-surface missiles targeting central Israel at the same time it launched dozens of rockets toward northern Israel on October 14.[12] All three of these missiles were intercepted, but the missiles caused 182 red alerts across central Israel.[13]

The IDF vowed to respond by targeting Hezbollah’s drone unit and drone production infrastructure in response to the October 13 attack. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on October 13 that Israel would engage in a “forceful response” against Hezbollah.[14] Israeli Army Radio reported that IDF Air Force commander Major General Tomer Bar instructed the IDF to prioritize airstrikes targeting Hezbollah's drone unit, which is responsible for drone production and operations.[15] Bar said that the IDF Air Force set the goal to target every Hezbollah fighter, “from junior to senior,” in Hezbollah’s drone unit.[16] Israeli airstrikes have primarily targeted Hezbollah’s rocket and missile capabilities but have occasionally targeted Hezbollah drone assets. The IDF recently struck drone warehouses in southern Lebanon on October 8 and 9, for example.[17]

Iranian media reported that Russia will launch two satellites on Iran’s behalf after Iran sent the two satellites to Russia on October 11.[18] Iran sent a high-resolution imaging ”Kowsar” satellite and a small ”Hodhod” communications satellite to Russia.[19] Russia was originally scheduled to launch these satellites in December 2023 but was delayed.[20] Russia previously launched two Iranian satellites in August 2022 and February 2024.[21] Russia will launch these satellites using the Soyuz space launch vehicle, which Russia also used in the February 2024 launch.[22]  Iran could use the ”Kowsar” satellite to collect imagery on US or allied troop positions and bases in the region. CTP-ISW has not observed acknowledgment of the satellite delivery in Russian media.

An unspecified Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force member told Kuwait-based newspaper Al Jarida that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh to serve as an operational adviser to Lebanese Hezbollah.[23] CTP-ISW cannot corroborate or verify this claim. The source claimed that Fallah Zadeh would help ”manage the current war” with Israel and secure logistical and communications support. The source reported that Fallah Zadeh will not advise Hezbollah in political matters or change the political structure of Hezbollah. Hezbollah has not announced its next Secretary General following airstrikes that killed Hassan Nasrallah and his presumed successor Hashem Safi el Din.[24] Al Jarida has previously made unsubstantiated claims citing unspecified IRGC Quds Force officials that CTP-ISW also could not independently verify. No other reputable news organization independently reported similar claims corroborating al Jarida’s previous reports.

Iranian media published the full text of the “Development Plan for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology” on October 14.[25] A parliamentary presidium member recently announced the plan on October 6.[26] The plan calls for the establishment of an “Atomic Energy Council” comprised of 19 members, including the Iranian president and the ministers of energy, foreign affairs, and defense.[27] The plan also stipulates that the National Development Fund must invest at least $1 billion in Iranian nuclear power projects annually.

Iran is continuing to coordinate with regional and Axis of Resistance leaders ahead of an expected Israeli retaliatory strike on Iran. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Baghdad on October 13 to discuss the “special and dangerous conditions” in the Middle East with senior Iraqi officials.[28] Araghchi may have warned Iraqi officials against allowing Israel to use Iraqi airspace to attack Iran. Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister Fuad Hussein described “[Israel's] exploitation of Iraqi airspace” to attack Iran as “completely unacceptable” during a press conference with Araghchi.[29] Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid separately emphasized that Iraq “will never serve as a launching pad” for attacking Iran during a meeting with Araghchi.[30] Western media previously reported that Israel likely used Iraqi airspace to attack Iran on April 18 in retaliation for the April 13 Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[31] Previous Iraqi governments have also warned Iran and the United States against using Iraq as a ”launching pad” for regional conflict, though these governments in practice are unable to prevent Iranian-backed groups in particular from using Iraqi territory to target US forces and Israel.[32]

Araghchi separately met with senior Omani officials and senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdulsalam in Muscat, Oman, on October 13.[33] Araghchi told reporters in Muscat that Iran has stopped indirect talks with the United States, likely referring to indirect talks that US and Iranian officials have held in Oman in recent months to try to avoid escalation in the region.[34] Oman and Iraq have historically served as intermediaries between Iran and the United States, and Araghchi may have called on the Omani and Iraqi governments to pressure the United States to restrain Israel’s response to the October 1 Iranian attack.[35] Unspecified sources told CNN on October 12 that Iranian officials have been conducting “urgent diplomacy” with Middle Eastern countries to try to reduce the scale of Israel’s retaliation.[36] The sources added that the Iranian regime is “extremely nervous” about the retaliation and is “uncertain” that the United States can convince Israel not to strike Iranian nuclear and energy infrastructure.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Hezbollah Drone Strike in Israel: Hezbollah’s October 13 drone attack targeting an IDF base is likely part of an effort to impose costs on Israel as Hezbollah faces operational challenges in southern Lebanon. This strike is likely an effort to impose costs on Israel at a time when Hezbollah can conduct only limited defensive operations in southern Lebanon.
• Hezbollah Tactical Adaptation: Hezbollah has almost certainly adopted a new tactic in an attempt to evade Israeli air defenses. The development of this tactic is a byproduct of Hezbollah’s year-long learning process during its fires campaign targeting civilian and military sites in northern Israel since October 2023.
• Iran-Russia: Iranian media reported that Russia will launch two satellites on Iran’s behalf after Iran sent the two satellites to Russia on October 11.
• Iranian Support to Hezbollah: An unspecified Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force member told Kuwait-based newspaper Al Jarida that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh to serve as an operational adviser to Lebanese Hezbollah. CTP-ISW cannot corroborate or verify this claim.
• Iranian Preparations for Israeli Strike: Iran is continuing to coordinate with regional and Axis of Resistance leaders ahead of an expected Israeli retaliatory strike on Iran.

 

Iran Update, October 13, 2024

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Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The United States deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and US military personnel to operate the system to Israel on October 13 to bolster Israeli air defenses following the April 13 and October 1 Iranian attacks on Israel.[1] The THAAD system is a “ground-based interceptor designed to shoot down ballistic missiles.”[2] Iran fired approximately 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in its April 13 attack and approximately 180 ballistic missiles in its October 1 attack.[3] The Wall Street Journal reported on October 13 that fewer than 100 US military personnel will operate the THAAD system in Israel.[4] The Pentagon stated that the deployment of the THAAD system underscores the United States’ “ironclad commitment” to defending Israel.[5] The United States previously deployed a THAAD system to the Middle East following Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack into Israel.[6] The United States also deployed a THAAD system to Israel in 2019 for “training and an integrated air defense exercise.”[7] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi responded to the deployment of the anti-missile system on October 13, warning that the United States is “putting [the] lives of its troops at risk by deploying them to ... Israel.”[8] Araghchi added that Iran has “no red lines” in defending its interests and people.[9]

US officials told NBC on October 12 that they believe Israel has “narrowed down” its targets for a retaliatory attack on Iran.[10] The officials stated that the targets include Iranian military and energy infrastructure and added that there is “no indication” that Israel will attack Iranian nuclear facilities or conduct targeting killings.[11] The officials emphasized that Israel has not finalized “how and when to act,” however.[12] An Israeli journalist separately reported on October 12 that Israel will delay its retaliatory attack until a US Army THAAD anti-missile battery arrives in Israel.[13] These reports come as Iranian officials have been conducting “urgent diplomacy” with Middle Eastern countries to try to reduce the scale of Israel’s retaliation.[14] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, and Oman on October 9, 10, and 13, respectively.[15] Unspecified sources told CNN that the Iranian regime is “extremely nervous” about the Israeli retaliation and is “uncertain” that the United States can convince Israel not to strike Iranian nuclear and energy infrastructure.[16] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance are likely trying to compel the United States to pressure Israel into a less-costly retaliatory strike by threatening to start an “energy war.”[17]

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar negotiated with Iran over financial support for a larger-scale attack on Israel in 2021, underscoring the coordination between Hamas and the wider Axis of Resistance before the October 7 attacks.[18] The Washington Post reported that Sinwar requested funding and military support from numerous senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, in order to “destroy Israel completely in two years.”[19] Iran reportedly agreed to allocate $10 million to the al Qassem Brigades, and several weeks later, Sinwar requested an additional $500 million to be allocated in monthly dividends over two years.[20] Iran’s financial support of Hamas and the al Qassem Brigades has been well-established and Western officials have previously estimated that Iran provides Hamas with around $100 million in annual funding for Hamas’ military activities.[21] This funding was instrumental for Hamas to be able to marshal the capabilities required to carry out the October 7 attacks.[22] Sinwar's direct coordination and communication with senior Iranian officials, along with meetings between Hamas and Iranian officials in July 2023, underscore that Iran had strategic foreknowledge of the October 7 attacks.[23] It remains unclear if Iran had tactical knowledge of the attack’s exact timing.

An unspecified IDF division began a new ground operation near Aita al Shaab and Ramyeh in southern Lebanon on October 13.[24] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported the IDF Air Force and artillery conducted a “massive” bombardment before Israeli forces began ground maneuvers.[25] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces with improvised explosive devices, small arms, rockets, anti-tank guided missiles, and mortars in Aita al Shaab and Ramyeh.[26]

Israeli forces entered a UNIFIL position in Ramyeh, southern Lebanon, after sustaining injuries in a Hezbollah attack close to the UNIFIL position on October 13.[27] The IDF reported that Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces with “a massive anti-tank missile” during an operation in an unspecified area of southern Lebanon, injuring several soldiers.[28] Israeli media reported that over 25 Israeli soldiers were injured in combat in southern Lebanon on October 13.[29] This casualty count is high for Israeli operations. The IDF reported that Israeli forces had to come within a few meters of a UNIFIL position to evacuate the wounded soldiers.[30] The IDF said that it was in constant contact with UNIFIL forces during the maneuver.[31] UNIFIL stated two Israeli tanks destroyed “the main gate and forcibly entered” the UNIFIL position in Ramyeh on October 13.[32] UNIFIL also reported Israeli munition emissions caused skin irritation and gastrointestinal reactions to 15 peacekeepers.[33] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appealed to the UN Secretary General to remove UNIFIL forces from combat areas in southern Lebanon on October 13.[34] Netanyahu accused Hezbollah of using UNIFIL sites and personnel as “human shields” and “hostages.”[35]

Hezbollah conducted a drone attack targeting an IDF training camp in Binyamina, south of Haifa, and injured at least 67 Israelis on October 13.[36] Hezbollah said it launched multiple drones targeting a training camp for the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade.[37] Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah launched two or three drones in the attack and that the IDF Navy intercepted one of the drones over Israeli territorial waters.[38] The drone that impacted in Binyamina reportedly did not trigger any warnings or register on Israeli detection systems.[39] Israeli media reported that the drones were fired at the same time as a barrage of rockets from Lebanon.[40] Hezbollah claimed a rocket attack targeting an IDF base in the Golan Heights shortly after the drone impacted Binyamin.[41] The Home Front Command loosened restrictions over the targeted area prior to the attack.[42] Israeli medics said that the attack wounded over 67 people.[43] Hezbollah said it conducted the drone attack in response to two IDF airstrikes on Basta and al Nuwairi neighborhoods in central Beirut on October 10.[44] The IDF reportedly targeted senior Hezbollah official and Jihad Council member Wafiq Safa in one of the October 10 strikes.[45]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Retaliation Against Iran: The United States deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and US military personnel to operate the system to Israel on October 13 to bolster Israeli air defenses following the April 13 and October 1 Iranian attacks on Israel. US officials told NBC on October 12 that they believe Israel has “narrowed down” its targets for a retaliatory attack on Iran.
• Hamas: Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar negotiated with Iran over financial support for a larger-scale attack on Israel in 2021, underscoring the coordination between Hamas and the wider Axis of Resistance before the October 7 attacks.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: An unspecified IDF division began a new ground operation near Aita al Shaab and Ramyeh in southern Lebanon on October 13. Israeli forces entered a UNIFIL position in Ramyeh, southern Lebanon, after sustaining injuries in a Hezbollah attack close to the UNIFIL position on October 13. The IDF reported that Israeli forces had to come within a few meters of a UNIFIL position to evacuate the wounded soldiers.
• Hezbollah Attacks into Israel: Hezbollah conducted a drone attack targeting an IDF training camp in Binyamina, south of Haifa, and injured at least 67 Israelis on October 13.

 

Iran Update, October 10, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld, Avery Borens, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened senior Saudi officials, warning that the Axis of Resistance would attack Saudi energy assets and infrastructure if Saudi Arabia supports an Israeli attack on Iran, according to anonymous Iranian officials speaking to Reuters.[1] Araghchi traveled to Riyadh on October 9 to discuss the October 7 War with senior Saudi officials.[2] Araghchi said that Iran “sent a clear message” to Saudi Arabia that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or the Houthis could “respond” if Saudi Arabia supports an Israeli attack.[3] Reuters separately reported that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have told the United States that they will deny Israel use of their respective airspaces to attack Iran, citing three unspecified Gulf sources. The sources added that the Gulf states are pushing the United States to prevent Israel from attacking Iranian energy assets or infrastructure because they fear that such an attack could trigger Iranian-backed attacks on them.[4] Araghchi traveled to Doha following his one-day visit to Riyadh and met with Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al Thani on October 10, presumably to convey a similar warning.[5]

Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Alaeddin Boroujerdi said on October 10 that Iran could withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in response to an Israeli strike on Iran.[6] Boroujerdi said that a withdrawal "could be necessary to defend [Iranian] interests." Boroujerdi suggested that Iran could then build a nuclear weapon in this scenario. Iran ratified the NPT, which prohibits nuclear weaponization, in 1970 and has repeatedly threatened to withdraw to impose pressure on the West.[7]

Lebanese Hezbollah has likely lost under five percent of its original fighting force over the past year. Western estimates of Hezbollah’s fighting force range from 20,000 to 50,000 fighters.[8] Now-dead Hezbollah Secretary General Hassam Nasrallah claimed in 2021 that Hezbollah had 100,000 fighters, which was very likely an exaggeration.[9] CTP-ISW has tallied over 600 Hezbollah fighter and commander death announcements over the past year.[10] The majority of these fighters died from the IDF air campaign to degrade Hezbollah capabilities in Lebanon. Hezbollah had issued timely mourning posts of its fighters throughout the conflict until Israel began its intensive air campaign against the force in late September 2024.[11] Local sources have continued to announce fighter deaths even after Hezbollah stopped distributing notices.[12] The IDF spokesperson separately said on October 5 that Israeli forces have killed 440 Hezbollah operatives since beginning ground operations in southern Lebanon, bringing the Hezbollah death toll to around 1,100.[13] The IDF has killed additional fighters since October 5, though the number is unclear.[14] IDF operations, including the widespread September pager and radio attacks, have almost certainly seriously injured thousands of Hezbollah fighters and rendered them unable to fight, moreover.[15] While the IDF has significantly degraded Hezbollah leadership, Hezbollah still retains the bulk of its rank-and-file forces capable of conducting attacks into northern Israel and engaging Israeli forces in Lebanon.

Israeli journalists reported on October 10 that the IDF has taken control of some border areas in southeastern Lebanon.[16] Israeli journalists recently visited the IDF 91st Division in an unspecified village in southeastern Lebanon.[17] Israeli Army Radio reported that Israeli forces took control of Lebanese villages in the area “within a few days” and are now operating within the villages to clear them of Hezbollah military infrastructure.[18] Several journalists noted that the recent Israeli ground maneuvers have made travel on the Israel-Lebanon border easier and safer from Hezbollah attacks.[19] Journalists posted photos of Israeli tanks, bulldozers, Humvees, and other machinery in southern Lebanese villages.[20] Hezbollah fighters do not appear to be conducting significant resistance to Israeli forces in these villages, as the Israeli forces have consistently encountered weapons caches and infrastructure formerly used by Hezbollah fighters that ”left the area.”[21] Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah fighters at one point tried to reach a warehouse that had been seized by Israeli forces and were killed.[22] An Israeli commander previously noted some Hezbollah militants have withdrawn deeper into Lebanon while others have fled from Israeli forces.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi threatened senior Saudi officials, warning that the Axis of Resistance would attack Saudi energy assets and infrastructure if Saudi Arabia supports an Israeli attack on Iran, according to anonymous Iranian officials speaking to Reuters.
• Iran: Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Alaeddin Boroujerdi said on October 10 that Iran could withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in response to an Israeli strike on Iran.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has likely lost under five percent of its original fighting force over the past year.
• Lebanon: Israeli journalists reported on October 10 that the IDF has taken control of some border areas in southeastern Lebanon.

 

Iran Update, October 9, 2024

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Carolyn Moorman, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Grace Mappes, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Israeli leaders have continued deliberating over how to respond to the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with the Israeli Security Cabinet to discuss potential Israeli responses on October 8 and will meet with the cabinet again for further discussion on October 10.[1] Anonymous Israeli officials told Axios that the Israeli response will be “significant and will likely include a combination of airstrikes on military targets in Iran and clandestine attacks like the one that killed Hamas Leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.”[2] The officials appeared to make no mention of striking Iranian energy and nuclear sites.[3] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant similarly said that the Israeli response will be “deadly and surprising,” adding that Iran “won’t understand what happened and how.”[4] US President Joe Biden, US Vice President Kamala Harris, and Netanyahu held a phone call on October 9 to discuss further how to respond to the recent Iranian missile attack.[5]

Gallant has postponed his official visit to Washington, DC, to discuss the Israeli response with senior US officials.[6] Netanyahu ordered Gallant to delay the visit until after Biden and Netanyahu spoke on the phone and the Israeli Security Cabinet approved a response, according to an anonymous Israeli source speaking to the Washington Post.[7]

Lebanese Hezbollah is continuing to avoid decisive engagements with Israeli forces, as they expand the breadth of ground operations in southern Lebanon.[8] Israeli forces in southern Lebanon have observed that Hezbollah prefers to engage from a distance, using anti-tank missiles and rockets, as opposed to close-quarters combat in border villages.[9] Israeli sources have reported that Hezbollah forces will withdraw shortly after making contact with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).[10] The IDF 36th Division commander similarly noted that some Hezbollah militants withdraw deeper into Lebanon while others flee outright.[11] The IDF has reported some isolated small-arms engagements with Hezbollah militants in buildings but that Hezbollah defenses in border villages primarily involve the widespread use of improvised explosive devices (IED) and mines.[12] The IDF has also noticed that, compared to Hamas fighters in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah militants are more organized and are operating above ground with longer-range weapons systems.[13]

Some Iranian hardliners are indirectly lobbying Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his fatwa that prohibits the production and use of nuclear weapons. Thirty-nine parliamentarians wrote a letter to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) calling for the revision of Iranian "defense doctrine" and for the SNSC to “issue permission and provide facilities for the production of nuclear weapons.”[14] The SNSC lacks the authority to unilaterally override Khamenei’s fatwa, which the parliamentarians almost certainly realize. But the SNSC can recommend to Khamenei that he revoke his fatwa, which is likely the effect that the parliamentarians are trying to generate. One of the signatories is Mohammad Reza Sabaghian Bafghi, who has previously supported Iran producing a nuclear weapon.[15] Another signatory is Hassan Ali Akhlaghi Amiri, who is affiliated with ultraconservative the Paydari Front.[16] One of the most prominent leaders of the Paydari Front is Saeed Jalili, who is one of Khamenei’s representatives to the SNSC. Amiri told Iranian media that the names of the other signatories will be disclosed when the letter is published.[17] This letter is consistent with reports that senior Iranian officials have been debating in recent months whether to build a nuclear weapon.[18] That the parliamentarians who drafted and signed the letter felt comfortable doing so reflects the extent to which suggesting that Khamenei should revoke his fatwa has become normalized in regime discourse. These parliamentarians would have jeopardized their political careers if the drafting and signing of the letter angered Khamenei. That these parliamentarians did so suggests that they did not perceive this risk and that Khamenei may be receptive to their lobbying.

An Iranian outlet affiliated with former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei claimed on October 8 that Russia provided Iran with an S-400 air defense system and a squadron of Su-35 fighter jets but provided no evidence for this claim.[19] No other Iranian or Western media outlet has reported this news at the time of this writing, and CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. Iran has long sought to acquire advanced air defense systems and Su-35s from Russia, and CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia could supply Iran with advanced military equipment in return for Iran’s ongoing support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[20]

Russian illegal arms dealer and Ulyanovsk Oblast parliamentarian Viktor Bout reportedly helped broker a deal for Russia to sell arms worth $10 million to Yemen's Houthi rebels in August 2024 amid increasing reports of potential Russian arms transfers to the Houthis and deepening Russo-Iranian cooperation. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on October 7, citing a European security official and other sources familiar with the matter, that Bout assisted in negotiations for small arms sales worth $10 million when a Houthi delegation visited Moscow in August 2024.[21] The WSJ's sources stated that the first two deliveries would consist of mostly AK-74 assault rifles and that the Houthis also discussed the potential transfer of Kornet antitank missiles and anti-air weapons. The sources stated that they were unsure whether Bout negotiated the deal on behalf of the Kremlin or just with the Kremlin's tacit approval, and the WSJ noted that the transfer has not yet occurred and the source of the arms is still unclear.[22] The WSJ reported that these deliveries could begin as soon as October 2024 to Hudaydah Port under the guise of food supplies. Both Bout and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied the WSJ report.[23] Russia has reportedly been involved in Iranian-brokered "secret talks" to transfer Russian Yakhont (P-800 Oniks) anti-ship cruise missiles and other military equipment to the Houthis, but it is unclear whether these transfers have or will occur.[24] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Russia likely aims to leverage Iranian proxies to indirectly confront the West and shape Western decision making, particularly to deter the West from supporting Ukraine over fears of Russian escalation against the West, including escalating in a different theater.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Israeli leaders have continued deliberating over how to respond to the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah is continuing to avoid decisive engagements with Israeli forces, as they expand the breadth of ground operations in southern Lebanon.
• Iran: Some Iranian hardliners are indirectly lobbying Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his fatwa that prohibits the production and use of nuclear weapons.
• Russia: An Iranian outlet claimed that Russia provided Iran with an S-400 air defense system and a squadron of Su-35 fighter jets but provided no evidence for this claim.

Iran Update, October 8, 2024

click here to read the full report with maps

Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Israeli political leaders indicated that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut on October 4.[1] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a video statement on October 8 that Israel killed “Nasrallah himself, and Nasrallah’s replacement, and the replacement of his replacement,” which Israeli media has framed as confirmation of the killing of Safi ed Din.[2] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant similarly said on October 8 that the IDF probably killed Safi ed Din.[3] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, on the other hand, said that the IDF is still investigating the results of the airstrike targeting Safi ed Din.[4] Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem released a video statement on October 8 in which he said that Hezbollah would select a new leader based on its approving mechanisms, noting that the war made the succession to Nasrallah ”difficult and compromised.”[5] Qassem may be among the candidates considered to replace Nasrallah given that he has formal seniority in the organization and has appeared as the public face of the group in these difficult circumstances.

Netanyahu in his own video statement addressed the Lebanese people directly, saying that Hezbollah is “weaker today than it has been for many years.”[6] Netanyahu asked the Lebanese people to “take back [their] country” from Hezbollah.[7] Gallant similarly noted that Hezbollah is “without a leader” and that Israel should ”take advantage” of this situation in order to safely return displaced civilians to their homes in northern Israel.[8]

Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Qassem separately in his video statement praised Hezbollah’s resilience and vowed to continue attacks into Israel.[9] Qassem described the Israeli killing of Nasrallah and other Hezbollah leaders as a ”painful blow” but said that new leaders have capably filled these vacant positions.[10] Qassem also observed that numerous Israeli cities are within the range of many Hezbollah weapons systems and said that Hezbollah would ”expand the ranges” of its attacks.[11] Qassem separately tried to build domestic Lebanese support for Hezbollah by asserting that Hezbollah began attacking Israel in October 2023 to support the Gaza Strip and to “defend Lebanon and its people.”[12]   

Qassem also expressed Hezbollah supports for Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s efforts to broker a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.[13] Qassem did not condition Hezbollah support for a ceasefire on first securing a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, as Nasrallah consistently did.[14] Qassem refrained from elaborating on what a ceasefire in Lebanon would involve. Berri, who is a Hezbollah political ally, has met recently with Arab, Iranian, and Western officials to discuss a potential ceasefire in Lebanon.[15] A ceasefire would require Hezbollah to at least cease its near constant attacks that Qassem vowed to continue and expand in northern Israel.

The IDF deployed a fourth division—the 146th Reservist Division—to southwestern Lebanon on October 8 for “focused and delimited" ground operations against Hezbollah.[16] The 2nd infantry, 205th armored, and 213th artillery brigades are currently operating under the 146th Division.[17] This division joins the 91st, 36th, and 98th divisions in southern Lebanon shortly after Israel announced that it would expand ground operations against Hezbollah and created a new closed military zone in Western Galilee.[18] An Israeli military corresponded estimated that there are likely over 15,000 Israeli soldiers deployed to fight in southern Lebanon.[19]

The IDF destroyed a Hezbollah tunnel that crossed the Israel-Lebanon border on October 8.[20] The IDF stated that the rudimentary tunnel crossed into Israel near Zarit but that Israeli forces blocked the tunnel exit into Israel several months ago and had maintained “full operational control” over the area.[21] Israeli forces seized weapons, including anti-tank missiles, inside the tunnel.[22] The IDF added that it has not found any other Hezbollah tunnels that cross into Israel.[23]

US Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns said on October 7 that Iran could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in around a week.[24] Burns also said that the United States has observed no evidence that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has ordered the regime to build a nuclear weapon. Burns added that the United States and its partners should be able to detect “relatively early on” if Iran begins building a nuclear weapon.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israeli political leaders indicated that the IDF killed Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem lauded the resilience of Hezbollah and vowed to continue and even expand attacks into northern Israel.
• Lebanon: The IDF deployed a fourth division—the 146th Reservist Division—to southwestern Lebanon as part of its expansion of ground operations against Lebanese Hezbollah.
• Iran: US CIA Director William Burns said that Iran could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in around a week but does not appear to have yet made the decision to do so.

 

Iran Update, October 7, 2024

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Carolyn Moorman, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, Anthony Carrillo, Buckley DeJardin, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deployed a third division—the 91^st Division—to southern Lebanon on October 7 for “focused and delimited” ground operations against Lebanese Hezbollah.[1] The 91st Division joins the 36^th and 98^th divisions in southern Lebanon shortly after Israel announced that it would expand ground operations against Hezbollah.[2] The IDF 3rd, 8th, and 288th reserve brigades are operating under the 91st Division.[3] The division is ordinarily responsible for the entire Israel-Lebanon border and has conducted hundreds of attacks from Israel targeting Hezbollah.[4] Hezbollah reported that it fired upon Israeli forces around the border near Yiftah.[5] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 7 similarly indicates troop movements in the area.

The IDF created a fourth closed military zone in Western Galilee on October 7.[6] The new zone encompasses Rosh Hanikra, Hanita, Admit, Arab al Aramshe, and Shlomi, which is the western-most section of the Israel-Lebanon border.[7] Most of the border is now a closed military zone. The IDF created closed military zones to the east over the Metula area on September 30, over the Dovev, Tzvion, and Malkia areas on October 1, and over Manara and Yiftah on October 6.[8]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 25 towns and villages in southern Lebanon on October 7.[9] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River.[10] The spokesperson also ordered Lebanese civilians to keep off the sea and shoreline south of the Awali River.[11] He said that the IDF Navy would soon operate off the coast against Hezbollah.[12] Local Lebanese sources reported that Israeli naval ships fired artillery targeting Ras Naqoura in southwest Lebanon.[13] The IDF Navy has provided fire support to ground forces operating in the Gaza Strip over the past year.[14]

US Central Command Commander General Michael Erik Kurilla met with senior Israeli defense officials on October 5 and 6.[15] Kurilla spoke with Israeli Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and other commanders about the recent Iranian missile attack on Israel and other threats facing Israel.[16] The IDF reported that Kurilla and Halevi discussed Israeli ground operations into southern Lebanon as well.[17]

Senior Iranian officials have continued insisting that Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani is alive but have not yet provided evidence.[18] Western and Middle Eastern outlets have suggested that Israel killed or injured Ghaani in an airstrike on Beirut on October 4. IRGC Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Eraj Masjedi said on October 4 that Ghaani is “in good health.”[19] The host of a Palestinian conference in Tehran similarly read a message that was purportedly written by Ghaani on October 7.[20] Anonymous Israeli military sources told Israeli media that Ghaani was not the target of the IDF airstrike on Beirut and that the IDF was unaware of whether Ghaani was at the location of the airstrike.[21]

Hamas issued a statement commemorating the anniversary of its October 7, 2023, attack into Israel and celebrating the other Iranian-backed actors that have begun attacking Israel regularly over the past year.[22] This framing is consistent with Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s reported desire to ignite a regional war against Israel in order to alleviate Israeli military pressure on Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas, in its statement, praised Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias, and West Bank fighters for their regular attacks on Israel.[23] Hamas also boasted that a recent terror attack on the Israel-Jordan border has inspired ”an authentic Jordanian Arab front.”

Hamas separately claimed that it conducted its October 7 attack into Israel in order to preempt an Israeli attack.[24] This appears to be the first time that Hamas has made this claim, raising the question of why it waited until now to make this assertion if it were true. Hamas also threatened to execute more Israeli hostages in its statement commemorating its indiscriminate killing, torture, and abduction of Israeli civilians.

The Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Committee is preparing legislation that would formalize parts of the Axis of Resistance as an alliance.[25] The proposed legislation would establish a "security defense agreement" or ”resistance pact” among Iran and its regional allies, likely Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. The agreement would require alliance members to provide “comprehensive economic, military, and political support to each other” in the event of a US or Israeli attack. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council would be responsible for admitting members into the alliance. The legislation also proposes establishing a headquarters to “coordinate operations and military decisions” across the alliance. The legislation finally mentions holding combined military exercises and developing military infrastructure together. The committee will send the legislation to the Iranian Parliament for voting ”soon.” This notional alliance would formalize much of what Iran already tries to do with the Axis of Resistance. Iran views itself as a member and the leader of this informal alliance and coordinates military activities across the alliance through a network of headquarters dispersed across the Middle East.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF deployed a third division for ground operations against Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The IDF also created another closed military zone in Western Galilee.
• Iran: Senior Iranian officials have continued insisting that IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani is still alive but have not yet provided evidence.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas released a statement commemorating the anniversary of its October 7, 2023, attack into Israel and celebrated other Middle Eastern actors’ attacks on Israel.
• Iran: The Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Committee is preparing legislation that would formalize parts of the Axis of Resistance as an alliance.

Iran Update, October 6, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

 

Western and Middle Eastern outlets have suggested that Israel killed or injured Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani on October 4. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have been unable to contact Ghaani since Israel conducted an airstrike targeting Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in Beirut on October 4.[1] Ghaani was in Beirut at the time of the Israeli airstrike, according to the New York Times and Reuters. He was reportedly helping Hezbollah recover from recent Israeli attacks on the group.[2] An Iranian security official told Reuters that Ghaani was not meeting with Safi ed Din when the Israeli airstrike targeted the latter. Ghaani was last seen publicly when he visited the Hezbollah representative office in Tehran on September 29.[3] Ghaani has been notably absent from high-profile regime events since then. He was not seen at Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Friday prayer sermon on October 4 or when Khamenei met with Iranian military leadership on October 6.[4]

Some Iranian officials and state-affiliated media have called on the regime to confirm whether Ghaani is alive. An Iranian parliamentarian claimed on October 6 that Ghaani was “in perfect health” and called on the IRGC to address the rumors of his death or injury in Beirut.[5] An outlet tied to former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei similarly called on the regime to publish “news that our general is alive and well.”[6] An IRGC member stationed in Beirut told the New York Times that the regime's silence about Ghaani’s status has created “panic among rank-and-file members.”[7]

Israeli leaders have continued signaling that they will retaliate for the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said during a visit to the IDF Nevatim airbase that Israel will respond to Iran at an appropriate place and time and in a manner of its choosing.[8] The Nevatim airbase was one of the sites that Iran targeted in its recent missile attack.[9] Several missiles hit the base, causing minor damage.[10] Gallant added that the Iranian attack “didn’t even scratch” the capabilities of the IDF Air Force.[11] Israeli President Isaac Herzog separately said that the Iranian attack “obviously deserves a response” in an interview with Saudi media.[12]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant will reportedly travel to Washington, DC, to meet with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on October 9.[13] Gallant and Austin are expected to discuss US-Israel security cooperation vis-a-vis Iran.[14]

Iran appears to be preparing for an Israeli retaliation amid reports that Israel may strike sensitive Iranian sites, such as energy and nuclear infrastructure.

• The Iranian State Civil Aviation Organization canceled all civilian flights in Iran from 2100 local time on October 6 to 0600 local time on October 7.[15] These times equate to 1400-2300 ET on October 6.
• The Iranian National Tanker Company has vacated empty oil tankers from the main Iranian oil export terminal on Kharg Island.[16] Many vessels that had been docked at Bandar Abbas have left as well.[17]
• Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad met with IRGC Navy officers in Bushehr City to discuss the security of the South Pars gas field, which is the largest Iranian gas field.[18] Paknejad also visited Kharg Island.[19]

The IDF continued clearing Hezbollah infrastructure around Maroun al Ras and Odaisseh in southern Lebanon. The IDF 188th Armored Brigade (36th Division) engaged Hezbollah Radwan special operations forces (SOF), killing some and destroying military headquarters and warehouses south of Bint Jbeil.[20] The brigade commander said that the IDF is focusing on destroying Hezbollah's surface and sub-surface infrastructure in order to prevent Hezbollah attacks into Israel.[21] The IDF 1st Golani Brigade (36th Division) destroyed tunnel shafts and ammunition depots near Maroun al Ras.[22] The IDF 35th Paratroopers Brigade (98th Division) seized ”hundreds” of weapons and a vehicle used by Hezbollah Radwan SOF.[23] An anti-aircraft gun was mounted atop the vehicle, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[24]

Israeli forces separately located a Hezbollah Radwan SOF warehouse and weapons storage facility in a tunnel complex beneath a civilian home in Odaisseh along the Israel-Lebanon border.[25]

The IDF created a third closed military zone in the Upper Galilee on October 6.[26] The new zone encompasses Malkia, Manara, and Yiftah, which is between the two existing closed zones. The IDF created closed military zones over the Metula area on September 30 and over the Dovev, Tzvion, and Malkia areas on October 1.[27] Hezbollah claimed that Israeli forces tried to cross into Blida, which is adjacent to Yiftah, on October 5.[28] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 6 indicates that Israeli forces operated near Blida. An Israeli military correspondent reported on October 4 that the IDF is preparing to expand its ground operations in southern Lebanon.[29]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 25 towns and villages in southern Lebanon on October 6.[30] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River.[31]

The IDF launched a new clearing operation into Jabalia refugee camp, Gaza City, on October 6 in order to disrupt Hamas reconstitution efforts.[32] The IDF last operated in the area in May 2024, during which the IDF encountered significant resistance from three Hamas battalions.[33] Hamas has reportedly re-armed and reorganized itself in the four months since the IDF withdrew.[34] An Israeli military correspondent said that the IDF assesses that there are thousands of original Hamas fighters and thousands of new but poorly trained Hamas recruits in the northern Gaza Strip.[35] The IDF stated that it would operate around Jabalia for as long as required in order to thoroughly destroy Hamas infrastructure there.[36] The IDF Air Force struck dozens of militia sites around Jabalia as the IDF 401st and 460th armored brigades encircled the camp.[37] Israeli forces have engaged dozens of Palestinian fighters around Jabalia since entering the area.[38] The 401st and 460th armored brigades are operating under the command of the 162nd Division, which has been leading operations in Rafah since May 2024.[39] The IDF Gaza Division will now lead the Givati and Nahal brigades in clearing operations in Rafah.[40]

Anonymous Iraqi officials claimed that the United States sent “strongly worded” messages to the Iraqi federal government following an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack targeting a US diplomatic facility in Baghdad.[41] An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacked the US Diplomatic Support Complex near Baghdad International Airport on October 1.[42] The Iraqi officials claimed that the United States threatened to attack Iranian-backed militias if they continued to attack US positions or escalated further against Israel.[43] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has increased its rate of attacks targeting Israel since September 17.[44]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Western and Middle Eastern outlets have suggested that Israel killed or injured IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani in an airstrike in Beirut. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have reportedly been unable to contact Ghaani since the airstrike.
• Iran: Israeli leaders have continued signaling that they will retaliate for the recent Iranian ballistic missile attack. Iran appears to be preparing for an imminent Israeli strike, possibly targeting Iranian energy and nuclear infrastructure.
• Lebanon: The IDF continued clearing Lebanese Hezbollah infrastructure around Maroun al Ras and Odaisseh. The IDF also created a third military zone in the Upper Galilee, amid Israeli reports that the IDF will expand its ground operations into Lebanon.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF launched a new clearing operation into the Jabalia refugee camp in order to disrupt Hamas reconstitution efforts. The IDF last operated in the area in May 2024 and encountered significant resistance from three Hamas battalions.

 

Iran Update, October 3, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued advancing into southern Lebanon on October 3. Geolocated imagery indicates Israeli troop movements around the western axis of advance, specifically around Aitaroun and Yaroun.[1] The IDF Golani Brigade (36th Division) coordinated with the IDF Air Force to strike Hezbollah militants in nearby buildings.[2] Hezbollah claimed that it engaged Israeli forces as they advanced.[3] Hezbollah claimed that it detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting the IDF around Maroun al Ras and that it detonated a “barrel bomb” targeting the IDF around Yaroun.[4] A Hezbollah-affiliated reporter claimed that Hezbollah prepared ambushes beforehand.[5] The IDF previously announced on October 1 that it would soon operate in this general area to clear it of Hezbollah militants and infrastructure and asked civilians to evacuate.[6] Hezbollah-affiliated sources separately reported that the IDF is operating around Kfar Kila around the eastern axis of advance.[7] The IDF reportedly estimated that it has killed over 100 Hezbollah militants since launching ground operations into Lebanon on October 1.[8] Hezbollah appears to have stopped posting obituaries for its militants in this time.[9] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi visited the Israeli forces on the Israel-Lebanon border and vowed to continue efforts against Hezbollah.[10]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) said that an Israeli strike killed an LAF soldier in southern Lebanon on October 3.[11] The LAF said that Lebanese soldiers returned fire after the strike.[12] A Lebanese security source told Reuters that this incident marked the first time that the LAF has fired at Israeli forces in the war.[13]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 25 towns in southern Lebanon.[14] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River, which is 30 miles north of the Litani River.[15] The 25 towns that the IDF identified are all north of the Litani River.[16] The IDF conducted several airstrikes in at least two of the specified towns on October 3.[17]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership across Lebanon on October 3.[18] The IDF Air Force struck over 200 Hezbollah targets, including Hezbollah militants and infrastructure, including observation posts and weapons depots.[19] The IDF 210th Division directed an airstrike that targeted and killed the local Hezbollah commander for the Shebaa Farms and Mount Hermon area.[20] The IDF said the commander was responsible for the Hezbollah attack that killed 12 children in the Golan Heights in July 2024.[21] The commander also oversaw hundreds of rocket and anti-tank guided missile attacks targeting IDF positions on Mount Dov, Mount Hermon, and the northern Golan Heights.[22]

The IDF conducted numerous strikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure and intelligence networks in Beirut on October 3. The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson asked residents of the Haret Hreik, Burj al Barajneh, and Hadath West neighborhoods to evacuate at least 500 meters from specific buildings that the IDF identified as “Hezbollah facilities.”[23] Local sources reported that the IDF then conducted strikes targeting across several neighborhoods in southern Beirut.[24] The IDF also conducted a strike that targeted an apartment complex in Bachoura, Beirut, marking the second time that the IDF has struck a target within Beirut city limits.[25] The IDF said that it struck several targets affiliated with Hezbollah's intelligence branch in Beirut, including intelligence unit members, collection instruments, and other infrastructure.[26] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported that nine people were killed and 14 injured in Israeli strikes on Beirut.[27]

The IDF stated that Hezbollah has used a civilian border crossing near Damascus as its “main” route for receiving military equipment and weapons from Syria to deliver to southern Lebanon.[28] The IDF stated that the transfer of weapons through Masnaa border crossing follows the IDF airstrikes on seven border crossings along the Syria-Lebanon border on September 26.[29] The IDF urged the Lebanese government to conduct strict inspections of trucks passing through civilian crossings and to turn weapons carrying trucks back to Syria.[30] The Lebanese Transport Minister Ali Hamieh said that the Lebanese government will monitor all border crossings following the accusations.[31]

A senior aide to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei traveled to Beirut and met with Lebanese officials on October 3.[32] Mohsen Ghomi, who is the international relations deputy in the Office of the Supreme Leader, met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, among others, to discuss the war against Israel.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will lead Friday prayers in Tehran on October 4, during which he will speak publicly on the war against Israel.[33] Khamenei is expected to honor Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan, both of whom died in the Israeli airstrike targeting the Hezbollah central military headquarters in Beirut on September 27. Khamenei will also commemorate the coming anniversary of Hamas’ brutal attack into Israel on October 7, 2023. Khamenei very rarely leads Friday prayers and typically reserves this right for especially sensitive times for the Islamic Republic. The last time that Khamenei did so was shortly after the United States killed Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.[34] CTP-ISW will report on this event further in future updates.

The Axis of Resistance has continued to signal its solidarity with Hezbollah and readiness to escalate further against Israel. An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia source claimed that there is an Iranian-backed Iraqi “combat reserve” that is near Lebanon and ready to support Hezbollah once given approval to do so.[35] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—separately fired an ”advanced” drone targeting an unspecified location in southern Israel on October 3[36] The IDF intercepted the drone.[37] Houthi spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea claimed the Houthis fired multiple Jaffa drones targeting Tel Aviv on October 3.[38] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik separately vowed to continue attacks in retaliation for US and Israeli airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen.[39]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF continued advancing into southern Lebanon. The IDF reportedly estimates that it has killed over 100 Lebanese Hezbollah militants during its ground operation. The IDF also issued calls for further evacuations.
• Lebanon: The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Lebanese Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership. The IDF conducted several strikes in Beirut specifically targeting the Hezbollah intelligence apparatus.
• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will lead Friday prayers in Tehran on October 4, during which he will speak publicly on the war against Israel. Khamenei very rarely leads Friday prayers and reserves the right for especially sensitive times for the Islamic Republic.

Iran Update, October 2, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has advanced into southern Lebanon along at least two axes. Geolocated imagery shows Israeli forces separately approaching Odaisseh and Maround al Ras.[1] The IDF 36^th and 98^th divisions participated in these advances and both have elements that fought in the Gaza Strip.[2] The Lebanese Armed Forces claimed that Israeli forces went around 1,300 feet into Lebanon around Odaisseh and Khirbet Yaroun and that the Israeli forces retrograded after a ”short period.”[3] This activity comes after the IDF began the initial phase of its ground operation into southern Lebanon on October 1. This effort—paired with the IDF air campaign—is meant to degrade Lebanese Hezbollah capabilities and destroy much of the military infrastructure that Hezbollah has built in southern Lebanon in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.[4] These military effects are meant, in turn, to achieve the stated Israeli war aim of safely returning displaced civilians to their homes in northern Israel.[5] Thousands of Israeli civilians have fled their homes, as Hezbollah has conducted almost daily attacks into northern Israel since October 2023.[6]

Hezbollah engaged the IDF as it advanced into southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed that it engaged Israeli forces in Odaisseh and Maround al Ras in southern Lebanon.[7] Hezbollah also claimed that it detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli forces near Kfar Kila and Yaroun.[8] The IDF reported that it killed Hezbollah fighters and destroyed military infrastructure in unspecified locations.[9] The IDF also reported that Hezbollah killed eight Israeli soldiers in four separate engagements.[10]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 24 towns in southern Lebanon.[11] The spokesperson asked residents to travel north of Awali River, which is 30 miles north of Litani River. The spokesperson separately asked residents to avoid traveling by vehicle from north of Litani River to anywhere south of it.[12]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership.  The IDF struck Hezbollah militants as well as observation posts and weapons depots, among other military infrastructure sites, across Lebanon.[13] The IDF reported that it has struck Hezbollah munitions production sites around Beirut in recent days.[14] The IDF also reported that it has destroyed over 150 Hezbollah infrastructure sites in airstrikes over an unspecified period of time[15]

Hezbollah has continued its attack campaign targeting civilian and military locations in Israel. Hezbollah conducted a two-wave rocket attack targeting an IDF position in Avivim for the second consecutive day on October 2.[16] The IDF reported that two rockets landed in an open area near Avivim.[17] Hezbollah also claimed that it fired rockets at Haifa in response to Israeli advances intosouthern Lebanon.[18] Hezbollah has fired rockets at Haifa almost daily since September 21.[19] Hezbollah separately attacked IDF personnel around the Israel-Lebanon border on October 2. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli troops near Adamit, Avdon, Misgav Am, Shtula, and Yaara.[20]

The IDF released new information on Hezbollah planning to launch a ground attack into Israel in the days after Hamas’ attack into Israel in October 2023. Israel military correspondent reported that over 3,000 Iranian-backed fighters deployed to the Israel-Lebanon border after Hamas’ October 7 attack in preparation for their own possible ground attack into Israel.[21] This force included 2,400 militants from Hezbollah‘s Radwan special operations forces and 500 Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants. The correspondent added that these forces were equipped with ”thousands of guns, anti-tank missiles, mines, [and] RPGs.”[22] The forces also had equipment, including aerial photographs, binoculars, night-vision goggles, and protective vests.[23] The correspondent lastly said that the force planned to use explosives to destroy the border walls between Israel and Lebanon and also use tunnels in order to enter Israel.

The Iranian missile attack into Israel on October 1 appears to have been more effective at penetrating Israeli air defenses than the Iranian drone-missile attack in April 2024. This may indicate that Iran is learning how to optimize its strike packages against Western and Israeli air defenses. Though Israel intercepted most of the missiles that Iran launched on October 1, some of the missiles managed to impact. These missiles caused minor damage to dozens of homes north of Tel Aviv, a major road near the Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv, a school in central Israel, and the IDF Nevatim airbase in the Negev Desert.[24] In contrast, the United States, Israel, and their regional partners intercepted almost all of the drones and missiles that Iran launched in April 2024.[25]

Several factors could have led to the increased damage in the most recent Iranian attack. One factor could be that Iran meaningfully increased its volume of fire, launching 180-200 ballistic missiles compared to the 120 that it launched in April 2024.[26] Iran also refrained from launching slower moving cruise missiles and drones in the April 2024 attack.[27] Former Israeli Missile Defense Organization head Uzi Rubin said that the April 2024 attack was “easier to defend [against]” because the cruise missile and drones gave the IDF “plenty of warning.”[28] The ballistic missiles took about 15 minutes to fly from Iran to Israel.[29] Iran separately appeared to concentrate much of its fire around densely populated central Israel in the most recent attack, whereas Iran exclusively attacked remote areas in April 2024. Israeli air defenses are designed to avoid intercepting projectiles that will land in open areas. But the concentration of fire on central Israel, where there is a high risk of collateral damage, may have been designed to overwhelm Israeli air defenses by saturating the airspace with a large number of projectiles over relatively small and densely populated areas.

Outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) reported that Iran used a combination of missiles to achieve different effects in the attack.[30] The outlet stated that the liquid-fueled Emad missiles were meant to engage Israeli interceptors, while the more advanced Fattah and Kheybar Shekan missiles were meant to strike precision targets.

Iranian military leaders threatened that they would launch larger attacks on Israel if Israel retaliated for the October 1 missile attack.[31] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri warned that Iran would repeat its October 1 attack with “greater intensity” and target “all [Israeli] infrastructure” if Israel attacks Iranian territory.[32] Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi similarly warned that Iran would attack unspecified Israeli infrastructure if Israel retaliates against Iran for the October 1 attack.[33] Mousavi added that future Iranian attacks would be “stronger and multiple times [larger].”[34]

These Iranian threats come amid reports that Israel will conduct a “significant retaliation” against Iran in the coming days.[35] Anonymous Israeli officials told Axios that Israel may target Iranian air defense sites or energy infrastructure or conduct a targeted killing similar to the killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024.[36] The officials said that the Israeli retaliation will be “much more significant” than the Israeli response to the April 2024 Iranian drone and missile attack.[37] Israel at the time conducted an airstrike targeting an Artesh airbase in Esfahan, Iran, in retaliation.[38] The Israeli officials added that Israel could attack Iranian nuclear facilities if Iran launched another attack.[39]

Adviser to IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, Ebrahim Jabari, claimed on October 2 that Iran conducted a cyber attack targeting Israeli air defense systems at the same as its ballistic missile attack on October 1.[40]

Reuters reported on how deeply Israel has infiltrated the Iranian security establishment and Hezbollah, citing anonymous Iranian sources.[41] The report stated that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei offered to relocate Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah to Iran in response to concerns of Israeli infiltration and the possibility that Israel would try to kill Nasrallah. Nasrallah declined the offer, according to the report, and Khamenei sent IRGC Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan to Beirut to persuade Nasrallah. Nilforoushan died in the Israeli airstrike that killed Nasrallah in Beirut. The airstrike follows several other Israeli operations killing high-profile officials in the Axis of Resistance, such as Mohammad Reza Zahedi, Fuad Shukr, and Ismail Haniyeh. Reuters reported that the killings—coupled with Israel detonating thousands of Hezbollah pagers and personal radios—has stoked mistrust and paranoia among Iranian and Hezbollah leaders, including Khamenei. Iran, according to Reuters, launched investigating possible Israeli agents in the Iranian security apparatus, focusing on individuals traveling or with family abroad. Reuters also reported that Iran has arrested several individuals on suspicion that they helped Israel kill Nasrallah.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed three drone attacks targeting three unspecified locations in northern Israel on October 2.[42]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened on October 1 to attack US forces in the Middle East if the United States attacks or helps Israel attack Iran in retaliation for the October 1 Iranian missile attack. Kataib Hezbollah threatened to attack US forces and interests in Iraq and across the region if the United States participates in “any hostile action” against Iran or if Israel uses Iraqi airspace to attack Iran.[43] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba similarly threatened to attack US forces if the United States or Israel attack Iran.[44] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba separately criticized Jordan for helping Israel intercept Iranian ballistic missiles.[45]

Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis launched three Quds-5 cruise missiles at unspecified locations in Israel on October 2.[46] Sarea claimed that the missiles hit their targets and added that the Houthis are ready to join any combined military operations against Israel. CTP-ISW cannot verify whether these attacks occurred.

Hamas claimed responsibility for the terror attack in Jaffa, south of Tel Aviv, on October 1.[47] Hamas claimed that two fighters managed to infiltrate into Israeli territory from the West Bank to conduct the attack. The two Hamas fighters reportedly stabbed and killed an Israeli security officer and seized his firearm.[48] The two attackers then shot and killed eight civilians in Jaffa and wounded 16 others before Israeli forces killed both attackers.[49] The IDF identified the two Hamas fighters as residents of Hebron in the West Bank and identified their homes for demolition.[50] The IDF also detained and interrogated several “suspects,” who were likely assisted the two Hamas fighters in the attack. [51]

Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group—has increased its rate of attacks targeting security forces in southeastern Iran in recent days. This uptick coincides with the two-year anniversary of “Bloody Friday,” when Iranian security forces brutally suppressed protests in Zahedan, Sistan and Balochistan Province.[52] Jaish al Adl has claimed the following attacks.

September 28

• An attack killing the deputy police chief of the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) in Sib and Suran.[53]
• An attack targeting two LEC officers at a police station in Zahedan.[54]

September 29

• A small arms and IED attack targeting two patrol vehicles in Rask.[55]
• An attack targeting an LEC officer in Khash.[56]
• An attack targeting an LEC base at Iranshahr.[57]

October 1

• An attack on the “Festival of Affections” ceremony at a school in Bent, killing a local IRGC commander and the head of the city council.[58]
• An attack targeting an IRGC Intelligence Organization vehicle, killing two agents in Rask.[59]
• An attack targeting a security patrol, killing two officers in Khash.[60]

This activity is part of a general increase in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[61] Jaish al Adl has conducted numerous attacks targeting Iranian security forces in this time, at times demonstrating unprecedented coordination and organization.[62] Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni ordered Deputy Interior Minister for Security and Police Affairs Brigadier General Ali Akbar Pour Jamshidian and the Sistan and Baluchistan governor to conduct an investigation into the recent attacks.[63] Iranian leaders could interpret some of this activity through the lens of their fight against the United States and Israel, as they have long accused both countries of stoking anti-regime militancy in Iran.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF has advanced into southern Lebanon along two axes. Hezbollah engaged the IDF as it advanced, killing at least eight Israeli soldiers. The IDF called on civilians across southern Lebanon to evacuate immediately and move northward.
• Iran: The recent Iranian missile attack on Israel appears to have been more effective at penetrating Israeli air defenses than the Iranian drone-missile attack in April 2024. This may indicate that Iran is learning how to optimize its attacks against Western and Israeli defenses.
• Iran: Israel will reportedly conduct a “significant retaliation” against Iran in the coming days. Iranian military leaders threatened that they would respond by conducting an even greater attack on Israel.
• Iran: Reuters reported on how deeply Israel has infiltrated the Iranian security establishment and Hezbollah. Israeli operations, including the killing of senior Axis of Resistance officials, has stoked mistrust and paranoia among Iranian and Hezbollah leaders.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to attack US forces if the United States supports an Israeli retaliation against Iran. Militia officials also criticized Jordan for purportedly helping Israel intercept Iranian ballistic missiles.
• Iranian internal security: There has been a significant uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran in recent days. This coincides with the two-year anniversary of “Blood Friday,” when Iranian security forces brutally suppressed protesters in southeastern Iran.

Iran Update, October 1, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iran launched a two-wave ballistic missile attack that targeted Israel from Iranian territory on October 1.[1] Iran claimed to launch this attack in response to Israel’s killing of senior Axis of Resistance leaders including Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut, and Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.[2] Iran launched approximately 180 ballistic missiles, including Emad and Ghadr ballistic missiles, from Iranian territory.[3] Iran claimed to launch its domestically produced hypersonic medium-range “Fattah-2” ballistic missile for the first time in the October 1 attack.[4] The IRGC claimed it launched Fattah missiles to destroy Israel's Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile interception systems.[5] The IRGC conducted the October 1 operation with the approval of the Supreme National Security Council and “with the knowledge of” the Armed Forces General Staff.[6] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh claimed that Iran targeted Israeli “military, operational and intelligence” centers associated with the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, which occurred in Tehran, Iran in July 2023.[7] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media claimed that Iran targeted the following airbases.[8]

• The Nevatim Airbase, which houses Israeli F-35s, located outside of Beersheba, Israel.[9] Most of Israel’s F-35s were presumably airborne at the time of the attack, given that most of Israel’s aerial refuelers were airborne during the attack. This would have enabled Israel to keep most of its aircraft airborne during the strike both to prevent any damage to the aircraft and to intercept projectiles if needed and possible. Pro-Hezbollah media claimed this base was used in the Israeli killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.[10] Geolocated footage showed impacts to the base from missiles.[11]
• The Hatzerim Airbase in the Negev Desert.[12]
• The Tel Nof Airbase 20 kilometers south of Tel Aviv.[13] Geolocated footage showed missiles impacting at or near the Tel Nof Airbase.[14]

Geolocated footage also showed Iranian ballistic missiles impacting in at least three other locations:

• An area south of Herzliya, Israel.[15] The geolocated footage depicts an area located near the IDF Glilot Intelligence Base, which houses IDF Unit 8200, which is the IDF’s signals collection unit, and the Mossad Headquarters.[16] Israel evacuated the Glilot Intelligence base before the attack.[17]
• A school in Gedera, Israel, located near the Tel Nof Airbase.[20]
• An area near the Ayalon Mall, Ramat Gan, Israel.[18] Ayalon Mall is immediately west of Yarkon Park, where Shin Bet is headquartered.[19]

The Iranian attack killed one Palestinian near Jericho in the West Bank, and shrapnel lightly injured two Israelis in Tel Aviv.[21]

Iran likely intended to inflict significant damage on Israel by oversaturating Israeli air defenses, particularly in central Israel. Iran launched approximately 180 ballistic missiles targeting Israel on October 1, compared to the approximately 120 ballistic missiles it fired at Israel in April 2024.[22] The April attack focused on Israeli positions in northern and southern Israel, with several ballistic missiles striking Nevatim Airbase.[23] This attack focused on at least three possible targets between Rehovot, south of Tel Aviv, and Herzliya, north of Tel Aviv. Rehovot and Tel Aviv are 29km apart. Some portion of the strike package focused on Nevatim and Hatzerim Airbases in southern Israel, but a large number of missiles targeted a very small geographic area in densely populated central Israel. All missiles in this area would presumably need to be intercepted because the IDF will only intercept missiles that fall in populated areas. This is not the case in Nevatim and Hatzerim, which are surrounded by relatively unpopulated deserts. The increase in ballistic missiles may have been designed to overwhelm the Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defense system by saturating it with large numbers of systems in relatively small and densely populated areas.  The large quantity of ballistic missiles also represents a significant Iranian investment that Iran is unlikely to willingly forfeit in an attack for show.

The IDF reported that Israel and its allies intercepted the “majority” of the Iranian ballistic missiles launched at Israel. IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari stated that the missiles impacted some areas in central and southern Israel, but that the IDF and the US-led defensive coalition intercepted the majority of projectiles.[24] United States National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan separately described the Iranian attack as “defeated and ineffective.”[25] An unspecified US defense official stated that US destroyers stationed in the eastern Mediterranean Sea helped intercept the Iranian ballistic missiles.[26]  The USS Arleigh Burke, USS Cole, and USS Bulkeley are currently deployed to the eastern Mediterranean region.[27] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) claimed that 90 percent of the missiles hit their intended targets without providing any evidence for these claims.[28]  

Israel vowed to retaliate against Iran for the October 1 attack. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated at the beginning of the Israeli cabinet meeting that Iran “made a big mistake and will pay.”[29] Netanyahu reiterated that Israel would attack anyone who attacks them. IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari stated that Israel’s operational plans are ready and vowed that Israel will respond ”wherever, whenever, and however we choose.”[30] Israel previously conducted retaliatory airstrikes targeting an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan, Iran, on April 18 in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[31] The IRGC warned on October 1 that it would conduct further attacks on Israel if Israel retaliates against Iran for its ballistic missile attack.[32]

The IDF began the initial phase of its ground operation in southern Lebanon. The IDF 98th Division began a “focused activity” on October 1 in what the IDF described would be a “targeted and delimited” operation in southern Lebanon.[33] The IDF said that a special operations brigade, a paratrooper brigade, and an armored brigade subordinate to the 98th Division have been preparing in recent weeks for the ground operation.[34] These units previously fought under the 98th Division for months in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli security cabinet approved the "targeted ground entry” on the evening of September 30.[35]

It is not immediately clear where the 98th Division began operations in southern Lebanon. The IDF did not specify where its forces began operations. The IDF created closed military zones over the Metula area on September 30 and over the Dovev, Tzvi’on, and Malkia areas on October 1.[36] An unspecified UNIFIL source told Western media that the Israeli forces have staged “sporadic raids” into Lebanon but have not “remained on Lebanese soil.“ [37] Lebanese sources reported that Israeli artillery units continued to bombard border towns, particularly targeting Kafr Kila, Tal al Nahhas, and areas near Khiam.[38] Artillery units serve the primary role of providing indirect fire support to ground forces’ maneuvers.[39] Lebanese sources also reported that the IDF fired illumination rounds over Rmeish and Aita al Shaab.[40]

Hezbollah has not yet engaged IDF units in Lebanon as of the time of writing. Hezbollah may not engage Israeli forces while Israeli forces are only staging “sporadic raids” that do not remain in Lebanon. Unspecified security officials confirmed to Western media that Hezbollah has not yet engaged IDF units.[41] An unspecified soldier from the 98th Division told the Wall Street Journal that Hezbollah has not yet engaged Israeli forces but that one Israeli unit spotted Hezbollah observers and directed artillery units to push them back.[42] Hezbollah, however, claimed at least six attacks targeting Israeli forces concentrated along the Israel-Lebanon border but inside Israel.[43] A correspondent from the Hezbollah-affiliated channel Al Manar reported that Hezbollah units attempted to confront Israeli attempts to penetrate the border by targeting gatherings of Israeli soldiers on the Israeli side of the border.[44]

Israeli officials maintained on October 1 that the IDF’s ground operation will remain “limited.”[45] An unspecified senior Israeli official told Israeli Army Radio that the “limited ground operation” will remove threats near or along the Israel-Lebanon border.[46] Israeli forces are expected to operate about three miles deep into Lebanese territory, according to the Wall Street Journal.[47] Three miles would encompass many border villages, including those that the IDF fought in in 2006. The IDF Arabic spokesperson issued a call to residents of 27 southern Lebanese towns on October 1 and asked residents to “evacuate [their] homes immediately.”[48] The spokesperson asked residents to immediately travel north of the Awali River, which is 30 miles north of the Litani River the spokesperson told residents to leave.[49] An unspecified security official told Western media that there is currently no thought of operations moving up to Beirut, however.[50] Evacuating up to the Awali would, however, move these individuals out of areas targeted in IDF strikes designed to interdict Hezbollah reinforcements or resupplies. The IDF also mobilized four additional reserve brigades and unspecified other forces for “operational tasks” in Lebanon on October 1.[51]

The current IDF ground operation is a continuation of a year-long, previously undisclosed Israeli special operations campaign that sought to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[52] The IDF announced on October 1 that Israeli forces destroyed about 700 Hezbollah targets in cross-border raids since October 2023, including underground compounds, military targets, weapons warehouses, explosives, and headquarters. The IDF’s cross-border operations, often led by the Egoz Unit, sometimes lasted multiple days and focused on destroying infrastructure belonging to Radwan forces located close to Israel.[53] The Egoz Unit was originally established in the 1990s as a raiding force specifically trained for operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah.[54] Unspecified Israeli officials said that the IDF’s current ground incursion into southern Lebanon will be ”an extension of the previous” raids with more units deployed to destroy infrastructure that smaller special forces could not.[55]

Hezbollah began its cross-border firing campaign in support of Palestinians in Gaza in October 2023. Israeli Army Radio reported that over 3,000 of Hezbollah’s Radwan special operations forces deployed along the Israel-Lebanon border following the October 7 attacks to conduct a long-planned ground infiltration into northern Israel.[56] Hezbollah pioneered the idea of ground attacks into Israel, and it developed the Radwan Force to this end.[57]

The IDF Air Force continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah's leadership and capabilities on October 1. The IDF continued to target Hezbollah weapons launchers, weapons storage facilities, and other military infrastructure across Lebanon.[58] The IDF’s air campaign concentrated airstrikes primarily on southern Lebanon but also continued to target sites in the Bekaa Valley. The IDF targeted and killed Hezbollah Unit 4400 commander Mohammad Jaafar Qasir in an airstrike in Beirut on October 1.[59] The IDF said that Unit 4400 is responsible for transferring weapons from Iran and its proxies to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[60] Qasir was a senior Hezbollah member who had been in his position for 15 years and was one of the ”most dominant” figures behind Iran’s ground line of communication through Syria to Hezbollah.[61] The IDF also killed the commander of the Syria-based Imam Hussein Division al Faqar Hinawi in Beirut on October 1.[62]  The IRGC formed the Imam Hussein Division in 2016.[63] The IDF said that the Imam Hussein Division had moved its headquarters to southern Lebanon since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war and operates closely with Hezbollah’s southern command units.[64]

The IDF Air Force likely struck multiple Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in southern Syria on October 1, possibly to suppress SAA air defenses.[65] The IDF also struck multiple locations in eastern Daraa and western Suwayda on October 1.[66] Syrian sources reported that the IDF targeted and eliminated the radar systems of five Syrian Arab Army (SAA) battalions, including those located at the al Thaala and al Khalkhala military airports in western Suwaida.[67] A Syrian outlet noted that the number of systems targeted, and Israel’s use of drones differentiates these strikes from Israel’s previous attacks targeting radar systems in southern Syria.[68]

The IDF has previously conducted airstrikes targeting SAA sites in southern Syria in response to SAA's cooperation with Lebanese Hezbollah.[69] The IDF has repeatedly targeted sites in Quneitra and Daraa provinces that Hezbollah fighters use as reconnaissance and observation points to observe the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[70] The IDF likely struck SAA sites in Suwayda and Daraa provinces on October 1 due to ongoing SAA-Hezbollah cooperation and possibly to continue to disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to receive weapons from Syrian territory. Israel has previously conducted airstrikes in Rif Dimashq and near the Lebanon-Syria border for this purpose.[71]

Hezbollah fired “Fadi-4” medium-range rockets targeting the Mossad headquarters near Tel Aviv on October 1.[72] This is the second time that Hezbollah targeted Mossad Headquarters near Tel Aviv in the recent days.[73] Hezbollah also reported that it fired a Fadi-4 rocket targeting Unit 8200 headquarters near Tel Aviv for the first time on October 1.[74] Unit 8200 is an Israeli Intelligence Corps unit responsible for signals intelligence and similar activities.[75] Hezbollah separately claimed that it fired medium-range rockets targeting Sde Dov Airport, which closed in 2019, near Tel Aviv on October 1.[76] Hezbollah said that these attacks are part of “Operation Khaybar,” which is Hezbollah’s response to the Israeli airstrike that killed Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on September 27.[77] The IDF has not commented on either attack at this time.

Hezbollah continued its attack campaign targeting Israeli civilian and military sites in Israel on October 1.  Hezbollah conducted a two-wave rocket attack targeting an IDF position in Metula.[78] The IDF said that it detected several projectiles over Metula and intercepted some of them.[79] Hezbollah also mortared Israeli forces in Avivim on October 1.[80] The IDF said that it also identified individual projectiles that fell in open areas in Avivim.[81] Hezbollah claimed on October 1 that the latest attack campaign against Israel is in response to Israel’s ”invasion” of Lebanese towns and villages.[82]

Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted a rocket attack targeting a US diplomatic facility near Baghdad International Airport on October 1.[83] The US ambassador to Iraq announced that an attack took place at the Diplomatic Support Complex, which is a US State Department facility.[84] The attack occurred hours before the Iranian ballistic missile attack targeting Israel. Iraqi media reported that ”elements outside the law” launched three Katyusha rockets from al Amiriya in Baghdad toward the complex.[85] Possible Iranian-backed Iraqi militants recently attacked the Baghdad Diplomatic Services Compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10.[86]

A security source separately told Al Jazeera on October 1 that unspecified militants conducted a rocket attack targeting US forces at Ain al Asad airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq.[87] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—denied responsibility for the attack.[88] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have threatened in recent days to resume attacks targeting US forces if Israel launched a ground campaign into Lebanon.[89] Iranian state media claimed on October 1 that the United States has “officially entered” the war and that all US bases in the region are “legitimate targets” for the Axis of Resistance.[90] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, which is a coordinating body for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, separately warned on October 1 that Iraqi militias will target “all US bases and interests” in the region if the United States attacks Iran or if Israel uses Iraqi airspace to attack Iran in retaliation for the Iranian attack on Israel.[91]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed three Arqab cruise missile attacks targeting unspecified locations in Israel on October 1.[92]

Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis launched one drone at Tel Aviv and four “Sammad 4” drones targeting unspecified sites in Eilat, Israel, on October 1, before Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel.[93] Israeli media did not acknowledge the attack. CTP-ISW cannot verify if these attacks took place.

Two unidentified individuals shot and killed eight civilians in Jaffa, south of Tel Aviv, on October 1.[94] The gunmen also wounded seven other civilians before Israeli security forces killed both gunmen.[95] Palestinian militias including the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and Palestinian Mujahideen Movement praised the attack, calling it a “natural response” to Israeli military operations in Gaza and the West Bank.[96] No Palestinian militias have taken responsibility for the shooting attack at the time of this writing, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Ballistic Missile Attack in Israel: Iran launched a two-wave ballistic missile attack that targeted Israel from Iranian territory on October 1. Iran likely intended to inflict significant damage on Israel by oversaturating Israeli air defenses, particularly in central Israel.
• Israeli Ground Operation in Lebanon: The IDF began the initial phase of its ground operation in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has not yet engaged IDF units in Lebanon as of the time of writing. Hezbollah may not engage Israeli forces while Israeli forces are only staging “sporadic raids” that do not remain in Lebanon.
• Hezbollah Attacks Targeting Northern Israel: Hezbollah fired “Fadi-4” medium-range rockets targeting the Mossad headquarters near Tel Aviv on October 1.
• Iraq: Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted a rocket attack targeting a US diplomatic facility near Baghdad International Airport on October 1.
• Houthis: Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis launched one drone at Tel Aviv and four “Sammad 4” drones targeting unspecified sites in Eilat, Israel, on October 1, before Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel.
• Terrorist Attack in Israel: Two unidentified individuals shot and killed eight civilians in Jaffa, south of Tel Aviv, on October 1.

Iran Update, September 30, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 6:55pm ET

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it began a "targeted and delimited ground operation in southern Lebanon" on September 30.[1] The IDF said that ground forces will operate to target Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure in villages along the Israel-Lebanon border.[2] The IDF said that Hezbollah infrastructure in these villages represents an “immediate and real” threat to Israeli communities in the north.[3] Israeli military and political officials formally approved the ”next steps” of Israel’s operation in Lebanon on September 30.[4] The IDF said it will act to achieve its stated war aim of returning the residents of the north to their homes.[5]

It is unclear where or if the IDF has entered southern Lebanon in force at the time of writing. Western media reported on September 30 that the IDF conducted several smaller incursions in the past week (for detailed coverage of these incursions, see below), but CTP-ISW has not yet observed large Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.[6] Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen reported on September 30 that Israeli units are concentrated at several positions along the Israel-Lebanon border.[7] This report is consistent with information reported by Western media.[8] Hezbollah claimed cross-border attacks targeting Israeli forces concentrated near the border on September 30.[9] Hezbollah mortared Israeli forces gathered in the border town Shtula.”[10] Hezbollah also claimed that it attacked Israeli soldiers in groves near the Lebanese towns Kfar Kila and Addasiya.[11] It is not clear if this attack took place in Israel or Lebanon. Saudi-owned outlets reported that Israeli tanks entered Ramish in southern Lebanon, but later deleted the reports.[12] There has been no corroboration of these now-deleted reports.

The IDF said that Israeli ground forces will coordinate with the IDF Air Force and artillery units to attack military targets during this stage of the campaign. Local Lebanese sources and Arabic-language media reported that the IDF conducted several hours of artillery shelling and fired illumination rounds over several Lebanese border towns on September 30.[13] Arabic-language media also reported that the IDF called upon residents in Lebanese border towns to evacuate.[14] A Lebanese security source told CNN that the Lebanese army evacuated its observation posts along the Israel-Lebanon border and moved into barracks in border villages.[15]

The IDF conducted several preparatory measures to prepare for its ground incursion into Lebanon in recent days. The IDF Northern Command issued a closed military zone over the northern Israeli towns Metula, Misgav Am, and Kfar Giladi, along the Israel-Lebanon border.[16] The IDF prohibited civilian entry to the area.[17] The IDF has been preparing for the possibility of a ground incursion into Lebanon by calling up reservist units and deploying the 98th Division to the Israel-Lebanon border in recent weeks.[18] IDF commanders from the Northern Command and IDF 36th, 98th, and 91st divisions recently approved plans for the ”coming days” along the northern front.[19] These formations have conducted several training exercises in recent days to prepare for the operation, including exercises that simulated a ground offensive into Lebanon.[20] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant visited the 188th Armored Brigade (36th Division) on the border on September 30 and said that the IDF will use all its capabilities, including ground forces, to return residents to the north.[21]

Western media reported on September 30 that Israeli special operations forces have already been conducting cross-border raids “to gather intelligence” ahead of the operation since last week, citing unspecified sources.[22] The raids reportedly included entering Hezbollah tunnels along the border.[23] One such Israeli cross-border raid occurred near the Lebanese town of Alma al Shaab on an unspecified date last week.[24] The IDF’s ground operation will take place as the IDF continues its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah's capabilities with the objective of returning residents to the north.

Unspecified US officials said that the objective of Israel’s “limited” ground operation is to clear Hezbollah infrastructure near the border that Hezbollah uses to threaten northern Israel.[25] US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said that Israel had informed the US about “a series of limited ground operations” it was planning into Lebanon that would focus on Hezbollah infrastructure near the Israel-Lebanon border.[26] The term ”limited” presumably refers only to the specific IDF operations to clear border infrastructure and is not necessarily applicable to the entirety of a potential Israeli ground campaign. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi recently told Israeli soldiers that the IDF is preparing for maneuver operations that would involve Israeli forces engaging Hezbollah militants and advancing into Lebanese towns and villages that are Hezbollah “military outposts.”[27]

The IDF Air Force continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah's weapons capabilities on September 30 ahead of a potential ground offensive. The IDF struck dozens of targets throughout Lebanon, including Hezbollah air defense systems.[28] The IDF destroyed a warehouse of surface-to-air missile launchers near the Beirut International Airport.[29] Israel’s air campaign also continued to eliminate Hezbollah missile and rocket system commanders.[30] An IDF airstrike in Beirut killed the commander of Hezbollah’s medium-range rocket forces on September 28.[31] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson also said on September 30 that the IDF had also killed the commander of Hezbollah’s precision missile unit in southern Lebanon, his deputy, and other commanders of the unit in southern Lebanon.[32] The IDF’s degradation of Hezbollah’s weapons capabilities and the commanders with knowledge of these systems fit into Israeli war objectives for Lebanon, which would require the disruption or degradation of Hezbollah’s ability to fire rockets into northern Israel. Syrian sources also reported Israeli drones and explosions near Qudsaya, outside west Damascus, on September 30.[33] Israel has previously conducted airstrikes in Rif Dimashq and near the Lebanon-Syria border to disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to receive weapons.[34]

The IDF Air Force also continued to target Palestinian militia members operating in southern Lebanon. The IDF struck and killed Hamas commander in Lebanon Fatah Abu al Amin in a refugee camp in Tyre on September 29.[35] Amin coordinated Hamas’ activities in Lebanon and helped to recruit Hamas operatives in Lebanon and purchase weapons.[36] The IDF also struck and killed two members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in southern Lebanon on September 29.[37] Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine acknowledged the death of their members in Lebanon on September 30.[38] Hezbollah commonly allows Palestinian groups to launch attacks on Israel from Hezbollah-controlled territory in Lebanon.[39] Previous IDF strikes in southern Lebanon throughout the war have killed fighters from multiple Palestinian militias, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Resistance Committees.[40]

Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem re-emphasized Hezbollah’s organizational resilience and its ability to resist an Israeli assault ahead of a potential Israeli ground operation.[41] Israeli strikes have severely degraded Hezbollah leadership in recent weeks, killing Nasrallah and numerous strategic- and operational-level leaders.[42] Qassem said in his speech that Hezbollah is structured to enable it to continue operations against Israel despite the loss of leadership, and deputy commanders are prepared to step forward to take up their units’ command.[43] Qassem said that Hezbollah’s “resistance forces are ready” to engage an Israeli ground invasion and will not “budge an inch from [Hezbollah’s] positions] regardless of the destruction to Hezbollah’s leadership.[44] Qassem’s comments likely seek to assuage concerns among Hezbollah’s rank-and-file that Hezbollah leadership remains strong and able to survive ahead of potential ground engagements with Israel. Qassem lastly said that Hezbollah will choose a new secretary-general as soon as possible and according to the approved party mechanisms.[45] Hezbollah will likely rapidly promote lower-ranking commanders to take the place of those Israel has killed, but the loss of long-serving strategic- and operational-level commanders will create temporary disruption in Hezbollah’s command-and-control.

Hezbollah continued its attack campaign targeting Israeli civilian and military sites in Israel on September 30. Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah likely launched a drone targeting the Karish gas field in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.[46] The IDF Navy intercepted the drone before the drone came close to the gas field.[47] Hezbollah has not claimed the attack as of the time of writing. Hezbollah fired at least 10 rockets targeting the Haifa area, as it has done repeatedly in recent days.[48] The IDF intercepted some of the rockets targeting Haifa and others fell in open areas.[49] Hezbollah fired barrages of rockets targeting Israeli forces in Beit Saida for the first time since the beginning of the war.[50]

Iran will likely not be able to intervene in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in a way that meaningfully impacts the outcome of the conflict. The Iranian regime has thus far indicated that it does not seek to intervene directly in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[51] However, the regime could decide to intervene if it assesses that Israel’s objective in Lebanon is to significantly degrade, defeat, or destroy Hezbollah, one of its principal regional allies. The Israeli Security Cabinet altered an earlier directive on September 26 by changing the directive from avoiding a “broad campaign involving Iran” to “reducing the possibility ... [of] an all-out war."[52] The revision of this directive suggests that Israel has accepted the risk that Iran might directly intervene in the conflict. Iran has few military capabilities that could shape the outcome of the conflict, even if it were to intervene directly.

Iran could take other measures to harm Israeli and US interests in an effort to stop Israeli operations against Hezbollah. These actions would likely also fail to meaningfully disrupt current Israeli operations in Lebanon. Iran could take the following actions:

1) Iran could conduct a large-scale drone and missile attack targeting Israel. The Iranian regime currently appears unwilling to conduct a direct attack targeting Israel, and thus risk a large Israeli retaliatory attack on Iranian territory. Iran recently dismissed a request by Hezbollah to conduct a direct attack on Israel, stating that the “timing [wasn’t] right” for such an attack.[53] The Biden administration recently warned Iran via an unspecified third country that it would likely not be able to “restrain” Israel if Iran conducts a direct attack on Israel, according to an unspecified Western official.[54] The official added that the Biden administration warned Iran that Israel would conduct a “broader and greater” attack on Iran than it did in April 2024 if Iran directly attacks Israel.[55] Israel conducted retaliatory airstrikes targeting an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan Province, Iran, on April 18 in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[56] It is also not clear that a major drone and missile attack would impact Israeli calculations, given that the vast majority of Israelis support the war in Lebanon and the Israeli cabinet appears willing to retaliate heavily against Iran in an attempt to deter any hypothetical Iranian attack.

2) Iran could increase assassination attempts targeting senior Israeli officials. The Shin Bet announced on September 30 that Iran has “significantly” increased its efforts to conduct assassinations in Israel.[57] The Shin Bet stated that it recently thwarted several Iranian assassination plots, including some that were in the “advanced stages” of planning.[58] The Shin Bet previously announced on September 19 that unspecified Iranian officials planned an assassination plot targeting the Israeli prime minister, defense minister, or other senior officials.[59] An assassination of a senior Israeli official would have no serious impact on military operations in Lebanon.

3) Iran could order attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria to try to coerce the United States to pressure Israel to halt its operations in Lebanon. The Iranian regime has previously operated under the theory that it can coerce the United States to alter Israel’s behavior if Iran hurts US interests in response to Israeli actions.[60] Israel acts independently of the United States, and therefore Iranian-backed attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East would likely fail to disrupt Israeli operations in Lebanon.

4) Iran could further expand its nuclear program. An Iranian parliamentarian stated on September 29 that Iran should expand its nuclear program, including increasing production of 90% enriched uranium, in response to Israel killing Nasrallah.[61] An Iranian decision to significantly expand its nuclear program, or even pursue weaponization, risks an Israeli or US military or economic response but would likely not cause Israel to suspend its campaign in Lebanon. Expanding the nuclear program also runs contrary to recent Iranian efforts to pursue negotiations.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed four attacks on Israel on September 30. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed the following:

• An Arqab cruise missile attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Israel[62]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Haifa[63]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” at the port of Haifa[64]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in central Israel[65]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it began a "targeted and delimited ground operation in southern Lebanon" on September 30. It is unclear where or if the IDF has entered southern Lebanon in force at the time of writing. Western media reported on September 30 that Israeli special operations forces have already been conducting cross-border raids “to gather intelligence” ahead of the operation since last week, citing unspecified sources.
• Iranian Response to Israeli Operations in Lebanon: Iran will likely not be able to intervene in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in a way that meaningfully impacts the outcome of the conflict. Iran could take other measures to harm Israeli and US interests in an effort to stop Israeli operations against Hezbollah. These actions would likely also fail to meaningfully disrupt current Israeli operations in Lebanon.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed four attacks on Israel on September 30.

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Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

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Iran Update, September 28, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas Carl

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Lebanese Hezbollah confirmed that Israel killed its secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, in an airstrike in Beirut on September 27.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that Israel was aware of Nasrallah’s whereabouts for months and conducted the airstrike to exploit a brief window of opportunity.[2] Unspecified Israeli officials said that Israel dropped over 80 explosive munitions on Hezbollah’s main military headquarters where Nasrallah was located.[3] The IDF confirmed that the commander of Hezbollah’s Southern Front, Ali Karaki, also died in the airstrike.[4] Iranian media confirmed that IRGC Operations Deputy Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan died as well.[5] Unspecified Israeli officials suggested that the chairman of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, Hashem Saffiedine, is expected to succeed Nasrallah.[6]

The Israeli air campaign into Lebanon has likely severely disrupted the strategic- and operational-level military leadership in Hezbollah. Continued Israeli airstrikes have killed numerous senior and mid-tier Hezbollah commanders, including Nasrallah, in recent days. These strikes almost certainly worsened the internal disarray that Hezbollah was already facing after Israel detonated thousands of pagers and personal radios belonging to Hezbollah members. Hezbollah appears to be suffering from temporary organizational paralysis, as it has not responded to Israel in any meaningful way and has failed to stop Israel from targeting its key leadership or take necessary steps to protect that leadership. Hezbollah has built a professionalized military force that should be able to overcome this disruption, however, if given the time and space to do so. All the commanders that Israel has killed have deputies who should in principle be able to fill those roles and help the force recover, although they will have taken over under extremely difficult circumstances and under intense pressure.

Iran Update, September 27, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

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The IDF is still investigating whether Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah survived the IDF strike that targeted his headquarters in Dahieh, Beirut, on September 27.[1] The IDF reported on September 27 that the IDF targeted Nasrallah in Hezbollah’s underground central command headquarters.[2] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari reported that the IDF is still investigating whether Nasrallah survived the airstrike.[3] Israeli officials told the New York Times that Israeli leadership decided to conduct the strike after receiving real-time intelligence indicating that Nasrallah was present for a meeting.[4] Israeli media speculated after reviewing imagery and video that the IDF used multiple large bunker-buster bombs to penetrate and destroy Hezbollah‘s underground command center.[5] An unspecified source close to Hezbollah cited by Agence France-Presse (AFP) claimed that Nasrallah is ”fine.”[6]

The IDF is conducting a decapitation campaign targeting senior Hezbollah leadership as part of its air campaign across Lebanon. This campaign could impact Hezbollah’s ability to effectively organize and direct its forces. The IDF reported that its September 24 airstrike which killed Hezbollah’s Rocket and Missile Unit Commander Ibrahim Muhammad Qabisi also killed Qabisi’s deputy Abbas Sharafeddine and a senior commander from Hezbollah’s missile division, Hussein Ezzeddine.[7] Ezzeddine was reportedly close to the former top Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr, who Israel killed in late July.[8] The IDF has conducted several major airstrikes in recent days targeting senior Hezbollah commanders and their communication networks.[9] CTP-ISW noted that Israel detonating Hezbollah pagers and personal radios disrupted the group’s internal communications and may have prompted the group to begin using less secure methods of communication that Israel could then intercept and exploit.[10]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel seeks to defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon and destroy Hamas in Gaza, and the achievement of these objectives would fundamentally change the security landscape in the Middle East.[11] Defeating both groups would also either achieve or create conditions to achieve all of Israel’s war aims. These war aims are destroying Hamas as a governing and military force, preventing terrorist attacks in Israel, returning the hostages, protecting Israel’s borders, and returning citizens to the north.[12] Iran has historically relied on Hezbollah to implement its Middle Eastern strategy. Hezbollah trainers have trained Iraqi, Syrian, and Houthi fighters to support Iran’s regional goals.[13] Hezbollah also supported Iran by deploying forces into Syria to support the Bashar al Assad regime.[14] Both Hamas and Hezbollah have used their large, well-developed non-state military forces to threaten Israel from the north and south in support of Iranian objectives.[15] The defeat or severe degradation of these two groups would significantly alter the current security architecture in the Middle East that has prevailed since at least the mid-2000s.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel has “destroyed nearly all of Hamas battalions” and is now focused on eliminating Hamas’ remaining fighting capabilities, which is generally consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment of Hamas’ current strength.[16] CTP-ISW assesses that Israeli operations have defeated or severely degraded Hamas units across the Gaza Strip.[17] Defeat occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight and is forced to yield to the friendly commander’s will. Hamas’ units do not appear to be fighting as cohesive military formations.[18] Defeating Hamas militarily is a prerequisite to destroying the group militarily and politically. Destroying Hamas as a military organization requires the IDF to damage Hamas’ military forces to such a degree that they cannot function without being entirely rebuilt.[19] Destroying Hamas as a political organization would require additional political measures, including the creation of a transitional governing authority to rule the Strip. Defeating or destroying Hamas would prevent future terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip and remove one entity that Iran can use to attack Israel.

Netanyahu said that Israel seeks to “defeat Hezbollah,” which would return Israeli citizens to the north.[20] The ongoing Israeli air campaign has severely damaged Hezbollah’s command-and-control network. Hezbollah has so far failed to cease rocket fire into northern Israel, and Israel’s top military commanders are signaling that a ground operation may be necessary to accomplish Israel’s war aims. These operations are presumably designed to defeat Hezbollah’s will or ability to continue the fight, thereby forcing Hezbollah to end its attacks and allowing Israeli citizens to return to the north. The Hezbollah that would emerge from such a war would be severely damaged and unable to execute the activities it traditionally has—at least for a time—thus leading to profound changes in regional security architecture. These changes would likely require Iran to make a series of choices related to how it would manage its Axis of Resistance in the future.

Israeli Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar reported on September 26 that the IDF Air Force is preparing to provide air support for a potential ground operation into Lebanon.[21] Bar stated that the Air Force would work with Israeli ground forces to provide air cover and destroy targets above and below ground. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi told Israeli forces on September 25 that the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon is “prepar[ing] the area for the possibility of [Israeli forces’] entry.”[22] Halevi said that the IDF is preparing for maneuver operations that would involve Israeli forces engaging Hezbollah fighters and advancing into Lebanese towns and villages that are Hezbollah “military outposts.” Hezbollah operates dozens of so-called “military areas“ close to civilian, UNIFIL, and Lebanese Army infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[23] Israeli Security Cabinet approved new war aims on September 16 as part of the October 7 War to return Israeli citizens to their homes in northern Israel.[24] The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War taught the IDF the lesson that airstrikes alone cannot stop Hezbollah rocket barrages, even when such an air campaign is very effectively designed and executed on a tactical level.[25]

Hezbollah continued its expanded attack campaign targeting Israeli civilian and military locations in northern Israel on September 26 and 27. Hezbollah targeted two Israeli towns, including Tiberias and Ilaniya, for the first time.[26] Hezbollah launched two waves of rocket attacks targeting Tiberias.[27] Israeli media reported that all five Hezbollah rockets launched as part of the first barrage fell into the Sea of Galilee.[28] Hezbollah launched medium-range “Fadi 1” rockets at several Israeli civilian centers in Kiryat Ata, Haifa District, for the second day in a row.[29] Hezbollah launched rockets and artillery shells in two separate attacks targeting IDF military sites in northern Israel on September 26 and 27.[30]

The Wall Street Journal reported on September 26 that Hezbollah is facing internal disagreements about how to respond to the recent Israeli air campaign.[31] The Wall Street Journal, citing people familiar with Hezbollah discussions, reported that some Hezbollah members believe the group is acting too cautiously and should instead retaliate quickly against Israel. The sources further revealed that some Hezbollah members expressed frustration with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) for failing to step in to support the group in recent days. The Wall Street Journal reported that Hezbollah leadership seeks to avoid a regional war which it views as a “trap” set by Israel.[32]

Iran’s Axis of Resistance is conducting a multi-front attack campaign targeting Israeli territory which may be intended to draw Israeli resources and attention away from its campaign in Lebanon. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—launched a one-way attack drone at an unspecified Israeli target in the Golan Heights on September 27.[33] Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree announced on September 27 that the Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Tel Aviv and a drone attack targeting Ashkelon.[34] The IDF reported that it shot down a Houthi ballistic missile with the Arrow air defense system outside Israeli borders and that the IDF was not aware of a drone reaching Israel on the night of September 26-27.[35] Members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance have intervened in Israel’s war with Hezbollah, in part, by intensifying attacks on Israel.[36] These groups could calculate that these attacks would strain Israeli air defenses by forcing the air defense systems to track multiple targets from multiple directions simultaneously.

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Strike Targeting Nasrallah: The IDF is still investigating whether Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah survived the IDF strike that targeted his headquarters in Dahieh, Beirut, on September 27. Israeli officials told the New York Times that Israeli leadership decided to conduct the strike after receiving real-time intelligence indicating that Nasrallah was present for a meeting.
• Israeli War Aims: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel seeks to defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon and destroy Hamas in Gaza, and the achievement of these objectives would fundamentally change the security landscape in the Middle East. Defeating both groups would also either achieve or create conditions to achieve all of Israel’s war aims.
• Lebanon: Israeli Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar reported on September 26 that the IDF Air Force is preparing to provide air support for a potential ground operation into Lebanon. The Wall Street Journal reported on September 26 that Hezbollah is facing internal disagreements about how to respond to the recent Israeli air campaign.
• Hezbollah’s Attack Campaign in Northern Israel: Hezbollah continued its expanded attack campaign targeting Israeli civilian and military locations in northern Israel on September 26 and 27.
• Iran’s Axis of Resistance in the October 7 War: Iran’s Axis of Resistance is conducting a multi-front attack campaign targeting Israeli territory which may be intended to draw Israeli resources and attention away from its campaign in Lebanon.

Iran Update, September 26, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, and Nicholas Carl

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Israeli sources provided additional details on some military effects that Israel is trying to achieve in Lebanon. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on September 26 that the IDF is currently working to degrade Hezbollah military capabilities, deny Hezbollah the ability to receive external weapons transfers, and kill senior Hezbollah officials.[1] The IDF Air Force has conducted a large-scale air campaign into Lebanon in recent days to this end.[2] The IDF Air Force most recently struck around seven border crossings between Lebanon and Syria on September 26 as part of Israeli efforts to prevent weapons transfers to Hezbollah.[3] An Israeli journalist separately reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seeks ultimately to push Hezbollah forces north of the Litani river in southern Lebanon.[4] This objective is consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which requires Hezbollah forces to remain north of the Litani river. Israeli officials have repeatedly said since at least December 2023 that they are pursuing diplomatic efforts and will use military force if necessary to get Hezbollah to comply with the UN Security Council resolution. Israeli military operations in Lebanon are meant to achieve the stated Israeli war aim of safely returning displaced civilians to their homes in northern Israel. Hezbollah has conducted almost daily drone, missile, and rocket attacks into Israel since October 2023, which has compelled Israeli civilians to evacuate their homes.

Hezbollah continued to fire rockets targeting Israeli civilian and military locations in northern Israel on September 26. Hezbollah launched rockets targeting Rafael Advanced Defense Systems near Haifa for the third time in recent days.[5] Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting four civilian centers in northern Israel, including Ahihud and Kiryat Ata, for the first time.[6] Targeting the relatively mobile and well-hidden Hezbollah drone, missile, and rocket array is a difficult undertaking, even for an air force as tactically proficient as the IDF Air Force. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War taught the IDF the lesson that airstrikes alone cannot stop Hezbollah rocket barrages, even when such an air campaign is effectively designed and executed on a tactical level.[7]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah outlined on September 25 how it will purportedly support Lebanese Hezbollah against Israel. Kataib Hezbollah called on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to increase the “level and size” of attacks targeting Israel.[8] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, has increased its rate of attacks targeting Israel in recent days. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed six attacks targeting Israel on September 22 and three attacks targeting Israel on September 24, for example.[9] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on September 25 that the IDF is aware of the threat posed by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to Israel and “will do whatever is necessary to deal with this matter.”[10] Kataib Hezbollah separately claimed that it has observed “intense” US and Israeli activity in Iraqi airspace, possibly setting informational conditions to resume attacks targeting US forces.[11] Kataib Hezbollah warned that it will confront “all aspects of the American presence.”[12] The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, which is a coordinating body for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, similarly threatened in June 2024 to target US interests in Iraq and across the Middle East if Israel launched a major military offensive into Lebanon.[13]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds—formerly known as Ashab al Kahf—published a video on September 26 threatening to attack Israeli military sites.[14] The video showed satellite imagery of the Israeli Defense Ministry building and an intelligence site in Tel Aviv as well as the town of Yodfat in northern Israel.[15] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds claimed that Israel assembles nuclear weapons at an underground facility in Yodfat.[16] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds has published several videos highlighting potential targets in Israel in recent weeks, including videos in August and September 2024 showing satellite imagery of the Israeli Soreq Nuclear Research Center, an Israeli military industrial site near Tel Aviv, and the Israeli Biological Research Institute.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israeli sources provided additional details on some military effects that Israel is trying to achieve in Lebanon. Lebanese Hezbollah continued to fire rockets targeting Israeli civilian and military locations in northern Israel.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah called on other Iraqi militias to increase the “level and size” of their attacks on Israel. Iraqi militias have conducted regular drone and missile attacks targeting Israel in recent months.

Iran Update, September 25, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Karolina Hird, and Nicholas Carl

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Israel Defense Forces (IDF) leadership is signaling to its forces that it will conduct a major ground operation into Lebanon imminently. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi told Israeli forces on September 25 that the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon is “prepar[ing] the area for the possibility of [Israeli forces’] entry.”[1] Halevi said that the IDF is preparing in particular for maneuver operations that would involve Israeli forces engaging Hezbollah militants and advancing into Lebanese towns and villages that are Hezbollah “military outposts.” Halevi made these remarks to the IDF 7th Armored Brigade during a training exercise on the Israel-Lebanon border.[2] The 7th Armored Brigade is one of several IDF units that have deployed to the northern border in recent weeks.[3] Major General Ori Gordin—the commander of the IDF Northern Command—similarly remarked that the Israeli forces must be “strongly prepared” for a ground offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon, while observing the 7th Armored Brigade simulate a ground operation in Lebanon on September 24.[4] Gordin said that the IDF campaign into Lebanon began with degrading Hezbollah rocket capabilities and command-and-control. The IDF has now entered a new phase of this campaign, according to Gordin.[5] 

Halevi and Gordin made these remarks directly to Israeli service members, as the IDF called up reservist units to deploy to the northern border.[6] The IDF announced on September 25 that it activated two reservist brigades—the 6th Infantry Brigade (36th Division) and 228th Infantry Brigade (146th Division)—so that the units would “allow the continuation of the fighting effort” against Hezbollah.[7] These two reservist brigades join several other IDF units, including the 98th Division, that have been called up or deployed from other areas of responsibility to the Israel-Lebanon border in recent days.[8] The commander of the 7th Brigade recently published a letter in which he said his unit is prepared to “lead the IDF in the northern arena.”[9]

Iran, Hezbollah, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance appear to be preparing for an Israeli ground operation into Lebanon. The IDF has observed around 40,000 Iranian-backed Iraqi, Syrian, and Houthi militants concentrate around the Syrian border with the Golan Heights, according to Israeli media.[10] It is unclear why and when the Axis of Resistance deployed these militants or whether they were already in the area. It is also unclear whether Hezbollah is able or willing to integrate these foreign fighters into its already well-organized and trained force structure. Syrian opposition media separately reported on September 24 that IRGC officers and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders recently met in Deir ez Zor Province and discussed how to “ease pressure” on Hezbollah.[11] The meeting participants reportedly considered attacking international coalition targets in eastern Syria.[12] CTP-ISW previously noted that Iran is trying to balance its support for the Axis of Resistance while trying to avoid an all-out war against Israel.[13]

The IDF Air Force continued to strike Hezbollah targets across Lebanon on September 25. The IDF announced that it struck over 280 targets across Lebanon, including rocket launchers and military infrastructure, such as weapons depots.[14] Numerous sites struck by the IDF produced secondary explosions, indicating the presence of explosive munitions.[15] The IDF also stated that it struck 60 targets connected to the Hezbollah intelligence apparatus, including collection sites and headquarters.[16]

Some of the IDF airstrikes targeted weapons depot and other military infrastructure in Nabatieh, which is one of the largest population centers in southern Lebanon.[17] Geolocated footage and local reports indicate that IDF struck targets within relatively densely populated areas near Nabatieh city center.[18] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF airstrikes in the city are ”relatively unusual.”[19]

Hezbollah fired a ballistic missile targeting the Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv on September 25.[20] Hezbollah has never before fired a ballistic missile at Tel Aviv.[21] Hezbollah used a Qadr-1 missile, which is a variant of the Iranian Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile.[22] An Israeli David’s Sling air defense system intercepted the missile over central Israel.[23] The Hezbollah attack was at least partly a reconnaissance-in-force operation, which the US Army defines as “a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[24] Hezbollah could use this attack to better understand Israeli air defense capabilities and how to more effectively defeat them in the future. Hezbollah also likely sought to demonstrate its willingness to fire ballistic missiles into Israel.

Lebanese Hezbollah has continued to fire medium-range rockets targeting Israeli civilian and military targets in northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 24.[25] Hezbollah fired multiple barrages of Fadi rockets targeting civilian and military sites near Haifa on September 25.[26] Hezbollah began launching Fadi rockets on September 21 and has fired multiple barrages into Israel since then.[27] The IDF detected five rockets that crossed from Lebanon and fell in open areas near Mount Carmel and Wadi Ara, south of Haifa.[28]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged on September 25 that the Israeli operations targeting Hezbollah leadership has caused “losses” for Hezbollah.[29] Khamenei made this statement during a meeting with Iran-Iraq War veterans and senior military officials in Tehran. Khamenei claimed that Hezbollah can recover from the losses to its leadership because of its “organizational and military strength.” Khamenei claimed that Hezbollah and the Axis of Resistance will be the “final winner” in the current conflict.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed five attacks targeting Israeli targets since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 24.[30] The claims include the following:

• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “military target” in northern Israel[31]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified location in the Golan Heights[32]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified location near the Jordan Valley[33]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat[34]
• An Arqab cruise missile attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in northern Israel[35]

The IDF reported on September 24 that a drone heading toward Israel from the east crashed near the Arava Desert in southern Israel.[36] The IDF separately reported on September 25 that it intercepted a drone that was launched from Syria south of the Sea of Galilee.[37]

The United States is reportedly pursuing a diplomatic initiative to both pause fighting between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah and to resume negotiations on a ceasefire-hostage deal for the Gaza Strip.[38] US officials, according to Axios, aim for a pause in fighting between Israel and Hezbollah to allow Israeli and Lebanese civilians to their homes on both sides of the border while creating momentum toward a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[39] The United States has discussed this initiative with French, Lebanese, and other unspecified Middle East officials and gotten an endorsement from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. One of the anonymous sources speaking to Axios suggested that a deal between Israel and Hezbollah could encourage Hamas to pursue one more seriously.

Iran and its Axis of Resistance continue to pursue expanding cooperation with Russia. Reuters reported that Iran has brokered “secret talks” to transfer Yakhont (P-800 Oniks) anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis.[40] Russia has not yet decided whether to send the missiles to the Houthis, according to anonymous Western and regional sources speaking to Reuters. CNN reported in August 2024 that the Kremlin had planned to send missiles to the Houthis but reneged due to international pressure.[41] Yakhont missiles could improve the Houthis’ ability to conduct precision strikes targeting maritime traffic around Yemen. The Houthis could also conceivably learn from Russia’s extensive experience using Yakhont missiles against Ukrainian targets.[42] CTP-ISW has reported extensively on the deepening strategic partnership between Iran and Russia since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF is signaling to its forces that it will conduct a major ground operation into Lebanon imminently. Iran, Hezbollah, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance appear to be preparing for a potential Israeli ground operation.
• Lebanon: The IDF continued its air campaign targeting rocket launchers and military infrastructure. Hezbollah continued firing rockets into northern Israel and fired a ballistic missile at Tel Aviv for the first time.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq continued to fire drones and missiles toward Israel and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. CTP-ISW cannotverify all these attacks occurred, though the IDF intercepted at least some of the projectiles.
• Gaza Strip: The United States is reportedly trying both pause fighting between Israel and Hezbollah and to resume ceasefire-hostage negotiations in the Gaza Strip. The United States has discussed this initiative with French, Israeli, and Lebanese officials, among others.
• Iran-Russia partnership: Iran and its Axis of Resistance continue to pursue expanding cooperation with Russia. Iran has brokered “secret talks” to transfer Russian anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis.

Iran Update, September 24, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter

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The intensifying operations between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah are part of the broader war that Israel has fought since October 7, 2023. Hezbollah has conducted almost daily attacks into Israel since the war began in order to compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and thus preserve Hamas.[1] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defined returning northern Israelis to their homes as an additional war aim, adding it to the objectives he set after October 7: returning Israeli hostages and destroying Hamas’ military and governance capabilities in the Gaza Strip.[2] Nasrallah has similarly directly connected Hezbollah’s war effort to the Gaza Strip in this broader conflict by tying an end to Hezbollah attacks to a ceasefire deal in the Gaza Strip.[3] Israel’s intensified air campaign in Lebanon is part of a broader Israeli strategy to defeat multiple Iranian-backed military campaigns executed by Iran and its Axis of Resistance as part of the October 7 War.

Agreeing to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to stop Hezbollah fire into northern Israel would not satisfy Israel’s war objectives, nor would it discourage similar Hezbollah operations in the future. Hamas’ current ceasefire demands include a ceasefire, a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, among other stipulations.[4] Hamas has set these demands in an attempt to set conditions that would enable its reconstitution in the Gaza Strip.[5] Agreeing to Hamas’ ceasefire demands would be tantamount to an Israeli defeat because Hamas’ current demands enable it to rebuild militarily and politically over time. Hamas could, if it retains access to supplies and is unbothered by Israeli military action, gradually regain some of the capabilities required to conduct future large-scale terrorist attacks into Israel. Agreeing to Hamas’ terms would also fail to ensure Israeli security over the long term because it would demonstrate to Nasrallah that Israel could be cowed and defeated by relatively inexpensive indirect fire targeting civilians in Israel. This would encourage Nasrallah to undertake similar campaigns again in the future.

CTP-ISW continues to assess that Lebanese Hezbollah will probably continue to conduct rocket attacks into northern Israel despite the ongoing Israeli air campaign, which would increase the risk of an Israeli ground campaign into Lebanon. Returning Israeli citizens to northern Israel requires that Hezbollah cease firing rockets into northern Israel. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah is extremely unlikely to give the order to cease Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel because he must continue to support his partners in the Axis of Resistance, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.[6]

The IDF continued its air campaign into Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah capabilities on September 23 and 24. The IDF reported on September 23 that it struck around 1,600 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley over the past day.[7]  The IDF Air Force conducted at least four waves of airstrikes across Lebanon targeting rocket launchers, weapons storage facilities, and other infrastructure on September 24.[8] Israeli Army Radio reported on September 24 that the IDF has “extensively damaged” Hezbollah’s short-range rocket capabilities over the past year and started "significantly impairing” Hezbollah’s medium-range firing capabilities on September 23.[9] Israeli Army Radio noted, however, that Hezbollah still maintains long-range precision missiles in locations that the IDF has not yet targeted.[10] The IDF has expanded the range of its airstrikes into Lebanon’s northern and eastern regions in recent days.[11] Hezbollah reportedly stores its higher-value munitions, including long-range precision missiles, in these regions.[12] Targeting the relatively mobile and extremely well-hidden Hezbollah rocket, missile, and drone array is a very difficult undertaking, even for an air force as tactically proficient as the IDF Air Force.

The IDF continued to target senior Hezbollah commanders on September 24. The IDF conducted an airstrike in Dahiya neighborhood, Beirut, on September 24 that killed Hezbollah Rocket and Missile Unit Commander Ibrahim Muhammad Qabisi.[13] Qabisi commanded several Hezbollah missile units, including its precision guided missile unit.[14] Qabisi previously served in Hezbollah’s Operations unit in southern Lebanon and commanded the Badr Unit in Hezbollah’s Southern Front.[15] Israel’s targeted killing of Qabisi is part of a broader Israeli campaign to degrade senior Hezbollah leadership. The IDF conducted an airstrike in southern Beirut on September 20, killing several senior commanders in Hezbollah’s Radwan special operations forces unit including overall Radwan Commander Ibrahim Aqil.[16] The IDF also conducted an airstrike on September 23 targeting Hezbollah’s Southern Front commander, Ali Karaki.[17] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on September 24 that the IDF airstrike failed to kill Karaki.[18] The correspondent added that Karaki—along with Hezbollah’s head of foreign operations unit Talal Hamia—are currently the two most senior military officials in Hezbollah.[19] CTP-ISW previously observed that Hezbollah remains a capable fighting force and that Israel’s killing of senior Hezbollah commanders will only have a temporary effect on the organization.[20]

Iran declined a request by Lebanese Hezbollah in recent days to conduct a direct attack targeting Israel, according to two unspecified Israeli officials and an unspecified Western diplomat speaking to Axios on September 24.[21] The Israeli officials stated that Iran told Hezbollah that the “timing isn’t right” for Iran to attack Israel given that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is currently in New York City attending the United Nations General Assembly.[22] A separate Israeli official told Axios that the Israeli security cabinet issued a directive to the IDF to “avoid steps that would give Iran a reason or a pretext to join the fighting.”[23] It is unclear what Israeli action(s) in Lebanon would drive Iran to enter the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah directly. Iran has previously directly intervened in regional conflicts when its principal allies—such as the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria—were at risk of collapsing.[24] Iran could decide to intervene in support of Hezbollah against Israel if Iran assesses that Israel is inflicting severe damage on Hezbollah. Iran’s reluctance to directly intervene to support Hezbollah could generate tension between Hezbollah and Iran as Hezbollah seeks full Iranian support against Israel and Iran attempts to avoid a large-scale war with Israel since the beginning of the October 7 War.

Lebanese Hezbollah continued its expanded attack campaign against Israel by targeting several new Israeli civilian and military sites on September 23 and 24. Hezbollah launched medium-range rockets targeting IDF Ramat David airbase in northern Israel for the third consecutive day.[25] Hezbollah also conducted a three-wave rocket attack targeting an IDF airfield in Jezreel Valley, which is an auxiliary airfield for Ramat David airbase.[26] The IDF said that it detected several projectiles over Jezreel valley and intercepted some of them, while the remaining fell in open areas in the valley.[27] Hezbollah also claimed that it launched one-way attack drones targeting an IDF naval base in Atlit, south of Haifa, for the first time.[28] The Atlit naval base is the headquarters of the IDF’s elite marine commando unit Shayetet 13.[29] Hezbollah also launched rockets explicitly targeting three new civilian and military sites in Israel and the Golan Heights for the first time since launching its indirect fire campaign targeting northern Israel on October 8, 2023.[30] Lebanese Hezbollah claimed on September 23 that the expanded attack campaign against Israel is in ”defense of Lebanon and its people.”[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The intensifying operations between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah are part of the broader war that Israel has fought since October 7, 2023.  Hezbollah has conducted almost daily attacks into Israel since the war began in order to compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and thus preserve Hamas. Agreeing to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to stop Hezbollah fire into northern Israel would not satisfy Israel’s war objectives, nor would it discourage similar Hezbollah operations in the future.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF continued its air campaign into Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah capabilities on September 23 and 24. The IDF reported on September 23 that it struck around 1,600 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley over the past day.
• Iranian Response to Israeli Operations in Lebanon: Iran declined a request by Lebanese Hezbollah in recent days to conduct a direct attack targeting Israel, according to two unspecified Israeli officials and an unspecified Western diplomat speaking to Axios on September 24.
• Hezbollah Attack Campaign in Israel: Lebanese Hezbollah continued its expanded attack campaign against Israel by targeting several new Israeli civilian and military sites on September 23 and 24.

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Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

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Israel set new war objectives for Lebanon on September 16. Accomplishing these objectives would require the IDF to undertake a second major military campaign in Lebanon as part of the October 7 War. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on September 16 that returning Israeli citizens to their homes in northern Israel would be a new Israeli war aim as part of the October 7 War.[1] Netanyahu’s new war aims are a response to the 11-month-long Lebanese Hezbollah military campaign that has sought to accomplish Hezbollah’s own military and political objectives vis-a-vis Israel and in support of Hamas.[2]

Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Lebanon is part of an Israeli effort to prevent Hezbollah from accomplishing its war aim, which is to enable Hamas’ survival and ability to rebuild itself in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has repeatedly tied an end to rocket fire into northern Israel to an Israeli ceasefire in the Gaza Strip on terms dictated by Hamas.[3] Hamas’ proposed ceasefire agreement, however, is tantamount to an Israeli defeat because it would enable Hamas to rebuild over time.[4] Agreeing to Hamas’ terms would also fail to ensure Israeli security over the long term because it would demonstrate to Nasrallah that Israel could be cowed and defeated by relatively inexpensive indirect fire targeting civilians in Israel. This would encourage Nasrallah to undertake similar campaigns again in the future.

Nasrallah is extremely unlikely to give the order to cease Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel because he must continue to support his partners in the Axis of Resistance, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.[5] Continuing to fire rockets into Israel increases the risk of war, given the stated Israeli aim to return its civilians to their homes in northern Israel. This Israeli aim is not possible unless Hezbollah's rocket fire ceases. Nasrallah is unlikely to abandon his Axis of Resistance partners in the end because to do so would severely diminish Hezbollah’s regional position as a leader of the Axis of Resistance. Hezbollah trainers, for example, routinely work with Iranian-backed militias in Syria to sustain ground lines of communication between Iran and Hezbollah. Losing influence with these groups could have detrimental impacts on Hezbollah’s long-term strength in the region and Lebanon.

Hezbollah will therefore probably continue its indirect fire into northern Israel despite the ongoing Israeli air campaign. This will increase the risk of a ground campaign, given that the Israeli war aims of returning Israeli residents to northern Israel will require the IDF to physically prevent Hezbollah from firing into Israel. Israel is conducting a major air campaign in Lebanon, primarily targeting rocket launch sites to degrade Hezbollah's capabilities and destroy threats to Israel.[6] The IDF reported that it struck approximately 800 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon on the morning of September 23.[7] Targeting the relatively mobile and extremely well-hidden Hezbollah rocket, missile, and drone array is a very difficult undertaking, even for an air force as tactically proficient as the IDF Air Force. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War taught the IDF the lesson that airstrikes alone cannot stop Hezbollah rocket barrages, even when such an air campaign is very effectively designed and executed on a tactical level.[8]

The IDF conducted an airstrike on September 23 targeting the commander of Hezbollah’s southern front Ali Karaki in Dahiya neighborhood, Beirut, according to sources in the IDF.[9] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Karaki became the most senior Hezbollah military commander after the IDF killed Ibrahim Aqil on September 20.[10] Karaki is the Southern Front commander and controls Hezbollah’s Badr, Nasser, and Aziz Units.[11] Hezbollah rejected reports that Karaki was killed in the Israeli airstrike and claimed that he was moved to a safe location.[12] The IDF has not commented on the airstrike at the time of this writing.

The IDF reported on September 23 that it struck over 800 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and is preparing to strike targets in the Bekaa Valley.[13] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF was primarily targeting rocket launchers aimed toward Israel to preempt threats.[14] The IDF stated that Hezbollah stores its weapons in populated areas and civilian structures and warned civilians to avoid those areas.[15]

Lebanese Hezbollah expanded the depth of its attack campaign against Israeli civilians by targeting Israeli settlements in the West Bank on September 23.^[16]Hezbollah fired an unspecified number of long-range rockets that struck at least five Israeli settlements in the West Bank.^[17]These settlements are located approximately 100 kilometers south of the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF stated that the rockets fell in open areas.^[18]A Palestinian journalist reported that Hezbollah rockets injured two Palestinians in Deir Istiya, which is about 15km southwest of Nablus and in Salafit Governorate.^[19] Hezbollah may intend for these rocket attacks deep into the West Bank attempting to strain Israeli air defenses by forcing Israeli air defense systems to intercept rockets over the West Bank, where Israel very infrequently intercepts rocket fire. Most of the rocket fire that Israel has historically intercepted close to the West Bank has come from the Gaza Strip to the west, rather than from the north. Hezbollah’s rocket attacks into the West Bank demonstrate its capabilities to strike new targets deeper into Israel and pose an imminent threat to major Israeli cities, including Tel Aviv. Tel Aviv is also located approximately 100 kilometers south of the Israel-Lebanon border. This is the first time that Lebanese Hezbollah has struck targets in the West Bank since launching its indirect fire campaign targeting northern Israel on October 8, 2023.^[20] 

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said on September 23 that the Masoud Pezeshkian administration is willing to resume nuclear negotiations.[21] Araghchi made this statement on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York City. Araghchi and President Pezeshkian traveled to New York on September 20 and 22, respectively, to attend the UNGA.[22] Araghchi stated that Iran is willing to resume nuclear negotiations in New York City if “the other parties are ready.”[23] Araghchi added that he will remain in New York longer than Pezeshkian to meet with various unspecified foreign diplomats. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi, Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif, and lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Kazem Gharib Abadi accompanied Araghchi and Pezeshkian to New York.[24] Ravanchi and Zarif were both part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former President Hassan Rouhani that helped conclude the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[25] Gharib Abadi was the Iranian representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 2018 to 2021, during which time he played a key role in engaging Western diplomats and negotiating teams.[26]

Araghchi also met with several foreign counterparts in New York on September 22 and 23. Araghchi met with the foreign affairs ministers of Bahrain, Bulgaria, Cuba, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan.[27] Araghchi emphasized Iran’s support for Lebanese Hezbollah during his meeting with Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Abdallah Bouhabib.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israel set new war objectives for Lebanon on September 16. Accomplishing these objectives would require the IDF to undertake a second major military campaign in Lebanon as part of the October 7 War. Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Lebanon is part of an Israeli effort to prevent Hezbollah from accomplishing its war aim, which is to enable Hamas’ survival and ability to rebuild itself in the Gaza Strip. Nasrallah is extremely unlikely to give the order to cease Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel because he must continue to support his partners in the Axis of Resistance, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.
• Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF reported on September 23 that it struck over 800 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and is preparing to strike targets in the Bekaa Valley. The IDF conducted an airstrike on September 23 targeting the commander of Hezbollah’s southern front Ali Karaki in Dahiya neighborhood, Beirut, according to sources in the IDF.
• Hezbollah Attack Campaign in Israel: Lebanese Hezbollah expanded the depth of its attack campaign against Israeli civilians by targeting Israeli settlements in the West Bank on September 23.
• Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on September 23 that the Masoud Pezeshkian administration is willing to resume nuclear negotiations.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas has published and attributed several messages to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in recent weeks. Israeli intelligence officials assess that Sinwar did not write the messages himself.
• Iraq: An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia member told Lebanese outlet al Akhbar on September 23 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ “scope of [Israeli] targets” has expanded due to recent Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon.

 

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a large-scale airstrike campaign across Lebanon on September 21 and 22.[1] The IDF announced on September 21 that it targeted over 400 rocket launchers, thousands of rocket barrels, and other military infrastructure in at least two waves of airstrikes across southern Lebanon.[2] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the strikes targeted short- and medium- range rocket launchers within firing range of Haifa and other northern Israeli towns.[3] The IDF stated that it was responding to indications that Hezbollah was preparing to launch rockets into northern Israel.[4] The IDF announced new security protocols for some of the northern communities around the same time in response to the indications of an imminent Hezbollah attack.[5]

The IDF announced on September 22 that it conducted another wave of airstrikes targeting dozens of Hezbollah rocket launchers and military infrastructure across Lebanon.[6] The IDF framed the most recent wave of strikes as meant to degrade Hezbollah forces rather than to preempt an imminent Hezbollah attack, as was the case for the previous day’s airstrikes.[7] The framing that the IDF offered for the most recent wave of strikes matches generally how the IDF has discussed most of its airstrikes into Lebanon since October 2023.

This activity marks the third consecutive day of heavy Israeli airstrikes into Lebanon.[8] This activity also comes immediately after Israel detonated thousands of Hezbollah pagers and personal radios on September 18 and 19, respectively. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that Israel will continue to target Hezbollah with ”blow after blow” until Israel achieves its stated war aim of allowing displaced citizens to return to their homes in northern Israel.[9]

Hezbollah launched its own strikes into Israel on September 21 and 22. These attacks are consistent with Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah declaring recently that the group would continue its cross-border attacks in support of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[10] Hezbollah launched three barrages of medium-range rockets targeting IDF Ramat David airbase in northern Israel on September 21.[11] The airbase is the northernmost one in Israel. Hezbollah stated that the attack was in response to “repeated Israeli attacks” on Lebanon.[12] The IDF intercepted about 24 rockets.[13] This attack may have been the one that the IDF preempted earlier that day.

Hezbollah fired around another 85 short- and medium-range rockets targeting Rafael Advanced Defense Systems near Haifa on September 22.[14] The Rafael Advanced Defense Systems is an Israeli defense company that develops weapons and military technology, including the Iron Dome air defense system, for the IDF.[15] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted the company’s site in retaliation for Israel detonating Hezbollah pagers and personal radios.[16] Several rockets impacted areas just outside Haifa and injured three people.[17]

It is notable that these latest Hezbollah attacks are slightly smaller in scale than previous retaliatory attacks the group has conducted. Hezbollah fired between 200 and 300 projectiles, including around 20 one-way attack drones, on August 24 in retaliation to Israel killing top Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr.[18]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed five attacks into Israel on September 22. The claims included the following:

• An Arqab cruise missile attack targeting an unspecified location in northern Israel[19]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Israel[20]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified location in southern Israel[21]
• An Arfad drone attack targeting an unspecified location in the Jordan Valley[22]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified location in the Jordan Valley[23]

The IDF intercepted two cruise missiles that were headed toward the southern Golan Heights from Iraq.[24] The IDF intercepted the missiles before they entered Israeli airspace. The IDF also intercepted a drone that was heading toward southern Israel from Iraq.[25] The IDF intercepted the drone before it entered Israeli airspace, but air sirens still activated near Eilat. The IDF lastly intercepted a drone that flew over the southern Golan Heights from the east.[26]

The commander of the IDF 7th Armored Brigade, Colonel Elad Zuri, published a letter on September 20 in which he said that the brigade is prepared to be the first unit to “lead the IDF in the northern arena.”[27] Zuri said that the 7th Brigade is deployed on the northern border and prepared to fight in order to return displaced northern residents to their homes.[28] The IDF separately deployed the 98th Division, including the 35th Paratroopers and 89th Commando brigades, to northern Israel on September 18.[29] The 7th Brigade most recently fought in the Gaza Strip on August 30 under the command of the 98th Division.[30] It is unclear whether the 7th Brigade deployed north as part of the 98th Division or whether it will be subordinate to the 36th Division in Israel’s Northern Command.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: The IDF conducted a large-scale air campaign into Lebanon. This activity marks three consecutive days of heavy Israeli airstrikes into Lebanon.
• Lebanese Hezbollah launched its own strikes into Israel, which is consistent with Hezbollah’s stated intent to continue cross-border attacks.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed five attacks into Israel. The IDF intercepted several drones and cruise missiles headed toward Israel from Iraq.

Iran Update, September 21, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Nicholas Carl

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The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Israel has issued new security protocols for some of its northern communities in anticipation of intensifying conflict with Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari announced the new measures for residents on September 21 in response to indications that Hezbollah is preparing to launch rocket attacks into Israel.[1] Hagari said that residents should limit gatherings outside to 30 individuals and inside to 300 individuals. Educational and workplace activities should occur near protected areas, such as shelters, according to Hagari. The new measures apply specifically to residents in Galilee and the Jordan Valley. IDF Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar separately reported that the Air Force is maintaining a high level of readiness.[2] Israel has closed its airspace north of Hadera, northern Israel, to civilian flights in order to avoid accidental engagement with Israeli air defenses.[3]

An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF exploited an “operational opportunity” in conducting its airstrike that killed 12 Hezbollah Radwan commanders in Beirut on September 20.[4] The correspondent said that the planning and execution of the airstrike occurred within a “few hours.”[5] The IDF received intelligence that the Radwan commanders were gathering in an underground operations center in southern Beirut and quickly developed plans to attack. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi was visiting forces in northern Israel when the IDF received this intelligence and presented the plan to political leaders for approval. This reporting is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation that the IDF appears to be exploiting disarray in Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage upon the group.[6] Israel detonating Hezbollah pagers and personal radios disrupted the group’s internal communications and may have prompted the group to begin using less secure methods of communication that Israel could then intercept and exploit.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to threaten intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war. The militias likely seek to deter a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon by threatening to expand the war. These militias could follow through with these threats in the event of intensifying conflict. Kataib Sarkhat al Quds—formerly known as Ashab al Kahf—announced on September 20 that it is prepared to send “hundreds or even thousands” of militants to Lebanon to support Hezbollah against Israel.[7]  Kataib Sarkhat al Quds also threatened to strike the Institute for Biological Research south of Tel Aviv.[8] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds is a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and has tried repeatedly to conduct drone and missile attacks into Israel since January 2024.[9]

The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and Iraqi Red Crescent Society sent two planes of aid to Beirut on September 21.[10] The delivery includes medical supplies. The PMF stated that the supplies will be delivered to Lebanese hospitals to treat individuals wounded by Israeli airstrikes.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israel has issued new security protocols for some of its northern communities in anticipation of intensifying conflict with Lebanese Hezbollah. The new measures are in response to indications that Hezbollah was preparing to launch rockets into areas.
• Lebanon: The IDF reportedly exploited an “operational opportunity” in conducting its airstrike targeting the Hezbollah Radwan commanders in southern Beirut. CTP-ISW has previously observed that Israel appears to be exploiting disarray in Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage on the group.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to threaten to intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war. The militias likely seek to deter a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon but could still follow through on their threats in the event of intensifying conflict.

 

Iran Update, September 20, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Katherine Wells, Behzad Rezaei, and Nicholas Carl

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Israel appears to be exploiting disarray in Lebanese Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage upon the group. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike in southern Beirut on September 20, killing several senior commanders in Hezbollah’s Radwan special operations forces unit.[1] The targeted individuals included Ibrahim Aqil, who was the overall Radwan commander. He was also a member of the Hezbollah Jihad Council, which oversees the group’s military operations. That Israel detected and was able to target such a sensitive meeting suggests that Hezbollah is suffering from lapses in operational security—possibly caused by Israel detonating the pagers and personal radios used by Hezbollah members.[2] These detonations compromised Hezbollah’s primary and secondary means of communication. CTP-ISW previously observed that Hezbollah could revert to less secure methods of communication, such as phones and radio relays, in order to rapidly restore communications.[3] Doing so would leave Hezbollah vulnerable, given that Israel could intercept these signals.

Hezbollah remains a capable fighting force that will overcome the disruption to its command-and-control and communications systems. Hezbollah has organized its forces in a conventional military structure that is designed to withstand and resolve these kinds of disruptions. The detonation of pagers and personal radios and the killing of senior Radwan commanders will thus generate only temporary effects on Hezbollah's military effectiveness. Hezbollah will recover given sufficient time to do so. Hezbollah also has Iranian-backed allied militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen that have not suffered any disruption to their own command-and-control and communications systems.

In the event of a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon, the IDF will have certain advantages that it did not in its war against Hezbollah in 2006 but will also face new challenges. The IDF is now more battle-tested and experienced from its time fighting Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has had time to practice complex maneuver operations against a deeply entrenched enemy force. The IDF 98th Division, for instance, has fought extensively in the Gaza Strip and is now deployed to the Israel-Lebanon border.[4] On the other hand, Hezbollah has a significantly more competent force than it did in 2006.[5] Hezbollah forces are more experienced given their participation in protracted campaigns fighting for Bashar al Assad in Syria. The Axis of Resistance is furthermore positioned to attack Israel from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in a way that they were not in 2006.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have indicated that they would intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war, which would risk intensifying the conflict across the Middle East. Kataib Hezbollah pledged on September 17 to send fighters and materiel to support Hezbollah against Israel.[6] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds—formerly known as Ashab al Kahf—separately announced on September 19 that it will soon launch a “new phase” of operations against Israel.[7] Abu Ala al Walai—the secretary general of Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada—lastly sent a message to Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on September 20, in which he suggested that Iranian-backed Iraqi forces could deploy to Lebanon and fight alongside Hezbollah.[8] This public messaging is likely meant to deter Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon, as CTP-ISW previously assessed, but could reflect the militias’ willingness to intervene as well.[9] The IDF conducted an airstrike south of Damascus on September 20, killing a senior Kataib Hezbollah official, underscoring the military presence that the militia has near the Israel-Syria border.[10]

The United States does not expect Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the coming months, according to the Wall Street Journal.[11] Anonymous US officials told the outlet that Hamas has made demands in the negotiations and then refused to accept a deal after the United States and Israel accepted those demands. This behavior has led international negotiators to doubt that Hamas seriously wants a deal. Senior US officials, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken, have similarly questioned whether Hamas is sincerely looking to reach a deal.[12] The officials also cited disagreement between Israel and Hamas about hostage-prisoner swaps as an obstacle in negotiations. The officials added that Israel detonating pagers and personal radios owned by Lebanese Hezbollah members has further complicated diplomatic engagement with Hamas. An anonymous Arab official similarly said that there was “no chance” of a ceasefire-hostage agreement after Israel detonated the pagers and personal radios.

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israel appears to be exploiting disarray in Lebanese Hezbollah in order to inflict further damage upon the group. The IDF conducted an airstrike in southern Beirut killing several senior commanders in Hezbollah’s Radwan SOF unit.
• Lebanon: In the event of a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon, the IDF will have certain advantages that it did not in its war against Hezbollah in 2006 but will also face new challenges. The IDF and Hezbollah have both gained combat experience since then.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have indicated that they would intervene in an Israel-Hezbollah war, which would risk intensifying the conflict across the Middle East. These militias are active near in Syria near the Israeli border.
• Gaza Strip: The United States does not reportedly expect Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the coming months. Hamas has made demands in the negotiations and then refused to accept a deal after the United States and Israel have accepted those demands.

 

Iran Update, September 19, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Kathryn Tyson, Andie Parry, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Israeli sources reported on September 19 that Israeli officials are deciding whether the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will conduct an offensive into Lebanon.[1] Hezbollah will almost certainly not cease rocket fire into northern Israel, which will necessitate an Israeli operation if Israel hopes to achieve its stated objectives in northern Israel. The Israeli security cabinet approved “returning the residents of the north securely to their homes” as an official war objective on September 16.[2] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on September 12 that a political settlement alone will not return displaced citizens to northern Israel and that Israel is "preparing for a broad campaign” to accomplish Israeli objectives.[3] Netanyahu chaired a security meeting with military and political leaders at the HaKirya in Tel Aviv on September 19 to discuss the IDF’s possible courses of action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, according to Israeli Army Radio.[4] The meeting follows Israel's multi-stage attack that detonated explosives in Hezbollah communications devices that killed 32 Hezbollah fighters and injured over 3,000 on September 17 and 18.[5] Israel also conducted pre-emptive strikes targeting over 150 Hezbollah rocket launchers ready to fire at Israel on September 19.[6] Israel has deployed additional IDF units to the northern sector since September 18.[7] Israeli media reported that the IDF does not have “imminent” plans to undertake a new major operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon, however, and that the Israeli security cabinet instructed the IDF to wait to see Hezbollah’s chosen course of action.[8]

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah declared in a September 19 speech that Hezbollah would continue to conduct attacks targeting Israel. Nasrallah said that Hezbollah would not stop its cross-border attacks in support of Gaza and that Israel would face a “severe reckoning” in response to the explosive device attacks.[9] Nasrallah did not specify when Hezbollah would conduct this retaliatory attack, however. Nasrallah has frequently delivered direct threats against Israel but seldom follows through upon these threats. There have been a few occasions on which Hezbollah has carried out Nasrallah’s threats by conducting attacks that Nasrallah deemed to be appropriate, however.[10] Nasrallah did retaliate as promised after Israel killed top Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr, for example. Hezbollah fired between 200 and 300 projectiles, including around 20 one-way attack drones, on August 24, a month after Israel killed Shukr.[11] Nasrallah is currently facing competing priorities that highlight Hezbollah’s constraints and impact his decision-making as he calculates Hezbollah’s response to Israel’s actions.

Nasrallah is extremely unlikely to give the order to cease Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel because he must continue to support his partners in the Axis of Resistance. Continuing to fire rockets into Israel increases the risk of war, given the stated Israeli aim to return its civilians to their homes in northern Israel. This aim is not possible unless Hezbollah rocket fire ceases. This objective is in tension with other Hezbollah priorities, which include avoiding a major war with Israel to prevent jeopardizing Hezbollah’s preeminent political position in Lebanon. Nasrallah ex post facto recognized that his decision initiating the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War by kidnapping three Israeli soldiers was a strategic mistake, likely due in part to the negative impact the war had on Hezbollah’s political position in Lebanon.[12] Nasrallah is unlikely to abandon his Axis of Resistance partners in the end, however, because to do so would severely diminish Hezbollah’s regional position as a leader of the Axis of Resistance. Hezbollah trainers, for example, routinely work with Iranian-backed militias in Syria to sustain ground lines of communication between Iran and Hezbollah. Losing influence with these groups could have detrimental impacts for Hezbollah’s long-term strength in the region and in Lebanon. It could also undermine Hezbollah's unity, as Nasrallah's relative caution is likely not reflective of the attitudes of all Hezbollah rank-and-file. Hezbollah’s rank-and-file is presumably more in favor of continuing operations against Israel, given the recent Israeli communications attacks and ongoing Israeli airstrikes targeting mid-level Hezbollah commanders.

Iranian officials stated that there will be a response to the Israeli operation that detonated pagers belonging to Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon on September 17. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Hossein Salami vowed a “crushing response” from the Axis of Resistance in a message to Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on September 19.[13] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated his condemnation for the attack in Lebanon and stated on X (Twitter) that “God ... takes revenge and [Israel] will definitely be punished justly” on September 19.[14] Salami separately visited Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani, who had been injured in the attack, after Amani had been transferred to a hospital in Tehran on September 19.[15] The Iranian Ambassador to the UN Saeed Iravani said in a letter to the United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres on September 18 that Iran will follow up the attack and Iran has the right to respond to Israel’s attack in Lebanon.[16]

Unspecified Iranian officials planned an assassination plot targeting the Israeli prime minister, defense minister, or other senior officials. The Israeli Shin Bet assessed that the plot was likely part of an effort to retaliate against Israel for the operation that killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024. It is not clear which specific Iranian officials had knowledge of or approved this plan. It is also unclear whether multiple government agencies were aware of the plan. The Shin Bet and Israel Police announced that Iran allegedly recruited an Israeli civilian in a failed plot to assassinate a senior Israeli political or defense official including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[17] The Shin Bet assessed that Iranian officials viewed the assassination plans as "revenge” for Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024.[18] The Israeli civilian traveled to Iran and Turkey several times and met with an Iranian businessman there who presented himself as a member of the Iranian intelligence apparatus.[19] The Israeli civilian met with the ”businessman” and his associates abroad on numerous occasions beginning in April 2024.[20] The fact that Iran cultivated this asset in April 2024 suggests that Iranian intelligence did not initially recruit this asset for an assassination operation directly related to the Haniyeh killing, given that Israel killed Haniyeh in July 2024. The Shin Bet did not provide indications as to whether the Israeli civilian made significant progress in carrying out any these assassination plots.[21] Israel Police arrested the civilian in August 2024.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israeli sources reported on September 19 that Israeli officials are deciding whether the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will conduct an offensive into Lebanon. Hezbollah will almost certainly not cease rocket fire into northern Israel, which will necessitate an Israeli operation if Israel hopes to achieve its stated objectives in northern Israel. Nasrallah is extremely unlikely to give the order to cease Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel because he must continue to support his partners in the Axis of Resistance.
• Iran and Israel: Unspecified Iranian officials planned an assassination plot targeting the Israeli prime minister, defense minister, or other senior officials. The Israeli Shin Bet assessed that the plot was likely part of an effort to retaliate against Israel for the operation that killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024.
• Gaza Strip: Senior Hamas official Hossam Badran said on September 19 that the group is not optimistic that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Cairo will produce a ceasefire agreement.
• Iraq: An Iraqi politician said that the IRGC Quds Force Commander met with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad and ordered the militias to “calm the political and military situation in Iraq” due to current regional developments, which is consistent with prior CTP-ISW assessments.

Iran Update, September 18, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Israel continued to destroy Lebanese Hezbollah tactical communications devices on September 18. Israel detonated thousands of handheld two-way radios (or walkie talkies) across Lebanon.[1] The detonated devices killed at least 20 people and injured over 450.[2] Israel simultaneously detonated thousands of pagers in a previous attack wave on September 17, injuring over 2800 people, including Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani.[3] Social media videos of the most recent attack showed that some of the radios detonated at the funerals of Hezbollah members killed in the September 17 pager detonations.[4] Unspecified US officials said that Israel conducted the first pager attack because of an imminent concern that Hezbollah might discover the rigged devices.[5] Israel reportedly decided to conduct the second attack due to the likelihood that Hezbollah would discover the remaining rigged devices after investigating the causes of the pager explosions, according to unspecified sources with knowledge of the operation.[6]

About 5,000 pagers were brought into Lebanon about five months ago as part of a yearslong effort to replace older devices.[7] Two sources with knowledge of the operation told Axios that Israel planted explosive materials in the devices in advance.[8] US and other officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal assessed that Israel intercepted the pagers and two-way radios at some point in the supply chain.[9] Western media reported that the walkie talkies may have contained more explosives than the pagers. The pagers contained one-to-two-ounces of explosive material.[10]

Israel’s multi-stage attack on Hezbollah communications will force Hezbollah to urgently reestablish reliable tactical communications in case of an Israeli offensive campaign into Lebanon. Hezbollah had recently ordered the pagers to communicate across its ranks after Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah warned group members in February 2024 to limit cellphone usage to avoid Israeli surveillance and detection.[11] The walkie talkies were reportedly a back-up communication method intended to only be used during a war with Israel.[12]  Hezbollah has limited options to rapidly reestablish long-range communications to reestablish effective command and control over its members in Lebanon and neighboring countries.  Some of these options are:

• Couriers. Hezbollah has relied on couriers in the past but usually in combination with modern communications devices, such as the pagers or the two-way radios that Israel has destroyed.[13] Relying solely on couriers would significantly slow the speed at which Hezbollah commanders could communicate orders to their subordinates to respond to Israeli operations, given the wide geographic distribution of Hezbollah fighters across Lebanon. Couriers could still remain effective within lower Hezbollah echelons operating within one relatively small sector.
• Landlines phones. Hezbollah has reportedly relied upon an Iranian-financed, private telecommunications network that involves fiber optic cables running from Beirut to southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.[14] Hezbollah may rely upon this network more heavily following Israel‘s attacks. Landlines can be relatively easily tapped or intercepted, however, and Israel has tapped Hezbollah landlines in the past.[15] Hezbollah may no longer trust landlines following the recent massive security breaches into systems previously thought to be impervious to Israeli hacking. It is unlikely that the fiber optic cable network extends to every tactically significant site inhabited by Hezbollah fighters, making this communication method suboptimal.
• Satellite phones. Hezbollah members, particularly high-level commanders, likely own satellite phones for use in an emergency. Satellite phone networks are not necessarily secure, however. Hezbollah fighters may be hesitant to use electronic devices such as satellite phones because of fears that Israel has compromised other supply chains outside of the pagers and radios. Satellite phones are also very expensive.
• Tactical radio relay systems: Hezbollah could decide to revert to older tactical communications systems. These systems are relatively easy to set up and use compared to landlines and couriers, both of which require substantial infrastructure or personnel. These systems can be jammed or intercepted, however. The IDF’s ability to intercept these systems and listen in on Hezbollah communications would make using these radio systems substantially less desirable for Hezbollah.
• Cell phones: Hezbollah previously advised its members to stop using cell phones to avoid Israeli detection and subsequent Israeli targeting, including by banning cell phone usage on the battlefield.[16] It is easy to track cell phone movements, which can be used to target Hezbollah fighters.[17] However, the lack of more accessible and rapid options to re-establish communications could force Hezbollah to return to cell phone use, even briefly, in order to effectively respond to a potential Israeli campaign. Hezbollah would risk Israeli surveillance and hacking in this scenario, therefore putting Hezbollah fighters at greater risk of targeted strikes or advertising Hezbollah movements. Hezbollah may calculate this is an acceptable risk to assume given the circumstances.

Hezbollah vowed to retaliate against the Israeli attacks in a statement on September 17.[18] The speed with which Hezbollah can bring up and organize these communication systems will determine how effectively and orderly it can respond to the Israeli attacks or a potential Israeli campaign.

Iran and its Axis of Resistance may decide to defend Hezbollah or help it reestablish deterrence vis-a-vis Israel during Hezbollah’s short period of vulnerability created by the communications crisis. Iran, and its proxies by extension, rely on Hezbollah to establish deterrence vis-a-vis Israel and to project force and influence throughout the region. Hezbollah has also adopted an increasingly prominent role in helping Iran manage the Axis of Resistance in recent years. Iran and its Axis of Resistance may seek to defend Hezbollah against any potential Israeli operation in Lebanon while Hezbollah lacks the tactical communications required to effectively coordinate its own defenses. Iranian-backed groups could attempt to restore deterrence with Israel by increasing attacks against Israeli targets or moving personnel and arms along the Iranian ground line of communication to support Hezbollah in Lebanon. CTP-ISW has not independently observed confirmation of any of these indicators. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah pledged on September 17 to send fighters, arms and equipment to defend Hezbollah, however.[19] Iran and Iranian-backed groups are likely to attempt to establish deterrence with Israel within the next few days if they choose this course of action, given that the pager attack only generates a temporary effect against Hezbollah’s communications and therefore a relatively short period in which Hezbollah is at highest risk.

Iranian officials condemned Israel for the pager attack that blew up Lebanese Hezbollah fighters’ pagers’ batteries in Lebanon on September 17. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned the attack and called for unity among Islamic countries in a government cabinet meeting on September 18.[20]The Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon, who was wounded in the attack, said on X (Twitter) that it was a “matter of pride that my blood is mixed with the blood of the wounded people of the honorable Lebanese nation.”[21] The Iranian Embassy in Lebanon also dismissed rumors that Amani was seriously injured in the pager attack.[22] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) spokesperson Ali Mohammad Naini claimed that the pager attack in Lebanon killed no IRGC personnel.[23] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi condemned the attack and stated that Iran would be ready to provide assistance in a phone call with his Lebanese counterpart Abdullah Bouhabib on September 17.[24]  Iranian Parliamentary National Security Committee member Alladin Boroujerdi said that Lebanon and Iran should respond firmly as soon as possible.[25] The Red Crescent Society confirmed that some of the more seriously injured in Lebanon have been sent to Tehran for treatment and that 12 doctors and 12 nurses have been sent from Iran to Lebanon to help.[26] 

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on September 17 to meet with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders, according to Iraqi media.[27] Ghaani met with Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali, Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri, and Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi, among other militia leaders.[28] Iraqi media did not provide details about what Ghaani and the militia leaders discussed, although Ghaani typically travels to Baghdad to coordinate or mediate among Iraqi militias or to give the militias new orders and instructions. Ghaani’s visit comes shortly after Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada leader Abu Ala al Walai claimed on September 13 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will soon launch a new phase of military operations against Israel.[29] Walai claimed that the new phase will include joint military operations and coordinated actions between Iranian-backed Iraqi groups and other Axis of Resistance members across multiple fronts. Ghaani’s visit also follows an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack targeting a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10.[30] CTP–ISW previously noted that Iranian-backed Iraqi militants seem to have conducted the attack against the wishes of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[31] Ghaani may thus have traveled to Baghdad to ensure that Iraqi militias do not conduct attacks without informing and receiving approval from Iran.

The Egyptian foreign minister said that Egypt would not accept an Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor on September 18.[32] Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said during a press conference with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken that Egypt would reject any changes to the security arrangements along the corridor that were in place before the Israel-Hamas war began. Blinken traveled to Cairo on September 17 to meet with Egyptian officials and discuss an Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage deal.[33] An anonymous official in the region told Western media that the trip is meant to assuage Israeli concerns that Hamas can smuggle weapons and other military materials through the Philadelphi Corridor into the Gaza Strip.[34]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Israel continued to destroy Lebanese Hezbollah tactical communications devices on September 18. Israel’s multi-stage attack on Hezbollah communications will force Hezbollah to urgently reestablish reliable tactical communications, particularly in the event of an Israeli offensive campaign into Lebanon. Iran and its Axis of Resistance may decide to defend Hezbollah or help it reestablish deterrence vis-a-vis Israel during Hezbollah’s short period of vulnerability created by the communications crisis.
• Iranian Response to the Pager Attack: Iranian officials condemned Israel for the pager attack that blew up Lebanese Hezbollah fighters’ pagers’ batteries in Lebanon on September 17.
• Iraq: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on September 17 to meet with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders, according to Iraqi media. Ghaani met with Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali, Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri, and Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi, among other militia leaders. Iraqi media did not provide details about what Ghaani and the militia leaders discussed, although Ghaani typically travels to Baghdad to coordinate or mediate among Iraqi militias or to give the militias new orders and instructions.
• Gaza Strip: The Egyptian foreign minister said that Egypt would not accept an Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor on September 18. An anonymous official in the region told Western media that the trip is meant to assuage Israeli concerns that Hamas can smuggle weapons and other military materials through the Philadelphi Corridor into the Gaza Strip.

Iran Update, September 17, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Kelly Campa, Kathryn Tyson, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, Siddhat Kishore, Annika Gazenveld, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Behzad Rezaei, Angelica Evans, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Israel simultaneously detonated thousands of pagers used by Lebanese Hezbollah members across Lebanon and Syria on September 17.[1] Lebanese officials reported that around 2,800 individuals were injured, though some reports suggest that the number is closer to 4,000, most of whom are Hezbollah members.[2] The attack also injured the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amani.[3] Hezbollah mourned the death of 12 fighters after the attack but did not explicitly acknowledge how they died.[4] Israel reportedly executed the attack by planting one-to-two ounces of explosive material and remote triggers inside a batch of Taiwanese-made pagers en route to Lebanon.[5] Hezbollah had ordered the pagers to communicate across its ranks, as Hezbollah Secretary General ordered group members to limit cellphone usage in order to avoid Israeli detection.[6] Hezbollah responded to the attack by blaming Israel and vowing to retaliate.[7]

The attack has likely had several negative effects on Hezbollah military effectiveness at least temporarily. The attack likely disrupted some internal communications across Hezbollah, especially given the extent to which Hezbollah has been relying on pagers in recent months. The nature and scale of the attack also likely stoked confusion and shock among some Hezbollah members. These effects could drive general paranoia within Hezbollah as well, given that Israel has demonstrated repeatedly in recent months how deeply it has infiltrated Iranian and Iranian-backed networks.

Israel announced on September 16 that it thwarted a Lebanese Hezbollah attempt to assassinate a former senior Israeli security official.[8] The Shin Bet located at an unspecified location an anti-personnel mine that a Hezbollah cell was planning to use for the assassination in the ”coming days.”[9] The mine was connected to a camera and a remote-controlled detonator. The Shin Bet reported that the mine was “nearly identical” to ones previously used by Hezbollah.[10]

The Israeli security cabinet approved “returning the residents of the north securely to their homes” as an official war objective on September 16.[11] The Israeli security cabinet’s approving this addition marks the first time that northern Israel is officially included in Israel’s stated war objectives.[12] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on September 12 that a political settlement alone will not return displaced citizens to northern Israel and that Israel is "preparing for a broad campaign” to this end.[13]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is in the process of defeating Hamas militarily in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has very likely degraded severely the two Hamas brigades in the southern Gaza Strip.[14] Hamas attacks decreased dramatically since August 2024, reflecting this degradation.[15] Israeli operations have destroyed the bulk of Hamas’ rocket supply as well, leading to a significant decline in Hamas rocket attacks.[16] Hamas is likely no longer operating as an effective and well-organized fighting force. Hamas is instead fighting in a disorganized manner through small, de-centralized cells of fighters across the Gaza Strip.[17]

Israel is meanwhile continuing to pursue its stated war aim of destroying Hamas as a military force and governing authority in the Gaza Strip.[18] Destroying Hamas militarily is a greater undertaking than defeating it and requires Israel—per US military doctrine—to physically render Hamas forces combat ineffective unless reconstituted.[19] Destroying Hamas as a governing authority requires Israel to replace Hamas with a new entity or force that can provide the civil services and security that the Hamas government has provided to Gazans.

Hamas is projecting public confidence that it will survive in the Gaza Strip as part of an information operation to erode Israeli will to sustain the war. Hamas cannot defeat Israel militarily in this war and is instead trying to compel Israel to accept defeat. Senior Hamas official Khaled Mashal said in an interview that Hamas will play a “dominant role” in the post-war Gaza Strip.[20] Hamas has also exploited Israeli hostages to increase Israeli domestic pressure on the government to agree to a ceasefire-hostage deal that would allow Hamas to survive. Hamas has, for example, published propaganda videos of hostages to reinforce the perception that Israel can only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations rather than military operations.[21] Mashal admitted in his interview that Hamas is in no rush to conclude ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Israel and will remain committed to its maximalist demands, which include a complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[22]

Hamas has articulated its own post-war vision for the Gaza Strip to further cement its enduring influence there. Hamas has repeatedly advocated for a Palestinian unity government to take control of the strip after the war and even signed an agreement with Fatah in July 2024 to that end.[23] CTP-ISW previously argued that Hamas could use its functioning military and internal security wings to coerce technocratic government employees at every level, thus providing Hamas with significant influence over the Gazan government even if Hamas officials were not officially controlling it.[24] Remnants of Hamas’ military and internal security organizations could still coerce government officials in any future Gazan Authority, though those efforts may initially lack overarching guidance from higher echelons of command.[25] A lack of central control of such efforts would initially impede Hamas’ efforts to exert influence over a future Gazan governing authority, but Hamas would almost certainly rebuild the control necessary to overcome this deficiency. Israeli efforts that focus on disrupting remaining elements of Hamas’ civil rule, such as its role in the distribution of humanitarian aid, would make it more even more difficult for Hamas to do so.[26]

Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran for an unannounced visit on September 17 following recent visits to Syria and North Korea and amid ongoing Russian efforts to secure military support from allies. Shoigu met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian and conveyed an unspecified message from Russian President Vladimir Putin.[27] The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) reported that Ahmadian and Shoigu discussed upcoming bilateral agreements.[28] Pezeshkian told Shoigu that Iran will work to increase cooperation and deepen bilateral relations between the two countries to reduce the impact of Western sanctions.[29] Shoigu previously met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus, Syria, on September 16 and discussed strengthening bilateral relations and regional and international security issues.[30] Shoigu also recently visited Pyongyang on September 13 and met with North Korean President Kim Jong Un for unspecified bilateral discussions.[31] Shoigu's international visits are coming over the backdrop of the recent Iranian delivery of over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, ongoing North Korean military support for the Russian war in Ukraine, and Ukrainian reports that Russia is hiring Syrian mercenaries to fight in Ukraine.[32] Russia’s deepening engagement with China, Iran, and North Korea is part of a wider Kremlin effort to establish a coalition of friendly states that could bolster Russia's defense industrial base and secure economic cooperation to support its war in Ukraine.[33]

A Washington-based think tank reported that Iran has in recent months increased its operation at two nuclear sites that were previously used for high explosive testing.[34] The report noted that this increased activity—paired with the growing Iranian stockpile of highly enriched uranium—could shorten the Iranian breakout timeline for producing a nuclear weapon to about one week.[35] The Institute for Science and International Security, citing unspecified Western intelligence sources, reported specifically that Iran has ”reactivated and accelerated” activities at the Sanjarian and Golab Dareh nuclear sites in Tehran Province in recent months.[36] The institute also observed through satellite imagery an increase in human traffic, landscaping, and physical security at the Sanjarian site.[37] The Sanjarian and Golab Dareh sites were both involved in Iran’s pre-2003 nuclear weapons program, according to documents retrieved by Israel in a clandestine operation in Iran in 2018.[38]

This report comes as Iran has taken several other measures to expand its nuclear program in recent months. Iran has increased its stockpile of weapons-grade uranium, installed new cascades of advanced centrifuges, and conducted metallurgical testing and computer simulations that could support the production of a nuclear weapon.[39] Russia has separately begun giving Iran unspecified nuclear assistance in exchange for Iran sending ballistic missiles to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[40]

Key Takeaways:

• Israel-Hezbollah conflict: Israel simultaneously detonated thousands of pagers used by Lebanese Hezbollah across Lebanon and Syria. The attack has likely had several negative effects on Hezbollah military effectiveness at least temporarily.
• Israel-Hezbollah conflict: The Israeli security cabinet approved “returning the residents of the north securely to their homes” as an official war aim. Israeli leaders seek to push Hezbollah away from the Israel-Lebanon border to allow displaced citizens to return to northern Israel.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF is in the process of defeating Hamas militarily in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is projecting confidence outwardly that it will survive in the Gaza Strip as part of an information operation to erode Israeli will to sustain the war.
• Iran-Russia cooperation: Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran on an unannounced visit following recent visits to North Korea and Syria and amid ongoing Kremlin efforts to secure military support from allies.
• Iranian nuclear program: A Washington-based think tank reported that Iran has in recent months increased its operations at two nuclear sites that were previously used for high explosive testing. This activity could shorten the Iranian nuclear breakout timeline to a week.

Iran Update, September 16, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Kathryn Tyson, Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Andie Parry, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Israel is refocusing its operations in the Gaza Strip to prioritize “destroying the pillars of Hamas’ civil rule . . . especially the distribution of humanitarian aid,” according to an anonymous Israeli official.[1] The official told Israeli media that controlling aid distribution enables Hamas to project the image that it still controls the Gazan population.[2] Hamas inserts itself into the aid distribution process by forcing humanitarian organizations to coordinate with Hamas affiliates and seizing aid shipments as they enter the strip.[3] Hamas has also aggressively opposed other Gazan factions from adopting a role in aid distribution given that it would jeopardize Hamas’ near monopoly of aid.[4]

Israeli officials have recently considered alternative methods to distribute aid without Hamas, especially as the IDF faces less resistance from Hamas’ military across the Gaza Strip.[5] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on September 2 that Israel needs to find an alternative distribution mechanism in order to deprive Hamas of its ability to rule.[6] Netanyahu has reportedly ordered the IDF to examine the administrative and logistics requirements involved in the IDF assuming responsibility for aid distribution from international organizations.[7] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi has reportedly opposed the IDF assuming such responsibility due to the risk it would pose to Israeli service members and because international organizations are already prepared to do so.[8]

Iran is simultaneously setting conditions to build a nuclear weapon while continuing to signal its willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West. Russia has increased nuclear cooperation with Iran in recent months in line with “[Iranian] ambitions to obtain atomic weapons,” according to unspecified Western officials speaking to Bloomberg on September 14.[9] It is unclear whether the Western officials meant that Iran has decided to produce a nuclear weapon or that Iran seeks to develop the capability to develop a nuclear weapon but has not actually decided to produce one. The Western officials stated that US President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer discussed on September 13 how Russia may be sharing unspecified nuclear technology and secrets with Iran in return for Iran providing Russia with ballistic missiles.[10] Iran recently delivered over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia on September 4.[11] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken similarly stated on September 10 that “Russia is sharing technology that Iran seeks . . . including on nuclear issues.”[12] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Iran and Russia have increased “peaceful nuclear cooperation” during a meeting with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian in St. Petersburg, Russia, on September 12. [13]  

The Masoud Pezeshkian administration is simultaneously continuing to signal its willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Mohammad Eslami emphasized that President Pezeshkian seeks to “expand constructive interactions” with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a speech at the 68^th IAEA General Conference in Vienna, Austria, on September 16. Pezeshkian separately suggested that Iran could engage in direct talks with the United States if Washington abandons its "hostile” policy toward Iran. These statements do not necessarily contradict Iran’s growing nuclear cooperation with Russia. Iran could seek Russian assistance with its nuclear program to try to increase pressure on the West and build leverage for itself in future negotiations.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force launched the Chamran-1 satellite into orbit on September 14.[14] The IRGC Aerospace Force and Iran Electronics Industries, which operates under the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, jointly designed and built the Chamran-1 satellite, which weighs 60 kilograms.[15] The Ghaem-100 space launch vehicle (SLV) launched the Chamran-1 satellite into a 550-kilometer orbit.[16] The Ghaem-100 SLV previously launched the Soraya satellite into a 750-kilometer orbit in January 2024.[17] Iran can use such satellites to support intelligence collection and attack targeting. Iranian state media previously reported in 2020 and 2022 that the IRGC used its satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region.[18] IRGC Aerospace Force Salman Farsi Space Commander Brigadier General Ali Jafar Abadi stated on September 15 that Iran will launch the Ghaem-105 SLV by the end of the current Persian calendar year, which ends in March 2025.[19] Russia has previously assisted Iran with its SLV and missile program and launched Iranian satellites into orbit on Iran’s behalf.[20]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian discussed parts of his agenda to strengthen Iran’s economic relationships abroad during his first press conference on September 16.[21] Pezeshkian advocated for Iran complying with the international money laundering and financial transparency standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in order to attract foreign investment and increase economic growth.[22] Pezeshkian previously said that Iran needs over 100 billion US dollars in foreign investment in order to reach eight-percent annual economic growth.[23] The FATF blacklisted Iran in February 2020 for failing to adhere to the international financing standards.[24] Former moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani similarly advocated for resolving issues with the FATF but failed due to hardliner opposition.[25] Pezeshkian separately in his press conference reiterated his call for "removing borders with neighbors" in a fashion similar to the European Union.[26] He said that Islamic countries would maintain "their own government[s] and authority" but that removing borders would facilitate travel among Muslims in the region and "improve the security and development of the economy and culture of the Islamic world." This proposal reflects the Iranian desire for greater economic integration with neighboring states, particularly Iraq and Syria, especially given the role that such integration could play in mitigating the impact of international sanctions. Pezeshkian first presented this idea during his first official visit to Iraq on September 11. Pezeshkian expressed his commitment to continue pursuing the development of relations with China, Russia, and regional countries.

Pezeshkian lastly reiterated that Iran will not accept constraints on its missile program.[27] Pezeshkian was referencing the notion that the West could demand that Iran limit its missile development in future nuclear negotiations. Iranian officials have long maintained that they will not grant any concessions on the missile program.

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar sent a letter to Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi, according to Houthi media on September 15, emphasizing that the Hamas is “well” and calling Israeli announcements claiming the opposite “psychological warfare.”[28] Sinwar also congratulated Abdulmalik on the Houthi ballistic missile attack into Israel on September 14 and claimed that combined efforts with the Houthis, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will “break” and “defeat” Israel. Israeli officials have made several recent statements on Hamas’ degradation in the Gaza Strip that Sinwar could be referencing to Abdulmalik. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated on September 10 that Hamas is no longer an organized military force in the Gaza Strip.[29] The IDF Southern Command’s fire control commander similarly said on September 11 that Hamas no longer functions as a conventional military organization but added that the IDF requires another year to fully destroy Hamas’ military and governance capabilities.[30] Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media claimed Sinwar also sent a letter to Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah at some point in August or September 2024, asserting that Hamas’ fight against Israel will continue until Israel is defeated.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israel is refocusing its operations in the Gaza Strip to prioritize “destroying the pillars of Hamas’ civil rule. . . especially the distribution of humanitarian aid.” An Israeli official said that controlling aid distribution allows Hamas to project the image that it still controls the Gazan population.
• Iranian nuclear program: Iran is simultaneously setting conditions to build a nuclear weapon while continuing to signal openness to nuclear negotiations with the West. Russia has increased nuclear cooperation with Iran in line with Iranian “ambitions to obtain atomic weapons,” according to Western media.
• Iranian economy: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian discussed parts of his agenda to strengthen Iran’s economic relationships abroad during his first press conference. Pezeshkian advocated for Iran complying with international money laundering and financial transparency standards, which Iranian hardliners have historically opposed.

Iran Update, September 15, 2024

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Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Ria Reddy and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Israeli air defenses “partially intercepted” a Houthi ballistic missile that entered Israeli airspace on September 14.[1] This is the third time that a Houthi missile or drone has entered Israeli airspace from Yemen since October 7.[2] The Houthis claimed that the attack targeted an unspecified military target in the Tel Aviv area with a “new hypersonic missile” on September 14.[3] The IDF denied that the Houthis used a hypersonic missile.[4] The IDF launched several interceptors at the missile but only partially struck it, causing the missile to disintegrate over central Israel.[5] The missile and interceptor fragments damaged and set fire to several areas but did not strike populated or military targets.[6] The Houthis said the missile flew for 11 minutes and 30 seconds over 2,040 kilometers.[7]  The Houthis did not say that the strike was in response to a specific event, but the attack coincided with the Prophet Mohammad's birthday.[8] Hezbollah similarly chose a religious occasion—Arbaeen—to conduct its August 25 rocket and drone attack on northern and central Israel.[9] The Houthi Defense Minister and Chief of Staff foreshadowed the attack on September 14, declaring to Israel that ”the coming days will bring you surprises that you will not expect” that would be ”more severe and harsher than what you have witnessed in the past.”[10]The Houthis said in their attack claim that they would continue to target Israel as the anniversary of Hamas’ October 7 attack draws closer.[11]

Palestinian and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias praised the Houthi missile attack targeting Israel.[12] Hamas claimed that the attack was a “natural response” to Israeli “aggression” against Palestinians, Arabs, and the Yemeni people.[13] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai claimed that the attack “surprised” Israeli air defenses and is part of the “new phase of operations” against Israel.[14] Walai recently announced on September 13 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would soon begin their fourth phase of operations against Israel.[15] Walai claimed that this phase will include joint military operations and coordinated actions between Iranian-backed Iraqi groups and other Axis of Resistance members across multiple fronts.

Iran, the Houthis, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance could learn lessons from the Houthi attack in order to increase the effectiveness of future attacks on Israel. The Houthi attack was likely in part a reconnaissance-in-force operation. The US Army defines reconnaissance-in-force as “a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[16] The Houthis could use their attack on Israel to better understand the capabilities and disposition of Israeli air defenses. Iran could similarly study the failure of Israeli air defense to intercept the missile prior to it entering Israeli airspace to better understand how to penetrate Israeli defenses in the future. 

Key Takeaways:

• Yemen: Israeli air defenses “partially intercepted” a Houthi ballistic missile that entered Israeli airspace on September 14. Iran, the Houthis, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance could learn lessons from the Houthi attack in order to increase the effectiveness of future attacks on Israel.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas conducted a relatively simple but multi-stage attack targeting Israeli forces in eastern Rafah City on September 15. Even severely weakened military organizations like Hamas’ Rafah Brigade can continue to conduct simple opportunistic attacks targeting Israeli forces. This attack, while somewhat tactically notable in that the Palestinian fighters conducted the attack in two deliberate stages, does not indicate that the Rafah Brigade is operating at a high level of combat effectiveness given that it appears to have been executed by one cell using one type of direct fire weapon system.
• West Bank: Israeli forces thwarted an infiltration attempt by a group of Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel on September 14.
• Lebanon: An IDF brigade commander in northern Israel independently issued evacuation orders for areas of southern Lebanon without coordinating with Israeli political leadership or higher IDF headquarters on September 15.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias

Iran Update, September 14, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The IDF 162nd Division killed over 100 Hamas fighters and located Hamas infrastructure in Tel al Sultan over the past week.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 13.
• Lebanon: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 15 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 13.
• Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed three Houthi drones and one Houthi “support vehicle” in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on September 13.

Iran Update, September 13, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Kathryn Tyson, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The US Embassy in Baghdad assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted the attack on a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10.[1] CTP-ISW also assessed on September 11 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted the September 10 attack. The US Embassy in Baghdad said on September 11 that an attack targeted the Baghdad Diplomatic Services Compound, a US diplomatic facility.[2] An unspecified military official told AFP on September 11 that militants fired two Katyusha-type rockets in the attack. One rocket struck the wall of an Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service building and the other rocked landed inside an international coalition base, presumably a reference to the Baghdad Diplomatic Services Compound.[3] CTP–ISW previously noted that Iranian-backed Iraqi militants seem to have conducted the attack against the wishes of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[4] The US Embassy called on the Iraqi government to protect US and coalition personnel and facilities.[5] The US government has often emphasized to the Iraqi government, especially Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani, the importance of ensuring the safety of US forces following Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria.[6]

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar sent a letter to Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah vowing to continue Hamas’ fight against Israel, according to Hezbollah-affiliated media.[7] Sinwar reportedly wrote the letter at an unspecified date after former Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh’s death on July 31.[8] Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen reported that Sinwar wrote that Hamas will “remain steadfast” until Israel is defeated and an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as the capital is established.[9] Sinwar also thanked Nasrallah for Iranian-backed groups' efforts to support Hamas since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[10] Hezbollah began its cross-border attacks in northern Israel in October 2023 in support of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah also harbors Hamas elements in Lebanon and permits them to conduct attacks into Israel.[11] The al Qassem Brigades recently launched an attack targeting an IDF site in northern Israel with rockets fired from Lebanon, for example.[12]

The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas' military wing—claimed on September 11 that its fighters continue to engage Israeli forces across the Gaza Strip.[13] Hamas has not claimed many individual attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip in recent weeks, however. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on September 9 that Hamas is no longer an organized military force in the Gaza Strip, suggesting that IDF operations have disrupted Hamas’ ability to operate as a conventional military.[14] 

The IDF said on September 13 that it discovered a small tunnel during a multi-day operation in Tulkarm.[15] The IDF said that the tunnel was near a hospital in the Tulkarm refugee camp.[16] The IDF added that the tunnel had only one entrance, which could indicate the tunnel was still under construction, according to an Israeli journalist.[17] Multiple entrances and exits to a tunnel network improve its resilience. Israeli media reported in March 2024 that the IDF has established a team to locate tunnels in the West Bank.[18] The IDF reportedly established the unit after residents near Tulkarm heard digging noises near their homes. An unspecified security official said that the unit is aware that “terrorist organizations [in the West Bank] are trying to mimic some of the combat methods in Gaza” and that these organizations use underground facilities for weapons storage. The IDF previously discovered one tunnel dozens of meters long in Jenin refugee camp in July 2023.

The Pentagon announced on September 12 that the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group is leaving the CENTCOM area of responsibility and is en route to the Indo-Pacific area of command.[19] The USS Roosevelt arrived in the CENTCOM area of responsibility on July 12 to deter or defend against an Iranian retaliatory strike targeting Israel.[20] The USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group will remain in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian concluded his official three-day trip to Iraq on September 13.[21] Pezeshkian met with Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leaders in Sulaymania, Iraqi Kurdistan, on September 12.[22]  Pezeshkian emphasized Iraqi Kurdistan’s importance to Iran during the meeting. Pezeshkian said that he hoped to increase economic relations between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan. PUK President Bafel Talabani stated that Iraqi Kurdistan will “fully and accurately implement what is mentioned in the security agreement.” This is likely in reference to the March 2023 security agreement between Baghdad and Tehran. This agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[23] Talabani reiterated his commitment to securing the border between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan.[24] This marked the first time an Iranian President traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan.[25]

Pezeshkian also visited religious sites in Karbala and Najaf on September 12.[26] Pezeshkian emphasized the need for unity amongst Muslims in a meeting with Iraqi elites, academics, and nomads in Basra on September 13.[27] Pezeshkian reiterated his support for concepts that would enable the free movement of people between Muslim countries in a fashion similar to the European Union.[28] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi accompanied Pezeshkian on the trip.[29] Pezeshkian returned to Tehran from Basra on September 13.[30]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai claimed Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will soon begin their fourth phase of operations against Israel.[31] Walai explained in an interview with Iranian state-owned media this phase will include joint military operations and coordinated actions between Iranian-backed Iraqi groups and other Axis of Resistance members across multiple fronts. Walai outlined the previous three operational phases. Walai said that in the first phase, Iraqi groups attacked US bases before attacking Israel in the second phase. In the third phase, Iranian-backed Iraqi groups conducted joint operations with the Houthis.[32] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that includes Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, conducted over 170 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023-January 2024.[33] Other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted occasional attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria since January 2024, but the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeted Israel in most of its attacks after January 2024.[34]  CTP-ISW has also reported extensively on how the military relationship between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias has deepened in recent months.[35] The Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq first claimed to conduct a joint drone attack targeting Israel on June 6. The last joint attack occurred on June 15.[36] A US self-defense strike on July 30 targeting a prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facility killed a Houthi drone expert who had traveled to Iraq to train other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in drone tactics, indicating the deepening relationship between Iraqi groups and the Houthis.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: The US Embassy in Baghdad assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted the attack on a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10. CTP-ISW also assessed on September 11 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted the September 10 attack.
• Gaza Strip: The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas' military wing—claimed on September 11 that its fighters continue to engage Israeli forces across the Gaza Strip. Hamas has not claimed many individual attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip in recent weeks, however.
• West Bank: The IDF said on September 13 that it discovered a small tunnel during a multi-day operation in Tulkarm. The IDF said that the tunnel was near a hospital in the Tulkarm refugee camp. The IDF added that the tunnel had only one entrance, which could indicate the tunnel was still under construction, according to an Israeli journalist. Multiple entrances and exits to a tunnel network improve its resilience.
• Iranian Retaliation: The Pentagon announced on September 12 that the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group is leaving the CENTCOM area of responsibility and is en route to the Indo-Pacific area of command.
• Iran: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian concluded his official three-day trip to Iraq on September 13.

Iran Update, September 12, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Israeli special operations forces conducted a highly unusual raid into Syria on September 8 to destroy a major Iranian-backed precision missile factory and recover intelligence from the site.[1] The mission targeted the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) site in Masyaf in northwestern Syria, which has been long involved in the production of advanced weapons, including precision munitions.[2] The Israeli raid began with several airstrikes targeting nearby roads in order to isolate the facility and prevent Iranian-backed or Syrian reinforcements from arriving. Israeli SOF entered the facility, some of which was underground, and engaged Syrian guards. The Israeli SOF then planted explosives before leaving the facility and detonating them.[3] The explosives were needed to destroy the facility because it was underground and thus protected from airstrikes.[4] Israeli SOF sustained no reports casualties during the raid. Iran built the targeted site in 2018, and Lebanese Hezbollah has used it since then to produce weapons.[5]

The raid was part of a concerted Israeli effort to disrupt Iranian weapons supply networks in the Levant.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have conducted numerous airstrikes across Syria to this end in recent months, including the strike that killed several senior IRGC officers in Damascus in April 2024.

A Hamas delegation met Egyptian and Qatari mediators in Doha on September 11 to discuss the ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Israel, specifically the release of Palestinian prisoners.[6] Khalil al Hayya led the Hamas delegation that met with Egyptian General Intelligence Services Director Abbas Kamel and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani.[7] Kamel and Thani reportedly encouraged Hayya to “lessen” Hamas’ demand for the release of 100 Palestinian prisoners serving life sentences in Israeli prisons.[8] This meeting comes after US officials said that this Hamas demand is the “main impediment” to negotiations.[9] Hamas released a statement after the meeting, reiterating its maximalist demands and stating that it would reject any new conditions in negotiations.[10] Axios reported that Egyptian and Qatari mediators feel that there may be an opportunity to present a new US-Egyptian-Qatari bridging proposal next week.[11]

The commander of the IDF 162nd Division, Brigadier General Itzhak Cohen, announced on September 12 that the IDF has “dismantled” Hamas' Rafah Brigade and secured control of the urban Rafah City area after four months of operations there.[12] Cohen told reporters that the IDF had “destroyed” the Rafah Brigade’s four battalions.[13] The IDF stated that it has also killed at least 2,308 Hamas fighters in the Rafah Brigade and destroyed 13 kilometers of tunnels since beginning clearing operations in Rafah in May 2024.[14] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF can destroy the remaining tunnels under Rafah in three weeks.[15]

Hamas’ recent attack rate and type in Rafah indicate that the Rafah Brigade is severely degraded and is no longer operating as an effective military unit. The weekly rate of Hamas attacks in Rafah has steadily declined since the IDF went into Rafah on May 2024. The attacks do not appear to have clear tactical or operational objectives, moreover, suggesting a breakdown in command and control.[16] Hamas has also stopped using advanced tactics and weaponry in Rafah in July 2024.[17] The last Hamas attack in Rafah that CTP–ISW observed was on August 31, in which Hamas claimed to fire a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) at an Israeli bulldozer in coordination with the al Nasser Salah ad Din Brigades.[18] This was the first claimed Hamas attack in Rafah in eight days.[19] Israeli forces have continued clearing operations in Tal al Sultan, where the attack occurred, since August 31 without any more claims of Hamas attacks.[20] The IDF has stated that it has killed over 250 Hamas fighters in Tal al Sultan in recent weeks, including the commander of the Tal al Sultan Battalion.[21]

Smaller Palestinian militias allied with Hamas have continued to target Israeli forces in the area, however, and can continue to threaten Israeli forces along the Philadelphi Corridor, even if Hamas is severely degraded. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), for example, targeted Israeli armor with RPG fire in central Rafah on September 12.[22]

The IDF stated that it has located and destroyed most of the underground tunnels below the Philadelphi Corridor.[23] Cohen said that Israeli engineering forces recently located 203 interconnected tunnels near or under the Philadelphi Corridor.[24] The IDF stated it has already destroyed 80 percent of the tunnels and intends to scan and demolish the remaining 20 percent.[25] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF could destroy all remaining underground routes beneath the Philadelphi Corridor in 48 hours if approved to do so.[26] Locating and destroying remaining underground infrastructure helps consolidate Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor and has been a focus of IDF operations since the IDF took the corridor in May 2024. Maintaining Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor would help prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting major smuggling operations into the Gaza Strip that would accelerate Hamas’ ability to resupply itself, as CTP–ISW has previously argued.

IDF sources told Israeli media that Hamas did not primarily use underground tunnels for smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip from Egypt. The IDF identified nine tunnels that crossed into Egyptian territory from Rafah.[27] Cohen confirmed that all nine tunnels were inactive and had been previously blocked by Egyptian authorities or Hamas.[28] IDF sources told the Jerusalem Post that most weapons in Hamas’ stockpiles are believed to have been smuggled aboveground through the Rafah border crossing, which is controlled by Egypt. The IDF assesses that most of Hamas’ aboveground and underground smuggling operations occurred during Mohammad Morsi’s one-year term as president of Egypt from 2012 to 2013.[29] These operations enabled Hamas to develop its extensive weapons manufacturing infrastructure, much of which the IDF has destroyed throughout the war.[30] The IDF sources also said that cross-border weapons smuggling continued to some degree until the IDF took the Philadelphi Corridor in May 2024.

The IDF sources said that Hamas’ main goal along the Philadelphi Corridor was to store and fire long-range rockets.[31] The sources said that Rafah, and the Philadelphi Corridor in particular, contained one of Hamas’ largest long-range rocket arsenals found by the IDF during the war.[32] Hamas reportedly stored rockets near the Egyptian border to discourage Israeli strikes on the stockpile.[33] The lack of IDF operations in Rafah in the last few decades also reportedly gave Hamas’ rocket units a sense of “immunity” from Israeli targeting.[34]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian continued his official visit to Iraq on September 11 and 12. Pezeshkian called for “unity and cohesion” among Muslim countries during a meeting with members of the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties—in Baghdad on September 12.[35] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali attended the meeting. Iranian state media reported that two individuals named Abu Ala and Abu Karar also attended the meeting.[36] Iranian media may have been referring to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Ala al Walai. Pezeshkian also attended a “government forming coalition” meeting in Baghdad on September 11.[37] Iranian media did not specify what Pezeshkian discussed with Iraqi officials at this meeting. The following prominent Iraqi politicians attended[38]:

• Prime Minister Mohammad Shia all Sudani
• Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Madalawi
• National Wisdom Movement Head Ammar al Hakim
• State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki
• Former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi
• Azm Alliance leader Muthanna al Samarrai
• Azm Alliance member Mohammad al Mashhadani[39]
• Sovereignty Alliance head Khamis al Khanjar[40]
• Former Parliament Speaker Salim al Jubouri[41]
• Foreign Affairs Minister Fuad Hussein
• Kurdish Democratic Party member Shakhawan Abdulla
• Babylon Movement leader Rayan al Kildani

Pezeshkian separately met with senior Kurdish leaders in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, on September 12. Pezeshkian met with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) President Masoud Barzani.[42] Nechirvan Barzani stated that Iraqi Kurdistan “should not be used against Iran.”[43] Iran has historically accused Kurdish opposition groups and Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan to conduct operations into Iran.[44] Iran and Iraq signed a security agreement in March 2023 that requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraq away from the border with Iran.[45] Pezeshkian will also meet with Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leaders in Sulaymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan, during his visit.[46]

Iran and Russia are downplaying their disagreement over the Zangezur Corridor project in the Caucasus. Tension has erupted between Moscow and Tehran since Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov announced on August 19 that Russia supports the Zangezur Corridor, which would connect Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhchivan Automonous Region through southern Armenia.[47] Iran has long opposed the development of the Zangezur corridor, arguing that it would sever Iranian land access to Europe and Russia.[48] Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian met Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in St. Petersburg, Russia, on September 10, during which Shoigu insisted that the Russian position vis-a-vis the Zangezur Corridor has not recently changed.[49] Ahmadian similarly said that nothing has changed in the Iran-Russia relationship during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on September 12.[50] Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova likewise said on September 11 that Russia ”provided all the necessary clarifications,” which Tehran has accepted.[51] Neither Iran nor Russia likely seeks to antagonize the other, despite their differing positions, especially as they implemented their agreement to provide Iranian missiles to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine..[52]

Russia is continuing to balance its relationships with Iran and the Gulf states. Ahmadian and Shoigu also discussed the dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates over ownership of three islands in the Persian Gulf.[53] Tehran has claimed the three islands as Iranian territory since 1971.[54] Iranian state media reported that Shoigu confirmed expressed Russian support for Iranian sovereignty over the three islands, though this report should be treated with skepticism.[55] Russia has historically indicated support for the Emirati claim to the islands, which has been a consistent point of tension between Moscow and Tehran.[56]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Israeli special operations forces conducted a highly unusual raid into Syria to destroy a major Iranian-backed precision missile factory and recover intelligence from it. The raid is part of a concerted Israeli effort to disrupt Iranian-backed weapons supply networks in the Levant.
• Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage negotiations: A Hamas delegation met with Egyptian and Qatari mediators to discuss the number of Palestinian prisoners freed in a potential agreement. Egyptian and Qatari mediators pressed Hamas to lessen its demands.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF 162^nd Division commander announced that Hamas’ Rafah Brigade is “dismantled” and that the IDF has secured control of the urban Rafah area. Recent Hamas attacks in Rafah indicate that the brigade is severely degraded.
• Iraq: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian continued his official visit to Iraq. Pezeshkian met with Iranian-backed politicians and militia leaders in Baghdad. Pezeshkian has traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan to meet with local officials there.
• Caucasus: Iran and Russia are downplaying their disagreement over the Zangezur Corridor project that would connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave. Neither Iran nor Russia likely seek to antagonize the other, especially as they pursue bilateral arms deals.

Iran Update, September 11, 2024

click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Ria Reddy, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The IDF Southern Command’s fire control commander said that Hamas no longer functions as a conventional military organization but added that the IDF requires another year to fully destroy Hamas’ military and governance capabilities.[1] Destruction is doctrinally defined as physically rendering an enemy force unable to fight until reconstituted.[2] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent interviewed the outgoing Southern Command fire control commander on September 11.[3] The commander said that all of Hamas brigades are “damaged to the point of disbandment” and that Hamas fighters almost exclusively conduct guerilla-style attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip.[4] He said that within a year he expects that the IDF would have "complete freedom of action” in the Gaza Strip.[5] The commander also said he believes it is possible to degrade Hamas to an extent it can never recover from. The commander’s assessment aligns with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s assertion on September 9 that Hamas is no longer an organized military force in the Gaza Strip.[6] The fire control commander and Gallant’s comments suggest that IDF operations have disrupted Hamas’ ability to operate as a conventional military under structured command hierarchies.

Hamas information captured by the IDF and released by Israel supports the assertion that the IDF has severely degraded Hamas’ military capabilities. Gallant released a captured Hamas letter on September 11 authored by Hamas Khan Younis Brigade Commander Rafe Salamah in which Salamah told Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar informing him of the damage sustained by the Khan Younis Brigade.[7] Salamah wrote the letter at an unspecified point before his death in July 2024.[8] The IDF withdrew from Khan Younis in April 2024 and has conducted intermittent raids since then that have encountered scattered resistance.[9] Salamah told Sinwar that his brigade had lost 50% of its fighters and that another 25% of the remaining fighters were mentally or physically unfit to fight.[10] Salamah also said that the brigade had depleted or lost control over 60% of its small arms and at least 65-70% of its anti-tank weapons.[11] The degradation of Hamas‘ military structure and capabilities is not limited to Khan Younis—Israeli military sources said in late August 2024 that IDF operations in Rafah caused the “collapse” of Hamas’ Rafah Brigade, for example.[12] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Hamas fighters have increasingly attempted to flee Rafah via tunnels north to the al Mawasi humanitarian zone, indicating a lack of unit cohesion or adherence to a command structure.[13] CTP-ISW continues to observe Hamas attacking Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip although at a significantly diminished rate in recent months.[14] Hamas likely continues to operate in small, de-centralized cells of fighters throughout the Gaza Strip.

Degradation is a temporary military effect and must be sustained by further military action or policy options to, at minimum, disrupt or prevent reconstitution. Reconstitution requires space and time for a degraded force to disengage, rest its forces, and train new personnel. IDF operations, including airstrikes, deny Hamas this space and time. Interdiction of Hamas resupply efforts under the Philadelphi Corridor is equally important to preventing reconstitution, given that new personal weapons and anti-tank systems would presumably enter the Strip from under the Philadelphi Corridor.

Possible Iranian-backed Iraqi militants attacked a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10.[15] The militants appear to have conducted the attack without approval from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The US Embassy in Baghdad announced that an attack took place at the Baghdad Diplomatic Services Compound, which is a US diplomatic facility.[16] The attack notably took place hours before Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in Baghdad.[17] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.[18] It is more likely, however, that an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia—rather than the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—conducted the attack. An unspecified military official told AFP that the fighters launched two Katyusha rockets targeting the facility.[19] The official stated that one of the rockets fell on the wall of an Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service compound while the other rocket landed inside an international coalition base. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have frequently used Katyusha rockets to target US forces in Iraq.[20] ISIS does not frequently directly target US forces in Iraq, opting instead to target Iraqi Security Forces, which are a comparably “softer“ target. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah claimed on September 11 that “suspicious hands” conducted the attack with the aim of “disrupting” Pezeshkian’s visit to Baghdad, indicating that Kataib Hezbollah--and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq more broadly--did not order or sanction the attack.[21] Unspecified fighters previously conducted a rocket attack targeting US forces stationed at Baghdad International Airport in October 2023.[22]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian traveled to Baghdad on September 11, marking his first visit abroad since becoming president in July 2024.[23] Iranian and Iraqi officials signed 14 cooperation agreements covering a variety of topics, including free trade zones, media, commerce, and transportation.[24] Iran, Iraq, and Syria have increasingly discussed establishing a free trade zone since former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Syria in May 2023.[25] CTP-ISW previously assessed that a free trade zone through Iran, Iraq, and Syria would allow Iran to move materials across borders with less oversight.[26]

Pezeshkian met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, President Abdul Latif al Rashid, and Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan on September 11.[27] Pezeshkian called for implementing existing security agreements between Iran and Iraq during a joint press conference with Sudani, likely in reference to the March 2023 security agreement between Tehran and Baghdad.[28] This agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[29] Iranian media recently reported on September 8 that the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan evacuated its headquarters in Iraq near the Iranian border as part of this agreement.[30] Sudani emphasized that Iraq will not allow “any group to commit transnational aggression against Iran.”[31] Pezeshkian separately called for “removing the borders of Islamic countries...similar to the experience of the European Union” during a meeting with Rashid.[32] This statement may reflect Iran’s desire to facilitate greater economic cooperation and integration with its regional partners, particularly Iraq and Syria.

Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNCS) Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian called for a BRICS security commission and “Joint economic mechanisms” to address a number of security issues during a BRICS security meeting on September 11.[33] The meeting, hosted in St. Petersburg, Russia, gathered high-ranking security officials from BRICS countries. Ahmadian proposed forming a “BRICS Security Commission” and “joint economic mechanisms,” to address issues related to terrorism, border security, maritime security, and cyber security.[34] Ahmadian emphasized that BRICS members have the potential to be “the founders of a new [global] security system.”[35] Ahmadian expressed his support for a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine and referenced peace initiatives proposed by China and Brazil.[36] High-ranking security officials from Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Sri Lanka, and Ethiopia attended the summit.[37] Ahmadian will hold further meetings with some of his counterparts on the summit's sidelines on September 11 and 12.[38]

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar will almost certainly reject a deal for his safety in exchange for Hamas surrender. Israeli hostage coordinator Gal Hirsch told Bloomberg News that he extended an offer to Hamas on September 8 that would give Sinwar free passage from the Gaza Strip in exchange for the return of the hostages, demilitarization, de-radicalization and a new political system in the Gaza Strip.[39] These stipulations would achieve all Israeli war aims in the Gaza Strip, thus resulting in a Hamas surrender. There have been no indications that Sinwar would moderate his stance to protect his own life or benefit himself, either in this war or during previous negotiations with Israel. Sinwar has maintained his hardline stance in negotiations and has repeatedly resisted pressure to moderate Hamas’ ceasefire position from both his former superiors and his military subordinates in the Gaza Strip during this war.[40] Sinwar has previously rejected conciliation or cooperation with Israel, and he is willing to absorb significant personal sacrifice to advance his objectives.[41] Sinwar opposed the 2011 prisoner deal in which Israel released Sinwar and other top Hamas leaders in exchange for Hamas-held IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, for example.[42] Sinwar was reportedly insistent on freeing Hamas fighters serving multiple life sentences and was willing to remain in prison and “pay a heavy price for principle,” according to a former Israeli prison official.[43] Sinwar also appears to be deeply committed to his belief that he and Hamas can destroy the Israeli state, suggesting he would not trade his personal safety for the collapse of the movement.

Key Takeaways:

• Hamas’ Military Effectiveness: An IDF officer said that Hamas no longer functions as a conventional military organization but added that the IDF requires another year to fully destroy Hamas’ military and governance capabilities. Hamas information captured by the IDF and released by Israel supports the assertion that the IDF has severely degraded Hamas’ military capabilities. Degradation is a temporary military effect and must be sustained by further military action or policy options to, at minimum, disrupt or prevent reconstitution.
• Iraq: Possible Iranian-backed Iraqi militants attacked a US diplomatic compound near Baghdad International Airport on September 10. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing. It is more likely, however, that an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia—rather than the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—conducted the attack. An unspecified military official told AFP that the fighters launched two Katyusha rockets targeting the facility.
• Iran and BRICS: Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNCS) Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian called for a BRICS security commission and “Joint economic mechanisms” to address a number of security issues during a BRICS security meeting on September 11.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar will almost certainly reject a deal for his safety in exchange for Hamas surrender. There have been no indications that Sinwar would moderate his stance to protect his own life or benefit himself, either in this war or during previous negotiations with Israel. Sinwar has maintained his hardline stance in negotiations throughout the war and he previously opposed the prisoner-hostage exchange deal in 2011 that freed him. Sinwar opposed the 2011 deal on the grounds that other Hamas fighters serving multiple life sentences were not freed alongside him.

Iran Update, September 10, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Kathryn Tyson, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Karolina Hird, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed on September 10 that Iran has sent short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia amid growing international condemnation of Tehran's support for Russia's war in Ukraine.[1] Blinken confirmed that Russia has received an unspecified number of SRBM shipments and warned that Russian forces will likely use them on the battlefield "within weeks." Iranian officials continue to deny that Tehran has sent weapons to Moscow. Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy affirmed on September 10 that the United States and the United Kingdom are "completely aligned" on the need to tackle Iranian influence both in Ukraine and the Middle East.[2] France, Germany, and the United Kingdom jointly condemned Iran's SRBM deliveries and emphasized that they are taking steps to cancel bilateral air services with Iran (including by sanctioning Iranian national airline Iran Air), designate individuals and organizations involved in Iran's ballistic missile program and the transfer of SRBMs to Russia, and sanction Russian cargo ships.[3] UK outlet the Times, citing Ukrainian intelligence sources, reported that Iran had delivered over 200 Fateh-360 SRBMs to Russia via a Caspian Sea port on September 4. CTP-ISW continues to assess that Russia will use Iranian-supplied SRBMs to target Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the coming months, thus alleviating the strain on Russia's domestic missile production capacity.[4]

The United States and several European countries imposed sanctions on Iran and Russia on September 10 following Iran’s shipment of ballistic missiles to Russia. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned ten individuals and six entities based in Iran and Russia for enabling Iran’s delivery of weapons components and systems to Russia and thus supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine.[5] OFAC sanctioned the following Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry officials:

• Rouhollah Katebi. Katebi is the Russian point of contact for the Iranian defense ministry. Katebi participated in Russian preparations to receive the Iranian Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles.
• Ebrahim Bahrami. Bahrami has been a point of contact in Iran for the Russian government and the training of Russian military personnel in Iran. Bahrami is an employee of Shahid Kharrazi Industries, which the United States previously sanctioned in January 2018.
• Ali Jafar Abadi. Jafar Abadi is the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force’s Salam Farsi Space Command and has overseen satellite launches in Iran. Russia has previously helped Iran launch satellites into orbit, including in August 2022 and February 2024.[6]

OFAC also sanctioned the following entities:

• Iran Air. Iran Air has shipped electronics and aircraft parts to Russia. OFAC previously sanctioned Iran Air in November 2018 and identified 67 of its aircraft as blocked property.[7] The US State Department separately designated Iran Air on September 10 for ”materially contributing to the supply, sale, or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, of arms or related materiel, including spare parts.”[8]
• Iran-based Azadegan Transportation Company. The Azadegan Transportation Company is an IRGC-affiliated company that is “critical to the logistics operations of the IRGC.”
• Iran-based Farzanegan Propulsion Systems Design Bureau. The Farzanegan Propulsion Systems Design Bureau has provided Russian weapons makers with samples of its engines in support of Russian cruise missile development. Farzanegan manufactures numerous types of engines, including turbojet engines, and previously claimed that it produced Iran’s first ramjet engine, according to the US Treasury Department.

The United Kingdom’s Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), France’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, and Germany’s Federal Foreign Office announced, as the E3, that they will cancel bilateral air services agreements with Iran and sanctioned three individuals and four entities.[9] Cancelling bilateral air services will restrict Iran Air’s ability to fly to the United Kingdom and Europe.[10]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi reportedly plans to appoint Kazem Gharib Abadi as the lead Iranian nuclear negotiator with the West.[11] This appointment would further signal the willingness of the Masoud Pezeshkian administration to pursue nuclear negotiations given Gharib Abadi’s experience. Gharib Abadi was the Iranian representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 2018-21, during which time he played a key role in engaging Western diplomats and negotiating teams.[12] Gharib Abadi claimed that the United States and the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) have failed to uphold their commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[13] Abadi currently serves as deputy judiciary chief for international affairs and secretary of the Iranian Supreme Human Rights Council.[14]

The appointment of Gharib Abadi as lead nuclear negotiator would come as Araghchi has selected other experienced diplomats for key positions. Araghchi appointed Majid Takht Ravanchi as deputy foreign affairs minister for policy on September 9.[15] Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former moderate President Hassan Rouhani.[16] Araghchi also appointed Ali Bagheri Kani as his personal adviser.[17] Bagheri Kani was appointed as lead nuclear negotiator in 2021 under former President Ebrahim Raisi.[18] Bagheri Kani reiterated Tehran’s willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West in July 2024.[19]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone targeting three senior Hamas commanders on September 9.[20] The IDF stated that it targeted Hamas commanders in a command-and-control compound within the al Mawasi humanitarian zone in Khan Younis.[21] The IDF killed the head of Hamas’ aerial system in the Gaza Strip, Samer Ismail Hader Abu Daqa, the head of targeting and surveillance in Hamas’ military intelligence, Osama Tabash, and senior Hamas fighter Ayman Mabhouh.[22] The IDF stated that the three commanders were directly involved in the October 7 attack and continued to conduct attacks against Israeli forces and Israel itself.[23] The IDF stated that it collected ”extensive” intelligence and conducted aerial observation in the hours prior to the attack to verify the commanders’ presence in the area.[24] A security source told Israeli Army Radio that there is a ”high level” of intelligence indicating that the three Hamas commanders were present at the site of the attack.[25] IDF clearing operations in recent months have forced senior Hamas officials to leave underground tunnels and hide among civilians in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone.[26]

Palestinian sources, including the Hamas-run Gazan Health Ministry, reported that the IDF killed at least 19 and wounded over 60 people in the strike.[27] The Hamas-run Government Media Office claimed that the strike killed 40 Palestinians.[28] US White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby called the reports of high civilian casualties in the strike “deeply concerning” and added that the United States would not be "bashful" about pressing Israel for more information about the attack.[29] The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres condemned the airstrike.[30] The IDF stated that it took steps to reduce civilian harm from the strike, including through the use of specific munitions and aerial surveillance.[31] The IDF added that the Hamas-run Government Media Office’s figures on Palestinian casualties are inconsistent with the IDF’s information.[32] The IDF stated that Hamas continues to concentrate its operatives and infrastructure in the humanitarian zone, despite IDF measures to keep Gazans out of combat zones.[33]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Hamas is no longer an organized military force in the Gaza Strip.[34] Gallant told reporters on September 9 that Hamas’ “military formation no longer exists.”[35] Gallant’s comments suggest that IDF operations have disrupted Hamas’ ability to operate as a conventional military. Prior to October 2023, Hamas structured its al Qassem Brigades to survive Israeli military action by building a resilient military organization with doctrinally correct unit echelons and command hierarchies.[36] This organization was meant to facilitate recovery in the face of the loss of militia leaders or the destruction of elements of units. The al Qassem Brigades organized themselves into echelons from the squad all the way to the brigade level just as conventional militaries do.[37] IDF operations in the Gaza Strip have significantly reduced Hamas’ ability to operate under these structured command hierarchies, however. Israeli military sources said in late August 2024 that IDF operations in Rafah caused the “collapse” of Hamas’ Rafah Brigade, for example.[38] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Hamas fighters have increasingly attempted to flee Rafah via tunnels north to the al Mawasi humanitarian zone, indicating a lack of moral cohesion or adherence to a command structure.[39] Furthermore, the lack of clear tactical or operational objectives in recent Hamas attacks in Rafah are inconsistent with those of an effective military unit. Israeli tactics responding to Hamas rocket fire have resulted in a significant decrease in rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel as well.[40]

Hamas continues to operate in the Gaza Strip from the remnants of its former structure. Gallant said that the IDF continues to engage Hamas fighters and pursue Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip.[41] CTP-ISW continues to observe Hamas attacking Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip although at a significantly diminished rate in recent months.[42] Hamas likely continues to operate in small, de-centralized cells of fighters throughout the Gaza Strip.

Gallant said that the IDF is “wrapping up [its] missions in the south” and will shift its focus from the Gaza Strip toward the Israel-Lebanon border.[43] Gallant visited Israel’s northern border on September 10 and spoke to Israeli forces simulating a military exercise in northern Israel.[44] Gallant told Israeli forces that they must be ready to execute the IDF’s mission along the northern front “when the time comes.”[45]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Russia cooperation: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed that Iran sent short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. The United States and European countries imposed sanctions on Iran and Russia in response.
• Iranian Nuclear negotiations: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi appointed Kazem Gharib Abadi, further signaling the willingness of the Masoud Pezeshkian administration to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Hamas is no longer an organized military force in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is instead operating from the remnants of its conventional military structure.

Iran Update, September 9, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Kathryn Tyson, Carolyn Moorman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iran recently delivered over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, according to Ukrainian intelligence.[1] An unspecified Ukrainian military source told British media on September 6 that Russia transported the missiles to an unspecified Caspian Sea port on September 4.[2] Iran has previously transferred weapons from its Amirabad and Anzali ports on the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, Russia, on the Volga River.[3] Iran and Russia previously signed an agreement in December 2023 for Iran to send Fateh-360 missiles and Ababil close-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[4] European intelligence sources told Reuters in August 2024 that Russian military personnel are training in Iran to operate Fateh-360 missiles.[5] Fateh-360 missiles have a range of up to 120 kilometers and can carry a payload of 150 kilograms.[6] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will likely use the Iranian-supplied missiles to target Ukrainian energy, military, and civilian infrastructure in the coming months.[7]

The Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry summoned the Iranian charge d’affaires in Ukraine, Shahriar Amouzegar, on September 9 following recent reports that Iran delivered hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia.[8] The Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry harshly warned Amouzegar about the “devastating and irreparable consequences” for Ukrainian-Iranian relations if recent reports about Iran sending ballistic missiles to Russia prove true.[9] Ukraine previously “downgraded” its diplomatic ties with Iran in September 2022 after Iran began supplying Russia with drones for its invasion of Ukraine.[10]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Raphael Grossi discussed ongoing increases in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles and noted that Iran has not resolved outstanding safeguards issues with the IAEA on September 9 in Vienna, Austria.[11] IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi highlighted an ongoing increase in Iran's 20% and 60% enriched uranium reserves, citing the IAEA’s May 2024 report on Iran’s nuclear program.[12] His statements are consistent with an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report which reportedly noted that Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium has increased by 22.6 kilograms (15.90 percent) since the IAEA's last report in May 2024.[13] Grossi added that Iran has taken no steps in the last 15 months to implement an agreement to cooperate with the IAEA and allow the IAEA to "implement further appropriate verification and monitoring activities" on a voluntary basis.[14] Grossi said that "there has been no progress in resolving the outstanding safeguards issues" with Iran and that the IAEA has limited awareness of the current locations of Iran's nuclear material and equipment.[15] Grossi stated that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian agreed to a bilateral meeting to resume "dialogue and cooperation between the [IAEA] and Iran." Grossi previously indicated that the meeting would be in the “near future.”[16]

Iran continues to deny that its nuclear program is violating any agreements.[17] Iran’s representation in the United Nations Office in Vienna called the IAEA’s report on Iran’s undeclared nuclear materials "fake and invalid." The note said the IAEA "did not provide Iran with credible documents" to back its claims and that Iran has no obligation to answer the IAEA's questions.[18]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander said on September 8 that Iran would take “revenge” for Israel’s “evils” in a “different” way. Israel’s “evils” probably refers to the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and other Axis of Resistance leaders.[19] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami said that Israel is "shaken" by the "nightmare of Iran's decisive action" and that "Israelis will taste the bitter taste of revenge."[20] Salami’s comments are notable because he is a senior operational commander in the IRGC chain of command, meaning he and his subordinates would be responsible for the planning and execution of an attack on Israel. Salami’s comments reiterated recent claims from the Iranian military establishment that emphasize that the Iranian delay is intentional for its psychological effect on the Israeli population.[21] Salami also noted that the attack would "definitely be different," which is consistent with statements from other Iranian officials, including IRGC Quds Force officers.[22] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.[23]

The Jordanian truck driver that killed three Israeli civilian at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8 likely acted alone. The Jordanian truck driver arrived at the Israeli-controlled side of the border crossing, exited his vehicle, and opened fire at Israeli forces working there.[24] The Jordanian Foreign Affairs and Expatriates spokesperson said that initial investigations confirmed the attack “was an individual act.”[25] The attacker was a former Jordanian Armed Forces soldier and a member of a powerful tribe aligned with the Jordanian monarchy. Both of these links suggest that he was not linked to Hamas or Shia militia groups.[26] The attacker’s tribe also released a statement stating that he had no party or political affiliations.[27]

It is notable that the attacker likely operated alone given that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.[28] Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Hussein Moanes, also known as Abu Ali al Askari, said in April 2024 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—has prepared to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with a significant supply of weapons.[29] CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that supports the idea that the ”Islamic Resistance in Jordan” exists and operates in Jordan. CTP-ISW assessed in April that Moanes’ declaration was likely aspirational and did not accurately represent Kataib Hezbollah’s reach in Jordan.[30] Other Axis of Resistance groups and anti-Israel factions in Jordan also attempted to capitalize on the Allenby Bridge border crossing attack. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad both called the attack a confirmation of the Arab world’s rejection of Israeli ”crimes” and ”massacres.”[31] A Jordanian civil society group that organized protests in spring 2024 held a demonstration attended by thousands of Jordanians in Amman celebrating the attack.[32] The civil society group also released a statement in response to the attack that called on the Jordanian monarchy to end normalization with Israel and withdraw from the 1994 Wadi Araba Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.[33]

The Biden administration is reportedly re-examining its ceasefire-hostage proposal amid Israeli and US pessimism over the feasibility of a ceasefire-hostage deal. Unspecified US officials said Hamas’ execution of six hostages and demands to release 100 more Palestinian prisoners led to “significant pessimism” within the White House over the feasibility of Hamas and Israel agreeing to a new proposal.[34] US officials said that President Biden does not want to “reward” Hamas with concessions after it killed the hostages and pushed for more demands.[35] A senior Israeli official told Israeli media that the US is re-considering whether its negotiators will introduce another bridging proposal at all.[36] Four unspecified senior Israeli officials said that the US and Israel recently attempted to organize another round of negotiations in Cairo but Egypt did not allow talks to move forward after expressing displeasure with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Netanyahu said that Egypt enabled weapons smuggling along the Philadelphi Corridor.[37] The Biden administration’s focus has reportedly shifted to encouraging the Egyptian and Qatari mediators to pressure Sinwar to concede some of Hamas’ demands.[38]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a major Syrian weapons facility as part of the Israeli campaign to interdict weapons and supplies flowing to Lebanese Hezbollah. The IDF likely conducted several airstrikes into Syria on September 8, including one targeting a Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) site in Masyaf, Hama Governorate, used to produce advanced weapons including precision guided munitions.[39] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent called the strike “exceptional” and large, adding that the strike hit an underground weapons facility at the SSRC site. FIRMS data showed significant fires in southern Masyaf and in a valley southwest of Masyaf that holds an underground facility and tunnel network.[40] The airstrikes killed 16 people and injured 43 others.[41] Iran reportedly uses the SSRC site in Masyaf to develop weapons for the members of the Axis of Resistance, including the Lebanese Hezbollah.[42] The Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned the airstrikes but denied the presence of any Iran-operated military site in the area.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Russia: Iran recently delivered over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, according to Ukrainian intelligence. An unspecified Ukrainian military source told British media on September 6 that Russia transported the missiles to an unspecified Caspian Sea port on September 4. Iran has previously transferred weapons to Russia from its Amirabad and Anzali ports on the Caspian Sea to Astrakhan, Russia, on the Volga River.
• Jordan: The Jordanian truck driver that killed three Israeli civilian at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8 likely acted alone. It is notable that the attacker likely operated alone given that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General discussed ongoing increases in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles and noted that Iran has not resolved outstanding safeguards issues with the IAEA on September 9 in Vienna, Austria.
• Iranian Retaliation: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander said on September 8 that Iran would take “revenge” for Israel’s “evils” in a “different” way. Israel’s “evils” probably refers to the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and other Axis of Resistance leaders.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: The Biden administration is reportedly re-examining its ceasefire-hostage proposal amid Israeli and US pessimism over the feasibility of a ceasefire-hostage deal.
• Syria: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a major Syrian weapons facility as part of the Israeli campaign to interdict weapons and supplies flowing to Lebanese Hezbollah.
• Lebanon: A veteran Israeli war correspondent said that Israeli deliberations over an offensive in southern Lebanon are “mainly in relation to [the] scope” of the operation, though the “political and security echelon” has not decided to conduct an operation.

Iran Update, September 8, 2024

click here to read the full report with maps

Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

A Jordanian truck driver killed three Israelis present at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8.[1] The driver arrived at the Israeli-controlled side of the border crossing, exited his vehicle, and opened fire at Israeli forces working there.[2] Israeli forces at the border crossing killed the shooter.[3] The gunman killed three Israeli civilians working at the border crossing.[4] The Israel Airports Authority—the Israeli government entity responsible for airports and land-to-land border crossings—closed Allenby Bridge, the Rabin crossing, and Jordan River crossing with Jordan until further notice following the shooting attack.[5]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated the Islamic Resistance in Jordan on September 8 for the shooting attack at Allenby Bridge.[6] Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Hussein Moanes, also known as Abu Ali al Askari, said on April 1 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—has prepared to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with a significant supply of weapons.[7] Moanes said that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq seeks to equip Jordanian fighters so that Iraq and Jordan can jointly attack Israel to ”defend” the Palestinian cause. Jordanian Interior Minister Mazin Abdullah Hillal al Farrayeh said that the driver acted alone.[8] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify Kataib Hezbollah’s September 8 claim.

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi claimed on September 7 that Iran will “certainly” conduct a “second True Promise Operation,” in reference to the April 2024 Iranian drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[9] Naghdi claimed that Iran will retaliate “at the right time” to ensure that its retaliation generates “more effects.”[10] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles that Iran fired toward Israel in April 2024, and the Iranian attack inflicted significantly less damage on Israel than Tehran intended.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.[12]

Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Richard Moore stated on September 7 that he still expects Iran to retaliate against Israel the killing of Haniyeh.[13] Moore stated that “we won’t be able to let our guard down for the type of activity that the Iranians might try and prosecute in that direction.”

Key Takeaways:

• West Bank: A Jordanian truck driver killed three Israelis present at the Allenby Bridge border crossing between Jordan and the West Bank on September 8.
• Iranian Retaliation: Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force struck and killed Hamas’ eastern Khan Younis Battalion rocket commander on September 3. The IDF said on September 8 that the commander launched rockets at towns near the Gaza Strip and central Israel throughout the war.

Iran Update, September 7, 2024

click here to read the full report with maps

Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force (IAF) conducted three airstrikes targeting Hamas command and control centers in Gaza City and Deir al Balah since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on September 6. One airstrike in Deir al Balah killed PIJ’s eastern Deir al Balah Battalion commander Hatem Abu al Jedian and PIJ’s southern Deir al Balah Battalion commander Abdullah Khattab.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: CIA Director Bill Burns said on September 7 that whether Israel and Hamas accept a new ceasefire proposal will be determined by political will.
• Northern Israel: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 13 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 6.
• Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed one Houthi drone and one Houthi “support vehicle” in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen on September 6.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF Air Force (IAF) conducted three airstrikes targeting Hamas command and control centers in Gaza City and Deir al Balah since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on September 6.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that the IAF struck command and control centers in the Amru Ibn al Aas school and Halima al Saadia school in Gaza City. An IAF airstrike on September 6 targeting a Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) command center in Deir al Balah killed two PIJ battalion commanders.[2] The IDF reported that the airstrike killed PIJ’s eastern Deir al Balah Battalion commander Hatem Abu al Jedian and PIJ’s southern Deir al Balah Battalion commander Abdullah Khattab. Khattab led a group of PIJ fighters in an attack in southern Israel on October 7.[3]

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—claimed one rocket and mortar attack targeting Israeli forces around the Netzarim Corridor on September 7.[4] The IDF has operated around the Netzarim Corridor in recent weeks in order to expand IDF control over territory along the corridor.[5]

CIA Director Bill Burns said on September 7 that whether Israel and Hamas accept a new ceasefire proposal will be determined by political will.[6] Burns said that he had hoped to have a “more detailed” ceasefire agreement to propose to Israel and Hamas in the coming days and said that the remaining “10%” of the deal contains the most challenging obstacles. Israel, Hamas, and international mediators have not resolved opposing demands relating to the hostage-prisoner release and the presence of Israeli forces along the Philadelphi Corridor.[7] US officials have also recently questioned Hamas’ willingness to reach a deal after its execution of six Israeli hostages.[8] Israeli Army Radio reported on September 6 that Israeli officials are “pessimistic” and added that “the chances of a deal are slim.”[9]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

CTP-ISW did not observe any clashes in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 6. This marks the first time CTP-ISW did not observe any West Bank clashes since June 17, 2024.[10]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 13 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on September 6.[11] Lebanese Hezbollah claimed a drone attack on the IDF’s 91st Division headquarters in Ayelet HaShahar on September 7.[12] Israel Army Radio confirmed that 2 to 3 drones “exploded” in the Ayelet HaShahar area on September 7 but did not cause any casualties.[13]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed one Houthi drone and one Houthi “support vehicle” in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen on September 6.[14]

 

Iran Update, September 6, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Kathryn Tyson, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Davit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iran has sent hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, according to the Wall Street Journal.[1] An anonymous European official told the outlet that more shipments of Iranian missiles to Russia are expected.[2] Iran and Russia previously signed a contract in December 2023 to send Iranian Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[3] Ababil missiles have a range of around 86 kilometers and can carry a payload of 45 kilograms, while Fateh-360 missiles have a range of around 120 kilometers and can carry a payload of 150 kilograms.[4] It is unclear, however, exactly what kind of missiles are included in the recently delivered shipment to Russia. Iran has meanwhile expanded at least two of its defense industrial sites outside Tehran throughout 2024 to support the production of drones and missiles, some of which are meant to go to Russia, according to Reuters.[5] Russia has recently intensified drone and missile attacks into Ukraine, notably continuing to use Iranian-developed Shahed-131/136 drones and North Korean ballistic missiles.[6] Russia will likely use Iranian-provided ballistic missiles to target Ukrainian energy, military, and civilian infrastructure over the coming fall and winter to further destabilize Ukrainian society and to disrupt Ukraine’s defense industrial base.

The missile shipment is part of the deepening strategic partnership between Iran and Russia. CTP-ISW has reported extensively on how Moscow and Tehran have expanded their economic, media, military, and political cooperation since Russian forces invaded Ukraine in February 2022.[7] That cooperation has included, among other things, the heavily scrutinized sale of Iranian drones to Russia to use against Ukrainian civilian and military targets.

Iran seeks to benefit economically and militarily from its expanding partnership with Russia. Iran has sought cash for its ailing economy in return for selling weapons to the Kremlin, as CTP-ISW reported in September 2023.[8] Iran has also sought to procure Russian Su-35 fighter jets.[9] Iranian officials “pressed” for the delivery of Su-35s during a meeting with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in Tehran in August 2024.[10] The acquisition of Su-35s could enable Iran to more readily and independently project air power, given that the current Iranian air fleet is outdated and poorly maintained.[11] Iranian leaders have separately sought Russian support in upgrading their cyber capabilities and missile and space programs as part of the expanding military collaboration.[12]

US and European officials have threatened in recent months to impose sanctions on Iran in response to the sale of missiles to Russia.[13] The United States and unspecified European countries have reportedly prepared a sanctions package against Iran for this contingency.[14] These sanctions could include banning Iran Air from flying to European airports.[15]

The rate of Palestinian militia rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel has decreased significantly in recent weeks. Israeli media reported that this decrease is due to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) beginning to immediately evacuate Gazan residents in areas from which rockets are fired and then demolishing buildings in the area.[16] This approach often includes Israeli airstrikes targeting rocket launch sites.[17] The IDF has reportedly pursued this approach regardless of the volume of rockets fired or where the rockets landed.[18] CTP-ISW has observed rocket launches from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory decrease significantly since June 2024, which is consistent with the reporting of this new Israeli approach. The decrease is also likely due to the Hamas stockpile of rockets dwindling.[19] Gazan residents have reportedly pressured Hamas to refrain from firing rockets from certain neighborhoods in response to this new Israeli approach.[20] Clashes have erupted between Hamas members and residents in some cases, according to Israeli military officials. An IDF source said that, in one incident, a Gazan clan attacked Palestinian fighters with clubs as the fighters tried to fire a rocket.[21]

Hamas has begun exploring new ways to pressure the Israeli public as firing rockets has become harder. Hamas has relied on its rockets for years to impose such pressure. But the loss of its stockpile and new Israeli approach have made this option decreasingly viable. Hamas has thus begun calling for suicide bombing attacks targeting civilians in Israel.[22] Hamas claimed responsibility for an attempted suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in August 2024, marking the first time that Hamas has made such a claim since 2008.[23]

Hamas continued to conduct an information operation to decrease Israeli willingness to continue fighting in the Gaza Strip and to pressure Israel to end the war on terms favorable to Hamas. Hamas released two propaganda videos on September 5 and 6 depicting two recently killed hostages calling for a ceasefire.[24] These videos are meant to drive the Israeli public to pressure the Israeli government to accept an immediate ceasefire-hostage deal with Hamas. Hamas has separately issued new demands in recent days by increasing the number of Palestinian prisoners whom Israel must release in a ceasefire-hostage deal, according to anonymous US officials.[25] The return of these Palestinian prisoners would support Hamas’ efforts to rebuild its military wing. The issuance of new demands has made the United States doubt whether Hamas sincerely wants a ceasefire-hostage deal.[26]

Israeli officials are reportedly pessimistic about the prospects of a ceasefire-hostage deal. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with his national security team on September 5 to discuss how to respond to Hamas recently executing six hostages.[27] Israeli Army Radio reported that Israeli officials left the meeting feeling “pessimistic” and added that “the chances of a deal are slim.”[28]

Iranian officials have continued expressing their opposition to Azerbaijan’s efforts to connect its mainland to its Nakhchivan exclave by going through Armenia.[29] These comments are in response to Russia changing policy to support this connection, which is known as the Zangezur Corridor.[30] Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei said that Russian support for the Zangezur Corridor is unacceptable and contradicts the Iran-Russia strategic partnership.[31] Iranian Ambassador to Armenia Mehdi Sobhani similarly told reporters on September 6 that “dreams about the Zangezur [Corridor] will not come true.”[32] IRGC-affiliated media separately published an article stating that Russia has “adopted a wrong position regarding that Zangezur Corridor that is incompatible with Iran’s interests and red lines.”[33] Tehran has long opposed the development of the corridor because it would sever Iranian land access to Europe and Russia via Armenia.[34]

Senior advisers to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with members of the newly formed Masoud Pezeshkian administration on September 4. Yahya Rahim Safavi, who is a senior military adviser to Khamenei, met Pezeshkian’s foreign minister, health minister, interior minister, and science minister.[35] Safavi stressed the importance of “constructive interaction” between the Iranian armed forces and Pezeshkian administration. Ali Akbar Velayati, who is a senior foreign policy adviser to Khamenei, separately met with some senior policy officials in the Pezeshkian administration.[36] Iranian opposition outlets have described these meetings as “unprecedented,” which is consistent with CTP-ISW's tracking. The meetings between Khamenei’s advisers and the Pezeshkian administration reflect the close coordination between them.[37] Pezeshkian has repeatedly emphasized his subordination to Khamenei and appears to be coordinating his agenda and policies with Khamenei’s inner circle directly.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Russia: Iran has sent hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia will likely use the missiles to attack Ukrainian civilian and military infrastructure over the coming months.
• Gaza Strip: The rate of Palestinian rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel has decreased significantly in recent weeks partly due to the IDF beginning to immediately evacuate areas from which rockets are fired and then demolishing buildings in the area.
• Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage negotiations: Hamas has continued to conduct an information operation to erode Israeli willingness to continue fighting in the Gaza Strip and to pressure Israel to accept a ceasefire-hostage deal on terms favorable to Hamas.
• Caucasus: Iranian officials have continued expressing opposition to Azerbaijani efforts to link Azerbaijan proper to its Nakhchivan exclave going through Armenia. Tehran is responding to Russia changing its policy to support this connection.
• Iran: Senior advisers to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with members of the newly formed Masoud Pezeshkian administration. These meetings reflect the close coordination between Khamenei’s and Pezeshkian’s circles.

  

Iran Update, September 5, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Johanna Moore, Katherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Kathryn Tyson, Carolyn Moorman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Biden administration is reportedly reevaluating its approach to ceasefire-hostage negotiations after Hamas killed six hostages, according to unspecified US officials cited by Axios on September 5.[1] US officials reported that the Biden administration is considering applying pressure and implementing unspecified accountability measures against Hamas instead of pushing Israel to agree to a ceasefire-hostage deal that would give the group additional concessions. Hamas’ decision to increase the number of Palestinian prisoners to be released in a ceasefire-hostage deal has lowered the administration’s confidence that Hamas is willing to reach a deal. Officials are concerned that if the United States pressures Israel to withdraw its forces from the Philadelphi Corridor, as Hamas has demanded, that Hamas will reject a different part of the proposal.

Hamas is using its execution of the six hostages to conduct a series of information operations that are designed to degrade Israeli will and force Israel to end the war on terms favorable to Hamas, which would ultimately lead to an Israeli defeat.[2] Hamas released a fourth video September 4 depicting two of the six recently killed hostages.[3] This video—like the others—featured scripted statements calling for a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[4] The two hostages in the September 4 video, who were under duress, accused the Israeli government of failing to rescue the hostages from the Gaza Strip and failing to reach a ceasefire-hostage proposal that would bring hostages home alive.[5] Both hostages called on Israeli civilians to protest in favor of a ceasefire-hostage deal. Hamas is intentionally releasing these videos at this time to capitalize on Israeli outrage towards Netanyahu and to coerce the Israeli state into softening its demands. The softening of the current Israeli demands—which include a presence on the Philadelphi Corridor and the exile of many Palestinian prisoners released under any deal—would threaten to cause an Israeli defeat by enabling Hamas to rebuild itself. Hamas would very likely reconstruct smuggling tunnels under the Philadelphi Corridor if it regained control over that area. Those tunnels would enable Hamas to rebuild its military wing with new weapons and supplies, including concrete to repair tunnels. Returning Palestinian prisoners—if they are allowed to return to the Palestinian territories—could serve as key commanders, replacing commanders Israel has killed in the ongoing war. Hamas has previously released hostage propaganda during periods of unrest and during ceasefire negotiations.[6]

Israel, Hamas, and international mediators have not resolved opposing demands relating to the hostage-prisoner release and the presence of Israeli forces along the Philadelphi Corridor. An anonymous White House official cited by the Washington Post reported that negotiations still have not determined who will be released in a hostage-prisoner release or when.[7] Hostage-prisoner release negotiations have become more ”complicated” since Hamas killed six hostages, ”some” of whom were reportedly listed to be released in the first phase of the ceasefire-hostage deal.[8] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also stated that Israel will maintain at least a reduced presence along the Philadelphi Corridor, which is a demand that is in direct opposition to Hamas’ demands for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Strip.[9] Netanyahu has argued that Israeli disengagement from the Philadelphi Corridor in 2005 enabled Hamas to become a serious threat in the first place by allowing Hamas to smuggle engineering equipment and weapons into the Gaza Strip.[10] Netanyahu said that he would only consider a full withdrawal in the second stage of ceasefire-hostage negotiations if another entity demonstrated that it could interdict Hamas smuggling through the corridor.[11]

Unspecified US and regional officials cited by The New York Times claimed that international mediators are “finalizing” a new ceasefire-hostage proposal to “narrow” remaining gaps between Israel and Hamas.[12] Two Israeli officials and a senior official from an unspecified mediating country reported that the United States, Qatar, and Egypt are reviewing a series of Egyptian- and Qatari-drafted proposals.[13] Netanyahu stated during a TV segment on September 5 that ”there is not a deal in the making.”[14]

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Inspection Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Jafar Asadi claimed that Iran must inflict “the largest blow” on Israel for Haniyeh’s death in an interview with Iranian armed forces-run media on September 5.[15] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is the highest Iranian operational headquarters and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[16] Several senior Iranian military officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Operations Deputy Brigadier General Mohsen Chizari, have made similar statements to Iranian armed forces-run media in recent days.[17] The coordination deputy of the Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC, Brigadier General Saeed Farjian Zadeh, separately warned on September 3 that Iran will respond to Israel “in a precise and calculated manner at the right time and under the right conditions.”[18]

The Iranian foreign minister called regional stability a pillar of Iranian national security on September 5, stressing that any attempts to redraw borders will be a “red line” for Iran. Araghchi’s comments were in reference to an earlier statement by the Russian foreign minister that supported the Turkish-Azerbaijani Zangezur Corridor project.[19] Araghchi’s warning follows a meeting between Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Eurasia Department Director General Mojtaba Demirchi Lou and Russian Ambassador to Tehran Alexey Dedov on September 2 in which Demirchi Lou expressed the need respecting internationally recognized borders.[20] Both the meeting and Araghchi’s comments were likely triggered by a statement by Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov in which Lavrov stated his support of Azerbaijan and Turkey‘s Zangezur corridor project.[21] The Iranian regime has historically opposed Azerbaijani and Turkish efforts to establish the Zangezur corridor between Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic because such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Iranian military officials have continued messaging that they will retaliate for Israel killing Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: The Biden administration is reportedly reevaluating its approach to ceasefire-hostage negotiations after Hamas killed six hostages, according to an unspecified US officials cited by Axios on September 5. Hamas is using its execution of the six hostages to conduct a series of information operations that are designed to degrade Israeli will and force Israel end the war on terms favorable to Hamas, which would ultimately lead to an Israeli defeat.
• Caucasus: Iranian and Russian officials met to discuss the Caucasus amid growing differences between Moscow and Tehran. 

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to signal that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. Armed Forces General Staff Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi claimed on September 4 that Israel “must bury [its] dream that Iran will not respond” to Haniyeh's death.[1] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Operations Deputy Brigadier General Mohsen Chizari separately warned that Iran will “definitely” give a “crushing response” to Israel in an interview with Iranian armed forces-run media on September 4.[2] Chizari stated that Iran seeks to “surprise” Israel, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran is likely trying to generate operational surprise while forgoing strategic surprise ahead of its expected attack.[3] Chizari also discussed Lebanese Hezbollah’s recent drone and rocket attack targeting Israel and claimed that Iran’s response to Israel will be “different.”[4] It is unclear whether Chizari meant that Iran’s retaliation will be different from Hezbollah’s recent attack or from Iran’s April 2024 drone and missile attack targeting Israel. Chizari is a senior Quds Force official who previously supported efforts to preserve the Bashar al Assad regime during the Syrian civil war.[5] The United States sanctioned Chizari in 2012 for committing human rights abuses against Syrians.[6] Senior Quds Force commanders in particular may desire a direct strike on Israel given that Israel killed Haniyeh at an IRGC Quds Force facility in northern Tehran.[7] The Quds Force’s participation in an Iranian strike on Israel could mean that Iran would use more than just drones and missiles—as it did in its April 2024 attack—to attack Israel. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its attack model—possibly by including militia attacks on US positions in Syria—to try to inflict greater damage on Israel than it did in April 2024.[8]

Chizari separately praised Palestinian militias’ response to recent Israeli operations in the West Bank, claiming that Israel will not be able to prevent the “formation and strengthening of resistance” in the West Bank.[9] Israeli forces have conducted a large-scale counterterrorism operation in the West Bank since August 27 in order to degrade Palestinian militia networks there.[10] The operation is partly a response to Palestinian militias in the West Bank building the capability and setting conditions to conduct suicide bombing attacks in Israel.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his plan for a continued Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor during an English-language press conference on September 4.[11] This is Netanyahu’s second press conference about the corridor this week amid domestic pressure to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement following Hamas’ execution of six Israeli hostages.[12] Netanyahu used the English-language press conference to explain to an international audience why he demands that Israel retain control of the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.[13] Netanyahu argued that Israeli disengagement from the Philadelphi Corridor in 2005 enabled Hamas to become a serious threat in the first place by allowing Hamas to smuggle engineering equipment and weapons into the Gaza Strip.[14] Netanyahu warned that international pressure would make it difficult for Israel to return militarily to the corridor if it withdrew as part of the first stage of a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[15] Netanyahu said that he would only consider a full withdrawal in the second stage of ceasefire-hostage negotiations if another entity demonstrated that it can interdict Hamas smuggling through the corridor.[16] Netanyahu's close aide, Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, separately criticized Egyptian President Abdel Fatteh al Sisi on September 4 for failing to stop Hamas smuggling through the corridor.[17]

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Eurasia Department Director General Mojtaba Demirchi Lou met with the Russian Ambassador to Tehran Alexey Dedov on September 2.[18] The meeting followed Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov‘s statement in support of Azerbaijan and Turkey‘s Zangezur corridor project.[19] Demirchi Lou underlined the need to respect internationally recognized borders, regional stability, and mutual interests of the Caucasus states, especially ahead of the upcoming 3+3 meeting with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Turkey, and Russia, as well as a meeting between the Iranian, Russian, and Azerbaijani foreign ministers.[20] Lavrov expressed support for the Zangezur corridor in an interview with Russian media during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Baku, Azerbaijan, on August 19.[21] The Iranian regime has historically opposed Azerbaijani and Turkish efforts to establish the Zangezur corridor between Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic because such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Senior Iranian military officials have continued messaging that they will retaliate for Israel killing Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his plans for a continued Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.
• Caucasus: Iranian and Russian officials met to discuss the Caucasus amid growing differences between Moscow and Tehran.

Iran Update, September 3, 2024

click here to read the full report with maps

Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Hamas has continued to exploit Israeli hostages in an information operation likely in order to increase pressure on Israel to accept a ceasefire-hostage agreement. Hamas likely calculates that this effort could create more favorable terms for Hamas in such an agreement while weakening the Israeli state. Hamas continued to insist on September 3 that Israel can only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations rather than military operations. Hamas released a propaganda video for the third time since recently killing six Israeli hostages. The most recent video—like the others—featured a recently executed Israeli hostage who called for a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[1] Hamas military spokesperson Abu Obeida separately blamed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu directly for Hamas killing the six Israeli hostages.[2] Abu Obeida added that Hamas had issued new unspecified instructions for what its fighters who are guarding hostages should do if Israeli forces approach them.[3] Hamas released the hostage propaganda videos and Obeida’s comments in Arabic, English, and Hebrew, indicating that the messages are meant for Israeli, Palestinian, and Western audiences, among others.[4] These messages are meant to undermine domestic and international support for Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and increase support for a ceasefire-hostage deal that meets Hamas’ demands. Senior Hamas official Mahmoud Mardawi told al Jazeera on September 3 that the release of Israeli hostages in Gaza will only occur through a prisoner exchange deal, which will only be achieved by a total Israeli withdrawal from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors.[5] The end of Israeli operations and a complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has been one of Hamas’ principal demands since the beginning of negotiations and has since become the greatest hurdle to the talks.[6]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defended and reiterated his plans for a continued Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor during a press conference on September 3.[7] The press conference comes amid domestic pressure to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement following Hamas’ execution of six Israeli hostages.[8] Netanyahu said that control of the Philadelphi Corridor is central to Israeli war aims.[9] Netanyahu argued that Israeli disengagement from the Philadelphi Corridor enabled Hamas to become a serious threat in the first place by allowing Hamas to smuggle engineering equipment and weapons into the Gaza Strip.[10] Netanyahu added that “the axis of evil needs the Philadelphi Corridor and, for the same reason, we must control it.”[11] Netanyahu lastly warned that international pressure would make it difficult for Israel to return militarily to the corridor if it withdrew.[12]

US White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby said on September 3 that Israel previously agreed to a US-outlined ceasefire-hostage proposal in May 2024 that required the IDF to withdraw from “all densely populated areas,” including around or adjacent to the Philadelphi Corridor.[13] Kirby said that this “essential element” had not changed in subsequent ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[14] Kirby’s comments are not necessarily inconsistent with Netanyahu’s promise to maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor. Netanyahu has reportedly agreed to withdraw Israeli forces from a one- to two-kilometer section of the Philadelphi Corridor during the first phase of the proposed ceasefire-hostage deal.[15]

An outlet affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) published on September 2 an analytical report examining the possible trajectories for fighting between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah.[16] The report assessed that the most likely course of action in the coming months is a continuation of limited fighting around the Israel-Lebanon border. The report concluded that Israel is unlikely to launch a major military offensive into southern Lebanon due to:

• Israeli forces being already stretched by militia activity in the Gaza Strip and West Bank;
• The threat of an Iranian attack on Israel in retaliation for Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh;
• Internal divisions within the Israeli government; and
• The United States opposing an all-out war ahead of its presidential election.

The report ignored the repeated statements from senior Israeli officials vowing to drive Hezbollah forces out of southern Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the Israel-Lebanon War in 2006.[17]

It is unclear to what extent this report reflects Iranian leaders’ thinking about attacking Israel while deterring Israel from launching an offensive into Lebanon. The report nevertheless suggests that at least some in the Iranian security establishment are considering how the threat of an attack on Israel could shape Israeli decision-making vis-a-vis Hezbollah. Iran has repeatedly signaled its opposition to an Israeli offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[18] Iran relies on Hezbollah to establish deterrence vis-a-vis Israel and to project force and influence throughout the Levant. Hezbollah has also adopted an increasingly prominent role in helping Iran manage the Axis of Resistance in recent years.

Some of the missiles that Iran fired in its large-scale attack on Israel in April 2024 were much less accurate than previously understood, according to a report by the Associated Press.[19] The report cited experts from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The report found that some of the Emad medium-range ballistic missiles that Iran used had a circular error probable of around 1.2 kilometers.[20] The circular error probable is a measurement of the median error radius of a weapon system. Tehran previously advertised that the Emad missile has a circular error probable of 50 meters, while international observers estimated that it was closer to 500 meters.[21] Both measurements suggest a much greater degree of accuracy than demonstrated in the Iranian April 2024 attack on Israel. Analysts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies assessed that Iran tried to strike Israeli F-35I fighter jet hangars at the Nevatim airbase with the Emad missiles.[22]

Iran using Emad missiles in another attack on Israel would increase the risk of an all-out war erupting against Israel and even the United States. The inaccuracy of these missiles would risk causing severe collateral damage, including civilian casualties, even if Iran does not intentionally target civilian areas in Israel.[23] Iranian military commanders have reportedly considered attacking military targets around Haifa and Tel Aviv, where the risk of harming civilians would be particularly high given the population density.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage negotiations: Hamas has continued to exploit Israeli hostages in an information operation to increase pressure on Israel to accept a ceasefire-hostage agreement. Hamas likely calculates that this effort could create more favorable terms for Hamas in such an agreement.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defended and reiterated his plans for a continued Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor that separates Egypt from the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu said that controlling the corridor is central to Israeli war aims and that withdrawing from the corridor would make it hard for Israel to ever return.
• Lebanon: An IRGC-affiliated outlet published an analytical report examining possible trajectories for fighting between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah. The report concluded that Israel is unlikely to launch a major military offensive into Lebanon for several reasons, including the imminent threat of an Iranian attack on Israel.
• Iran: Some of the missiles that Iran fired in its large-scale attack on Israel in April 2024 were much less accurate than previously understood. Iran using such missiles in another attack on Israel would increase the risk of an all-out war erupting against Israel and even the United States.

 

Iran Update, September 2, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, Kathyrn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Masoud Pezeshkian administration is continuing to signal its willingness to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian media reported on September 2 that Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi appointed Majid Takht Ravanchi as deputy foreign affairs minister for political affairs.[1] Araghchi has not officially announced Ravanchi’s appointment at the time of this writing. Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former President Hassan Rouhani that helped conclude the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the P5+1.[2] The P5+1 is composed of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.[3] Ravanchi also served as the Iranian ambassador to the UN between April 2019 and August 2022.[4] Pezeshkian’s appointment of Araghchi—who himself played a prominent role in the nuclear negotiations under Rouhani—as Iranian foreign affairs minister and Araghchi’s appointment of Ravanchi as his political deputy underscores the Pezeshkian administration’s serious intent to resume nuclear negotiations with the West. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi separately stated that Pezeshkian has indicated to him “a potential for renewed dialogue aimed at ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities” during an interview with Saudi-owned al Arabiya on September 2.[5] Grossi previously indicated on August 30 that Pezeshkian had agreed to a bilateral meeting in the “near future.”[6] It is unclear to what extent Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will permit the Pezeshkian administration to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West, although Khamenei has expressed support in recent weeks for engaging in negotiations in order to remove international sanctions on Iran.[7]

Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[8] An unspecified European official told Bloomberg on September 2 that Iran could begin shipping ballistic missiles to Russia "within a matter of days.”[9] European intelligence sources previously told Reuters in August 2024 that Iran and Russia signed a contract in December 2023 for Iran to deliver Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[10] The intelligence sources added that dozens of Russian military personnel are currently training in Iran on how to operate Fateh-360 missiles. Russia’s acquisition of Ababil or Fateh-360 ballistic missiles would likely allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian near-rear targets while reserving Russia's own missile stockpiles (such as Iskander missiles) for deep-rear Ukrainian targets, as CTP-ISW previously assessed.[11]

Iranian Supreme National Defense University President Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam stated on September 2 that keeping Israel in a state of anxiety is “no less than a military strike.”[12] Moghaddam claimed that Iran will have a “wise reaction” to Ismail Haniyeh’s death. Moghaddam’s statements are consistent with those from senior Iranian officials discussing Iran’s “psychological war” against Israel.[13] Moghaddam is not within the Iranian chain of command but his statements are representative of the larger ongoing public conversation in Iranian defense and security circles discussing the merits of employing “psychological warfare” against Israel.[14]

Hamas released hostage propaganda on September 2 that likely intended to increase domestic Israeli pressure that Hamas likely calculates could create more favorable terms for Hamas in a ceasefire agreement and weaken the Israeli state. Hamas released propaganda videos featuring six recently executed Israeli hostages on September 2 calling for a ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange.[15] Hamas also released a graphic in Hebrew stating that Israel will only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations, not military operations.[16] Hamas has previously released hostage propaganda during periods of unrest and during ceasefire negotiations.[17] These videos are part of an information operation that aims to undermine Israeli public support for the ground operation in the Gaza Strip. Hamas leaders likely seek to exacerbate the tensions in the Israeli domestic sphere and cause further psychological distress by airing this propaganda. Hamas leaders may believe that the Israeli public and officials will increase pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to drop demands from ceasefire negotiations that Hamas dislikes, such as continued control over the Philadelphi Corridor. Maintaining Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor would help prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting major smuggling operations into the Gaza Strip that would accelerate Hamas’ ability to resupply itself, as CTP-ISW has previously argued.[18]

Israeli political and military leaders argued over the best path to a ceasefire-hostage deal on September 1 after Hamas executed six Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant criticized the August 29 decision by Israel’s political-security cabinet to back Netanyahu’s proposal to maintain an IDF presence on the Philadelphi Corridor.[19] Gallant reportedly argued in a private cabinet meeting that prioritizing IDF control over the Philadelphi Corridor for six weeks over securing the release of dozens of living hostages is the wrong decision and should be reversed.[20] Gallant said that the IDF could retake the corridor in eight hours if it withdrew.[21] Netanyahu argued that repealing the security cabinet’s decision would send the wrong message to Hamas and incentivize the militias to kill more Israeli hostages.[22] Netanyahu added that the Philadelphi Corridor is Hamas’ “oxygen pipe” and a withdrawal from the corridor would restore Hamas’ rule and military capabilities.[23] Several other members of the cabinet disagreed with Gallant’s public suggestion to reverse the August 29 cabinet decision.[24]

Israel's national workers union announced a general strike on September 2 in support of an immediate ceasefire deal and hostage-release.[25] Israeli media reported that hundreds of thousands of Israelis demonstrated in support of a ceasefire in major Israeli cities.[26] The recovery of six Israeli hostages who had been executed by Hamas in the Gaza Strip on September 1 spurred the strike and protests.[27] Ben Gurion International Airport and some schools shut down during the strike.[28] The Israeli labor court ruled on September 2 that the strike was political and therefore illegal.[29] The national workers union agreed to end the strike prematurely due to the court ruling.[30] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly condemned the protests and said that the demonstrations supported Hamas.[31]

The Biden administration is considering submitting a new “final” ceasefire-hostage deal proposal to Israel and Hamas in the coming days, according to Axios.[32] National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk told hostage family members on September 1 that the United States may present a new bridging proposal after mediators made significant progress on the specifics of the hostage-prisoner exchange component of the ceasefire deal over the last week of talks.[33] The United States last submitted a “bridging proposal“ to Israel and Hamas on August 16.[34] The new text is expected to include a US proposal about Israeli presence on the Philadelphi Corridor. The Israeli presence in the Philadelphi Corridor is currently a major hurdle in talks.[35] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu added a stipulation in July that Israeli forces would maintain control over the corridor for the first phase of the ceasefire deal, which would be six weeks long.[36]

Hamas’ lead negotiator, Khalil al Hayya, spoke negatively about the progress of ceasefire-hostage talks and restated Hamas’ maximalist negotiation position on September 1.[37] Hayya clearly stated that Hamas would not agree to a ceasefire and hostage exchange without a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi Corridor.[38] Hayya told al Jazeera that the past two weeks of ceasefire talks in Doha and Cairo have achieved nothing and are “like grinding water.”[39] Hayya criticized US officials for simultaneously expressing false optimism and not pressuring Israeli leaders to allow greater concessions in negotiations.[40] US President Joe Biden indicated on September 2 that he thought Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was not doing enough to reach a deal.[41]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The Masoud Pezeshkian administration is continuing to signal its willingness to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West. Iranian media reported on September 2 that Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi appointed Majid Takht Ravanchi as deputy foreign affairs minister for political affairs. Araghchi has not officially announced Ravanchi’s appointment at the time of this writing. Ravanchi was part of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team under former President Hassan Rouhani that helped conclude the 2015 nuclear deal.
• Russo-Iranian Relations: Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
• Iranian Retaliation: Iranian Supreme National Defense University President Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam stated on September 2 that keeping Israel in a state of anxiety is “no less than a military strike.” Moghaddam is not within the Iranian chain of command but his statements are representative of the larger ongoing public conversation in Iranian defense and security circles discussing the merits of employing ”psychological warfare” against Israel.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas released hostage propaganda on September 2 that likely intended to increase domestic Israeli pressure that Hamas likely calculates could create more favorable terms for Hamas in a ceasefire agreement and weaken the Israeli state.
• Israeli Reactions to Ceasefire Negotiations: Israeli political and military leaders argued over the best path to a ceasefire-hostage deal on September 1 after Hamas executed six Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip.
• Hamas Reactions to Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas’ lead negotiator, Khalil al Hayya, spoke negatively about the progress of ceasefire-hostage talks and restated Hamas’ maximalist negotiation position on September 1.

Iran Update, September 1, 2024

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Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

A senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander reiterated Iran’s support for Hamas’ maximalist ceasefire demands on September 1.[1] IRGC Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Eraj Masjedi expressed support for Hamas’ maximalist demands, which include a permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange.[2] Masjedi stated that Hamas will continue to fight Israel unless Israel accepts its demands. Accepting Hamas’ maximalist demands would prevent Israel from being able to achieve its stated war aim of destroying Hamas as a military organization and governing authority. Israel’s acceptance of Hamas’ demand for a complete Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, for example, would mean that the IDF could no longer operate along the Philadelphi Corridor. Maintaining Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor would help prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting major smuggling operations into the Gaza Strip that would accelerate Hamas’ ability to resupply itself, as CTP-ISW has previously argued.[3]

IRGC-affiliated media indicated on August 31 that some elements of the Iranian regime are likely continuing to try to delay a retaliatory strike on Israel until the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations conclude. Basirat claimed that Iran’s response to Israel killing Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh will be “strong, decisive, and deterrent,” but noted that Iran does not seek to derail the ongoing ceasefire talks.[4] International mediators, including Qatar, have kept Iranian officials apprised of negotiation progress since the latest round of negotiations started in Doha in mid-August 2024.[5] Unspecified Iranian officials previously told Western media on August 13 that Iran will "delay” its attack on Israel if Israel and Hamas conclude a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[6]

Lebanese Hezbollah Representative to Iran Abdallah Safi al Din met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Iran on September 1.[7] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry reported that Safi al Din and Araghchi discussed the “latest situation of the anti-Israel front in Lebanon.”[8] Safi al Din and Araghchi likely discussed the Hezbollah drone and rocket attack targeting Israel in some capacity, though neither official would be responsible for planning or executing military operations against Israel. The United States sanctioned Safi al Din in May 2018 for acting as a conduit between Iran and Hezbollah and serving as an interlocutor between Iran and Hezbollah on financial issues.[9]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recovered the bodies of six Israeli hostages from a tunnel in Rafah on September 1.[10] Israeli security sources said that Hamas executed the hostages two to three days before the hostages were found and recovered.[11] An IDF spokesperson said that the hostages were executed by Hamas guards "shortly before IDF forces reached them.”[12] The Israeli forces did not encounter Palestinian fighters inside or near the tunnels while discovering and recovering the hostages.[13] The IDF located the hostages one kilometer away from where they rescued living hostage Farhan al Qadi on August 27.[14] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, IDF Southern Command commander Major General Yaron Finkelman, and hostage talks negotiator Major General (res.) Nitzan Alon visited the recovery site in Rafah on September 1.[15]

Hamas blamed Israel for the hostage’s death and recovery, claiming that Israel is ultimately responsible for the deaths by failing to agree to a ceasefire.[16] Hamas did not deny killing the hostages but attempted to shift overall blame to Netanyahu and the United States.[17] Netanyahu's statement blamed Hamas for continuing to “firmly refuse any [ceasefire-hostage deal] offer” and said that the execution of the hostages demonstrates Hamas does not want a deal.[18] Israeli security sources speaking to state-funded, IDF-supported Israeli Army Radio, said that the three of the hostages were supposed to be released in the first stage of a ceasefire-hostage deal.[19] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant criticized the August 29 decision by Israeli’s political-security cabinet to back Netanyahu’s proposal to maintain and IDF presence on the Philadelphi Corridor—a major hurdle in a ceasefire-hostage deal—in response to the execution of the six hostages.[20] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that the hostages were likely executed around the time the security cabinet approved retaining an IDF presence on the Egypt-Gaza Strip border on August 29.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Ceasefire Talks: A senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander reiterated Iran’s support for Hamas’ maximalist ceasefire demands on September 1. IRGC-affiliated media indicated on August 31 that some elements of the Iranian regime are likely continuing to try to delay a retaliatory strike on Israel until the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations conclude.
• Hostage Recovery: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recovered the bodies of six Israeli hostages from a tunnel in Rafah on September 1. Hamas blamed Israel for the hostage’s death and recovery, claiming that Israel is ultimately responsible for the deaths by failing to agree to a ceasefire.
• Gaza Strip: A humanitarian pause began September 1 in the central Gaza Strip to enable humanitarian aid groups to start a mass polio vaccination campaign.
• West Bank: The IDF continued raids in Jenin for the sixth consecutive day as part of the IDF effort to degrade Palestinian militia networks in the West Bank.

Iran Update, August 31, 2024

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Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

At least two Palestinian fighters attempted to carry out two coordinated car bombing attacks in the Gush Etzion area of the West Bank on August 30.[1] No militia has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing, though the attack targeting IDF settlements is consistent with recent Hamas threats to target Israeli settlers in the West Bank. According to an initial IDF probe, the two militants set out together from the Hebron area towards Gush Etzion–a cluster of Israeli settlements south of Jerusalem–to carry out coordinated attacks in two locations.[2] One fighter set off a car bomb at a gas station at the Gush Etzion junction.[3] The fighter shot at IDF forces who arrived at the scene.[4] IDF forces shot and killed the fighter. The second fighter breached the entrance to the Israeli Karmei Tzur settlement, located within the Gush Etzion area, approximately twenty minutes later.[5] The second fighter tried to run over the security guard at the Karmei Tzur settlement entrance, resulting in a car chase with Israeli security guards.[6] The IDF stated that an explosive device in the attacker‘s vehicle detonated during the exchange of fire.[7] IDF forces shot and killed the second fighter.[8] Israeli media reported that the two car bombs were packed with ”makeshift explosive devices” and packed with nails and screws.[9] An initial IDF probe into the attacks found that the two explosives came from the same bomb-making lab in Hebron.[10] The IDF located and destroyed an explosives laboratory in Hebron on August 31.[11] The IDF discovered the lab as part of the operation following the identification of the suspects.[12] Three Israelis were inadvertently hurt during the attacks.[13]

 

An Israeli military correspondent reported that the Palestinian Authority Health Ministry said that two Hebron residents were responsible for the attack[14] Israeli forces detained six Palestinians who are suspected to have been involved in the Gush Etzion attack.[15] Various Palestinian militias in the West Bank and Gaza Strip praised the attack.[16] The IDF and Shin Bet are investigating whether the attack was carried out by ”foreign threats.”[17] Israeli security officials believe a terrorist cell operating in Hebron intends to carry out additional attacks using similar tactics, which would be consistent with recent Hamas threats to conduct attacks targeting Israeli settlers and troops in the West Bank..[18] No militia has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing, however. These attempted bombings follow four consecutive days of significant IDF military operations in the West Bank.[19] Palestinian militias, including Hamas, have repeatedly called on Palestinians in the West Bank to attack Israelis.[20]

 

Key Takeaways:

 

• West Bank: At least two Palestinian fighters attempted to carry out two coordinated car bombing attacks in the Gush Etzion area of the West Bank on August 30. No militia has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing, though the attack targeting IDF settlements is consistent with recent Hamas threats to target Israeli settlers in the West Bank.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force targeted and killed PIJ's Central Camps Brigade commander Muhammad Qatrawi in the central Gaza Strip on August 30.
• Northern Israel: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least six attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on August 30.
• Red Sea: The Houthis claimed an attack targeting Liberian-flagged container ship M/V GROTON in the Gulf of Aden on August 31.

Iran Update, August 30, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Siddhant Kishore, Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Israel and Hamas are reportedly reviewing a draft agreement for the hostage-prisoner exchange component of ceasefire talks after working group-level negotiations over the exchange.[1] The agreement states that Hamas should release 33 living hostages who are women, men over the age of 50, and hostages with serious medical conditions. If there are not 33 living hostages to return in these groups, the difference between the two should include the bodies of dead hostages. Israel has provided a list of 33 hostages to Hamas that Israel says meet these conditions. In exchange, Israel will release “several hundred” Palestinian prisoners, including 150 serving life sentences for killing Israelis. Those who were sentenced to life in prison will be exiled and barred from returning to the Gaza Strip or the West Bank. Hamas has transferred a list of prisoners to Israel according to Israeli officials. Senior Israeli officials claimed that negotiations have made “significant progress” although no agreement has been reached yet.

Working-group talks have not resolved the issue of Israeli forces remaining along the Philadelphi Corridor.[2] An unspecified senior official from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office reported that the Israeli security cabinet voted on August 29 in favor of retaining Israel’s presence along the Philadelphi Corridor, thus cementing an Israeli presence in the corridor as official policy.[3] Israeli officials said on August 23 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to withdraw Israeli forces from a one- to two-kilometer section of the Philadelphi Corridor during the first phase of the proposed ceasefire-hostage deal.[4] Netanyahu’s insistence on an Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor has been one of the most significant sticking points in the negotiations.[5] Netanyahu has said that retaining a presence in the corridor is required to achieve Israeli war aims.

Mediators are attempting to bridge the remaining gaps through “mediation formulas” before presenting a single draft proposal to Israel and Hamas to implement, according to unspecified senior Israeli officials cited by Walla.[6] Unspecified senior US and Israeli officials also claimed that the agreement should meet “most” of Hamas’ demands, including a minimum six-week ceasefire, the release of hundreds of prisoners, the return of displaced Palestinians to their homes, the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza, and rehabilitation and medical treatment in Egypt for wounded Hamas fighters.

An unspecified Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) official told Iraqi media that Iran is attempting to use its nuclear program to pressure Western countries as part of nuclear negotiations, which would be consistent with statements by the supreme leader and other Iranian officials indicating interest in renewed negotiations. It is not clear why this unspecified AEOI official would speak with Iraqi media before speaking to Iranian media. The level of access this official has within AEOI and Iranian policymaking is also unclear. The source told Iraqi media on August 30 that Iran does not aim to build a nuclear weapon but continues to pursue a nuclear program to pressure Western countries into reaching a new nuclear deal, which is consistent with statements from senior Iranian officials indicating the regime’s willingness to reengage in nuclear negotiations with the West to relieve sanctions pressure on Iran.[7] International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi indicated on August 30 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has agreed to a bilateral meeting in the “near future.”[8]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Ceasefire Talks: Israel and Hamas are reportedly reviewing a draft agreement for the hostage-prisoner exchange component of ceasefire talks after working group-level negotiations over the exchange. Working-group talks have not resolved the issue of Israeli forces remaining along the Philadelphi Corridor. Mediators are attempting to bridge the remaining gaps in ceasefire talks through “mediation formulas” before presenting a single draft proposal to Israel and Hamas to implement.
• Philadelphi Corridor: An unspecified senior official from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office reported that the Israeli security cabinet voted on August 29 in favor of retaining Israel’s presence along the Philadelphi Corridor, thus cementing an Israeli presence in the corridor as official policy.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: An unspecified Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) official told Iraqi media that Iran is attempting to use its nuclear program to pressure Western countries as part of nuclear negotiations, which would be consistent with statements by the supreme leader and other Iranian officials indicating interest in renewed negotiations. It is not clear why this unspecified AEOI official would speak with Iraqi media before speaking to Iranian media. The level of access this official has within AEOI and Iranian policymaking is also unclear.

 

 

Iran Update, August 25, 2024

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Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted a drone and rocket attack on Israel on August 24 in response to Israel killing a senior Hezbollah commander, Fuad Shukr. Hezbollah fired 200-300 projectiles, including around 20 one-way attack drones, in two waves into Israel.[1] Hezbollah fired rockets at 11 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) sites in northern Israel in the first wave of its attack.[2] These sites included a prominent IDF air defense and communications site on Mount Meron, which Hezbollah has targeted repeatedly since October 2023.[3] Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah said that the rockets were meant to distract Israeli air defenses and enable the second wave to penetrate deeper into Israel.[4] The second wave involved firing one-way attack drones targeting Ein Shemer base in Hadera and Glilot Base north of Tel Aviv.[5] This tactic of using imprecise and indirect fire to distract air defenses and then using precision weapons to strike targets has become common across Iran and its Axis of Resistance in recent years. Ein Shemer base hosts major IDF air defense assets, while Glilot base has signals intelligence functions.[6] The IDF stated that it intercepted some of the Hezbollah rocket fire in northern Israel and that Hezbollah failed to strike the bases in central Israel.[7] The IDF also reported that an IDF Navy member was killed in the Hezbollah attack.[8]

Hezbollah meant for its attack to be much larger than it was. The IDF conducted a series of preemptive strikes in southern Lebanon about 30 minutes before the attack was expected to begin.[9] The IDF Air Force struck around 40 locations and destroyed “thousands” of Hezbollah rocket launchers and around 40 unspecified launch pads.[10] An Israeli military correspondent noted that the IDF Air Force destroyed over 200 targets “within minutes.”[11] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated that the IDF destroyed between 50 and 67 percent of the munitions that Hezbollah planned to use in the attack.[12] Israeli officials later said that only some of the rocket launchers that Hezbollah positioned appeared to be meant for use in the attack. Hezbollah may have positioned more rocket launchers than it planned to use in order to obfuscate the direction and scale of its attack.

Nasrallah gave a speech after the attack and outlined the factors that led Hezbollah to delay its attack until now.[13] Hezbollah waited nearly 30 days before responding to Israel killing Fuad Shukr in Beirut on July 30. Nasrallah said that the United States and Israeli deterrent postures affected Hezbollah's decision making. Nasrallah also claimed that Hezbollah and the Axis of Resistance delayed the retaliation to allow the ceasefire-hostage talks in the Israel-Hamas war to continue. Nasrallah lastly said that Hezbollah delayed its attack to evaluate whether the Axis of Resistance would respond “as a whole or [on] each front alone.” CTP-ISW has previously argued that these factors were driving Iran and its Axis of Resistance to delay their attacks on Israel.[14]

Hezbollah and the rest of the Axis of Resistance have indicated that the Hezbollah attack is only the beginning of their retaliation. Nasrallah said, for instance, that the Hezbollah attack is only “part of the punishment.”[15] The Houthi Political Bureau reiterated that a Houthi response to Israel is “definitely coming.”[16] The Houthis have not yet retaliated against Israel for Israel striking on Hudaydah port, Yemen, on July 20.[17] Iran has likewise not yet retaliated against Israel for the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 30.[18] Western and regional sources expect further attacks in the near future.[19]  CTP-ISW has continuously assessed that Iran and the Axis of Resistance will likely conduct a staggered attack against Israel, perhaps even spanning multiple waves across multiple days.[20]

Iran, Hezbollah, and the rest of the Axis of Resistance will likely learn lessons from the Hezbollah attack in order to improve the efficacy of future attacks on Israel, as CTP-ISW has previously warned.[21] The Hezbollah attack likely in part a reconnaissance-in-force operation. The US Army defines reconnaissance-in-force as “a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[22] Hezbollah could thus use the attack to better understand the capabilities and disposition of Israeli air defenses. Hezbollah could also better understand how to design more effective strike packages against Israel, which could include a larger volume of fire or the use of missiles—rather than just drones and rockets. The Axis of Resistance could apply this information in separate attacks in the coming days or weeks.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei referenced the Axis of Resistance’s war against Israel during a prayer ceremony in Tehran on August 25.[23] Khamenei compared the Palestinian fight against Israel to Imam Hossein’s uprising in Karbala, Iraq, against the second Umayyad Caliphate leader in 680 AD.[24] Khamenei described how Imam Hossein had “the goal of confronting oppression” and explained how these ”methods of confrontation” have changed in the “age of the atom and artificial intelligence.”[25] Khamenei’s speech occurred shortly after Lebanese Hezbollah conducted its drone and rocket attack on Israel.

Hamas rejected Israel’s “new ceasefire conditions” following negotiations in Cairo on August 25.[26] A Hamas delegation led by head negotiator Khalil al Hayya arrived in Cairo on August 24 to “listen” to the results of negotiations between US, Egyptian, Israeli, and Qatari mediators.[27] Senior Hamas political official Izzat al Rishq said that the Hamas delegation met with Egyptian and Qatari mediators and left Cairo on the evening of August 25.[28] Al Rishq also said that the Hamas delegation demanded that Israel commit to the July 2024 ceasefire-hostage proposal that Hamas backs.[29] Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan told the Hamas-run network al Aqsa TV that Hamas will not accept “retractions” or “new conditions” from the July 2024 proposal.[30] Hamdan said that Hamas has given the mediators its response to the latest proposal.[31] Hamas previously rejected the latest US-proposed ceasefire-hostage proposal following talks in Doha on August 18 and similarly accused Israel of setting ”new conditions and demands” that obstructed the negotiations.[32]    

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanese Hezbollah conducted a drone and rocket attack on Israel in response to Israel killing a senior Hezbollah commander, Fuad Shukr. Hezbollah meant for its attack to be much larger than it was.
• Hezbollah and the rest of the Axis of Resistance have indicated that the Hezbollah attack is only the beginning of their retaliation. The Axis of Resistance will likely learn lessons from the Hezbollah attack in order to improve the efficacy of future attacks on Israel.
• Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei referenced the Axis of Resistance’s war against Israel during a prayer ceremony in Tehran.
• Hamas rejected Israel’s “new ceasefire conditions” following negotiations between US, Egyptian, Israeli, and Qatari officials in Cairo.

Iran Update, August 24, 2024

A Hamas delegation arrived in Cairo on August 24 to “listen to the results of the negotiations” between US, Egyptian, Israeli and Qatari mediators.[1] Senior Hamas political official Izzat al Rishq announced that a Hamas delegation led by head negotiator Khalil al Hayya will travel to Cairo on August 24.[2] Hamas official Mahmoud Mardawi said that the Hamas delegation is not going to Cairo to negotiate but instead will “listen closely” to the mediators.[3] Two Egyptian security sources told Reuters that the Hamas delegation arrived in Cairo to be close to the negotiations and review the proposals.[4] CIA Director William Burns, senior Biden administration adviser Brett McGurk, Mossad director David Barnea, Egyptian General Intelligence chief Abbas Kamel, and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani are also expected to attend the talks in Cairo.[5] US President Joe Biden spoke with al Thani on August 23 and discussed the urgency of concluding the deal under the current US bridging proposal.[6]

Israeli officials said on August 23 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to withdraw Israeli forces from a one-to two-kilometer section of the Philadelphi Corridor during the first phase of the proposed ceasefire-hostage deal.[7] Three anonymous Israeli officials told Axios that President Biden asked Netanyahu to agree to withdraw Israeli forces from the Philadelphi Corridor during the first phase of the deal in their call on August 21.[8] Netanyahu’s insistence on an Israeli military presence along the Philadelphi Corridor, which his office has said is required for achieving Israel’s war objectives, has been one of the most significant sticking points of the negotiations.[9] Israeli officials said that Netanyahu “partially” heeded Biden’s request and agreed to withdraw the IDF from a one-to two-kilometer section of the Philadelphi Corridor adjacent to Tal al Sultan neighborhood.[10] A Netanyahu aide said that Netanyahu only agreed to change one IDF position by “a few hundred meters,” which the aide said would not impact the IDF’s operational control of the corridor.[11] Netanyahu’s “partial” concession allowed the United States to support Israel’s position that Israeli forces remain along most of the corridor during the first phase.[12] Egypt reportedly agreed to deliver updated maps reflecting this change to Hamas.[13] Egypt has maintained its firm refusal of any Israeli presence on the Philadelphi Corridor.[14]

US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Brown Jr. began an “unannounced visit” to the Middle East on August 24.[15] Reuters reported that General Charles Brown Jr. arrived in Jordan on August 24 and will also travel to Egypt and Israel during his visit to “hear the perspectives of military leaders.”[16] General Brown is expected to discuss US perspectives on a regional war between Israel and Iran’s Axis of Resistance as well as further US efforts to strengthen deterrence in the region.

Newly appointed Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated on August 24 that Iran will retaliate against Israel for killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks.[17] Araghchi told reporters that Iran will “respond to Israeli crimes” and prevent Israel from “expanding the war in the region.”[18] Araghchi added that the Foreign Affairs Ministry is in “complete coordination” with the Iranian armed forces. Araghchi separately discussed his recent phone calls with his French, German, and UK counterparts and stated that Iran will respond to Israel at the “right time and in the right way."[19]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency claimed on August 24 that the April 2024 Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel demonstrated Israel’s inability to counter a multifront attack from Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[20] Tasnim News Agency claimed that a “massive” attack by Iran and its Axis of Resistance on Israel would “paralyze” Israeli and partner air defense systems. Tasnim News Agency further claimed that Israel lacks the manpower and military equipment to defend against such an attack. The article also described the April 2024 attack as a “warning operation.”

Key Takeaways:

• Hostage-ceasefire negotiations: Hamas sent a delegation to Cairo for further ceasefire-hostage consultations. Israel agreed to withdraw forces from part of the Philadelphi Corridor during the first phase of the proposed deal.
• Iran: The newly appointed Iranian foreign affairs minister reiterated that Iran will retaliate for Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh and other senior Axis of Resistance leaders. IRGC-affiliated media claimed that Israel could not counter a multi-front attack by Iran and the Axis of Resistance.

Brian Carter, Carolyn Moorman, Kathryn Tyson, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

The factors seemingly driving Iran to delay its direct attack on Israel are temporary. These factors will disappear with time, which would increase the likelihood of an Iranian attack on Israel. These factors include ongoing ceasefire-hostage talks between Israel and Hamas, the US-Israeli deterrent posture, and internal Iranian coordination and planning. These factors are not mutually exclusive; the delay in Iran’s retaliation for Israel's killing of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh could be caused by any combination of these factors. Iranian officials have suggested that Iran is delaying its retaliation to account for ceasefire-hostage talks. US President Joe Biden likewise said that he expected Iran to delay or indefinitely postpone an attack on Israel if a ceasefire-hostage deal was reached.[1] The United States explicitly communicated to Iran that Israel would mount a major military response to an Iranian attack targeting Israel, while Israel has practiced aerial refueling fighter jets to simulate “long-range flights deep into enemy territory.”[2] Iran lastly seeks to calibrate its attack on Israel in order to establish deterrence while avoiding a major war. Iran could also use the delay to plan and coordinate the strike with other, external partners and stakeholders both inside and outside the Axis of Resistance. The factors described here will not persist indefinitely, meaning that Iran will have fewer reasons to continue delaying the attack over time.

The implication by US officials that the US deterrent posture in the Middle East decreases the risk of an Iranian attack would simultaneously imply that changing or removing the US deterrent posture increases the risk of an Iranian attack. The Pentagon deputy press secretary said that the arrival of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group (CSG) to the Middle East sends a “very powerful message of deterrence,” adding that she cannot predict how long the Abraham Lincoln CSG will stay in the region but that the United States is “well-postured” to defend Israel.[3] It is far from clear that the Abraham Lincoln CSG or the arrival of other US military assets--including F22 stealth fighters and the USS Georgia guided missile submarine--the region deterred Iran, however.[4] To the extent that Iranian calculus is, in fact, affected by the US military posture in the region, the Pentagon’s statements imply that changing or removing that posture would increase the likelihood of an Iranian attack.

Maintaining the US deterrent posture in the region is possible but would be tantamount to a shift in US global priorities that is inconsistent with the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The 2022 NDS identifies China as the “most comprehensive and serious challenge to US national security,” Russia as an “acute threat,” and Iran as only a “persistent” threat.[5] Two of the four NDS defense priorities are “deterring strategic attacks against the United States” and its partners and “deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary, prioritizing” the challenges posed by China and  Russia.[6] Maintaining the current deterrent posture in the Middle East indefinitely would mean de-facto deprioritizing establishing deterrence vis-a-vis China or Russia. There are currently no US CSGs in the Western Pacific as of August 23, 2024, for example, while two CSGs are in the Middle East.[7]

Newly appointed Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated in separate phone calls with his French and UK counterparts on August 23 that Iran maintains the right to attack Israel in response to Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh.[8] Araghchi told British Foreign Secretary David Lammy that Iran does not want to expand the war or increase regional tensions.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin discussed regional developments in a phone call on August 22.[9] Gallant and Austin discussed attacks on the Israel-Lebanon border and the threats that Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah, and other Iranian-backed militias pose to Israel. Austin said that the United States will continue to monitor Iranian attack planning and added that the United States is prepared to defend Israel in the case of an attack. Austin also highlighted the importance of securing a hostage and ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas.

Palestinian sources told Israeli media that Hamas has decided to begin targeting Israeli civilians abroad, possibly due to Hamas’ decreasing ability to conduct attacks into Israel.[10] Hamas has historically targeted Israeli civilians to impose costs on Israel for operations against Hamas. Unspecified Palestinian sources told Israeli Channel 12 that Hamas took a “strategic decision” to attack Israelis abroad to avenge the death of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Hamas may made this decision because Israeli operations have destroyed the bulk of Hamas’ rocket supply.[11] The loss of this rocket supply and improved Israeli preventative measures over the last three decades that have made the use of suicide bombers within Israel impractical and less effective means that the two tactics Hamas has historically used are decreasingly viable.[12] Hamas could collaborate with Iran to threaten Israeli civilians abroad, given that Iran has invested tremendously in building covert attack networks abroad that could be used to target Israelis.

Unspecified Hamas officials said that Hamas has rejected multiple elements of the latest US bridging proposal. Israeli officials said that there was “significant progress” after ceasefire-hostage talks in Cairo and that Egypt is prepared to give Hamas the latest proposal.[13] Two Hamas sources, however, told Reuters that the US bridging proposal does not include a permanent ceasefire and that it includes “changes [that Hamas] rejects,” including allowing an Israeli military presence “at the crossings” and the stipulation that freed Palestinian prisoners go into exile instead of returning to the Gaza Strip or West Bank.[14] Two Egyptian security officials emphasized that Israel and Hamas appeared willing to resolve all differences except the issue of an Israeli withdrawal, presumably from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors in particular.[15] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not changed his position on the need for Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor, and his office has stated that the “achievement of all of Israel’s objectives for the war requires securing” the Philadelphi Corridor.[16]

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias told Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani that they would refrain from attacking US forces for the moment, according to an adviser to the Iraqi federal government speaking to Lebanese media.[17] Sudani has reportedly tried to deescalate between the United States and the militias in recent days.[18] Sudani also reportedly requested that the United States refrain from attacking militia positions in exchange for the militias pausing their attacks targeting US forces.[19] This mediation comes after the militias injured five US personnel in a rocket attack in Iraq on August 5.[20] CTP-ISW is considering the hypothesis that Iran is restraining its Iraqi militias while planning its retaliation for Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have messaged that they intend to soon resume attacks, however. A leader of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, Ali Hussein, denied that the militias have agreed to pause attacks targeting US forces.[21] CTP-ISW has similarly reported in recent days that the militias have begun threatening to resume attacks targeting US forces in order to expel the United States from the Middle East.

Unknown gunmen shot and killed the deputy police chief for security of Khash City, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, Iran, on August 23.[22] Unknown gunmen killed officer Hossein Piri near his house after he attended Friday prayer services. Iranian state media blamed unspecified “terrorists” for the attack. Piri was dressed in civilian clothing in broad daylight, suggesting that the attack was a targeted killing. CTP-ISW has previously noted an uptick in anti-regime militancy and unrest in southeastern Iran and the increasingly precarious internal security situation there.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation: The factors seemingly driving Iran to delay its direct attack on Israel are temporary. These factors will disappear with time, which would increase the likelihood of an Iranian attack on Israel. These factors include ongoing ceasefire-hostage talks between Israel and Hamas, the US-Israeli deterrent posture, and internal Iranian coordination and planning.
• Deterring an Iranian Retaliation: The implication by US officials that the US deterrent posture in the Middle East decreases the risk of an Iranian attack would simultaneously imply that changing or removing the US deterrent posture increases the risk of an Iranian attack. To the extent that Iranian calculus is, in fact, affected by the US military posture in the region, recent statements by Pentagon officials imply that changing or removing that posture would increase the likelihood of an Iranian attack. Maintaining the US deterrent posture in the region is possible but would be tantamount to a shift in US global priorities that is inconsistent with the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).
• Hamas External Operations: Palestinian sources told Israeli media that Hamas has decided to begin targeting Israeli civilians abroad, possibly due to Hamas’ decreasing ability to conduct attacks into Israel.
• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Unspecified Hamas officials said that Hamas has rejected multiple elements of the latest US bridging proposal.
• Iraq: Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias told Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani that they would refrain from attacking US forces for the moment, according to an adviser to the Iraqi federal government speaking to Lebanese media.
• Iran: Unknown gunmen shot and killed the deputy police chief for security of Khash City, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, Iran, on August 23.

 

Iran Update, August 22, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iranian interest in the progress of Gaza Strip ceasefire-hostage negotiations suggests that elements of the Iranian regime are likely delaying a retaliatory strike on Israel until ceasefire talks conclude. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that newly appointed Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is scheduled to meet Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Tehran "in the coming days."[1] Thani kept Iranian officials apprised of negotiation progress during the August 15-16 ceasefire talks. The timing of Thani’s visit, combined with his role as a liaison between Iran and the other negotiators, suggests that Thani is likely to discuss the ceasefire with Iranian officials during his visit.[2]  Talks between Israel and international mediators, including Qatar, restarted in Cairo on August 22 immediately before Thani’s visit to Iran.[3] Statements from Hamas and Israel suggest that disagreements over Israeli force presence in the Strip continue to be a barrier to a ceasefire agreement, however.[4] Unspecified Iranian officials told Western media on August 13 that Iran will "delay” its attack on Israel if Israel and Hamas conclude a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[5] The Iranian UN mission similarly claimed on August 20 that Iran seeks to “avoid any possible adverse impact” on the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[6]

The Iranian security establishment may calculate that a continued delay will generate operational surprise while forgoing strategic surprise, though the continued Iranian delay has also enabled the United States to move more assets into the theater to defend against an attack. Iran has likely not retaliated against Israel up to this point because Iran very likely seeks to ensure that its next attack restores deterrence with Israel while simultaneously avoiding a large-scale war.[7] Iranian leaders are therefore incentivized to carefully and slowly calculate their next attack to ensure that the attack inflicts serious damage on Israel but does not cause mass civilian casualties. Establishing deterrence would, however, require any retaliation to be successful. Iranian and Axis of Resistance officials have repeatedly emphasized that an attack targeting Israel will occur but have sought to counteract strategic clarity with operational ambiguity on the attack’s precise timing. US officials have warned, for example, that Iran could launch a strike with ”little or no warning.” The operational surprise that Iran is trying to build is meant to increase the likelihood that an Iranian retaliation on Israel would inflict serious damage, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.[8]

Iranian decisionmaker’s delay has also enabled Israel and its allies to ready defenses and move additional military assets to the region, however. The Nimitz-Class carrier USS Abraham Lincoln arrived in the Middle East on August 21, enabling US forces to operate two carrier strike groups in the event of an Iranian attack on Israel.[9]

Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi highlighted the psychological effects of delaying the retaliatory strike, which is consistent with Iranian efforts to use the delay to generate psychological effects.[10] Abdulmalik said that planning is one reason for the delay but added that the delay is also creating “anxiety“ among Israeli civilians as they wait the “inevitable response“ of Hezbollah to avenge the death of Fuad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah official whom Israel killed on July 30. Abdulmalik explicitly noted that “anxiety and anticipation” is part of the response. This is consistent with previous Iranian efforts to use the delay to generate psychological effects within Israel. Iranian armed forces-run outlet Defa Press claimed on August 11 that Iran is conducting a “flawless psychological war” against Israel by drawing out its retaliation.[11] Defa Press claimed that Iran’s psychological war on Israel has disrupted Israelis’ daily routines and stagnated the Israeli economy. This effort mirrors Iran’s attempt to exploit uncertainty surrounding its “imminent” attack in April 2024 to stoke terror in Israel, as CTP-ISW previously reported on April 11, 2024--two days before Iran attacked Israel in a major drone and missile attack on April 13.[12]

Egyptian officials cited by the Wall Street Journal on August 22 said that Egypt has refused any Israeli presence on the Philadelphi Corridor, which runs along the Egypt-Gaza Strip border.[13] The officials argued that Israel’s presence would violate the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and claimed that Egypt does not want to appear complicit in allowing Israeli forces to remain in the Gaza Strip. Israel has insisted that Israeli forces will remain on the Philadelphi Corridor to prevent Hamas’ weapons smuggling across the Egypt-Gaza Strip border. The United States proposed that the IDF control two observation towers instead of eight towers. Egyptian negotiators rejected the proposal. Unspecified current and former Israeli military officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal suggested that Israel could monitor the Philadelphi Corridor without a physical troop presence. The officials said that the IDF could use sensors to alert Israeli forces of possible tunnel building. Israeli forces would then conduct a targeted raid on the location in this scenario.[14] Maintaining Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor would help prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting major smuggling operations into the Gaza Strip that would accelerate Hamas’ ability to resupply itself, as CTP-ISW has argued previously.[15]

Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed responsibility on August 22 for the August 21 attack targeting the Greek-flagged Sounion oil tanker and Panama-flagged SW North Wind I cargo ship in the Red Sea.[16] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi claimed that a Houthi operation conducted in the past week damaged a ship, causing it to be ”swept away by the waves.”[17] The European Union’s military mission in the Red Sea, Operation Aspides, destroyed an unmanned surface vessel (USV) that posed an imminent threat to the Sounion while responding to the vessel’s call for help. Operation Aspides reported that its forces anchored the Sounion oil tanker and transported the crew to Djibouti.[18] Operation Aspides stated that the Sounion is still floating but it is carrying 150,000 metric tons of crude oil and could become a ”navigational and environmental hazard.”[19]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation: Iranian interest in the progress of Gaza Strip ceasefire-hostage negotiations suggests that elements of the Iranian regime are likely delaying a retaliatory strike on Israel until ceasefire talks conclude. The Iranian security establishment may calculate that a continued delay will generate operational surprise while forgoing strategic surprise, though the continued Iranian delay has also enabled the United States to move more assets into the theater to defend against an attack.
• Axis of Resistance Information Efforts: Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi highlighted the psychological effects of delaying the retaliatory strike, which is consistent with Iranian efforts to use the delay to generate psychological effects.
• Philadelphi Corridor: Egyptian officials cited by the Wall Street Journal on August 22 said that Egypt has refused any Israeli presence on the Philadelphi Corridor, which runs along the Egypt-Gaza Strip border. The officials argued that Israel’s presence would violate the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and claimed that Egypt does not want to appear complicit in allowing Israeli forces to remain in the Gaza Strip.
• Red Sea: Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed responsibility on August 22 for the August 21 attack targeting the Greek-flagged Sounion oil tanker and Panama-flagged SW North Wind I cargo ship in the Red Sea. The EU military mission in the Red Sea evacuated the Sounion’s crew and added that the Sounion is still floating but it is carrying 150,000 metric tons of crude oil and could become a ”navigational and environmental hazard.”

 

Iran Update, August 21, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iranian Permanent Mission to the UN suggested on August 20 that Iran’s Axis of Resistance could conduct a ground attack into Israel in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks.[1] The Iranian UN mission likely published this statement to generate psychological and informational effects, rather than to signal Iran’s serious intention to conduct a ground attack into Israel imminently. The Iranian UN mission asserted that Iran could attack Israel “from the ground” while Israel is focused “on the skies and [its] radar screens.”[2] CTP-ISW has not previously observed Iranian officials threaten to conduct a ground incursion into Israel in response to Haniyeh’s death. Iran and its Axis of Resistance are unlikely seriously considering conducting a ground operation into Israel, however, given that such an operation would undermine their stated objective to avoid a large-scale war with Israel.

Iran and its Axis of Resistance are unlikely to risk triggering a large-scale war with Israel by conducting a ground operation into Israeli territory, and more likely seek to stoke fear and anxiety in Israeli society by presenting such an operation as a possible response to Haniyeh’s death. Israeli officials have repeatedly threatened military action to force the Radwan Force north of the Litani River if diplomatic efforts fail, and any ground attack into Israel is most likely to come from Lebanon.[3] Hezbollah’s Radwan Force, which is deployed in southern Lebanon, is designed for ground attacks to Israel. A ground attack from Lebanon would accelerate Israeli decision-making and trigger a war to force the Radwan north of the Litani, at minimum. Senior IDF officials have explicitly stated that Israel will not allow Lebanese Hezbollah to conduct an October 7-style attack in northern Israel.[4] The IDF has also consistently targeted Radwan Force commanders in recent months.[5] The IDF’s targeting of Radwan Force commanders illustrates that the most likely ground attack threat to Israel comes from Hezbollah.

CTP-ISW is currently not prepared to change its assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack targeting Israel. Some recent Iranian statements and Western media reports diverge from CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment. Below are several of these statements and reports:

• Unspecified Iranian officials told Western media that Iran will "delay” its attack on Israel if Israel and Hamas conclude a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[6] The Iranian UN mission similarly claimed in its August 20 statement that Iran seeks to “avoid any possible adverse impact” on the ongoing ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[7]
• The Iranian president and his allies have advocated for attacking “secret Israeli bases” in Iraqi Kurdistan and Azerbaijan as a way to limit the risk of escalation.[8]
• Some senior Iranian officials have called for killing senior Israeli political and military leaders instead of conducting a widescale attack on Israel.[9]

CTP-ISW does not dismiss the above statements and reports. These statements and reports, however, most likely do not reflect the views of the Iranian security establishment and members of the chain of command who are ultimately responsible for deciding and implementing Iran’s response. The Iranian UN mission, for example, reports to the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry, which is part of the Masoud Pezeshkian administration. The Iranian UN mission’s statement that Iran seeks to avoid undermining ceasefire-hostage negotiations by conducting a strike therefore likely reflects Pezeshkian’s desire to avoid a direct strike on Israel rather than the views of the Iranian security establishment.[10] CTP-ISW continues to attach greater significance to statements from senior Iranian military officials and the Supreme Leader about how Iran will respond. These statements continue to indicate that Iran will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack targeting Israel:

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered a direct strike on Israel during a Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) meeting immediately following Haniyeh’s death.[11] Khamenei has publicly stated that Israel should face a “harsh punishment” for killing Haniyeh.[12]
• Senior Iranian security officials, including Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri and SNSC Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian, have suggested that both Iran and the Axis of Resistance will retaliate against Israel.[13]
• Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps officials, including IRGC Deputy Commander Ali Fadavi, continue to indicate that Iran will attack Israel directly.[14]

CTP-ISW will continue to closely monitor statements from senior Iranian security officials and will reevaluate its current assessment if these officials alter their rhetoric regarding Iran’s retaliation against Israel.

The Iranian Parliament approved all 19 of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s ministerial nominees on August 21.[15] This is the first time since 2001 and third time in the Islamic Republic’s history that all the President’s cabinet proposals got through the first round of voting in parliament. Parliament approved all of the ministerial nominees in the Khatami administration’s 2001 cabinet and the Rafsanjani administration’s 1989 cabinet.[16] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had seen and approved Pezeshkian’s nominees before Pezeshkian presented it to Parliament, presumably as a way to increase the likelihood that Parliament would approve his nominees.[17] Pezeshkian’s deliberate choice to obtain Khamenei’s approval demonstrates his approach to cooperate with Khamenei.

Pezeshkian’s selection and Khamenei’s approval of this slate of ministers sought to establish a cabinet based on “unity” between political factions. This strategy probably also increased the likelihood Parliament would approve the nominees. President Masoud Pezeshkian emphasized that his ministerial nominees demonstrated that his administration would move forward with “unity” before Parliament voted on the ministers.[18] Pezeshkian also highlighted his proposed list’s diverse political factions, ranging from moderates and conservative and including officials with security backgrounds.[19] Pezeshkian’s cabinet selections underline his intentions to appease political factions in Iran, reduce domestic political friction, and promote his agenda of national unity.

An unspecified Iranian official claimed that there is an ongoing “high-level debate” within Iran over the continued utility of the supreme leader’s 2003 fatwa against nuclear weapons. This debate is consistent with previous statements from Iranian officials that normalized discussions about Iran’s ability to procure nuclear weapons. Iranian officials continue to suggest Iran could change its nuclear strategy to address growing Israeli threats. An unspecified official told Al Jazeera that there is "high-level debate" over the continued utility of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's 2003 fatwa against the acquisition, development, and use of nuclear weapons.[20] The official said any shift in Iran's nuclear doctrine would be undertaken to address the threat Israel poses towards Iran.[21] The official noted, however, that a change in Iran's nuclear doctrine "does not necessarily mean moving towards nuclear weapons."[22]

Iranian officials have normalized discussions about Iran’s ability to procure nuclear weapons since April 2024 and there are some indications that Iran is setting conditions to be able to quickly move towards a weapon, should it choose to do so.[23] Axios, citing US and Israeli intelligence agencies, reported in June 2024 that Iran began running computer simulations that could support the research and development of a nuclear weapon.[24] Anonymous diplomats told Reuters on June 12 that Iran is installing new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow, increasing the Iranian capacity to enrich uranium.[25] The Iranian stockpile of 60-percent-enriched uranium separately increased by over 15 percent from February to May 2024, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.[26] These technical developments are especially noteworthy given that senior Iranian officials have indicated that Iran could change its nuclear doctrine in response to threats.[27] Some Iranian officials, including a top foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have threatened to pursue nuclear weapons development in recent months.[28]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said that it has defeated Hamas’ Rafah Brigade. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on August 21 during a visit to Rafah that the IDF 162nd Division has defeated Hamas’ Rafah Brigade and have uncovered over 150 tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.[29] Gallant said that roughly one hundred of the tunnels are relatively low-tech and shallow.[30] The IDF 162nd Division advanced into Rafah on May 7, and the IDF said on June 17 that it had dismantled about half of Hamas’ forces in Rafah.[31] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said in June 2024 that the IDF would shift to a “targeted raid” approach in the whole of the Gaza Strip after the end of the Rafah operation.[32] Hamas fighters have conducted 16 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Rafah over since August 10.[33] Other Palestinian militias conducted a combined 17 attacks over the same 11 days.[34] Smaller Palestinian militias allied with Hamas can continue to target Israeli forces along the Philadelphi Corridor, even if Hamas is ”defeated.”

Egyptian security sources told Reuters that Egypt would be open to an international presence along the Philadelphi Corridor for up to six months.[35] Egypt and Israel have not resolved their dispute over who will control the Rafah side of the Egypt-Gaza Strip border in the event of a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Israeli negotiators presented a map to Egyptian officials in recent days showing Israel reducing its forces but maintaining full control of the corridor, according to unspecified Israeli officials speaking to Axios.[36] Egyptian negotiators reportedly rejected the request to keep Israeli forces along the corridor.[37] Maintaining Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor will prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting major smuggling operations into the Gaza Strip that would accelerate Hamas’ ability to resupply itself, as CTP-ISW has argued previously.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation: The Iranian Permanent Mission to the UN suggested on August 20 that Iran’s Axis of Resistance could conduct a ground attack into Israel in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. The Iranian UN mission likely published this statement to generate psychological and informational effects, rather than to signal Iran’s serious intention to conduct a ground attack into Israel imminently. Iran and its Axis of Resistance are unlikely to risk triggering a large-scale war with Israel by conducting a ground operation into Israeli territory, and more likely seek to stoke fear and anxiety in Israeli society by presenting such an operation as a possible response to Haniyeh’s death.
• Risk of Major Iranian Drone and Missile Attack: CTP-ISW is currently not prepared to change its assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack targeting Israel. Some recent Iranian statements and Western media reports diverge from CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment. CTP-ISW does not dismiss the divergent statements and reports. These statements and reports, however, most likely do not reflect the views of the Iranian security establishment and members of the chain of command who are ultimately responsible for deciding and implementing Iran’s response.
• Iran’s Presidential Cabinet: The Iranian Parliament approved all 19 of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s ministerial nominees on August 21. Pezeshkian’s selection and Khamenei’s approval of this slate of ministers sought to establish a cabinet based on “unity” between political factions. This strategy probably also increased the likelihood Parliament would approve the nominees.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: An unspecified Iranian official claimed that there is an ongoing “high-level debate” within Iran over the continued utility of the supreme leader’s 2003 fatwa against nuclear weapons. This debate is consistent with previous statements from Iranian officials that normalized discussions about Iran’s ability to procure nuclear weapons. There are some indications that Iran is setting conditions to be able to quickly move towards a weapon, should it choose to do so.
• Rafah: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said that it has defeated Hamas’ Rafah Brigade. Egyptian security sources told Reuters that Egypt would be open to an international presence along the Philadelphi Corridor for up to six months. Maintaining Israeli control of the Philadelphi Corridor will prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting major smuggling operations into the Gaza Strip that would accelerate Hamas’ ability to resupply itself.

Iran Update, August 20, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Kathryn Tyson, Siddhant Kishore, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials have continued signaling that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks. IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi warned on August 20 that Iran will “definitely” retaliate against Israel “at the suitable time and place.”[1] Fadavi also warned that Israel “will be punished more severely than before,” likely referring to the large-scale Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel in April 2024.[2] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran likely seeks to cause greater damage to Israel than it did in its April 2024 attack in order to restore deterrence with Israel.[3] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles that Iran and its allies fired at Israel in April 2024, so that the Iranian attack inflicted significantly less damage than Tehran intended.[4] IRGC spokesperson Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini separately stated on August 20 that Iran is not rushing to retaliate against Israel.[5] Naeini, as the IRGC spokesperson, is the IRGC’s chief media officer and responsible for external messaging. Naeini claimed that Iran’s “right” to respond to Haniyeh’s death is unrelated to current ceasefire-hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas, which mirrors similar statements from senior Iranian political officials in recent days.[6] This statement notably differs from recent Western reports that Iran would refrain from attacking Israel if Israel reached a ceasefire-hostage agreement with Hamas.[7] The Western reports may reflect the views of more moderate factions, such as President Masoud Pezeshkian and his allies, within the regime, while the IRGC and Iranian security establishment more broadly still seemingly seeks to conduct a direct strike on Israel regardless of whether Israel and Hamas conclude a ceasefire-hostage agreement.[8] Naeini’s remark that Iran is not rushing its retaliation is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iran is likely delaying its attack in part to stoke psychological terror among Israelis.[9]

Disagreements between Egypt and Israel over control of the Egypt-Gaza Strip border remain an obstacle to a ceasefire-hostage agreement. US, Egyptian, and Israeli negotiators in Cairo discussed control of the border area, known as the Philadelphi Corridor, on August 18 and 19.[10] Israeli negotiators presented a map at the talks showing Israel reducing its forces but maintaining full control of the corridor, according to unspecified Israeli officials speaking to Axios.[11] Controlling the Philadelphi Corridor will prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly by interdicting smuggling into the Gaza Strip, as CTP-ISW has argued previously.[12] Axios reported that Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and the heads of the Israeli security services have concluded they can mitigate the risk of forces from the Philadelphi Corridor by building a monitoring mechanism over several months.[13] Arab media separately reported that Israel requested to introduce a written agreement that stipulates Israel’s "supervision” over the Palestinian side of the Philadelphi Corridor to the Camp David Accords peace deal with Egypt.[14] Egypt had previously threatened to suspend the Camp David Accords over an Israeli presence along the corridor.[15] Egypt denied the proposal that would permit a reduced Israeli force presence along the corridor and the request to formally alter the Camp David Accords terms.[16] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Israeli hostages’ families on August 20 that “under no circumstances” will Israeli forces leave the Philadelphi Corridor.[17] Hamas rejected the most recent US proposal for changing previously agreed upon terms, including allowing a reduced Israeli force presence along the Philadelphi Corridor.[18] Hamas has consistently demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip under a ceasefire deal.[19]

Israeli forces recovered the bodies of six Israeli hostages in a tunnel in Khan Younis on August 20.[20] The IDF 35th Paratroopers Brigade, the 75th Armored Battalion (7th Brigade), Yahalom special operations engineers, and Shin Bet forces operated under the IDF 98th Division to retrieve the bodies.[21] The IDF stated that precise intelligence from Shin Bet enabled the operation.[22]  Israeli forces located a 10-meter-deep tunnel shaft that led to a tunnel system where Israeli forces located the hostages’ bodies.[23] The IDF added that Israeli forces searched nearby buildings and killed several Palestinian fighters in the area before the operation.[24] Palestinian fighters guarding the tunnel were killed or fled as Israeli forces approached the area.[25] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the operation was the “fastest" recovery operation conducted during the war.[26] The military correspondent reported that the Israeli forces had achieved “operational control” in a single day over one of the neighborhoods in which the hostages’ bodies were believed to be held.[27] The IDF did not specify in which neighborhood the recovery operation occurred. The IDF 35th Paratroopers Brigade expanded operations to western Khan Younis on August 18 and advanced into Hamad neighborhood—an area formerly designated as part of the al Mawasi humanitarian zone until the IDF declassified it on August 16.[28]

Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have threatened to resume attacks targeting US forces in order to expel the United States from the Middle East. These militias may be responding to the Iraqi Foreign Affairs Ministry stating on August 15 that it has postponed its announcement of the end of the US-led International Coalition’s mission to defeat ISIS.[29] Ashab al Kahf announced on August 19 that it changed its name to Kataib Sarkhat al Quds (meaning “Screams of al Quds Brigades”) and that the militia may resume attacking US forces around August 25.[30] The group added that its renaming is meant to reflect that its objectives are not limited to Iraq. A senior member of Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba similarly told Emirati-owned media that Iraqi militias are resuming attacks targeting US forces due to US “procrastination and stalling” on withdrawing from Iraq.[31] An Iranian-backed militia leader likewise emphasized to Lebanese media the readiness of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to attack US forces.[32] 

The militia leader, named Haydar al Moussawi, separately boasted that Iraqi militias have “new strategies” for attacking US forces due to military collaboration with the Houthis.[33] This statement reflects the growing military relationship across these parties, though Moussawi did not elaborate on these strategies. CTP-ISW has reported extensively on how the military relationship has deepened particularly in recent months.[34] A US self-defense strike in Iraq in July 2024 killed a senior Houthi officer and drone expert at an Iraqi militia stronghold.[35] The Houthi officer had traveled to Iraq to train Iranian-backed Iraqi militias on drone warfare. The Houthis and Iraqi militias have separately conducted several combined attacks on Israel throughout the Israel-Hamas war. [36]

IRGC Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian will likely keep his current position as secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) under the Masoud Pezeshkian administration, according to United Kingdom-based Amwaj Media.[37] Ahmadian is a hardline IRGC officer with close connections across the IRGC leadership.[38] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei advised President Pezeshkian to keep Ahmadian for at least one or two years, according to the Amwaj Media report.[39] The Iranian president is nominally responsible for appointing the SNSC secretary, although the appointment requires the backing of the supreme leader. Former President Ebrahim Raisi appointed Ahmadian as SNSC secretary in May 2023.[40] Ahmadian replaced IRGC Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, who had held the position from 2013 to 2021.[41] Ahmadian was Shamkhani's deputy, when the latter was IRGC Navy commander from 1988 to 1997.[42]

Amwaj Media also reported that Pezeshkian had considered four other candidates to be SNSC secretary before Khamenei advised him to keep Ahmadian. The four candidates were reformist former IRGC Navy officer Hossein Alaei, Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Saeed Iravani, former presidential candidate and justice minister Mostafa Pour Mohammadi, and former SNSC secretary and former parliament speaker Ali Larijani.[43] All the candidates have connections to varying degrees to the moderate-reformist bloc. Alaei, for instance, implicitly criticized Khamenei for his handling of the Green Movement in 2009.[44] Alaei’s criticism prompted senior IRGC officials to condemn Alaei and pressure him into issuing a public apology.[45] Pezeshkian had no obvious reason to expect Khamenei to approve these candidates, especially Alaei, suggesting that Pezeshkian considering such figures was meant to appeal to the moderate-reformist bloc and frame Pezeshkian as advocating for its platform.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian attack on Israel: Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials have continued signaling that Iran will attack Israel directly in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks.
• Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage negotiations: Disagreements between Egypt and Israel over control of the Egypt-Gaza Strip border remain an obstacle to a ceasefire-hostage agreement.
• Iraq: Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have threatened to resume attacks targeting US forces in order to expel the United States from the Middle East.
• Iran: IRGC Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian will likely keep his current position as secretary of the Iranian SNSC under the Masoud Pezeshkian administration, according to United Kingdom-based Amwaj Media.

Iran Update, August 19, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Kathryn Tyson, Carolyn Moorman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The United States, Israel, and international mediators plan to continue ceasefire talks despite Hamas’ rejection of the latest ceasefire-hostage proposal. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli President Isaac Herzog, and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on August 19 to discuss the ceasefire-hostage deal and the prevention of a regional war.[1] Blinken told reporters before meeting with Israeli President Isaac Herzog that the current ceasefire-hostage talks could be the last chance to achieve a ceasefire.[2] An Israeli official told The Times of Israel that Netanyahu said during the meeting that he will send his top negotiators to this week’s ceasefire summit in Cairo.[3] An anonymous US official said that the Biden administration still expects a resumption of talks from the key negotiating partners later this week.[4] Hamas, however, rejected the ceasefire-hostage proposal produced in the most recent round of talks in Doha and continues to support the July 2024 ceasefire-hostage proposal.[5] Several senior Hamas officials similarly indicated to international media that there are significant obstacles in the ceasefire-hostage negotiations, despite US optimism about the chances of striking a deal.[6]

An unspecified source “familiar with the talks” told a Lebanese news outlet that Egypt agreed not to set a timeline for an Israeli withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor during talks in Cairo.[7] An Israeli delegation traveled to Cairo on August 17 to discuss security along the Philadelphi Corridor and opening the Rafah crossing.[8] Al Akhbar reported that Egypt agreed to drop its request for a timeline for Israeli withdrawal from the corridor in return for a reduction of Israeli forces along the border and a complete withdrawal “as soon as possible.” Egypt also reportedly agreed to ensure there are no operational tunnels leading from Egypt into the Gaza Strip.

Maintaining control over the Philadelphi Corridor by the IDF or another entity capable of preventing smuggling and the operation of tunnels will prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly. Controlling the corridor would very likely make it extremely difficult for Hamas to reconstitute itself to the levels it had achieved prior to October 7 in any short period of time. The IDF has severely degraded elements of Hamas. Israeli military action, though not yet destroying or defeating Hamas, has killed many senior and mid-level Hamas commanders and thousands of fighters.[9] These operations have also destroyed a significant amount of Hamas infrastructure.[10] The IDF assesses that Hamas’ rocket stockpiles are dwindling, and there are increasing indications that Hamas’ governance is breaking down.[11] Hamas police have reportedly “disappeared,” and robbery, looting, and extortion has increased.[12] Hamas reconstitution to the same levels the group achieved prior to October 7 would require the group to undertake large-scale smuggling operations under the Philadelphi Corridor, which will be very difficult with competent border security there.

Iranian officials suggested that Iran will delay its retaliation against Israel for the death of former Hamas head Ismail Haniyeh until after ceasefire negotiations conclude. The United States and international mediators have maintained pressure on Iran to encourage Tehran to delay or indefinitely postpone its attack, arguing that such a delay could help deescalate regional tension. Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Nasser Kanani said that Iran supports the negotiations and it is “waiting to see which direction the negotiations will go and whether America is willing to end this war or not.”[13] Kanani’s comments are likely reflective of Iranian policy towards the negotiations, given that Iran’s acting foreign minister has been responsible for engaging with Qatari mediators during the current round of negotiations.[14] Iranian politician and former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Brigadier General Esmail Kowsari, who has deep personal relationships with top IRGC commanders, claimed that Iran will "respond“ for the death of Haniyeh but argued that “[Iran] must never rush into carrying out operations that may be very large.”[15] These statements echo statements from other Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei maintained that Iran must respond to Israeli attacks targeting senior Axis leaders. Khamenei has simultaneously implied that Iran could delay retaliation without compromising its position towards Israel, however.[16]

An unidentified Iraqi militia member claimed that the Axis of Resistance does not "rule out" attacks on targets within Iraq as part of the broader retaliation for the death of Haniyeh.[17] It is unclear whether Iran or a different member of Iran’s Axis of Resistance could conduct the strike in Israel or what the target would be. CTP-ISW assessed on August 2 that Iran and its Axis of Resistance may target US forces in Syria as part of a retaliatory strike for the killing of several Axis of Resistance members, including Haniyeh.[18] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria as part of their campaign to expel US forces and maintain the capabilities needed to participate in a retaliatory strike on US forces in Iraq.[19] Iran has previously struck targets in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region that Tehran claims are linked to the Mossad or Israel as a whole, however, meaning that Iran could eschew an attack on US forces even if it conducted retaliation within Iraq.

Hamas claimed its first suicide attack in Israel since 2008.[20] Hamas claimed that it conducted a “martyrdom operation” in southern Tel Aviv on August 18 using an explosive device that killed the attacker and moderately injured one civilian.[21] Hamas said it coordinated the attack with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).[22] Israel Police and Shin Bet assessed that the Palestinian suspect was carrying a backpack of explosives that detonated before he reached “a more heavily populated area.”[23] The IDF and Israeli police said that the suspect was a West Bank resident and that the explosive device was “low quality” and likely manufactured in the West Bank.[24] Israeli security forces did not provide further detail on the suspect’s identity. Hamas warned in a statement that suicide bombings in Israel would continue as long as Israel attacks Palestinians, carries out the “displacement of civilians,” and conducts targeted killings of Palestinian leaders.[25]

Hamas’ threat of further suicide attacks may indicate a shift in tactics as IDF operations destroy Hamas rocket supplies and limit Hamas’ ability to conduct rocket attacks.[26] Hamas uses rocket attacks in part as a way to impose costs on the Israeli civilian population, and it may begin to use other tactics to impose costs on Israeli civilians. Hamas has not claimed a suicide bombing in Israel since 2008 and has not been affiliated with a suicide bombing attack since 2016.[27] Hamas has relied on mortars, rockets, and other systems to conduct regular attacks targeting the Israeli population after it stopped conducting suicide bombings.[28] Current IDF operations are limiting Hamas’ ability to conduct long-range rocket attacks. The IDF has assessed that Hamas’ long-range rocket and launcher supply is dwindling, and its forces frequently destroy rocket stockpiles on the ground.[29] The IDF Air Force also responds rapidly to rocket launches, quickly destroying relatively rudimentary launch sites from which Hamas has launched rockets into Israel.[30] Hamas retains a very limited ability to continue rocket attacks targeting major Israeli population centers such as Tel Aviv. The group attempted to fire two rockets at Tel Aviv on August 13, but the last Hamas rocket attack targeting Tel Aviv prior to August 13 came on May 26.[31] This demonstrates that Hamas may attempt to revert to suicide attacks to target Israeli civilian centers, though its ability to do so successfully will be hampered by far more effective Israeli preventative measures that did not exist in the 1990s and 2000s.[32]

Iranian ministerial nominees outlined their agendas to Parliament on August 18 and 19.[33] The nominees’ proposed policies are largely consistent with current regime policies. Parliament will vote to approve nominees on August 21 or 22.[34] Below are the agendas of several prominent ministerial nominees:

• Abbas Araghchi (Foreign Affairs Minister): Araghchi echoed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s foreign and nuclear policies. Araghchi stated that he would seek to both “neutralize” and “lift” Western sanctions on Iran.[35] Lifting sanctions refers to pursuing nuclear negotiations with the West, while neutralizing sanctions refers to mitigating the impact of sanctions by promoting self-sufficiency and bilateral relationships with regional and extra-regional countries. Araghchi stated that Iran will neither rush to enter negotiations nor “fall into the trap of erosive negotiations.”[36] Araghchi’s statements mirror recent remarks by Khamenei about nuclear negotiations.[37] Araghchi also stated that he would prioritize developing relations with China, Russia, and other countries that stood by Iran “during times of hardship and [helped Iran evade] sanctions.”[38] Araghchi added that Iran could choose to improve ties with European countries if “Europe amends its wrong and hostile behavior” toward Iran. Khamenei similarly stated on July 28 that Iran could choose to mend its relations with European countries if these countries stop their “bad behavior.”[39] Araghchi conversely stated that he will pursue a policy of “conflict management” with the United States.[40] Araghchi lastly stated that he seeks to be a “hardworking and active” foreign affairs minister like his predecessor, Hossein Amir Abdollahian.
• Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh (Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister): Nasir Zadeh emphasized the importance of “active deterrence” to prevent foreign attacks on Iran.[41] Iran’s active deterrence doctrine involves building strategic depth and regional influence to establish control over the operational environment, which in turn facilitates taking the initiative when necessary to suppress any nascent threat from endangering the homeland.[42] Nasir Zadeh claimed that Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack on Israel decreased Israel’s ability to deter Iran, causing the United States to try to “strengthen...Israel’s deterrence.” Nasir Zadeh also stated that he would try to increase Iran’s production of advanced military equipment and military exports to “friendly countries.”[43] The Iranian defense minister is primarily responsible for managing arms procurement and sales and the Iranian defense industrial base.[44]
• Esmail Khatib (Intelligence and Security Minister): Khatib stated that he would work to strengthen border and cyber security, confront the West’s “cognitive warfare” against Iran, and promote “stable security” as intelligence minister.[45] Khatib has served as Iran’s intelligence minister since 2021.
• Abdul Naser Hemmati (Economic Affairs and Finance Minister): Hemmati emphasized the need to reduce inflation and stabilize the Iranian economy, attract foreign investment, and fully implement pre-existing economic policies.[46] Hemmati previously served as the Central Bank of Iran governor under former President Hassan Rouhani between 2018 and 2021.[47]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation and Ceasefire Negotiations: The United States, Israel, and international mediators plan to continue ceasefire talks despite Hamas’ rejection of the latest ceasefire-hostage proposal. Iranian officials suggested that Iran will delay its retaliation against Israel for the death of former Hamas head Ismail Haniyeh until after ceasefire negotiations conclude.
• Gaza Strip: An unspecified source “familiar with the [ceasefire] talks” told a Lebanese news outlet that Egypt agreed not to set a timeline for an Israeli withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor during talks in Cairo. Control over the Philadelphi Corridor by the IDF or another entity capable of preventing smuggling and the operation of tunnels will prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from rebuilding their capabilities quickly. Controlling the corridor would very likely make it extremely difficult for Hamas to reconstitute itself to the levels it had achieved prior to October 7 in any short period of time.
• Terror Attack in Tel Aviv: Hamas claimed its first suicide attack in Israel since 2008. Hamas threatened further suicide attacks, which may indicate a shift in tactics as IDF operations destroy Hamas rocket supplies and limit Hamas’ ability to conduct rocket attacks.
• Iranian Presidential Cabinet Formation: Iranian ministerial nominees outlined their agendas to Parliament on August 18 and 19. The nominees’ proposed policies are largely consistent with current regime policies.

Iran Update, August 18, 2024

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Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, and Nicholas Carl

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Hamas rejected the latest US-mediated ceasefire-hostage proposal negotiated last week with Egypt, Israel, and Qatar.[1] An anonymous Hamas official told Saudi-owned Asharq News on August 18 that the US-mediated proposal “completely contradicts” Hamas’ previous demands.[2] The proposal included the following stipulations, according to the Hamas official, although CTP-ISW cannot verify the official’s claim.

• The IDF would reduce its force presence along the Philadelphi Corridor but not withdraw completely.
• The Palestinian Authority (PA) would manage the Rafah border crossing under “Israeli supervision.”
• Israel would monitor the displaced Gazans returning to the northern Gaza Strip and crossing the Netzarim Corridor.
• Israel would release a “large” number of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Hamas releasing Israeli hostages.
• Israel would retain the right to veto the release of at least 100 Palestinian prisoners that Hamas demands.

Hamas in a statement on August 18 formerly rejected the proposal and accused Israel of setting “new conditions and demands” that obstructed the negotiations. Hamas criticized the lack of a provision for a permanent ceasefire in the latest proposal. Hamas rejected the possibility that the IDF would remain in the Gaza Strip, particularly around the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors. Hamas also rejected the latest proposal for exchanging Israeli hostages with Palestinian prisoners. Hamas lastly reiterated its support for the ceasefire-hostage proposal that it submitted in July 2024. The contents of that proposal are not publicly available.[3]

Several senior Hamas officials similarly indicated to international media that there remain significant obstacles in the ceasefire-hostage negotiations, despite US optimism about the chances of striking a deal.[4] Hamas Political Bureau member and spokesperson Osama Hamdan claimed to al Jazeera on August 18 that Israel introduced “new ideas” in the most recent negotiations.[5] Hamdan criticized Israel for a permanent ceasefire and to withdraw its forces from the Gaza Strip. Hamdan also claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is not serious about negotiations and called him the main obstacle to a ceasefire. Hamdan was in Doha, where the negotiations occurred, when making these remarks, indicating that he was involved in the negotiations alongside other senior Hamas officials.[6] Hamdan has previously served in senior roles in Hamas, representing the organization in Iran and Lebanon.[7] Hamas Political Bureau member Sami Abu Zuhri separately stated on August 17 that reports of progress towards a ceasefire-hostage deal are an ”illusion.”[8]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived in Israel on August 18 to continue efforts to bridge gaps between Israel and Hamas regarding the US-mediated ceasefire-hostage proposal.[9] The US State Department stated that Blinken will emphasize to the involved parties to “avoid escalation or any other actions that could undermine the ability to finalize an agreement.”[10] A senior State Department official stated, prior to the Hamas rejection, that there is a ”strong belief” within the Joe Biden administration that any remaining gaps between Israel and Hamas are ”bridgeable.”[11] Blinken will meet with Netanyahu on August 19.[12]

Iran has engaged with international mediators throughout this latest of ceasefire-hostage negotiations. Acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani held two phone calls with Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani on August 15 and 16.[13] An unspecified US official told Axios that Iran claimed that it wanted a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and to deescalate regional tensions.[14] Bagheri Kani separately held a phone call with Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister Badr Abdelatty on August 17.[15] Bagheri Kani reiterated that Iran has the ”inherent and legitimate right” to retaliate for the Israeli killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31.

Key Takeaways:

• Hamas rejected the latest US-mediated ceasefire-hostage proposal negotiated last week with Egypt, Israel, and Qatar. Several senior Hamas officials similarly indicated to international media that there remain significant obstacles in the ceasefire-hostage negotiations, despite US optimism about the chances of striking a deal.
• US Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived in Israel to continue efforts to bridge gaps between Israel and Hamas regarding the US-mediated ceasefire-hostage proposal.
• Iran has engaged with international mediators throughout this latest of ceasefire-hostage negotiations.

Iran Update, August 17, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, and Nicholas Carl

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Hamas has rejected optimism from US and international mediators that a ceasefire-hostage agreement is close to being reached.[1] Hamas stated that there has been no progress on ceasefire-hostage talks and accused the United States of selling a “false positive atmosphere.”[2] Hamas restated its demand on August 16 that negotiations return to the Hamas’ July 2024 proposal after talks in Doha concluded. Hamas listed its demands for a full Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, a “real [hostage-prisoner exchange] deal,” and humanitarian aid for the Gaza Strip. Unspecified sources “familiar with the matter” claimed that Hamas suggested that it is willing to speak with mediators if “significant progress” was made during the talks in Doha on August 15 and 16.[3] It is unclear whether the ceasefire talks met this threshold. Israeli mediators are “cautiously optimistic” that ceasefire negotiations will advance.[4] Israel, however, insists that Israeli forces retain control over the Philadelphi Corridor, which is incompatible with Hamas’ demand for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[5] Lower-level talks will continue into next week to resolve outstanding demands between Israel and Hamas ahead of a second round of talks in Cairo, Egypt.[6]

The United States and foreign mediators are maintaining pressure on Iran to delay an attack targeting Israel by threatening Iran and highlighting reported ceasefire progress. Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani highlighted progress in ceasefire-hostage negotiations during phone calls with acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani following talks in Doha on August 15 and 16.[7] Al Thani warned Bagheri Kani of unspecified consequences if Iran attacked Israel during negotiations in retaliation for Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. An unspecified US official speaking to reporters stated that Iran could face “cataclysmic” consequences if it derailed negotiations by conducting a retaliatory strike on Israel.[8] US, Israeli, and Iranian officials cited by the New York Times on August 16 said that Iran is expected to delay its retaliatory strike during ceasefire negotiations.[9] US President Joe Biden reportedly views the deal as the “key. . . to preventing a regional war,” and he said that he “expects” that Iranian leaders will delay or indefinitely postpone a strike if a ceasefire agreement is reached.[10] It remains unclear if “hold off” means that Iranian leaders would decline to mount any retaliatory strike on Israel or just that Iran would delay its strike.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Ceasefire-Hostage Negotiations: Hamas has rejected optimism from US and international mediators that a ceasefire-hostage agreement is close to being reached.
• Iranian Retaliation: The United States and foreign mediators are maintaining pressure on Iran to delay an attack targeting Israel by threatening Iran and highlighting reported ceasefire progress.
• Gaza: The IDF 98th Division expanded its clearing operation in Khan Younis on August 17. Israeli forces located and destroyed Hamas infrastructure and engaged Palestinian fighters.
• Lebanon: Hezbollah launched at least 55 rockets into northern Israel on August 17 in retaliation for an IDF strike in Nabatieh that killed 10 civilians.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on August 16.
• Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed a Houthi naval attack drone in the Red Sea on August 16.

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Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

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The United States and foreign mediators seem to be attempting to delay or indefinitely postpone an Iranian and Hezbollah attack targeting Israel by both threatening Iran and presenting a potential ceasefire-hostage agreement as an off-ramp from further regional escalation. Both the United States and Israel have signaled that a strike would be met with a significant military response while indicating optimism toward a ceasefire-hostage agreement. The United States recently warned Iran that an Iranian attack on Israel could trigger a “robust military response” from Israel.[1] Israel practiced aerial refueling of fighter jets in Israeli airspace and “simulated long-range flights deep into enemy territory” on August 16 to signal to Iran and Hezbollah its readiness to respond to any attack.[2] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran likely seeks to restore deterrence with Israel while simultaneously trying to avoid a large-scale war.[3] A major military response against Iran in the wake of an Iranian strike would demonstrate it had not re-established deterrence while simultaneously increasing the risk of a wider war. 

The United States and foreign mediators are also framing a potential ceasefire-hostage agreement as a necessary measure to de-escalate tensions in the region. US President Joe Biden reportedly views the deal as the “key...to preventing a regional war,” and he said that he “expects” that Iranian leaders will delay or indefinitely postpone a strike if a ceasefire agreement is reached.[4] It remains unclear if “hold off” means that Iranian leaders would decline to mount any retaliatory strike on Israel, or just that Iran would delay its strike. Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al Thani warned Iran about the “grave consequences” of conducting an attack on Israel “at the very moment there are signs of diplomatic progress” during a phone call with Iranian Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani on August 15, according to an unspecified diplomat who spoke to the Washington Post.[5] It is unclear whether the “grave consequences” Thani warned Iran about are related to the current military situation in the Gaza Strip or the region more broadly.

There are some indications that Iran will wait until the current ceasefire negotiations conclude to conduct an attack on Israel. The United States, Egypt, and Qatar announced on August 16 that ceasefire negotiations will resume in Cairo “before the end of next week.”[6] CBS reported that the United States previously assessed that Iran would not attack Israel during the two-day ceasefire negotiations in Doha on August 15 and 16.[7] It is unclear, however, whether Iran will postpone its attack until the next round of negotiations in Cairo takes place. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said on August 14 that a “non-tactical retreat” from a retaliatory strike targeting Israel was unacceptable, implying that a tactical retreat would be acceptable.[8] This suggests Khamenei may have delayed the strike to account for ceasefire negotiations. Five Israeli officials told The New York Times on August 16 that the Israeli intelligence community assessed that Iran and Hezbollah have lowered the level of alertness of their missile and rocket units.[9] Israel also assessed that Hezbollah will not retaliate against Israel so long as ceasefire negotiations continue with “high intensity” because it “does not want to be perceived as undermining the prospects [of a ceasefire agreement].”[10] These indications do not confirm that Iran and Hezbollah will hold off on conducting an attack on Israel until the next round of negotiations takes place. It is also unclear whether a ceasefire agreement would prevent Iran from attacking Israel altogether. Senior Iranian officials and members of the chain of command have not raised the idea of indefinitely postponing or canceling Iran’s retaliation if a ceasefire agreement is reached, although they likely would avoid doing so during negotiations in order to retain leverage.

The Iranian regime is continuing to signal that it will conduct a serious retaliation against Israel in response to Israel killing several senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Ismail Haniyeh, in recent days. Numerous Friday prayer leaders vowed on August 16 that Iran will give a “harsh” and “tooth-breaking” response to Israel for killing Haniyeh.[11] The Shiraz Friday prayer leader claimed that Israel will become more “insolent” if Iran does not respond to Haniyeh’s death.[12] The Karaj Friday prayer leader separately claimed that failing to respond to Israel would signal to Israel that Iran has “surrendered and accepted humiliation.”[13] This rhetoric is consistent with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s remarks on August 14, which emphasized that Iran cannot execute a “non-tactical” retreat.[14] Khamenei directly appoints Friday prayer leaders, and the prayer leaders receive guidance for their weekly Friday sermons from the Office of the Supreme Leader.[15] The consistent rhetoric among various Friday prayer leaders therefore suggests that the rhetoric is part of a coordinated regime messaging effort.

US and international mediators are expressing optimism about ceasefire and hostage talks that Hamas did not officially participate in. Israel and international mediators concluded two days of ceasefire talks in Doha, Qatar, on August 16. US officials presented a new “bridging proposal” to “both parties” during the talks.[16] Hamas did not officially join the talks, but mediators reportedly updated Hamas representatives in Doha throughout the two-day period.[17] Mediators may have spoken with Hamas head negotiator Khalil al Hayya, Yahya Sinwar’s deputy in the Gaza Strip, who resides in Qatar.[18] The United States, Egypt, and Qatar issued a joint statement on August 16 confirming that the talks were “serious and constructive and were conducted in a positive atmosphere.”[19] Unspecified US, Egyptian, and Israeli officials speaking to international media were similarly optimistic about the talks, calling them "very good.”[20]

Israeli and Arab reports suggest that the talks have not resolved the two largest residual issues which both concern Israel’s presence in the Gaza Strip during a ceasefire. Mediators believe disagreements remain around Israel’s continued control of the Philadelphi Corridor—the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip—and over the creation of an Israeli checkpoint mechanism to prevent armed Palestinian fighters from returning to the northern Gaza Strip.[21] Hamas has repeatedly called for a full IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including on August 15.[22] Hamas has not officially acknowledged the US proposal, but unspecified Hamas sources speaking to Western and Arab media have expressed their displeasure with the proposal because the proposal allegedly put forward new conditions.[23] Hamas had pushed for Israel to respond to Hamas’ July 2 proposal rather than executing a new process in which mediators would introduce a new document.[24] Hamas has maintained that Israel recently introduced new clauses to the deal. Israel denied Hamas’ accusations, calling any so-called additions “essential clarifications.”[25] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office conversely pushed for Hamas to accept Israel’s May 27 proposal after talks concluded.[26] The US-led “bridging proposal” is different from what both sides are publicly insisting the other adopts.

Lebanese Hezbollah published a video on August 16 showing a network of its tunnels in Lebanon. The video further publicizes the development of Hezbollah’s capabilities, likely in part to deter Israel from launching a major offensive against the group.[27] The video shows Hezbollah fighters communicating on laptops and driving through underground tunnels on motorcycles. The video also displays trucks carrying rockets through the tunnels to a launch site. Hezbollah overlaid audio from a 2018 speech by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah with Hebrew and English subtitles, indicating the video is meant as both a threat to Israel and a warning to the West to restrain Israel from launching an offensive.[28] Nasrallah said that Hezbollah has targets it can attack in a potential conflict and added that Hezbollah is “stronger than at any time since its” establishment.[29] Nasrallah also said that Hezbollah’s weapons capabilities mean that “if Israel imposes a war on Lebanon, Israel will face a destiny and reality it didn't expect.” Hezbollah has built and maintained tunnels in southern and eastern Lebanon to host and move equipment and personnel since at least the early 2000s.[30] The timing of the video is notable because Israeli officials have threatened a wider Israel-Hezbollah war in recent months, suggesting the video is in part meant to deter broader Israeli action against Hezbollah activity in Lebanon.[31]

Dozens of armed Israeli settlers stormed a village near Nablus in the West Bank on August 15. At least 70 settlers set fire to vehicles and homes and threw firebombs and rocks in Jit, west of Nablus, according to Western media.[32] The IDF said that Israeli forces dispersed the rioters shortly after the attack began.[33] The Palestinian Authority said that the rioters killed one Palestinian and injured at least three others.[34] The IDF said that it is looking into reports that one individual died and added that it is opening an investigation into the incident.[35] Israeli forces also detained one Israeli settler for police questioning.

Senior Israeli leaders including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant condemned the attack.[36] US Ambassador to Israel Jack Lew said that he is “appalled” by the violence and the White House National Security Council said that the attack is “unacceptable.”[37] The attack comes amid an uptick in settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, according to human rights groups.[38] Several Palestinian militias, including Hamas, condemned the attack and called on Palestinians in the West Bank to mobilize against Israeli settlers.[39]

Iran is reportedly seeking security partnerships with two Chinese satellite companies specializing in low-cost satellites capable of capturing high-resolution imagery.[40] This capability could enable Iran to enhance its intelligence-gathering capabilities to improve the effectiveness of its strikes. The Washington Post, citing unspecified Western security officials, reported on August 16 that Iran is seeking a partnership with two Chinese satellite companies specializing in manufacturing and operating small, low-cost satellites with optical equipment capable of producing high-resolution images. The Washington Post reported that the optical equipment of the Chinese satellites is “at least twice as sensitive” as the most advanced satellites currently operated by Iran. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Chinese companies have exchanged multiple delegations over the past few months in an attempt to secure these partnerships.

Higher resolution satellite imagery could allow Iranian military services to improve their targeting practices for future operations targeting US, Israeli, and Arab military bases. Iran would also almost certainly share this targeting information with its proxies and partners to enable their attacks. Iranian state media previously reported in July 2020 that the IRGC used its satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region.[41] The United States previously sanctioned one of the companies Iran is pursuing a partnership with, Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., due to its support for Russia’s Wagner Group.[42]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Retaliation: The United States and foreign mediators seem to be attempting to delay or indefinitely postpone an Iranian and Hezbollah attack targeting Israel by both threatening Iran and presenting a potential ceasefire-hostage agreement as an off-ramp from further regional escalation. There are some indications that Iran will wait until the current ceasefire negotiations conclude to conduct an attack on Israel.
• Hostage-ceasefire negotiations: US and international mediators are expressing optimism about ceasefire and hostage talks that Hamas did not officially participate in. Israeli and Arab reports suggest that the talks have not resolved the two largest residual issues which both concern Israel’s presence in the Gaza Strip during a ceasefire.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah published a video on August 16 showing a network of its tunnels in Lebanon. The video further publicizes the development of Hezbollah’s capabilities, likely in part to deter Israel from launching a major offensive against the group.
• West Bank: Dozens of armed Israeli settlers stormed a village near Nablus in the West Bank on August 15. At least 70 settlers set fire to vehicles and homes and threw firebombs and rocks in Jit, west of Nablus, according to Western media.
• Iran-China Relations: Iran is reportedly seeking security partnerships with two Chinese satellite companies specializing in low-cost satellites capable of capturing high-resolution imagery. This capability could enable Iran to enhance its intelligence-gathering capabilities to improve the effectiveness of its strikes.
• Iraq: University of Tehran President Mohammad Moghimi announced on August 15 that the University of Tehran will accept members of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) without university entrance exams.

Iran Update, August 10, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, and Brian Carter

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Different elements of the Iranian regime have advocated for varying responses to Israel’s killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31. The different messages across the regime are very likely emblematic of differences in opinion between different camps in the regime. The messages may also reflect changes in position within these camps. Senior Iranian military and security officials, as well as Iranian armed forces- and IRGC-affiliated media, have suggested that Iran and its Axis of Resistance seek to conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack on Israel.[1] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani, for example, claimed on August 10 that Israel “only understands [the] language of force.”[2] Iranian armed forces-run outlet Defa Press separately published an article on August 10 speculating that Iran could attack Tel Aviv and Haifa.[3] The publication of this article does not necessarily mean that Iran will target Tel Aviv and Haifa, and more likely reflects the Iranian armed forces’ general desire to strike Israel directly. Other elements of the regime, including moderate President Masoud Pezeshkian, have advocated for attacking “secret Israeli bases” in Iraqi Kurdistan or Azerbaijan to avoid a direct conflict with Israel.[4] It is not possible to conclusively determine from individual statements exactly how and when Iran will respond to Israel given that these statements intentionally and unintentionally obfuscate regime discussions and Iran’s intent behind a potential attack.

The general trends reflected in Iranian rhetoric, however, support CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack on Israel. The number of Iranian official statements vowing a “harsh” and “forceful” response to Israel far outweigh the number of statements calling for a more limited response. CTP-ISW's assessment is also not only based on Iranian rhetorical statements, but also on CTP-ISW's prior assessments about Iranian objectives and perceived strategic requirements. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran likely seeks to restore deterrence after its unsuccessful April 2024 attack while simultaneously trying to avoid a large-scale war with Israel.[5] Iran and its allies fired around 170 one-way attack drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in the April 2024 attack.[6] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles, and the Iranian attack did significantly less damage than Tehran intended.[7] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.[8] CTP-ISW will continue to track and report the general trends in Iranian rhetoric across different elements of the regime while highlighting which elements of the regime likely have the most influence.

Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters conducted a drone attack targeting US forces at the Rumalyn Landing Zone in Hasakah Province, Syria, on August 9.[9] An unspecified US official told Reuters that the attack does not appear to have caused injuries but that medical evaluations are ongoing.[10] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have claimed six attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since late mid-July 2024.[11] CTP-ISW assessed on July 17 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear to have resumed their attack campaign targeting US forces in the Middle East.[12]

Key Takeaways: 

• Iranian Retaliation: Different elements of the Iranian regime have advocated for varying responses to Israel’s killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31. The general trends reflected in Iranian rhetoric, however, support CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack on Israel. The different messages across the regime are very likely emblematic of differences in opinion between different camps in the regime. The messages may also reflect changes in position within these camps. It is not possible to conclusively determine from individual statements exactly how and when Iran will respond to Israel given that these statements intentionally and unintentionally obfuscate regime discussions and Iran’s intent behind a potential attack.
• Iraq and Syria: Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi fighters conducted a drone attack targeting US forces at the Rumalyn Landing Zone in Hasakah Province, Syria, on August 9.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force targeted a group of Hamas fighters in a mosque at the al Tabaeen school in al Daraj, Gaza City on August 10.

Iran Update, August 9, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, and Brian Carter 

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will likely conduct a coordinated strike targeting Israel in retaliation for the death of former Hamas Political Bureau head Ismail Haniyeh on July 31. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has continued to communicate that Iran will retaliate “forcefully” against Israel to restore deterrence. Three anonymous Iranian officials told The New York Times that Khamenei ordered a direct strike on Israel during the SNSC meeting on August 7.[1] Khamenei later published a statement that blamed Israel directly and vowed retaliation, and his personal website published an article on August 8 arguing that it is Iran’s duty to seek retribution for the death of Haniyeh.[2] The article stated that Iran is prepared to respond with “authority.”[3] Other top Iranian officials who would be involved in the planning and execution of the strike have also threatened Israel in response to Haniyeh’s death. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi stated that Khamenei has ordered Iranian forces to “harshly punish” Israel for the death of Haniyeh.[4] IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani similarly restated Khamenei’s orders to “avenge” Haniyeh’s death in a letter to Hamas’ new Political Bureau head Yahya Sinwar on August 9.[5] Ghaani reassured Sinwar that Iran will inflict a harsh punishment on Israel for Haniyeh’s death. Khamenei holds ultimate decision-making power in Iran and would have to approve any retaliatory strike on Israel, making his statements on the strike particularly noteworthy.

This coordinated strike will likely include two waves of attacks from Iran and its Axis of Resistance. Western intelligence officials continue to assess that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will conduct two waves of attacks targeting Israel. Two Israeli officials and a senior Western intelligence official cited by the Wall Street Journal on August 9 said that the latest intelligence suggests that Hezbollah and members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance will likely conduct the first wave of attacks targeting Israel.[6] The sources said that Iran is expected to conduct a second independent wave of attacks on Israel. This is consistent with an Axios report on August 5, which highlighted a similar scenario two-wave scenario.[7] The Axios report did not, however, make clear whether Iran or Hezbollah would launch the first attack. Unspecified sources “familiar with intelligence [about the attacks]” told CNN that Hezbollah is prepared to strike Israel independently of Iran.[8]

Iran and Hezbollah leaders may choose to conduct separate waves of attacks—as described by The New York Times on August 9—to satisfy divergent goals and priorities.[9] CTP-ISW noted that Iran and Hezbollah have partially divergent imperatives that could create friction between the two parties and disagreement on the timing and coordination of an attack.[10] Both groups want to establish deterrence with Israel but may have different feelings of urgency. Hezbollah leaders may feel increasing pressure to retaliate given repeated Israeli operations that have killed Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon and Syria since the targeted killing of Fuad Shukr in Beirut on July 30.[11] Iranian decision-makers are likely not under the same temporal pressure as Hezbollah given that Israel has not continued to conduct attacks in Iran or against Iranian targets since killing Haniyeh on July 31. Iranian leaders are likely incentivized to carefully and slowly assemble a strike package that both hurts Israel and avoids escalation into a wider war. 

Iranian-armed forces-affiliated Defa Press on August 9 accused the United States of disrupting GPS in Iran “in recent days.”[12] Defa Press’s Defense and Security correspondent claimed that an investigation into the incident determined that the United States was attempting to disrupt Iran’s retaliation against Israel. Defa Press claimed that Iranian and Axis of Resistance drones and missiles use an advanced navigation system that does not rely on GPS. Countries may undertake certain defensive measures like GPS spoofing as defensive measures against missile strikes. Israeli forces implemented GPS spoofing over Israeli territory ahead of Iran’s April 2024 strike.[13]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is reportedly at odds with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) over how to respond to Israel’s killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, highlighting the likely existence of fissures between the relatively moderate president and some elements of the IRGC. Iranian presidential aides told The Telegraph on August 9 that the IRGC wants to directly strike military targets in Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities, while Pezeshkian seeks to avoid a direct attack on Israel.[14] Pezeshkian has reportedly instead suggested striking “secret Israeli bases” in Azerbaijan or Iraqi Kurdistan. The presidential aides claimed that Pezeshkian is concerned that a direct Iranian strike on Israel will cause an “all-out war." Pezeshkian is likely involved in discussions about Iran’s retaliation as the ex officio head of the Supreme National Security Council, which is the senior-most Iranian defense and foreign policy body.[15] Pezeshkian is not part of the Iranian chain of command, however, and therefore has no direct control over the regime’s response to Israel. Other ex officio members of the SNSC, including SNSC Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian, Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, and Artesh Commander Abdol Rahim Mousavi, in contrast, will play a much more direct and significant role in Iran’s retaliation because they either have roles in planning and execution or are close to key decision-makers, like the supreme leader.[16] Ahmadian stated on July 31 that Iran will have a “serious presence” in the retaliation for Haniyeh’s death, suggesting that Ahmadian is aligned with the elements of the IRGC that are advocating for a direct attack on Israel.[17]

It is not surprising that Pezeshkian would oppose a direct attack on Israel. Pezeshkian and his administration—not the IRGC commanders responsible for conducting an attack—would have to respond to international backlash and criticism of an Iranian attack on Israel. Pezeshkian has also repeatedly expressed support for resuming nuclear negotiations with the West, and an Iranian attack on Israel would likely undermine Pezeshkian’s efforts to resume such negotiations.[18] Pezeshkian’s aides may have intentionally chosen to speak to an English-language outlet to try to preserve Pezeshkian’s image as a “moderate” politician who seeks to preserve stability in the Middle East and mend ties with the West.

An unspecified US official told the Wall Street Journal on August 9 that the US intelligence community continues to assess that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon but is improving its ability to do so if it chooses.[19] The official noted that Iran is conducting research that “could shrink the knowledge gap Tehran faces in mastering the ability to build a weapon,” but that the US intelligence community does not believe that this research would shorten the time Iran needs to produce a nuclear weapon. These statements follow a US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) report on August 6 that noted that Iran is pursuing research “that better positions it to produce a nuclear device if it chooses to do so.”[20]

Iran is continuing its efforts to develop military and defense cooperation with Belarus. Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Force Commander Major General Andrei Yulianovich Lukyanovich met with Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi, Artesh Air Defense Force Commander Brigadier General Ali Reza Sabahi Fard, and Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi in Tehran on August 7 and 8.[21] Lukyanovich and Mousavi discussed "threats“ faced by both Iran and Belarus, including US unilateralism and Western sanctions.[22] Mousavi stressed Belarus’s role as a barrier to NATO's expansion in Europe and emphasized Iran’s opposition to the growth of NATO.[23]

The United States, Qatar, and Egypt released a joint statement on August 8 calling upon Israel and Hamas to join a final round of ceasefire and hostage negotiations.[24]  President Biden, the Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, and the President of Egypt Abdel Fattah al Sisi called on both Israel and Hamas to resume “urgent discussions” on August 15 in Doha or Cairo to close remaining gaps in an agreement based on the US-backed, UN Security Council-endorsed proposal.[25] The statement said that the mediating parties are prepared to present a “final bridging proposal” that resolves outstanding points of disagreement in a manner that can ideally meet both Israel’s and Hamas’ expectations.[26] Axios reported that the planned round of negotiations is the Biden administration’s “Hail Mary” attempt to land a deal and prevent a regional war, citing a source familiar with the deliberations.[27]  An anonymous senior Biden administration official said that there are “four or five issues” that need to be resolved or adjusted to achieve a deal.[28] The specific issues and their relative magnitude and importance to the two sides is not clear. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Office said in a statement that it would send an Israeli negotiations team to participate in the US-Qatar-Egypt effort on August 15.[29] Hamas has not responded as of this writing.

UAE state-owned media and Israeli media circulated conflicting reports on August 8 about Yahya Sinwar’s current posture on ceasefire and hostage negotiations with Israel. Sinwar’s position remains unclear, and it is not possible to assess the outcome of this round of negotiations with any certainty. An Egyptian journalist reported in UAE state-owned outlet The National on August 8 that Sinwar told Egyptian mediators that he will be “uncompromising” on key maximalist Hamas demands in negotiations.[30] The Egyptian journalist, citing unspecified sources, said that Sinwar contacted Egyptian mediators shortly after his selection as Hamas’ new political leader to convey that he will continue to pursue a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the release of high-profile Palestinian detainees, particularly on the release of Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti and PFLP leader Ahmed Saadat.[31] CTP-ISW Is unable to verify The National’s reporting, but that Sinwar would maintain his hardline posture is consistent with Sinwar’s previous refusal to moderate Hamas’ ceasefire positions, even when pressured by his superiors abroad and military subordinates in the Gaza Strip. Israeli outlet Channel 12 cited Hamas sources on August 8 who said that Sinwar instructed Hamas leaders to pursue a ceasefire and hostage deal “as soon as possible” before a potential escalation between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran.[32] The Hamas sources claimed that Gaza military commanders are pressuring Sinwar to achieve a ceasefire quickly.[33] The Hamas sources did not specify the terms on which Sinwar is reportedly pushing for an immediate deal.[34]  

Key Takeaways: 

• Iranian Retaliation: CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will likely conduct a coordinated strike targeting Israel in retaliation for the death of former Hamas Political Bureau head Ismail Haniyeh on July 31. This coordinated strike will likely include two waves of attacks from Iran and its Axis of Resistance. Iran and Hezbollah leaders may choose to conduct separate waves of attacks—as described by The New York Times on August 9—to satisfy divergent goals and priorities.
• Iranian President and the IRGC: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is reportedly at odds with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) over how to respond to Israel’s killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, highlighting the likely existence of fissures between the relatively moderate president and some elements of the IRGC. It is not surprising that Pezeshkian would oppose a direct attack on Israel, given Pezeshkian’s position and foreign policy priorities.
• Sinwar and Ceasefire Negotiations: The United States, Qatar, and Egypt released a joint statement on August 8 calling upon Israel and Hamas to join a final round of ceasefire and hostage negotiations. UAE state-owned media and Israeli media circulated conflicting reports on August 8 about Yahya Sinwar’s current posture on ceasefire and hostage negotiations with Israel. Sinwar’s position remains unclear, and it is not possible to assess the outcome of this round of negotiations with any certainty.
• Iran-Belarus: Iran is continuing its efforts to develop military and defense cooperation with Belarus.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: An unspecified US official told the Wall Street Journal on August 9 that the US intelligence community continues to assess that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon but is improving its ability to do so if it chooses.

 

Iran Update, August 8, 2024

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Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Emma Milchunes, and Brian Carter 

Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Katherine Wells, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) issued a statement on August 3 claiming that Israel killed Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran using a short-range projectile equipped with an explosive warhead.[1] The statement claimed that the projectile was fired from outside the guesthouse where Haniyeh was staying in northern Tehran. The IRGC also claimed that the projectile was equipped with a “seven-kilogram warhead.” The IRGC vowed to retaliate severely against Israel at the “appropriate time and place” for the killing of Haniyeh.

The statement follows an August 1 New York Times report that stated, citing seven anonymous Middle Eastern officials, that Israel killed Haniyeh by remotely detonating an explosive device covertly smuggled into the Tehran guesthouse months in advance.[2] The report stated that Haniyeh had stayed at that guesthouse multiple times previously. United Kingdom-based outlet the Telegraph similarly reported on August 2 that the Israeli Mossad hired Iranian security agents from the IRGC Ansar ol Mehdi Protection Corps to plant explosives in three separate rooms in the guesthouse.[3] The Telegraph also reported that Israel originally planned to detonate the explosives targeting Haniyeh during former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s funeral in May 2024. The report stated that this original plan did not go ahead due to large crowds inside the building. The report stated that the agents then fled Iran and detonated the explosive devices from abroad. The IRGC is responsible for securing and maintaining the guesthouse.[4] The IRGC may have claimed that a projectile killed Haniyeh to deflect blame for allowing Mossad to infiltrate its security forces.

The New York Times reported on August 3 that Iran has arrested over twenty-four individuals, including senior intelligence officers, military officers, and staff at the guesthouse, in connection to the security failure that led to the killing of Haniyeh.[5] Israel has not claimed responsibility for killing Haniyeh at the time of this writing.

Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have refused to speak with US and Arab diplomats trying to deescalate between Israel and Iran, according to the Wall Street Journal on August 3.[6] The Wall Street Journal reported that  the United States and Israel are preparing for an “unpredictable,” broader, and more complex attack than Iran’s April 2024 drone and missile strike on Israel. Iranian officials warned Israel of their plans ahead of the attack in April 2024, providing the United States and Israel with time to prepare. Former White House Middle East director Andrew Tabler told the Wall Street Journal that “less telegraphing means potential to misjudge the next step on the escalatory ladder.” The US Department of Defense announced on August 2 that it will “take steps” to support the defense of Israel and to “mitigate the possibility of regional escalation.”[7] The department also reported that air and sea-based cruise missile defenses, ballistic missile defense-capable cruisers and destroyers, and a squadron of F-22s will deploy to the Middle East. The USS Abraham Lincoln will replace the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group.[8]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) issued a statement on August 3 claiming that Israel killed Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran using a short-range projectile equipped with an explosive warhead. The New York Times reported on August 3 that Iran has arrested over twenty-four individuals, including senior intelligence officers, military officers, and staff at the guesthouse, in connection to the security failure that led to the killing of Haniyeh.
• Iran and Hezbollah: Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have refused to speak with US and Arab diplomats trying to deescalate between Israel and Iran, according to the Wall Street Journal on August 3. The Wall Street Journal reported that the United States and Israel are preparing for an “unpredictable,” broader, and more complex attack than Iran’s April 2024 drone and missile strike on Israel.
• Gaza: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck a Hamas command and control site in Hamama School, Sheikh Radwan, Gaza City on August 3. Hamas used the site to plan attacks on Israeli forces, manufacture and store weapons, and train fighters.
• West Bank: The IDF killed nine Palestinian fighters, including a Hamas commander in Tulkarm, in two separate airstrikes on August 3.
• Southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on August 2.
• Yemen: The United Kingdom Maritime Transit Organization (UKMTO) reported a small explosion in close proximity to merchant vessel M/V Groton around 170 nautical miles east of Aden, Yemen.
• Syria: The IDF reportedly struck a weapons convoy on August 3 west of Qusayir, Syria on route to the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon.

Iran Update, August 2, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Robert Moore, William Doran, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iran and its Axis of Resistance may target US forces in Syria as part of a retaliatory strike for Israel killing several Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh. Euphrates Post reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah, Sayyida al Shuhada, and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya deployed fighters to eastern Syria on July 31 “with the aim of targeting the International Coalition bases in Hasakah Governorate.[1] Euphrates Post sources in Homs Governorate reported that unspecified Iranian-backed fighters have moved “heavy equipment” and rocket launchers from militia warehouses in Jabal al Mazar into the desert east of Palmyra.[2] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted over 170 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and January 2024 including US positions in Hasakah and Homs Governorates[3] Mashhad Friday prayer leader Ahmad Alam ol Hoda claimed that US support for Israel emboldened Israel to kill Haniyeh in Tehran and declared that “[Iran] demands blood” from the United States.[4]

Iran is very likely taking into consideration US and allied support defending Israel as it considers how to cause greater damage than the April 2024 attack did. Iran and its allies fired around 170 one-way attack drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in the April 2024 attack.[5] Iran designed this strike package of over 300 projectiles to inflict serious damage on Israel. The United States and allied forces in the region intercepted a majority of the drones and missiles en route to Israel during Iran’s April 2024 attack.[6] The United States, Israel, and allied countries in the region collectively intercepted approximately 99% of all munitions launched by Iran during its April 2024 attack.[7]

Iranian-backed militia attacks targeting US bases in Syria could pull resources away from engaging and intercepting munitions bound for Israel in some circumstances. If the United States had to focus on defending US ground positions, Iran could calculate that the effectiveness of the integrated regional air defense that defended Israeli territory in April 2024 would be reduced. Tehran might expect that attacks targeting US forces in combination with a large-scale drone and missile attack conducted by the Axis of Resistance could be significantly more effective. Achieving the greatest impact of attacks on US forces to draw resources away from intercepting Iranian strikes against Israel would require a high degree of coordination across the Axis of Resistance and would need to be precisely timed. It is far from clear that Iran and its proxies and partners could coordinate many disparate air and ground operations that finely. US and allied forces can also take many measures to mitigate these risks.

The following indicators would support the hypothesis that Iranian-backed militias are preparing to attack US forces in eastern Syria.

• Iranian-backed militias massing additional forces in or around eastern Syria
• Iranian-backed militias leaving their stations in western Iraq or other parts of Syria
• Iranian or Iranian-backed militia leaders meeting in eastern Syria
• Iranian-backed militias flying ISR drones around US forces in eastern Syria
• Iranian-backed militias in eastern Syria conducting exercises simulating attacks on US forces
• Iranian or Iranian-backed militia leaders in eastern Syria taking heightened security precautions
• Iranian or Iranian-backed sources signaling publicly the possibility of intensified conflict in eastern Syria
• Iranian-backed militias rapidly increasing the dissemination of anti-US disinformation in eastern Syria

CTP-ISW has not independently observed confirmation of any of these indicators, and many of them are unlikely to be observable in the open-source environment.

Iran is likely considering its ability to maintain nuclear deterrence against Israel as it plans its retaliatory strike against Israel. Iranian nuclear deterrence against Israel most likely requires that Iran demonstrate a reasonable ability to strike Israeli territory with a delivery device capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Iran’s April 2024 attack on Israel demonstrated it is not capable of effectively penetrating Israeli air defenses. The Iranians may shape this attack deliberately to try to establish that they can, indeed, get a nuclear-capable missile to a target in Israel. That course of action would require strike planning to focus on ensuring that the ballistic missiles succeed in hitting at least some of their targets and would not be satisfied if only drones or small missiles penetrated Israeli and partner air and missile defenses.

Anonymous Western intelligence sources told Sky News Arabia that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah may attack Israel on the Jewish holiday Tisha B’Av on August 12-13 in retaliation for Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh.[8] Tisha B’Av commemorates the destruction of the First and Second Temples and is widely considered a day of sadness and tragedy. An Iranian-Hezbollah attack on this date would come about 12-13 days after Israel killed Haniyeh on July 31. Iran similarly waited 13 days before retaliating against Israel in April 2024 for killing senior IRGC commander Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi.[9]

US and UK officials have engaged Israel to affirm support and coordinate defensive action in preparation for an Iranian-led attack on Israel. US President Joe Biden spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by phone on August 1 and reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to supporting Israeli security.[10] Biden discussed US efforts to support Israel ”against ballistic missiles and drones,” including new defensive US military deployments.[11] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin spoke with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on August 2 and discussed the United States’ ongoing and future defensive force posture changes in support of Israel.[12] The US Department of Defense announced that Austin had not yet decided which forces to deploy.[13] Israeli officials also engaged with their UK counterparts on August 2. Gallant met with UK Secretary of State for Defense John Healy to discuss creating a coalition of states in Israel’s defense against Iran and Iranian-backed militias.[14] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and UK Army Chief of Staff Admiral Tony Radakin conducted a joint assessment and discussed UK-Israeli cooperation in the region.[15]

Ismail Haniyeh was buried in Doha, Qatar, on August 2.[16] Senior Hamas officials, including Khaled Meshaal, attended the funeral ceremony.[17] Meshal is considered to be a top contender to replace Haniyeh as Hamas Political Bureau chairman. Other senior officials attended as well, such as Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Syria: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have moved fighters and weapons to eastern Syria in order to attack US forces there, according to local Syrian reports. Iran directing a militia attack on US forces at the same time as an Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel could hinder the United States’ ability to defend Israel.
• Iran: Anonymous Western intelligence sources told Sky News Arabia that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah may attack Israel on the Jewish holiday Tisha B’Av on August 12-13 in retaliation for Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh.
• Israel: US and UK officials have engaged Israel to affirm support and coordinate defensive action in preparation for an Iranian-led attack on Israel.

 

Iran Update, July 25, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Kathrine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Kathryn Tyson, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 6:30pm ET

US President Joe Biden met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on July 25.[1] Biden and Netanyahu discussed Biden’s “ironclad commitment” to Israeli security, as well as “developments in Gaza, including efforts to reach a ceasefire.” An unspecified US official said that the administration believes that the deal “is in the closing stages.”

US Vice President Kamala Harris said that she told Netanyahu that it is “time for this war to end” and that “it is time to get this [ceasefire] deal done.”[2] Harris met with Netanyahu on July 25 following Netanyahu’s meeting with Joe Biden. Harris added that the war must “end in a way that ensures Israel’s security.” Harris called her conversation with Netanyahu ”frank and constructive,” and added that she will continue to support Israel against Iran and its partners. US officials emphasized that Harris has been involved in “every call“ with Netanyahu since October 7.[3]

US, Israeli, and Arab officials are reportedly considering former Fatah leader Mohammad Dahlan as an interim leader of Palestinian security forces in the post-war Gaza Strip. Dahlan is a former Fatah official who was a close advisor to former Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Yasser Arafat. The Wall Street Journal reported on July 25 that under the plan, Dahlan would oversee an interim security force of 2,500 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip after Israeli troops withdraw, citing Arab officials.[4] The United States, Israel, and Egypt would vet the Palestinian personnel, who would work in coordination with unspecified international forces and even private Western security firms. The Palestinian security force would not be directly affiliated with the PA. International mediators have recently considered multiple alternative proposals that have recommended sending non-Israeli, non-Hamas, and UAE-supported security forces to maintain security in the Gaza Strip.[5] The Arab officials also said that the Palestinian force could assist with the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip if it operates successfully.

Dahlan could be a “palatable figure” to Israel, the United States, Gulf states, and potentially Hamas who may be capable of leading post-war Palestinian security forces.[6] Dahlan organized Fatah-led PA forces against Hamas’ 2007 takeover in the Gaza Strip.[7] Hamas destroyed the Fatah-led PA forces in the Gaza Strip during that takeover. Dahlan left the Palestinian territories for the UAE after Fatah party leadership expelled him in 2011.[8] Dahlan maintains an active political party in the West Bank and he has connections to armed Palestinian networks on the ground, however.[9] Dahlan has publicly argued in recent months that a lasting solution requires a new Palestinian leader within a transitional government until parliamentary elections can be held.[10] Dahlan stated that this cannot be reached without Hamas’ consent.[11] Notably, Hamas has reportedly indicated to meditators in recent weeks that it has “softened” its hostility towards Dahlan and could accept him as an interim security leader.[12] Dahlan has repeatedly met with top Hamas officials since the beginning of the war, initially to coordinate aid distribution.[13] Arab and Hamas officials said that Dahlan has presented himself in recent conversations with Hamas as someone who could oversee aid distribution within a new Palestinian system in Gaza.[14]

The proposed 2,500-strong Palestinian security force is probably insufficient to counter Hamas’ future attempts to reassert control in the Gaza Strip, regardless of who leads the force. Hamas would need to agree to Dahlan or any other leader unless Hamas is militarily defeated and unable to resist a transitional force. Failing to defeat Hamas militarily will risk a resumption of de-facto or de-jure Hamas control in the Gaza Strip. Hamas would almost certainly act to suppress the authority of any non-Hamas security force attempting to assume Hamas’ former security responsibilities in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has a long history of violently countering attempts from other Palestinian factions to assert authority in the Gaza Strip, including defeating Dahlan’s PA forces in the Gaza Strip in 2007.[15] A 2,500-strong interim security force would likely be insufficient to challenge Hamas’ long-standing monopoly on violence in the Gaza Strip. Dahlan, who is currently based in the UAE, has not expressed explicit public interest in assuming the position.[16] Hamas’ reported acceptance of Dahlan also indicates that Hamas assesses it could maintain significant influence under his rule.

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Mohammad Eslami claimed that Iran had exported nuclear materials and expertise to various unspecified countries in an interview with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website on July 22.[17] Eslami stated that Iranian nuclear experts had “exported services” to unnamed countries during an unspecified timeframe. Eslami added that an AEOI technical group had travelled to an unspecified Latin American country within the past four months for “consultations” and that Iran was “continuously receiving” similar requests from other countries. Eslami also stated that Iran had exported domestically-produced heavy water—a substance that serves as a moderator and coolant in nuclear reactors—without providing further details. Eslami‘s statements focused on the development and export of Iranian pharmaceutical nuclear capabilities. Khamenei publicly called on the AEOI in June 2023 to commercialize nuclear products—specifically heavy water and nuclear isotopes—and services.[18] Khamenei.ir published Eslami’s interview on a new page titled “A Strong Iran with an Advanced Nuclear Industry,” underscoring the extent to which the supreme leader seeks to promote Iranian indigenous nuclear capabilities.[19]

It is unclear to what extent Iran has previously provided nuclear expertise to other actors, although Iranian officials have previously expressed their readiness to do so. Eslami stressed Iran’s willingness to help Saudi Arabia develop its nuclear program in May 2024.[20] Iran sold heavy water to the US in 2016 as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[21] Iranian officials have since claimed that the US purchased and requested the purchase of Iranian heavy water in recent years.[22] One Iranian official stated that Iran discussed heavy waters sales with Russia in 2016, although it is unclear if these discussions resulted in the purchase of such materials.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Netanyahu Visits Washington, DC: US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris met separately with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on July 25. Harris told Netanyahu that it is “time for this war to end” and that “it is time to get this [ceasefire] deal done.
• Gaza Strip: US, Israeli, and Arab officials are reportedly considering former Fatah leader Mohammad Dahlan, who could be palatable to all parties, as an interim leader of Palestinian security forces in the post-war Gaza Strip. The proposed 2,500-strong Palestinian security force is probably insufficient to counter Hamas’ future attempts to reassert control in the Gaza Strip, regardless of who leads the force. Hamas would need to agree to Dahlan or any other leader unless it is militarily defeated and unable to resist that force. Failing to defeat Hamas militarily will risk a resumption of de-facto or de-jure Hamas control in the Gaza Strip.
• Iraq: Two unspecified security officials cited by Reuters reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched four rockets at Ain al Asad Airbase, Anbar, on July 25.
• Iran: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Mohammad Eslami claimed that Iran had exported nuclear materials and expertise to various unspecified countries in an interview with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website on July 22.

Iran Update, July 24, 2024

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Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Kathryn Tyson, Siddhant Kishore, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 4:00pm ET

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint meeting of the US Congress on July 24.[1] Netanyahu described his vision for “a demilitarized and deradicalized” post-war Gaza Strip but did not offer details about how to achieve this vision.[2] Netanyahu further said that Israel would need to ”retain overriding security control” over the Gaza Strip for the ”foreseeable future” to prevent the resurgence of Hamas.[3] Netanyahu added that the Gaza Strip ”should have a civilian administration run by Palestinians.”[4] He did not directly comment on the ongoing ceasefire negotiations but said that the war would end “tomorrow“ if Hamas surrenders, disarms, and returns all the hostages.[5] He said that, if Hamas does not, Israel will fight until Hamas is destroyed militarily, its rule of the Gaza Strip is ended, and Israel frees all the hostages.[6] Netanyahu said that he prefers a diplomatic resolution that returns residents of northern Israel to their homes but that Israel “will do whatever it must do to restore security,” in reference to expectations that Israel may conduct a major military operation into southern Lebanon against Lebanese Hezbollah.[7] Netanyahu also proposed creating a new security alliance of regional Arab states that he termed the ”Abraham Alliance” to balance against Iran and the Axis of Resistance.[8] Netanyahu said that the US-assembled coalition that successfully defended Israel from the April 13 large-scale Iranian drone and missile attack shows the potential of such an alliance.[9]

Egypt may agree to a long-term Israeli presence along the Egypt-Gaza Strip border, according to an anonymous Israeli official.[10] Egypt and Israel have not yet reached an agreement on control of the Philadelphi Corridor, however, which separates Egypt from the Gaza Strip. Cairo has vocally opposed in recent months any Israeli presence along the Philadelphi Corridor.[11] Israeli forces took control of the corridor in May 2024 and have since consolidated their position by creating an 800-meter buffer zone. [12] The anonymous Israeli official suggested that recent discussions between Egypt and Israel have made progress toward a long-term arrangement that allows the IDF to remain around the Philadelphi Corridor.

An enduring IDF presence along the Philadelphi Corridor would complicate ongoing ceasefire negotiations but provides a better guarantee against Hamas rearming. Hamas has demanded repeatedly that Israeli forces withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor in a ceasefire and hostage exchange deal.[13] But Israeli officials consider controlling the Philadelphi Corridor as necessary to prevent Hamas from importing military materials into the Gaza Strip.[14] Hamas could use such materials to support its larger effort to rebuild its weapons production capacity and reconstitute its forces.[15] The IDF has called the corridor Hamas’ "lifeline” that Hamas needs to replenish its military resources, such as explosive materials, supplies, and weapons.[16]

The discussions about a lasting Israeli presence along the Philadelphi Corridor are part of a larger series of conversations about how to manage the corridor in the long term. The United States, Egypt, and Israel have reportedly considered alternative smuggling interdiction methods, such as constructing a high-tech and deep-buried border fence.[17] Israel also reportedly considered involving the United Nations and Gazans who are not connected to Hamas in managing parts of the border, such as the Rafah border crossing.[18] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he would not consider an IDF withdrawal from the corridor on July 12, tabling these alternatives to long-term Israeli control of the corridor.[19]

Lebanese Hezbollah published drone footage of an Israeli airbase in northern Israel on July 24 as part of an effort to deter Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon.[20] The drone footage showed the IDF Ramat David airbase, which is about 50 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border. The footage included purported details of the airbase, such as the locations of air defenses, aircraft shelters, and fuel storage units.[21] This video marks the third time in recent months that Hezbollah has published drone footage of critical Israeli sites.[22] These videos are meant to demonstrate Hezbollah’s ability to reach these sites while terrorizing Israeli civilians and military personnel. The videos could also communicate information about critical Israeli targets to other members of the Axis of Resistance.

The United States and Iraq continued discussing their bilateral security partnership, which is in conflict with Iranian-backed efforts to expel US forces from Iraq. US and Iraqi delegations concluded their two-day Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue in Washington, DC, on July 23.[23] The dialogue covered ending the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq and transitioning the US presence in Iraq to part of a bilateral security relationship.[24] US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated that the United States will continue to develop and strengthen its security partnership with Iraq.[25] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted around over 160 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began in order to compel Washington to withdraw its troops.[26] The militias paused attacks in February 2024 but announced on July 19 that they would resume attacks since Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani had failed to set a timeline for the complete withdrawal of US forces.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Israel: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint meeting of the US Congress to discuss the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and international efforts to counter Iran and its Axis of Resistance.
• Gaza Strip: Egypt may agree to a long-term Israeli presence along the Egypt-Gaza Strip border, according to an anonymous Israeli official.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah published drone footage of an IDF airbase in northern Israel as part of an effort to deter Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon.
• Iraq: The United States and Iraq continued discussing their bilateral security partnership, which is in conflict with Iranian-backed efforts to expel US forces from Iraq.

Iran Update, July 23, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

 

Hamas, Fatah and other unspecified Palestinian political factions agreed on a vision for post-war governance of the Gaza Strip on July 23 during “intra-Palestinian reconciliation” talks in Beijing.[1] The factions signed a joint declaration setting out their intention to form “a temporary national unity government” responsible for governing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[2] The agreement stipulates that a government partly influenced by Hamas would rule the Gaza Strip and West Bank until elections could be held at an unspecified future date.[3] The declaration reportedly does not address what party maintains security control over the Gaza Strip, and Hamas has been adamant it will keep its military wing.[4] Hamas, Fatah, and China have not disclosed the full text of the declaration at the time of this writing. Senior Hamas official Hossam Badran claimed that unity government would supervise the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, manage the affairs of the Palestinian people, and provide a “formidable barrier” against regional and international intervention in the governance of the Gaza Strip.[5] Hamas and Fatah have previously signed a series of unimplemented reconciliation agreements.[6] The former Palestinian Authority prime minister and top Fatah official Mohammad Shtayyeh said that Hamas and Fatah must continue discussions to advance the declaration’s framework.[7] CTP-ISW will publish more in-depth analysis and coverage of this development as more details of the agreement become available.

 

The United States, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are separately advancing an alternative post-war governance vision for the Gaza Strip that conflicts with the Beijing meeting’s vision.[8] Israeli sources said that Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah Bin Zayed organized a meeting with top US and Israeli officials, including Israeli defense officials responsible for “day-after plans” for the Gaza Strip, on July 18.[9] Abdullah Bin Zayed’s special envoy to the United Nations published a proposal for post-war governance of the Gaza Strip shortly before the meeting and indicated that the UAE could send armed forces to support a multinational “stabilization” mission in the Gaza Strip.[10] The UAE specified that it would only send forces if it was invited by the Palestinian Authority and the United States held a leadership role in the post-war Gaza Strip.[11] Part of the UAE’s plan involves appointing a reformed Palestinian Authority led by an independent prime minister to govern the post-war Gaza Strip.[12] The Palestinian Authority remains most influenced by Fatah, which just signed a unity government declaration with Hamas. The UAE is pushing for non-Fatah officials, such as former Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad, to head the government, however.[13]

 

The US-Israeli-UAE plan could move towards accomplishing Israeli war aims by protecting nascent, non-Hamas alternatives in the Gaza Strip. The non-Israeli, non-Hamas, and UAE-supported security forces described in this plan could successfully maintain security in the Gaza Strip if Hamas were militarily defeated. This force or one with similar features is necessary to accomplish Israeli war aims because it would be able to suppress Hamas military remnants and begin the process of transitioning to a non-Hamas authority. This transition would take a considerable amount of time.  This plan stands in stark contrast with the Beijing proposal, which would probably result in Hamas retaining at minimum a monopoly on violence in the Gaza Strip. A monopoly on violence would give Hamas excessive influence over governance of the Gaza Strip even if under a nominally muti-party structure. CTP-ISW previously assessed Hamas would similarly take over a technocratic government if the group retains a monopoly on violence in the Gaza Strip.[14] The Beijing proposal, if successful, would result in an Israeli defeat because it would result in at least de-facto—if not de jure—Hamas control in the Gaza Strip. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on July 19 that a ceasefire agreement without an interim governance plan for the Gaza Strip would create a void that is filed by Hamas resurgence, Israeli military presence, or “chaos.”[15]

 

Four unspecified Iraqi sources cited by Reuters on July 22 claimed that an Iraqi delegation in Washington, DC, has requested the United States begin withdrawing its forces from Iraq starting in September 2024.[16] The unspecified Iraqi sources claimed that the delegation has asked the coalition to begin withdrawing its forces in September 2024 in order to end the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq by September 2025. US and Iraqi officials began talks on July 22 in Washington, DC, to continue negotiations over the end of the International Coalitions mission in Iraq.[17] The United States and Iraq are evaluating a timeline to end the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq based on threats posed by ISIS in Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) capabilities to conduct independent counter-ISIS operations.

 

CTP-ISW continues to assess that the United States and its partners in Iraq and Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS and that a US withdrawal from Syria would very likely cause a rapid ISIS resurgence there within 12 to 24 months that would then spill into Iraq.[18] Iraqi security forces still face significant deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that would impede their ability to eliminate ISIS and other domestic threats alone.[19] The US presence in Iraq logistically sustains the presence in Syria.[20] This is consistent with CENTCOM’s previous and current reporting about the state of ISIS. US Central Command commander Gen. Michael Kurilla said in March 2024 that a US withdrawal from Iraq before the Iraqi Security Forces could successfully ”stand on their own” would ”all but guarantee” ISIS’s return.[21] Kurilla’s statements echo his 2023 Congressional Testimony, when he reported that he assessed ISIS would reconstitute within 12 to 24 months without a US presence in Iraq and Syria.[22] CENTCOM reported on July 16 that ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria are on track to double from 2023 to over 153 attacks in 2024.[23] CENTCOM noted that the rate of attacks suggests that ISIS is attempting to reconstitute itself. CENTCOM’s report is consistent with CTP-ISW assessment that the United States and its partners in Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS.

 

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gave a speech to Parliament in which he implicitly called on Parliament not to obstruct potential efforts by President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian to resume nuclear negotiations with the West. Khamenei simultaneously encouraged Parliament to work to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions.[24] Khamenei voiced support for both “lifting and neutralizing” western sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear program while impressing upon Parliament the importance of unity within government and acting with a “united voice” with President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian. Pezeshkian voiced support for increased international engagement with Western actors and endorsed a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) throughout his campaign.[25] Iran’s Parliament will not play a direct role in negotiations, though it is responsible for approving any agreement, and Iran’s recently-elected Parliament is dominated by hardline politicians who have obstructed nuclear negotiations in the past.[26] Khamenei implicitly called on hardliners to allow Pezeshkian to pursue nuclear talks by encouraging unity, but his comment about ”neutralizing” sanctions simultaneously encourages hardliners to work to mitigate the effects of sanctions. Neutralizing and mitigating the effect of sanctions has been a long-held foreign policy objective for Iran. This effort includes improving relations with non-Western countries and improving Iran’s own economic self-reliance.[27]

 

Khamenei also defended the Strategic Action Plan to Lift Sanctions and Protect Iranian Nation’s Interests, but his statements on the Strategic Action Plan probably sought to placate hardliners in parliament. Khamenei said that passing the Strategic Action Law “was the right thing to do.“[28] This 2020 legislation mandated that Iran increase uranium enrichment and reduce IAEA inspections if the United States did not lift sanctions.[29]

 

The pursuit of nuclear negotiations to lift sanctions caused by the nuclear program and an effort to mitigate the effects of sanctions in general are not mutually exclusive.  Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei previously urged Raisi administration officials to counter the impact of economic sanctions and simultaneously expressed approval of sanctions-lifting nuclear negotiations.[30] It does not necessarily follow that a new nuclear deal would cause the United States and its partners to lift all of the sanctions they have imposed on Iran, such as sanctions tied to Iran’s drone and missile programs.[31]

 

The Houthis appear to have successfully coerced Saudi Arabia into stopping a Yemeni government effort to cut Houthi access to the international finance system. The Central Bank of Yemen based in Aden (CBY-Aden) had been considering a plan in early July to remove several banks from the SWIFT system.[32] CBY-Aden also suspended at least 26 money exchange companies from operating in government-controlled Yemen between late June and early July.[33] Banning the Houthis from SWIFT would disrupt the ability for these banks to send and receive money from outside Houthi-controlled areas, which could severely damage the economy in Houthi-controlled areas.[34]

 

The Houthis responded by threatening Saudi Arabia as part of an effort to pressure Riyadh to reverse the Yemeni government’s decision. The Yemeni government is based in Riyadh, and Saudi Arabia can exert significant amounts of pressure on the Yemeni government to secure Yemeni agreement in negotiations. The Houthis threatened to target Saudi Arabia on July 8, one week after plans to remove several banks in Houthi-controlled areas from the SWIFT system leaked.[35] The Houthis published drone footage of airports and ports in Saudi Arabia, and the Houthi leader threatened that ”if [Saudi Arabia] wants good for [itself], stability [for itself] and [its] economy,” Saudi Arabia would need to stop conspiring against Yemen and cease cooperation with the United States.[36]

 

Saudi Arabia likely pressured the Yemeni government to cancel its decisions to prevent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia. The United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen noted that Saudi Arabia played a “significant role” in securing a Houthi-Yemeni government agreement to “cancel all recent decisions and procedures against banks” on July 23, suggesting that Saudi Arabia pressured the Yemeni government into reversing its decisions in the banking sector.[37] Saudi Arabia has previously undermined its Yemeni allies’ position by either negotiating with the Houthis without the Yemeni government or by pressuring the Yemeni government to agree to disadvantageous deals with the Houthis.[38] The CBY-Aden governor resigned after the agreement was signed.[39]

 

Key Takeaways:

 

• Gaza Strip: The United States, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are separately advancing an alternative post-war governance vision for the Gaza Strip that conflicts with a separate Chinese-mediated proposal for a unity government between Hamas and Fatah. The US-Israeli-UAE plan could move towards accomplishing Israeli war aims by protecting nascent, non-Hamas alternatives in the Gaza Strip. The Beijing proposal would amount to an Israeli defeat, if implemented.
• Iraq: Four unspecified Iraqi sources cited by Reuters on July 22 claimed that an Iraqi delegation in Washington, DC, has requested the United States begin withdrawing its forces from Iraq starting in September 2024. CTP-ISW continues to assess that the United States and its partners in Iraq and Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS and that a US withdrawal from Syria would very likely cause a rapid ISIS resurgence there within 12 to 24 months that would then spill into Iraq.
• Iran:Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei gave a speech to Parliament in which he implicitly called on Parliament not to obstruct potential efforts by President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian to resume nuclear negotiations with the West. Khamenei simultaneously encouraged Parliament to work to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions. The pursuit of nuclear negotiations to lift sanctions caused by the nuclear program and an effort to mitigate the effects of sanctions in general are not mutually exclusive.
• Houthi Attacks on Israel: Unspecified military sources in Sanaa told Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar on July 23 that the Houthis will target new civilian sites in Israel, which is consistent with the Houthi leader’s statements on July 21.
• Houthi Threats Against Saudi Arabia: The Houthis appear to have successfully coerced Saudi Arabia into stopping a Yemeni government effort to cut Houthi access to the international finance system. Saudi Arabia likely pressured the Yemeni government to cancel its decisions to prevent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah may be expanding the locations it targets in northern Israel. This expansion follows threats by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to expand the group’s targets on July 17.

Iran Update, July 22, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The modified Houthi drone that struck Tel Aviv flew at least 2,600 kilometers, demonstrating how Iran and its partners have expanded the geographic range of their weapon systems to target the eastern Mediterranean and other areas.[1] The modified Sammad-3 drone traveled east-to-west from Yemen, crossing into Eritrea before turning north and flying through Sudan and Egypt and then turning east to target Tel Aviv from the west. A standard Sammad-3 can travel 1,500 kilometers. Israeli air defense operations failed to identify the drone as a threat because it traveled in civilian flight corridors and dropped off and on the Israeli radar system. The Houthi attack approached Israeli air space at the same time as a second drone that came from Iraq. The IDF concluded that there was no operational coordination between the Houthis and the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia. The Iraqi drone arrived near Israel at the same time, but it was not launched simultaneously, given the much shorter flight time from Yemen.[2]

Iran and the Houthis have both said that they aim to develop the ability to attack targets in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. The capability to strike a target over 2,500 kilometers from Yemen demonstrates that the Houthis can launch drones targeting areas as far north as Cyprus—ranging all of Israel—and as far south as the southeastern coast of Tanzania, ranging large portions of the Indian Ocean. The Houthis have expressed an intent to expand their targeting into both areas.[3]

This Houthi attack is part of a broader Axis of Resistance reconnaissance-in-force effort against Israeli air defenses, which aims to better understand the strengths and weakness of Israeli air defense, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed. These lessons can be shared across the Axis, given that the Houthis and Axis of Resistance almost certainly communicate about their attacks and lessons learned. The Houthi supreme leader, Abdulmalik al Houthi, noted that the Houthis and Iraqi groups continue to coordinate, for example.[4]

US and Iraqi officials began talks on July 22 in Washington, DC, to continue negotiations over the end of the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq.[5] Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Major General Pat Ryder announced that the Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue met at the Pentagon to discuss the future of the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq and security cooperation between the United States and Iraq.[6] Participants from US CENTCOM, the Joint Staff, the State Department, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the National Security Council attended as part of the US delegation, and the Iraqi delegation included representatives from the Iraqi Defense Ministry, Iraqi Security Forces, Counterterrorism Service, and Kurdish Peshmerga.[7] Ryder said that Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue will consider recommendations from the US-Iraq Higher Military Commission (HMC).[8] The Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue will meet again on July 23.[9] The United States and Iraq have been evaluating a timeline to withdraw International Coalition forces from Iraq following the January 2024 Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack that killed three US servicemembers.[10]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 98th Division launched a new clearing operation in Khan Younis on July 22 to disrupt Hamas’ efforts to reconstitute in the governorate.[11] The IDF issued evacuation orders for civilians in Khan Younis, including eastern portions of the humanitarian zone in Khan Younis, on July 22.[12] Approximately 400,000 civilians reside in the areas identified under the new evacuation orders.[13] The IDF reported that Hamas fighters had infiltrated into previously cleared areas of Khan Younis and had re-established militia infrastructure in the area.[14] The IDF reported that Hamas has also used areas within the humanitarian zone to launch indirect fire attacks into Israel.[15]

The 214th Artillery Brigade (98th Division) and the IDF Air Force struck over 30 militia infrastructure targets in Khan Younis on July 22.[16] The IDF Air Force struck Hamas military depots, observation posts, underground shafts, and buildings used by Hamas.[17] An Israeli military correspondent and local Palestinian reports claimed Israeli armored vehicles advanced through Abasan al Jadida and reached Bani Suhaila.[18] A Palestinian journalist reported “violent clashes” and artillery shelling in Bani Suhaila and unspecified areas of eastern Khan Younis.[19] Hamas targeted Israeli tanks advancing in Bani Suhail with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs).[20]

The IDF reported that Hamas fighters planned to take control of a humanitarian aid route in Rafah. An Israeli military correspondent posted IDF footage on July 22 that showed a group of Palestinian fighters hijacking a humanitarian aid truck along a designated aid route in Rafah.[21] The military correspondent reported that the IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) raided a school adjacent to the humanitarian corridor in the past week and identified several fighters planning to hijack vehicles and “take control” of the aid convoy route.[22] The Nahal Brigade directed drone strikes against the fighters and identified a tunnel shaft in the school’s courtyard.[23] CTP-ISW cannot verify the location of the video or the school. This incident likely took place along an IDF-designated aid corridor that stretches from the Kerem Shalom crossing to southern Khan Younis, however. The IDF established the corridor in June 2024 to facilitate aid convoys’ safe travel through the Gaza Strip.[24] The United Nations and international aid groups have alleged that the IDF has not protected its designated aid route, creating a corridor that is unstable and vulnerable to frequent hijacking by armed groups.[25] The IDF acknowledged that Hamas fighters often attempt to stop and hijack aid convoys along the designated route.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Yemen: The modified Houthi drone that struck Tel Aviv flew at least 2,600 kilometers, demonstrating how Iran and its partners have expanded the geographic range of their weapon systems to target the eastern Mediterranean and other areas.
• Iraq: US and Iraqi officials began talks on July 22 in Washington, DC, to continue negotiations over the end of the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq.
• Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 98th Division launched a new clearing operation in Khan Younis on July 22 to disrupt Hamas’ efforts to reconstitute in the governorate.
• West Bank: The Shin Bet said on July 22 that it uncovered a plot by Palestinian fighters to kidnap IDF soldiers and Israeli civilians in the West Bank.
• Lebanon: A Wall Street Journal report on July 22 highlighted challenges that Israel faces intercepting drones targeting northern Israel.

Iran Update, July 21, 2024

Click here to read the full report and maps

Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The IDF reported that its airstrikes targeting Hudaydah, Yemen, on July 20 sought to disrupt the Iranian weapons supply route to the Houthis and damage dual-use infrastructure.[1] The IDF said that it intended to disrupt an Iranian weapons supply route to the Houthis and a critical source of Houthi financing by targeting dual-use energy infrastructure and the port’s cargo unloading capabilities.[2] The IDF estimated that 70% of goods that enter the port of Hudaydah reach the Houthis.[3] Israeli F15s and F35s struck 20 fuel depots, large container cranes used to unload goods from ships, and unspecified energy infrastructure.[4] The strikes set fire to the port and the fire is expected to continue burning for several days.[5] Houthi-affiliated media reported that 84 people were wounded in the airstrikes.[6] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF assessed that the port of Hudaydah’s ability to receive goods has been “completely shut down” by the airstrikes.[7]  The IDF stated that this operation was the longest-range operation conducted by the IDF Air Force.[8] The IDF said that the Houthis did not attempt to shoot missiles at incoming Israeli aircraft.[9]

A senior security official told an Israeli Army Radio correspondent that Israel needs to “project power towards the entire region” after the Houthi drone hit Tel Aviv.[10] A senior security official told an Israeli Army Radio correspondent that the IDF may need to conduct further attacks in Yemen in the near future.[11] The IDF conducted the July 20 airstrikes in retaliation for the July 18 Houthi drone attack that targeted Tel Aviv and killed one Israeli citizen, but the IDF added that the airstrikes were also a response to “hundreds of [Houthi] aerial threats” targeting Israel in recent months.[12] US and coalition airstrikes have previously targeted military sites and targets within Houthi-controlled Yemen.[13] An Israeli military correspondent noted that Hudaydah port is also used to import humanitarian aid into Yemen.[14] The July 20 airstrike was the first Israeli strike targeting the Houthis.

Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi announced the start of the fifth phase of Houthi escalations against Israel known as “Operation Jaffa” in a speech on July 21.[15] Abdulmalik’s speech follows the IDF‘s retaliatory strike on the port of Hudaydah, Yemen on July 20. Abdulmalik claimed that Israelis are no longer safe in main population centers of Israel, including Tel Aviv. Abdulmalik added that Israel will not re-establish deterrence vis-a-vis the Houthis by launching attacks on Yemen. Abdulmalik denied that the “Jaffa” drone that the Houthis used in its July 18 attack on Tel Aviv was foreign-made and referred to it as “purely“ Yemeni made.[16] The Jaffa drone, however, appears to be a modified variant of the Iranian-designed Samad-3 drone.[17] The Houthis presumably modified the Samad-3 in order to extend its range. Abdulmalik denied that the Houthis are conducting operations to benefit Iran and reiterated that the Houthis are operating in support of the Palestinians.[18] Houthi spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea separately said in a televised statement on July 20 that the Houthis will respond to this “blatant Israeli aggression and will not hesitate to strike the enemy’s vital targets.”[19]

The IDF said it intercepted a surface-to-surface missile approaching Israeli territory from Yemen on July 21.[20] The missile did not cross into Israeli territory.[21] The Houthis have not claimed the attack as of this writing.

Key Takeaways:

• Yemen: Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi announced the start of the fifth phase of Houthi escalations against Israel known as “Operation Jaffa,” claiming that Israelis are no longer safe in Israel’s main population centers.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF confirmed on July 21 that it killed a prominent Hamas fighter and the Gaza Brigade commander in the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in an airstrike on an unspecified date.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 20.
• Lebanon: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 20.

Iran Update, July 20, 2024

Click here to read the full report and maps

Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting several Houthi military targets in al Hudaydah, Yemen, on July 20 in retaliation for the July 18 Houthi drone attack targeting Tel Aviv.[1] The IDF stated that it conducted the strike “in response to the hundreds of [Houthi] attacks carried out against the state of Israel in recent months.”[2] A senior Israeli official told Axios that “the attack by the Houthis on Tel Aviv crossed all the red lines and that is why we responded to it after nine months of restraint.”[3] The IDF airstrike marks the first time Israel has directly struck Yemen since the Israel-Hamas war began.[4] A second unspecified Israeli official told Axios that Israel coordinated the attack with the United States and the international coalition that was established in December 2023 to counter Houthi attacks on international shipping.[5] Houthi media claimed that Israel targeted oil facilities and a power station in al Hudaydah.[6]

Key Takeaways:

• Yemen: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting several Houthi military targets in al Hudaydah, Yemen, on July 20 in retaliation for the July 18 Houthi drone attack targeting Tel Aviv.
• Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 99th Division operated in Gaza City over the past week and seized weapons in buildings surrounding UNWRA headquarters in Tal al Hawa.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least five locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 19.
• Lebanon: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least eight attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on July 19.

Iran Update, July 19, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

The Houthis launched a one-way attack drone into Tel Aviv for the first time on July 18, killing one individual and injuring at least another 10.[1] The Houthis appear to have flown the drone from Yemen to the Mediterranean Sea before turning it eastward into Tel Aviv.[2] The drone then struck an apartment building about 100 meters from a US consulate.[3] The Houthis have claimed responsibility for the attack and vowed to continue attacking deep into Israel.[4] The Houthis said that the attack used their new “Yafa” drone, which appears to be a modified variant of the Iranian-designed Samad-3 drone.[5] The Yafa drone carried around 10 kilograms of explosives, according to an Israeli military correspondent.[6]

The Houthis have conducted reconnaissance in force against the Israeli air defense network in recent months, which may have enabled the attack into Tel Aviv. The US Army defines reconnaissance in force as “a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[7] The Houthis have conducted regular drone and missile attacks targeting Israel since October 2023 to this end.[8] These attacks could have provided the Houthis with the information needed to evade Israeli air defenses and strike targets in Tel Aviv. The almost daily Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel could be meant to similarly gather information on Israeli air defenses and vulnerabilities.

The Houthi reconnaissance-in-force effort against Israeli air defenses reflects more broadly how Iran and its Axis of Resistance are learning from the Israel-Hamas war and accordingly developing new ways of fighting Israel. Senior Iranian military officials have discussed, for instance, how Hamas’ attack into Israel in October 2023 demonstrated how effective and valuable ground incursions into Israel could be.[9] Iran and the Axis of Resistance have similarly experimented throughout the war with how to disrupt the Israeli economy by attacking critical Israeli infrastructure and international shipping.[10]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on July 19 that there are “increasing indications” that Hamas’ top military commander, Mohammad Deif, is dead.[11] The IDF targeted Deif and Hamas Khan Younis Brigade Commander Rafe Salameh on July 13 by dropping eight 2,000-pound precision munitions on their location in the southern Gaza Strip. The IDF confirmed on July 14 that the strike killed Salameh. The IDF statement on July 19 confirmed that Mohammad Deif was “sitting next to” Salamah at the time of the strike.[12] Hamas has denied that Deif is dead.[13] The IDF has in turn accused Hamas of trying to hide what happened to Deif.[14]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on July 19 that Iran has reduced its nuclear breakout time to one to two weeks.[15] Senior US officials have previously estimated that the Iranian nuclear breakout time was between 12 days and several months. Blinken’s statement comes as Iran has in recent months expanded its nuclear program and run computer simulations that could support the production of a nuclear weapon.[16] Senior Iranian officials have threatened repeatedly in recent months to pursue a nuclear weapon.[17]

The IDF conducted airstrikes into southern Lebanon on July 18, killing two officers from Lebanese Hezbollah’s Radwan unit.[18] The Radwan unit is Hezbollah’s elite commando force and is designed to conduct ground operations into Israel.[19] The IDF airstrike killed two operations officers in the Radwan unit—Ali Jafar Matouq and Mohammad Hassan Mustafa. Both officers were involved in Hezbollah attacks into northern Israel.[20] Matouq had reportedly replaced another Radwan officer, named Ali Ahmed Hussein, whom the IDF killed in April 2024.[21]

Hezbollah launched around 65 rockets into northern Israel in retaliation for the IDF killing the two Radwan officers.[22] The IDF intercepted some of the rockets, while the rest fell in open areas. Hezbollah claimed that it attacked three Israeli towns—Abirim, Neve Ziv, and Manot—for the first time as part of its retaliation.[23] These attacks come after Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah threatened on July 17 to expand the geographic scope of attacks into northern Israel.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Yemen: The Houthis launched a one-way attack drone into Tel Aviv for the first time. The Houthis have conducted reconnaissance in force against Israeli air defenses in recent months, which may have enabled the attack.
• Gaza Strip: Israel announced that there are “increasing indications” that Hamas’ top military commander, Mohammad Deif, is dead. The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting Deif in the southern Gaza Strip on July 13.
• Iran: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that Iran has reduced its nuclear breakout time to one to two weeks. His comments come as Iran has in recent months expanded its nuclear program and run computer simulations that could help build a nuclear weapon.
• Lebanon: The IDF conducted airstrikes into southern Lebanon, killing two officers from Lebanese Hezbollah’s Radwan unit. The Radwan unit is Hezbollah’s elite commando force and is designed to conduct ground attacks into Israel.

 

Iran Update, July 18, 2024

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Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, Kathryn Tyson, Siddhant Kishore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Members of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s inner circle told Western Media that Khamenei sought to promote the candidacy of Masoud Pezeshkian due to Pezeshkian’s ability to “foster unity.”[1] Individuals close to the supreme leader told Western media that Khamenei received intelligence reports in May 2024 revealing that only 13 percent of Iranians would participate in the snap presidential election following former President Ebrahim Raisi’s death. Unnamed regime insiders stated that Khamenei subsequently "orchestrated” the election to result in the victory of moderate candidate Masoud Pezeshkian due to Khamenei’s fear that low voter turnout would “damage the clerical establishment’s credibility.” Regime insiders told Western media that Khamenei stated Iran needed a president who could “appeal to different layers of society” while “foster[ing] unity among those in power” and without challenging Iran’s ruling theocracy. This may be part of an effort to emphasize the regime’s stability and message to the West that attempts to undermine the regime will fail and that negotiations will prove the only successful way to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Iranian officials believe that the United States and the West have used and are using media and other non-military means to fight a “soft war” against Iran to subvert the regime and eventually overthrow it. These Iranian officials, by presenting the facade of stability, appear to be attempting to discourage these efforts.

The Western media report is inconsistent with the regime’s previous stances vis-a-vis Pezeshkian throughout the election campaign period. Khamenei’s statements and IRGC meetings suggest that Pezeshkian’s rise to the presidency was unplanned. Khamenei and the Iranian regime writ large did not appear to publicly rally around Masoud Pezeshkian prior to Pezeshkian winning the presidential election. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei implicitly criticized Pezeshkian’s support for increasing Iranian engagement with the West in a speech on June 25, stating that politicians who are “attached to America” cannot be “good managers.” Khamenei’s statement came after Pezeshkian’s expression of support for improving relations with the West during the June 24 foreign policy debate.[2] Senior leaders of the IRGC similarly expressed support for hardline candidates over Pezeshkian throughout the 2024 campaign season. The IRGC tried to unite the hardline camp against Pezeshkian, according to unverified social media rumors. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly met with hardline candidates Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili in Mashhad on June 26 to form a consensus between them.[3] Two unspecified Iranian officials later confirmed to the New York Times on June 28 that Ghaani called on Jalili to withdraw from the race during an emergency meeting with Jalili and Ghalibaf in Mashhad, Iran, on June 26.[4] The New York Times later deleted its report. The Telegraph reported in early June 2024 that some senior IRGC commanders, including former IRGC Air Force Commander Hossein Dehghan, supported Ghalibaf instead of Pezeshkian.[5] The reports of IRGC support for hardline candidates call into question to what extent the supreme leader fully engineered the election beginning from the start of the campaign in May, as Western media report suggests.

Key Takeaways:

Iran Update, July 17, 2024

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Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Kathryn Tyson, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Marcus Mildenberger, Johanna Moore and Brian Carter

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Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear to have resumed their attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched two one-way attack drones targeting US and coalition forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq on July 16, according to two Iraqi militia “officials” cited by Western media.[1] An anonymous US-led coalition source told Iraqi media that US air defense systems intercepted both drones.[2] No group has officially claimed the attack at the time of writing, though an Iraq-focused analyst reported that a propaganda outlet affiliated with Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba claimed the attack on July 16.[3] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously threatened on or before June 5 to attack US forces in Iraq if the Iraqi prime minister failed to set a date for US troop withdrawal within 40 days, and the militias’ coordinating body also threatened to resume attacks on June 19.[4] Ali al Fatlawi, a leader in Ansar Allah al Awfiya cited by Shafaq on July 17, claimed that the drone attack on Ain al Asad Airbase meant attacks against US forces had resumed.[5] Fatlawi did not specify which militia conducted the attack.[6] Fatlawi is also a member of Asaib Ahl al Haq‘s parliamentary bloc.[7] This attack marks the second Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on a US base in Iraq since Iraqi militias suspended their attack campaign targeting US forces in February 2024.[8]

An Iraqi delegation will travel to Washington, DC, on an unspecified date in July 2024 to continue negotiations over the end of the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq.[9] Anonymous Iraqi political sources cited by Iraqi news outlet al Mada claimed that the Iraqi delegation will request the withdrawal of US and coalition forces from Iraq in three to four months. The same sources believe the United States will request a longer withdrawal timetable over three to five years. It is unclear how the anonymous Iraqi political sources have access to this information about US calculations. The United States and Iraq have been evaluating a timeline to withdraw International Coalition forces from Iraq following the January 2024 Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack that killed three US servicemembers.[10]

Iran is still attempting to establish a permanent naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast following unsuccessful bilateral talks in March 2024.  The Wall Street Journal initially reported in March 2024 that Iran unsuccessfully tried to persuade Sudan to allow Iran to build a permanent naval base in Port Sudan on the Red Sea.[11]  France-based, Sudanese outlet the Sudan Tribune reported on July 16 that the Sudanese Armed Forces rejected an Iranian proposal to permanently station an Iranian military vessel in Port Sudan in exchange for continued Iranian military aid to the Sudanese Armed Forces.[12]  The July 16 report stated that Iran modified its initial proposal to instead request to establish a dual-use commercial and military port at Port Sudan. Iran’s initial proposal was to establish a solely military-use port, according to the Wall Street Journal.[13] The most recent proposal was also rejected by Sudanese officials, according to the Sudan Tribune report. The July 16 report likely indicates that Iran continued talks with Sudan after its initial talks as reported by the Wall Street Journal in March 2024.

Sudanese Armed Forces officials reportedly rejected these Iranian proposals due to concerns about potential backlash from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Western countries. Port Sudan is located approximately 200 miles west of Saudi Arabia—separated by the Red Sea.  A senior Sudanese intelligence adviser to the Sudanese Armed Forces stated in March 2024 that Sudan rejected the initial proposal to ”avoid alienating the US and Israel.”[14] Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel all have direct access to the Red Sea, and an Iranian presence on the Red Sea would enable Iran to support longer-range naval operations to disrupt international shipping to any of these states, should Iran choose to do so.[15] Sudan’s rejection of these proposals has not visibly affected Iran’s decision to supply drones to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Iran has supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with drones, such as the Mohajer-6, to use against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in the ongoing Sudanese Civil War.[16] CTP-ISW previously assessed in March 2024 that Iran would use a naval base in Sudan to support out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.

Hamas likely retains the institutional knowledge and skilled commanders required to reconstitute despite the loss of several high-ranking Hamas commanders in the Gaza Strip since October 2023. The IDF has killed three of five Hamas Brigade commanders in the Gaza Strip.[17]  The original Hamas Gaza City and Rafah Brigade commanders remain active in the Gaza Strip, and the IDF has conducted operations in both Rafah and Gaza City in recent weeks targeting forces under the command of the last two pre-October 7 brigade commanders.[18] Many of the senior Hamas military commanders whom Israel has killed in this war have decades of experience fighting Israel, and their loss will make reconstitution more challenging. Hamas made a deliberate choice to structure its military wing to survive Israeli military action by building a resilient military organization modeled on conventional militaries, however. Militaries design their command structures to ensure continuity of command during combat as units take casualties and leaders die. Killed Hamas commanders are almost certainly backfilled by their deputies and subordinates. These deputies and subordinates have survived nine months in a Darwinian combat environment, which can help lower-ranking commanders develop skills and teach them lessons they may not otherwise develop in peacetime when the stakes are much lower. These commanders will likely quickly assume and execute reconstitution tasks, such as reorganization, recruiting personnel, and replenishing stockpiles of military equipment and weapons across the Gaza Strip.[19]

Hamas is deploying poorly trained new recruits in the Gaza Strip, probably due to its inability to effectively train new fighters amid Israeli military pressure. This inability to effectively train fighters will not persist if military pressure—from Israel or a different security force—does not continue. Hamas is recruiting new fighters to replace the reportedly 14,000 Palestinian fighters killed in the Gaza Strip since the start of the war.[20] The IDF reported that these new recruits are ”low quality,” however.[21] The ”low-quality” of new fighters is unsurprising given that Hamas does not have the freedom of movement or safe spaces to train new recruits in the same way new fighters would have been trained before October 7th. The IDF Air Force continues to strike with ease across the Gaza Strip. Training would increase the signature of Hamas fighters and present them as targets for the IDF Air Force. These fighters would be able improve their capabilities without a non-Hamas security presence to continue to disrupt training activities, however. An IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip without a viable alternative security force to challenge Hamas’ monopoly on violence would provide Palestinian militias the space to rebuild fighter capacity. Raids can temporarily disrupt but will not stop a reconstitution process.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear to have resumed their attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas likely retains the institutional knowledge and skilled commanders required to reconstitute despite the loss of several high-ranking Hamas commanders in the Gaza Strip since October 2023. The IDF has killed three of five Hamas Brigade commanders in the Gaza Strip.
• Hamas Reconstitution: Hamas is deploying poorly trained new recruits in the Gaza Strip, probably due to its inability to effectively train new fighters amid Israeli military pressure. This inability to effectively train fighters will not persist if military pressure—from Israel or a different security force—does not continue.
• Iran in Africa: Iran is still attempting to establish a permanent naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast following unsuccessful bilateral talks in March 2024. Sudanese Armed Forces officials reportedly rejected these Iranian proposals due to concerns about potential backlash from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Western countries.
• Lebanon: Nasrallah gave a televised speech on July 17 commemorating the Shia holy Day of Ashura and stated that Hezbollah would hit new Israeli targets if Israel “continues to target civilians” in Lebanon. CTP-ISW has observed that Hezbollah has attacked areas further south in Israel in retaliation for recent Israeli strikes targeting Hezbollah leaders.

Iran Update, July 11, 2024

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Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, Kathryn Tyson, Siddhant Kishore, and Nicholas Carl

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Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani has traveled to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria in recent days to meet with unspecified Axis of Resistance leaders, according to Iraqi media.[1] An anonymous Iranian source told Baghdad Today that Ghaani met with Iranian-backed officials from Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, and Yemen during his travel. The source reported that Ghaani met with militia leaders in Iraq on July 9, which is the same day that Iranian-backed Iraqi and Palestinian militias met in Baghdad to discuss military and political coordination.[2] Ghaani may have attended this meeting given his role in coordinating and planning Axis of Resistance activity. This flurry of activity across the Axis of Resistance could in part reflect preparations for a possible major Israeli military offensive into Lebanon.

Some senior IRGC commanders have emphasized in recent days the need for the Iranian political establishment, particularly hardliners, to accept and support Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian in order to preserve political stability. Former IRGC Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei said on July 10 that Pezeshkian should be considered part of “the revolution front,” which is a reference to parts of the hardline camp.[3] Rezaei further stated that those who support the regime and Islamic Revolution must also support Pezeshkian. IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh similarly on July 11 called on supporters of runner-up presidential candidate Saeed Jalili to respect Pezeshkian’s victory and avoid criticizing the electoral process.[4] Hajji Zadeh described Pezeshkian as “the president of the entire nation and of every Iranian.” Hajji Zadeh also noted that former President Ebrahim Raisi’s death could have triggered a “major crisis” but that the regime averted such a crisis and conducted two rounds of voting within a week “without the smallest problem.” Rezaei’s and Hajji Zadeh’s statements are consistent with CTP-ISW's previous assessment that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei prioritized regime legitimacy and stability over installing his preferred candidate in the election.[5]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani has traveled to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria in recent days to meet with unspecified Axis of Resistance leaders, according to Iraqi media
• Some senior IRGC commanders have emphasized in recent days the need for the Iranian political establishment, particularly hardliners, to accept and support Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian in order to preserve political stability.
• Gaza Strip: International mediators are reportedly considering using 2,500 US-trained PA supporters from the Gaza Strip as an interim governing force in the Gaza Strip.
• Russia: Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf attended the BRICS parliamentary forum in St. Petersburg, Russia.

Iran Update, July 10, 2024

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Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, and Nicholas Carl

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Palestinian militias, including Hamas, are continuing to coordinate militarily and politically with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Deputy Secretary General Jamil Mazhar met with the leaders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq, the Badr Organization, and the Jihad and Construction Movement in Baghdad on July 8 and 9.[1] The Jihad and Construction Movement is affiliated with the Badr Organization and controls the Popular Mobilization Forces 17th Brigade.[2] Mazhar called for increasing coordination between Palestinian and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias during his meetings with the militia leaders. Mazhar praised the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—for "exhausting” the United States and Israel through its repeated attacks targeting US bases and Israeli targets since October 2023.[3] Mazhar separately discussed Palestinian militia activities in the West Bank. Unspecified Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials attended Mazhar’s meeting with Hadi al Ameri, who is head of the Badr Organization.[4]

The PFLP, Hamas, and PIJ delegations’ visit to Baghdad comes amid reports that Hamas plans to relocate its political leadership to Iraq. Emirati media reported in late June 2024 that Hamas plans to move its political leadership to Iraq due to growing pressure from the United States and Qatar on Hamas to show greater flexibility in ceasefire negotiations with Israel.[5] Iran will reportedly be responsible for protecting Hamas personnel and offices in Iraq. The Emirati report followed the opening of a Hamas political office in Baghdad in early June 2024.[6]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) issued new evacuation orders for all of Gaza City on July 10.[7] The IDF dropped leaflets over Gaza City urging civilians to evacuate southward for Deir al Balah and al Zuwayda in the central Gaza Strip. The IDF stated that Gaza City will remain a "dangerous combat zone.” The announcement appears to be an expansion of an earlier Israeli evacuation order issued for parts of Gaza City on July 8.[8] The IDF 98th and 99th divisions are currently in Gaza City. The 99th Division launched a raid into Tal al Halwa, Gaza City, on July 8 in order to find and destroy Palestinian militia infrastructure.[9] Some of that infrastructure was inside a UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) headquarters.

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah tried to project strength and highlight Israeli weakness during a speech on July 10. [10] Nasrallah claimed that the IDF cannot likely launch a major offensive into Lebanon because of bandwidth constraints. He also boasted that Hezbollah attacks into Israel have exhausted Israeli forces. Nasrallah claimed that the extension of Israeli reservists’ service is imposing economic and social costs on Israel. Nasrallah likely made these remarks to portray confidence to Hezbollah members and the Lebanese public while messaging his readiness and willingness to fight Israeli leaders.

Lebanese Hezbollah is adapting to evade Israeli detection and surveillance ahead of a possible major Israeli offensive into Lebanon. Reuters reported on July 10, citing six anonymous sources familiar with Hezbollah operations, that Hezbollah is adapting in response to Israeli airstrikes and surveillance.[11] These adaptations include banning its members from using cellphones in the battlefield and instead requiring them to use couriers and pagers to communicate. Hezbollah is also using an Iranian-financed, private telecommunications network that involves fiber optic cables running from Beirut to southern Lebanon and the Bekka Valley. The sources furthermore told Reuters that Hezbollah frequently changes its code words to reference meeting sites and weapons. The Reuters report is consistent with Nasrallah warning in February 2024 that Israel is surveilling Lebanese phone calls.[12] Israel has conducted extensive airstrikes targeting Hezbollah throughout the Israel-Hamas war. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated on July 7 that the IDF has killed three division-level Hezbollah commanders and 15 brigade-level Hezbollah commanders.[13]

Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian is apparently considering nominating Abbas Araghchi as his foreign affairs minister, underscoring Pezeshkian’s intent to seriously pursue nuclear negotiations with the West. IRGC-affiliated media reported on July 10 that Pezeshkian’s advisers "have almost reached the final conclusion” to nominate Araghchi, citing an unspecified source.[14] The source claimed that Araghchi has advised Pezeshkian on his conversations with unspecified Axis of Resistance and regional officials in recent days. Araghchi played a prominent role in the nuclear negotiations with the West under the Hassan Rouhani administration and served as Rouhani's deputy foreign affairs minister for policy between 2017 and 2021.[15] It is unclear whether the Iranian Parliament, which is currently dominated by hardliners, would approve Araghchi as foreign affairs minister. It is furthermore unclear whether Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would permit Araghchi to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West in a manner meaningful different from the Ebrahim Raisi administration if the Iranian Parliament does approve him as foreign affairs minister. Khamenei implicitly criticized Pezeshkian’s support for increasing Iranian engagement with the West in a speech on June 25.[16]

Key Takeaways:

• Iraq: Palestinian militias, including Hamas, are continuing to coordinate militarily and politically with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. PFLP, Hamas, and PIJ delegations recently met with senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders in Baghdad.
• Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) issued new evacuation orders for all of Gaza City on July 10.
• Southern Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah is adapting to evade Israeli detection and surveillance ahead of a possible major Israeli offensive into Lebanon. Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah separately tried to project strength and highlight Israeli weakness during a speech on July 10.
• Iran: Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian is apparently considering nominating Abbas Araghchi as his foreign affairs minister, underscoring Pezeshkian’s intent to seriously pursue nuclear negotiations with the West.

Iran Update, July 9, 2024

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Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hamas is threatening to end ceasefire negotiations with Israel in response to Israeli raids targeting Hamas fighters in Gaza City. This effort may seek to trigger increased international pressure on Israel to stop the raids. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh said on July 8 that continued Israeli raids in Gaza City and Rafah would end the current Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations.[1] Israel launched a raid in Tal al Hawa in southwest Gaza City on July 8 to target Hamas fighters, dismantle militia infrastructure, and destroy weapons caches.[2] Israel is conducting raids on a UNRWA headquarters in Gaza City that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have used to detain individuals, shelter fighters, and store weapons.[3] Israeli forces also sought to locate and destroy militia safehouses and other sheltered positions during the raids.[4] Haniyeh’s statement suggests Hamas is concerned that the Israeli raids could severely disrupt Hamas’ capabilities in the area. Haniyeh and Hamas may assess that threatening to end negotiations over Israeli action will cause the mediators to increase pressure on Israel to slow or cease operations to save the deal. Hamas will likely survive an Israeli operation in Tal al Hawa because it is able to relocate fighters and resources to other areas of the Gaza Strip and infiltrate areas after Israeli forces have completed clearing operations. Israeli operations do damage Hamas, however, and this statement suggests that Hamas seeks to decrease Israel’s ability to conduct these raids at will.

Hamas has begun transporting unspecified equipment to Baghdad International Airport in preparation for relocating its political leadership to Iraq, according to an unspecified senior Shia Coordination Framework member.[5] The politician claimed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq Leader Qais al Khazali and Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri met on July 8 to discuss Hamas’ potential relocation to Baghdad. The politician noted that unspecified Shia factions are divided over whether the Iraqi federal government should allow Hamas to move to Iraq. Emirati media reported on June 24 that Hamas plans to relocate its political leadership to Iraq due to growing pressure from the United States and Qatar on Hamas to show greater flexibility in ceasefire negotiations with Israel.[6] Emirati media noted that Iran would be responsible for protecting Hamas personnel and offices in Iraq. The Emirati report followed the opening of a Hamas political office in Baghdad in early June 2024.[7]

Key Takeaways:

• Hamas: Hamas is threatening to end ceasefire negotiations with Israel in response to Israeli raids targeting Hamas fighters in Gaza City. This effort may seek to trigger increased international pressure on Israel to stop the raids.
• Hamas in Iraq: Hamas has begun transporting unspecified equipment to Baghdad International Airport in preparation for relocating its political leadership to Iraq, according to an unspecified senior Shia Coordination Framework member.
• Lebanon: Hezbollah released drone footage on July 9 reportedly showing various Israeli military sites in the Golan Heights.

Iran Update, July 8, 2024

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Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Siddhant Kishore, Marcus Mildenberger, and Nicholas Carl

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Iran is expanding its domestic drone and missile production capacities, which would enable further Iranian military support to Russia and the Axis of Resistance. Reuters, citing commercially available satellite imagery, reported on July 7 that Iran has expanded two defense industrial sites outside Tehran City in recent months.[1] The satellite imagery indicated that Iran has built over 30 new buildings at the two sites, which are meant to support the manufacturing of ballistic missiles and drones. A Western analyst that Reuters cited assessed that the expansion began at one site—the Khojir missile production complex—in August 2023 and at the other site—the Shahid Modarres base—in October 2023.[2] The buildings are apparently still under construction. Anonymous Iranian officials speaking to Reuters claimed that Iran would transfer the drones and missiles produced at these facilities to Russia, the Houthis, and Lebanese Hezbollah. The satellite imagery of the Iranian sites also showed dirt berms surrounding many of the new structures, indicating the nearby presence of highly combustible materials.[3] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) oversees both sites undergoing construction.

The expansion of the Iranian defense industrial sites comes amid discussions between Iran and Russia to expand their military cooperation. Politico, citing anonymous sources, reported in April 2023 that Iran was negotiating a deal with Russia and China to send missiles to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[4] Western officials and media moreover indicated in January 2024 that Iran and Russia were continuing negotiations to supply Iranian missiles to Russian forces.[5] Reuters reported in February 2024, citing anonymous Iranian sources, that Tehran had sent short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[6]

Iranian short-range ballistic missiles could improve the Russian ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. Kremlin-affiliated milblogger Rybar claimed in February 2024 that the acquisition of Iranian missiles would enable Russian forces to hit “remote Ukrainian targets.”[7] The Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson similarly said in February 2024 that Russia acquiring such missiles would pose a “serious threat to Ukraine.”[8] This Russo-Iranian military exchange is part of the strategic partnership that has developed between Moscow and Tehran since 2022, which CTP-ISW has covered extensively.[9]

Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian appears to be associating himself with members of the moderate Hassan Rouhani administration, which was in power from 2013-21. Pezeshkian identified former Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif as one of his close advisers and supports while running for the presidency.[10] Zarif served in the Rouhani administration and played a prominent role in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[11] Rouhani’s Information and Communications Technology Minister Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi has separately been advising Pezeshkian throughout his campaign.[12] Pezeshkian has since winning the presidential elections met other members of the Rouhani administration, such as Rouhani himself and former Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Ali Taib Nia. The connection between Pezeshkian and the Rouhani administration could indicate that Pezeshkian will draw from this network to build his cabinet. That Pezeshkian may be rallying support from Rouhani’s circles would be unsurprising given that Pezeshkian has not historically appeared to have a prominent support base independently. Pezeshkian will remain considerably constrained in his capacity as president, regardless of support from Rouhani and his network.

Masoud Pezeshkian held a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 8, marking one of his first known call with a foreign official as president-elect.[13] Pezeshkian advocated for the continued expansion of Russo-Iranian ties on the call.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran-Russia cooperation: Iran is expanding its domestic drone and missile production capacities, which would enable further Iranian military support to Russia and the Axis of Resistance.
• Iran Domestic Politics: Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian appears to be associating himself with members of the moderate Hassan Rouhani administration, which was in power from 2013-21.
• Gaza Strip: Israel and international mediators are weighing options for interdicting Hamas weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip in the event of an Israeli withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor.

Iran Update, July 7, 2024

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Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa and Alexandra Braverman

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Hamas is continuing to resist Israeli and US efforts to create a phased ceasefire deal that would secure the release of Israeli hostages, end the war, and begin major reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. The remaining gap in ceasefire negotiations is significant because agreeing to the most recent Hamas language would effectively commit Israel to the permanent ceasefire Hamas has been demanding before Hamas had released all remaining hostages. Hamas’ current demands could also enable Hamas to drag on negotiations indefinitely with no mechanism to compel it to release the remaining hostages. Hamas remains unlikely to accept a proposal that does not meet its maximalist demands, including a permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange. The May 31 ceasefire proposal announced by US President Joe Biden continues to serve as the basis for negotiations.[1] The phases of the May 31 proposal were:[2]

• Phase one involves a six-week ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from densely populated areas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas would release an unspecified number of hostages, including Americans, women, and elderly and sick individuals, in exchange for “hundreds” of Palestinian prisoners in this phase. Displaced Palestinian civilians would return to their homes, including those in the northern Gaza Strip. Humanitarian aid would “surge with 600 trucks [entering the Gaza Strip] per day,” which is a notable increase from the 500 trucks in an earlier Israeli proposal. Negotiations for a permanent ceasefire would continue during this phase.
• Phase two involves Hamas and other Palestinian militias releasing all remaining living hostages, and the IDF withdrawing from the Gaza Strip completely. Biden said that the United States, Egypt, and Qatar would facilitate continued negotiations during this phase.
• Phase three involves major reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. It also involves Hamas and the other militias returning the bodies of all hostages to Israel.

Hamas attempted in early June to undermine the phasing of the May 31 proposal by demanding the beginning of reconstruction in phase one and a complete halt to the war regardless of whether negotiations to transition to the second phase succeeded.[3] The May 31 proposal notably did not guarantee a transition from the first to the second phase of the ceasefire. This would enable Israel to resume military operations if Hamas proved unwilling to compromise on the specifics for a permanent ceasefire beginning after phase two and three. Undermining the phasing would have enabled Hamas to continue to extract concessions from Israel indefinitely without transitioning to phase two, because Israel could not impose military pressure on Hamas to encourage Hamas to compromise to release hostages without breaking the agreement. Hamas’ attempt to undermine the phasing of the proposal also did not make clear how Israel would secure the release of the remaining hostages that would have been released under phase two of the May 31 proposal.

Hamas’ most recent ceasefire position demonstrates that the group has not meaningfully shifted its position since negotiations last stalled in June and that it still seeks to undermine the agreement’s phasing. Axios reported on July 6 that the outstanding gaps between Israel and Hamas center on the language regarding and time-delimitation of negotiations to transition from the first phase of the ceasefire deal to the second phase.[4] The current proposal says that the United States, Egypt, and Qatar will “make every effort” to ensure negotiations during the first phase end in a transition to the second phase and a sustainable calm. Hamas is attempting to remove “make every effort,” replacing it with “ensure“ and dropping the original six-week time limit for the first phase.[5] This change would make the initial ceasefire effectively permanent from the start and would commit the United States, Qatar, and Egypt to securing a ceasefire and enable Hamas to draw out negotiations for the transition to the second phase indefinitely, if needed.[6] The language and removal of the time-delimited first phase makes it more difficult for Israel to resume operations to pressure Hamas and extract concessions without breaking the agreement entirely or appearing to scuttle negotiations over the transition to phase two. This could allow Hamas to secure a complete ceasefire without adhering to commitments under phases two and three, which include the release of Israeli hostages. The categories of hostages in phase two and three include Israeli soldiers, whom Hamas is reticent to release.

Hamas and its leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, feel that they can manipulate ceasefire negotiations in this manner because they remain confident that they are winning in the Gaza Strip. Hamas forces throughout the Strip remain combat effective and are attempting to reconstitute, with some success. Sinwar has noted that he believes Hamas has Israel “right where [Hamas] wants [Israel].”[7]  

Post-election statements by both President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian and the supreme leader indicate that the Pezeshkian administration will not change the regime’s trajectory. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated his desire for Pezeshkian to continue the policies of former president Ebrahim Raisi in a message on July 6 following the presidential election.[8] Pezeshkian issued a statement to the people of Iran on July 6 following the election thanking Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for opening the field for “participation and competition.”[9] Pezeshkian has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to enforcing Khamenei’s policies throughout his campaign. Pezeshkian also prayed at the tomb of first Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini on July 6 after the election to “renew his allegiance to Khomeini’s ideals.”[10] Masoud Pezeshkian will be sworn in as the ninth president of the Islamic Republic of Iran on August 4 or 5, according to a member of Iran’s parliament presiding board.[11]

Key Takeaways:

• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas is continuing to resist Israeli and US efforts to create a phased ceasefire deal that would secure the release of Israeli hostages, end the war, and begin major reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. The remaining gap in ceasefire negotiations is significant because agreeing to the most recent Hamas language would effectively commit Israel to the permanent ceasefire Hamas has been demanding before Hamas had released all remaining hostages. Hamas’ current demands could also enable Hamas to drag on negotiations indefinitely with no mechanism to compel it to release the remaining hostages.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas military spokesperson Abu Obeida claimed on July 7 that Hamas has regenerated materiel and personnel across the Gaza Strip.
• Iran: Post-election statements by both President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian and the supreme leader indicate that the Pezeshkian administration will not change the regime’s trajectory.
• Northern Israel: Lebanese Hezbollah launched a heavy barrage of rockets targeting IDF air defense assets and surveillance equipment in response to a recent Israeli strike. Hezbollah aims to degrade Israel's integrated air defense system by targeting Mount Meron, which hosts air surveillance and battle management functions.

Iran Update, July 6, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Moderate politician Masoud Pezeshkian won the Iranian presidential runoff election on July 5.[1] Iranian media reported that Pezeshkian received over 16 million votes, while his opponent, ultraconservative hardliner Saeed Jalili, received approximately 13.5 million votes.[2] Pezeshkian and Jalili won approximately 10.4 million and 9.5 million votes respectively in the first round of voting on June 28.[3] The Iranian Election Headquarters announced that voter turnout in the runoff presidential election was 49.8 percent, marking an approximately 10 percent increase from the first round of elections on June 28.[4] Pezeshkian will be inaugurated on an unspecified date between July 22 to August 5.[5] Pezeshkian’s presidency will mark a departure from hardline President Ebrahim Raisi’s presidency.  Pezeshkian has repeatedly criticized Raisi’s presidency in recent weeks.[6]

Pezeshkian previously served as a senior health official in the reformist Mohammad Khatami administration from 2000-2005 and as a parliamentarian from 2008 to 2024.[7] Pezeshkian hails from Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province, and is fluent in Azeri and Kurdish.[8] Pezeshkian is trained as a physician and served as a medic during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988.[9] He later served in the reformist Khatami administration as health and medical education minister.[10] Pezeshkian is currently a parliamentarian representing East Azerbaijan Province and has held this role for 16 years.[11]  He served as a deputy parliament speaker in 2016.[12] Pezeshkian was disqualified from running in the 2021 presidential election, making his recent qualification and subsequent presidential win noteworthy.[13]

Pezeshkian will likely attempt to pursue nuclear negotiations with the West, although it is unclear to what extent Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will permit him to do so. Pezeshkian called for increasing international engagement with Western actors and endorsed a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) throughout his campaign.[14] Mohammad Javad Zarif, the foreign affairs minister under reformist president Hassan Rouhani who helped negotiate the JCPOA in 2015, has played a prominent role in Pezeshkian’s campaign, suggesting that Pezeshkian is committed to resuming negotiations.[15]  Pezeshkian separately supported resolving issues with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).[16] The FATF blacklisted Iran in February 2020 for failing to implement anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing policies.[17] The Supreme Leader has previously expressed foreign policy and nuclear views that promote domestic production over economic engagement with the West, making it unclear to what extent Khamenei will permit Pezeshkian to engage with Western actors.[18] Khamenei has also indirectly criticized Pezeshkian’s campaign and has called on him to “continue [former hardline president Ebrahim] Raisi’s path” in his presidency.[19]

Pezeshkian’s presidency is unlikely to generate meaningful changes within the regime. Pezeshkian supports regime policies like mandatory veiling. Pezeshkian has previously critiqued the Noor Plan—a 2024 Iranian law enforcement plan that often violently enforces veiling—but continues to support mandatory veiling within Iran and has argued that the regime must reform the way it educates girls so that they do not question the need to veil.[20] Pezeshkian has also boasted about his role in enforcing mandatory veiling in hospitals and universities shortly after the Islamic Revolution.[21] Pezeshkian has repeatedly reiterated his commitment to enforcing Khamenei’s policies throughout his campaign. The president also lacks the authority to pursue policies different from the supreme leader’s edicts, even if the president aims to pursue policies separate from the supreme leader.[22] 

Pezeshkian’s presidency suggests that Khamenei prioritized the regime’s legitimacy over his individual legacy in this instance. Khamenei implicitly criticized Pezeshkian’s campaign policies and espoused Jalili’s nuclear and foreign policy views in a speech on June 25, which suggested that Khamenei preferred Jalili over Pezeshkian.[23] Khamenei previously paved the way for his preferred candidate, Ebrahim Raisi, to win the August 2021 presidential election.[24] The fact that Khamenei allowed Pezeshkian to win the election suggests that Khamenei prioritized preserving the Islamic Republic’s veneer as a “religious democracy” over installing a president who more closely aligns with his hardline stances on domestic and foreign issues.

It is particularly noteworthy that Khamenei allowed Pezeshkian to win given that the next Iranian president may oversee Khamenei’s succession. Khamenei is currently 85 years old and has almost certainly begun to consider who will succeed him. That Khamenei allowed Pezeshkian to win suggests that he believes Pezeshkian could maintain order in the regime and Iranian society during a potential succession crisis. It also suggests that Khamenei prioritizes regime survival over having a president in power whose views and policies directly align with his own.

Khamenei may have calculated that manipulating the July 5 election results could stoke widespread unrest. The regime previously engineered the election results between reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi and hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, which galvanized a months-long anti-regime protest wave.[25] The regime might be particularly wary of public unrest given that it recently suppressed the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini movement and that much of the Iranian population still holds sociocultural, political, and economic grievances against the regime.[26]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Moderate politician Massoud Pezeshkian won the Iranian presidential runoff election on July 5. Pezeshkian’s presidency is unlikely to generate meaningful changes within the regime. It is noteworthy, however, that Khamenei allowed Pezeshkian to win given that the next Iranian president may oversee Khamenei’s succession.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Anonymous Israeli officials said that the main sticking point in ceasefire negotiations centers around Article 14, which states that the United States, Egypt, and Qatar will “make every effort” to ensure negotiations end in an agreement and that a ceasefire is held as negotiations continue. Hamas seeks to remove the phrase “make every effort,” leaving only “ensure.”
• Gaza Strip: The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) reported on July 6 that the 98th Division located a weapons warehouse in Shujaiya containing long-range rockets and explosive charges.

Iran Update, July 5, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Kathryn Tyson, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sent a delegation led by Mossad Director David Barnea to Doha, Qatar on July 5 to continue ceasefire talks.[1] Barnea met with Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani on July 5 to build discussions on the ceasefire proposal Hamas submitted to Israel on July 2.[2] An anonymous Israeli official told The New York Times that the Israeli delegation is engaging in preliminary talks before advancing to more “substantive” ones.[3] US and Israeli officials described this new round of ceasefire talks as a breakthrough after weeks of stalled negotiations but the officials warned that these talks do not guarantee a ceasefire deal.[4] Netanyahu told the Israeli negotiation team prior to its departure to Doha that the war in the Gaza Strip would end “only after achieving all of [the war] goals.”[5] An anonymous US official cautioned that “[t]here’s still work to do” on the ceasefire.[6]

Israel’s post-war plan for the Gaza Strip remains unclear as negotiations resume in Doha. Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan said that Saudi Arabia supports an international force under the auspices of the United Nations to support the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip following the end of the war.[7] Hamas has promised to prevent the deployment of foreign forces in the Gaza Strip.[8]

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah discussed Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks and security developments in the Gaza Strip with a senior Hamas delegation in Beirut on July 5.[9] Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Khalil al Hayya led the Hamas delegation. Nasrallah and the delegation discussed Hamas’ political efforts to reach a ceasefire agreement with Israel. The Hamas delegation expressed appreciation for Hezbollah’s support to Palestinian fighters in the Gaza Strip.

The Hamas delegation separately held meetings with a senior Houthi delegation and a delegation from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, without providing additional details.[10]

Iran held the second round of its presidential election between ultraconservative hardliner candidate Saeed Jalili and moderate candidate Masoud Pezeshkian on July 5.[11] The Iranian Election Headquarters extended the voting deadline from 1800 to 0000 local time, likely to try to increase voter turnout.[12] This action is not unprecedented; the regime has previously extended voting hours during both presidential and parliamentary elections, including during the June 28 first-round presidential election.[13] The Interior Ministry will likely announce the final election results in the morning local time on July 6. CTP-ISW will publish an analysis of the results on July 6.

Iran is continuing to promote greater financial and monetary cooperation with Russia to try to undermine Western sanctions. Central Bank of Iran Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin traveled to St. Petersburg, Russia, on July 3 to attend a financial conference.[14] Farzin called on BRICS members to form a financial institution similar to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).[15] The FATF blacklisted Iran in February 2020 for failing to implement anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing policies.[16] Farzin also called on Russia, China, and Iran to use their national currencies—rather than the US dollar—in economic transactions.[17] Farzin invited Russia to join the Asian Clearing Union, which is a payment arrangement in which the central banks of member states "settle payments for intra-regional transactions...on a net multilateral basis.”[18] Iran, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka currently comprise the Asian Clearing Union. Belarus applied to join the Asian Clearing Union in May 2023.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran held the second round of its presidential election between ultraconservative hardliner candidate Saeed Jalili and moderate candidate Masoud Pezeshkian on July 5.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sent a delegation led by Mossad Director David Barnea to Doha, Qatar on July 5 to continue ceasefire talks.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas tactics and Shujaiya’s dense, urban terrain are presenting challenges for the IDF, in some cases requiring that Israeli infantry clear buildings multiple times.
• Lebanon: Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah discussed Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks and security developments in the Gaza Strip with a senior Hamas delegation in Beirut on July 5.

 

Iran Update, July 4, 2024

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Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Andie Parry, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Recent Iranian polls show that moderate Masoud Pezeshkian is leading over ultraconservative hardliner Saeed Jalili in the Iranian presidential race.[1] The runoff election will occur on July 5. The Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) published a poll on July 4 showing that Pezeshkian has a 5.6 percent lead over Jalili.[2] ISPA notably predicted accurately that Pezeshkian and Jalili would win the highest and second highest number of votes, respectively, in the first round of voting on June 28.[3] ISPA also correctly predicted that pragmatic hardliner Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf would receive significantly less votes than Pezeshkian and Jalili.[4] The July 4 ISPA poll is consistent with CTP-ISW's observation on July 1 that Pezeshkian appears to be gaining momentum ahead of the July 5 runoff election.[5]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei must decide whether he will permit Pezeshkian to win the election if Pezeshkian wins the most votes. Khamenei recently expressed foreign and nuclear policy views on June 25 that closely align with Jalili’s views, suggesting that Khamenei endorses Jalili.[6] Khamenei furthermore indirectly criticized Pezeshkian’s campaign policies on the same date.[7] Khamenei’s opposition to some of Pezeshkian’s policies could lead him to directly intervene in the upcoming election and install Jalili as president.

Israel and Hamas have resumed negotiations over a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Qatar sent Hamas on June 25 a revised ceasefire proposal that was based on an earlier US-backed proposal.[8] The new proposal includes several unspecified amendments to the original text.[9] Hamas has reviewed the new proposal and sent its response to Israel. Israeli leaders plan to discuss the Hamas response and send a delegation for further discussions.[10] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a phone call with US President Joe Biden on July 4 to discuss the new proposal.[11]

Hamas appears to have changed part of its maximalist negotiating position in its response to the new proposal. An anonymous Israeli official said that Hamas is no longer demanding the full withdrawal of Israeli forces during the first phase of the proposed ceasefire.[12] This phase includes a six-week ceasefire and the release of some Hamas-held hostages. The phasing of the original US-backed proposal has been a point of disagreement between Israel and Hamas.[13]

Significant obstacles remain to securing a ceasefire agreement, however. Lebanese media reported that some of the changes in the new proposal do not “affect the essential issues” but are meant to preserve negotiations.[14] An Israeli official similarly told Axios that ”serious challenges” remain and that it could take several weeks to reach a deal.[15]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are conducting an information operation meant to prevent Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon. An anonymous commander from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq told Western media that there would be an “escalation for escalation” if the IDF goes into Lebanon..[16] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The commander also told Western media that the coalition has sent military advisers and experts to Lebanon to help Lebanese Hezbollah prepare for a greater conflict against the IDF. These remarks come after two unspecified Iraqi officials told Associated Press that some advisers are already in Lebanon to support Hezbollah.[17] Iranian-backed Iraqi and Lebanese officials separately told the Associated Press that thousands of Iranian-backed fighters from across the Middle East would join the war between Israel and Hezbollah.[18] That the Axis of Resistance is speaking to Western media reflects its intent to message to Western audiences.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Recent Iranian polls show that moderate Masoud Pezeshkian is leading over ultraconservative Saeed Jalili in the Iranian presidential race.
• Gaza Strip: Israel and Hamas have resumed negotiations over a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Significant obstacles remain to securing a ceasefire agreement.
• Lebanon: Iran and the Axis of Resistance are conducting an information operation meant to prevent Israel from launching a major military offensive into Lebanon.

Iran Update, July 3, 2024

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Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The two Iranian presidential candidates—ultraconservative Saeed Jalili and reformist Masoud Pezeshkian—discussed economic issues in their final debate before the upcoming runoff election.[1] The debate occurred on July 2. The runoff election will occur on July 5. Below are the key takeaways from what Jalili and Pezeshkian said in the debate.

• Saeed Jalili. Jalili continued to downplay the importance of nuclear negotiations with the West and relief from international sanctions in order to improve the Iranian economy. Jalili argued that Iran should instead prioritize increasing energy exports and pursuing an autarkic agenda. He also noted the importance of attracting foreign investment but did not explain how to do so without sanctions relief. Jalili separately criticized Pezeshkian’s understanding of economic issues and questioned his competence.
• Masoud Pezeshkian. Pezeshkian tried to garner support from hardliners by reiterating his subordination to the supreme leader and voicing support for some hardline policies. Pezeshkian vowed to continue implementing the Strategic Action Plan, which is a law that the hardliner-dominated Parliament passed in 2020 to increase uranium enrichment and restrict international inspectors’ access to Iranian nuclear sites. The moderate-reformist bloc has criticized the law as an obstacle to advancing nuclear negotiations with the West.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed a senior Lebanese Hezbollah commander in Tyre, Lebanon on July 3.[2]  The commander, Mohammad Nama Naser, led the Aziz Unit, which is responsible for Hezbollah operations in southwestern Lebanon. Hezbollah said that Naser joined the group in 1986 and fought in the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006.[3] Nasser also participated in the Iranian-led military interventions into Iraq and Syria to fight the so-called ”Islamic State” and Syrian opposition. Naser joined the Aziz unit in 2016 and oversaw anti-tank and rocket fire into Israel.[4]  Hezbollah responded to the killing of Naser by launching around 100 rockets into northern Israel.[5] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted IDF sites, including air and missile defenses.

Hezbollah has sustained almost daily attacks into northern Israel since October 2023, despite the IDF killing several Hezbollah commanders throughout the war. The IDF killed Taleb Sami Abdullah, who commanded Hezbollah operations in southeastern Lebanon, in June 2024.[6] The IDF also killed a senior officer in Hezbollah’s Radwan special operations forces in January 2024.[7] Hezbollah has nevertheless sustained and even intensified in some cases its direct and indirect fire attacks into Israel.

Senior Iranian officials are continuing to message that Iran and its Axis of Resistance could escalate severely in response to a major Israeli offensive into Lebanon. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Protection Corps Commander Brigadier General Fath Ollah Jamiri stated on July 3 that the Axis of Resistance could launch ground attacks into Israel from multiple fronts simultaneously—particularly from Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria—if the IDF goes into Lebanon.[8] Jamiri should have no role in planning and executing such attacks given that the Protection Corps is responsible for protecting senior Iranian officials and sensitive infrastructure.[9] But his comments nevertheless reflect how Iranian strategic discourse has focused increasingly in recent years on the viability of ground attacks into Israel. Senior IRGC officers, including Major General Hossein Salami and Major General Gholam Ali Rashid, have similarly discussed the concept of conducting protracted ground campaigns in order to destroy the Israeli state.[10]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran held its final debate before the upcoming presidential runoff election. Ultraconservative Saeed Jalili continued to downplay the importance of nuclear negotiations with the West. Reformist Masoud Pezeshkian tried to garner support from hardliners.
• Lebanon: Israeli forces killed the commander responsible for Lebanese Hezbollah operations in southwestern Lebanon. Hezbollah has sustained almost daily attacks into northern Israel since October 2023, despite the IDF killing Hezbollah commanders throughout the war.
• Gaza Strip: Qatar sent Hamas a revised ceasefire proposal for the Gaza Strip. Hamas has reviewed the proposal and sent its response to Israel. This comes after Hamas essentially rejected the most recent US-backed ceasefire proposal.
• Syria: Iranian-backed militias have moved advanced weapons into Syria and established a drone assembly site in eastern Syria, according to Syrian opposition media.

 

Iran Update, July 2, 2024

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Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iranian reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian appears to be gaining momentum ahead of the runoff presidential elections on July 2. Several recent polls demonstrate that Pezeshkian is maintaining his lead over hardline candidate Saeed Jalili.[1] Pezeshkian received 10.4 million votes and Jalili received around 9.5 million during the first round of elections on June 28.[2]  Former presidential candidate and pragmatic hardliner Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s campaign head Sami Nazari Tarkarani also endorsed Pezeshkian on July 2.[3] This endorsement may divert some of 3.4 million votes Ghalibaf received during the first round of elections to Pezeshkian, thus advantaging Pezeshkian.[4] Pezeshkian also performed strongly in a July 1 economic debate against Jalili. Members of Jalili’s own faction criticized Jalili’s poor performance, in contrast.[5] Details on this debate are included in the following paragraphs.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei must determine if he will permit Pezeshkian to win the election if Pezeshkian maintains his lead over Jalili. Khamenei expressed foreign and nuclear policy views on June 25 that closely align with ultraconservative hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili’s views, suggesting that Khamenei endorses Jalili.[6] Khamenei also indirectly criticized Pezeshkian’s campaign policies on the same date.[7] This suggests that Khamenei may decide to prevent Pezeshkian from becoming president. Raisi’s 2021 election suggests that Khamenei is comfortable engineering elections to advantage his preferred candidate.[8] The Guardian Council denied the candidacies of several prominent politicians in the 2021 elections and Raisi therefore faced no significant competition in the race.[9]

It is unclear, however, how and if Khamenei will advantage Jalili if Pezeshkian is able to generate increased support and win the election this week. The regime engineered the election results between reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi and hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, galvanizing a months-long anti-regime protest wave.[10] Khamenei would risk further deteriorating regime legitimacy and possibly kickstarting unrest if Pezeshkian garners increased support in the coming days and Khamenei decides to undermine Pezeshkian’s ability to win the election.

The two remaining presidential candidates, reformist Masoud Pezeshkian and hardliner Saeed Jalili, discussed the economy in the first debate of the election’s second round on July 1.[11] Both candidates reiterated previous economic talking points on their agenda from the first round.[12]

• Masoud Pezeshkian (reformist): Pezeshkian emphasized the importance of increased public participation in the economy, including by women and minority groups. Pezeshkian also emphasized the importance of high voter turnout rates for the final election on July 5. He probably calculates that a greater voter turnout will improve his chances at election.[13] Pezeshkian said that international sanctions cause Iran’s economic issues in part, but that the government’s failure to fully implement economic policy also contributes to Iran’s economic woes.[14] Pezeshkian said that improving the economy also requires pragmatism in diplomatic relations with the world, noting that Iran will ”never...cancel all sanctions” and that loosening sanctions depends on ”what we give [diplomatically] and what we get [diplomatically]“ and whether Iran wants to ”solve [its] problem with the world or not.”[15] Pezeshkian also noted the value of strong management within government.
• Saeed Jalili (ultraconservative hardliner): Jalili focused on how the next government can create more employment opportunities.[16] Jalili agreed with Pezeshkian that greater participation in the economy is better.[17] Jalili proposed finding alternative trade partners to alleviate sanctions’ impact on the Iranian economy.[18] This suggestion presumably means that China, Russia, and other US adversaries. Jalili did not suggest returning to nuclear negotiations as a way to improve the Iranian economy or relations with foreign countries.[19] Jalili criticized Pezeshkian for placing too much of the blame on the Iranian government for the failure of JCPOA and not enough on the other parties involved.[20]

A senior advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is attempting to publicly discourage US support for a major Israeli military offensive into Lebanon. Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairperson and Supreme Leader Foreign Affairs Advisor Kamal Kharrazi stressed Iran's support for Hezbollah in the event of an Israeli military operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon during an interview with the Financial Times on July 2.[21] The fact that Kharrazi gave this interview to this outlet suggests his primary audience is the West, including the United States. Kharrazi said that Iran was “not interested” in participating in a regional war and stressed the need for the United States to discourage Israel from launching an operation against Hezbollah. Kharrazi noted that Iran and the Axis of Resistance would have “no choice” but to use “all means” to support Hezbollah in the event of an Israeli military offensive into southern Lebanon. Kharrazi’s comments follow statements from several Iranian officials boasting about Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s ability to destroy Israel in recent days. IRGC Air Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh warned that Iran is ”awaiting an opportunity for the True Promise II Operation” during a speech on July 1.[22] The first True Promise Operation was the Iranian drone and missile attack targeting Israel on April 13.[23] Acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani separately told Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in a phone call on July 1 that Hezbollah is ”fully prepared” to resist any Israeli threats into Lebanon.”[24]

Kharrazi separately reiterated in his interview with the Financial Times that Iran was open to pursuing nuclear weaponization if it faced ”an existential threat.” [25] Kharrazi made similar statements suggesting that Iran could pursue a nuclear weapon in May 2024.[26] Kharrazi’s statements also coincide with normalized discussions about Iran’s ability to procure nuclear weapons among Iranian officials and evidence that Iran has expanded its nuclear program in recent weeks, suggesting a broader policy shift in Tehran.[27]

Several current and former Israeli security officials told the New York Times that top Israeli generals disagree with political establishment’s war goals in the Gaza Strip.[28] Unspecified Israeli generals reportedly think a ceasefire is the best way to ensure the release of living Israeli hostages from Hamas custody.[29] Former Israeli National Security Advisor Eyal Hulata corroborated this account, adding that high-level military officials believe a ceasefire would allow for the release of hostages and that the IDF could fight Hamas at some point in the future.[30] Hulata was the national security advisor until early 2023. Hamas has rejected ceasefire proposals that do not ensure a permanent ceasefire partly due to the possibility of the IDF fighting Hamas again after Hamas releases the hostages.[31] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari implied on June 19 that the IDF thinks the Israeli prime minister’s goal of destroying Hamas is not an achievable goal and that those advocated the goal are ”misleading the Israeli people.”[32] IDF clearing operations have successfully degraded Hamas battalions throughout Gaza Strip, but Hamas has reconstituted its forces in several areas after Israeli withdrawals, partly from newly recruited fighters.[33] The IDF explicitly responded to the New York Times report, reiterating that the IDF agrees with the Israeli political leaders' goal to “destroy the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas” and return Israeli hostages.[34] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his stance that the war will end once Israel “achieves all of its objectives, including the destruction of Hamas and the release of all” the hostages.[35] The reported disagreement between the Israeli civil-military establishment comes as the IDF is expected to shift from full division-sided clearing operations like it is currently pursuing in Rafah to a reduced but lasting force presence along the Philadelphi and Netzarim Corridors.[36]  Prime Minister Netanyahu said on July 1 that the IDF was advancing to the ”end of the stage of eliminating Hamas” militarily.[37]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian appears to be gaining momentum ahead of the runoff presidential elections on July 2. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei must determine if he will permit Pezeshkian to win the election if Pezeshkian maintains his lead over Jalili. Khamenei would risk further deteriorating regime legitimacy and possibly kickstarting unrest if Pezeshkian garners increased support in the coming days and Khamenei decides to undermine Pezeshkian’s ability to win the election.
• Lebanon: A senior advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is attempting to publicly discourage US support for a major Israeli military offensive into Lebanon.
• Gaza Strip: Several current and former Israeli security officials told the New York Times that top Israeli generals disagree with political establishment’s war goals in the Gaza Strip. IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari implied on June 19 that the IDF thinks the Israeli prime minister’s goal of destroying Hamas is not an achievable goal and that those advocated the goal are ”misleading the Israeli people.”
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed on July 1 that it conducted four ballistic and cruise missile attacks targeting four commercial vessels in the Red Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean. CTP-ISW cannot verify that these attacks occurred. 

 

Iran Update, July 1, 2024

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Andie Parry, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Brian Carter, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, Kathryn Tyson, and William Doran

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Hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili will likely win the Iranian presidential election in the runoff race on July 5. No candidate received the majority of votes needed to win the Iranian presidential election on June 28 and Iran will hold a runoff election between the two most popular candidates—ultraconservative Saeed Jalili and reformist Masoud Pezeshkian—on July 5.[1] Pezeshkian received 10.4 million votes while Jalili received around 9.5 million. The second most prominent hardline candidate—Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—received around 3.4 million votes in the first round of elections on June 28, which was not enough to compete in the runoff election.[2] At least some Ghalibaf voters will presumably back Jalili in the runoff election, however, giving Jalili a significant advantage over Pezeshkian. Pezeshkian has also struggled to consolidate support among Iranian youth, a key voter demographic for the reformist faction.[3] Pezeshkian is unlikely to garner enough support to win against Jalili, especially since social media users have circulated statements in recent days of Pezeshkian boasting about his role in enforcing unpopular policies such as mandatory veiling.[4]

The Iranian regime is attempting to frame the July 5 presidential runoff elections as a fair and competitive race, despite Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei indicating a preference for hardline candidate Saeed Jalili.  Khamenei has repeatedly expressed concern about low voter turnout rates in recent years and views participation in Iran’s presidential elections as a demonstration of Iran’s democratic legitimacy.[5] Iranian regime officials during this election cycle have attempted to reinforce the regime’s democratic legitimacy by boasting that Pezeshkian’s candidacy illustrated the legitimacy of Iran’s electoral process.[6] Some Iranian university students confronted  Pezeshkian in a meeting on June 16, framing his candidacy as an effort on the part of the regime to contribute to an “illusion of democracy” and an attempt by the regime to legitimize the elections.“[7] The June 28 voter turnout rate was nevertheless unprecedently low at 40 percent, with the lowest recorded rates in Kermanshah, Kurdistan and Tehran provinces.[8] It is noteworthy that a significant percentage of anti-regime protests during the Mahsa Amini movement occurred in Kurdistan and Tehran provinces, suggesting continued disillusionment with the Iranian regime in these regions.[9]

Khamenei and segments of Iran’s clerical establishment have indirectly demonstrated a preference Jalili in recent days, making a Pezeshkian win unlikely regardless of how many votes he receives. Khamenei expressed foreign and nuclear policy views on June 25 that closely align with ultraconservative hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili’s views, suggesting that Khamenei endorses Jalili.[10] Khamenei also indirectly criticized Pezeshkian’s campaign policies on the same date, making it unlikely that Khamenei will permit him to become president. Segments of the Iranian clerical establishment may also back Jalili. Reformist-affiliated Entekhab News posted a screenshot on July 1 that it claimed showed coordination among Iranian clerics to campaign for Jalili in villages and cities across Iran.[11] Entekhab also circulated reports on July 1 that the influential Qom Seminary in Iran will close this week for its students and teachers to help improve voter turnout. Entekhab suggested that the Qom Seminary closures corroborated reports of clerics campaigning for Jalili.[12] It is likely, if the Qom Seminary closures are indeed connected with reports of clerics campaigning, that students and teachers will disperse to their hometowns—specifically rural areas—to generate support for Jalili. Rural and sparsely populated areas have historically served as a bastion of support for the regime and its hardline policies.[13] Roughly 35 percent of the Iranian population lives in rural areas and political engagement in these areas could furthermore improve voter turnout rates while benefiting Jalili.[14]

The Supreme Leader will risk further deteriorating regime legitimacy in the unlikely event that Pezeshkian garners enough votes to win the election. Khamenei has criticized Pezeshkian’s policies and echoed Jalili’s nuclear and foreign policies, indicating that Khamenei endorses Jalili over Pezeshkian. It is therefore unlikely that Khamenei will permit Pezeshkian to win, regardless of whether Pezeshkian receives the majority of votes. Raisi’s 2021 election suggests that Khamenei is comfortable engineering elections to advantage his preferred candidate.[15] The Guardian Council denied the candidacies of several prominent politicians in the 2021 elections and Raisi therefore faced no significant competition in the race. It is unclear, however, how Khamenei will advantage his preferred candidate if Pezeshkian is able to generate increased support and win the election this week. The regime engineered the election results between reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi and hardline Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, galvanizing a months-long anti-regime protest wave.[16] Khamenei will risk further deteriorating regime legitimacy and possibly kickstarting unrest in the unlikely event that Pezeshkian garners significant support in the coming days.

Palestinian militia groups in the West Bank appear to be strengthening at the expense of the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian militia fighters, Israeli military officials, and Palestinian Authority officials told the New York Times that Palestinian militia organizations control refugee camps in the West Bank by refusing to allow Palestinian Authority security forces to enter.[17] Palestinian fighters have prevented Palestinian Authority officials from entering refugee camps since before October 7, according to Palestinian media.[18] Fighters in Nur al Shams, east of Tulkarm, fired small arms at Palestinian Authority forces in June 2023 when the Palestinian Authority attempted to remove barriers that Palestinian militia fighters had placed at the entrances of the camp to prevent Israeli forces from entering.[19] Palestinian militia control of refugee camps in the West Bank provides a relatively safe area for Palestinian militias to build new capabilities and plan operations against both the IDF and the Palestinian Authority.

The Palestinian Authority’s inability to exert effective control over refugee camps in the West Bank has significant implications for the post-war situation in the Gaza Strip, if these statements to the New York Times are accurate. The Palestinian Authority remains extremely unpopular, and Hamas will be able to easily justify continued resistance to the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip if the authority assumes control with Israeli backing. A surviving Hamas in the Gaza Strip will attempt to rapidly resume its control over the Gaza Strip and continue its efforts to undermine the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Hamas sees control over the Gaza Strip as an interim step to creating an Islamist Palestinian state controlling all of Israel and the Palestinian territories.[20]

The Iranian-guided effort to establish combined battalions in the West Bank since at least 2022 is almost certainly contributing to the gradual strengthening of Palestinian militia groups in the West Bank. Palestinian militias—under Iranian direction—have created a series of combined battalions in the West Bank since at least 2022, modeled on the Lion’s Den militia in Nablus.[21] The New York Times interviewed a former Fatah militia member who had defected to Palestinian Islamic Jihad and now leads one of these combined battalions in Tulkarm.[22] This battalion includes all Palestinian factions in the area, including PIJ, Hamas, and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade.[23] Palestinian militias in combined units are able to unify planning and logistics by combining their resources, thus improving the militias’ capabilities and efficiency in aggregate.

Israeli security measures will likely constrain the groups’ ability to quickly expand their capabilities, however. Israeli counter-smuggling efforts and IDF control over access to the West Bank make it challenging for Palestinian militia groups to successfully access enough materiel to build advanced explosive devices or weapon systems at scale. Israeli security forces have successfully interdicted relatively large smuggling operations throughout and prior to this war.[24] Major Israeli raids also disrupt the activity of nascent militia cells before these cells have time to build large stockpiles of weapons and explosives.[25] CTP-ISW has not observed a major and consistent change in militia capabilities during the war.

Iran is likely continuing its efforts to arm West Bank militias by smuggling arms through Jordan into the West Bank. The IDF thwarted an attempt to smuggle handguns and rifle parts into the West Bank from Jordan on July 1.[26] Three smugglers attempted to cross the border from Jordan into the northern West Bank.[27] Israeli border police and the IDF searched the area and discovered three bags containing over 75 handguns and dozens of M16 rifle components, including upper receivers, bolts, and charging handles.[28] Israeli security forces have not apprehended the three suspects at the time of writing.[29] The July 1 smuggling attempt is consistent with other Iranian-backed smuggling attempts.

Iran is supplying Palestinian militias with weapons to improve their capabilities and to foment unrest against Israel.[30]  Both Israeli and Jordanian police have thwarted numerous attempts in recent months by Iran and its partners to transport small arms, explosives, mines, and rockets across the Jordan-West Bank border.[31] Iranian-backed smugglers often use established multinational narcotics-smuggling networks and routes to smuggle arms from Syria into Jordan.[32]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 98th Division continued clearing operations to degrade a reconstituted Hamas battalion and to demolish underground military infrastructure in Shujaiya, Gaza City, on July 1.[33] The IDF re-entered Shujaiya on June 27.[34] Hamas fighters in Shujaiya have targeted Israeli forces with sophisticated weapons, such as explosively formed penetrators, supporting the IDF assessment that the Hamas Shujaiya Battalion has at least partially reconstituted since the IDF last operated in the area in April 2024.[35] The IDF killed Hamas‘ Shujaiya Battalion commander and his deputy in December 2023, which led them to conclude the battalion was ”significantly damaged.”[36] The IDF assesses that Hamas has partially rebuilt its battalion from new recruits and Hamas fighters from other degraded battalions.[37] One element of reconstitution is reorganization, in which a commander redistributes the resources at their disposal to restore attrited units to a minimal level of effectiveness.[38] Building composite units by combining several degraded or combat ineffective battalions is one common way to reorganize a force to be minimally combat effective. Israeli forces operating in Shujaiya have also destroyed weapons productions sites during the past several days of operations, indicating that Hamas’ Shujaiya Battalion is also pursuing small-scale weapons production to replenish its stockpiles and aid in regeneration tasks.[39] CTP-ISW previously observed that Hamas cells have probably established a rear area in Jabalia or northern Shujaiya, from which they can mount attacks on IDF units along the Israel-Gaza Strip border.[40]

The IDF issued evacuation orders for eastern Khan Younis on July 1.[41] An IDF evacuation order typically means that Israeli forces will enter the area within 24 hours to begin clearing operations.[42] PIJ launched 20 rockets from Khan Younis into southern Israel roughly 10 hours before the IDF issued the order on July 1.[43] The IDF Air Force struck the launch site shortly after PIJ fired the barrage.[44]  An Israeli military correspondent reported on June 23 that Hamas is reconstituting its military and governance structures in Khan Younis in the absence of Israeli force presence.[45] The IDF withdrew its forces from Khan Younis on April 7.[46] Hamas is also working to reassert local control in Khan Younis by deploying fighters on the streets, managing local policing, and taking over humanitarian aid shipments.[47] Hamas is restoring its governing organizations as well, which has prompted the IDF to target Hamas officials involved in these activities.[48] Hamas’ reconstitution in Khan Younis is likely driving the IDF to conduct a short-term raid into Khan Younis. An IDF operation into Khan Younis may also target Hamas political and military leadership. CTP-ISW previously noted that the IDF’s decision to withdraw its forces from Khan Younis enabled Hamas militants and political leadership to flee to Khan Younis.[49] Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar is likely hiding in a “vast” tunnel system beneath Khan Younis, according to unspecified US officials speaking to the New York Times.[50] Hamas fighters’ option to move northward contributed to their decision to not become decisively engaged in Rafah.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to target US interests in Iraq and the Middle East in the event of an Israeli operation into southern Lebanon. The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee, a coordinating body comprised of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, met on June 30 and threatened to target US interests in Iraq and the region and increase the “pace and type” of its operations if Israel launches a major military offensive into Lebanon.[51] Iranian-backed militias initially paused attacks against US forces in the region in February 2024 after IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad and ordered a pause on the attack campaign after a Kataib Hezbollah drone attack killed three US soldiers in Jordan in January 2024.[52] The militias’ announced strategy is partially inconsistent with a Saudi report that alleged Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would intervene in Lebanon by sending fighters and weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah if Israel launches a major military offensive into Lebanon. Both the IRGC and Hezbollah reportedly had reservations against such plans, which is consistent with the long-standing Iranian desire to avoid an overt regional war against the United States and Israel.  The militia’s newly articulated strategy is more consistent with the militia’s attacks and involvement in the Israel-Hamas war thus far.[53]

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee most recently threatened to resume its attack campaign on US forces and interests in the Middle East on June 19, citing the Iraqi government’s failure to establish a timeline for a US troop withdrawal from Iraq.[54] The June 30 Coordination Committee statement citing a possible Israeli offensive into Lebanon as a trigger for new attacks comes after individual attempts by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia groups to resume attacks on US forces.[55] Emirati state media reported that other Islamic Resistance in Iraq militia leaders have disagreed with Kataib Hezbollah’s calls to resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq since April 2024. Kataib Hezbollah has reportedly begun to ”reconsider” its decision to pause attacks.[56] Qais Khazali, who is the secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq, similarly threatened on June 24 to attack US interests if Israel launched a major military offensive into Lebanon.[57] Such calls appear to encourage action that would disobey the orders from the IRGC Quds Force commander in January to stop attacks.

The June 30 Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee statement also identified targeting the under-construction Aqaba-Basra oil pipeline connecting Basra, Iraq to Aqaba port south of Jordan, as a “starting point” for new attacks.[58] The Coordination Committee claimed that Aqaba-Basra oil pipeline is a ”malicious project aimed at draining Iraqi resources and paving a path toward normalization with Israel”. The pipeline project is strategically important for Iraq as it will offer a key alternative port to Iraq’s currently existing exports terminal, eventually diversifying its export routes and linking Iraq’s economy with those of its Arab neighbors.[59] The Coordination Committee and Iran may assess that this declared strategy of attacking Jordanian targets is less likely to elicit a US response and is therefore less risky than targeting US forces in the region. This lower-risk strategy would also be consistent with the long-standing Iranian desire to keep its militia activity at a level that does not cause the United States to seriously threaten Iranian assets.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili will likely win the Iranian presidential election in the runoff race on July 5.
• West Bank: Palestinian militia groups in the West Bank appear to be strengthening at the expense of the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority’s inability to exert effective control over refugee camps in the West Bank has significant implications for the post-war situation in the Gaza Strip, if statements to Western Media about strengthening militia groups in the West Bank are accurate.
• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF continued operations aimed at degrading a reconstituting Hamas Battalion in Shujaiya. Hamas commanders in Shujaiya may have formed a composite unit there by combining multiple degraded or combat ineffective units to form one combat effective unit. Forming a composite unit is one method through which reconstitution takes place.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF issued evacuation orders for eastern Khan Younis on July 1. These evacuation orders typically precede Israeli operations. 
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatened to target US interests in Iraq and the Middle East in the event of an Israeli operation into southern Lebanon. The groups identified the under-construction Aqaba-Basra oil pipeline between Basra, Iraq, and Aqaba, Jordan, as a starting point for a new attack campaign.
• Yemen: Houthi media published footage on June 30 of a Houthi attack targeting a bulk cargo carrier with a new model of unmanned surface vessel.

Iran Update, June 30, 2024

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Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued re-clearing Shujaiya in Gaza City. Hamas combat units began reconstituting there after Israeli forces withdrew in April 2024.
• West Bank: Israeli forces conducted a drone strike killing a senior PIJ official in Tulkarm. The official was responsible for recent militia activity targeting civilian and military targets.
• Northern Israel: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted 10 attacks into northern Israel. One of the attacks involved a one-way attack drone that injured nine Israelis.

Iran Update, June 29, 2024

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Nicholas Carl, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, and Johanna Moore

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No candidate received the majority of votes needed to win the Iranian presidential election on June 28.[1] Iran will hold a runoff election between the two most popular candidates—ultraconservative Saeed Jalili and reformist Masoud Pezeshkian—on July 5.[2] Jalili will likely win the runoff vote and become the next Iranian president. The Iranian regime reported that Pezeshkian received the most votes at around 10.4 million, while Jalili received around 9.5 million.[3] Jalili will likely receive significantly more votes in the runoff election since there will be no other hardline candidates splitting the hardline vote. The second most prominent hardline candidate—Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—received around 3.4 million votes, which was not enough to compete in the runoff election. At least some Ghalibaf voters will presumably back Jalili in the runoff election, giving him a significant advantage over Pezeshkian.

Jalili would run an ultraconservative hardline government similar to late-President Ebrahim Raisi. Such a president would likely exacerbate the economic and socio-cultural issues frustrating large swaths of the Iranian population. Jalili is a deeply ideological regime loyalist who has long supported extreme domestic and foreign policies. Western and Iranian opposition outlets reported that some Iranian hardliners, including senior officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, tried to prevent Jalili from running for president, feeling that his views are too radical.[4] Jalili downplayed the importance of external engagement to improve the Iranian economy during the presidential debates, suggesting that he might instead favor an autarkic agenda.[5] Jalili also voiced support for Iran’s “nuclear rights” and criticized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in the debates.[6] These comments are particularly concerning given that Iran has in recent months expanded its nuclear program significantly and begun running computer simulations that could help build a nuclear weapon.

The presidential election on June 28 saw unprecedently low voter turnout, highlighting widespread disillusionment with the Iranian regime. The Iranian Interior Ministry announced that around 25.5 million votes were cast, which is around 40 percent of the Iranian electorate.[7] Notwithstanding the possibility that the regime inflated these numbers, they reflect a notable drop-off from the roughly 48.5-percent turnout for the Iranian presidential election in 2021.[8]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: No candidate received the majority of votes needed to win the Iranian presidential election. Iran will hold a runoff vote on July 5. Hardliner Saeed Jalili will likely win the runoff vote and become the next Iranian president.
• Gaza Strip: The IDF 98th Division continued raids in Shujaiya, Gaza City. An Israeli military correspondent reported that Hamas' Shujaiya Battalion reconstituted after previous Israeli raids by recruiting new fighters and fighters who fled to Shujaiya from other parts of the strip.
• Gaza Strip: The United States has proposed new language for the US-backed Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, according to three unspecified informed sources cited by Axios.
• Yemen: The Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a combined drone attack targeting a commercial vessel in the Mediterranean Sea. This attack marks the sixth time that the Houthis have claimed a combined operation targeting Israel with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.

Iran Update, June 28, 2024

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Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, William Doran, and Brian Carter

Iran held its presidential election on June 28.[1] Iran will likely have to hold a runoff election on July 5 given that neither of the two hardline frontrunners—Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili—withdrew from the election before the first round of voting on June 28. Four candidates—pragmatic hardliner Ghalibaf, ultraconservative hardliner Jalili, reformist Masoud Pezeshkian, and hardliner Mostafa Pour Mohammadi—participated in the June 28 election. The Iranian constitution stipulates that a candidate must win over 50 percent of the vote to become president.[2] Senior hardline Iranian officials have repeatedly called on the hardline candidates in recent weeks to coalesce around a single candidate.[3] These calls were driven by concerns that splitting the hardline vote across numerous candidates could inadvertently advantage the sole reformist candidate, Pezeshkian. Two unspecified Iranian officials confirmed to The New York Times on June 28 that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani called on Jalili to withdraw from the race during an emergency meeting with Jalili and Ghalibaf in Mashhad, Iran, on June 26.[4] Ghaani reportedly stated that Ghalibaf is better qualified than Jalili to run the government because of his “military background and pragmatic outlook.”[5] Ghaani’s characterization of Ghalibaf as “pragmatic” is consistent with recent Western reports that some IRGC factions are trying to prevent Jalili from winning the election because they regard him as “too hardline.”[6] Ghaani’s intervention also highlights hardliners’ concerns that Pezeshkian could pose a real threat to Jalili and Ghalibaf in the election. The New York Times later deleted its report about Ghaani’s meeting with Jalili and Ghalibaf without providing an explanation.

Preliminary reports suggest that most Iranians did not participate in the June 28 election. The Iranian Election Headquarters extended the voting deadline twice until 2200 local time, likely to try to increase voter turnout.[7] This action is not unprecedented; the regime has previously extended voting hours during both presidential and parliamentary elections.[8] The decision to extend the voting deadline nevertheless highlights that voter turnout likely did not reach the regime’s desired level during the regular voting hours. The Interior Ministry, which runs elections in Iran, reportedly estimated a voter turnout of less than 30 percent by 2000 local time.[9] A Tehran-based researcher similarly claimed that turnout only reached approximately 35 percent by 2115 local time.[10] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify these reports. Opposition media separately circulated videos of poll workers sleeping at empty voting centers and reported that the regime forced prisoners in Kurdistan Province to vote to boost voter turnout statistics.[11]

Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah discussed security developments in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip with Jamaa al Islamiya Secretary General Mohammed Taqoush on June 28.[12] Nasrallah and Taqoush discussed the importance of coordination between Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance to support Palestinian fighters in Gaza.[13] Jamaa al Islamiya has conducted attacks targeting northern Israel and the disputed Sheba Farms area since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023.[14] Jamaa al Islamiya was founded in 1964 as the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.[15]

Palestinian militias defended against Israeli forces advancing in Shujaiya. Palestinian fighters have conducted 24 attacks targeting Israeli forces advancing in Shujaiya since the IDF began its operation on June 27.[16] Palestinian fighters conducted 33 attacks targeting Israeli forces during the first 24 hours of re-clearing operations in Jabalia in May 2024.[17] IDF officers described the fighting in Jabalia during the May re-clearing operation as some of the most intense of the war.[18]

Reuters, citing an unpublished International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, reported that Iran installed four new cascades of IR-6 centrifuges in Unit 1 of the Fordow fuel enrichment facility on June 28.[19] Iran has not yet brought the four new cascades online. Iran previously informed the IAEA on June 13 that it planned to add eight total cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow within the next three to four weeks.[20]

Key Takeaways: 

• Iran: Iran held its presidential election on June 28. Iran will likely have to hold a runoff election on July 5 given that neither of the two hardline frontrunners—Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili—withdrew from the election before the first round of voting on June 28. Preliminary reports suggest that most Iranians did not participate in the June 28 election. 

• Iran: Reuters, citing an unpublished International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, reported that Iran installed four new cascades of IR-6 centrifuges in Unit 1 of the Fordow fuel enrichment facility on June 28. 

• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah discussed security developments in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip with Jamaa al Islamiya Secretary General Mohammed Taqoush on June 28. 

• Gaza: Palestinian fighters have conducted 24 attacks targeting Israeli forces advancing in Shujaiya since the IDF began its operation on June 27. 

 

 

Iran Update, June 27, 2024

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Ashka Jhaveri, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Nicholas Carl, Kathryn Tyson, Katherine Wells, and Johanna Moore

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Iranian hardliners have made only limited progress toward uniting behind a single candidate ahead of the Iranian presidential election on June 28. Remaining divisions among the hardliners by the time of the vote significantly increases the likelihood of a runoff election. Two hardline candidates—Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi and Ali Reza Zakani—have withdrawn from the race since June 26 in order to help unify their faction.[1] Neither candidate was especially popular, however, making it unclear that their exits will meaningfully affect the vote. The two most prominent hardline candidates (Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili) remain in the race and have refused to withdraw in support of the other at the time of this writing. Ghalibaf and Jalili both staying in the election ensures that they will split at least some of the hardliner vote. It will also likely prevent either from reaching the majority needed to win—unless the supreme leader and his inner circle manipulate the vote blatantly to favor either candidate. Iran will hold a runoff election between the two most popular candidates on July 5 if no one wins the majority.[2]

Some hardliners, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, appear concerned that the sole reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, could win the vote outright. Khamenei indirectly criticized Pezeshkian on June 25 for supporting engagement with the West, indicating Khamenei’s opposition to him.[3] The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is run by hardliners, additionally cancelled one of Pezeshkian‘s rallies at the last minute on June 26, further indicating that some in the regime view him as a serious contender for the presidency.[4] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has separately tried to unite the hardline camp against Pezeshkian, according to unverified social media rumors. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly met with Ghalibaf and Jalili in Mashhad on June 26 to form a consensus between them.[5] Ghaani clearly failed, if this reporting is accurate. But his intervention is nonetheless remarkable and possibly unprecedented, reflecting hardliners’ serious concerns about Pezeshkian.

Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah are concerned that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could escalate the war with Israel too far, according to Saudi media. The Saudi outlet, citing unspecified sources, reported that the Iraqi militias are developing plans to support Hezbollah if Israel launches a major military offensive into Lebanon. The plans involve sending fighters and weapons to Hezbollah. There is precedent for close military cooperation between Hezbollah and the Iraqi groups, as they fought alongside one another in the Syrian civil war to preserve the Bashar al Assad regime. The Iraqi militias reportedly proposed their plans to intervene in Lebanon during a recent meeting with a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer in Baghdad. Both the IRGC and Hezbollah had reservations, with the senior IRGC officer describing the plans as “too enthusiastic at the moment.” The Saudi outlet noted that Iran must still reach a final decision on the plans, however.

That Iran has hesitated to approve the plans in consistent with the long-standing Iranian desire to avoid an overt regional war against the United States and Israel. Iranian leaders will almost certainly use their proxy and partner militias to deter and pressure Israel. But Iranian leaders have also historically tried to restrain the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, fearing that they could inadvertently spiral the escalation cycle out of Iranian control. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, for instance, traveled to Baghdad and ordered the militias to stop attacking US targets after the militias killed three US soldiers in Jordan in January 2024.

Qais Khazali, who is the secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq, argued in the meeting with the senior IRGC officer that the Iraqi militias should attack US interests rather than intervening in Lebanon. This reporting is consistent with Khazali threatening on June 24 to attack US interests if Israel launched a major military offensive into Lebanon.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) detonated deep-buried improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting two Israeli vehicles around Jenin in the West Bank on June 27, killing one Israeli soldier and wounding 16 others.[6] Israeli forces were conducting a raid targeting Hamas networks in the area when PIJ attacked.[7] An Israeli military correspondent reported that PIJ buried the IEDs 1.5 meters underground, making them difficult for Israeli forces to detect.[8] The use of deep-buried IEDs is especially noteworthy given that burying them could be a relatively time-intensive process. Palestinian militias have previously used sophisticated means to attack Israeli forces around Jenin. Palestinian militias, for instance, used an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) against Israeli forces in Jenin in July 2023.[9] The attack marked the first recorded use of an EFP in the West Bank.[10] EFPs require specially manufactured concave copper disks, indicating that the militia that used them either imported the disks or received technical instruction and materials to produce them.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian hardliners have made only limited progress toward uniting behind a single candidate ahead of the Iranian presidential election. Remaining divisions among hardliners significantly increases the likelihood of a runoff vote.
• Iraq: Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah are reportedly concerned that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could escalate the war with Israel too far. Iran has thus hesitated to approve the militias’ plans to intervene if Israel launched a major military offensive into Lebanon.
• West Bank: PIJ detonated a deep-buried IED targeting Israeli forces in the West Bank, killing one Israeli soldier and wounding 16 others. Palestinian militias previously conducted an EFP attack targeting Israeli forces in the area in July 2023.

Iran Update, June 26, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Kathryn Tyson, Grace Mappes, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hardline candidate Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi withdrew from the Iranian presidential election on June 26.[1] Hashemi did not appear to have a serious chance at winning and withdrew to avoid splitting votes across too many hardline candidates.[2] It is unclear, however, whether his withdrawal will meaningfully benefit the two hardline frontrunners, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili. An unspecified hardline Iranian source told the Middle East Eye on June 25 that Hashemi supports Jalili and hopes to receive a political appointment if Jalili becomes president.[3] Hashemi’s withdrawal follows repeated calls from senior hardline officials in recent weeks for the hardline faction to coalesce behind a single candidate.[4] These calls are driven by concerns that splitting the hardline vote across numerous candidates could inadvertently advantage the sole reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian.

Iranian presidential candidates reiterated their economic policies during the final debate of the upcoming election.[5] This debate occurred on June 25 and focused on the economy. Below are the key takeaways from what the three presumed frontrunners said.

• Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (pragmatic hardliner): Ghalibaf again framed his candidacy as a continuation of the Ebrahim Raisi administration.[6] Ghalibaf claimed that he would increase workers’ salaries to match rising inflation and criticized other candidates’ lack of managerial experience.
• Saeed Jalili (ultraconservative hardliner): Jalili identified employment rates and inflation as the greatest issues facing the Iranian economy.[7] Jalili notably did not mention the role of international sanctions in this context. Jalili also called for deepening economic ties with China and increasing non-oil exports.
• Masoud Pezeshkian (reformist): Pezeshkian vowed to implement the seventh five-year development plan, which is a Raisi-era agenda aimed at increasing economic growth, minimizing government debt, and optimizing the state budget.[8] Pezeshkian also said that he would focus on external economic engagement and secure sanctions relief.

Upon reviewing Iranian polling data, CTP-ISW has concluded that recently published polls cannot accurately or meaningfully predict who will win the upcoming Iranian presidential election. Most of the polls include large percentages of voters who have not yet decided for which candidate they will vote. A June 24 Iranian Students Polling Agency poll, for example, showed that 30.6 percent of respondents had not decided for which candidate they would vote.[9] A June 26 Parliamentary Research Center poll similarly showed that 28.5 percent of respondents had not decided which candidate they will support.[10] The large percentage of undecided voters makes it extremely difficult for these polls to accurately predict the election outcome given that candidates need to win the majority vote to win the race.

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh appointed an Iranian-backed militia member as deputy chief of staff of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) on June 26.[11] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service comprised of various militias that in theory report to the Iraqi prime minister but in practice answer to Iran.[12] Fayyadh appointed Hussein Faleh Aziz (also known as Abu Zaynab al Lami), who is a member of Iranian-backed militia Kataib Hezbollah (KH), as PMF deputy chief of staff. Aziz previously served as chairman of the PMF Central Security Directorate, which “provides internal security mechanisms and aims to prevent violations or criminal activities by PMF members.”[13] The United States sanctioned Aziz in December 2019 for cooperating with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force to violently suppress popular protests in Iraq.[14] The US Treasury Department noted at the time that Aziz “directed militia fighters who shot protesters in early October 2019.”[15] US government-owned, Arabic-language outlet al Hurra reported in October 2019 that Aziz had a direct line of communication with then-IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani.[16] PMF Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz (Abu Fadak) al Mohammadawi is—like Aziz—a senior member of KH.[17] That KH members occupy such prominent positions within the PMF reflect the significant control and influence that a loyal Iranian proxy has in the Iraqi security apparatus.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Hardline candidate Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh withdrew from the Iranian presidential election. Ghazi Zadeh did not appear to have a serious chance at winning and withdrew to avoid splitting votes across too many hardline candidates.
• Iraq: A member of an Iranian-backed militia became the deputy chief of staff of the Iraqi PMF. The appointment reflects the significant control and influence that the loyal Iranian-backed militia has in the Iraqi security apparatus.
• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces conducted airstrikes killing two Palestinian militia members involved in manufacturing and smuggling weapons in the Gaza Strip.
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed that they conducted a combined drone attack with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq into Israel for the fourth time.

Iran Update, June 25, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Marcus Mildenberger, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed foreign and nuclear policy views on June 25 that closely align with ultraconservative hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili’s views, possibly indicating that Khamenei endorses Jalili in the upcoming election. Khamenei’s views also signal the supreme leader’s opposition to reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian. Khamenei expressed strong opposition to mending ties with the United States during a speech on June 25, which mirrored similar statements made by Jalili in a foreign policy debate on June 24.[1] Jalili defended Iran’s “nuclear rights” and criticized the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during the debate.[2] Khamenei also indirectly criticized Pezeshkian, stating that politicians who are “attached to America” cannot be “good managers.”[3] Pezeshkian expressed support for improving relations and resuming nuclear negotiations with the West during the June 24 foreign policy debate.[4] Pezeshkian stated that “no country in history has been able to achieve prosperity and growth by closing its borders and wanting to work alone.”[5] Khamenei’s criticisms of Pezeshkian may also stem from the fact that Pezeshkian has closely coordinated his presidential campaign with Mohammad Javad Zarif, who served as Iran’s foreign affairs minister under former moderate President Hassan Rouhani. Pragmatic hardliner Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf also expressed support for nuclear negotiations during the June 24 debate, which is consistent with recent reports from Iranian opposition outlets that advisers to Ghalibaf have approached Western diplomats in recent weeks.[6]

Khamenei’s possible endorsement of Jalili would diverge from some Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) factions’ support for pragmatic hardline candidate Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The Telegraph reported in early June 2024 that some senior IRGC commanders, including former IRGC Air Force Commander Hossein Dehghan, are supporting Ghalibaf.[7] An IRGC member told the Telegraph that some IRGC factions are trying to prevent Jalili from winning the election because they regard him as “too hardline.”[8] IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Haji Zadeh separately stated on June 24 that Iran’s next president must have “strong executive management” experience.[9] Some Western commentators and analysts have interpreted Haji Zadeh’s statement as an implicit endorsement of Ghalibaf given Ghalibaf’s experience serving as Iran's parliament speaker since 2020.[10] Ghalibaf has decades-old ties to many senior IRGC officers dating back to their time fighting in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.[11] Ghalibaf is also part of a close circle of current and former IRGC officers who have repeatedly come together in times of domestic crisis to interfere in Iranian domestic politics.[12]

Khamenei’s explicit opposition to engagement with the West also challenges recent Western reports that incorrectly suggested that Iran is seeking to renew nuclear talks with the West. Iranian Permanent Representative to the UN Saeed Iravani stated that the JCPOA is “not perfect” but is the “best option” during a UN Security Council meeting on June 24.[13] Some Western media outlets incorrectly interpreted Iravani’s statement as signaling the Iranian regime’s readiness to renew nuclear negotiations. Iravani’s statements were instead consistent with repeated statements by regime officials blaming the current state of the JCPOA on the United States and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany). Iravani accused the United States of “unilaterally and illegally” withdrawing from the JCPOA and accused the E3 of “failing” to fulfill their JCPOA obligations.[14] Jalili additionally accused the United States and the E3 of lacking “sincerity and determination” to revive the JCPOA.

Israel assesses that it will complete the intense phase of ground operation in the Gaza Strip within a few days.[15] Israeli Army Radio reported on June 25 that the IDF will fully transition to conducting raids after it declares that it has defeated Hamas’ Rafah Brigade.[16] The IDF raids will require two divisions in the Gaza Strip.[17] The IDF will remain along the Philadelphi Corridor to locate and destroy smuggling tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, a process that will take several more months to complete.[18] The IDF similarly transitioned to a raid system in the northern Gaza Strip in early January 2024.[19]

Hamas will very likely exploit the Israeli raid system to reconstitute its combat units and reassert its governing authority across the Gaza Strip. Hamas has rebuilt itself elsewhere in the Gaza Strip after Israeli drawdowns elsewhere in Strip, which began in January 2024. The IDF has subsequently re-cleared the areas that it withdrew from and has found reconstituted Hamas forces there.[20] Hamas exploits these Israeli raids—which by definition include a planned retrograde—to subsequently reorganize and regenerate themselves. The IDF currently assesses that it will soon destroy Hamas’ Rafah Brigade.[21] Thousands of Palestinian fighters fled the Rafah area prior to the Israeli operation, however.[22] This cadre of surviving Hamas fighters assigned to the Rafah Brigade could provide Hamas commanders in Rafah or elsewhere sufficient human resources to reorganize themselves into composite, fully combat effective units by combining assets from various degraded Hamas units.[23] Hamas commanders are also engaging in regenerative tasks, such as recruiting personnel and replenishing stockpiles of military equipment and weapons.[24] Hamas is capable of regrouping in the Gaza Strip in the absence of sustained military pressure and a viable alternative to its rule. Raids can temporarily disrupt but will not stop a reconstitution process.[25]

Hamas is disrupting Israeli efforts to create nascent governing authorities that exclude Hamas’ political wing. Hamas reportedly killed two clan leaders in the central and southern Gaza Strip as part of this effort.[26] A Palestinian journalist reported on June 25 that members of the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry’s Internal Security Forces, which employs fighters from the Hamas military wing, killed the clan leaders.[27] The leaders were coordinating with Israel and forming “criminal armed groups,” presumably to counter Hamas’ control in the Gaza Strip.[28] Hamas has not claimed responsibility for the killings at the time of writing. Hamas similarly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City in March 2024, after which the clans signed a letter refusing to coordinate with Israel.[29] Israel was working with the clan leader in an attempt to create a nascent governing authority.[30]

Hamas will likely continue to suppress Israeli-organized political alternatives. The lack of security for Palestinians involved in Israeli-organized alternatives to Hamas makes establishing a non-Hamas governing authority more difficult. Hamas has a long history of killing and suppressing dissidents and political alternatives, including members of local Gazan clans.[31] An attempt to use these clan leaders to form a nascent alternative to Hamas will necessitate the provision of security to protect the clan members from Hamas. The Israeli national security adviser said on June 25 that the IDF will replace Hamas in the northern Gaza Strip “in the coming days,” suggesting confidence that an unspecified force will take over despite Hamas’ continued presence.[32] Hamas responded to the national security adviser’s statement, threatening that it would “cut off any hand” of Israel attempting to decide Gaza’s political future.[33]

Iranian-backed groups are continuing to recruit members and smuggle and manufacture weapons, likely to destabilize Jordan and facilitate Iranian efforts in the West Bank. Jordanian police discovered and detonated two separate caches of unspecified explosives in east Amman on June 21 and June 24.[34] An initial explosion tipped police off to the first cache of explosives in Marka, a dense residential neighborhood.[35] Former Jordanian officials said the explosion may have been a failed attempt to manufacture more explosives.[36] Police discovered a second cache of explosives tied to the Marka suspects in a car repair shop in an industrial area of Abu Alanda, Amman, on June 24.[37] Jordanian police are still investigating the incidents and have not released the suspects’ identities.[38] However, anonymous Jordanian security officials told Reuters the quantities of discovered explosives indicated that the incidents are “terror-related.”[39]

These explosive caches and other security incidents in Jordan, including weapons smuggling, are part of a possible Iranian effort to destabilize Jordan and use it as a springboard to increase Iranian influence in the West Bank. The Jordanian security officials said that the Marka and Abu Alanda incidents are linked to Iranian efforts to recruit agents within Jordan to destabilize the Kingdom.[40] Jordanian territory offers multiple ground routes through which Iran could move military materiel into the West Bank. Tehran has sought to develop its militia capabilities and infrastructure in the West Bank in recent years, but the Israel-Hamas war has highlighted Iranian shortcomings there.[41] Iran and Iranian-backed groups have shown a recently shown greater interest in developing networks in Jordan, including by threatening to equip thousands of “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with weapons.[42] This threat is likely aspirational at present, but Jordanian police disrupted an attempt by Iranian-backed militias in Syria to smuggle weapons to a Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood cell in late March 2024.[43] Both Jordanian and Israeli police have thwarted several attempts in recent months by Iran and its partners to conduct attacks within the kingdom or smuggle weapons into the West Bank.[44]

Iranian efforts to manufacture weapons, arm Jordanian agents, and undermine the Jordanian state are consistent with CTP-ISW's previous assessments that Iran is adopting a more confrontational approach towards Jordan in its regional strategy.[45] An expanding Axis of Resistance network in Jordan could destabilize a major Western partner in the region and facilitate Iranian efforts in the West Bank by providing a ground line of communication over which Iran could transport weapons and other capabilities to its allies in the West Bank. It is notable in this context that Iranian-linked actors were reportedly manufacturing weapons in Jordan. Weapons smugglers—Iranian-linked and otherwise—continue to face significant difficulty in moving weapons and other materiel into the West Bank.[46] These smugglers will continue to attempt to move weapons into the West Bank, however, and a destabilized Jordan could facilitate an Iranian effort to accelerate this process.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed foreign and nuclear policy views on June 25 that closely align with ultraconservative hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili’s views, possibly indicating that Khamenei endorses Jalili in the upcoming election. Khamenei’s views also signal the supreme leader’s opposition to reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian.
• Gaza Strip: Israel assesses that it will complete the intense phase of ground operation in the Gaza Strip within a few days. Hamas will very likely exploit the Israeli raid system to reconstitute its combat units and reassert its governing authority across the Gaza Strip.
• Hamas is disrupting Israeli efforts to create nascent governing authorities that exclude Hamas’ political wing. Hamas reportedly killed two clan leaders in the central and southern Gaza Strip as part of this effort
• Jordan: Iranian-backed groups are continuing to recruit members and smuggle and manufacture weapons, likely to destabilize Jordan and facilitate Iranian efforts in the West Bank.
• West Bank: Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades infiltrated Israeli territory near Tulkarm and fired at IDF soldiers.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: US presidential envoy Amos Hochstein warned Hezbollah that the group cannot rely on the United States to prevent Israel from conducting an attack into Lebanon.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified “military target” in Haifa, Israel.

Iran Update, June 24, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Hamas is rebuilding its weapons production capacity in the Gaza Strip as part of a larger effort to reconstitute its military forces. An Israeli military correspondent reported on June 24 that Hamas is establishing small weapons manufacturing sites across the Gaza Strip in order to replenish its stockpiles of military equipment and weapons.[1] The replenishment of these resources is a key component of the reconstitution of a military force.

Reconstitution consists of two general tasks: reorganization and regeneration. Reorganization involves a commander redistributing the resources at their disposal to restore attritted units to a minimal level of effectiveness.[2] Regeneration is a more complex, resource-intensive, and time-intensive process “that requires large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.”[3] This process naturally involves replenishing stockpiles of military equipment and weapons. Hamas is also recruiting 18-year-olds and trying to train them as part of that reconstitution effort, as CTP-ISW previously reported, which is crucial to restoring combat units.[4] These reports indicate that at least some Hamas commanders have begun to regenerate the forces and materiel under their command and could become again prepared to engage Israeli forces.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is trying to disrupt Hamas’ reconstitution efforts by targeting relevant Hamas officials. The IDF conducted an airstrike killing a Hamas weapons production specialist in Gaza City on June 23.[5] The IDF stated that the specialist developed “strategic” weapons for Hamas and oversaw several weapons development cells.[6] The IDF has killed about 45 weapons production specialists from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) since the war began.[7]

Hamas will likely try to exploit the absence of Israeli forces throughout much of the Gaza Strip in order to facilitate its reorganization and regeneration efforts.[8] A commander usually must disengage their force from opposing forces to efficiently and successfully reconstitute. Hamas has exploited IDF withdrawals in much of the Gaza Strip to rebuild the combat power of degraded Hamas battalions, integrate new forces, and prepare them for further combat activities. This is particularly accurate in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone, where Hamas has reportedly established weapons production workshops.[9]

Iranian presidential candidates discussed socio-cultural issues during the third debate for the upcoming election. None of the presumed frontrunners (Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Saeed Jalili, and Masoud Pezeshkian) suggested that they would support fundamental changes to long-standing regime policies. All three frontrunners indicated support for the mandatory hijab law and did not suggest that they would support easing restrictions on women’s dress code.[10] That none of these candidates challenged the regime policy reflects their subordination to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has expressed opposition repeatedly to changing the hijab requirement. Khamenei has described veiling as an “irrevocable, religious necessity.”[11] The frontrunners did debate slightly how to enforce the mandatory hijab law.

• Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (pragmatic hardliner). Ghalibaf emphasized that all regime bodies—not just the national police force—should encourage and enforce the hijab requirement.[12] Ghalibaf claimed that some regime bodies have supported the police insufficiently in enforcing the mandatory hijab law, leading to violent confrontations between the regime and unveiled women. Ghalibaf also expressed support for a recent hijab enforcement bill that Parliament is considering currently. The legislation codifies legal punishments, including fines and salary cuts, for women who violate the hijab requirement.[13]
• Masoud Pezeshkian (reformist). Pezeshkian emphasized his opposition to using violence to enforce the mandatory hijab law but did not propose changing the law itself.[14] Pezeshkian described regime treatment of unveiled women as immoral. Pezeshkian also argued that the regime could stop women from questioning the need to veil by changing how it educates girls in mosques and schools. This statement mirrors similar remarks from Khamenei calling for greater emphasis on indoctrinating Iranian youth in order to resolve social issues.[15]
• Saeed Jalili (ultraconservative hardliner). Jalili avoided addressing the hijab issue directly and instead focused on criticizing the West. Jalili accused the West of hypocrisy for condemning Iran for treating women harshly while ignoring the deaths of Palestinian women in the Gaza Strip.[16]

The frontrunners’ comments on the mandatory hijab law reflect their efforts to appeal to certain demographics. Pezeshkian has consistently tried to rally Iranian youth who are frustrated with the harsh enforcement of the hijab requirement. Jalili contrastingly tried to pander to hardline, anti-Western voters in order to distinguish himself from Ghalibaf.

The frontrunning candidates separately expressed support for ongoing censorship and internet restrictions in Iran. Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian both claimed that they support internet freedom but added that censorship is necessary during “crises.”[17] Ghalibaf emphasized the need to “carefully and intelligently monitor” the internet and expressed support for building the national intranet, which would increase regime control of the Iranian domestic information space.[18] Jalili praised regime efforts to develop indigenous communications and social media platforms as alternatives to Western platforms.[19]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Hamas is rebuilding its weapons production capacity in the Gaza Strip as part of a larger effort to reconstitute its military forces. Hamas has also begun trying to recruit and train 18-year-olds to this end.
• Iran: Iranian presidential candidates discussed socio-cultural issues during the third debate of the upcoming election. None of the presumed frontrunners suggested that they would support fundamental changes to long-standing regime policies.
• West Bank: PIJ detonated an IED around Bat Hefer, which is near the Israel–West Bank border. The attack comes amid an uptick in Palestinian militant activity in the area in recent weeks.
• Lebanon: Workers at Beirut-Rafik Hariri International Airport are reportedly concerned about an increase in Iranian weapons deliveries to Lebanese Hezbollah.
• Iraq: Hamas is reportedly planning to relocate its political leadership from Qatar to Iraq. Iran and the Iraqi federal government would reportedly provide security to Hamas leaders in Iraq.

Iran Update, June 23, 2024

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Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hamas appears to be accelerating its reconstitution effort in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is actively recruiting 18-year-olds and has attempted to conduct training for new recruits.[1] Recruitment is one element of the second stage of reconstitution, regeneration. Reconstitution consists of two general tasks, reorganization and regeneration. Reorganization involves a commander redistributing the resources at their disposal to restore attrited units to a minimal level of effectiveness.[2] Regeneration is a more complex, time-intensive, and resource-intensive process “that requires large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.”[3] This process includes training of new personnel.[4] Active Hamas recruitment efforts indicate that at least some Hamas commanders have begun to regenerate the forces under their command.

Hamas will likely continue to try to exploit the lack of Israeli forces throughout much of the Gaza Strip by executing both reorganization and regeneration efforts to reconstitute itself.[5] A commander usually must disengage their force from opposing forces to successfully and efficiently reconstitute. Hamas took advantage of Israeli withdrawals in much of the Gaza Strip to rebuild the combat power of degraded local battalions, integrate new forces, and prepare them for further combat activities. Recruitment and training are key components of restoring combat units, which will enable Hamas to prepare for further engagements with the IDF.[6]

Hamas appears to be successfully reconstituting itself militarily and politically in areas where the IDF is no longer present. Repeated Israeli raids into Gaza City suggest that Hamas is successfully reconstituting itself militarily, prompting the raids. A senior Israeli defense official said that Hamas is focusing on recovery and rehabilitation across the Gaza Strip, particularly in areas where the IDF is no longer operating.[7] Hamas is also working to reassert local control in Khan Younis by deploying fighters on the streets, managing local policing, and taking over humanitarian aid shipments.[8] Hamas is restoring its governing arms as well, which has prompted the IDF to target Hamas officials involved in these activities.[9]

The Houthis claimed on June 22 that they conducted a combined attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias targeting five vessels in and around Haifa Port.[10] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Houthi military spokesperson issued separate but complimentary statements claiming to target four commercial vessels in the Haifa Port using drones on June 22.[11] The Houthi military spokesperson said that the groups targeted two unnamed “cement tankers” and two cargo ships that violated the Houthis’ unofficial blockade of Israel.[12] The groups also claimed a drone attack on a Luxembourg-flagged livestock carrier in the Mediterranean Sea as it approached Haifa Port.[13] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether any attack occurred. These attacks mark the third time that the Houthis have claimed a combined operation targeting Israel with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq since June 6.[14] The growing cooperation between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias furthermore reflects the desire of the Axis of Resistance to present itself as an interoperable coalition.[15]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted two drone attacks targeting US forces at al Tanf Garrison in eastern Syria on June 22. Iranian-backed militia Telegram accounts, Syrian media, and international journalists reported that three drones targeted al Tanf Garrison in two separate attack waves on June 22.[16] No group has claimed responsibly for the attack at the time of this writing and CTP-ISW cannot verify whether any attack occurred.

The attacks may be linked to a likely Israeli strike that killed a Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada (KSS) militant in Albu Kamal, eastern Syria, on June 21.[17] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah and KSS blamed the United States for the June 21 airstrike.[18] Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve categorically denied on June 22 that the US or other coalition forces conducted an airstrike on the Iraq-Syria border.[19] Local opposition media reported the strike targeted an Iranian-backed militia vehicle transporting weapons near an ammunition warehouse.[20]

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee issued a statement suggesting a consensus among Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to resume attacks targeting US forces on June 19.[21] The reported al Tanf garrison drone attacks do not confirm that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has decided to restart its attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria, however.  Unspecified actors have previously conducted unclaimed attacks targeting US positions in Syria since the Islamic Resistance in Iraq paused its attack campaign.[22] Kataib Hezbollah has been driving efforts to resume attacks on US forces since at least April 2024 after its resistance to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani‘s original order to stop attacks in January.[23] Emirati state media reported in April 2024 that Islamic Resistance in Iraq militia leaders disagreed with Kataib Hezbollah’s calls to resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Hamas Reconstitution: Hamas appears to be accelerating its reconstitution effort in the Gaza Strip by beginning to regenerate its forces through recruitment. Hamas appears to be successfully reconstituting itself militarily and politically in areas where the IDF is no longer present.
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed on June 22 that they conducted a combined attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias targeting five vessels in and around Haifa Port.
• West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 22.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 22.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias likely conducted two drone attacks targeting US forces at al Tanf Garrison in eastern Syria on June 22. The reported al Tanf garrison drone attacks do not confirm that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has decided to restart its attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria, however.

Iran Update, June 22, 2024

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Ashka Jhaveri, Kelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Hamas infrastructure in two areas of Gaza City.[1] Palestinian sources, including the Hamas-controlled Government Media Office, reported that 38 bodies were brought to a local hospital after the strike in al Shati Camp.[2] Several people are still trapped under rubble at another targeted site in the Tuffah neighborhood.[3] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF was targeting a Hamas leader that it assesses as the fourth most important senior Hamas military commander, Raad Saad.[4] The outlet said that Saad evaded Israeli targeting at al Shifa Hospital when the IDF returned in March 2024 targeting Hamas forces who had regrouped there.[5] The IDF has not confirmed the target of the strikes at the time of this writing.[6]

The IDF 99th Division continued operations along the Netzarim Corridor south of Gaza City on June 22. The IDF 3rd Brigade directed an airstrike targeting armed Palestinian fighters nearby.[7] Three Palestinian militias separately fired rockets and mortars targeting Israeli forces along the corridor.[8]

Key Takeaways:

• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF reportedly attempted to target the fourth highest-ranking Hamas military commander in Gaza City.
• Humanitarian Aid: An anonymous UN official said that unspecified armed groups regularly block aid convoys and hold aid drivers at gunpoint along the Israeli-declared humanitarian corridor east of Rafah.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least seven locations in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least four attacks into northern Israel.
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed two attacks targeting vessels in the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea.

 

Iran Update, June 21, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Katherine Wells, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iranian presidential candidates discussed government management and service provision during the second debate for the upcoming election.[1] The debate occurred on June 20. The candidates spoke in generalities without describing substantive policies to address domestic issues for much of the debate. Below are the key takeaways from what the three presumed frontrunners said in the debate.

• Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (pragmatic hardliner): Ghalibaf presented the most discrete policy positions among the frontrunners. Ghalibaf reiterated readiness to negotiate with the West in order to secure relief from international sanctions.[2] He discussed increasing wages to match inflation and launching a “multi-layered” social security insurance program.[3] Ghalibaf also reiterated support for foreign currency investment in Iran. Ghalibaf separately advocated for building a border wall dividing Iran from Afghanistan and Pakistan.[4]

• Saeed Jalili (ultraconservative hardliner): Jalili discussed resolving domestic issues but downplayed the importance of external economic interaction. Jalili discussed increasing food subsidies, managing energy consumption, and preventing brain drain.[5] Jalili also hesitated to endorse negotiations with the West and dismissed the need for Iran to adhere to international anti-corruption and transparency standards. Jalili separately criticized the Iranian healthcare system.

• Masoud Pezeshkian (reformist): Pezeshkian emphasizes his subordination to the supreme leader, as he has done repeatedly throughout his campaign.[6] His rhetoric reaffirms that, if elected, he would be constrained by whatever political boundaries the supreme leader sets just as every Iranian president is. Pezeshkian expressed support for loans and public works projects for rural communities. He also emphasized the importance of countering corruption and promoting education.[7] 

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iranian presidential candidates discussed government management and service provision during the second debate for the upcoming election. The candidates spoke in generalities without describing substantive policies to address domestic issues for much of the debate.

• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. Palestinian fighters continued attacking Israeli forces throughout the area.

• West Bank: Israeli police located and disarmed an IED planted under a car in Lod—an Israeli city around five miles from the Israel-West Bank border.

• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted six attacks into northern Israel, including with one-way attack drones.

• Yemen: The United States intercepted four Houthi unmanned surface vessels and two unmanned aerial vehicles in the Red Sea.

Israeli War Cabinet minister Benny Gantz resigned from the coalition government on June 9.[1] Gantz said he resigned because of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s conduct of the war in the Gaza Strip, which he believes is ”preventing [Israel] from reaching true victory.”[2] Gantz called for Netanyahu to set an election date for Fall 2024.[3] Gantz postponed the announcement, which was originally scheduled for June 8, after Israeli forces rescued four hostages from the Gaza Strip.[4] Gantz’s resignation will not on its own cause the collapse of the Netanyahu government.

The IDF expects to conclude clearing operations in Rafah in the “next few weeks,” according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.[5] The correspondent noted that the IDF will fully transfer to a targeted raid approach in the Gaza Strip after concluding the Rafah operation. The IDF transferred to a ”targeted raid” model in the northern Gaza Strip in late December 2023 after withdrawing five brigades and completing large-scale clearing operations in the northern Strip.[6] The IDF has repeatedly relaunched clearing operations into the northern Gaza Strip after transitioning to the raid model to degrade reconstituting Hamas forces.[7] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hamas and other Palestinian militias would likely try to exploit the Israeli withdrawal to reconstitute militarily and reassert Hamas' governing authority in Khan Younis.[8] An Israeli transition to targeted raids in Rafah would be similarly exploited by Hamas.

The Guardian Council approved six candidates to participate in the June 28 Iranian presidential elections.[9] CTP-ISW will publish additional analysis on the approval of these candidates on June 10. These candidates include Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Raisi administration Vice President and Martyrs and Veteran Affairs Foundation Head Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh, Supreme National Security Council Supreme Leader Representative Saeed Jalili, Parliamentarian Masoud Pezeshkian, former prosecutor and Interior Minister Mostafa Pourmohammadi, and Tehran Mayor Ali Reza Zakani.

Pezeshkian is the only reformist politician whom the council permitted to run. The Guardian Council notably did not approve prominent moderate politician Ali Larijani--marking Larijani’s second consecutive disqualification--or Vahid Haghanian, a close aide to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[10]

Key Takeaways:

• Israel: Israeli War Cabinet minister Benny Gantz resigned from the coalition government on June 9. Gantz’s resignation will not on its own cause the collapse of the Netanyahu government.
• Rafah: The IDF expects to conclude clearing operations in Rafah in the “next few weeks,” according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.
• Iran: Iran’s Guardian Council approved six candidates to participate in the June 28 Iranian presidential elections. The council only approved one reformist politician, and it disqualified prominent moderate politician Ali Larijani for the second consecutive presidential election.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 10 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 8.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on June 8.
• Yemen: A Houthi attack in the Arabian Sea on June 9 caused two ships to catch fire.

 

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Israeli forces rescued four Hamas-held hostages during a complex operation in the central Gaza Strip.[1] Hamas captured the four hostages from the Nova music festival during the October 7 attack.[2] This marks the second successful rescue of living hostages by Israel during the war.[3] Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters during the rescue and Palestinian fighters killed one Israeli officer during the engagement.[4] Hamas fighters fired a man portable air defense system at an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) helicopter in Nuseirat, where the rescue occurred.[5] The IDF acknowledged the presence of civilians in the area and estimated the number of casualties to be under 100. Palestinian reports said that hundreds of civilians died during the rescue.[6] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF recently launched raids in eastern Bureij and eastern Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip prior to ”provide cover” for the rescue operation.[7] US officials speaking to Western media said that the United States provided some intelligence to support the hostage rescue operation.[8]

The spokesperson for Hamas’ military wing threatened to capture more hostages and noted that most hostages remain in Hamas’ hands in response to the Israeli hostage rescue.[9] Hamas referenced its May 2024 claims that it captured Israeli soldiers in Jabalia as evidence of its ability to take additional hostages.[10] The IDF has previously denied that Hamas kidnapped an Israeli soldier in Jabalia in May 2024.[11] Hamas also said that Israel killed other hostages while conducting the rescue.[12] Hamas stated that Israel’s rescue operation does not alter what it calls Israel’s “strategic failure” in the Gaza Strip.[13] Hamas commended its fighters who engaged Israeli forces during the rescue and criticized the United States for its involvement in the operation.[14]

Israeli war cabinet minister Benny Gantz canceled his June 8 speech, in which he was expected to announce his resignation from the coalition government.[15] He made this decision following the Israeli hostage rescue. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called on Gantz not to leave the government during ”this time for unity.”[16]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The IDF rescued four hostages in an operation in Nuseirat, central Gaza Strip. Palestinian fighters killed one Israeli officer during the rescue. Separately, Israeli War Cabinet minister Benny Gantz canceled a speech in which he was expected to announce his resignation from the Israeli coalition government.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least six locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on June 7.
• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 11 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 7.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM destroyed a Houthi patrol boat in the Red Sea on June 7.

Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar indicated opposition to the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal, according to unspecified Arab officials. Sinwar stated that Hamas will only accept a proposal that guarantees a permanent ceasefire, which is one of the maximalist demands that Hamas has maintained since December 2023.[1] The current Israeli proposal provides provisions to meet Hamas’ demands but does not guarantee them. Sinwar’s comment comes amid international pressure on Hamas to accept the Israeli proposal. The United States has urged Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey to pressure Hamas to accept the proposal. An Israeli official indicated that “there will not be a better offer.”[2] US officials similarly said there is no backup plan if Hamas refuses the proposal.[3] Hamas has not delivered an official response to the proposal at the time of this writing.

Hamas seems unlikely to accept a proposal that does not meet its maximalist demands, which include a permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange. Hamas likely remains confident that it will survive Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip and can therefore maintain its maximalist demands without granting major concessions.

Some senior members of the Ebrahim Raisi administration are backing Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Mohammad Esmaili in the upcoming Iranian presidential election. They have framed their support for Esmaili as meant to continue Raisi’s agenda. Fifteen senior officials signed a letter on June 7 urging the Guardian Council, which is responsible for vetting and approving electoral candidates, to allow Esmaili to compete in the election.[4] The officials praised Esmaili’s “intellectual, political, and managerial abilities and qualifications."[5] The letter’s signatories include the following:

• Vice President for Executive Affairs Mohsen Mansouri
• Vice President for Women’s Affairs Ensieh Khazali
• Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani
• Energy Minister Ali Akbar Mehrabian
• Oil Minister Javad Owji
• Industry, Mines, and Trade Minister Abbas Ali Abadi
• Agricultural Jihad Minister Mohammad Ali Nikbakht
• Information and Communications Technology Minister Issa Zareh Pour
• Environmental Protection Organization Director Ali Salajegheh
• Administration and Employment Organization Director Meysam Latifi

Esmaili leads a faction affiliated with Raisi’s son-in-law, Mekdad Nili.[6] Mekdad’s brother, Meyshem Nili, and Mohsen Mansouri accompanied Esmaili when he registered for the presidential election on June 2.[7] Esmaili’s faction also includes Planning and Budget Organization Director Davoud Manzour and Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare Minister Solat Mortazavi.[8] Esmaili’s faction is reportedly competing against another faction in the Raisi administration that is led by Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash.[9] Bazrpash has also registered as a candidate in the presidential election. Bazrpash’s faction includes Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation President Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi and is affiliated with Presidential Office Cultural Deputy Mehdi Mojahed.[10] Bazrpash, along with Interim President Mohammad Mokhber, did not sign the letter to the Guardian Council endorsing Esmaili.[11] Mortazavi, who is part of Esmaili’s faction, also notably did not sign the letter.[12]

Some elements in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) appear to be supporting Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the upcoming Iranian presidential election. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency published an article on June 4 indirectly criticizing Ghalibaf’s competitor, Vahid Haghanian.[13] The article accused Haghanian of “unethically” using his relationship with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to advance his presidential campaign. The article was referencing that Haghanian has long worked in the Office of the Supreme Leader as a senior adviser to Khamenei. Haghanian responded to the article by vowing to end Iranian media’s “interference in internal politics” if he becomes president.[14] Reformist and opposition media attributed the attack on Haghanian to Tasnim News Agency supporting Ghalibaf in the upcoming election.[15] These reports are consistent with other reports that Tasnim News Agency has defended Ghalibaf against corruption allegations in recent months.[16]

Tasnim News Agency’s support for Ghalibaf could indicate that the top echelons of the IRGC also support him. Hamid Reza Moghadam Far, who is one of the outlet’s founders and current chairman of its board of directors, serves as a cultural and media adviser to IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami.[17] The close relationship between Moghadam Far and Salami suggests that there is a broader IRGC effort to help Ghalibaf win the presidency. Tasnim News Agency has notably left an article of Salami congratulating Ghalibaf on his reelection as parliament speaker on its politics home page since May 28.[18]

It would be unsurprising for significant elements in the IRGC to support Ghalibaf in the presidential race. Ghalibaf has decades-old ties to many senior IRGC officers dating back to their time fighting Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the 1980s. Ghalibaf is moreover part of a close circle of current and former IRGC officers who have repeatedly come together in times of domestic crisis to interfere in Iranian domestic politics.

US State Department spokesperson Mathew Miller said on June 6 that the United States is concerned that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani does not control fully the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[19] Miller’s statement is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iran has infiltrated the PMF extensively and uses it to exert significant influence in Iraq.[20] The PMF and the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that comprise it answer to Iran—not the Iraqi prime minister. Iranian-backed militias under the PMF paused attacks targeting US forces in January 2024 after IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani ordered them to stop.[21] Iraqi Kurdish media reported on June 5 that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias plan to renew their attacks targeting US forces in Iraq if Sudani does not set a deadline for a full US military withdrawal by the end of a 40-day deadline.[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar indicated opposition to the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal. Hamas seems unlikely to accept a proposal that does not meet its maximalist demands.
• Iran: Some elements in the IRGC appear to be supporting Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the upcoming Iranian presidential election. This support is unsurprising given Ghalibaf’s deep connections to the IRGC.
• Iraq: The US State Department said that it is concerned that the Iraqi prime minister does not control fully the Iraqi PMF. Iran has infiltrated the PMF extensively and uses it to exert significant influence in Iraq.
• Yemen: US CENTCOM destroyed two Houthi uncrewed surface vessels and intercepted eight Houthi drones in the Red Sea.

 

 

Iran Update, June 6, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iranian hardline officials are continuing to try to promote an electoral consensus among hardliners ahead of the June 28 presidential election. These efforts probably seek to avoid infighting between Iranian hardliners that could provide an opening for a more moderate candidate to win the presidency. Former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei called for “synergy and unity” among hardliners in a Twitter (X) post on June 5.[1] Rezaei similarly called for a "consensus” among "revolutionary forces” during a meeting with Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation President Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi and Parliamentary Economic Committee Chairman Mohammad Reza Pour Ebrahimi on June 4.[2] Hardline politician Gholam Ali Haddad Adel separately called on hardliners on June 6 to support a single candidate in the upcoming election.[3] Haddad Adel warned that hardliners could suffer a “defeat” in the election if they support a “plurality of candidates.”[4] Haddad Adel added that supporting a “plurality of candidates” could lead to a repeat of the 2013 presidential election in which a reformist candidate, Hassan Rouhani, won the presidency.[5]

Hamas reportedly said that it will reject the Israeli ceasefire proposal, arguing that the proposal does not ensure a permanent end to hostilities.[6] Saudi-based media obtained a copy of a Hamas memo to other Palestinian militias in which Hamas explained that Hamas did not accept the proposal because it is "fundamentally different" from the proposal that US President Joe Biden outlined on May 31.[7] Hamas said that it is committed to the proposal it accepted on May 6. Egypt unilaterally modified the May 6 proposal to include a permanent end to hostilities.[8] Hamas has previously said that it will not accept a ceasefire that does not ensure a permanent ceasefire after the completion of the initial phase of the proposal.[9] Hamas does not view any ceasefire as permanent and believes that any truce that ends before Israel’s destruction is a temporary truce.[10] The United States said on June 6 that Hamas has not delivered an official response to the Israeli proposal.[11]

Hamas’ reported rejection follows several reports that negotiations involving Israel, Hamas, and international mediators were showing no signs of a breakthrough.[12] Unspecified Egyptian sources said the mediators were attempting to reassure Hamas that the proposal would lead to an end to the fighting and full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[13]

Hamas will likely continue to reject ceasefire proposals if the proposal fails to secure Hamas’ maximalist objectives, which include a permanent ceasefire. Hamas remains confident that it can survive Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, and it can therefore pursue its maximalist demands without major concessions. Hamas’ leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, said in February that his military forces are in good condition and would survive a Rafah operation and he was in no rush to secure an agreement in early May.[14] CTP-ISW has previously noted that Hamas’ confidence in its survival increased and its ceasefire demands appear to have solidified as the IDF drew down its forces in the Gaza Strip beginning in late December 2023.[15]

Hamas attempted to infiltrate Israel using a tunnel 200 meters from the Israel-Gaza Strip border in Rafah.[16] Four Palestinian fighters armed with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) emerged from the tunnel under the cover of a thick fog.[17] Israeli forces engaged the Palestinian fighters in a fire fight and directed a drone and tank to engage the fighters.[18] The IDF killed three of the four Palestinian fighters 400 meters from the Israeli border in the Gaza Strip.[19] The fourth Hamas fighter fled into Rafah.[20] One Israeli soldier died during the incident.[21] Palestinian fighters have very rarely attempted to infiltrate Israeli territory since the October 7, 2023, attack.

Unspecified US and Israeli officials said in a June 6 Reuters report that Hamas has lost half of its forces and is currently using insurgent tactics.[22] Three senior US officials familiar with battlefield developments said that Hamas’ numbers have decreased from an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 before the conflict to between 9,000 and 12,000 fighters at present.[23] US intelligence previously estimated that Hamas has lost 30 to 35 percent of its fighters, and Israeli intelligence previously estimated that Hamas had as many as 30,000 to 40,000 fighters prior to the war.[24] An IDF spokesperson acknowledged that destroying Hamas as a governing authority is “an achievable and attainable military objective,” instead of attempting to kill every Hamas fighter.[25] Israeli officials have previously said that Israel’s war objectives are to destroy Hamas as a military organization and governing authority.[26]

One of the officials said that Hamas is avoiding direct battles with Israeli forces, preferring to ambush the IDF and using improvised explosive devices against Israeli forces.[27] A Gazan resident noted that Hamas previously immediately engaged Israeli forces as they advanced, but now Hamas is waiting for the IDF to enter the IDF’s target area before attacking.[28] An Israeli officer similarly noted that Hamas allows the IDF to advance into a target area before Hamas begins to engage the IDF.[29] Hamas fighters have previously employed similar “insurgent” tactics, however. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that Israeli forces encountered significant militia “resistance” in Zaytoun but not en route to Zaytoun in February 2024.[30] US officials estimate that Hamas can sustain such tactics “for months,” given Hamas’ ability to access weapons smuggled into the Strip via tunnels as well as additional weapons and ordinance captured from the IDF.[31]

A US official told Reuters that the Palestinian militias are withdrawing rapidly after attacks, taking cover, regrouping, before appearing in areas where Israeli forces are absent.[32] CTP-ISW has previously observed that Palestinian militias withdraw into areas where Israeli forces are absent to rest and reconstitute.[33] This complicates Israeli efforts to conduct repeated raids, as Palestinian fighters can withdraw from the areas that the IDF targets if the Palestinian fighters are at risk of being destroyed.

Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias issued a 40-day deadline for Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani to set a date for a US troop withdrawal from Iraq according to an “informed [Iraqi] political source” cited by an Iraqi Kurdish news outlet on June 5.[34] The ultimatum warned that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would resume attacks targeting US forces if Sudani fails to meet the 40-day deadline. A Lebanese Hezbollah–affiliated news outlet reported on May 25 that several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias believe the United States and Iraq have been "procrastinating” a decision to remove US forces from Iraq and are considering resuming attacks on US forces.[35] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Forces Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani ordered Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to suspend attacks on US forces in January 2024.[36] Some militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, fiercely resisted the order. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not changed their long-standing objective to expel US forces from Iraq and Syria and retain the capabilities to resume their attack campaign at any time.[37] Kataib Hezbollah has been driving efforts to resume attacks on US forces since at least April 2024 after their resistance to Ghaani‘s original stand-down order in January.[38] Various Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, including the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, have also warned that Iranian-backed militias will resume attacks on US forces if the United States and Iraq fail to set a timely date for a US troop withdrawal.[39] This report in Iraqi media did not make clear whether individual Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or the Islamic Resistance in Iraq as a whole issued this ultimatum. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that conducted attacks targeting US forces between October 2023 and January 2024, but many of the coalition’s constituent militias have attacked US forces prior to the current war.

The Houthis claimed on June 6 that they conducted a combined operation targeting Israel with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias as part of their effort to impose an unofficial blockade.[40] The Houthis said that they conducted a combined operation with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeting three ships near Haifa port, Israel, on June 6, including one ship that the Houthis said violated their unofficial blockade on Israel.[41] The IDF has not acknowledged any such attacks and CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim at the time of this writing. Both the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq have targeted shipping companies for transporting goods to Israel ports overland or by sea.[42] Iran and its Houthi partners have begun to articulate an aspiration to increase their ability to target Israel’s economy through military action, including by using drones and missiles to discourage shipping from traveling to Israeli ports.[43] Iran and its militia partners cannot likely impose a blockade using drone and missile attacks in the near term, given that the Houthis and other Iranian-backed groups have not yet proven that they can successfully fire missiles and drones into the Mediterranean Sea at a rate sufficient to impose costs on the Israeli economy.[44] But Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” likely believe that a severe economic disruption would compel Israeli leaders to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and that such pressure could ultimately collapse the Israeli state.[45]

The combined attacks come shortly after a flurry of engagements across the Axis of Resistance to promote cooperation against Israel. Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi called on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to join the Houthis in attacking international shipping in the Mediterranean Sea during a speech on May 16.[46] The secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah held a phone call with Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi on May 24 to discuss the war, including coordination and force readiness.[47] Such engagements demonstrate that members of the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance are continuing to coordinate their actions during the Israel-Hamas war.

The combined Houthi-Iraqi militia attack reflects the broader desire of the Axis of Resistance to operate and present itself as an interoperable coalition. The claimed attacks highlight how Iran and its Axis of Resistance seek to function as a coalition to achieve its goals against Israel.[48] The Axis of Resistance has also seemingly attempted to present itself as an interoperable coalition at other junctures in the war. Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi said on October 10 that the Houthis were “coordinating” with the Axis of Resistance to decide when and how to enter the war, and both the Houthis and Iraqi groups began their respective attack campaigns on October 18, one day after the al Ahli Hospital explosion.[49] This coordination is emblematic of Iran’s vision for the Axis of Resistance, which Iran sees as its unconventional alliance of like-minded actors united by anti-US and anti-Israeli ideologies.[50] This strategic alignment helps Iran and Iranian-backed groups accomplish their shared objectives, such as the destruction of Israel and the expulsion of US influence from the region.

The Houthis released a video on June 5 that shows the Houthis firing a likely Iranian-supplied missile that it used to target Eilat, southern Israel, on June 3.[51] The Houthis said that its Palestine missile is “locally made,” but the missile bears visual similarities to the Iranian Kheiber Shekan ballistic missile.[52] Iran originally unveiled the Khiber Shekan in February 2022.[53] Associated Press reported that the Palestine missile uses solid fuel as opposed to liquid fuel.[54] The Kheiber Shekan is also a solid fuel missile.[55] A Syrian Arab Army affiliated source also reported that the Palestine missile resembles the Kheiber Shekan missile.[56]

Palestinian fighters are likely maintaining at least one vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) manufacturing cell northeast of Tubas. Unidentified Palestinian fighters detonated a VBIED approximately one kilometer from the IDF’s Tayasir checkpoint in Tubas on June 6.[57] The VBIED exploded in an open area and there were no casualties.[58] There are no obvious targets in the area where the Palestinian fighters detonated the VBIED, and the IDF is investigating whether this incident was a failed attempt to detonate the VBIED at the Tayasir checkpoint.[59] No Palestinian militia has claimed the attack as of this writing. Palestinian fighters have deployed at least five VBIED attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern West Bank since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023.[60] Four of those attacks took place near Tubas.[61]

Palestinian militias in Tubas may be collaborating to assemble and deploy these VBIEDs, given the significant amount of resources and expertise required to manufacture a VBIED. It is unclear how sophisticated or well-manufactured these VBIEDs are, especially because the VBIED used in this attack appears to have detonated before its operators intended. An Israeli military correspondent noted that IED attacks of an “unprecedented nature” have appeared in the West Bank in recent months.[62]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Presidential Elections: Iranian hardline officials are continuing to try to promote an electoral consensus among hardliners ahead of the June 28 presidential election as part of an effort to avoid infighting between hardliners that could provide an opening for a moderate victory.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas reportedly said that it will reject the Israeli ceasefire proposal, arguing that the proposal does not ensure a permanent end to hostilities. Hamas will continue to reject proposals until it secures a “permanent ceasefire.” Hamas does not acknowledge the legitimacy of any permanent ceasefire and has repeatedly said that any ceasefire is temporary until Hamas destroys Israel.
• Gaza Strip: An Israeli official said that Hamas is avoiding direct battles with Israeli forces, preferring to ambush the IDF and using improvised explosive devices against Israeli forces
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed on June 6 that they conducted a combined operation targeting Israel with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias as part of their effort to impose an unofficial blockade. This blockade is unlikely to be successful, given that the Houthis have so far been unable to successfully attack Israeli shipping in the Mediterranean at a sufficient rate to impact imports or exports from Mediterranean ports.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias reportedly set a 40-day deadline for the Iraqi prime minister to expel US forces from Iraq.
• West Bank: Palestinian fighters are likely maintaining at least one vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) manufacturing cell northeast of Tubas. Palestinian militias in Tubas may be collaborating to assemble and deploy these VBIEDs, given the significant amount of resources and expertise required to manufacture a VBIED.

Iran Update, June 4, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

A senior Hamas official responded negatively on June 4 to the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal for the Gaza Strip. Hamas appears unlikely to accept a proposal that does not meet the maximalist demands that Hamas has maintained since December 2023. Hamas Political Bureau member Osama Hamdan said Hamas cannot agree to a proposal that does not guarantee a permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange.[1] Hamdan called on international mediators to obtain a clear Israeli commitment to these demands. Hamdan added that all Palestinian factions share Hamas’ position. Hamas remains confident that it will survive Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip and can therefore maintain its maximalist demands without granting major concessions.

The current Israeli proposal provides provisions to meet Hamas’ demands but does not guarantee them. An anonymous Israeli official told Israeli media that “there will not be a better offer” than the current Israeli proposal that Hamas is reviewing.[2] US President Joe Biden outlined the three phases of the proposal as follows:[3]

• Phase one involves a six-week ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from densely populated areas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas would release an unspecified number of hostages,
  including Americans, women, and elderly and sick individuals, as well as the bodies of hostages in exchange for “hundreds” of Palestinian prisoners in this phase. Displaced Palestinian civilians would return to their homes, including those in the northern Gaza Strip. Humanitarian aid would “surge with 600 trucks [entering the Gaza Strip] per day” as well. Negotiations for a permanent ceasefire would continue during this phase.
• Phase two involves Hamas and other Palestinian militias releasing all remaining living hostages and Israeli forces withdrawing from the Gaza Strip completely. Biden said that the United States, Egypt, and Qatar would ensure that negotiations continue during this phase.
• Phase three involves major reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. It also involves Hamas and the other militias returning the bodies of all hostages to Israel.

Axios reported that some Israeli officials are concerned that recent remarks from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could disrupt ceasefire negotiations.[4] Netanyahu stated that Israel will not agree to a ceasefire until Hamas is destroyed.[5] Some Israeli officials are concerned that these comments could signal to Hamas that Israel only wants a temporary pause in the fighting rather than a permanent ceasefire.[6] The proposal includes two clauses with vague language that would allow both sides to begin the first phase of the deal and progress into phase two as long as talks persist.[7] Axios noted that the ambiguous phrasing could allow fighting to resume after the first phase without meaningful progress toward an end to the war.[8] Netanyahu has said that he wants to retain the option to resume fighting should negotiations falter and that Israel could initiate the first phase of the ceasefire proposal without a follow-on agreement for a permanent ceasefire, according to Israeli media.[9]

US President Joe Biden said on June 3 that Hamas is the only obstacle to a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[10] Biden told the Qatari emir that Israel is ready to initiate the ceasefire deal. Biden also said in an interview with Time that the Israeli proposal was “very generous” regarding which Palestinian prisoners Israel would release in exchange for Hamas-held hostages.[11] The Qatari Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson said on June 4 that Qatar has delivered the latest Israeli proposal to Hamas.[12]

Kataib Hezbollah, which is a prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia, called for a boycott of US businesses in Iraq and implied support for recent attacks targeting these businesses.[13] KH spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari called for the boycott in a statement on June 3. Askari accused US businesses of working as fronts for US intelligence services. Askari’s statement comes amid a series of attacks on US and UK companies in Iraq in recent days. Unidentified assailants have stormed and thrown explosives at these businesses, including Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) restaurants. damaging and vandalizing their property.[14] Local reporting claims that some of the assailants are KH members.[15]

Askari separately called on Iraqi security forces personnel to refuse to comply with US instruction in operations against the so-called “Islamic State” (IS). US advisory forces under Operation Inherent Resolve advise Iraqi security forces on air operations, intelligence, logistics, planning, and targeting through the Joint Operations Command.[16] The US Defense Department has said that Iraqi security forces rely on US support for counter-IS operations.[17] Iraqi security forces personnel refusing to follow US instruction would undermine combined US-Iraqi counterterrorism operations.

Senior officials tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are supporting Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the Iranian presidential election. Iranian media reported on June 4 that former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei and Interim President Mohammad Mokhber recently met with Ghalibaf and expressed support for his candidacy.[18] Their backing alleviated Ghalibaf’s “doubts” about running, according to the Iranian reports.[19] The Telegraph similarly reported that IRGC factions, including former IRGC Air Force Commander Hossein Dehghan, are supporting Ghalibaf.[20] Dehghan is currently a senior adviser for defense industrial policy to the Iranian supreme leader. The Telegraph reported that individuals close to Dehghan ”are contacting everyone they know” to improve Ghalibaf’s chances. Ghalibaf—like Rezaei and Dehghan—is himself a former IRGC commander. Ghalibaf headed the IRGC Air Force from 1997 to 2000. He also has deep personal ties dating back to the Iran-Iraq War to many senior officers in the Iranian security establishment.[21]

Ghalibaf and other prominent figures are apparently focused on preventing Saeed Jalili in particular from winning the election. The Telegraph reported that some IRGC factions are trying to prevent Jalili from winning because they consider him too extreme politically.[22] Jalili serves as one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s personal representatives to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and was the SNSC secretary from 2007 to 2013. A former official from the Iranian Interior Ministry told the Telegraph that individuals close to Ghalibaf oppose Jalili and “are contacting everyone they know to block Jalili.” An Iranian opposition outlet similarly reported in May 2024 that elements in the regime tried to convince Khamenei to prevent Jalili from competing in the election.[23] These elements included Ghalibaf as well as other hardliners, such as Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani and senior adviser to the supreme leader Ali Shamkhani. These elements also included some moderates, such as Ali Larijani, who is the brother of Sadegh.

Ghalibaf and Jalili were previously at odds during the Mahsa Amini protest movement in Iran in late 2022. Ghalibaf accused Jalili of adopting too harsh a stance vis-a-vis the protests and exacerbating frustrations among disaffected Iranian youth.[24] Ghalibaf contrastingly called for limited economic and political reforms to address protester grievances. Ghalibaf could use this contrast to appeal to more moderate elements in the Iranian political establishment.

Two factions from the Ebrahim Raisi administration are vying for the Iranian presidency, according to Iranian media.[25] These factions revolve around Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Mohammad Esmaili and Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash, both of whom registered as candidates for the election. Esmaili’s faction includes Planning and Budget Organization Director Davoud Manzour and Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare Minister Solat Mortazavi. Bazrpash’s faction includes Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation President Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: A senior Hamas official responded negatively to the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal for the Gaza Strip. Hamas appears unlikely to accept a proposal that does not meet the maximalist demands that Hamas has maintained since December 2023.
• Iraq: A prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia called for a boycott of US businesses in Iraq and implied its support for recent attacks targeting these businesses.
• Iran: Senior officials tied to the IRGC are supporting Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the Iranian presidential election.
• West Bank: Palestinian militias have continued trying to attack and threaten Israeli towns adjacent to the West Bank.
• Yemen: The Houthis announced that they recently fired a ballistic missile from Yemen toward Israel.

Iran Update, June 3, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Hardliners overwhelmingly dominate the candidate pool for the upcoming Iranian presidential election. The registration period for the election ended on June 3, and 80 individuals registered to compete in the election.[1] The Guardian Council—a regime body responsible for supervising elections and approving candidates—will vet candidates between June 4 and 10, and the Interior Ministry will then announce the final list of presidential candidates on June 11.[2] The Guardian Council has historically disqualified moderate and reformist figures to advantage hardline candidates.[3]

The following individuals registered between June 1 and 3:

• Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.[4] Ghalibaf is a hardline politician who has served as Iran’s parliament speaker since 2020.[5] Parliamentarians recently re-elected Ghalibaf as parliament speaker on May 28.[6] Ghalibaf is a long-time member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), having served as the IRGC Air Force commander between 1997 and 2000.[7] He is a very well-connected politician who maintains close personal relationships with the highest echelons of the IRGC dating back to the Iran-Iraq War.[8] Ghalibaf also served as Iran’s police chief between 2000 and 2005.[9]
• Vahid Haghanian.[10] Haghanian is a close aide to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Haghanian serves as Khamenei’s Executive Deputy and Deputy for Special Affairs and acts as a liaison between Khamenei’s office and senior Iranian politicians.[11] Iranian media noted on June 3 that Haghanian has “always been present in the Supreme Leader’s inner circle.”[12] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Haghanian in 2019 for acting on behalf of Khamenei’s office and noted that Haghanian “has been referred to as the Supreme Leader’s right hand.”[13] The US Treasury Department added that Haghanian is a former military commander and usually accompanies Khamenei on social engagements.[14] Haghanian emphasized on June 1 that it was his “personal decision” to register for the upcoming presidential election.[15]
• Zohreh Elahian, Hamida Zarabadi, and Hajar Chenarani.[16] Three women registered for the upcoming presidential election. The Guardian Council has never allowed a woman to compete in a presidential election.[17] Elahian is a hardline politician and a former member of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee.[18] The Canadian government sanctioned Elahian in March 2024 for supporting the dealth penalty of protesters involved in the Mahsa Amini movement.[19] Zarabadi is a reformist politician who represents Qazvin Province’s Qazvin, Abyek, and Alborz districts in Parliament.[20] Zarabadi stated on June 3 that her cabinet would be composed of men and women representing every ethnicity, religion, and class if she became president.[21]
• Mehrdad Bazrpash and Mohammad Esmaili.[22] Two current Ebrahim Raisi administration officials registered for the upcoming presidential election. Bazrpash currently serves as Iran’s roads and urban development minister and Esmaili serves as Iran’s culture and Islamic guidance minister. Bazrpash previously headed Iran’s two largest car manufacturing companies, SAIPA and Pars Khodrow.[23] The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada announced coordinated sanctions against Esmaili on the anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death in September 2023 for his role in enforcing the mandatory veiling law.[24]
• Ali Reza Zakani.[25] Zakani is a hardline politician who has served as the mayor of Tehran since 2021.[26] The Guardian Council barred Zakani from running in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections.[27] Zakani competed in the 2021 presidential election but ultimately withdrew his candidacy in support of Raisi.[28] Zakani previously headed the Student Basij Organization during the crackdown on student protesters in July 1999.[29]
• Eshaq Jahangiri.[30] Jahangiri is a reformist politician who served as Iran’s first vice president under former President Hassan Rouhani between 2013 and 2021.[31] Jahangiri withdrew from the 2017 election in support of Rouhani.[32] The Guardian Council barred Jahangiri from competing in the 2021 presidential election.[33]
• Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[34] Ahmadinejad is a hardline politician who served as Iran’s president between 2005 and 2013.[35] The Guardian Council barred Ahmadinejad from competing in the 2017 and 2021 presidential elections.[36]

Iran is continuing to increase its enriched uranium stockpile, according to a statement by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi during an IAEA Border of Governors meeting on June 3.[37] Grossi stated that the IAEA had not been able to access Iranian nuclear sites for over three years and that Iran had made no progress in resolving outstanding safeguards issues. Safeguards are IAEA activities that enable the IAEA to verify that a state is not using its nuclear programs for nuclear-weapons purposes.”[38] Grossi added that “public statements made in Iran” made about Iran’s ability “to produce nuclear weapons and possible changes to Iran’s nuclear doctrine” increased his concerns about the “correctness and completeness of Iran’s safeguards declarations.”[39] Iranian officials have increasingly normalized discussions about Iran’s ability to procure a nuclear weapon in recent months, as CTP previously reported.[40]

The Associated Press cited a confidential IAEA report on May 27 that reported that Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium from 121.5 kilograms to 142.1 kilograms (a 16.95 percent increase).[41] Weapons-grade uranium is uranium that is enriched to 90 percent purity. A US expert noted on May 28 that, based on the confidential IAEA report, Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for almost eight nuclear weapons in the first month after breakout.[42]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on June 3 that Israel will not agree to a permanent ceasefire until Israel achieves its war objectives.[43] US President Joe Biden outlined the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal and encouraged both Hamas and Israel to accept it during a speech on May 31.[44] He said that the proposal includes an initial six-week ceasefire with a partial Israeli military withdrawal and the release of some hostages while Hamas and Israel negotiate a permanent end to hostilities.[45] Netanyahu said on June 3 that Biden’s outline of the proposal was only “partial.”[46] Israel has confirmed that it approves the proposal that Biden outlined but insisted that a permanent ceasefire is only possible once Israel achieves its war objectives.[47] Two right-wing members of Netanyahu‘s coalition have threatened to dissolve the Israeli government if Netanyahu agrees to end the war.[48] Netanyahu said that Israel is insisting that a second phase of the ceasefire can begin only after there is an agreement on the terms of the complete ceasefire.[49] This would allow Israel to retain the right to resume fighting in the Gaza Strip as long as Israel views that the negotiations are futile. Netanyahu said during a closed-door parliamentary meeting that Israel could initiate the first phase of the proposal without an agreement on what follows.[50]

Hamas official Suheil al Hindi told The Washington Post on June 3 that Hamas is still discussing the ceasefire proposal that Biden presented.[51] Hamas told international mediators that it wants a detailed proposal that reflects the one Biden presented in his speech.[52] Hamas officials told international mediators that the latest Israeli proposal described a period of “sustainable calm“ in ambiguous terms, suggesting that Hamas was not confident that the “sustainable calm“ would secure Hamas‘ key demand, a permanent ceasefire.[53] Hamas stated on May 31 that it is willing to engage "positively and constructively" with the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal, so long as it meets Hamas’ maximalist demands.[54] Qatar sent the Israeli proposal to Hamas on May 30.[55] A senior US official mentioned that the proposal is "nearly identical" to one presented by Hamas three weeks prior before that proposal was unilaterally altered by Egyptian intelligence.[56] Hamas has not issued an official response to the Israeli proposal at the time of writing.

Hamas may reject the agreement if the agreement fails to secure Hamas’ maximalist objectives, which include a permanent ceasefire. Hamas remains confident that it can survive Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, and it can therefore pursue its maximalist demands without major concessions. CTP-ISW has previously noted that Hamas’ confidence in its survival increased, and its ceasefire demands appear to have solidified as the IDF drew down its forces in the Gaza Strip beginning in late December 2023.[57] Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar expressed confidence in February 2024, stating that Hamas is "doing fine" amid Israeli clearing operations.[58] Sinwar conveyed to Arab mediators in early May 2024 that he is in no hurry to end the war, as it is drawing international condemnation of Israel and reviving the Palestinian national cause.[59]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and War Cabinet member Benny Gantz on June 2.[60] Blinken commended Israel for its latest ceasefire proposal and emphasized that Hamas should accept the deal without delay.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on June 2 that Israel is assessing an alternative governing authority to Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[61] Gallant stated that Israel will isolate areas in the Gaza Strip, remove Hamas operatives, and bring in other forces to enable an alternative government. He emphasized that Israel will not accept Hamas’ rule.[62] Hamas will violently resist and undermine alternative governing authorities that do not include it. An Israeli intelligence source confirmed on June 1 that Hamas killed the head of a local clan in the Gaza Strip, disrupting an Israeli plan to replace Hamas as the primary governing authority.[63]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Presidential Elections: Hardliners overwhelmingly dominate the candidate pool for the upcoming Iranian presidential election. Current Parliament Speaker and former IRGC Air Force commander Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and close Khamenei aide Vahid Haghanian both registered for the election between June 1 and 3.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel will not agree to a permanent ceasefire until Israel achieves its war objectives. Hamas may reject the agreement if the agreement fails to secure Hamas’ maximalist objectives, which include a permanent ceasefire.
• Post-War Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on June 2 that Israel is assessing an alternative governing authority to Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas will violently resist and undermine alternative governing authorities that do not include it.
• West Bank: Palestinian fighters continue to seek to attack Israeli towns from the West Bank.
• Northern Israel: An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on June 3 that the IDF faces challenges intercepting drones targeting northern Israel. Other military forces, including the US Army, have also encountered challenges combatting Iranian-made drones in the Middle East.
• Yemen: The Houthis likely launched a ballistic missile from the Red Sea targeting Israel on June 3. The IDF’s Arrow ballistic missile defense system intercepted the Houthi missile.

Iran Update, June 2, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: Israeli forces launched a raid targeting Palestinian militias in Sabra and Zaytoun neighborhoods of Gaza City.
• Political Negotiations: Hamas stated that it will engage the latest Israeli proposal constructively, so long as the proposal meets Hamas’ maximalist demands.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in eight locations across the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted 11 attacks into northern Israel.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting Israel.
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed six drone and missile attacks targeting commercial and US naval vessels.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on June 1 that it launched a raid into the Sabra and Zaytoun neighborhoods of Gaza City.[1] Israeli forces have conducted multiple operations in this area of Gaza City throughout the war.[2] The IDF deployed its joint special operations multidimensional unit and two reserve brigades under the 99th Division for the raid.[3] The IDF said on June 2 that the multi-dimensional unit cooperated with the IDF Air Force to attack a Palestinian militia squad in a building.[4] The IDF 99th Division is currently operating along the Netzarim Corridor, which the IDF uses to launch raids against Hamas fighters and infrastructure in the northern and central Gaza Strip.[5] Palestinian militias conducted attacks targeting Israeli forces along the corridor and in Sabra.[6] CTP-ISW has previously stated that Hamas exploits the IDF raid-based model to protect Palestinian forces and facilitate reconstitution efforts.[7]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in several sectors of Rafah on June 2. The IDF confirmed that its Givati Brigade has advanced into the Yabna refugee camp.[8] Palestinian militias have claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces around the camp since May 28.[9] The IDF said on May 31 that its units are operating in central Rafah, where the camp is located.[10] Israeli forces located weapons in the camp, including anti-aircraft machine guns.[11] Israeli forces engaged Palestinians fighters near the Philadelphi Corridor, of which the IDF said it took control on May 29.[12]

Unspecified US and Israeli officials said that Israel adjusted its military operations in Rafah to avoid crossing the US Joe Biden administration’s red lines.[13] Israel originally planned to deploy two divisions to conduct clearing operations in Rafah.[14] The United States expressed concern that such action could increase civilian casualties significantly.[15] President Biden said on May 8 that the United States will stop supplying Israel with certain weapons if Israel conducts a major military operation into Rafah.[16] The latest reporting is consistent with other reports that Israel was planning a limited attack targeting Hamas in Rafah and that the IDF is moving “more deliberately” in Rafah.[17]

Hamas stated on May 31 that it is willing to engage "positively and constructively" with the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal, so long as it meets Hamas’ maximalist demands.[18] Hamas restated that its demands are a permanent ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, the return of displaced Palestinians, and a “genuine” prisoner swap deal.[19] Hamas was responding to a speech on May 31 from US President Joe Biden, who urged Hamas to accept the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal. The proposal outlines three phases that include the withdrawal of Israeli forces and a permanent ceasefire.[20] Biden did not specify how many Israeli hostages or Palestinian prisoners would be released in this proposal, nor did he specify the length of phases two and three. Hamas’ response to the speech does not necessarily reflect a change in its position.

US officials stated that Biden's speech aimed to garner international support for the proposal and increase pressure on Hamas to accept the deal.[21] Biden warned that Hamas’ rejection of the proposal could lead to an escalation of the war. A senior US official mentioned that the proposal is "nearly identical" to one presented by Hamas three weeks prior.[22] The United States, Qatar, and Egypt published a joint statement on June 2 calling for Israel and Hamas to agree to the ceasefire proposal that Biden referenced in his speech.[23]  

Israel confirmed on June 1 that it agreed with the framework of the ceasefire proposal that President Biden described.[24] Ophir Falk, who is a senior adviser to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, confirmed that Israeli approves the deal but also noted that a permanent ceasefire would only be possible once Israel achieves all its war aims. US officials expressed optimism, noting that Israel did not oppose Biden's speech or dispute that it accurately reflected the latest Israeli proposal.[25]

An Israeli intelligence source confirmed on June 2 that Hamas killed a clan leader in the Gaza Strip, disrupting an Israeli plan to replace Hamas as the primary governing authority in the strip.[26] Israel tried to persuade the Dughmush clan to assume responsibility from Hamas. The clan leaders were reportedly open to such discussions.[27] Hamas then killed the clan leader, which CTP-ISW assessed at the time was meant to reassert Hamas control of the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli security analyst Ronen Solomon noted that no other force in the southern Gaza Strip is as powerful as the Dughmush clan. Senior Israeli officials are now working to find credible alternative rulers for the strip, aiming to persuade younger, more moderate Fatah members to govern and coexist with Israel.[28] Hamas has been rebuilding its military and governing authority in the northern Gaza Strip since Israeli forces reduced their presence in December 2023. Hamas has a long history of violently suppressing political opposition in Gaza, and this incident highlights its determination to thwart Israeli efforts to replace it.

Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks into Israel on June 2.[29] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine fired rockets at an IDF site.[30] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine fired rockets at Israeli forces near the Kerem Shalom border crossing between Israel and the Gaza Strip.[31] Kerem Shalom is the main entry point for humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least eight locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on June 1.[32]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 11 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 1.[33] The IDF intercepted an aerial target in northern Israel, which caused alarms near Nahariya.[34] Neither Hezbollah nor a Palestinian militia has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat on June 1.[35] Israeli officials and media have not commented on the attack at the time of this writing.

The Houthis claimed six drone and missile attacks targeting US Navy ships and merchant vessels in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean on June 1.[36] The Houthis claimed that they conducted two attacks targeting the US aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower north of the Red Sea in the past 24 hours.[37] The Houthis purportedly used drones and missiles in the first attack and unspecified weapons in the second attack.[38] There is no evidence that these attacks occurred. The Houthis also claimed they “directly hit” a US destroyer in the Red Sea using drones.[39] US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that it intercepted two Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the USS Gravely destroyer in the southern Red Sea on June 1.[40] The Houthis additionally claimed two attacks targeting the Malta-flagged MAINA merchant vessel in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, one attack targeting the Marshall Islands-flagged AL ORAIQ LNG tanker in the Indian Ocean, and one attack targeting the Malta-flagged ABLIANI crude oil tanker in the Red Sea.[41] CENTCOM reported that it intercepted one Houthi drone in the southern Red Sea on June 1 and that two other Houthi drones crashed into the Red Sea without causing damage or injuries.[42] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported that a vessel observed an explosion “a significant distance from the vessel” approximately 48 nautical miles southwest of al Hudaydah, Yemen, in the southern Red Sea on June 1.[43]

Iran Update, June 1, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force has killed three Hamas officials in the central Gaza Strip over the past week. Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Rafah.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in five locations in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Yemen: The Houthis launched one drone from Houthi-controlled Yemen into the Red Sea.