Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 26, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 26, 2023

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 26, 2023, 6:30pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:15pm ET on November 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed drone strikes on Ukraine on the night of November 25-26. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched nine Shahed-136/131 from Primorsko-Akhtarsk direction and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down eight drones.[1] Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev, like other Ukrainian officials on November 25, continued to praise the actions of Ukrainian mobile fire groups in intercepting Russian drones.[2] Nayev stated that mobile fire groups will receive foreign-made man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) in the near future.[3]

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a large-scale drone strike on Russian territory, and Russian occupation officials accused Ukrainian forces of launching a strike on occupied Donetsk Oblast that resulted in widespread power outages. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down 24 Ukrainian drones over Moscow, Tula, Kaluga, Bryansk, and Smolensk oblasts on the night of November 25-26 and on the morning of November 26.[4] Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin stated that one drone crashed into an apartment building in Tula City after Russian air defenses shot it down.[5] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne, citing its own unnamed sources, reported that the overnight Ukrainian drone strike on Russia was a GUR special operation.[6] Russian sources, including Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin, also claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a large artillery and HIMARS strike on power distribution substations in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight, causing electricity outages in many settlements and cities, including Donetsk City, Mariupol, and Manhush.[7]

Russian forces reportedly complained about the vulnerability of Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities on the east bank. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 26 that personnel of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division (of the newly formed 18th Combined Arms Army) often write to him complaining about the vulnerability of Russian logistics in the east bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson Oblast and 2km from the Dnipro River) to Ukrainian drone strikes.[8] The milblogger also agreed with another Russian milblogger’s previous claims that Russian forces in this area struggle with unit coordination as well as commanders’ negligence at the company and battalion levels.[9] The milblogger suggested that Russian forces near Krynky should create a separate anti-drone company staffed by personnel of the separate reconnaissance battalion of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division to protect Russian GLOCs.[10] Russian GLOCs on left bank Kherson Oblast, such as the E58 Antonivka-Sahy highway (about 5-8km away from the Dnipro River), are located close to the Dnipro River shoreline, making them vulnerable to Ukrainian interdiction. ISW previously reported that Russian milbloggers have repeatedly complained about Russian forces near Krynky suffering from problems, such as insufficient fire support, unit coordination, electronic warfare (EW), counterbattery, and air defense, but has observed that these reported problems do not always translate into significant battlefield effects.[11] Russian sources have continually claimed that Russian forces are unable to push Ukrainian forces out of Krynky and that Ukrainian forces are currently unable to make operationally significant advances in the east bank area.[12]

Russia continues to face skilled and unskilled labor shortages amid inconsistent and contradictory Kremlin policies that disincentivize Russians who fled Russia and migrant workers from working in Russia while simultaneously trying to increase Russian industrial capacity and force generation. Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin claimed on November 25 that many Russians who left Russia because of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine are returning to Russia because they could not find work abroad.[13] Volodin warned that Russia is not “waiting with open arms” to accept returning Russians and claimed that they “committed treason against Russia, relatives, and friends.”[14] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger agreed with Volodin’s statements on November 26 but noted that Russia continues to face severe skilled labor shortages and characterized the number of returning Russians as “catastrophically small.”[15] The milblogger added that the labor shortages have increased the number of migrants seeking jobs in Russia and criticized Russian authorities for their “open door policy” on migration.[16] The Russian government appears to be struggling to reconcile incoherent and competing objectives by prioritizing crypto-mobilization efforts to send manpower to the frontline at the expense of Russia’s national labor force while simultaneously enforcing policies that restrict migrants’ prospects to work in Russia.[17] Russian law enforcement agencies are also coercing migrants both with and without Russian citizenship into Russian military service, further reducing the migrants’ ability to augment Russia’s labor force.[18] The Kremlin’s incoherent and contradictory policies seek to achieve mutually exclusive objectives of reducing negative shocks to Russia’s domestic labor force, while disincentivizing migrants from working in Russia and enticing Russians to return from abroad while not providing them opportunities to work and trying to recruit them into a war they fled. The poor implementation of these policies has not generated any apparent or imminent threats to the Russian economy or war effort at this time, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed drone strikes on Ukraine on the night of November 25-26.
• The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a large-scale drone strike on Russian territory, and Russian occupation officials accused Ukrainian forces of launching a strike on occupied Donetsk Oblast that resulted in widespread power outages.
• Russian forces reportedly complained about the vulnerability of Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast amid continued complaints about weak Russian capabilities on the east bank.
• Russia continues to face skilled and unskilled labor shortages amid inconsistent and contradictory Kremlin policies that disincentivize Russians who fled Russia and migrant workers from working in Russia while simultaneously trying to increase Russian industrial capacity and force generation.
• Russian forces continued attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• The Russian Supreme Court ruled that certain Russian mobilized individuals have the right to serve in the Russian Alternative Civil Service (AKS) rather than on the front lines.
• Russian occupation officials continue to establish programs aimed at indoctrinating Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine into Russian national and cultural identities.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 26 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage published on November 26 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced southwest of Pershotravneve (24km east of Kupyansk).[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove), and near the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have unsuccessfully attempted to advance northeast and east of Kupyansk over the past week.[21] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo reported that Russian forces have intensified their use of loitering munitions and first-person view (FPV) drones near Synkivka in attempts to advance toward Kupyansk.[22]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 26. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka, Ivanivka, and near the Serebryanske forest area.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to seize the initiative in the Serebryanske forest area over the past week by taking advantage of a Russian troop redeployment from the area to other unspecified directions.[24] Russian milbloggers have routinely claimed in recent weeks that Ukrainian forces are preparing to launch a localized offensive effort near Kreminna.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued conducting assaults south of Bakhmut on November 26 and are inflicting personnel and military equipment losses on Russian forces.[25]

Russian sources claimed on November 26 that Russian forces marginally advanced near Bakhmut. A Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian armored group attacked near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and seized unspecified positions but that Ukrainian forces still control key heights around the settlement.[26] The milblogger added that Russian forces advanced northeast of Klishchiivka, towards Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), and near the railway in the vicinity of Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) over the past week.[27] A Russian news aggregator similarly claimed on November 25 that Russian forces advanced towards Klishchiivka and on its northeastern outskirts, and successfully counterattacked near Andriivka.[28] Some milbloggers, however, claimed that there had been no changes to the Bakhmut frontline.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[30] Russian milbloggers indicated that elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Army Corps, 8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and 137th Guards Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th Guards VDV Division) are operating in the Bakhmut direction.[31]

Ukrainian forces reportedly attacked northwest of Horlivka (25km south of Bakhmut) on November 26 but did not make claimed or confirmed advances. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Pivdenne and Shumy (both immediately northwest of Horlivka).[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that there have not been any changes on the Horlivka frontline as of November 26.[33]

Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked northwest of Horlivka on November 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on the eastern part of Pivnichne (just northwest of Horlivka).[34]

Russian forces made confirmed advances northwest and southeast of Avdiivka on November 26. Geolocated footage published on November 26 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced northwest of Krasnohorivka (7km northwest of Avdiivka) and in the eastern part of the industrial zone on Avdiivka’s southeastern outskirts.[35] Geolocated video footage on November 26 shows Russian armored vehicles attacking Ukrainian positions in the northern part of the industrial area on Avdiivka’s southeastern outskirts.[36] Russian milbloggers overwhelmingly claimed that Russian forces captured the entire industrial area near the Yasynuvata-2 railway station on November 26 after clearing the last remaining buildings in the area on November 25, though ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims yet.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that the industrial zone is located on a slight hill that they assessed would allow Russian forces to shell Ukrainian positions on the outskirts of Avdiivka and develop further offensive operations.[38] Some Russian sources claimed that capturing this industrial area will not make further offensive operations easier for Russian forces, however, as Russian forces will need to develop offensives on Avdiivka’s other flanks or mobilize more personnel to achieve rapid and decisive results.[39] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces gained a foothold near the railway adjacent to the Avdiivka Coke Plant.[40] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled all Russian attacks on the Avdiivka Coke Plant and near Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka) on November 26 and that Russian forces advanced on the eastern approaches to Avdiivka and near Novokalynove (7km north of Avdiivka) over the past week.[41] The milblogger observed that Russian advances over the past week do not immediately threaten Ukrainian forces and largely do not affect Russian efforts to capture Avdiivka but simply extend the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults east of Novobakhmutivka (9km northwest of Avdiivka); south of Novokalynove; and near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Stepove, Avdiivka, and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[42]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to counterattack on the Avdiivka frontline on November 26 but did not make claimed or confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are continuing to counterattack despite retreating from their fortified positions near Stepove.[43] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces failed to restore the lost position in the industrial zone on Avdiivka’s southeastern outskirts after counterattacking in the area.[44]

Russian forces continued unsuccessful offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched unsuccessful offensive operations near Marinka (immediately west of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[45] A prominent Russian milblogger similarly claimed that Russian forces did not advance near Marinka or Novomykhailivka on November 26 but claimed that Russian forces made some unspecified advances near Novomykhailivka over the past week with the operational objective of reaching Vuhledar.[46] The milblogger added that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back to the northwestern part of Marinka over the past week.

The Russian MoD claimed on November 26 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka and Shevchenko (8km southwest of Vuhledar).[47]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make any confirmed advances on November 26. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces made unspecified advances in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 26.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported in its morning situation reports that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked east of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and south of Zolota Nyva (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and reported in their evening situation report that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[49]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on November 26. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked Robotyne and Verbove (9km east of Robotyne) with small infantry groups.[50] Russian sources claimed on November 25 and 26 that Ukrainian forces reduced the tempo of their operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast in part due to poor weather conditions.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 26 that Ukrainian forces advanced half a kilometer towards Novofedorivka (15km northeast of Robotyne) and unsuccessfully tried to advance in the direction of Kopani (5km northwest of Robotyne) in the past week.[52]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances on November 26. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a series of counterattacks along the Kopani-Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line and advanced near Verbove.[53] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces achieved unspecified tactical successes near Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne) before heavy rainfall disrupted the active fighting.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff reported in its morning situation reports that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne and noted in their evening situation report that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction.[55] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Territorial Troops [TRV]) and 136th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Robotyne.[56] Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 108th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th Guards VDV Division) and the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[57]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as Russian forces made claimed advances on the east bank on November 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[58] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of forest areas near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson Oblast and 2km from the Dnipro River).[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered the western outskirts of Krynky.[60]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful missile strike against occupied Crimea on November 26. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two Ukrainian S-200 missiles over the Sea of Azov that some Russian sources claimed targeted the Kerch Strait Bridge.[61]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Supreme Court ruled that certain Russian mobilized individuals have the right to serve in the Russian Alternative Civil Service (AKS) rather than on the front lines. The Russian Supreme Court ruled on November 23 in favor of Pavel Mushumansky, who served in the AKS based on his religious beliefs after conscription in 2019 and asked to serve in the AKS again after mobilization in fall 2022.[62] Mushumansky deployed to a military unit and appealed his case to the Supreme Court after the Leningrad Oblast court denied his appeal to serve in the AKS. Kremlin newswire RBK reported statements from Russian legal experts that the Supreme Court’s ruling affirms the right of Russian conscripts and mobilized personnel to replace military service with AKS if military service contradicts their spiritual or religious beliefs.[63] The experts noted that the mobilization ruling only applies to individuals who can demonstrate that military service violates their beliefs and who have not served in the military or as a conscript previously, however.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to establish programs aimed at indoctrinating Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine into Russian national and cultural identities. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration announced on November 26 that it and the Kremlin-backed United Russia party are opening a center for children without parental care in occupied Kherson Oblast.[64] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration noted that Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova supported the project and that the Ryazan Oblast government will help renovate the center.[65] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on November 26 that Russian occupation authorities are launching a program at institutions of higher education in occupied Melitopol to train students to create minefield maps.[66]

Russian occupation authorities continue to use maternity capital benefits to augment passportization efforts in occupied areas. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Militia claimed on November 26 that residents in occupied Luhansk Oblast can apply for maternity capital payments for their second and third children and their first child (if the first child was born after January 1, 2020) if they or their children have Russian passports.[67]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian sources are seizing upon a civilian protest on the Ukrainian-Polish border to amplify standard Kremlin narratives aimed at driving a wedge in relations between Ukraine and Poland. Polish truckers began a blockade of three border crossings between Ukraine and Poland on November 6 and expanded the blockade to a fourth border crossing on November 24 as part of a strike to prevent Ukrainian truckers from crossing the Polish border into Ukraine.[68] The Polish truckers are reportedly protesting the competition from Ukrainian trucks and only allow humanitarian and passenger vehicles to cross the border, creating significant traffic jams of over 2,000 trucks and a humanitarian crisis at the border crossings that has resulted in the deaths of two Ukrainian truck drivers.[69] Ukrainian officials have routinely called for an end to the protest, and Latvian Foreign Minister Krisjanis Karins expressed willingness on November 26 to mediate between Poland and Ukraine to unblock the border.[70] Pro-Kremlin Russian sources are claiming that the blockade has created critical fuel and military shortages in Ukraine, that some Ukrainian officials are also protesting, and that the strike may expand further.[71] These narratives are likely intended to undermine Ukrainian-Polish relations and sabotage future negotiations to end the strike.

The Russian MoD continues efforts to portray Russian-led international organizations as unified during Russia's full-scale invasion in Ukraine. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on November 26 that the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has effectively created a unified air defense network because Russia already has bilateral air defense agreements with all other CSTO member states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.[72] A bilateral agreement creating a joint regional air defense network between Russia and Kyrgyzstan as part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) framework came into force on November 9.[73] Shoigu’s mention of Armenia alongside other CSTO member states is notable, as Armenia did not attend the CSTO Collective Session in Minsk, Belarus, on November 23 amid continued Armenian efforts to distance itself from Russia.[74]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The independent Belarusian monitoring project The Hajun Project reported on November 26 that Russian and Belarusian forces have extended joint exercises in Belarus to mid-December that have been ongoing since April 29, 2022.[75]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fccXumsFLRaANkyWmbXqYS47Bm8DGorn7qaBNsjYjjAfZ7dpaRqSWcmRjv9EMXx3l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyugmFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl ; https://www.facebook.com/kpszsu/posts/pfbid0YeKQoV6e6wHCSDVNbusdXpH2V9BYEzFEjzQxQeWk5t6XRMnFQxyTm9d52K68tkrbl?locale=uk_UA ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/11/26/nashi-chergovi-grupy-postijno-vidstezhuyut-na-radarah-mozhlyvi-ruhy-bpla-yurij-ignat/

[2] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/11/25/na-pivnochi-bilsha-polovyna-vorozhyh-bezpilotnykiv-znyshhena-mobilnymy-grupamy-sergij-nayev-pro-nichnu-ataku-shahediv/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/26/najblyzhchym-chasom-mobilni-vognevi-grupy-protypovitryanoyi-oborony-otrymayut-perenosni-zrk-inozemnogo-vyrobnycztva-sergij-nayev/

[3] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/11/26/najblyzhchym-chasom-mobilni-vognevi-grupy-protypovitryanoyi-oborony-otrymayut-perenosni-zrk-inozemnogo-vyrobnycztva-sergij-nayev/

[4] https://t.me/mod_russia/32861 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32865 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32871

[5] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/26/11/2023/6562b32d9a794746fddb738c?from=from_main_3 ; https://vk dot com/tularegion71?w=wall-56015144_241630

[6] https://suspilne dot media/625695-nicna-ataka-bezpilotnikiv-na-rosiu-bula-specoperacieu-gur-dzerela/

[7] https://t.me/dva_majors/29690 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104766 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/12245 ; https://t.me/DmitriySteshin/9461 ; https://t.me/astrapress/42938 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/15454 ; https://t.me/pushilindenis/4038 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/11/26/glava-dnr-denis-pushilin-zayavil-chto-chast-anneksirovannogo-regiona-byla-obestochena-iz-za-massirovannogo-obstrela-so-storony-ukrainy ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38780 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69921 ; https://t.me/pushilindenis/4041

[8] https://t.me/zhivoff/11815 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29722

[9] https://t.me/zhivoff/11815 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29722 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29419 ; https://t.me/zhivoff22/13497

[10] https://t.me/zhivoff/11815 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29722

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2023

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2023 ; https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2954 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12351 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16486 ; https://t.me/rybar/54430 ; https://t.me/rodinarussia27/2194 ; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1727731938742436076/photo/1 ; https://t.me/rodinarussia27/2197 ; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1727733682767618373 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29460

[13] https://t.me/vv_volodin/719

[14] https://t.me/vv_volodin/719

[15] https://t.me/rybar/54497

[16] https://t.me/rybar/54497

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111423

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112423 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2023

[19] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1728821451967644027?s=20; https://t.me/brigade_14/1875

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyugmFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl

[21] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[22] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/11/26/okupanty-ne-polyshayut-sprob-povtorno-zahopyty-kupyansk-volodymyr-fito/; https://suspilne dot media/625507-rosia-vnoci-atakuvala-dronami-souzniki-nadadut-ukraini-konvoj-morskih-kateriv-641-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1701018349&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/32878

[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyugmFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/16680

[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[28] https://t.me/readovkanews/69914

[29] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104739

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyugmFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/5009; https://t.me/milinfolive/111483

[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/32878

[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104733 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52381

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl

[35] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1728817596475318387?s=20; https://t.me/khornegroup/1019; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/7850; https://www.facebook.com/31ombr/videos/1523912645038740/?mibextid=rS40aB7S9Ucbxw6v; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1728781434255560867?s=20; https://www.facebook.com/31ombr/videos/1523912645038740; https://x.com/TankDiary/status/1728735206578835786?s=20; https://t.me/BARSRF11/6336

[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104776

[37] https://t.me/rybar/54494 ; https://t.me/smotri_z/22943 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/31110; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57194; https://t.me/rusich_army/11932; https://t.me/dva_majors/29690; https://t.me/notes_veterans/13706; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52381 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104733; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/5075; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52379

[38] https://t.me/rybar/54494 ; https://t.me/smotri_z/22943 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/31110; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57194; https://t.me/rusich_army/11932; https://t.me/notes_veterans/13719

[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696; https://t.me/readovkanews/69914; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/13603

[40] https://t.me/rybar/54494 ; https://t.me/smotri_z/22943 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/31110

[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/16680 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyugmFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl

[43] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104805

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyugmFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/32878

[48] https://t.me/mod_russia/32878

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyugmFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl

[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/29690

[51] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52381 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104733 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/5008 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4996

[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/16696

[53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57262

[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57262

[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyugmFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl

[56] https://t.me/dva_majors/29692

[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4996 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29725

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FWHdv3t2Kzykd8um93YYJkb6ST62SHCDPdiuGnPUUVMCCAYpW7gNfMQ69sdBTm2jl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021qCkZ3Mafv32bex9DYW5YmJE7ZeTNAo5Bv8Ubby38UNFhgH5SsZAUQTzK63QUv4zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xNapJkeXfPdZhtfgysnfkLZ63XGFTZyugmFXWePSHFWhUaN8Tp1ciw7DNNfCWitFl

[59] https://t.me/wargonzo/16680 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29690 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/5005

[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/5005

[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/32873; https://t.me/wargonzo/16692 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104774 ; https://t.me/vrogov/13040

[62] https://t.me/netprizyvu/2607; https://www.svoboda dot org/a/verhovnyy-sud-rf-podtverdil-pravo-mobilizovannyh-na-ags/32697323.html

[63] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/26/11/2023/656200729a79475724c7a908

[64] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/15703

[65] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/15703

[66] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/3870

[67] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/11301

[68] https://www.ft.com/content/8ce3b3b5-b2b1-4871-baec-394bc74e8911; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2023/11/26/latvia-offers-to-help-resolve-poland-ukraine-border-crisis-as-2000-trucks-lined-up-on-polish-border/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-ready-evacuate-stranded-truckers-polish-protests-persist-2023-11-24/

[69] https://www.ft.com/content/8ce3b3b5-b2b1-4871-baec-394bc74e8911; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2023/11/26/latvia-offers-to-help-resolve-poland-ukraine-border-crisis-as-2000-trucks-lined-up-on-polish-border/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-ready-evacuate-stranded-truckers-polish-protests-persist-2023-11-24/; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/24545; https://forbes dot ua/ru/money/tse-bude-katastrofa-polski-perevizniki-zablokuvali-kordon-shchob-zakhistiti-vid-ukraintsiv-rinok-perevezen-es-na-370-mlrd-ekonomistka-irina-kosse-poyasnyue-shcho-vidbuvaetsya-naspravdi-23112023-17450

[70] https://suspilne dot media/625667-glava-mzs-latvii-zaaviv-pro-gotovnist-dolucitisa-do-peregovoriv-iz-rozblokuvanna-kordonu-ukraini-ta-polsi/; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2023/11/26/latvia-offers-to-help-resolve-poland-ukraine-border-crisis-as-2000-trucks-lined-up-on-polish-border/; https://www.ft.com/content/8ce3b3b5-b2b1-4871-baec-394bc74e8911; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2023/11/26/latvia-offers-to-help-resolve-poland-ukraine-border-crisis-as-2000-trucks-lined-up-on-polish-border/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-ready-evacuate-stranded-truckers-polish-protests-persist-2023-11-24/

[71] https://ria dot ru/20231125/postavki-1911872219.html; https://ria dot ru/20231126/obraschenie-1911881224.html; https://ria dot ru/20231123/defitsit-1911351580.html; https://ria dot ru/20231123/ukraina-1911297390.html; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19380707; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19366731; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19325977; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/19334835; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/19231615; https://t.me/readovkanews/69911

[72] https://t.me/astrapress/42947 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/19381789 ;

[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2023

[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20November%2024%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf

[75] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/7568