Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 17, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 17, 2023

Riley Bailey, George Barros, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 17, 5:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Kremlin will likely subsume elements of Belarus’ defense industrial base (DIB) as part of Moscow’s larger effort to reequip the Russian military to support a protracted war against Ukraine. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on February 17 that Belarus’ aerospace industry is ready to produce Su-25 ground attack aircraft for the Russian military with the support of Russian technology transfers.[1] Lukashenko also stated that the Belarusian state-run Minsk Automobile Plant began producing components to support Russian KAMAZ (a Russian heavy-duty truck producer) products and expressed willingness to help Russia produce electronic components to substitute for lost Western imports.[2] Lukashenko additionally stated that Belarus is implementing 100 percent of unspecified defense and security cooperation agreements that Belarus and Russia agreed to “three months ago.”[3]

Additional Su-25s and truck parts are likely not critical material for the success of Russia’s long-term war effort. The Kremlin may commandeer Belarusian factories and retool them to produce critical materiel that the Russian military needs, Lukashenko’s statements notwithstanding. The Russians might also seek to repurpose Russian factories currently involved in or tooled for the production of Su-25s and trucks to produce more urgently needed materiel.  ISW previously assessed that Russian forces began using Belarusian training grounds and trainers to train mobilized Russians to compensate for Russia‘s degraded training capacity.[4] The Kremlin appears to be similarly incorporating elements of Belarus’ DIB to augment Russian defense output as Putin seeks to reinvigorate Russia’s DIB to support a protracted war with Ukraine.[5]

Lukashenko confirmed that Belarus has implemented more Union State integration programs - marking progress in the Kremlin’s steady pressure campaign to formalize the Russian-Belarusian Union State across decades. Lukashenko stated on February 17 that Russia and Belarus implemented 80 percent of the 28 Union State programs including programs on customs and tax – a significant achievement in the Kremlin’s campaign to formalize the Union State.[6] Lukashenko has historically resisted implementing the Union State integration programs by stalling specifically on complex customs and tax harmonization issues since at least 2019.[7] Lukashenko’s statement that Belarus has finally ratified Union State programs on customs and tax issues therefore marks a significant Russian gain. Lukashenko stated that the remaining unimplemented Union State programs concern humanitarian issues.[8]

Lukashenko is likely paying for his rejection of Putin’s larger demand for Belarusian forces to join the invasion against Ukraine by making smaller concessions that he has stonewalled for years, as ISW assessed.[9] Lukashenko’s belated concessions and continued refusal to commit Belarusian forces to the Russian invasion indicate Lukashenko’s determination to keep Belarusian forces from directly participating in the Russian war.

The Kremlin’s gains in Belarus underscore that Putin’s imperialistic ambitions transcend Ukraine and that containing the Russian threat requires the West’s sustained attention. Putin will very likely make significant gains in restoring Russian suzerainty over Belarus regardless of the outcome of his invasion of Ukraine. ISW has long assessed that the West sometimes ignores Putin’s activities that appear trivial, but that seemingly trivial activities that fly under the radar are essential to Putin’s strategic gains in the long run.[10] Putin’s gains in Belarus indicate that he is reaping the benefits of such long-term campaigns. Russia and Belarus formed the Union State structure in 1999. The Kremlin significantly intensified its political and economic pressure campaigns to integrate Belarus through the Union State structure no later than 2019.[11] Putin and Lukashenko initially ratified the package of 28 Union State integration programs - which are now mostly implemented - in November 2021.[12]  Western shortsightedness about the Kremlin’s slower-developing, long-term efforts helps enable Putin’s strategic advances.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed the names of the commanders of Russia’s four military districts, finalizing a complete turnover of the Russian military’s initial command since the start of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Russian MoD confirmed on February 17 that it appointed Lieutenant General Andrey Mordvichev as Central Military District (CMD) commander and that it had previously appointed Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev as Southern Military District (SMD) commander, Lieutenant General Yevgeny Nikiforov as Western Military District (WMD) commander, and Lieutenant General Rustam Muradov as Eastern Military District (EMD) commander.[13] The Russian MoD confirmed ISW’s previous reporting that Muradov, Nikiforov, and Kuzovlev were the commanders of their respective military districts.[14] Mordvichev reportedly replaced Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin as CMD commander when the Russian military appointed Lapin the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces on January 10.[15] Lapin appears to be the only previous Russian military commander in Ukraine who retains a significant position at the MoD, as General Alexander Dvornikov, who was previously in charge of Russian forces in Ukraine, Colonel General Aleksandr Chaiko, the former Eastern Military District commander who oversaw the Russian military’s failed offensive to capture Kyiv, and initial WMD commander Colonel General Aleksandr Zhuravlev appear to hold no significant positions.

The formalization of military district commanders is likely part of an effort to distance the Russian military from past failures and to prepare the Russian military for a renewed large-scale offensive in Ukraine. The formalization of military district commanders also accompanies the MoD’s likely attempt to delineate clearer areas of responsibility for each military district in Ukraine. The appointment of these commanders does not represent the restoration of the pre-war MoD leadership bloc or an expansion of the ultranationalist siloviki faction’s power, despite reported connections that Nikiforov has to Wagner Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and tenuous connections that Mordvichev may have with Chechen Republic head Ramzan Kadyrov.[16] The Kremlin likely appointed figures relatively neutral in the struggle between Wagner PMC financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin and the MoD to these positions to appease both parties while also likely setting up potential scapegoats for any future failures in Ukraine to protect recently appointed theater commander and Russian Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, from potential criticism.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to be mounting an informational counteroffensive against the conventional Russian military establishment. Following a video posted on February 16 of Wagner Group troops stating that they have been cut off from artillery supplies Wagner fighters released another video on February 17 showing a room full of bodies of deceased Wagner fighters.[17] The fighter in the video claims that Wagner is losing hundreds of personnel a day because the Russian MoD is not providing them with the weapons, ammunition, and other supplies that they need.[18] Several Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels also amplified a #GiveShellstoWagner post that explicitly tags the Russian MoD and claims (falsely) that Wagner is the only formation currently advancing in Ukraine and that Wagner elements therefore need immediate support.[19] The escalation of Wagner’s direct accusations against the Russian MoD represents a new informational counteroffensive by Prigozhin that seeks to continue to undermine the Russian MoD and obscure Wagner’s attrition-based operational model by blaming the Russian MoD for its failures.

Prigozhin has likely launched an intensified informational campaign against the Russian MoD in response to the MoD’s likely role in barring the Wagner Group from continuing its prison recruitment campaign and Prigozhin’s overall declining influence.[20] Prigozhin‘s declining prominence and the end of the Wagner Group‘s prison recruitment campaign are likely constraining the Wagner Group‘s operational capabilities in Ukraine, and it appears that the MOD continues to sideline Wagner Group forces from decisive efforts.[21] Prigozhin appears to be courting ultranationalist figures, fellow siloviki such as Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov, and select Russian milbloggers to aid him in his effort to regain prominence but will likely find these figures’ support to be unreliable.[22] Prigozhin became such an influential figure in the pro-war ultranationalist community by directing veiled and outright criticism at the conventional Russian establishment and by promoting the Wagner Group as an elite force that could secure tactical gains that the regular Russian military could not.[23] Prigozhin will likely try to emulate this path to renewed prominence, but it is unclear if he will be able to do so.

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin will likely subsume elements of Belarus’ defense industrial base (DIB) as part of Moscow’s larger effort to reequip the Russian military to support a protracted war against Ukraine.
• Lukashenko confirmed that Belarus has implemented more Union State integration programs - marking progress in the Kremlin’s decades-long pressure campaign to formalize the Russian-Belarusian Union State.
• The Kremlin’s gains in Belarus underscore that Putin’s imperialistic ambitions transcend Ukraine and that containing the Russian threat requires the West’s sustained attention.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed the names of the four military district commanders, finalizing a complete turnover of the Russian military’s initial command since the start of the invasion of Ukraine.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to be mounting an informational counteroffensive against the conventional Russian military establishment.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, in the Donetsk City-Avdiivka area, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian and Ukrainian military activity near Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast indicates that Russian forces are likely deployed to positions close bank of the Dnipro River.
• The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that Russian forces have likely suffered up to 200,000 casualties since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a variety of laws on February 17 to integrate occupied territories into Russian legal, economic, and administrative structures.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1- Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and  northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on February 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attacked near Hrianykivka (55km northwest of Svatove), Synkivka (45km northwest of Svatove), and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove). One Russian source claimed that Russian forces took full control of Hrianykivka, while other sources stated that fighting is ongoing near the settlement and that Russian forces took control of unspecified positions in the Kupyansk area about 45km northwest of Svatove.[24] A Russian milblogger emphasized that Ukrainian forces northwest of Svatove in the Kupyansk area are focusing on defensive preparations for Russian offensive actions and predicted that Russian forces may attack towards Lyman Pershyi and Vilshana, both about 45km northwest of Svatove.[25] Russian forces also continued offensive operations around Kreminna on February 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian ground attacks near Kreminna itself and near Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[26] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai remarked that Russian forces have concentrated all of their efforts on the Kreminna area.[27] Russian milbloggers reported positional battles along the Balka Zhuravka gully west of Kreminna, near Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna), and in the Serebrianska forest area (8km south of Kreminna).[28] One Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces are bracing themselves for a Russian offensive in Siversk, 20km southwest of Kreminna.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on February 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Bakhmut itself and near Fedorivka (20km north of Bakhmut), Rozdolivka (19km northeast of Bakhmut), Paraskoviivka (9km north of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske (5km west of Bakhmut).[30] Geolocated footage published on February 17 of a Ukrainian armored fighting vehicle firing at Russian positions in northeastern Bakhmut shows Russian forces have made minor advances toward Bakhmut’s city center.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner assault detachments advanced into Paraskoviivka from three sides on the night of February 16 and are engaging in heavy fighting around the settlement.[32] Russian milbloggers offered conflicting claims on Wagner Group positions near Ivanivske. One milblogger claimed that Wagner forces advanced to the outskirts of Ivanivske, while another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Wagner forces away from the highway.[33]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on February 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults along the outskirts of Donetsk City near Sieverne and Vodyane (on the northwest outskirts) and Marinka and Novomykhailivka (on the southwestern outskirts).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks on Vodyane, Novomykhailivka, and Pervomaiske (on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk city).[35] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces expanded their control within Marinka and pushed Ukrainian troops out of unspecified lines.[36]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on February 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Novosilka (65km southwest of Donetsk City) and Prechystivka (35km southwest of Donetsk City) and attempted to advance south and east of Vuhledar.[38]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian military activity near Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast indicates that Russian forces are likely deployed to positions close to the bank of the Dnipro River. Geolocated footage published on February 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian tank under a bridge near the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station.[39] A Russian milblogger amplified footage on February 17 showing Russian forces launching an anti-tank guided missile from a position at the Nova Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station and striking reported Ukrainian positions in Vesele (on the west bank of the Dnipro River) on an unspecified date.[40]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone attack against Crimea on February 17. Sevastopol occupation head Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed that Russian air defenses shot down a Ukrainian drone near the Balaklava Thermal Power Plant in the vicinity of Sevastopol, Crimea.[41]

Russian forces continued routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts on February 17.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces struck Kherson City and its suburbs.[43] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces are conducting drone reconnaissance and isolated strikes with loitering munitions in Kherson Oblast.[44]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian logistics on the east (left) bank in Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces conducted airstrikes on Russian military concentration areas in Hola Prystan and Pishchanivk and destroyed five ammunition depots and an observation post in Kherson Oblast, some of which were on islands close to the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[45]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that Russian forces have likely suffered up to 200,000 casualties since the start of its invasion of Ukraine.[46] The UK MoD reported on February 17 that Russian military servicemembers and paramilitary company personnel have suffered 175,000 to 200,000 causalities in Ukraine, with 40,000 to 60,000 of those killed.[47] The UK MoD reported that Wagner Group fighters have likely experienced a casualty rate of up to 50 percent and that the Russian military’s casualty rate has significantly increased since the start of partial mobilization in September 2022.[48] Western officials reported on February 2 that Russian forces sustained almost 200,000 casualties since the beginning of the invasion.[49] Many more Russian forces may have died in Ukraine than the UK MoD suggests, as independent Russian outlet Meduza recently reported that over 32,000 Wagner Group convict recruits alone are dead or missing.[50] The high Russian casualty rate, especially the high ratio of deaths to injuries, continues to have deleterious effects on the Russian military's combat effectiveness and is likely prompting Russian officials to continue crypto-mobilization efforts.

Russian sources amplified advertisements for a Donetsk People‘s Republic (DNR) effort to train commanders, possibly in support of efforts to integrate ad-hoc DNR formations into the Russian Armed Forces. The advertisement calls for candidates to enter the Donetsk Higher Combined Arms Command School to acquire the necessary skills to fill command positions for motorized rifle platoons.[51] The DNR People’s Militia may have started this effort because of significant losses among its cadre of commanders as well as to support ongoing efforts to integrate ad-hoc DNR formations into traditional Russian military formations.[52] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu previously proposed the creation of new mechanized maneuver divisions, and the DNR People’s Militia may be training commanders for motorized rifle platoons as part of an effort to form new Russian military formations partially from existing DNR formations. ISW previously reported that the reported subordination of Russian mobilized personnel to DNR units resulted in widespread discontent, and a Russian source claimed on February 17 that the Russian military transferred these mobilized personnel to conventional Russian formations following their publicized complaints.[53] ISW assesses that efforts to integrate existing ad hoc DNR formations rapidly into conventional Russian military formations will likely produce integrated units with command-and-control issues and degraded combat effectiveness. 

Russian officials reportedly continue measures to support the Russian MoD’s crypto-mobilization effort while also trying to assuage domestic discontent over mobilization.  Russian sources claimed on February 15 that universities in Tomsk and Novosibirsk cities are preparing lists of students to be mobilized and issuing mobilization orders to students.[54] Another Russian source claimed that the Omsk City draft commission ruled in favor of a lawsuit delaying the mobilization of 2,608 residents working in 12 non-defense-related companies.[55] A Russian source reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree extending social support to all widows and widowers of combat veterans.[56] Russian officials will likely continue piecemeal efforts to grant benefits to Russian servicemembers and mobilize further personnel through crypto-mobilization measures as the Kremlin continues to avoid starting a second mobilization wave.

An investigative report shows that the Russian military likely relied on a Russian subsidiary of the French firm Auchan for the basic provisioning of Russian forces in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet The Insider published a report jointly with French outlet Le Monde and Dutch-based open-source group Bellingcat on February 17 detailing how the Russian subsidiary of Auchan collected basic goods in Russian stores under the guise of “humanitarian aid” drives and sent them to Russian forces fighting in Ukraine.[57] Russian officials reportedly directly organized deliveries from some Auchan stores in Russia to the Russian military.[58] Auchan stores also reportedly aided Russian military recruitment offices in recruiting mobilized personnel from among their employees following the start of partial mobilization.[59]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a variety of laws on February 17 to integrate occupied territories into the Russian legal, economic, and administrative structures.[60] Putin signed decrees establishing sick leave, maternity and child care benefits, and support for veterans and disabled persons in occupied territories.[61] Putin also ordered that those seeking pensions in occupied territories submit applications with the appropriate documents, noting that applicants will not be required to translate their application portfolios into Russian.[62] Putin’s decree established a transitional period until 2027, during which time the retirement age in occupied territories will rise from 60 years old to 65 years old, the latter of which is the legal age for retirement in Russia.[63] The mandate allows those receiving pensions in accordance with Ukraine’s retirement age will maintain the right to regional payments.[64] Russian officials will likely continue efforts to increase the legal integration of occupied areas into the Russian system by passing such decrees, which will streamline occupational control of occupied Ukraine.

Russian officials and occupation authorities continued efforts to integrate schools in occupied territories into the Russian education apparatus.  Putin also signed a law on February 17 to recognize academic degrees and titles achieved in occupied territories as legitimate in Russia.[65] Putin’s decree will not require teachers in occupied territories to obtain certification until September 1, 2024, and that education and scientific organizations in occupied territories must operate in accordance with Russian legislation.[66] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed on February 17 that Russian universities in Rostov, Volograd, and Voronezh Oblasts will increase the number of state-funded seats for residents of occupied territories.[67] Rogov noted that students must pass Russia’s Unified State Exam, a series of exams Russian high-school students must pass to enter college or university.[68]

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to exploit assets from captured Ukrainian cities for economic and military benefits, intensifying the process of institutionalized corruption in occupied territories. Kherson Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo stated on February 17 that the Russian Commission of the State Council for the Development of Small and Medium Enterprises met in Moscow to discuss the development of small- and medium-sized businesses in occupied Kherson Oblast.[69] Saldo stated that the Commission discussed a number of potential support measures for occupied Kherson Oblast, including closing criminal cases of economic crimes initiated before the illegal annexation of occupied Kherson Oblast into Russia.[70] Saldo stated that the Commission also discussed organizing small-business development institutions in all regions, providing immediate preferential agricultural machinery lease programs, and carrying out explanatory work on the adaptation of small businesses to Russian legislation.[71]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.)

 See the topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/peregovory-s-prezidentom-rossii-vladimirom-putinym-1676619522; http://kremlin doc ru/events/president/news/70530

[2] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/peregovory-s-prezidentom-rossii-vladimirom-putinym-1676619522; http://kremlin doc ru/events/president/news/70530

[3] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/peregovory-s-prezidentom-rossii-vladimirom-putinym-1676619522; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70530

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2023

[6] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/peregovory-s-prezidentom-rossii-vladimirom-putinym-1676619522; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70530

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-kremlin-prepares-further-integrate-belarus; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-belarus-update-lukashenko-uses-oil-tariffs-delay-integration-russia; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-october-20-%E2%80%93-november-9-2021; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-kremlin-deploys-brigade-sized-force-belarus-near-polish-border

[8] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/peregovory-s-prezidentom-rossii-vladimirom-putinym-1676619522; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70530

[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-20

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%20The%20Kremlin%27s%20Geopolitical%20Adaptations%20Since%202014.pdf

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-belarus-update-lukashenko-uses-oil-tariffs-delay-integration-russia

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-october-20-%E2%80%93-november-9-2021

[13] https://ria dot ru/20230217/komanduyuschie-1852680114 dot html; https://tass%20dot%20com/defense/1577923

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110722 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122622 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJuly23

[15] https://ria dot ru/20230217/komanduyuschie-1852680114 dot html;

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122622 ; https://t.me/theinsider/17241

[17] **GRAPHIC** https://t.me/razgruzka_vagnera/10

[18] **GRAPHIC** https://t.me/razgruzka_vagnera/10

[19] https://t.me/zastavnyii/3031; https://t.me/grey_zone/17263

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020923

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013123

[22] https://t.me/strelkovii/3988 ; https://t.me/sashakots/38550 ; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/462   

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122222 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122022 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111622 ; https://isw.pub/UKrWar111422 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111022 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110722 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110522 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar103122 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102822 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102522 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102422 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct19 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct17 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct13 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct7 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct5 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct4

[24] https://t.me/milinfolive/97071; https://t.me/wargonzo/10906; https://t.me/readovkanews/52824

[25] https://t.me/rybar/43703

[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wnv4TZv5ZNLcyLhAtbBjk4sEgckRm1oBiBYQnVhV1iXfWTaYfT8iLtduvH8PQfhQl

[27] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/8703

[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/10906; https://t.me/rybar/43686; https://t.me/rybar/43703

[29] https://t.me/rybar/43703

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wnv4TZv5ZNLcyLhAtbBjk4sEgckRm1oBiBYQnVhV1iXfWTaYfT8iLtduvH8PQfhQl

[31] https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1626514077257195522; https://twitter.com/EerikMatero/status/1626520800386744321

[32] https://t.me/rybar/43708; https://t.me/rybar/43674; https://t.me/rybar/43680; https://t.me/readovkanews/52824

[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/10906; https://t.me/readovkanews/52824

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wnv4TZv5ZNLcyLhAtbBjk4sEgckRm1oBiBYQnVhV1iXfWTaYfT8iLtduvH8PQfhQl

[35] https://t.me/wargonzo/10906

[36] https://t.me/rybar/43680; https://t.me/rybar/43686  

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wnv4TZv5ZNLcyLhAtbBjk4sEgckRm1oBiBYQnVhV1iXfWTaYfT8iLtduvH8PQfhQl

[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/10906

[39] https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/status/1626583718046633986 ; https://twitter.com/worldonalert/status/1626577925033299968 ; https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1626576639869227009 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1626594089037893634?s=20    

[40] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/19842

[41] https://t.me/razvozhaev/2085

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027q6bgp2LfCkjEHkuc9HnTdMwoKG8BxJVsd7ikaWgaS9pvHDo3HtVjGvNHUuRMcdhl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wnv4TZv5ZNLcyLhAtbBjk4sEgckRm1oBiBYQnVhV1iXfWTaYfT8iLtduvH8PQfhQl ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=639978071466601 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wnv4TZv5ZNLcyLhAtbBjk4sEgckRm1oBiBYQnVhV1iXfWTaYfT8iLtduvH8PQfhQl ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/16770 ;

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027q6bgp2LfCkjEHkuc9HnTdMwoKG8BxJVsd7ikaWgaS9pvHDo3HtVjGvNHUuRMcdhl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Wnv4TZv5ZNLcyLhAtbBjk4sEgckRm1oBiBYQnVhV1iXfWTaYfT8iLtduvH8PQfhQl

[44] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=639978071466601

[45] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=639978071466601

[46] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1626472945089486848

[47] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1626472945089486848

[48] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1626472945089486848

[49] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/02/us/politics/ukraine-russia-casualties.html

[50] https://meduz dot io/news/2023/01/23/rus-sidyaschaya-iz-50-tysyach-zaklyuchennyh-zaverbovannyh-chvk-vagnera-na-fronte-ostalis-tolko-10-tysyach-ostalnye-libo-pogibli-libo-dezertirovali

[51] https://t.me/notes_veterans/8040

[52] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020423

[53] https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/14292  ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020823

[54] https://activatica dot org/content/eab70ce5-16e1-4d2f-82fd-27c069665f0e/v-novosiberske-ishut-studentov-dlya-raznosa-povestok-o-mobilizacii; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-feb-15-16  ;  https://t.me/mobilizationnews/8861; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-feb-15-16  ;

[55] https://t.me/omsk_ogo/10969

[56] https://t.me/readovkanews/52864    

[57] https://theins doc ru/politika/259454

[58] https://theins doc ru/politika/259454

[59] https://theins doc ru/politika/259454

[60] http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170006; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170007; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170004; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170003; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170005; https://t.me/pushilindenis/3190

[61] http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170006; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170007; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170004; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170003; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170005; https://t.me/pushilindenis/3190

[62] http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170006; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170007; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170004; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170003; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170005; https://t.me/pushilindenis/3190

[63] http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170006; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170007; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170004; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170003; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170005; https://t.me/pushilindenis/3190

[64] http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170006; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170007; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170004; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170003; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170005; https://t.me/pushilindenis/3190

[65] http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170006; http://duma dot gov.ru/news/56425/

[66] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202302170006

[67] https://t.me/vrogov/7742

[68] https://t.me/vrogov/7742

[69] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/405

[70] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/405

[71] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/405; https://khogov dot ru/press-center-news/%d0%b2%d0%be%d0%bf%d1%80%d0%be%d1%81%d1%8b-%d1%80%d0%b0%d0%b7%d0%b2%d0%b8%d1%82%d0%b8%d1%8f-%d0%bc%d0%b0%d0%bb%d0%be%d0%b3%d0%be-%d0%b8-%d1%81%d1%80%d0%b5%d0%b4%d0%bd%d0%b5%d0%b3%d0%be-%d0%b1%d0%b8/