Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2025

Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel and Nate Trotter

February 28, 2025, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on February 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump held a contentious meeting at the White House on February 28.[1] Zelensky observed that Russia has repeatedly violated previous ceasefire agreements, as ISW has reported.[2] Zelensky said that Ukraine will not accept a ceasefire agreement with Russia without sufficient external security guarantees, as such an agreement will fail to preserve Ukraine's sovereignty and prevent war in Europe in the long term. Zelensky stated that Russian strikes have not "completely destroyed" Ukraine and that Ukraine is "alive" and continuing to defend itself against Russian aggression. Zelensky reiterated that no country wants to end the war more than Ukraine and that any negotiations to end the war will be between Ukraine and Russia with US and European mediation efforts. Trump declined to comment on the possibility of future US security guarantees for Ukraine and US troop deployments to Ukraine. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly told Zelensky to leave the White House following the meeting, and the White House canceled the afternoon press conference and the signing of the US-Ukraine mineral deal.[3] ISW continues to assess that supporting Ukraine is a vital American national security interest, as is a strong bilateral relationship between the United States and Ukraine.[4]

Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American adversaries despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to posture Russia's receptiveness to negotiations with the United States. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu met separately with People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on February 28 to discuss bilateral security issues and international and regional matters.[5] Shoigu and Xi also underlined the need to continue coordinating efforts at key international platforms, including BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and diplomatic efforts about "solving the Ukrainian crisis."[6] Shoigu claimed that the Russia-PRC relationship has reached "unprecedented" heights, and Russian state media highlighted statements from Xi and PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin Jian's praise of close bilateral relations.[7]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and Chairperson of the ruling United Russia party Dmitry Medvedev met with North Korea's Workers' Party (WPK) Central Committee member Ri Hi-yong on February 26 in Moscow to express United Russia's desire "for closer cooperation with the WPK and for expanding contracts and exchanges in all areas."[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Ri on February 27, but the Kremlin's readout did not provide further details about the meeting.[9] Representatives of the Kursk Oblast Chamber of Commerce signed a cooperation agreement with the Pyongyang Chamber of Commerce on February 27 to develop bilateral economic ties and expand municipal production opportunities between Kursk Oblast and North Korean enterprises.[10] The agreement also includes trade and economic ties; cooperation in industry, agriculture, and processing; and joint logistical projects. Russia continues to align itself with adversaries of the United States, underscoring the importance of strengthening and supporting US allies and partners, including Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials are increasing cooperation with South Korea amid deepening Russia-North Korea ties and recent reports of a new wave of North Korean troop deployments to Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Serhiy Boyev met with a South Korean delegation led by National Assembly Member Yu Yong-weon in Kyiv on February 28 to discuss Ukraine-South Korea bilateral relations and North Korea's involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine.[11] The delegations discussed exchanging defense industrial experience, and Yu expressed interest in organizing a joint seminar between Ukrainian and South Korean defense manufacturers. This meeting follows a recent South Korean report that North Korean forces deployed 1,000 to 3,000 additional personnel to Kursk Oblast between January and February 2025 to support Russia's war effort against Ukraine.[12] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov highlighted on February 24 that North Korean forces are gaining valuable combat experience and enhancing their weapons systems while fighting in Kursk Oblast and cooperating with Russia.[13]

Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against near-rear Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot containing thermobaric artillery ammunition near occupied Selydove, Donetsk Oblast overnight on February 27 to 28.[14] Geolocated footage published on February 28 shows a facility on fire and secondary explosions in eastern Selydove.[15] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a forward command post of the Russian 14th Army Corps (AC) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) near occupied Ivanivka, Kherson Oblast and a drone control point of the Russian 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) near occupied Nesteryanka (southwest of Orikhiv), Zaporizhia Oblast on February 26.[16]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight on February 27 to 28.[17] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery on February 9 and 17.[18]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 28 that the United States approved current MFA North American Department Director Alexander Darchiev's appointment as Russia's Ambassador to the United States.[19] Darchiev headed the Russian delegation to the February 27 US-Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul, Turkey, and his recent appointment indicates that he will likely continue to be a key member of any future US-Russian bilateral engagements.[20]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump held a contentious meeting at the White House on February 28.
• Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American adversaries despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to posture Russia's receptiveness to negotiations with the United States.
• Russia continues to align itself with adversaries of the United States, underscoring the importance of strengthening and supporting US allies and partners, including Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials are increasing cooperation with South Korea amid deepening Russia-North Korea ties and recent reports of a new wave of North Korean troop deployments to Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against near-rear Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 28 that the United States approved current MFA North American Department Director Alexander Darchiev's appointment as Russia's Ambassador to the United States.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov with establishing a "Kadry" ("Human Resources") national project to integrate Russian veterans into the Russian economy, likely in support of the Kremlin's efforts to prevent the emergence of subversive veteran civil societies.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued attacking in Kursk Oblast on February 28 but did not make any confirmed advances. Fighting continued northwest of Sudzha near Staraya Sorochina and Lebedevka, north of Sudzha near Malaya Lokyna, and south of Sudzha near Kurilovka.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Lebedevka and Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha).[22]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 28 that Russian forces seized Novaya Sorochina.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed on February 28 that Russian forces seized Nikolskyi (northwest of Sudzha) and that Russian forces advanced into Lebedevka.[24]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and Rosgvardia personnel are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[25] Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Staraya Sorochina.[26] Elements of the Russian 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Sverdlikovo and other elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Lebedevka.[27] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha).[28]

Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov visited Kursk Oblast on February 28 and delivered 50 vehicles to Russian forces operating in the area.[29]

Russian forces continued to claim on February 28 that Russian forces are operating near the international border in Sumy Oblast. Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation acknowledged that Russian forces attacked along the international border near Basivka and Novenke (north of Sumy City and west of Sudzha).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near the international border in Sumy Oblast.[31] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces attacked near Novenke on February 20 and 25 and that Russian forces are trying to cut Ukrainian supply routes into the Kursk salient.[32]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 28 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 27 and 28.[33]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment's "Bati" Detachment reportedly are striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 28 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka on February 28.[35]

A Russian milblogger claimed on February 28 that Russian forces successfully struck a Ukrainian bridge over the Oskil River near Osynovo (south of Kupyansk) on February 27 with a FAB-1500 glide bomb.[36] The milblogger claimed that the strike damaged the bridge, forcing Ukrainian forces to rely on two remaining crossings over the Oskil River for logistical resupply.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Borova direction on February 28.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 28 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Ivanivka; and northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Torske, and Kolodyazi on February 27 and 28.[37]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian sources claimed on February 28 that Russian forces advanced in fields near Yampolivka and near Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman).[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 31st Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Yampolivka.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 28 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on February 28.[40]

An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated that Russian forces mostly conduct infantry assaults and occasionally conduct mechanized assaults in this direction.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 28 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Vasyukivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne on February 27 and 28.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked in Novopivnichnyi Microraion in western Chasiv Yar.[43]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) cleared all of Shevchenko Microraion in southern Chasiv Yar.[44]

A non-commissioned officer of a Ukrainian company operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces are deploying wounded personnel to initially assault Ukrainian positions after which better-trained soldiers attack.[45] The officer stated that Russian forces are mainly operating older tanks in the area.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on February 28 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Krymske; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka on February 27 and 28.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the western outskirts of Toretsk and in Shcherbynivka.[47]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are unable to transfer equipment into Toretsk and move around the settlement in small infantry groups due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes.[48] The milblogger characterized Toretsk as a "big contested grey zone."

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Dyliivka (northeast of Toretsk).[49]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Berezivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Nadiivka, Uspenivka, Pishchane, Preobrazhenka, Bohdanivka, and Novooleksandrivka on February 27 and 28.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novooleksandrivka and Novoserhiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[51]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 26 and 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within central Pishchane and seized Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Pokrovsk).[52]

The operational planning head of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces often deploy only one or two soldiers to seize a position and that Russian soldiers sometimes have to walk up to 10 kilometers on foot to the line of contact due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian vehicles.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reconstituted Soviet-era unit) are operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[54]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction. Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka on February 27 and 28.[55]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 27 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced north of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove).[56]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on February 28 that Russian military command continues to deploy an increased number of armored vehicles in the Kurakhove direction despite high losses and noted that the situation in the Kurakhove direction is more difficult than in the Pokrovsk direction.[57] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are currently benefitting from the frozen soil in the Kurakhove direction and that upcoming warmer weather conditions will reduce the effectiveness of Russian attacks and armored vehicle maneuverability.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction. Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne and Burlatske and in the direction of Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and in the direction of Vilne Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka, Rivnopil, and Novopil on February 27 and 28.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pryvilne and Vilne Pole.[60]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 28 indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Burlatske.[61]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Official Russian sources and milbloggers claimed on February 28 that Russian forces seized Burlatske and reached the eastern outskirts of Pryvilne.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) seized Pryvilne.[63] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Vilne Pole.[64]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Pryvilne.[65]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on February 28.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly struck Ukrainian targets in the Polohy direction.[66]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Robotyne near Charivne and northwest of Robotyne near Stepove, Kamyanske, Novoandriivka, and Pyatykhatky on February 27 and 28.[67]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 27 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in southern Pyatykhatky, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the settlement.[68] Russian milbloggers began claiming that Russian forces intensified activity and advanced near Pyatykhatky on February 20.[69] Ukrainian sources warned about a possible intensification of Russian activity in the Zaporizhia direction in November 2024, but ISW has not observed any indications that Russian forces are planning a concerted, large-scale offensive operation in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of this report.[70] The frontline west of Orikhiv has been relatively dormant since the Summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking targets near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne).[72]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on February 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 208 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[73] Ukrainian forces downed 107 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts, and another 97 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Shahed strikes damaged residential areas in Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv cities and Sumy Oblast, as well as an industrial enterprise in Mykolaiv Oblast.[74]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov with establishing a "Kadry" ("Human Resources") national project to integrate Russian veterans into the Russian economy, likely in support of the Kremlin's efforts to prevent the emergence of subversive veterans civil societies.[75] Aksyonov announced on February 28 that Putin instructed Russian officials to create the "Kadry" project in 2025 and that the project will maintain a database with all vacant positions in the private and public sector for veterans to apply to. Aksyonov noted that this database will support Russian veterans returning from the frontlines. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is intensifying a campaign launched in late 2022 and early 2023 to prevent the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society and pacify a surge of alienated veterans in Russia likely because the Kremlin perceives the demobilization of Russian veterans as a potential threat to regime stability.[76]

The Russian government is considering a Russian Ministry of Defense- (MoD) backed bill that will extend veteran and combat disability statuses to Russian servicemen, Rosgvardia forces, and law enforcement who fought in Kursk Oblast.[77] The Russian government submitted a bill proposed by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on February 27 that will extend veterans and combat disability to Russian servicemen and law enforcement personnel who fought in areas that the Russian government determines as "adjacent to" the Ukraine-Russia border.[78] The Russian government introduced the bill after facing backlash for failing to recognize and issue compensation for Russian servicemen who have fought in Kursk Oblast since the start of Ukraine's incursion in August 2024.[79]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russia started testing a civilian drone identification system as part of the "ERA-GLONASS" information system in hopes of using the system to forcibly land civilian drones instead of expending anti-aircraft systems to down drones.[80] Russian global navigation satellite system JSC GLONASS Head Alexei Raikevich stated on February 25 that the company has also tested ERA-GLONASS against small aircraft and integrated the system with certain commercial platforms. Raikevich stated that the next step is to integrate ERA-GLONASS information sharing with regional situation centers and operational headquarters and to develop a forced landing feature that enhances operational control over civilian drones.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian President Vladimir Putin ratified the Union State security guarantee agreements with Belarus on February 28.[81] The Russian and Belarusian parliaments voted on February 26 to ratify the security guarantees that Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed on December 6, 2024.[82]

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://thehill.com/video-clips/5168859-watch-live-donald-trump-volodymyr-zelensky-press-conference-minerals-deal/ ; https://kyivindependent.com/zelensky-trump-get-into-heated-argument-during-live-conference/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UH1WNGu4lOQ

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UH1WNGu4lOQ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/lessons-minsk-deal-breaking-cycle-russias-war-against-ukraine

[3] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-zelensky-news-02-28-25#cm7p2wu7p000t3b6vnjiwri8c ; https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-zelensky-news-02-28-25#cm7p4b0u300003b6tya6r07kg ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-rare-earth-minerals-trump-zelenskyy/

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625

[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/23268145; https://tass dot ru/politika/23268361; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23268613; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23269387;

[6] https://tass dot com/politics/1920843 ; https://tv.cctv dot com/2025/02/28/VIDEJZAxyT1nwbQ7NXQrVmSj250228.shtml?spm=C96370.PPDB2vhvSivD.ERPyWJCsPwT9.1; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23272055; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23272033

[7] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23269387; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23272033

[8] https://tass dot ru/politika/23267459

[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76341

[10] https://www.nknews dot org/2025/02/north-korea-kursk-strike-deal-on-boosting-ties-as-dprk-troops-fight-in-region/ ; https://kursk.tpprf dot ru/ru/news/565488/

[11] https://mod.gov dot ua/news/koreya-zaczikavilas-dosvidom-zsu-u-vikoristanni-droniv-zustrich-sergiya-boyeva-z-korejskoyu-delegacziyeyu ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/28/koreya-zaczikavylas-dosvidom-zsu-u-vykorystanni-droniv-zustrich-sergiya-boyeva-z-korejskoyu-delegacziyeyu/

[12] https://www.joongang.co dot kr/article/25316905; https://t.me/bbcrussian/77114; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-has-sent-more-troops-russia-reports-citing-skorea-spy-agency-say-2025-02-27/

[13] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3964703-kirilo-budanov-nacalnik-golovnogo-upravlinna-rozvidki-minoboroni-generallejtenant.html

[14] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21497

[15] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1895449270502965727; https://x.com/GeneralStaffUA/status/1895427935974441333; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1895449567568748816;

[16] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5427 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21475

[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21497

[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2024

[19] https://t.me/tass_agency/303202 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/303203 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/303204 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/303205 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/53108

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2025

[21] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62490; https://t.me/wargonzo/25030; https://t.me/rybar/68425

[22] https://t.me/rybar/68404; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32930; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87020; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24599 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52202

[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/49493

[24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/156060 ; https://t.me/rybar/68404

[25] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87064; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/156024; https://t.me/yurasumy/21448

[26] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32964

[27] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87020; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24569

[28] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/44077

[29] https://t.me/tass_agency/303195

[30] https://t.me/CenterCounteringDisinformation/13439

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24569

[32] https://t.me/dva_majors/65603; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87049; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2025/02/28/7500630/

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21498; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21489; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GZbUcVPe4S7wV9f2t8Wc2ecH9f5PBARYXh8C4YWw3QMNuuQaHrc9BV3Q3gVcLeTEl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5826; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12567

[34] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5527

[35]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GZbUcVPe4S7wV9f2t8Wc2ecH9f5PBARYXh8C4YWw3QMNuuQaHrc9BV3Q3gVcLeTEl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5826

[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/156075

[37]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21498 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21489 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GZbUcVPe4S7wV9f2t8Wc2ecH9f5PBARYXh8C4YWw3QMNuuQaHrc9BV3Q3gVcLeTEl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5826

[38] https://t.me/tass_agency/303086 ; https://t.me/rybar/68425 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32945 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32943

[39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32945 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32943

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21498

[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/28/stoyav-robyv-selfi-rosijski-generaly-palyat-velycheznyj-resurs-i-hochut-rezultat/

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21498 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21489 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GZbUcVPe4S7wV9f2t8Wc2ecH9f5PBARYXh8C4YWw3QMNuuQaHrc9BV3Q3gVcLeTEl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25030 ;

[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24562

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24562

[45] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/28/jdut-try-vanyushky-tyagnut-sanky-rosijski-ataky-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-mezhuyut-z-absurdom/

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21498 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21489 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GZbUcVPe4S7wV9f2t8Wc2ecH9f5PBARYXh8C4YWw3QMNuuQaHrc9BV3Q3gVcLeTEl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5826 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32936 ; https://t.me/rybar/68438

[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24590 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21447 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32936

[48] https://t.me/rybar/68438

[49] https://t.me/sashakots/52201

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21498 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21489 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GZbUcVPe4S7wV9f2t8Wc2ecH9f5PBARYXh8C4YWw3QMNuuQaHrc9BV3Q3gVcLeTEl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5826 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62493 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25030 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32968

[51] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62493 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25030

[52] https://t.me/UMBRELLA_32_OMBR/31 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26019 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=3987320164822295; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8503

[53] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/28/parochky-samogubcziv-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-zastosovuyut-nebachenu-taktyku/

[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/49511

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21498 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21489 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GZbUcVPe4S7wV9f2t8Wc2ecH9f5PBARYXh8C4YWw3QMNuuQaHrc9BV3Q3gVcLeTEl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5826 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25030 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24606 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87040 ; https://t.me/rybar/68425

[56] https://t.me/raid_413/126 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8510

[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/28/potonuty-pid-chas-bolotyanogo-shturmu-v-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-shho-pryzupynyt-vorozhu-bronetehniku/

[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24606 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13651

[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21498 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21489 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GZbUcVPe4S7wV9f2t8Wc2ecH9f5PBARYXh8C4YWw3QMNuuQaHrc9BV3Q3gVcLeTEl ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21444 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87040 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62491 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62480

[60] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32940 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62480

[61] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8512 ; https://t/me/ombr_110/490

[62] https://t.me/tass_agency/303131 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24607 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62485 ; https://t/me/DnevnikDesantnika/24607 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65583 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87040 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87054 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32942

[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32940

[64] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62480

[65] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62491

[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/13661

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21489; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0GZbUcVPe4S7wV9f2t8Wc2ecH9f5PBARYXh8C4YWw3QMNuuQaHrc9BV3Q3gVcLeTEl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02YS8JEnnuhRZwHzye9q71FT9EG1u8gR3HEvmmaCdBg9vLmqSwq7EBv2aErjvqwuzZl; https://t.me/rybar/68425; https://t.me/wargonzo/25030

[68] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8502; https://t.me/mayzheshturmovyk/94

[69] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2025

[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024

[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101623

[72] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87045

[73] https://t.me/kpszsu/29640

[74] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/39200; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/39193; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/39192; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/13299; https://t.me/kpszsu/29640; https://t.me/synegubov/13262

[75] https://t.me/Aksenov82/6871

[76] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans

[77] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23275057; https://crimea dot ria.ru/20250227/v-gd-vnesen-proekt-o-statuse-otrazhayuschikh-vtorzhenie-v-kurskuyu-oblast-1144539963.html

[78] https://t.me/mod_russia/49471 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/44072 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/22269; https://t.me/tass_agency/303033 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52186

[79] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2024; https://vk dot com/wall-23304496_2578928; https://tass dot ru/politika/22714989; https://www.severreal.org/a/my-v-uzhase-voevat-ne-hotim-srochnikam-platyat-po-falshivym-kontraktam/33164620.html

[80] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27665/5053873/

[81] https://t.me/tass_agency/303244

[82] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2024; https://belta dot by/society/view/parlament-rossii-ratifitsiroval-dogovor-s-belarusjju-o-garantijah-bezopasnosti-698651-2025/; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23248193;