Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Updates Page

Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update May 21, 2025

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Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Tetiana Trach, and Jennie Olmsted

May 21, 2025, 9:30am

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on May 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 28 Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Report.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to prioritize leveraging migrants to mitigate ongoing labor shortages, despite ongoing complaints from Russian ultranationalists advocating for the Kremlin to impose harsher restrictions on migrants. Putin on April 28 extended the deadline for migrants who entered Russia illegally to apply for legal status or leave Russia from April 30 to September 10, 2025. Putin initially signed the decree setting the deadline on December 30, 2024.[1] Migrants can obtain legal status by submitting to a series of health screenings; passing a Russian language, history, and legal exams; and paying off all debts, or by signing a military service contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russia is reportedly suffering a labor shortage of 1.5 million people due to its war in Ukraine.[2] Putin likely does not want to exacerbate ongoing labor shortages with arbitrarily imposed deadlines that will further restrict migrants from contributing to the Russian economy, given that a significant number of migrants work in consumer services, construction, delivery, and other low-skilled industries.[3] Putin's migrant policies notably contradict his efforts to appease the ultranationalist crowd that has been increasingly calling for Putin to take harsher measures against migrants in Russia.

Russia has also increasingly targeted migrant communities to support force generation efforts as the Russian military continues to rapidly deploy low-quality troops to frontline units. Russian authorities have threatened to revoke naturalized Russian citizenship to impress migrants into the Russian military and have leveraged the prospect of obtaining Russian citizenship to recruit migrants into joining the Russian military.[4] The Russian law enforcement launches raids on migrant workplaces and detains migrants to coerce them into Russian military service and advertise Russian military contract service in Central Asian languages.[5] Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) announced in February 2025 that it has created a registry to monitor migrants who are illegally residing in Russia and prohibit individuals included in the registry from leaving the Russian federal subject in which they reside.[6] Russia likely intends to use this registry to strictly monitor migrants and build out a list of vulnerable individuals to coerce into joining the Russian military.

Ukraine's "I Want to Live" project reported that Russia has been recruiting foreign citizens to the Russian military since the first quarter of 2023 and specifically targeted people from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan during the initial stages of the recruitment campaign.[7] The "I Want to Live" project reported in April and May 2025 that it confirmed the identities of at least 1,110 Uzbek, 931 Tajik, 661 Kazakh, 360 Kyrgyz, and 170 Turkmen citizens serving in the Russian military against Ukraine.[8] Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin stated on May 20 that the committee's military investigative department has detained 80,000 naturalized Russian citizens who do not want to register for military service, presumably since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.[9] Bastrykin claimed that 20,000 of these detainees — who are mainly from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan — are now serving on the frontline in Ukraine. Russia likely seeks to continue to leverage migrant populations in the immediate term to support force generation efforts as the Russian military increasingly suffers higher casualties for a lower rate of advance across the theater.[10]

Putin remains willing to acquiesce to select ultranationalist demands for forceful assimilation of migrants, likely as part of longstanding Kremlin efforts to combat Russian demographic decline. Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly expressed support for the incorporation of migrants into Russian society, although they have supported efforts to Russify these migrants.[11] The Russian Ministry of Education developed a procedure in January 2025 to test foreign children's Russian language proficiency as a condition for attending a Russian school.[12] The Russian Federal Service for Supervision in Education and Science (Rosobrnadzor) reported on May 13 that it rejected 81 percent of applications to take a Russian language exam, citing incomplete applications and a lack of vacancies in schools, however.[13] Russia has also considered increasing the minimum Russian history and law exam score for foreigners interested in a Russian residence permit or Russian citizenship.[14] The Kremlin consistently supports establishing Russian and Russian language schools and universities in Central Asia.[15] Russian authorities also reportedly began developing a system to legalize the status of Russia's so-called "compatriots abroad" - whom Putin has previously defined as anyone with historical, cultural, or linguistic ties to Russia - that would allow these individuals to access unspecified government services, visit and work in Russia, and even apply for Russian citizenship in the future.[16] Putin likely intends to utilize migration — especially from post-Soviet countries with closer economic, political, and cultural ties to Russia — to counter Russia's demographic decline in the long term. Putin likely supports these assimilation efforts in order to ease relations between migrants and local inhabitants and to generate a docile population susceptible to ongoing Kremlin efforts to promote civic Russian nationalism.

Putin's continued efforts to establish a civic Russian identity that includes ethnic and religious minorities are at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians. Putin has commended Central Asian contributions to Russia and publicly supported efforts to leverage migrants to offset labor shortages and incorporate migrants into Russian society at high-profile events such as the December 2024 annual Direct Line televised press conference and May 2025 Victory Day celebrations.[17] Putin’s choice to promote multiculturalism at Russia’s largest national holiday, Victory Day, demonstrates that Putin continues to support an informal state ideology of Russian civic nationalism over an ethno-religious-based nationalism.

Putin's manifestation of Russian nationalism is at odds with the informal ideology of pro-war Russian ultranationalists, which is based on an ethnic Russian identity and promotes Russian Orthodoxy.[18] Pro-war Russian ultranationalist milbloggers have routinely advocated for harsher restrictions against migrants entering and living in Russia and called for increased deportations.[19] Select milbloggers have also directly criticized Putin's and the Russian government's perceived lenient attitude toward Central Asian migrants.[20] The "Russian Community," a Russian far-right pro-war ultranationalist online community with ties to affiliates of Russian Tsargrad outlet founder and Russian Orthodox nationalist Konstantin Malofeev, organizes demonstrations against migrants and has garnered over half a million followers on its Telegram.[21] The "Russian Community" routinely posts instances of alleged migrant violence on Telegram. These ultranationalist communities are one of the key constituencies that Putin is trying to leverage to boost domestic support for the war and long-term militarization of Russian society.[22] Malofeev is also a key figure in Russia's force generation efforts.[23] Senior Russian officials such as Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin, Russian MVD Head Vladimir Kolokoltsev, and head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), Patriarch Kirill, have routinely appeared more interested an ideology predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians that defends and platforms Russian Orthodoxy.[24]

Putin has to balance his civic nationalism ideology, force generation and labor needs, and ultranationalists' demands for a Russian ethno-state to sustain his war effort in Ukraine and support his economy. Russian ultranationalist communities such as Cossacks and the Union of Donbas Volunteers, who avidly promote ethnic Russian identity and promote Russian Orthodoxy, have proven to be essential in Russia's force generation efforts.[25] The Kremlin also relies on migrants and ethnic minority groups to generate forces and support the economy.[26] Putin is likely hesitant to fully commit to the ultranationalist ideology as it risks fragmenting Russia's multiethnic and religiously diverse population, jeopardizing Russia's war effort in Ukraine, and threatening his regime's stability. Putin will likely continue to struggle to balance placating the increasingly influential ultranationalist community and their champions in key Kremlin institutions with the need to leverage migrants to offset immediate economic and force generation issues and long-term demographic decline.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to prioritize leveraging migrants to mitigate ongoing labor shortages, despite ongoing complaints from Russian ultranationalists advocating for the Kremlin to impose harsher restrictions on migrants.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin once again reaffirmed the Kremlin's commitment to avoiding declaring an involuntary mobilization call-up.
• The Russian Airborne Forces continue recruiting volunteers to staff the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center.
• Putin reportedly signed an amendment that allows for the demobilization of a limited number of Russian servicemen who were illegally mobilized in September 2022.
• The Russian MoD recently intensified recruitment into the state-controlled Africa Corps, likely to finally replace remaining Wagner Group personnel in Africa and the Middle East.
• Russian milbloggers argued that Russia needs to form private military companies (PMCs) like the Wagner Group to retain Russian officers and professional servicemen in military service.
• The Russian Navy is forming at least five unmanned systems regiments within the Russian regional fleets.
• The Kremlin is actively co-opting Russian veterans to participate in the 2025 regional and 2026 State Duma elections as part of an ongoing coordinated campaign aimed at raising a loyal, pro-war elite in Russia.
• The Kremlin has evolved its use of veterans in election campaigns since last nominating Russian veterans in the 2024 elections.
• The Kremlin introduced quotas to ensure that federal subjects integrate enough veterans into the Russian government via the "Time of Heroes" program likely because Russian regional officials are failing to or are deliberately sabotaging Putin's efforts to install new officials recruited from the Russian veteran class.
• Russian officials are continuing to introduce financial compensations and social benefits to Russian veterans and their families to integrate veterans into Russian society and alleviate the risk of societal backlash against the regime.
• Putin established an interdepartmental working group for raising Russian children and youth on May 19 under the leadership of the Kremlin's main propaganda curator.
• Russia has introduced several initiatives in schools aimed at militarizing children and preparing them for future military service.
• Russian occupation officials reportedly formed 102 Yunarmiya (Young Army Cadets National Movement) units in occupied Luhansk Oblast to militarize Ukrainian children and prepare them for future Russian military service.
• Russian federal subjects and occupation officials are trying to scale up Russia's drone development and production.
• The Russian MoD is failing to distribute state orders and funding to some Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises.
• Satellite imagery indicates that the Kremlin has depleted another Soviet-era Russian armored vehicle storage facility in Omsk Oblast to support its war effort in Ukraine.
• The Russian government is establishing the state-controlled Center for the Development of Artificial Intelligence.
• Russian forces reportedly developed a smaller variant of the Shahed drone that can be used along the frontlines and modified Shahed strike drones to overcome Ukraine's anti-drone measures.
• Russian developers continued to introduce new anti-drone adaptations and interceptors and belatedly modernized the two-seater Yakovlev Yak-52 training aircraft into Yak-52B2 anti-drone aircraft.
• Russian developers presented a new large cargo drone reportedly capable of facilitating logistics.
• The Russian MoD reportedly equipped Russian mobile fire groups with mobile radars from the latest Pantsir-SMD-E surface-to-air missile system.
• Putin awarded the state Marshal Georgy Zhukov prize to the developers of unguided rockets for TOS-1A “Solntsepek” and TOS-2 "Tosochka" heavy flamethrower systems on May 15.

Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update May 14, 2025

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Tetiana Trach, Vivien Flokas, Daria Novikov, and Kateryna Stepanenko

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1 pm ET on May 12, 2025. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 20 Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Report.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) intensified recruitment efforts for the state-controlled Africa Corps starting in February 2025, likely in an effort to expand Russia’s military presence in Africa and raise an active reserve that the Kremlin can use in Ukraine.
• The Russian government reportedly launched the Russian Unified Register for Military Registration (Reestrpovestok), which is responsible for distributing conscription notices electronically.
• Russia presented its first drone regiment of the newly established Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) branch during the May 9 "Victory Day" parade.
• The Russian Presidential Administration is setting information conditions to loosen the "Time of Heroes" eligibility requirement for informal units serving within the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) in order to expedite the formation of a country-wide, veteran-based elite loyal to the Kremlin.
• The Kremlin is pursuing a coordinated campaign aimed at expanding Russian military-patriotic youth organizations to support Russia's long-term force generation efforts.
• Russian officials reportedly involved over 12 million children and teachers in celebrations ahead of the "Victory Day" parade on May 9 in support of the Kremlin's efforts to indoctrinate and militarize the Russian youth.
• The Russian MoD is continuing to execute Putin's stated objective of expanding mandatory genomic registration for various classes of Russian servicemen by July 1, likely as part of the Kremlin's effort to combat desertion via a unified state database.
• Recently appointed commander of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, Colonel Abdulaziz Shikhabirov, reportedly died in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is scaling up its missile production by doubling down on its sanctions evasion schemes and domestically producing some missile components in Russia.
• The Kremlin is attempting to set up a new production line for hexogen (RDX) explosives in an effort to expand Russia's artillery ammunition and glide bomb stocks.
• The Russian forces reportedly procured multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) from North Korea.
• Russia is reportedly recruiting young women from Latin America, South Asia, and countries of the former Soviet Union to build Shahed strike drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan.
• Russia reportedly developed a new S8000 "Banderol" drone-based cruise missile.
• Russian forces are continuing to use attack helicopters to repel Ukrainian drone strikes with mixed results.
• Putin awarded the 52nd Artillery Brigade (likely part of the Russian 104th Airborne [VDV] Division) with the honorific "guards" title on May 5.
• The Russian MoD awarded on May 7 more than 200 Russian servicemen for their participation in assaults in Ukraine, likely as part of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's efforts to appease Russian servicemen and ultranationalists.
• The Russian MoD awarded elements of BARS detachments operating in southern Ukraine on May 9 and 11 in a continued effort to centralize state control over informal, volunteer detachments.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Assessed Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization and undermining regime stability)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) intensified recruitment efforts for the state-controlled Africa Corps starting in February 2025, likely in an effort to expand Russia’s military presence in Africa and raise an active reserve that the Kremlin can use in Ukraine. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Tatar-Bashkir Service Idel Realii reported on May 5 that the Russian Africa Corps is actively recruiting in the Republic of Tatarstan and actively leverages local media outlets and social media advertisements to attract recruits.[1] The head of the "Batyr" recruitment center in the Republic of Tatarstan, Vladislav Kuznetsov, told a local media agency in March 2024 that the Russian MoD is offering men aged 18 through 45 and officers up to 55 years old a one-year-long military service contract in the Africa Corps.[2] Kuznetsov stated that recruits train in Russia for the first six months and then relocate to Africa for the remaining service period. Kuznetsov stated that those who join the Africa Corps receive a one-time federal payment of 400 thousand rubles ($4,938), a regional payment of 2.1 million rubles ($25,925) from the Tatarstan Republic, and a minimum monthly salary of 240,000 rubles ($2,963). Idel.Realii calculated that the Africa Corps recruits in the Tatarstan Republic receive compensation comparable to the combined compensation provided by the Russian federal and regional recruiters. Kuznetsov claimed that the Africa Corps recruits are entitled to some state benefits, such as additional one-time payments for having children and compensation for being wounded or killed. A local Africa Corps recruiter stated in April 2025 that the Africa Corps is exclusively recruiting for operations in Africa.[3] The recruiter added that Africa Corps servicemen sign military service contracts with the Russian MoD and will have to fight in Ukraine if the Russian MoD orders them. The official Africa Corps Telegram channel also stated that active-duty servicemen fighting in Ukraine cannot be transferred to the Africa Corps.[4] The Kremlin is reportedly recruiting personnel into the Africa Corps throughout the country, including in Moscow City, Moscow Oblast, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Krasnodar City, and Novorossiysk.[5]

Russian Involuntary Military Service (Assessed Russian objective: Expand Russia's inactive reserve via conscription and enhance Russian administrative capacity regarding military mobilization)

The Russian government reportedly launched the Russian Unified Register for Military Registration (Reestrpovestok), which is responsible for distributing conscription notices electronically. Russian human rights organization Idite Lesom reported on May 9 that Reestrpovestok is operating across Russia and that Russian officials removed the notice that Reestrpovestok was only working in test mode in Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, and the Republic of Mari El.[6] Idite Lesom reported that Reestrpovestok now allows Russian men to log into the portal and check the status of any active summons, but noted that the organization has not observed any reports that Russian men have begun receiving summonses from the portal as of May 9. Russian anti-mobilization resource Dvizheniye Soznatelnyh Otkazchikov (Movement of Conscientious Objectors) reported on May 9 that Reestrpovestok launched a new function on May 8, which allows men to request information from the registry of sent summonses and the Russian military information registry.[7] Reestrpovestok contains information about military registration, personal, and passport data; individual insurance account numbers; taxpayer personal identification numbers; citizenship information; education; work activity; and health status.[8] Russian opposition outlet Meduza noted that Russian officials did not officially announce the launch of Reestrpovestok and that Russian officials planned to launch the registry in Fall 2024.[9] The Kremlin has been increasingly reforming the Russian conscription apparatus since November 2022, likely to expand Russia’s inactive reserve and enhance Russia’s mobilization potential.[10]

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring: (Assessed Russian objective: Restructure the Russian military to maintain the war in Ukraine while preparing for a potential large-scale conventional war with NATO)

Russia presented its first drone regiment of the newly established Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) branch during the May 9 "Victory Day" parade. Russian state media outlet RBC reported on May 9 that elements — a column — of the Russian 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment participated in the May 9 “Victory Day” parade for the first time.[11] RBC reported that Russian Senior Lieutenant Grigory Teplykh commanded the column during the parade and that the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment demonstrated various types of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including "Orlan-10", "Orlan-30”, ZALA, "Lancet-51", "Lancet-52", "Harpy" and "Geran" (Shahed) drones — UAVs that Russian forces use in Ukraine. Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov announced in December 2024 that the Russian military would establish the USF branch at Russian President Vladimir Putin’s request by the third quarter of 2025.[12] ISW assessed that Russia began forming the USF as early as August 2024.[13] Ukrainian volunteer drone initiative Victory Drones reported in April 2024 that the Russian military command was finalizing the creation of the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment as part of the Central Military District (CMD).[14] Victory Drones stated that the Russian military command aimed to form 102 subordinate reconnaissance and strike units staffed by 1342 enlisted servicemen within the 7th Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment. ISW previously assessed that Russia's establishment of separate UAV regiments would likely augment Russia’s drone support capabilities, provided the Russian MoD properly forms, staffs, supports, and integrates such UAV regiments into the larger Russian force.[15]

Integration of Veterans into Russian Society (Assessed Russian objective: Mitigate the risk of veterans emerging as a political group in a way that could erode the stability of the Russian state)

The Russian Presidential Administration is setting information conditions to loosen the "Time of Heroes" eligibility requirement for informal units serving within the Russian Combat Army Reserve (BARS) in order to expedite the formation of a country-wide, veteran-based elite loyal to the Kremlin. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Governor Yevgeny Balitsky reported on May 7 that Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko visited the BARS-11 Cossack volunteer special forces detachment in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[16] Balitsky claimed that the BARS-11 commander and volunteers asked Kiriyenko to extend the Time of Heroes program to BARS volunteer detachments. Balitsky implied that Putin will consider the soldiers’ request and expand the program. Putin established the "Time of Heroes" initiative in February 2024 in order to offer positions of political power to Russian veterans in an effort to form a new social stratum of Russian elites composed of loyal ultranationalists. Kiriyenko has reportedly been one of the main executors of Putin's veteran integration campaign.[17] Kiriyenko's publicized interaction with BARS-11 elements is likely part of Putin's recently stated objective of lowering eligibility requirements for the "Time of Heroes" program. Putin implied that the Kremlin plans to lower the program’s eligibility requirements during a meeting of municipal officials of Russian federal subjects and the occupation administrations on April 21.[18] Putin added that the requirements can be modified if participants are patriots and make sacrifices to defend Russia. ISW previously noted claims that Putin regards veterans’ word as "law for [him],” an approach that underlies Putin’s coordinated campaign to prevent the emergence of an independent veteran society threatening the stability of the Kremlin regime.[19]

The Kremlin continues to appoint war veterans to regional government positions under the "Time of Heroes" initiative as part of its long-term campaign to militarize Russian society and maintain regime stability. Republic of North Ossetia Head Sergei Menyailo announced on May 6 the appointment of a Russian veteran and “Time of Heroes” participant, Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Abayev, as the North Ossetia Minister of Labor and Social Development.[20] Menyailo stated that Putin tasked regional governments to form a political team from veterans who "have already proven that they are ready to stand for [Russia] to the end." Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) previously identified Lieutenant Colonel Abayev as the commander of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]).[21] The GUR reported that Abayev participated in the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast in May 2024. The official Telegram channel of the "Time of Heroes" program announced on May 7 that another veteran and "Time of Heroes" program participant, Alexei Yefimov, became the Primorsk Krai gubernatorial representative for the integration of war veterans into Russian society.[22] The Time of Heroes channel reported on May 12 that Russia also appointed Igor Yurgin as Russia’s Ministry of Education’s Director of the Department of State Policy in the sphere of child-rearing, supplementary education, and children’s recreation.[23] Time of Heroes channel reported on May 12 that the Kremlin had already employed 40 Russian veterans out of the first program cohort.

Russian occupation officials are continuing efforts to recruit veterans via the "Time of Heroes" program to raise a new class of loyal occupation officials. Sevastopol Occupation Governor Mikhail Razvozhayev reported on May 8 that he held a public council meeting for implementing the regional training program “Sevastopol — City of Heroes,” which aims to train veterans to assume jobs in the Russian government and state enterprises.[24] Razvozhayev claimed that 933 Russian veterans registered for the "Sevastopol — City of Heroes" program and that Sevastopol occupation officials selected 307 participants to participate in interviews for positions within the occupation government from May 12 through June 6. Razvozhayev added that the Sevastopol occupation government is trying to form a reserve of public administration officials so that veterans can fill vacant positions within the civil and public sectors.

The Kremlin and the Russian government are continuing to co-opt Russian servicemen, veterans, and their families by offering them state benefits. Putin signed a decree on May 8 offering free rehabilitation resort vouchers for family members of Russian military and security personnel who sustained injuries during combat operations in Ukraine or in Russia's border regions.[25] The decree extends vouchers to family members of Russian military volunteers and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Russian Investigative Committee, the Federal Penitentiary Service, the Investigative Committee, and the National Guard (Rosgvardia). The Russian Ministry of Finance and the Russian Federal Tax Service reportedly developed changes to the Russian tax code that would give significant breaks to Russian servicemen for the calendar year of their service. The Russian Ministry of Finance and the Russian Federal Tax Service are reportedly considering granting tax breaks on personal vehicles and 600 square meters of land.[26]

Russian federal subjects are incentivizing the employment of Russian veterans with disabilities in order to facilitate the integration of veterans into civil society and address Russian labor shortages. Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko announced on May 6 that the region will offer one-million-ruble ($12,120) compensation to employers who hire disabled Russian veterans for at least two years.[27] Drozdenko stated that enterprises can use the subsidy to replenish business capital and compensate employees who are military veterans.

Militarization of Society and Youth (Assessed Russian objective: Condition Russian society and youth for military service and raise societal support for Russian war efforts)

The Kremlin is pursuing a coordinated campaign aimed at expanding Russian military-patriotic youth organizations to support Russia's long-term force generation efforts. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu stated on May 5 that Russian officials are constantly working to develop and implement military-patriotic education of Russia’s youth to prepare them for future military service in defense of Russia.[28] Shoigu added that the Kremlin is leveraging various agencies, organizations, and regional administrations to prepare Russian youth to defend Russia, including the Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), the Yunarmiya (Young Army Cadets National Movement), and the Russian Military Historical Society. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev called on the Russian government and society to begin efforts to memorialize the war in Ukraine and Russia‘s “lost Heroes“ during a meeting with Russian military writers and poets on May 8.[29] Medvedev stated that memorialization of Russian military history has long been the ”common thread” between generations of Russians and that Russian society must not miss its opportunity to influence how Russia’s youth retroactively perceives the war in Ukraine.

Yunarmiya Chief of the General Staff Captain Vladislav Golovin told Russian news agency TASS in an interview published on May 8 that Yunarmia — Russia's largest youth military organization, numbering over 1.8 million members — directly prepares Russia’s children for military service and helps Russian parents raise their children ”correctly."[30] Golovin stated that over 120,000 Yunarmia alumni now serve in Russia’s military or security agencies. Golovin also stated that Yunarmia develops and collaborates with other Russian military-patriotic programs such as the “Zarnitsa 2.0,” “Return the Hero’s Name,” "Movement of the First," and “Victory Windows” initiatives, and the “Squad 22: ZOV” videogame set in occupied Mariupol. Golovin added that Yunarmiya encourages Russian parents of young children to join the organization as detachment leaders and bring their children to learn skills such as first aid and protocols for handling weapons. Golovin assumed command of Yunarmiya in December 2024 after completing the "Time of Heroes" program.[31]

Russian officials reportedly involved over 12 million children and teachers in celebrations ahead of the "Victory Day" parade on May 9 in support of the Kremlin's efforts to indoctrinate and militarize the Russian youth. The Russian Federal Budgetary Agency for Children's Development and Education (Rosdetsentr) reported on May 7 that over 12.5 million schoolchildren, students, and teachers participated in the all-Russian “Immortal Regiment: Heroes Next to Us” demonstration, which took place on educational campuses throughout Russia.[32] Rosdetsentr reported that children and teachers held photos of relatives who served in the Second World War and met with Russian veterans and servicemen who fought in Ukraine. Russian Education Minister Sergei Kravtsov stated that 10 million students and teachers participated in "Victory Day" related demonstrations in 2024.[33] Russian opposition media outlets posted footage of kindergarteners participating in "Victory Day" events in various Russian cities.[34]

Russian Desertion Reduction Measures (Assessed Russian objective: Reduce desertion rates among Russian servicemen by intensifying punishments and expanding law enforcement's authority)

The Russian MoD is continuing to execute Putin's stated objective of expanding mandatory genomic registration for various classes of Russian servicemen by July 1, likely as part of the Kremlin's effort to combat desertion via a unified state database. The Russian MoD proposed to amend the law “On State Genomic Registration” on May 12. The amendment, if passed, would require all Russian servicemen who signed military service contracts with the MoD (including foreigners and those fighting abroad), informal forces fighting in “volunteer formations,” Rosgvardia elements, and law enforcement employees fighting in combat zones to submit their genomic data.[35] Putin ordered in February 2025 that the Russian MoD and other ministries institute mandatory genomic registration for Russian servicemen by July 1.[36] The Russian MoD previously only collected genomic data from prisoners, convicts, arrested individuals, and relatives of missing Russian servicemen.[37] The collection of genomic data follows the Kremlin’s efforts to establish an interdepartmental database, which gathers personal information on Russian people across different departments.[38] These efforts are aimed at tightening Russian state control over Russian society and may make it more difficult for Russians to desert, avoid the draft, or escape punishment.[39]

Russian Command Changes and Chain of Command (Russian command appointments, dismissals, and casualties among senior Russian military commanders)

Recently appointed commander of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, Colonel Abdulaziz Shikhabirov, reportedly died in Ukraine. Putin appointed Shikhabidov to command the 76th VDV Division in March 2024.[40] Independent Russian news outlet Agenstvo observed several Russian milbloggers and local social media accounts in the Republic of Dagestan reporting that Shikhabirov was killed in action and was already buried at the Troekurovskoye Cemetery in Moscow City as of May 5.[41] Agentstvo stated that schools in the Republic of Dagestan posted and later deleted posts on May 6 showing Russian schoolchildren observing moments of silence in Shikhabidov’s memory. Russian state media outlet Lenta.Ru also posted and later deleted a report about Shikhabidkov’s death on May 6.[42] The Russian military command is likely working to minimize the Russian information space’s coverage of Shikhabidov’s death, given the proximity of Shikhabidov’s promotion to his death.

Russian Defense Industrial Base (Assessed Russian objective: Increase Russia's defense industrial base production to support Russian war efforts)

The Kremlin is scaling up its missile production by doubling down on its sanctions evasion schemes and domestically producing some missile components in Russia. Ukrainian media outlet Kanal 24 reported on May 7, citing Russian documents obtained by private intelligence company Dallas, that Russia increased the production of Kh-101 missiles, likely by acquiring Western-made components via intermediary firms such as the "TRV-Engineering" private company.[43] Kanal 24 reported that the “TRV-Engineering” company is affiliated with the Russian state-owned defense holding Tactical Missile Armament Corporation, which oversees Russian missile production. Kanal 24 reported that TPV-Engineering obtains components for the Kh-101, Kh-59, Kh-69, and 3M14 Kalibr cruise missiles and glide bombs with unified planning and correction modules (UMPK) through front companies in China and abroad. Kanal 24 reported that the Russian Ural Design Bureau “Detal” enterprise is now domestically producing altimeters for Kh-101 missiles and that Russian missile manufacturers are using Belarusian OJSC Integral enterprise microchips. Kanal 24 reported that Russia plans to produce 633 Kh-101 missiles in 2025 and 223 Kh-101 missiles in 2026, noting that the number for 2026 is subject to change. The Financial Times reported on July 10, 2024, that Russia has increased Kh-101 missile production eightfold since 2021, producing 50 missiles per month in 2024 compared to 56 missiles annually in 2021.[44] The scale of Russian planned cruise missile production suggests that the Kremlin is committed to investing in Russia’s military capabilities, likely as part of the wider campaign to intensify the missile campaign against Ukraine and in preparation for possible confrontation with NATO.

The Kremlin is attempting to set up a new production line for hexogen (RDX) explosives in an effort to expand Russia's artillery ammunition and glide bomb stocks. A Reuters special investigation reported on May 8 that studies of documents and satellite imagery indicate that the Russian state defense company Ya. M. Sverdlov Plant is building a new production line at its Biysk Oleum Plant (BOZ) in Siberia, likely to produce RDX.[45] RDX is a component in many artillery shells, mortar rounds, missiles, and glide bombs used by Russia against Ukraine. A source close to the project and at the BOZ factory confirmed to Reuters that an expansion is underway.  Documents published in 2023 by an unspecified Russian state procurement agency and later deleted indicate that the new facility is scheduled for completion in 2025 with an expected annual production capacity of 6,000 metric tons of high explosives. Reuters reported that BOZ does not currently produce RDX. Experts consulted by Reuters could not rule out the possibility that the line identified by Reuters could be for the production of HMX, which is another high explosive. Reuters estimated that the plant's output capacity would be enough to fill 1.28 million OF-29 (152 mm) artillery shells. The GUR told Reuters that Russia produced two million 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds in 2024 and imported 2.7 million from North Korea.

The Kremlin may have decided to build a new production line in Biysk to protect Russian explosives production from Ukrainian drone strikes. Reuters reported that the Sverdlov Plant is Russia’s only significant RDX and HMX manufacturer and previously produced these explosives in a factory in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod, which Ukrainian drones struck on October 19, 2024. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Open-Source Centre (OSC) stated in a joint 2024 report that new production lines will not resolve all bottlenecks in Russia’s munitions supply chain due to wartime shortages and sanctions.[46]      

The Russian forces reportedly procured multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) from North Korea. Russian milbloggers posted footage on May 7 showing Russian forces using North Korean 240 mm M1991 (or “Juche-100”) MLRS on the frontline, possibly in Kursk Oblast.[47] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces allegedly destroyed the first North Korean M1991 MLRS near Pervomaisky village in Kursk Oblast.[48] GUR Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov previously reported that North Korea supplied Russia with 120 long-range self-propelled artillery systems and 120 MLRS pieces.[49]

Russia is reportedly recruiting young women from Latin America, South Asia, and countries of the former Soviet Union to build Shahed strike drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime reported on May 8 that Russian recruiters targeted women ages 18 through 22 and lured them under false pretenses of participation in a work-study program.[50] Russia reportedly recruited these women online and via local intermediaries. Recruited women complained to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime about enduring long work hours, constant surveillance, punitive management, harsh working conditions, and health issues due to exposure to chemicals.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Assessed Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russia reportedly developed a new S8000 "Banderol" drone-based cruise missile. Ukraine’s GUR reported on May 11 that the Russian MoD-sponsored Kronstadt enterprise developed a new S8000 “Banderol” cruise missile, which can be carried by the Russian "Orion" UAV.[51] The GUR reported that Kronstadt also produces several types of UAVs, including “Orion,” “Molniya,” and “Grom.”[52] The GUR reported that Kronstadt is adapting the missile for use from Mi-28N attack helicopters. The GUR reported that “Banderol” can turn at a smaller radius than traditional Russian-made cruise missiles such as Kh-101 and Kh-69, while maintaining the usual flight path. The GUR reported that the S8000 cruise missile can carry a 150-kilogram warhead and travel up to 500 kilometers at a speed of 500 kilometers per hour. A Russian milblogger claimed that “Banderol” can reach speeds of 650 kilometers per hour and carry a 115-kilogram high-explosive warhead.[53] The milblogger also noted that the S8000 cruise missile contains a Chinese-made SW80Pro-A95 turbojet engine and an eight-channel Kometa-M8 satellite signal receiver. The GUR identified several foreign components for the “Banderol” production, including Chinese, American, Japanese, Swiss, and South Korean parts.[54] A Ukrainian radio technology expert previously reported that Russian forces used the “Banderol” missile to strike Odesa Oblast several times in April 2025.[55]

Russian forces are continuing to use attack helicopters to repel Ukrainian drone strikes with mixed results. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger published footage on May 8 reportedly showing Russian Ka-52 attack helicopters targeting Ukrainian drones.[56] The milblogger noted that attack helicopters are generally effective in targeting Ukrainian drones and observed that Russian Mi-28NM attack helicopters have also been successful in shooting down Ukrainian strike drones. The milblogger observed that not all Russian attack helicopters can effectively shoot down Ukrainian drones, noting that Russian Mi-24 helicopters are too old and lack the necessary radars and modern optics to target Ukrainian drones in the rear and that Mi-8 helicopters require crews to serve as gunners. The milblogger noted that the Russian military needs to integrate different types of aircraft, including small aircraft. The milblogger argued that Russia has to develop a system for target designation, control, and assessment of the situation in the airspace.[57] The milblogger argued that such a system would enable Russian forces to see the location of Ukrainian and Russian drones and personnel in real-time.

Russian State Recognition of Officers and Military Units: (Assessed Russian objective: Honor specific Russian units for service, achievements, and hardships in Ukraine and incentivize service in distinguished units)

Putin awarded the 52nd Artillery Brigade (likely part of the Russian 104th Airborne [VDV] Division) with the honorific "guards" title on May 5.[58] The Russian military command likely formed the 52nd Artillery Brigade in January 2023 and deployed the brigade to repel Ukrainian positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in Fall 2023.[59] ISW last observed elements of the 52nd Artillery Brigade operating in the Kherson direction in late June 2024.[60]

The Russian MoD awarded on May 7 more than 200 Russian servicemen for their participation in assaults in Ukraine, likely as part of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's efforts to appease Russian servicemen and ultranationalists. The Russian MoD reported that a representative of the Russian Ground Forces awarded Russian servicemen who participated in assaults and offensive operations with "For Assault" qualification badges during a ceremony in Moscow Oblast.[61] The Russian MoD added that Belousov ordered the creation of the badge in Spring 2025 to recognize Russian assault elements. Russian milbloggers welcomed Belousov's order, with some claiming that Belousov introduced the badge following a conversation with state-affiliated Russian milbloggers.[62]

The Russian MoD awarded elements of BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) detachments operating in southern Ukraine on May 9 and 11 in a continued effort to centralize state control over informal, volunteer detachments. The Russian MoD reported that a representative of the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the Russian General Staff awarded volunteers of the BARS-33 detachment fighting in Kherson Oblast as part of the "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces (GoF) and other unspecified BARS elements in "Southern" and "Dnepr" GoFs.[63]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update May 7, 2025

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Angelica Evans, Tetiana Trach, and Kateryna Stepanenko with Jessica Sobieski

May 7, 2025, 9am

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10pm ET on May 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 13 Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Report.

Russian forces are integrating responsive tactical innovations among frontline Russian units, indicating that the Russian military is learning modern ground warfare lessons that it intends to carry on beyond the war in Ukraine. ISW has observed Russian forces increasingly using unarmored civilian vehicles, including motorcycles, in assaults throughout the theater in Ukraine since late Fall 2024.[1] Russian forces are frequently using motorcycles to penetrate Ukrainian lines and advance in the Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka directions.[2] A Ukrainian artilleryman operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on May 4 that Russian motorcyclists are currently attacking in columns of eight motorcycles with electronic warfare (EW) support and that Russian servicemembers carry EW systems at the front, center, and end of the columns to protect the motorcycles from Ukrainian drone strikes.[3] The artilleryman noted that recent improvements in the ground conditions in the Pokrovsk direction are allowing Russian forces to use motorcycles more frequently. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on May 4 that Russian motorcycle assaults can involve anywhere from a dozen to one hundred motorcycles, and Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed 70 Russian motorcycles during a recent Russian assault in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[4] A Ukrainian National Guard servicemember operating in the Lyman direction reported that each Russian motorcycle has two riders – a driver and a gunner – and that Russian forces continue attacking on the motorcycle in the event that Ukrainian drone operators only kill one rider.[5]

Russian forces have iterated their use of motorcycles and other civilian vehicles several times throughout 2024 and across different frontlines. Russian motorcycle usage has not been consistent throughout the theater, as the Russian General Staff has traditionally struggled to disseminate lessons learned between operational areas of responsibility (AoRs). ISW began observing Russian forces consistently leveraging motorcycles to transport infantry in near rear areas in the Kharkiv, Chasiv Yar, and Zaporizhia directions in mid-2024, and Russian forces have intensified their use of motorcycles to transport personnel and advance into Ukrainian lines, mainly in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts in recent months.[6] The Russian Central Grouping of Forces began integrating motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) into combat operations in the Pokrovsk direction (their priority sector) in Summer 2024, several months before the Southern Grouping of Forces began using motorcycles in the Kurakhove direction in late Fall 2024.[7] The Russian Southern Grouping of Forces intensively relied on armored vehicles and tanks to make significant advances in the Kurakhove direction in Summer and Fall 2024 while the Central Grouping of Forces likely leveraged faster vehicles, such as motorcycles, during this time.  Russian forces are currently mainly using tanks as fire support for infantry assaults and are mainly using armored vehicles to transport infantry in near rear and frontline areas, but not to conduct penetrations of the Ukrainian defensive line.[8]

Russia's increased use of motorcycles is an adaptation in response to pervasive Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian armored vehicles and the unsustainable armored vehicle losses that Russian forces suffered in late 2023 and 2024. Trehubov noted on May 4 that motorcycle assaults are a "standard tactic" of the Russian military now due to Russia's ongoing shortage of heavy equipment and armored vehicles.[9] Trehubov stated that Russian motorcycle assaults are more effective because Russian forces can advance quickly and better evade Ukrainian drone operators and force Ukrainian drone operators to expend more drones to counter motorcycle assaults. Trehubov noted that Ukrainian forces typically expend one drone per Russian motorcycle – a comparatively smaller and less valuable target, given that Ukrainian forces can also use first-person view (FPV) drones to disable Russian tanks and armored vehicles.[10] ISW previously observed Russian forces largely abandon armored vehicle usage in the Pokrovsk direction after a series of successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian forces in Winter 2023-2024, and Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles throughout the frontline in 2024.[11] The Central Grouping of Forces likely learned a lesson from observing Ukrainian drone operators successfully destroy Russian armored vehicles near Pokrovsk in Fall 2023 and Winter 2023-2024.[12] Russia's wider integration of motorcycles appears to be an effort to offset the significant armored vehicle losses that Russian forces took in Ukraine in 2024 and possibly conserve some armored vehicles and tanks for future use.[13]

Russian forces may also be increasingly leveraging motorcycles to intensify Russian offensive operations and to pressure Ukraine and the West into making further concessions to Russia. Russian forces intensified offensive operations throughout Ukraine in February and March 2025, around the time that the United States began significant efforts to mediate a ceasefire and long-term peace agreement in Ukraine.[14] Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to leverage these intensified offensive operations and the threat of operationally significant Russian advances to force Ukraine to the negotiating table and into concessions. A Ukrainian servicemember recently reported that Russian forces are currently using motorcycles to support "run, stab, escape" tactics - likely referring to Russian forces' recent tactics of conducting unsuccessful assaults several kilometers into the Ukrainian line in priority frontline areas such as into Pokrovsk itself or along the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway in the direction of Kostyantynivka.[15] ISW previously noted that Russian forces likely see a tactical opportunity in leveraging motorcycles and civilian vehicles to advance and seize as much Ukrainian territory as possible ahead of possible ceasefire or peace negotiations.[16]

It remains unclear how Russia's use of motorcycles will continue to evolve, particularly given reports that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) intends to integrate formal motorcycle units into Russian formations. A Ukrainian brigade operating along the Kupyansk-Lyman line reported on April 20 that the Russian MoD intends to integrate motorcycle units into the Russian 6th and 123rd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]).[17] The brigade noted that Russian servicemembers have previously purchased their motorcycles or received motorcycles from Russian volunteer organizations that support the war in Ukraine, but that the Russian MoD will soon begin to issue motorcycles to Russian servicemembers as standard equipment. The Russian MoD posted footage on April 26 showing likely elements of the 299th (Airborne) VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) practicing offensive and defensive tactics on motorcycles in groups of two to three people at a Russian training ground.[18] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on April 26 that Ukrainian intelligence indicates that the Russian military is currently training Russian motorcyclists at training centers in Russia and along the frontline.[19] Shamshyn stated that Russia will likely increasingly integrate motorcycles into assault operations in Spring and Summer 2025.

Russian motorcycle usage appears to have begun as a grassroots tactical response to Ukrainian drone operations, comparable to how Russia's own informal frontline drone units began. The Russian MoD is responding similarly to Ukrainian ad hoc adaptations by trying to centralize and formalize Russian motorcycle usage.[20] The Russian MoD may be able to better supply Russian units with motorcycles under a more centralized system, but the MoD may also significantly constrain Russian motorcyclists' ability to adapt to new frontline realities. Russian forces will likely increasingly depend on motorcycles and other quicker unarmored vehicles, as slower-moving vehicles have become a hazard on the more transparent battlefield of Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are integrating responsive tactical innovations among frontline Russian units, indicating that the Russian military is learning modern ground warfare lessons that it intends to carry on beyond the war in Ukraine.
• Russian federal subjects continue to use dynamic pricing for one-time enlistment bonuses to incentivize volunteer recruitment.
• Russian military recruiters continued to lure foreign recruits from Africa to support Russia's war effort in Ukraine.
• A Russian serviceman suggested that poor treatment of Russian mobilized personnel, lack of financial compensation, and indefinite terms of military service are inhibiting the Kremlin's efforts to retain remaining mobilized personnel on contract military service.
• The Russian government continued efforts to centralize state control over private military company (PMC) elements via state financial and social benefits.
• Putin continues to portray himself as a wartime leader concerned with veterans’ affairs, likely as part of his coordinated campaign to prevent the emergence of an independent, anti-regime veterans-based civil society in Russia.
• Russian occupation officials continued efforts to build out a loyal occupation government via the "Time of Heroes" veteran initiative.
• The Kremlin is intensifying its efforts to indoctrinate and militarize Russian youth ahead of Russia's celebration of Victory Day on May 9 to justify its war efforts against Ukraine and possibly against NATO.
• The Kremlin is creating new departments within government agencies aimed at promoting military-patriotic education in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is raising a new group of milbloggers and military correspondents to centralize the state's control over coverage of Russia's war efforts in Ukraine and prepare Russia’s propaganda machine for future war efforts.
• Russian occupation officials and milbloggers complained that the Kremlin's centralized drone production is hindering Russia's ability to scale the production and development of drones.
• Systematic corruption reportedly continues to plague Russia's weapon and military supplies procurement efforts.
• Russian forces are continuing to develop and adapt Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and incorporate tactical innovations to defend against drone warfare.
• Russian forces continued to develop unmanned surface vehicles (USVs).
• The Russian Ministry of Finance signaled Russia's commitment to financing force generation and defense industrial base (DIB) efforts amidst a reported budget deficit triggered by plummeting oil and gas prices.
• Russian federal subjects and occupation officials continued to introduce new pro-natalist policies in an effort to improve Russia's declining demographics.
• The Russian Pacific Fleet recently completed its stay in Cambodia and conducted joint naval exercises with the Royal Thai Navy.

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Kateryna Stepanenko with Tetiana Trach

April 29, 2025 7:30 pm

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10pm ET on April 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 5 Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Report.

Russian military recruitment officials are reportedly leveraging a new law extending the validity of conscription notices to detain military-aged men and meet Russia's record-high Spring 2025 conscription quota. Putin signed a law on April 21 that simplifies conscription procedures for military aged men who were called up in a semi-annual conscription but did not deploy for compulsory military service.[1] The law specifies that conscripts who underwent conscription processes such as medical commissions but were not assigned to military service could be called up to military service within a year without repeating conscription procedures. Russian opposition outlet Verska, citing Russian human rights activists, reported that Moscow City police began raiding public spaces to catch military-aged men and immediately commit them to compulsory military service in Russia without proper conscription processing.[2] Russian human rights activists told Verstka that Moscow City law enforcement is particularly targeting men ages 18 through 30 who were conscripted in Fall 2024 but were not called up or did not show up for military service.[3] Verstka reported that men who successfully appealed their conscription notices in Fall 2024 may also be subject to immediate conscription without additional due process. A Russian lawyer stated that the new conscription law excluded men who underwent conscription processes in Fall 2024 but did not report to military service, meaning that Russian law enforcement is illegally using this law to boost conscription numbers.[4]

Russian officials may be intensifying raids and detentions of military-age men in an effort to urgently satisfy the increased draft quota. Putin ordered the conscription of 160,000 Russian men aged 18 through 30 on March 31, the largest conscription call up since 2011.[5] Russian human rights activists told Radio Svoboda's northwestern Russia service Sever Realii that St. Petersburg law enforcement recently illegally detained at least 200 military-aged men and attempted to commit detainees with chronic illnesses and medical deferrals to compulsory military service within 24 hours.[6] Moscow City law enforcement also began raiding fitness clubs in an effort to find men who avoided compulsory military service or registration.[7]

Russian law enforcement raids of military aged men and the new conscription procedures indicate that the Russian military conscription apparatus may lack the administrative capacity to meet the Kremlin's increasing draft quotas in wartime. Independent Russian human rights project OVD-Info assessed that detentions of military-aged men are part of the military recruiters' effort to bypass the standard procedure that lasts a few days and illegally draft men into the military without due process.[8] OVD-Info remarked that the number of detained military-aged men in Fall 2024 increased nearly two-fold (170 detentions) over Fall 2023 (around 94 detentions) and that military recruitment centers intensified raids in December 2024 in a likely effort to urgently meet the conscription quota before the end of the draft period. OVD-Info reported that the largest number of raids during Fall 2024 conscription cycle occurred in Moscow City, and Russian human rights activists warned that Russian conscription methods for the Spring 2025 period will be even harsher.[9] Russian military recruiters may be struggling to meet Russia's conscription quotas due to Russia's growing demographic problems, active recruitment for combat operations in Ukraine, and draft evasion.[10]

The Kremlin has been increasingly reforming the Russian conscription apparatus since November 2022 likely in an effort to expand the Russian inactive reserve and enhance Russia's mobilization potential. The Kremlin has introduced various laws since at least November 2022 that expand the Russian conscription pool, introduce stricter punishments for draft evasion, and simplify draft procedures. Putin tasked the Russian Digital Development Ministry and the Federal Tax Service in November 2022 to create a joint database containing information on Russians liable for compulsory military service by April 2024.[11] Putin's order notably follows the Kremlin's systematic failures during the September 2022 partial mobilization.[12] The Kremlin began working on and rolling out a unified digital register for Russian citizens eligible for military service starting in April 2023, which allows Russian military recruitment centers to digitally distribute summonses and crack down on draft dodging.[13] The Kremlin also collated the unified digital register with other government agencies starting November 2024, which makes it challenging for military aged men to obtain government services if they dodge the draft.[14] The Kremlin also expanded the Russian conscription pool by increasing the maximum draft age from 27 to 30 starting January 1, 2024.[15] Putin signed a decree in July 2023 increasing fines for draft dodging, and the Russian State Duma Defense Committee had since proposed increasing penalties for people who fail to update their military registrations in February 2025.[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed in February 2025 to shorten the list of medical conditions that qualify for deferment from the draft.[17]

The Kremlin's efforts to reform the Russian conscription apparatus suggest that the Kremlin is learning from its bureaucratic failures during the September 2022 mobilization. The Kremlin has yet to resolve persistent bureaucratic inefficiencies, draft dodging, and conscript retention, as it is increasingly relying on raids and coercion to fulfil its conscription and recruitment quotas. These reforms may enable Russia to effectively conduct partial or general involuntary reserve call-ups in the future, however, if the Kremlin properly adopts these measures.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is continuing to recruit foreigners to support its war effort in Ukraine, particularly from Southeast and Central Asia.
• Russian federal subjects are continuing to incentivize military recruitment by increasing the one-time compensation for Russians who bring new recruits into regional military recruitment centers.
• Kaliningrad Oblast formed a new reserve unit, possibly as part of the Kremlin's ongoing preparations for future aggression against NATO.
• Putin is setting information conditions to lower eligibility requirements for veterans to join local government service, likely to expedite the formation of a country-wide, veteran-based elite loyal to the regime and Russia's war efforts.
• The Kremlin is increasing the federal funding for military patriotic education of Russian youth in an effort to expand the Russian recruitment pool over the long term.
• Putin acknowledged that Russia still faces drone shortages during the Military-Industrial Commission meeting on April 23.
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian MoD for failing to effectively integrate small drone development companies into the Russian DIB and rapidly adapt drones to battlefield realities.
• Russia continues the development of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and multi-purpose drones to support logistics and remote mining efforts.
• Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec launched an effort to improve communication between drones.
• Russian forces conducted joint military and naval exercises with Bangladeshi and Laotian forces in late April.

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Kateryna Stepanenko

April 22, 2025, 9pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on April 21, 2025. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 29, 2025, Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Report.

The Kremlin appears to be increasingly concerned with the Russian military's ability to retain forces in the event of demobilization following a ceasefire or a negotiated peace. Russian propagandist Anastasiya Kashevarova claimed on April 17 that the Kremlin assigned Russia’s military chiefs of staff in early April to survey contract servicemen and mobilized personnel about their intent to reenlist in the Russian military should Russia complete its war in Ukraine.[1] Kashevarova implied that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is trying to retain active servicemen by offering them full social benefits, subsidized rent, a monthly salary of 100,000-to-200,000 rubles ($1,225 to $2,450), 60 days of paid leave annually, and other benefits. Kashevarova claimed that the Russian military chiefs of staff asked all Russian servicemen who had indicated that they intend to refuse to reenlist following Russia's war in Ukraine to write formal reports documenting their refusal. Kashevarova assessed that the survey may be part of the Russian MoD's effort to estimate potential reductions in force and forecast the strength of the Russian military in the event of the completion of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The Russian government signed a decree on April 19 that will increase the salaries for military and law enforcement personnel by 4.5 percent starting on October 1, 2025, and the Ukrainian Resistance Center assessed that this decree aims to incentivize recruitment and force retention.[2] ISW has recently observed reports of the Russian MoD intensifying efforts to coerce mobilized servicemen into signing military contracts, which could help Russia to retain contract personnel in the event of demobilization.[3]

Russian milbloggers expressed doubts that the Russian MoD will be able to retain the current size of the Russian military if the Russian MoD does not promise — and honor — increased financial benefits. One milblogger confirmed that Russian military leadership is surveying Russian forces, but claimed that Russian military leadership is not offering any special benefits to increase force retention rates.[4] The milblogger, citing unnamed sources within an unspecified Russian operational grouping of forces fighting in Ukraine, claimed that some field commanders independently imposed a new requirement for servicemen to document their refusal to reenlist after facing nagging from senior military commanders about the need to retain forces on the battlefield. The milblogger added that the Russian military’s persistent commitment to wounded personnel on the battlefield underscores Russia’s need to generate new recruits and retain existing forces. The milblogger implied that the Russian MoD is conducting this survey in an effort to assess which financial and social benefits are the most attractive and most likely to attract Russian servicemen to reenlist after a potential demobilization. The milblogger suggested that these efforts ultimately will be futile, as the Russian military continues to face widespread logistics problems, fails to provide servicemembers career advancement opportunities, and continues to lose credibility by providing exaggerated field reports. Another Russian milblogger observed that the Russian MoD would need to amend the Russian military’s official military pay scale and official budget to deliver on promised raises.[5] The milblogger added that the Russian military must conduct reforms that transform the average Russian’s perception of military service away from being a lucrative opportunity towards being an honorable responsibility.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin and some Russian federal subjects are continuing to increase financial incentives and expand eligibility requirements for contract military service.
• Some Russian federal subjects are failing to meet the Kremlin's recruitment targets as the Russian volunteer recruitment system continues to suffer from high recruitment costs and other inefficiencies.
• Some Russian federal subjects may be failing to meet recruitment targets because they are unable to compete with financial incentives offered in other federal subjects.
• Putin signed a decree on April 21 exempting select volunteers who fought in Ukraine in volunteer units or Kremlin proxy forces from being conscripted into the Russian military, likely as part of the Kremlin's effort to centralize control over informal volunteer units.
• The Kremlin is continuing to expand the "Time of Heroes" Higher School of Public Administration Program across occupied Ukraine, likely in an effort to raise a new class of loyal occupation officials.
• Russian milbloggers criticized Russian state media after it published a video of Russian long-range drone operators conducting a drone strike from a high-rise in Moscow City.
• Russia reportedly developed a new version of the "Kometa" navigation chip, enhancing the resistance of Russian satellite navigation signals against Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW).
• On April 16, Putin awarded the honorific "Guards" titles to four Russian motorized rifle regiments, an aviation regiment, and an army corps that have fought in Donetsk and Kherson oblasts.

Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update, April 15, 2025

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