Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 31, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 31, 2024

Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 31, 2024, 6:20pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on July 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Israel conducted an airstrike killing Hamas Political Bureau Chairperson Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran to derail attempts to establish peace in the Middle East.[1] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also responded to Haniyeh's death, stating that it "strongly condemned" Haniyeh's assassination and emphasized that Haniyeh's assassination occurred during his visit to Tehran for Masoud Pezeshkian's presidential inauguration.[2] The Russian MFA did not explicitly implicate Israel but claimed that the "organizers of this political assassination" were aware of the "dangerous consequences" Haniyeh's death would have on the entire region. Russia's decision to publicly blame Israel for destabilizing peace prospects in the Middle East and indirectly threaten Israel with "dangerous consequences" demonstrates Russia's increasing willingness to publicly align with Iran amid deepening Russian-Iranian military cooperation.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin has increasingly expressed anti-Israel positions since the start of the Israel–Hamas war in October 2023 and notably amplified information operations designed to justify Iranian aggression against Israel, including the April 13 large-scale missile and drone strikes against Israel.[4]

The Russian State Duma revised some aspects of a recent bill criminalizing Russian soldiers' use of personal devices on the battlefield following outcry in the Russian ultranationalist community. The Russian State Duma Defense Committee recommended on July 30 that the Duma repeal its prior approval of the bill, and the State Duma adopted a new version of the bill on July 31 clarifying that Russian soldiers will not be subject to disciplinary arrest for using or wearing devices to perform combat operations.[5] Russian milbloggers largely celebrated the revision, with most praising the State Duma for its willingness to listen to the Russian ultranationalist information space.[6] Some milbloggers were still cautious, however, advocating for the State Duma to completely repeal the law and noting that the State Duma should repeal other unspecified laws in line with "common sense."[7] One milblogger continued to criticize the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for this bill, claiming that the MoD has failed to change ineffective structural entities responsible for the MoD's public relations and noting that the MoD should consider how this bill hurts its image.[8] Russian milbloggers largely ignored the fact that the State Duma's revisions do not address many of the milbloggers' initial concerns, including the lack of MoD-provided devices for Russian soldiers to use for their duties, the lack of criteria for distinguishing between a personal device and a service device, using this bill as an excuse to justify harsh punishments against conscripts or disliked subordinates, and depriving Russian soldiers of their ability to contact family members and raise awareness of corruption or incompetence of their commanders.[9] It remains unclear if the Russian military command will be able or willing to enforce punishment for the use of personal devices in Ukraine, and the Russian military will likely find it extremely difficult to eliminate its dependence on insecure personal devices for many frontline tasks.[10]

Russian officials may be taking steps to address domestic security issues following the March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack and June 2024 shootings in the Republic of Dagestan. Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov stated on July 31 that the Crocus City Hall and Dagestan attacks challenged Russian law enforcement and society and showed that the Russian government has made "mistakes" in its counter-terrorism policies.[11] Krasnov stated that the Russian government needs to inspect its policies and respond to terrorist threats in a "fundamentally different way." Actors affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) conducted the Crocus City Hall and likely conducted the Dagestan attacks, and Russian security personnel largely failed to rapidly and sufficiently respond to both events.[12] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed it prevented a terrorist attack in the Republic of Adygea on July 11, and Russian security forces may by intensifying proactive counter-terrorism operations in response to government pressure, although ISW cannot confirm the veracity of the FSB's reporting.[13] The Russian government, however, has largely chosen to posture that it is adequately combating the threat of domestic terrorism, but it is unclear what change, if any, in Russian counterterrorism policies may come from Krasnov's proposals.[14]

Ukrainian forces struck a weapons and equipment warehouse in Kursk City on the night of July 30 to 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a warehouse in Kursk City and that Ukrainian forces are conducting a battle damage assessment.[15] Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov claimed that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified facility in Kursk Oblast and caused the facility to catch fire.[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed an unspecified number of Ukrainian drones and missiles, including at least one Neptune anti-ship missile, over Kursk Oblast.[17] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov told Radio Svoboda on July 31 that recent "explosion[s]" at the Olenya Airfield in Murmask Oblast damaged the frames of two Tu-22M3 bombers.[18] Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a successful drone strike against the airfield on the night of July 26 to 27.[19]

Russian border guards withdrew from Armenia’s main international airport. Armenian and Russian sources reported on July 31 that Russian border guards left Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan, Armenia.[20] Armenian authorities requested in March 2024 that Russia remove its border guards from the airport by August 1 because Armenia can conduct its own border control without the help of Russian border guards who had been stationed at the airport since 1992.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Israel conducted an airstrike killing Hamas Political Bureau Chairperson Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran to derail attempts to establish peace in the Middle East.
• The Russian State Duma revised some aspects of a recent bill criminalizing Russian soldiers' use of personal devices on the battlefield following outcry in the Russian ultranationalist community.
• Russian officials may be taking steps to address domestic security issues following the March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack and June 2024 shootings in the Republic of Dagestan.
• Ukrainian forces struck a weapons and equipment warehouse in Kursk City on the night of July 30 to 31.
• Russian border guards withdrew from Armenia’s main international airport.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Svatove, Chasiv Yar, Torestsk, and Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 31 increasing financial incentives for signing a Russian military service contract, likely to support ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

A Russian insider source claimed on July 31 that Ukrainian forces ambushed elements of the Russian 322nd Spetsnaz Training Center (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) as the Russian unit was conducting sabotage and reconnaissance operations in Semenivskyi Raion, Chernihiv Oblast border area.[22] The insider source claimed that the Ukrainian ambush killed five Russian soldiers and that Russian military leadership concealed this failure following the insurgent ambush of Wagner Group personnel in Mali.[23] ISW is unable to confirm this report. Ukrainian sources stated that the Ukrainian ambush occurred on July 28.[24] A Chernihiv Oblast-focused Ukrainian source claimed on July 29 that Russian forces have increased their reconnaissance activity in the oblast and changed their tactics to mine Ukrainian logistics routes rather than ambush Ukrainian forces.[25]

 

Fighting continued north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 31, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and seized two heights near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[26] Russian forces also continued ground attacks near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City), Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk), and Tykhe (east of Vovchansk) on July 30 and 31.[27] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that Russian forces have deployed elements of the 1st Assault Company of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade to frontline positions near Tykhe and are transferring elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) from an unspecified area in occupied Luhansk Oblast to the Starytsya area.[28] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), including its "Tigr" Battalion, reportedly continue to operate near Lyptsi.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk and southwest of Svatove amid continued Russian assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 31. Geolocated footage published on July 31 indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[30] Additional geolocated footage published on July 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Novoyehorivka (southwest of Svatove).[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also seized two unspecified Ukrainian positions south of Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna).[32] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that fighting continued near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Berestove, Pishchane, Kolisnykivka, Stepova Novoselivka, and Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Nevske, and Novoserhiivka; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on July 30 and 31.[33]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on July 30 and 31, but there were no confirmed advances in the area.[34] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction, and elements of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Pereizne.[35]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in eastern Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on July 31. Geolocated footage published on July 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced and crossed the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal north of Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar).[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further within Novyi and Zhovtnevyi microraions, and one milbloggers claimed that Russian assault groups used underground tunnels to advance behind Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank of the canal (which flows south).[37] Russian forces also conducted assaults north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka.[38] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[39]

 

Russian forces advanced within Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk) amid continued offensive operations near Toretsk on July 30. Geolocated footage published on July 31 indicates that Russian forces advanced within northwestern and southwestern Zalizne and have seized most of the settlement.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to a kilometer in depth near Zalizne and Pivdenne (east of Toretsk) and advanced near Druzhba (east of Toretsk) and within Niu York (south of Toretsk).[41] Russian forces are also conducting assaults within Toretsk itself and near Panteleymonivka (south of Toretsk) on July 30 and 31.[42] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating in Niu York.[43]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on July 31, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing northwest of Avdiivka towards Ivanivka, along the railway line south of Vesele and Serhiivka, and west of Lozuvatske and west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka.[44] Russian forces are also conducting assaults northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka, Tymofiivka, Lysychne, Novooleksandrivka, and Zhelanne and west of Avdiivka near Kalynove and Karlivka.[45]

 

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Heorhiivka (southwest of Donetsk City) amid continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on July 30 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced northeast of Heorhiivka during a reinforced-platoon sized mechanized assault.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced south of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) and up to the northwestern outskirts of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), but noted that some Ukrainian assault groups remain in northern Krasnohorivka.[47] Russian forces also continued assaults southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka on July 30 and 31.[48] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating within Krasnohorivka.[49]

Russian forces continued ground assaults near Velyka Novoseilka and south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 30 and 31, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[50]

Russian sources speculated that Ukrainian forces may have used a first-person view (FPV) drone to down a Russian helicopter taking off in Donetsk City. Russian milbloggers insinuated on July 31 that a Ukrainian FPV drone downed an Mi-8 helicopter in Donetsk City and footage purportedly shows the wreckage of a helicopter in the area.[51] A Russian milblogger amplified footage purportedly showing Ukrainian FPV drones unsuccessfully attempting to strike rotary wing aircraft mid-flight in May and mid-July 2024, which suggests that Ukrainian forces have recently improved their drone capabilities.[52]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces advanced east of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of July 31. Geolocated footage published on July 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), although this advance is likely not recent.[53] Russian sources claimed on July 31 that Russian forces also advanced further northwest of Robotyne, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[54] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting near Robotyne; east of Robotyne near Verbove; northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka; and northwest of Robotyne near Novoandriivka on July 30 and 31.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne).[56]

 

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including on islands in the Dnipro River Delta, on July 31.[57]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force Command reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-59 cruise missile from occupied Kherson Oblast and 89 Shahed-136/131 drones from the Yeysk, Seshcha, Kursk, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk directions, and that Ukrainian forces downed all 89 drones and the Kh-59 missile.[58] The Ukrainian Air Force Command noted that this is one of the largest Russian Shahed strikes against Ukraine since January 1, when Russian forces launched the same number of Shaheds at Ukraine. Kyiv City officials reported that Ukrainian forces downed roughly 36 Shaheds over Kyiv City alone and that falling debris damaged residential areas.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of "Gerbera" plywood and foam drones, which look like Shaheds and are used to test and distract Ukrainian air defenses, in the July 30 to 31 strike.[60]

The Belarusian Hajun project reported that at least five Russian Shaheds flew into Belarusian airspace during the July 30 to 31 strike, the largest number of Shaheds that crossed into Belarusian airspace during a strike series.[61] The Hajun project reported that Belarus scrambled a Belarusian fighter jet in response to the drone intrusion and that one drone flew more than 260 kilometers into Belarus from northern Chernhiv Oblast and reached Stolin, Brest Oblast, and the other drones flew near Loyev, Asarevichi, and Kirovo, Gomel Oblast.[62]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 31 increasing financial incentives for signing a Russian military service contract, likely to support ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts. The decree established a one-time minimum payment of 400,000 rubles (about $4,700) to Russians and foreigners who sign a Russian military service contract from August 1, 2024, to December 31, 2024.[63] The decree also recommends that senior Russian regional officials give cash one-time payments of no less than 400,000 rubles to individuals who sign Russian military service contracts. Many Russian federal subjects (regions) have already advertised a one-time payment of over one million rubles (about $11,800).[64] Putin previously signed a decree in November 2022, shortly after the start of partial mobilization, providing a one-time payment of 195,000 rubles (about $2,300) to individuals who signed a Russian military service contracts after September 21, 2022.[65]

The Kremlin continues efforts to groom Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine for positions in the Russian government through the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program. Altai Republic Head Andrei Turchak announced on July 30 that he appointed Russian veteran and "Time of Heroes" program participant Captain Alexander Surazov Chairperson of the republic's Physical Culture and Sports Commitee.[66] Turchak stated that Surazov will work to develop combat sports and martial arts at educational institutions in the republic. Russian authorities likely intend to prepare and recruit Russian youth for military service through the promotion of combat sports.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues efforts to address complaints over a lack of benefits for military personnel and formalize Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DNR/LNR) proxy units. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) submitted a proposal to the Russian presidential administration that Russia provide a one-time disability payment of roughly 4.4 to six million rubles (about $51,600 to $70,600) to individuals who fought in proxy formations in the DNR and LNR since 2014 — the same disability payment that regular Russian military personnel receive.[67]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A Russian milblogger claimed on July 31 that the Russian military began to deliver computerized sights for Russian AGS-17 and AGS-30 automatic grenade launchers "in bulk" to Russian forces on the frontline.[68] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military began testing the computerized sights on the frontline in 2023.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian authorities have renewed their informational attacks against Moldova following reports that Moldovan authorities are investigating two Moldovan civil servants for espionage. Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe (RFE/RL)'s Moldovan service reported on July 31 that Moldovan authorities are searching offices of Moldovan parliamentarians in connection with an espionage case against the Parliamentary Legal Department Head Ion Creanga for providing information to Russia.[69] Another Moldovan source reported that Moldovan authorities detained Creanga and another civil servant.[70] The Russian Embassy in Moldova claimed that Moldovan authorities are preparing to expel Russian diplomats in connection with a "treason" case involving Moldovan officials.[71] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reiterated narratives accusing Moldova of following the "path of Ukraine and the Baltics" and more closely cooperating with the West.[72] The Kremlin likely aims to take advantage of any Moldovan effort to distance and protect itself from Russian interference by intensifying narratives intended to discredit the Moldovan government and set conditions for further interference in Moldova.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on July 31 that elements of the Russian Central and Southern military districts (CMD and SMD) have begun the third stage of tactical nuclear exercises, likely as part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign intended to influence Western states into decision-making favorable to Russia.[73]

The Kremlin continues efforts to deter further military assistance to Ukraine. Russian MFA Deputy Press and Information Director Andrey Nastasin threatened Japan with unspecified countermeasures if Japan allocates lethal military assistance to Ukraine.[74] The Kremlin routinely levies threats against NATO states and their partners to deter them from providing military assistance to Ukraine.[75]

Ukrainian military officials continue to warn about Russian disinformation efforts, including those targeting Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported on July 31 that Russian forces are using Leer-3 systems to spread false information to Ukrainians through faked SMS and Telegram messages.[76] The Kharkiv Group of Forces also warned that Russian propagandists are spreading a false narrative that Ukrainian forces are using prohibited chemical substances on the battlefield. Russian forces have frequently used chemical substances on the battlefield in Ukraine, and Russia likely aims to distract from these instances by falsely deflecting blame onto Ukraine.[77]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/263494 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/21495531

[2] https://t.me/MID_Russia/43746 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43752

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050624

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121423 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041624

[5] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21496887; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21492495

[6] https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/12018 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48470; https://t.me/sashakots/48128; https://t.me/epoddubny/20574; https://t.me/rogozin_do/6203 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48513; https://t.me/motopatriot/25680 ; https://t.me/beard_tim/18949

[7] https://t.me/dva_majors/48472; https://t.me/dva_majors/48514 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/12021 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48515

[8] https://t.me/dva_majors/48509; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072424

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072424

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072324; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072424

[11] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/21496753

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2024

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071124

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072224; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2024

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0o8B5uFvXvA8JQoTc94RiivZJVDMNKxD1ftngq2JfzyWS5xcREPs3A4qa4BM6dvSyl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/16436 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/31/genshtab-zsu-syly-oborony-zavdaly-udaru-po-vijskovomu-obyektu-bilya-kurska-v-rosiyi/

[16] https://t.me/gubernator_46/7076 ; https://t.me/gubernator_46/7073 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1818520614644109607

[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/41579 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73605 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73622 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48462

[18] https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/news-hur-udar-olenia/33056642.html ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/30/gur-pid-chas-udaru-po-aerodromu-v-rosiyi-buly-poshkodzheni-odrazu-dva-litaky-tu-22m3/

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2024

[20] https://t.me/dva_majors/48523 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/263555 ; https://news dot am/eng/news/836502.html ; https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/rous-sahmanapahnery-dours-en-ekel-zvartnots-%D6%85danavakayanits-lratsvogh-/33058069.html

[21] https://armenpress dot am/en/article/1196821; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2024 ; https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-russia-guards-airport-withdrawal/33058381.html; https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-to-withdraw-troops-from-armenias-border/

[22] https://t.me/vchkogpu/49543

[23] ttps://t.me/vchkogpu/49543

[24] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12252 ; https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/pfbid02NHh7Er53HkGBvMcv9zrYniAyxLrDFLNkyrGGiTs9b1vP9KWbA1EKXLNsPVHt4WwQl; WARNING: graphic footage (https://t.me/partizanyofkrk/1667)

[25] https://t.me/partizanyofkrk/1666

[26] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11075; https://t.me/motopatriot/25678

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fh83yKz5eD5vecyvkm6PxBtXzjGDoSrJUHGduQRtzNEVQRLz4u4CAmZBoGi9GBC9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SBKY7ZMRJQPNJUUqZoSvhBrBFopfV1iCLzkVc3QJPx6W2wXpXrvTxePkGvdF37K7l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Y5hGg9M3Ay83uaFscrFu19dnKBQX9B3jxNdtvpiosz9aEMP2Dr6BJGt1LhMtnzC4l; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11075; https://t.me/dva_majors/48466

[28] https://t.me/otukharkiv/479 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/31/na-harkivskomu-napryamku-rosiya-zavodyt-na-pozycziyi-novi-shturmovi-grupy/

[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/21297

[30] https://t.me/AFUStratCom/25320; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6212

[31] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wURh-J-U1ZU; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/17829

[32] https://t.me/motopatriot/25690

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Y5hGg9M3Ay83uaFscrFu19dnKBQX9B3jxNdtvpiosz9aEMP2Dr6BJGt1LhMtnzC4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SBKY7ZMRJQPNJUUqZoSvhBrBFopfV1iCLzkVc3QJPx6W2wXpXrvTxePkGvdF37K7l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fh83yKz5eD5vecyvkm6PxBtXzjGDoSrJUHGduQRtzNEVQRLz4u4CAmZBoGi9GBC9l ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25690

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Y5hGg9M3Ay83uaFscrFu19dnKBQX9B3jxNdtvpiosz9aEMP2Dr6BJGt1LhMtnzC4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SBKY7ZMRJQPNJUUqZoSvhBrBFopfV1iCLzkVc3QJPx6W2wXpXrvTxePkGvdF37K7l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fh83yKz5eD5vecyvkm6PxBtXzjGDoSrJUHGduQRtzNEVQRLz4u4CAmZBoGi9GBC9l

[35] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/15926 (Siversk direction) ; https://t.me/mod_russia/41573 (Pereizne)

[36] https://x.com/small10space/status/1818519911779467719; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1818548121799946494; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6203

[37] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27459 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25681 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13237 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127195

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Y5hGg9M3Ay83uaFscrFu19dnKBQX9B3jxNdtvpiosz9aEMP2Dr6BJGt1LhMtnzC4l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48466 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21303

[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131828

[40] https://t.me/voron1OO/44; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6214; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6213

[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/48466 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73593 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25679 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73578 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13237 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27465

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Y5hGg9M3Ay83uaFscrFu19dnKBQX9B3jxNdtvpiosz9aEMP2Dr6BJGt1LhMtnzC4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SBKY7ZMRJQPNJUUqZoSvhBrBFopfV1iCLzkVc3QJPx6W2wXpXrvTxePkGvdF37K7l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fh83yKz5eD5vecyvkm6PxBtXzjGDoSrJUHGduQRtzNEVQRLz4u4CAmZBoGi9GBC9l

[43] https://t.me/wargonzo/21297 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21310

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13237 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13256 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/2130 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/13046 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73632

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Y5hGg9M3Ay83uaFscrFu19dnKBQX9B3jxNdtvpiosz9aEMP2Dr6BJGt1LhMtnzC4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SBKY7ZMRJQPNJUUqZoSvhBrBFopfV1iCLzkVc3QJPx6W2wXpXrvTxePkGvdF37K7l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fh83yKz5eD5vecyvkm6PxBtXzjGDoSrJUHGduQRtzNEVQRLz4u4CAmZBoGi9GBC9l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48466 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/2130

[46] https://x.com/puenteuribarri/status/1818284719190007947; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1818652703838314714 ; https://t.me/oaembr46/943 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1818368449506427254

[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/48466 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73613 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13247 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13265 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25685 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/10039 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/13044  

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Y5hGg9M3Ay83uaFscrFu19dnKBQX9B3jxNdtvpiosz9aEMP2Dr6BJGt1LhMtnzC4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SBKY7ZMRJQPNJUUqZoSvhBrBFopfV1iCLzkVc3QJPx6W2wXpXrvTxePkGvdF37K7l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fh83yKz5eD5vecyvkm6PxBtXzjGDoSrJUHGduQRtzNEVQRLz4u4CAmZBoGi9GBC9l

[49] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73582 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73635 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73613

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Y5hGg9M3Ay83uaFscrFu19dnKBQX9B3jxNdtvpiosz9aEMP2Dr6BJGt1LhMtnzC4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fh83yKz5eD5vecyvkm6PxBtXzjGDoSrJUHGduQRtzNEVQRLz4u4CAmZBoGi9GBC9l ; https://t.me/voin_dv/10039 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25691

[51] https://t.me/ZOV_Voevoda/17654; https://t.me/fighter_bomber/17582 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131859 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127238 ; https://x.com/lost_warinua/status/1818618573318676501; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1818618610085970396; https://t.me/svvaul10/6688  

[52] https://t.me/helifriends/2698; https://t.me/ZOV_Voevoda/16983; https://t.me/ZOV_Voevoda/17611

[53] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1818419372324454573; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1818419375881277618; https://t.me/ghost_of_khortytsia/121

[54] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27463?single; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131831; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13268

[55]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SBKY7ZMRJQPNJUUqZoSvhBrBFopfV1iCLzkVc3QJPx6W2wXpXrvTxePkGvdF37K7l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0fh83yKz5eD5vecyvkm6PxBtXzjGDoSrJUHGduQRtzNEVQRLz4u4CAmZBoGi9GBC9l; https://t.me/wargonzo/21303; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02Bb3xCKYwCjj3gXdBFwxo9zSP5VCmMnCssj4FNw7UNQbaymnVZMYh8skZsmF1LXAel?__cft__[0]=AZWnN3m7AGgnXE5c9t37iwOHUzj8kaazerH6Ok_4ouhxDtuGlybg8-jPeE6MdioRrwiJgtA9duIYXb3xb09ACpJCUIJ1iBA3ZH2Nfx18cJiEAmnNblXGcSahBStUPh-BLyP8J4qzVo6qyYbXXyUfnIh3MyY5zVg_i5dcKCWb85HoOrt9kVLfyWbPiN2TuKGH3BA6pNMeCH-8KJNoPbMXPb5n&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/wargonzo/21303 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48466 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13237

[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13268

[57]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Y5hGg9M3Ay83uaFscrFu19dnKBQX9B3jxNdtvpiosz9aEMP2Dr6BJGt1LhMtnzC4l; https://t.me/dva_majors/48466

[58] https://t.me/ComAFUA/363

[59] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/7117 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/31/najbilsha-ataka-udarnymy-dronamy-za-rik-poblyzu-kyyeva-znyshhyly-ponad-30-bpla/

[60] https://t.me/milinfolive/127240

[61] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8025

[62] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8025

[63] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/973313; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202407310001 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/41583

[64] https://t.me/sotaproject/84278 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2024

[65] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/973313

[66] https://t.me/turchak_andrey/2626 ; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21484553

[67] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/07/31/minoborony-predlozhilo-vyplatit-po-neskolko-millionov-rubley-separatistam-donbassa-poluchavshim-raneniya-s-2014-goda ; https://regulation dot gov.ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=149492

[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13259

[69] https://moldova.europalibera dot org/a/sis-si-pccocs-au-descins-cu-perchezitii-in-parlament/33057505.html

[70] https://agora dot md/2024/07/31/seful-directiei-juridice-a-parlamentului-ion-creanga-si-inca-o-persoana-retinuti-intr-un-dosar-de-spionaj

[71] https://t.me/tass_agency/263568

[72] https://t.me/MID_Russia/43762; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43762

[73] https://t.me/mod_russia/41581; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/denying-russia%E2%80%99s-only-strategy-success; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/why-putin-remains-uninterested-meaningful-negotiations-ukraine;

[74] https://tass dot `ru/politika/21494749

[75] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/america%E2%80%99s-stark-choice-ukraine-and-cost-letting-russia-win; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/May%2029%2C%202024%2C%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF_0.pdf

[76] https://t.me/otukharkiv/498 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-vs-ukraine-biggest-war-fake-news-era-2024-07-31/

[77] https://t.me/otukharkiv/477; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-25-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/April%2010%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf