Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 10, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 10, 2024

Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, and Fredrick W. Kagan

February 10, 2024, 6:10pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on February 10 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Delays in Western security assistance may lead to significant Ukrainian air defense missile shortages that could allow Russian forces to bomb Ukrainian forces or even front-line cities more aggressively. The New York Times reported on February 9 that American officials assess that Ukrainian air defense missile stocks will run out in March 2024 without further replenishment by Western security assistance.[1] Ukrainian officials have recently warned that Ukraine is facing a “critical shortage” of air defense missiles as delays in Western aid continue to force Ukraine to husband materiel.[2] Russian forces have routinely pressured Ukraine’s limited air defense umbrella through missile and drone strikes integrating Iranian and North Korean weapons with Russian systems against rear Ukrainian areas in an effort to force Ukrainian forces to expend air defense missiles and to draw and fix Ukrainian air defense systems away from the frontline.[3] Ukrainian forces previously shot down tactical Russian aircraft in Kherson Oblast in December 2023, which had a temporary chilling effect on Russian aviation support for Russian ground operations throughout the theater.[4] Ukrainian forces also shot down a Russian A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft on January 14 which similarly led to a temporary decrease in Russian aviation operations over the Sea of Azov.[5] The intensification of the Russian strike campaign in recent weeks likely further pressured Ukraine’s air defense umbrella and may have forced Ukraine to redeploy air defenses that were previously able to place constraints on Russian tactical aviation operating along the front and in the Russian rear.

Russian aviation reportedly intensified operations supporting Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in January 2024, particularly near Avdiivka, suggesting that limited Ukrainian air defense missile stocks may be giving Russian aviation more opportunities to attack.[6] Critical Ukrainian shortages of air defense missiles could permit Russian forces to operate aircraft, especially manned aircraft that generally carry heavier payloads, closer to and beyond the current frontline in Ukraine at scale. The Russian military has yet to conduct consistent large-scale aviation operations supporting Russian ground offensives in Ukraine, and the intensification of Russian aviation operations at scale would represent a significant threat to Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Major General Anatoliy Barhylevych as Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff, replacing Lieutenant General Serhiy Shaptala.[7] Zelensky noted on February 10 that Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi recommended Barhylevych, and Syrskyi congratulated Barhylevych on his appointment.[8] Zelensky appointed Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief responsible for unmanned systems and Colonel Andriy Lebedenko as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief responsible for innovation.[9] Zelensky also appointed Brigadier General Volodymyr Horbatiuk as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff responsible for operations, planning, and management; Brigadier General Oleksii Shevchenko as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff responsible for logistics; and Brigadier General Mykhailo Drapatyi as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff responsible for training.[10]

Russian drone footage published on February 9 showed Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Klishchiivka in the Bakhmut direction.[11] The footage shows a Russian soldier executing an unarmed Ukrainian prisoner surrendering with his hands raised and killing a second Ukrainian prisoner after throwing a grenade into a dugout. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office has started a pre-trial investigation and criminal proceedings. Attacking soldiers recognized as hors de combat, specifically including those who have clearly expressed an intention to surrender, is a violation of Article 41 of the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict.[12] Similar previous footage has shown Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Stepove in the Avdiivka direction in December 2023.[13] The Russian Southern Grouping of Forces is responsible for the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions, and a separate unnamed Russian grouping of forces is responsible for western Zaporizhia Oblast, indicating that the practice of executing Ukrainian POWs is not limited to a single sector of the front or an area under one Russian grouping of forces.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated several Kremlin narratives aimed at justifying Russia’s war in Ukraine and threatening the West at a ceremony honoring Diplomats’ Day on February 10. Putin claimed that one of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) priorities is to “unite the multinational and multi-confessional Russian World (Russkiy Mir) by supporting [Russia’s] compatriots abroad.”[14] The Kremlin had repeatedly claimed that the Russian World, which is vaguely defined as including ethnic Russians and Russian speakers abroad, includes Ukrainians and that Russia’s invasions of Ukraine were allegedly in the defense of “compatriots abroad” in Ukraine.[15] Putin’s calls for the unification of the multinational and multi-confessional Russian World are at odds with Russian authorities’ actual persecution of ethnic groups and religions, including some Christian sects, in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[16] Kremlin officials and mouthpieces have also recently invoked the idea of Russia’s “compatriots abroad” and intensified rhetorical attacks surrounding Soviet historical monuments in neighboring states to set information conditions to justify possible future Russian aggression abroad.[17] Putin’s speech indicates that these efforts will likely remain a Kremlin priority going forward.

Lavrov also spoke on Diplomat’s Day and reiterated Kremlin narratives about the emergence of a new multipolar world.[18] Lavrov continued to sharply criticize the West for trying to “impose an unjust unipolar neocolonial model” on the world. Lavrov claimed that the West objects to Russia’s support of the principles of international law, especially the principle of the sovereign equality of states, despite the fact that Russia has repeatedly undermined and attacked Ukraine‘s independence, statehood, and sovereignty, all of which it specifically guaranteed in 1991 and 1994.[19]  ISW previously observed Kremlin attempts to appeal to wider audiences that likely do not identify with the ideology of the Russian World, and Lavrov’s statements are likely intended for an international audience, especially in those countries that Lavrov listed as having growing ties with Russia, including Syria, Cuba, and Venezuela as well as Iran and North Korea.[20]

Kremlin mouthpieces reiterated ongoing Russian narratives blaming the West, specifically the United States, for the absence of constructive peace negotiations to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, despite numerous Russian statements indicating that Russia is not interested in good-faith peace negotiations with Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov claimed on February 10 that the Kremlin has not seen any indications of America’s desire or political will for peace negotiations with Russia.[21] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova similarly claimed that the prospects of dialogue between Russia and the US depend entirely on American willingness to negotiate “on the basis of mutual respect.”[22] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin also reiterated Kremlin claims that the West does not want peace in Ukraine and wants to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia.[23] Peskov’s and Zakharova’s emphasis on negotiations with the United States are part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to frame the West as the only meaningful negotiating partner in Ukraine in order to convince the West to accept the Kremlin’s premise that Ukraine has no independent agency and to gain concessions from the West that undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to further the long-standing Kremlin information operation that falsely asserts that Russia is interested in a negotiated end to its war in Ukraine during a February 8 interview but instead illustrated throughout the interview that Russia has no interest in good faith negotiations, as ISW continues to assess.[24] Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly signaled and at times openly stated that Russia has not abandoned its maximalist objectives in Ukraine, which ISW assesses amount to full Ukrainian and Western capitulation.[25]

The Russian State Duma is considering a bill aimed at further censoring actors designated as “foreign agents,” likely aimed at censoring dissent from opposition media outlets and prominent information space voices. Head of the Russian State Duma Commission on Investigations of Foreign Interference in Internal Affairs Vitaly Piskarev stated on February 10 that the Duma has prepared and is considering a bill that will ban Russian citizens and companies from advertising on platforms owned by entities designated as “foreign agents.”[26] Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin added that Russia should prevent foreign agents from earning any income in Russia.[27] This bill will heavily impact Russian opposition media sources, many of which are legally designated as foreign agents. These media outlets may have to shutter their operations or move primary operations outside of Russia to maintain their sources of income, which may impact their ability to reliably report on news in Russia. Other information space actors, such as opposition-leaning media outlets without the foreign agent label or fringe ultranationalist milbloggers who rely on advertising revenue from their Telegram channels, may further self-censor their content to avoid earning the foreign agent designation and maintain sources of income. The Kremlin is notably cracking down on dissent in and consolidating control over the Russian information space ahead of the March 2024 elections, and this bill likely aims to severely restrict opposition media sources while reinforcing pressures to self-censor in the Russian information space.

Key Takeaways:

• Delays in Western security assistance may lead to significant Ukrainian air defense missile shortages that could allow Russian forces to bomb Ukrainian forces or even front-line cities more aggressively.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Major General Anatoliy Barhylevych as Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff, replacing Lieutenant General Serhiy Shaptala.
• Russian drone footage published on February 9 showed Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Klishchiivka in the Bakhmut direction.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated several Kremlin narratives aimed at justifying Russia’s war in Ukraine and threatening the West at a ceremony honoring Diplomats’ Day on February 10.
• Kremlin mouthpieces reiterated ongoing Russian narratives blaming the West, specifically the United States, for the absence of constructive peace negotiations to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, despite numerous Russian statements indicating that Russia is not interested in good-faith peace negotiations with Ukraine.
•  The Russian State Duma is considering a bill aimed at further censoring actors designated as “foreign agents,” likely aimed at censoring dissent from opposition media outlets and prominent information space voices.
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Kreminna and Avdiivka.
• The relatives of mobilized Russian soldiers continue to protest throughout Russia despite previous Kremlin efforts to censor similar protests and suppress any possible resurgence of a broader social movement in support of mobilized Russian soldiers.
• Russian and occupation officials continue to set conditions for the deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine through educational and extracurricular schemes.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Activities in Russian-Occupied Areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced south of Kreminna amid continued positional fighting along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on February 10. Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the eastern outskirts of Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[28] Positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; northwest of Svatove near Ivanivka, Tabaivka, and Krokhmalne; west of Kreminna near Terny, Yampolivka, and Torske; southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova and the Serebryanske forest area; and south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka.[29] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces have recently decreased indirect fire in the Kupyansk direction likely due to poor weather conditions in the area.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces reportedly advanced near Bakhmut amid continued positional engagements in the area on February 10. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division advanced in a forest area south of Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut).[31] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Bakhmut near Vyimka and Rozdolivka, northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka, west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske, southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka, and south of Bakhmut near Pivdenne and Shumy.[32]

Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance in southern Avdiivka and reportedly made further advances in northern Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Chernyshevskoho, Sportyvna, and Soborna streets in southern Avdiivka.[33] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced from the Tsarska Okhota restaurant area in southeastern Avdiivka.[34] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Avdiivka along Sapronova and Lesy Ukrainky streets and towards Hrushevskoho Street as well as in northeastern Avdiivka near the quarry, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[35] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces hold positions roughly 700 meters from Ukraine's alleged main ground line of communication (GLOC) in Avdiivka along Hrushevskoho Street, which is largely consistent with ISW’s assessment of Russian advances in the area.[36] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northwest of Avdiivka near Keramik, Novobakhmutivka, Stepove, and Ocheretyne; near the Avdiivka Coke Plant in northwestern Avdiivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Sieverne, Tonenke, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[37] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps), reinforced with elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), advanced along Michurina and Zaliznychnyi streets and towards the railway overpass near Chystiakova Street in northern Avdiivka in the past few days.[38] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are operating north of Optyne (south of Avdiivka).

Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements west and southwest of Donetsk City on February 10. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City).[39] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured previously lost positions on the southern outskirts of Novomykhailivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[40] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda, Novomykhailivka, and Vodyane.[41] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are preparing to intensify assault operations near Novomykhailivka even though available Russian manpower and materiel in the area are limited.[42] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, Eastern Military District) are trying to advance from Solodke to Vodyane (southwest of Novomykhailivka) while also advancing towards Novomykhailivka from the south. Mashovets stated that Russian efforts in the Marinka-Novomykhailivka area are aimed at pushing Ukrainian forces out of positions east of the O0532 Marinka-Vuhledar road. Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near Heorhiivka.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on February 10. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that there were positional engagements south of Zolota Nyva (southeast of Velyka Novosilka), near Urozhiane and Staromayorske (both south of Velyka Novosilka), southwest of Rivnopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and north of Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[44] Elements of the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District), including elements of its 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade, are operating south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Orlynske.[45]

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne and west of Verbove (east of Robotyne) and Novopokrovka (northeast of Robtoyne) on February 10.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced from Kamianske (35km northwest of Robotyne) and achieved unspecified success near Kopani (west of Robotyne) and Robotyne.[47]

Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky.[48]

Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on February 10 that Russian patrol ships and electronic warfare (EW) systems intercepted several Ukrainian naval drones targeting Russian civilian transport ships in the southwestern Black Sea.[49]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched 31 Shahed drones from occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces downed 23 drones over Odesa and Kharkiv oblasts.[50] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces conducted three waves of drone strikes on Odesa City and Oblast and damaged port infrastructure.[51] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City and Velykyi Burluk, Kharkiv Oblast, killing several civilians including children.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian drones struck an oil depot in Kharkiv City.[53]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The relatives of mobilized Russian soldiers continue to protest throughout Russia despite previous Kremlin efforts to censor similar protests and suppress any possible resurgence of a broader social movement in support of mobilized Russian soldiers. Russian opposition outlets Sota and Mobilization News published footage on February 10 showing members of the Russian “Way Home” social movement laying flowers and gathering at monuments in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, and Yekaterinburg to call for the demobilization of their relatives.[54] Mobilization News reported that ”Way Home” members also visited the campaign headquarters of Russian presidential candidate Vladislav Davankov in Moscow and submitted letters advocating for demobilization to Davankov’s team.[55] Russian authorities recently attempted to censor a protest by ”Way Home” members at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow and nearby Manezhanaya Square.[56] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin’s efforts to censor and discredit the ”Way Home” social movement underscore the Kremlin’s desperation to shut down these movements, particularly ahead of the March 2024 Russian presidential election.[57]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Kalashnikov Concern drone production facilities in the Udmurt Republic on February 10. Shoigu also visited a facility belonging to Lancet drone manufacturer and Kalashnikov Concern subsidiary Zala Aero and inspected the drone production lines and new drone models.[58] Kalashnikov representatives told Shoigu that Kalashnikov has increased its drone production volume by 60 percent since 2022. Shoigu highlighted the Russian military’s demand for anti-aircraft guided missiles to protect critical infrastructure and economic facilities, specifically oil and gas refineries. Ukrainian actors have recently conducted several successful drone strikes against Russian oil refineries in Leningrad and Volgograd oblasts and Krasnodar Krai.[59]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)  

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian and occupation officials continue to set conditions for the deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine through educational and extracurricular schemes. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on February 10 that Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergey Kiriyenko met with Ukrainian children in occupied Kherson Oblast to discuss future educational and extracurricular opportunities in Russia.[60] Russia has routinely used educational and youth engagement programs as avenues to deport Ukrainian children to Russia.[61]

Russian occupation officials continue to consolidate control over agricultural enterprises in occupied Ukraine. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on February 10 that it signed an agreement to join the All-Russian “People’s Farmer” Association, a non-governmental business organization that works closely with the Russian Ministry of Agriculture and the Russian Agricultural Bank.[62] The “People’s Farmer” Association stated on February 8 that it signed cooperation agreements with the Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk Oblast occupation administrations.[63]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials and Kremlin mouthpieces targeted Germany using longstanding information operations that aim to discourage further security assistance to Ukraine. Russian Ambassador to Germany Sergei Nechaev claimed that German military assistance to Ukraine is prolonging Russia’s war in Ukraine and accused Germany of harboring “everyday Russophobia” against Russians.[64] Nechaev’s claim that Western aid prolongs the war in the current context of Russian rhetoric implies a sense of triumphalism that Russia would be able to win quickly in Ukraine if Western military assistance stopped. Prominent Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, levied claims that Germany’s industrial sector is suffering under its current government, likely aimed at discouraging domestic German support for continued assistance to Ukraine.[65]

Russian officials and Kremlin mouthpieces continue to accuse Moldova and Latvia of discriminating against Russians over efforts to remove Soviet-era monuments and alleged issues with Russian polling stations abroad, likely creating justifications for future escalation against these states. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on February 9 that it is opening an investigation into the alleged demolition of part of a Soviet-era monument to Soviet soldiers in Bilicenii Vechi, Moldova.[66] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also criticized Moldova for gravitating away from Russia and towards the European Union.[67] Russian Ambassador to Latvia Oleg Zykov claimed that Latvia is intentionally attempting to prevent Russians in Latvia from voting in the upcoming March 2024 Russian presidential election.[68]

Senior Russian diplomats continue to criticize international institutions and frame Western states as threats to Russia. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya reiterated several ongoing Kremlin rhetorical lines during an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS, including portraying the US as an inept leader of the UN, portraying UN leadership itself as inept, and claiming that the UN’s now defunct Black Sea grain initiative poses a security threat to Russia.[69] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin stated that he expects members of the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to ”more clearly” object to ”anti-Russian” policies in the UN and criticized Ukraine and Moldova for gravitating towards the West.[70]

Significant Activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/09/world/europe/ukraine-oleksandr-syrsky-war-russia.html

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011924; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2024

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122923

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122923

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011624

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2024

[7] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/9420; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/09/prezydent-ukrayiny-pryznachyv-novogo-nachalnyka-generalnogo-shtabu-zsu/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yq3ciw2PFJnkA9YHYrHDYtZDxSYK8urSHeg7XCAPAvfrjJSwMrCyZkFCZWU1NEyHl; https://mil dot in.ua/uk/news/general-major-anatolij-bargylevych-pryznachenyj-na-posadu-nachalnyka-generalnogo-shtabu/  

[8] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/9420; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/09/prezydent-ukrayiny-pryznachyv-novogo-nachalnyka-generalnogo-shtabu-zsu/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yq3ciw2PFJnkA9YHYrHDYtZDxSYK8urSHeg7XCAPAvfrjJSwMrCyZkFCZWU1NEyHl; https://mil dot in.ua/uk/news/general-major-anatolij-bargylevych-pryznachenyj-na-posadu-nachalnyka-generalnogo-shtabu/; https://t.me/osirskiy/570

[9] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/uves-realnij-dosvid-bojovih-komandiriv-i-brigad-maye-buti-re-88897

[10] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/uves-realnij-dosvid-bojovih-komandiriv-i-brigad-maye-buti-re-88897

[11] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/21594

[12] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-41

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2023

[14] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1930686/

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123123; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023

[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123123; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112823; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011624

[18] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1930617/

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012224; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012024

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1930617/

[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/231147; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/14279

[22] https://t.me/tass_agency/231176

[23] https://tass dot ru/interviews/19946235; https://t.me/MID_Russia/34912 

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020824

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020824; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021823; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011624

[26] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/19952701; https://t.me/tass_agency/231157

[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/231151

[28] https://x.com/StettingerN/status/1756272297105596666?s=20; https://x.com/GloOouD/status/1756252124168536435?s=20; https://x.com/StettingerN/status/1756295081999450514?s=20; https://t.me/sowaFm/224; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4333; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1756179341627592977; https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1756124382932488319

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0v9DLfL9pw7x8ngboQivMKgFRUtgXKmV3TzRDWSaKshVGVRxg3ZBFQLkBQJADBAa8l ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7213; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rexLoXqxKWXqttyo2Zp2NRfbGBrqgUGbNE5C31D5246p7Kqz4W11fQcEhRzHqERMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v4dDgMv2fn9mVb1GfG6anSTmDYN3cdZMBvZnPtSqdft7US2Nvu1MJ7RZWCGx8geQl; https://t.me/mod_russia/35530; https://t.me/mod_russia/35519; https://t.me/wargonzo/18097;

[30] https://suspilne dot media/681548-za-9-lutogo-na-shodi-ukraini-zsu-znisili-6-rosijskih-tankiv-evlas/

[31] https://t.me/rybar/56958; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61829; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112449; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7201

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0v9DLfL9pw7x8ngboQivMKgFRUtgXKmV3TzRDWSaKshVGVRxg3ZBFQLkBQJADBAa8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rexLoXqxKWXqttyo2Zp2NRfbGBrqgUGbNE5C31D5246p7Kqz4W11fQcEhRzHqERMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v4dDgMv2fn9mVb1GfG6anSTmDYN3cdZMBvZnPtSqdft7US2Nvu1MJ7RZWCGx8geQl; https://t.me/mod_russia/35530; https://t.me/rybar/56958; https://t.me/wargonzo/18097; https://t.me/basurin_e/8932

[33] https://x.com/franfran2424/status/1756029405724389563?s=20; https://x.com/Suriyakmaps/status/1755932634562142472?s=20

[34] https://t.me/rybar/56961

[35] https://t.me/rybar/56961; https://t.me/rybar/56961; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112452; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112452; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112396; https://t.me/rybar/56975

[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61857; https://t.me/milinfolive/116060  

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0v9DLfL9pw7x8ngboQivMKgFRUtgXKmV3TzRDWSaKshVGVRxg3ZBFQLkBQJADBAa8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rexLoXqxKWXqttyo2Zp2NRfbGBrqgUGbNE5C31D5246p7Kqz4W11fQcEhRzHqERMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v4dDgMv2fn9mVb1GfG6anSTmDYN3cdZMBvZnPtSqdft7US2Nvu1MJ7RZWCGx8geQl; https://t.me/rybar/56961; https://t.me/wargonzo/18097; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1317; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112469; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/53910; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/112452; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7211; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/7207

[38] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1618

[39] https://t.me/rybar/56959; https://t.me/dva_majors/34363; https://t.me/wargonzo/18097

[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/18097

[41] https://t.me/mod_russia/35530; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0v9DLfL9pw7x8ngboQivMKgFRUtgXKmV3TzRDWSaKshVGVRxg3ZBFQLkBQJADBAa8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rexLoXqxKWXqttyo2Zp2NRfbGBrqgUGbNE5C31D5246p7Kqz4W11fQcEhRzHqERMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v4dDgMv2fn9mVb1GfG6anSTmDYN3cdZMBvZnPtSqdft7US2Nvu1MJ7RZWCGx8geQl; https://t.me/wargonzo/18097

[42] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1619

[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/61850; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/7702

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rexLoXqxKWXqttyo2Zp2NRfbGBrqgUGbNE5C31D5246p7Kqz4W11fQcEhRzHqERMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v4dDgMv2fn9mVb1GfG6anSTmDYN3cdZMBvZnPtSqdft7US2Nvu1MJ7RZWCGx8geQl; https://t.me/mod_russia/35530; https://t.me/wargonzo/18097; https://t.me/voin_dv/6971

[45] https://t.me/voin_dv/6963 (Orlynske); https://t.me/voin_dv/6970 (Staromayorske)

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rexLoXqxKWXqttyo2Zp2NRfbGBrqgUGbNE5C31D5246p7Kqz4W11fQcEhRzHqERMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v4dDgMv2fn9mVb1GfG6anSTmDYN3cdZMBvZnPtSqdft7US2Nvu1MJ7RZWCGx8geQl; https://t.me/wargonzo/18097

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/18097

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rexLoXqxKWXqttyo2Zp2NRfbGBrqgUGbNE5C31D5246p7Kqz4W11fQcEhRzHqERMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v4dDgMv2fn9mVb1GfG6anSTmDYN3cdZMBvZnPtSqdft7US2Nvu1MJ7RZWCGx8geQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0v9DLfL9pw7x8ngboQivMKgFRUtgXKmV3TzRDWSaKshVGVRxg3ZBFQLkBQJADBAa8l; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/2173

[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/35529; https://t.me/dva_majors/34375

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02v4dDgMv2fn9mVb1GfG6anSTmDYN3cdZMBvZnPtSqdft7US2Nvu1MJ7RZWCGx8geQl; https://t.me/kpszsu/10554

[51] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/10/nataliya-gumenyuk-pro-obstril-odeshhyny-zafiksovano-try-hvyli-atak-vidomo-pro-chotyroh-poranenyh/

[52] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/02/10/rosiya-maye-vidpovisty-volodymyr-zelenskyj-prokomentuvav-ataku-po-harkovu-de-zagynuly-dity/; https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/10563; https://t.me/synegubov/8352; https://t.me/synegubov/8357; https://t.me/synegubov/8362; https://t.me/synegubov/8371

[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/34348; https://t.me/dva_majors/34349; https://t.me/dva_majors/34350; https://t.me/z_arhiv/25980; https://t.me/milinfolive/116036; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/33068; https://t.me/dva_majors/34365; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/53895; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/53908; https://t.me/rybar/56974

[54] https://t.me/sotaproject/73789; https://t.me/sotaproject/73795; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17591; https://t.me/sotaproject/73799; https://t.me/sotaproject/73801; https://t.me/sotaproject/73802; https://t.me/sotaproject/73806; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17578

[55] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17588

[56] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020324

[57] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020324

[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/35517; https://t.me/mod_russia/35518

[59] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020324; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012524; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024

[60] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/18242

[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied

[62] https://xn--80aidastcchtfc1c5f dot xn--p1ai/about_us; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/18259

[63] https://t.me/n_ferm/1383

[64] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34882  `

[65] https://t.me/dva_majors/34361; https://t.me/rybar/56968 

[66] https://t.me/tass_agency/231117

[67] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34945 

[68] https://t.me/MID_Russia/34945  

[69] https://tass dot ru/interviews/19947947

[70] https://tass dot ru/interviews/19946235; https://t.me/MID_Russia/34912