Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 14, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 14, 2023

Karolina Hird, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 14, 2023, 6:20pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces are likely trying to regain the theater-level initiative in Ukraine by conducting several simultaneous offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, although it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to fully regain the initiative as Ukrainian forces maintain pressure on critical areas of the front. Several Ukrainian officials noted that the situation along the frontline is complex but that Ukrainian forces maintain control of the battlespace.[1] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi stated on November 13 during a conversation with US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Brown that the Avdiivka, Kupyansk, and Marinka directions are the most intense but noted that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive actions in unspecified sectors of the front.[2] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi emphasized that Russian forces are pursuing simultaneous offensive actions in several directions and trying particularly to regain the initiative north and south of Bakhmut.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces are reporting an increase of Russian assaults in the Kupyansk, Avdiivka, and Donetsk directions.[4]

Ukrainian officials’ statements about the current tempo of Russian operations along the frontline are consistent with ISW's assessment about ongoing Russian offensive operations, particularly in the Kupyansk, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka directions.[5] Russian forces will likely struggle to fully regain the initiative across the theater, however, and Ukrainian forces are continuing their own offensive operations and making tactical-level gains along the front, particularly in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[6] The Russian military command will likely have to decide whether to keep certain Russian elements on certain sectors of the front to defend against ongoing Ukrainian offensive operations or to redeploy them to support offensive operations elsewhere that will likely culminate without reinforcements. These choices will likely hinder Russia's ability to fully regain the initiative in the coming weeks.

Ukrainian President's Office Head Andriy Yermak stated on November 13 that Ukrainian forces have established a "foothold" on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[7] In a speech at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC, Yermak emphasized that despite the challenging battlefield situation, Ukrainian forces have "gained a foothold on the left bank of the Dnipro" and continue counteroffensive operations in unspecified sectors of the front.[8] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces have been conducting larger-than-usual ground operations on the east bank of Kherson Oblast since mid-October 2023 and that Ukrainian forces appear to be able to maintain and supply their current positions on the Russian-controlled side of Kherson Oblast.[9] Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson Oblast and 2km from the Dnipro River).[10]

Russian President Vladimir Putin approved amendments to the Russian federal election law on November 14 that increase the Kremlin's control over the conduct of elections and reduce election transparency ahead of the 2024 presidential elections.[11] The amendments allow the Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) to control the specifics and conduct of elections in areas under martial law, which notably includes occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, and stipulates that voting in these areas will only occur following coordination among the regional occupation administrations, the CEC, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Federal Security Service (FSB). The amendments also restrict media access to polling places and election commission meetings exclusively to Russian-accredited journalists and media organizations. Russian-accredited journalists who seek access to polling areas in the jurisdiction of Russian military units require the approval of the unit’s commander to visit the areas. The amendments also necessitate that any actor legally designated as a “foreign agent” who speaks during a campaign event must announce that designation at the start of the speech and further prohibits presidential campaigning on blocked online platforms, such as opposition outlets Meduza and Vazhnye Istorii. These amendments allow the Russian federal government to increasingly control election campaigning and coverage of polling in Russian media to set conditions for additional Kremlin controls over Russian elections to help re-elect Putin in 2024. The Russian government may also postpone or cancel presidential elections in occupied Ukraine depending on the frontline situation and their ability to convincingly portray Putin as the winning candidate in these areas.

Russian forces conducted another wave of missile, air, and drone strikes against Ukrainian rear areas on the night of November 13–14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 14 that overnight Russian forces launched nine Shahed-131/-136 drones from the direction of Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; an Iskander-M ballistic missile from the direction of Dzhankoi, occupied Crimea; and Kh-35 cruise missiles from the direction of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[12] Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down seven of the nine Shaheds.[13] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command clarified that a ballistic missile, presumably the Iskander-M, struck an open area near Chornobaiivka, Kherson Oblast, and Russian forces launched Kh-59s at Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts.[14] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat noted that Russian forces are using ballistic missiles more frequently because they are more challenging for Ukrainian air defenses to intercept.[15] Russian sources claimed that Russian strikes hit military assets and critical infrastructure in Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Kirovohrad oblasts, as well as the Shebelinsky gas processing plant in Kharkiv Oblast, although ISW has not observed visual evidence for all of these strikes.[16]

Ukraine's Western partners announced new efforts to continue providing Ukraine with military and financial aid. Germany announced a new aid package to Ukraine on November 13 that includes 10 Leopard tanks, 14 Bandvagn 206 tracked all-terrain vehicles, and 1,020 155-mm shells, and Reuters reported on November 12 that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s governing coalition has agreed in principle to double Germany’s military aid to Ukraine next year to €8 billion.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 13 that Ukrainian pilots began training at the F-16 training center in Romania.[18] NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized on November 14 that sustained NATO support for Ukraine is important as the current situation on the battlefield is difficult.[19] EU Foreign Affairs Representative Josep Borrell stated on November 13 that Ukraine is the EU’s top priority and that the EU’s commitment will not waver.[20] Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba highlighted the importance of speeding up the EU’s plan to supply Ukraine with one million shells by March 2024 during a meeting with the EU Council of Foreign Ministers on November 13, but Politico reported on November 14 that German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius expressed doubt that the EU would be able to meet this target.[21] Politico also reported that Borrell stated that the European defense industry is exporting about 40 percent of its current production to third countries and urged European countries to shift exports to Ukraine as “priority one.”[22] Borrell stated that the EU’s ability to supply Ukraine with one million shells “will depend on how quickly orders come to the industry and how quickly the industry reacts.”[23] Stoltenberg also reiterated on November 14 that NATO has put in place framework contracts worth €2.4 billion, including €1 billion worth of firm orders, and stated that NATO countries are increasing production in order to reach the target of one million shells by March 2024.[24] Politico reported that Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur also announced that Estonia offered five European companies a procurement offer for €280 million worth of 155-mm artillery ammunition.[25]

The Russian government is likely attempting to force Google to cease operations in Russia. The Moscow Magistrate’s Court fined Google 15 million rubles (roughly $165,745) on November 14 for the repeated failure to localize the personal data of Russian citizens in Russia.[26] Russian state censor Roskomnadzor requires foreign internet-based services to localize databases of Russian users as of July 1, 2021, and Russian courts previously fined Google 15 million rubles in June 2022 for failing to adhere to this law.[27] The Russian government has previously fined Russian internet giant Yandex for also failing to adhere to Russian laws regarding disclosing users’ personal data to the government, likely forcing Yandex to split its Russian entity from its international entity to adhere to Russian laws and allowing the Russian government to exercise increased control and surveillance over Russians’ usage of Yandex.[28] The Russian government previously banned certain Western social media sites and demanded that Google remove “false information” about the Russian war in Ukraine in early 2022.[29] The Russian government likely aims to force Russians to utilize search engines and other internet services of Russian companies that the government can control better than international entities like Google.

Armenia continues to distance itself from Russia amid deteriorating Russian–Armenian relations. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan informed Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on November 14 that he would not participate in the Russian-led Collective Treaty Security Organization (CSTO) meeting in Minsk on November 23.[30] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov responded to Pashinyan’s announcement, stating that the Kremlin understands that heads of state have their own events in their work schedules but that this is regrettable as meetings like the CSTO meeting are a “very good occasion for exchanging opinions” and coordinating ideas.[31] Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan told journalists on November 9 that Armenia is currently not discussing the legal process of leaving the CSTO.[32]

Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Pyotr Tolstoy suggested a measure that would restrict work opportunities for migrants from countries that have not designated Russian as a state language, likely as part of an ongoing effort to coerce migrants into Russian military service. Tolstoy proposed restricting migrants from working in service sector jobs if they are not citizens from a country that designates Russian as a state language at a Federation Council meeting on state policy in the field of preservation, protection, and development of Russian language on November 14.[33] Tolstoy claimed that post-Soviet countries are teaching English and “trying to supplant Russian with their national language.”[34] If Tolstoy’s measure is officially proposed and passed, it would allow Russian authorities to limit work opportunities for migrants from Central Asia and the south Caucasus, potentially making it easier for Russian authorities to coerce migrants into serving in the Russian military due to a lack of other labor alternatives. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan designate Russian a state language while the titular languages are their state languages.[35] Tajik law designates Russian as a language of “interethnic communication.”[36] The Russian language does not have a legally designated status in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, or Armenia.[37] Russian authorities may also be attempting to pass laws restricting migrant work in Russia in an effort to placate Russian ultranationalists who are often critical of migrants working in Russia ahead of the Russian presidential elections in 2024.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are likely trying to regain the theater-level initiative in Ukraine by conducting several simultaneous offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, although it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to fully regain the initiative as Ukrainian forces maintain pressure on critical areas of the front.
• Ukrainian President's Office Head Andriy Yermak stated on November 13 that Ukrainian forces have established a "foothold" on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin approved amendments to the Russian federal election law on November 14 that increase the Kremlin's control over the conduct of elections and reduce election transparency ahead of the 2024 presidential elections.
• Russian forces conducted another wave of missile, air, and drone strikes against Ukrainian rear areas on the night of November 13–14.
• Ukraine's western partners announced new efforts to continue providing Ukraine with military and financial aid.
• The Russian government is likely attempting to force Google to cease operations in Russia.
• Armenia continues to distance itself from Russia amid deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.
• Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Pyotr Tolstoy suggested a measure that would restrict work opportunities for migrants from countries that have not designated Russian as a state language, likely as part of an ongoing effort to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 14 and advanced in some areas.
• The Russian government discussed amendments that would more strictly penalize those who evade mobilization as well as volunteer servicemen who “improperly” perform their duties.
• Russian occupation officials are beginning to announce that occupied areas of Ukraine will not hold significant public Christmas and New Years’ celebrations due to security concerns.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 14 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage published on November 13 and 14 indicates that Russian forces advanced southwest of Pershotravneve (21km east of Kupyansk).[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 14 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Kupyansk direction near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), and Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk) and in the Lyman direction near Nadiya (16km west of Svatove), Novoyehorivka (15km southwest of Svatove), Torske (15km west of Kreminna), and the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Petropavlivka and Synkivka and that there are positional combat engagements in the Serebryanske forest area.[40] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces continue offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction despite suffering heavy losses.[41]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 14 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Kupyansk direction near Synkivka and Zahoruykivka (16km east of Kupyansk) and in the Lyman direction near Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna).[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Tymkivka (19km east of Kupyansk), Raihorodka (12km west of Svatove), and forest areas near Kreminna.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut on November 14 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows that Russian forces have made gains north of the Berkhivka Reservoir, about 5km northwest of Bakhmut.[44] Additional geolocated footage published on November 14 shows that Russian forces have advanced westward along a tree line west of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut).[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing near the Berkhivka Reservoir in the direction of Bohdanivka (5km west of Bakhmut).[46] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on November 14 reportedly showing elements of the 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division's "Storm" unit capturing positions on the western flank of Bakhmut.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are also pushing Ukrainian troops back from positions near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and trying to advance near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[48] One milblogger refuted claims of Russian advances near Klishchiivka and claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near the settlement.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Ivanivske (5km west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Bohdanivka.[50] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi noted on November 14 that Russian forces are attacking north and south of Bakhmut in an attempt to regain the initiative but reported that Ukrainian forces are defending the area.[51] Commander of the Ukrainian "Achilles" Company Yuri Fedorenko stated that the situation in the Bakhmut direction has become more complicated due to constantly changing Russian tactics and Russian forces’ heavy use of drones.[52]

The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces continued assault actions in the Bakhmut direction on November 14.[53] Syrskyi noted that the Ukrainian defense of the Bakhmut area is hindering Russian offensive capabilities.[54] One Russian VDV-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Klishchiivka.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction on November 14 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage posted on November 14 shows that Russian forces have made a marginal advance into the Avdiivka industrial zone near Yasnynuvata Lane, about 1km southeast of Avdiivka.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to improve their tactical positions on the eastern outskirts of Stepove (about 4km northwest of Avdiivka).[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces used "Wagner tactics" in assaults on eastern Stepove and conducted small group assaults against fortified Ukrainian positions, suggesting that Russian forces conducted infantry-led frontal assaults without armored vehicle support.[58] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novokalynove (7km north of Avdiivka).[59] Russian sources additionally claimed that there is heavy fighting ongoing south of Avdiivka near the industrial zone, and that Russian forces advanced on November 13 near Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka) and Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka).[60] The Ukrainian General Staff reported unsuccessful Russian attacks near Avdiivka, Sieverne, Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka), Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka), east of Pervomaiske, and south of Novokalynove.[61]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited and unsuccessful counterattacks near Avdiivka on November 14. One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in the industrial zone south of Avdiivka.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 14 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported unsuccessful Russian attacks near Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) and near Novomykhailivka (10km south of Donetsk City).[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces stormed Ukrainian positions in Marinka and achieved unspecified tactical success.[64] A Russian source posted footage of a fighter of the Donetsk People's Republic’s (DNR) 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade who is reportedly fighting in Marinka.[65]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Novomykhailivka.[66]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported Ukrainian ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 14.

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 14 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows that Russian forces advanced west of Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[67] The Russian Vostok Battalion, which is deployed to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, claimed that poor weather conditions will continue to complicate ground operations until the soil solidifies, and claimed that fighting in the area has become positional.[68] Footage published on November 13 and 14 purportedly shows elements of the Russian 30th Artillery Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) and the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) operating in the Velyka Novosilka area, and elements of the Russian 69th Separate Covering Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) operating near Zahirne (11km southwest of Hulyaipole).[69]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 14 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced northwest of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne).[70] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue offensive operations in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[71] Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne, Novofedorivka (15km northeast of Robotyne)) and north and northwest of Verbove.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 1430th Regiment (purportedly consisting of mobilized personnel from Moscow Oblast), 291st, and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiments (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled Ukrainian attacks along the Pyatykhatky-Robotyne-Verbove line (ranging from about 25km northwest of Robotyne to 10km east of Robotyne).[73]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 14 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured several unspecified Ukrainian positions near Robotyne, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[74] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Robotyne.[75] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces “activated” near Pyatykhatky (25km northwest of Robotyne) and captured several unspecified new positions, while another milblogger claimed that the sector of front near Pyatykhatky and Zherebyanky (27km northwest of Robotyne) is stable with periodic shelling.[76]

Ukrainian forces continued ground operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 14 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City, 2km from the Dnipro River, and about 3.6 km north of the E-58 highway).[77] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 14 that Ukrainian forces attempted to expand their zone of control near Krynky.[78] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the Russian military is transferring units from unspecified locations in order to repel Ukrainian attacks near Krynky.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of unspecified positions near Krynky, although ISW has not observed visual evidence to support this claim.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that intense fighting is ongoing near Poyma (10km southeast of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), Pishchanivka (13km southeast of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River), and Pidstepne (17km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[81] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are using firepower to prevent Ukrainian transfers of personnel and materiel to the east bank.[82]

Russian forces conducted air and artillery strikes against the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 14. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces conducted five airstrikes with 33 glide bombs against civilian areas in Kherson Oblast in the past day.[83] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue conducting air, artillery, and TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system strikes on the west bank.[84]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian government discussed amendments that would more strictly penalize those who evade mobilization as well as volunteer servicemen who “improperly” perform their duties.[85] The Russian Federation Council held a roundtable on November 10 during which senators discussed proposals to introduce criminal liability for individuals already in the Russian reserves who evade mobilization as well as individuals who “incite” mobilization evasion.[86] Senators also called for the introduction of criminal penalties for volunteer servicemen “for improper performance of their contractual duties,” and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Vorona stated that volunteers who desert or do not comply with orders should be held accountable.[87] Chairman of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Andrey Kartapolov previously stated on August 4 that the Duma would consider a law proposing punishments for mobilization evasion in the fall of 2023.[88]

A limited number of former Wagner fighters reportedly received combat veteran status certificates on November 14. Russian sources stated that the Kremlin-created Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation presented former Wagner fighters with the certificates with combat veteran status designations for the first time.[89] A Russian insider source claimed that Pavel Prigozhin, son of deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, reached an agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) about the issue of combat veteran status for former Wagner fighters.[90] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin previously signed resolutions on August 1 clarifying rules on awarding combat veteran status to fighters contracted with organizations assisting the Russian military, including private military companies (PMCs), who fought in Ukraine.[91]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) stated on November 14 that Russia will increase the production of the Krasnopol-M2 laser-guided artillery munition and improve the system’s performance in poor weather conditions.[92] The UK MoD stated that Russia will likely try to reduce the Krasnopol’s laser detection time, as low-hanging cloud coverage makes it difficult for the laser detector to identify and maneuver to the laser painting the intended target. The UK MoD stated that the planned increased Krasnopol production is likely an attempt to use production capacity more efficiently and that Russia’s access to improved precision munitions will be crucial for Russian operational performance during winter weather.

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec stated on November 14 that Rostec subsidiary Roselectronics presented an updated automated control system for air defense units, including Russian air defenses, at the Dubai Airshow 2023.[93] Rostec claimed that the updated wearable version of the control system includes an automated control module that allows an anti-aircraft gunner unit commander to simultaneously command nine gunners or four platoons of MANPADS gunners. The system reportedly also includes an individual automation kit for individual fighters who are equipped with portable anti-aircraft systems or small arms. The individual automation kit reportedly includes safety glasses with a heads-up display showing targets received from the unit commander. Rostec claimed that the control system’s efficiency has been tested in combat conditions, presumably in Ukraine, and that the system can be sold to other countries and adapted to their air defense systems.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials are beginning to announce that occupied areas of Ukraine will not hold significant public Christmas and New Years’ celebrations due to security concerns. Crimean occupation head Sergei Aksyonov announced on November 14 that occupied Crimea will not host significant public Christmas or New Years’ events.[94] Aksyonov noted that many areas of Crimea remain under a “yellow level” of terrorist threat.[95] Many Russian regions cancelled mass holidays gatherings in winter 2022 to redirect the funds to supporting Russian mobilized personnel in Ukraine, and occupation administrations have previously cancelled public holiday celebrations due to the martial law declarations across occupied territories.[96]

The Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration has formed a people’s militia (народное ополчение) for law enforcement purposes in Russian rear areas. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky announced on November 14 that the first detachment of the people’s militia will begin to operate in occupied Enerhodar on November 15.[97] Balitsky stated that the people’s militia currently consists of 500 personnel and operates in Akymivka, Berdyansk, Kamianka-Dniprovska (immediately west of Enerhodar), Kamianka (formerly Kuibysheve, 60km north of Berdyansk), Melitopol, and Enerhodar. Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom head Petro Kotin stated on November 9 that the number of male Russian military personnel near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and elsewhere in Enerhodar has decreased and that Russia is deploying more female personnel to the area.[98] The Kremlin is likely trying to create dedicated security forces for occupied Ukraine in order to free up military personnel for frontline operations.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFU/posts/pfbid0AHfFEgXyybxs2wSGntVGhhKwz5z8XvkHbD5BZZiW8tjq84dUZT48tAtgCesmVyQil; https://t.me/osirskiy/445; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/8584

[2] https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFU/posts/pfbid0AHfFEgXyybxs2wSGntVGhhKwz5z8XvkHbD5BZZiW8tjq84dUZT48tAtgCesmVyQil

[3] https://t.me/osirskiy/445

[4] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/8584

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110923; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110923; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110123

[6] https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1724487208982163595; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/56624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110723; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2023; https://www.president.gov.ua/news/demokratiyi-svitu-doveli-svoyu-zdatnist-obyednuvatisya-j-pro-86997

[7] https://www.president.gov.ua/news/demokratiyi-svitu-doveli-svoyu-zdatnist-obyednuvatisya-j-pro-86997; https://www.hudson.org/events/decisive-moment-ukraine-conversation-andriy-yermak-head-office-president-ukraine; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-troops-have-secured-foothold-south-senior-official-says-2023-11-14/

[8] https://www.president.gov.ua/news/demokratiyi-svitu-doveli-svoyu-zdatnist-obyednuvatisya-j-pro-86997; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GCQUfjjtZgM&ab_channel=HudsonInstitute

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111323; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110723;

[10] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1724194361062138220?s=20; https://t.me/romanov_92/42464

[11] https://publication dot pravo dot gov dot ru /document/0001202311140005 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/14/11/2023/655336089a7947a88deb4b6b; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/11/14/putin-utverdil-popravki-k-zakonu-o-vyborah-prezidenta-rossii-oni-zatrudnyayut-rabotu-zhurnalistov; https://t.me/sotaproject/69345; https://ria dot ru/20231114/vybory-1909321431.html

[12] https://www.facebook.com/kpszsu/posts/pfbid0i5g1KxsfLZZbqFS1ravnbR3rcwVRN1eBU8z1nfHhqMhrZVYRwQdjSek6KYkA8SbRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NMNKPxDrcJ6uJQNvoAZPQwAmhggaqkuaVdykpGXxVB8LLrA7tcr7tG6T95Pn7mBLl

[13] https://www.facebook.com/kpszsu/posts/pfbid0i5g1KxsfLZZbqFS1ravnbR3rcwVRN1eBU8z1nfHhqMhrZVYRwQdjSek6KYkA8SbRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NMNKPxDrcJ6uJQNvoAZPQwAmhggaqkuaVdykpGXxVB8LLrA7tcr7tG6T95Pn7mBLl

[14] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/2727

[15] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/14/zbilshennya-kilkosti-antybalistychnyh-kompleksiv-aktualne-pytannya-dlya-ukrayiny-yurij-ignat/

[16] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12231; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38654; https://t.me/readovkanews/69334

[17] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/11/14/tanky-snaryady-vsyudyhody-ta-rls-novyj-paket-dopomogy-nimechchyny-dlya-ukrayiny/ ; https://www.bundesregierung dot de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-set-double-its-ukraine-military-aid-under-scholz-plan-bloomberg-news-2023-11-12/

[18] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/dlya-ukrayini-principovo-realizuvati-vsi-sim-rekomendacij-ye-86989

[19] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_220058.htm

[20] https://twitter.com/JosepBorrellF/status/1724059125464670383

[21] https://www.politico dot eu/article/germanys-pistorius-says-eu-will-fall-short-of-million-shell-pledge-to-ukraine/ ; https://mfa.gov dot ua/news/dmitro-kuleba-na-radi-ministriv-zakordonnih-sprav-yes-golovne-zavdannya-zabezpechiti-uspih-ukrayinskogo-pihotincya

[22] https://www.politico dot eu/article/germanys-pistorius-says-eu-will-fall-short-of-million-shell-pledge-to-ukraine/

[23] https://www.politico dot eu/article/germanys-pistorius-says-eu-will-fall-short-of-million-shell-pledge-to-ukraine/

[24] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_220061.htm

[25] https://www.politico dot eu/article/germanys-pistorius-says-eu-will-fall-short-of-million-shell-pledge-to-ukraine/

[26] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/19276391

[27] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/19276391

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2023

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-14; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-19: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-12

[30] https://www.primeminister dot am/hy/press-release/item/2023/11/14/Nikol-Pashinyan-Telephone-Conversation/

[31] https://tass dot ru/politika/19277399

[32] https://news dot am/eng/news/791601.html; https://arka dot am/en/news/politics/armenia_has_made_no_decision_yet_on_participation_in_csto_summit_in_minsk/; https://caucasuswatch dot de/en/news/armenian-deputy-foreign-minister-says-his-country-is-not-discussing-csto-withdrawal.html; https://armeniasputnik dot am/20231109/hapk-gagatnazhvoghvovin-pashinjani-masnakcutjan-masin-vorvoshum-der-chi-kajacvel-kvostanjan-68406442.html

[33] https://t.me/sotaproject/69356 ; https://www.pnp dot ru/politics/tolstoy-prizval-ogranichit-priem-rabotnikov-iz-stran-gde-ushhemlyayut-russkiy-yazyk.html ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/11/14/vitse-spiker-gosdumy-predlozhil-zapretit-rabotat-kurierami-i-taksistami-grazhdanam-stran-gde-russkiy-yazyk-ne-yavlyaetsya-gosudarstvennym

[34] https://t.me/sotaproject/69356 ; https://www.pnp dot ru/politics/tolstoy-prizval-ogranichit-priem-rabotnikov-iz-stran-gde-ushhemlyayut-russkiy-yazyk.html ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/11/14/vitse-spiker-gosdumy-predlozhil-zapretit-rabotat-kurierami-i-taksistami-grazhdanam-stran-gde-russkiy-yazyk-ne-yavlyaetsya-gosudarstvennym

[35] https://constitutionrk dot kz/razdel-1/statya-7 ; https://ru.sputnik dot kg/20230421/kyrgyzstan-russkij-yazyk-status-1074640204.html

[36] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/07/12/2021/61a8d6659a79476c9c9d5775

[37] https://media-mig dot ru/world-experience/russkii-yazyk-v-uzbekistane-segodnya-perezhivaet-n/ ; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/07/12/2021/61a8d6659a79476c9c9d5775

[38] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/7451; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1724367402559766615?s=20; https://x.com/GloOouD/status/1724189164525027352?s=20

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dTzqAmUndaZ6MMMdagBGFzRQRBFeZwygCSE1WcR28Gb48kjjxxV55UQULk18cMfjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02h8XA7ACDErBhv8nkYDDDDyXMEXejstg3xxwY6aMbPvMTucyZYH1u6Bwy82HuzGjql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PXQYKT4YpfNfRv4LWwZdAGTB3zcmS8rv9r5J4QCxv1g7B9ZEdUyXaXC4des5BbFPl

[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/16413

[41] https://t.me/osirskiy/445

[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/32470 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32472 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32473 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32469

[43] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12238 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16413 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12238

[44] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/7441

[45] https://x.com/GermanObserver1/status/1724492611413590119?s=20; https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13606

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/16413; https://t.me/rybar/54176; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4743; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4751

[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/32461 ; https://t.me/vdv_ZA_teplinsky/439

[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4751; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4743; https://t.me/readovkanews/69333; https://t.me/wargonzo/16413; https://t.me/rybar/54176

[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/16413

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dTzqAmUndaZ6MMMdagBGFzRQRBFeZwygCSE1WcR28Gb48kjjxxV55UQULk18cMfjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02h8XA7ACDErBhv8nkYDDDDyXMEXejstg3xxwY6aMbPvMTucyZYH1u6Bwy82HuzGjql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PXQYKT4YpfNfRv4LWwZdAGTB3zcmS8rv9r5J4QCxv1g7B9ZEdUyXaXC4des5BbFPl

[51] https://t.me/osirskiy/445

[52] https://suspilne dot media/616475-vijska-rf-obstrilali-hersonsinu-es-vidpravit-misiu-z-propozicieu-bezpekovih-zobovazan-628-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1699942851&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dTzqAmUndaZ6MMMdagBGFzRQRBFeZwygCSE1WcR28Gb48kjjxxV55UQULk18cMfjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02h8XA7ACDErBhv8nkYDDDDyXMEXejstg3xxwY6aMbPvMTucyZYH1u6Bwy82HuzGjql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PXQYKT4YpfNfRv4LWwZdAGTB3zcmS8rv9r5J4QCxv1g7B9ZEdUyXaXC4des5BbFPl

[54] https://t.me/osirskiy/445

[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4751

[56] https://t.me/BUAR110ombr/162; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/7454

[57] https://t.me/readovkanews/69333; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12252; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4745; https://t.me/dva_majors/28991; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/56594; https://t.me/rybar/54176 https://t.me/rybar/54172; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12225

[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4745

[59] https://t.me/wargonzo/16413

[60] https://t.me/rybar/54176; https://t.me/wargonzo/16413; https://t.me/dva_majors/28991 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69333

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PXQYKT4YpfNfRv4LWwZdAGTB3zcmS8rv9r5J4QCxv1g7B9ZEdUyXaXC4des5BbFPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dTzqAmUndaZ6MMMdagBGFzRQRBFeZwygCSE1WcR28Gb48kjjxxV55UQULk18cMfjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02h8XA7ACDErBhv8nkYDDDDyXMEXejstg3xxwY6aMbPvMTucyZYH1u6Bwy82HuzGjql

[62] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12254

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PXQYKT4YpfNfRv4LWwZdAGTB3zcmS8rv9r5J4QCxv1g7B9ZEdUyXaXC4des5BbFPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dTzqAmUndaZ6MMMdagBGFzRQRBFeZwygCSE1WcR28Gb48kjjxxV55UQULk18cMfjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02h8XA7ACDErBhv8nkYDDDDyXMEXejstg3xxwY6aMbPvMTucyZYH1u6Bwy82HuzGjql

[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/16413

[65] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/30865

[66] https://t.me/mod_russia/32470 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32475

[67] https://x.com/Inside_the_AFU/status/1723955396170162637?s=20; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1723966115326386504?s=20; https://x.com/wilendhornets/status/1724161013413499269?s=20; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1724161831181099109?s=20

[68] https://t.me/batalyon_vostok/253

[69] https://t.me/voin_dv/5953 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/5953 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/5958 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/11973 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/11762

[70] https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1724487208982163595; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/56624

[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dTzqAmUndaZ6MMMdagBGFzRQRBFeZwygCSE1WcR28Gb48kjjxxV55UQULk18cMfjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02h8XA7ACDErBhv8nkYDDDDyXMEXejstg3xxwY6aMbPvMTucyZYH1u6Bwy82HuzGjql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PXQYKT4YpfNfRv4LWwZdAGTB3zcmS8rv9r5J4QCxv1g7B9ZEdUyXaXC4des5BbFPl

[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/29001 ; https://t.me/polk_1430/1627 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12238 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4734 ; ttps://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4741 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4742 ; https://t.me/vrogov/12872 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4752

[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/29001 ; https://t.me/polk_1430/1627

[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/28991

[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02dTzqAmUndaZ6MMMdagBGFzRQRBFeZwygCSE1WcR28Gb48kjjxxV55UQULk18cMfjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02h8XA7ACDErBhv8nkYDDDDyXMEXejstg3xxwY6aMbPvMTucyZYH1u6Bwy82HuzGjql

[76] https://t.me/wargonzo/16413 ; https://t.me/batalyon15/3281

[77] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1724194361062138220?s=20; https://t.me/romanov_92/42464

[78] https://t.me/rybar/54192 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28991 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16413 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12238

[79] https://t.me/rybar/54190

[80] https://t.me/rybar/54192

[81] https://t.me/wargonzo/16413

[82] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4755 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/28991 ; https://t.me/rybar/54192

[83] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/2727

[84] https://t.me/rybar/54192 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29024 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4750 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/103816

[85] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6336138

[86] https://t.me/astrapress/42296 ; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/11/13/1005432-senatori-predlagayut-kriminalizirovat-napravlennie-protiv-mobilizatsii-deyaniya ; http://council dot gov.ru/events/news/149956/

[87] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/11/13/1005432-senatori-predlagayut-kriminalizirovat-napravlennie-protiv-mobilizatsii-deyaniya ; https://t.me/astrapress/42296 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6336138

[88] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2023

[89] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/30878 ; https://t.me/sashakots/43324 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/4806 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16436 ; https://t.me/annatsivileva/6046

[90] https://t.me/vchkogpu/43736

[91] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/August%202%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf

[92] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1724334648942059695?s=20

[93] https://rostec dot ru/news/roselektronika-vpervye-predstavlyaet-modernizirovannyy-kompleks-upravleniya-pvo-na-dubai-airshow/

[94] https://t.me/Aksenov82/3504

[95] https://t.me/Aksenov82/3504

[96] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20April%2013%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2023;

[97] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/2022

[98] https://suspilne dot media/613295-na-timcasovo-zahoplenij-zaes-ta-energodari-rosiani-zmensuut-kilkist-vijskovih-petro-kotin/