Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 26, 2024

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 26, 2024, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on June 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The likely Islamic State (IS) affiliate Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23 have increased fears within the Russian information space about further attacks and instability in the North Caucasus. Russian sources, including prominent Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers and Russian opposition media, amplified reports of two armed men firing on police in Makhachkala on the evening of June 25 and amplified footage of the alleged gunmen and gunfire in the area.[1] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that police deployed to central Makhachkala and cordoned off select areas, but Dagestan's Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) stated that it did not introduce an "interception" plan to apprehend the alleged gunmen.[2] Dagestan's MVD reported on June 25 that police received reports about an armed man in central Makhachkala but that the reports were false and that there were no violations of public order in the city.[3] Many Russian sources amended their earlier reports to label the shooting as fake and claimed that the footage was from the June 23 terrorist attacks and not the evening of June 25.[4] The apparent widespread misreporting of the shooting and the relatively heavy police response to the false reports suggests heightened fear and expectations in the Russian information space that there will be further terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus.

The Kremlin is attempting to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy in response to the Dagestan terror attack and posture Russia's alleged multiethnic and multi-religious unity but is likely so far failing to reassure the public that there will not be further attacks.[5] The March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow and increasingly frequent Russian counterterrorism operations in the North Caucasus have previously prompted tensions within the Russian information space, exacerbated by calls for increased controls on migration to Russia, appeals to Russia's multiethnic and multi-religious makeup, and outright xenophobia and racism.[6] The Kremlin has struggled to balance its appeals to anti-migrant Russian ultranationalists, its reliance on recruiting migrants for its war effort in Ukraine, and its need for migration to address labor shortages within Russia.[7] Heightened fears about religious extremism will further complicate the Kremlin's efforts to balance between these competing priorities. A Russian insider source directly commented on this nexus in response to the Dagestan attacks and claimed that Dagestan's force generation efforts caused practitioners at a government-friendly mosque to turn to a more radical mosque with alleged Wahhabi connections.[8] ISW has previously assessed that Russian force generation efforts and Russian ultranationalist rhetoric are alienating minority and Muslim-majority communities and generating animosities that Salafi-Jihadi groups can exploit in recruitment efforts.[9]

The June 23 terrorist attacks in Dagestan also prompted Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov to double down on his image as a ruthless autocratic strongman capable of protecting the North Caucasus from religious extremism. Kadyrov held a meeting with Chechen law enforcement agencies on June 25 in connection with the Dagestan attacks and called on Chechens to be especially vigilant and prevent their relatives from succumbing to religious extremism.[10] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s North Caucasus service Kavkaz Realii reported that Kadyrov stated in Chechen that Chechen authorities would kill the relatives of those suspected of Wahhabism in a "blood feud."[11] Kadyrov has routinely threatened the family members of those he deems a threat to his control over Chechnya.[12] Kadyrov appears to be attuned to heightened Russian fears about further attacks and is posturing himself as an attentive and ruthless strongman who can prevent instability in the North Caucasus. Kadyrov invoked the memory of the Chechen wars of the 1990s and 2000s and claimed that his father, Akhmad, and Russian President Vladimir Putin prevented "international" efforts to use Chechnya to destroy Russia.[13] Akhmad Kadyrov supported Russian forces in the Second Chechen War (1999–2002), in which the Russian military brought Chechen separatism to heel through excessive force including the almost complete destruction of Chechnya's capital, Grozny.[14] Kadyrov has long modeled himself in the image of his father, a strongman loyal to the Kremlin and whom the Kremlin can rely on to ensure stability in the region.[15] Kadyrov consistently appeals to Putin's favor and is likely aware that further terrorist activity in the North Caucasus may threaten his standing with the Kremlin.[16] Kadyrov also claimed that religious extremism is emanating from Europe and suggested that outside actors aided the Dagestan attackers, supporting Kremlin efforts to tie the attacks to the war in Ukraine while also downplaying the threat of an endogenous religious extremism threat in the North Caucasus.[17]

North Korea will reportedly send military construction and engineering forces to participate in "reconstruction work" in occupied Donetsk Oblast as early as July 2024.[18] South Korean TV network TV Chosun, citing a South Korean government official, reported on June 21 that South Korea expects North Korea to dispatch a large-scale engineering force to occupied Donetsk Oblast as early as July 2024 and that the force will help rebuild infrastructure in occupied Donetsk City.[19] The North Korean military reportedly operates 10 engineering brigades, and TV Chosun estimated that North Korea could earn up to $115 million in unspecified foreign currency each year from Russia if it dispatches three or four engineering brigades to occupied Ukraine.[20] Pentagon Press Secretary Major General Pat Ryder stated on June 25 that the US will "keep an eye" on this development and suggested that North Korea should "question" its decision to send its forces to be "cannon fodder" in Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine.[21] Russia and North Korea signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on June 19, but Russian President Vladimir Putin later attempted to downplay the importance of the agreement and the possibility of North Korean troops serving in Ukraine.[22] ISW noted that Russia appears to be pursuing a coalition of friendly states with historically warm ties to the Soviet Union, including North Korea and Vietnam, to form the basis of an alternative world order.[23] ISW has yet to observe reporting that suggests that North Korean military personnel intend to participate in combat operations in Ukraine, but direct North Korean engineering support can free up Russian combat power for operations along the frontline and aid Russian efforts to expand military infrastructure and defensive fortifications in occupied Ukraine.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia is not interested in any negotiations that do not result in Ukrainian territorial concessions beyond the parts of Ukraine Russian forces already occupy. Lavrov gave a speech at the “Primakov Readings” international political and economic forum on June 26 and claimed that Russia is open to dialogue with Europe only “based on the recognition of territorial realities enshrined in the [Russian Constitution],” while also dismissing Western calls for the war to end with the restoration of all of Ukraine’s legal sovereign territory.[24] Lavrov is referring to Russian constitutional provisions that consider the administrative boundaries of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts as Russian territory, and Lavrov's comments emphasize that the Kremlin sees any negotiations on Ukraine’s terms as both unconstitutional and irreconcilable with Russian law. This all-or-nothing approach echoes Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 14 demands for Ukraine to “completely withdraw” from the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts before Russia considers any sort of “peace negotiations” — notably including areas of each oblast that Russia does not currently occupy.[25] Both Lavrov and Putin have clearly articulated that the only end-state of the war that the Kremlin envisions is Ukraine’s territorial capitulation, strongly emphasizing the fact that Russia remains uninterested in engaging in negotiations with Ukraine in good faith, and only invokes the concept of “peace plans” and “negotiations” to convince Ukraine’s partners to encourage Ukraine to make preemptive concessions about its people and its internationally-recognized territory even before negotiations begin. Lavrov's explicit mention of negotiations with "Europe" rather than Ukraine also forwards the Kremlin's ongoing false narrative that there are no legitimate Ukrainian authorities with whom Russia can negotiate, further undermining Ukraine's status as a sovereign country with its own borders in the context of territorial concessions.

New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov used his first phone call with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on June 26 to reiterate standard Russian threats meant to coerce the US out of supporting Ukraine as part of the wider Russian reflexive control campaign targeting Western decision-making.[26] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Belousov stressed to Austin the “danger of further escalation” should the US continue to supply weapons to Ukraine, while the US Department of Defense (DoD) noted that Austin emphasized to Belousov the importance of maintaining open communication between the US and Russia.[27] Russian officials have consistently attempted to use vague threats of escalation against the US and Ukraine’s other partners to discourage continued Western military support for Ukraine, and Belousov’s statements to Austin fall in the same category as countless other Russian efforts at informational and diplomatic coercion.[28] Belousov’s predecessor, former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, similarly threatened French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu during a phone call on April 4, warning that the potential deployment of French troops to Ukraine would “create problems for France itself.”[29] Shoigu notably called several NATO defense ministers in October 2022 to threaten nuclear disaster if NATO members sustained support for Ukraine.[30] Belousov will continue using pseudo-diplomatic engagements with his Western counterparts to further the same narrative in an attempt to influence Western decision-making via the Kremlin’s reflexive control campaign. Russia has notably yet to escalate militarily in response to any US or Western provision of weapons to Ukraine.[31]

Russia and Ukraine exchanged 90 prisoners of war (POWs) each in a one-to-one POW exchange on June 25 amid United Nations (UN) reports of Russia's continued abuse of POWs. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on June 25 that 90 Ukrainian POWs returned to Ukraine in the 53rd POW exchange thus far during the war.[32] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also reported that 90 Russian POWs returned to Russia, and the MoD claimed that the Russian POWs were in "mortal danger" while in Ukrainian custody.[33] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Spokesperson Krzysztof Janowski stated on June 26 that the UN OHCHR has interviewed over 600 released Ukrainian civilians and POWs since 2022, all of whom reported experiencing or observing torture, severe beatings, and prolonged exposure to stressful positions, and being mauled by dogs.[34] POWs also reported that Russian guards psychologically tortured them and forced them to sing patriotic Russian songs daily and reported experiencing constant hunger and poor medical care for long periods of time. OHCHR reported also hearing accounts of torture in “transitory" POW camps in occupied Ukraine, but POWs reported that Russian guards did not torture them in “official“ internment camps. ISW has extensively reported on footage and reports of Russian servicemen abusing and executing Ukrainian POWs and noted that the Russian military command appears to be permitting these war crimes in Ukraine.[35]

Russia and Iran signed a memorandum on June 26 regarding the supply of Russian gas to Iran, following reported disagreements between Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the Russian supply of gas to the PRC. Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom Head Alexey Miller signed the memorandum with the National Iranian Gas Company in Iran at a ceremony attended by Acting Iranian President Mohammad Mokhber.[36] Miller also met with Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji about implementing the new memorandum and other areas of energy cooperation. Neither Russia nor Iran provided details about the new memorandum, but Gazprom and the National Iranian Gas Company were negotiating unspecified deals worth about $40 billion as of October 2023.[37] Miller's visit to Iran and agreement with the National Iranian Gas Company follows a recent Financial Times (FT) report that Russia and the PRC are reportedly in disagreement about economic issues including the Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) gas pipeline, resulting in Miller not travelling with Russian President Vladimir Putin to Beijing in May 2024 — likely aimed at extracting concessions from Russia given Gazprom's recent economic struggles and the PRC's upper hand in the energy sphere.[38] Iran may benefit from this new deal with Russia to reduce its reliance on existing gas swap deals it has with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to mitigate summer electricity shortages that could fuel domestic unrest.[39]

Ukraine’s pervasive shortage of critical air defense missiles is inhibiting Ukraine’s ability to protect its critical infrastructure against Russian strikes. Private Ukrainian energy enterprise DTEK Executive Director Dmytro Sakharuk told the Kyiv Post on June 26 that for every one interceptor missile that Ukraine possesses to defend against Russian strikes on the energy grid, Russia has five to six missiles to launch at Ukraine.[40] Sakharuk noted that if Russia were to launch 10 missiles at any target in Ukraine, Ukrainian forces would need to respond with at least 12 air defense missiles to adequately protect against the attack. Sakharuk emphasized that the stark difference in Ukraine's necessary and actual ratios of Ukrainian air defense to attacking Russian missiles means that the shortage in interceptor missiles is making it impossible to cover energy grid units that Ukraine has repaired or is repairing. Russia’s air strike campaign against the Ukrainian energy grid has already imposed serious constraints on Ukraine’s power generation capacity, and Russian forces have been able to exploit air defense shortages caused by a lack of Western-provided air defense systems to maximize the damage to Ukraine’s energy capacity over the course of 2024.[41]

Key Takeaways:

• The likely Islamic State (IS) affiliate Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23 have increased fears within the Russian information space about further attacks and instability in the North Caucasus.
• The June 23 terrorist attacks in Dagestan also prompted Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov to double down on his image as a ruthless autocratic strongman capable of protecting the North Caucasus from religious extremism.
• North Korea will reportedly send military construction and engineering forces to participate in "reconstruction work" in occupied Donetsk Oblast as early as July 2024.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia is not interested in any negotiations that do not result in Ukrainian territorial concessions beyond the parts of Ukraine Russian forces already occupy.
• New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov used his first phone call with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on June 26 to reiterate standard Russian threats meant to coerce the US out of supporting Ukraine as part of the wider Russian reflexive control campaign targeting Western decision-making.
• Russia and Ukraine exchanged 90 prisoners of war (POWs) each in a one-to-one POW exchange on June 25 amid United Nations (UN) reports of Russia's continued abuse of POWs.
• Russia and Iran signed a memorandum on June 26 regarding the supply of Russian gas to Iran, following reported disagreements between Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the Russian supply of gas to the PRC.
• Ukraine’s pervasive shortage of critical air defense missiles is inhibiting Ukraine’s ability to protect its critical infrastructure against Russian strikes.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk.
• Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) published a report on June 26 detailing a significant increase in Russia's military equipment and weapons production in 2023.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Fighting continued in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Povkh and Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov noted that Ukrainian forces continue to "block" a small group of Russian troops in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant amid continued reports of heavy close-combat fighting within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[42] Russian and Ukrainian forces reported fighting in and around Vovchansk, east of Vovchansk near Tykhe, and near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) on June 25 and 26.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces launched 11 guided glide bombs at Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) in the afternoon of June 26.[44]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk amid continued Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 26. Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) advancing along a windbreak northeast of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[45] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 26 that Russian forces advanced up to one kilometer in the area northeast of Petropavlivka, relatively consistent with the available geolocated footage.[46] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces entered eastern Stelmakhivka (northwest of Svatove), although ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims.[47] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; northwest of Svatove near Berestove, Stepova Novoselivka, Pishchane, and Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Andriivka and Kopanky; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Hrekivka, and Nevske; west of Kreminna near Torske and Terny; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on June 25 and 26.[48] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on June 26 that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations in the area exclusively with squad-sized infantry groups without armored vehicle support.[49] The Ukrainian spokesperson added that these Russian squad-sized infantry groups attack one at a time but that a second squad-sized group will follow behind an initial assault group to potentially help secure captured positions.[50]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Siversk on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue to advance within Rozdolivka (southeast of Siversk) and have seized two thirds of the settlement, though ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian forces operating beyond the southeastern portion of Rozdolivka.[51] Russian forces also continued to attack northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka on June 25 and 26.[52] Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) reportedly continue operating near Vyimka.[53]

Russian forces continued attacks near Chasiv Yar on June 26 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces continued ground attacks within easternmost Chasiv Yar; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[54] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces are operating fewer armored combat vehicles and tube artillery systems in the area and are instead mainly attacking with infantry groups and shelling with mortars.[55] The Washington Post reported on June 25 that Ukrainian soldiers are saying that Russian assaults are disrupting Ukrainian troop rotations and supply deliveries near Chasiv Yar.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 26 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Chasiv Yar.[57] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division continue operating near Chasiv Yar.[58]

Russian forces reportedly recently advanced amid continued fighting near Toretsk on June 26. Russian milbloggers claimed on June 25 and 26 that Russian forces advanced between 800 meters and two kilometers in depth from Mayorske to Druzhba (both east of Toretsk); continued to advance towards Niu York (south of Toretsk) from the south; and advanced 500 meters deep in Pivnichne (east of Toretsk).[59] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims. One milblogger amplified a claim that Russian forces achieved these advances by taking advantage of a Ukrainian troop rotation.[60] Russian forces also attacked near Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk) and Dachne (northeast of Toretsk) on June 26.[61]

Russian forces have not made any recent confirmed advances west of Avdiivka amid continued fighting in the area on June 26. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 900 meters from Novooleksandrivka towards Vozdvyzhenka (both northwest of Avdiivka); 500 meters north of Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka); and on both sides of the Karlivske Reservoir (southwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[62] Russian forces also continued attacks northwest of Avdiivka near Prohres, Yevhenivka, and Novoselivka Persha;  west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near  and Karlivka on June 25 and 26.[63] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Avdiivka direction stated that Russian forces are conducting squad-sized infantry attacks and that these squads are equipped with electronic warfare (EW) devices that limit Ukrainian drone operations.[64] Elements of the Russian Somalia Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are fighting near Karlivka, and elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (reportedly of the 24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade) are reportedly fighting in the Avdiivka direction.[65]

 

Russian forces continued ground attacks west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to advance within western and central Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) and advanced south of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City) towards the T0524 Kostyantynivka-Vuhledar highway.[66] Russian forces also attacked west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka and Paraskoviivka on June 25 and 26.[67] Elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly fighting near Kostyantynivka.[68]

 

Russian forces continued attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Urozhaine and Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 25 and 26, but there were no changes to the frontline.[69] Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) and 26th Radio, Chemical, and Biological Protection Regiment (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD) are reportedly striking targets in Urozhaine.[70]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 25 and 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced northwest of Robotyne and another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 400 meters near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) over the last two days, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[71] Russian forces continued assaults near Robotyne and Mala Tokmachka and northeast of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[72] Elements of the Russian 7th Air Assault (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction (north of Robotyne).[73]

Russian officials accused Ukrainian forces of destroying the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) radiation control post in Velyka Znamyanka (southwest of Enerhodar) but claimed that there is no risk of excess background radiation to local areas.[74] Ukrainian officials have not commented on the alleged strike as of the publication of this report.

 

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky and on the islands in the Dnipro River on June 25 and 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[75] Ukrainian Naval Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported that Ukrainian forces have destroyed 10 Russian boats in southern Ukraine over the past two days.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces intensified their glide bomb strike campaign against Ukrainian positions in the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast over the last two weeks.[77]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile and a Kh-59 cruise missile at southern Ukraine on the night of June 25 to 26.[78] Ukraine's Southern Military Command noted that the Kh-59 struck an empty area in Mykolaiv Oblast, while the Iskander-M struck administrative infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[79]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) published a report on June 26 detailing a significant increase in Russia's military equipment and weapons production in 2023. RUSI reported that it observed in February 2024 internal Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reports of 2023 defense industrial production that claim that Russia expects to manufacture 1.325 million 152mm artillery shells and 800,000 122mm artillery shells in 2024.[80] RUSI reported that Russia was able to produce 1 million 152mm artillery shells per year at the beginning of 2023 and only 250,000 152mm artillery shells per year at the beginning of 2022.[81] RUSI noted that the internal Russian MoD reports claim that Russia increased production of 122mm Grad multiple launch rockets systems (MLRS) ammunition from 33,000 rounds in 2023 to a planned 500,000 in 2024 and has increased production of Uragan MLRS ammunition from 2,800 rounds in 2023 to a planned 17,000 rounds in 2024.[82] The internal Russian MoD reports also reportedly claim that Russia was able to produce 420 Kh-101 cruise missiles per year by 2023 and tripled Iskander-M ballistic missile production in 2023, allowing Russian forces to accumulate 180 Iskander-M missiles in stocks by 2024.[83]  RUSI reported that the Ukrainian intelligence community assessed in February 2024 that Russia and Iran were able to jointly produce over 250 Shahed-136 drones per month as compared to the initial monthly Iranian production of 40 drones before Iran began sending the drones to Russia.[84] The report states that Russia plans to produce 1,500 tanks and 3,000 other armored fighting vehicles in 2024, but RUSI noted that 85 percent of these vehicles are refurbished from storage instead of new production.[85] RUSI reported that production figures from Kurganmashzavod, a subsidiary of Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec, claim that the armored vehicle producer increased BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle (IFVs) production from 100 vehicles in the first quarter of 2023 to 135 by the fourth quarter of 2023.[86] RUSI added that analysis of captured Russian armored vehicles shows that Russia is achieving increased production figures by producing lower quality equipment for some models.[87] RUSI cited commercially-obtained trade data that shows that Russia has relied on imports of nitrocellulose (an explosive precursor) from Germany, Turkey, Taiwan, and other countries to help support its increased production of weapons.[88] RUSI noted that the Russian MoD has previously assessed that Western sanctions have imposed a 30 percent price increase for critical microelectronic components used in military equipment and weapons.[89]

Russian regional administrations continue to support the Russian MoD's crypto-mobilization campaign. A Russian milblogger amplified on June 26 an advertisement for volunteer recruitment through the "Stal" training center in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and claimed that the Nizhny Novgorod Oblast administration will supervise unspecified frontline units that volunteers from the training center will join.[90] The advertisement promises a 195,000 ruble ($2,230) federal lump sum payment, a 500,000 ruble ($5,730) regional lump sum payment, and a 305,000 ruble ($3,500) gubernatorial lump sum payment for contracts signed in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[91]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Ukraine continues to develop its Unmanned Systems Forces and unmanned weapons capabilities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree on June 25 establishing the Unmanned Systems Forces as a separate service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[92] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Representative Yevhen Yerin stated on June 26 that Ukraine is trying to improve its Magura V5 naval drones, a variant of which Ukrainian forces have recently modified to include a launcher for R-73 air to air missiles.[93] Ukrainian Brigadier General Ivan Lukashevych told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on June 24 that Ukraine's Security Service is partnering with the Ukrainian Navy and Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) to innovate and expand the utility of Ukrainian naval drones.[94] Lukashevych stated that Ukraine aims to create squads of 10 to 20 drones with various functions that together will be able to replicate the capabilities of a single warship. Lukashevych stated that Ukraine's SeaBaby naval drone can carry a larger payload than other naval drones and that specialized SeaBaby drones can lay mines that weigh up to 400 pounds in shallow water and use acoustic and electromagnetic sensors to detect passing ships. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Dmytro Klimenkov reported on June 21 that the Ukrainian MoD purchased 2.5 billion hryvnias (roughly $61.69 million) worth of Mavic 3E and 3T drones from Ukrainian drone procurement companies since the start of 2024.[95]

Ukraine's Western allies continue their support for Ukraine's war effort. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda announced on June 26 that Lithuania will allocate at least 0.25 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to Ukraine's security and defense.[96] Spanish outlet EFE reported on June 24 that sources within the Spanish government stated that Spain provided Ukraine with an unspecified number of Patriot missiles, Leopard tanks, various types of ammunition, anti-drone systems, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and remote-control turrets on June 21.[97] The Danish MoD announced its 19th aid package to Ukraine worth 1.2 billion DKK ($171.8 million) on June 18, including additional support for Denmark's F-16 training program.[98] Ukraine's National Association of Ukrainian Defense Industries (NAUDI) announced that it signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Romanian Business Association of Military Technique Manufacturers (PATROMIL) on June 19 to expand Ukrainian-Romanian joint defense production and increase ammunition production and equipment maintenance programs on June 19.[99] French arms company Thales signed three agreements with Ukrainian defense industrial companies, including an agreement creating a joint venture to deliver and operate EW, communications, air defense, and radar systems in Ukraine; an agreement requiring Thales to provide maintenance and specialized training for Ukrainian forces using their EW systems; and another agreement on co-developing ammunition-carrying drones.[100] Breaking Defense reported on June 18 that US aerospace and defense technology company Northrop Grumman plans to produce medium caliber ammunition in Ukraine and will look to expand into tank ammunition and 155mm ammunition in the future.[101] German vehicle and arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced on June 17 that it will produce an unspecified number of "Frankenstein" air defense tanks — Leopard 1 chasses equipped with a Skyranger air defense system mounted on top — for increased protection against drones and missiles to Ukraine.[102] Western media reported the that Italian government is preparing to send Ukraine an unspecified number of Storm Shadow air defense missiles and a SAMP/T air defense system in its next military assistance package to Ukraine.[103]

The Ukrainian government continues efforts aimed at addressing Ukraine's force generation challenges. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Kateryna Chernohorenko announced on June 19 that the Ukrainian government processed over 645,000 electronic military registration documents in the first two days of launching Ukraine's new "Reserve+" mobile application for mobilization and military registration.[104] Ukrainian MoD Representative Oleksiy Bezhevets stated on June 18 that over 7,000 Ukrainians have applied for military service through a recruiting center since about mid-February, including roughly 700 women.[105] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Nataliya Kalmykova reported on June 17 that the Ukrainian MoD opened its 25th recruiting center in Kropyvnytskyi, Kirovohrad Oblast.[106] Finnish Defense Minister Antti Haakainen stated on June 26 that Finland has trained thousands of Ukrainian servicemen in Finland and through the United Kingdom- (UK) led Operation Interflex.[107]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials and sources attempted to undermine and downplay the International Criminal Court (ICC)'s arrest warrants for former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on June 26 that Russia refuses to recognize the arrest warrants and considers them "absurd."[108] President of the Russian Constitutional Court Valery Zorkin derided the arrest warrants on June 26 as "information noise without legal basis."[109] A prominent Russian milblogger accused the ICC of a "cynical violation of the law."[110] Russian officials and milbloggers similarly responded to the ICC's 2023 arrest warrants against Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova for their involvement in the deportation of Ukrainian children.[111]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://t.me/rybar/61276 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71215; https://t.me/astrapress/58364 ; https://t.me/istories_media/6746 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57209; https://t.me/milinfolive/124832 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57210; https://t.me/milinfolive/124829 

[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/257042 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/257043 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/257045 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/257048 

[3] https://t.me/tass_agency/257050

[4] https://t.me/rybar/61276 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71215 ; https://t.me/istories_media/6746 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57209; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71217 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/28954;

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2024

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWarO41224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040124 ;  https://isw.pub/UkrWar040924

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWarO41224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024

[8] https://t.me/vchkogpu/49001

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324

[10] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4870 

[11] https://www.kavkazr.com/a/kritiki-kadyrova-zayavili-o-massovyh-reydah-v-chechne-posle-napadeniy-v-dagestane/33010635.html ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4869 

[12] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/russia-politician-threatens-to-decapitate-family-members-of-chechen-activist/ ; https://meduza dot io/en/news/2024/01/03/chechen-governor-ramzan-kadyrov-says-relatives-of-criminals-who-cannot-be-apprehended-should-be-punished

[13] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4870 

[14] https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1289/RAND_MR1289.pdf

[15] https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c200v0oc ; https://www.npr.org/2022/04/27/1094873072/russia-ukraine-war-chechen-leader-ramzan-kadyrov

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092823

[17] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4870  ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062424

[18] https://www.reuters.com/world/north-korean-official-criticises-us-expanding-support-ukraine-kcna-reports-2024-06-23/  ; https://www.kyivpost.com/post/34893 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/north-korean-official-criticises-us-expanding-support-ukraine-kcna-reports-2024-06-23/  ; https://news dot tvchosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2024/06/21/2024062190181.html

[19] https://www.jayupress dot com/news/articleView.html?idxno=30826 ; https://x.com/TVChosunNews/status/1804123491333271917 ; https://news.tvchosundot com/site/data/html_dir/2024/06/21/2024062190181.html ; https://www.reuters.com/world/north-korean-official-criticises-us-expanding-support-ukraine-kcna-reports-2024-06-23/

[20] https://news.tvchosundot com/site/data/html_dir/2024/06/21/2024062190181.html ; https://www.jayupress dot com/news/articleView.html?idxno=30826

[21] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3817329/pentagon-press-secretary-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062024

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062024

[24] https://t.me/tass_agency/257141; https://t.me/tass_agency/257149

[25] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74285

[26] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3817099/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iiis-phone-call-with-russian-min/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/257035; https://t.me/mod_russia/40322 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/42572  

[27] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3817099/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iiis-phone-call-with-russian-min/; https://t.me/mod_russia/40322

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424

[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/37317; https://www.france24 dot com/en/europe/20240403-french-defence-minister-lecornu-holds-rare-phone-talks-with-russia-s-shoigu

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030924

[32] https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/5990; https://suspilne dot media/776709-ukraina-povernula-90-vijskovopolonenih/

[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/40318

[34] https://ukraine dot un.org/uk/272518-міжнародний-день-на-підтримку-жертв-катувань

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122823 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052924

[36] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/04/06/3111285; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/21206665

[37] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/18990129

[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2024; https://www.ft.com/content/f7a34e3e-bce9-4db9-ac49-a092f382c526

[39] https://www.rferl.org/amp/iran-azerbaijan-turkmenistan-gas-swap/31583984.html; https://www.aei.org/articles/iran-agrees-to-gas-swap-with-azerbaijan-turkmenistan/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-2-2023

[40] https://www.kyivpost.com/post/34872

[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2024

[42] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/776761-26-cervna-golovni-novini-harkova-ta-oblasti-naslidki-rosijskih-obstriliv/?anchor=live_1719399290&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/777183-agregatnij-zavod-u-vovcansku-rosijski-vijskovi-lisautsa-zablokovanimi-na-pidpriemstvi/; https://t.me/synegubov/10115; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/128011; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57213; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71236  

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zbnp5hcFhznRsZJNLRoF7iVmwDtsFXPxCBQLJhBsxG4pvnaU4spZbPRLJ7sNjzH9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f63e5THo1saBhjfZ36LEKsrhLs2Au7fhz6tqwrzPyrEwdjamq3sjYn4EKLPR3SjPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jg5dghHXFUjB9zSFD6Fpbg13ubqVy2wUnrTN5CE93JvhfoKz8WCwbdFaa7qbC5jxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0213EgGvTk2189JWsvJNjs7wbZwMd4SQwdqARF6NvLWp3WVNjuu2DBACUh3xVwL7kNl; https://t.me/wargonzo/20730;

https://t.me/dva_majors/46129; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12141; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12133; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12168; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/128011; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57213

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f63e5THo1saBhjfZ36LEKsrhLs2Au7fhz6tqwrzPyrEwdjamq3sjYn4EKLPR3SjPl

[45] https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1805694087603142714; https://t.me/operational_space/631

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12149 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71236

[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71236 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/12338 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12149 

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zbnp5hcFhznRsZJNLRoF7iVmwDtsFXPxCBQLJhBsxG4pvnaU4spZbPRLJ7sNjzH9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jg5dghHXFUjB9zSFD6Fpbg13ubqVy2wUnrTN5CE93JvhfoKz8WCwbdFaa7qbC5jxl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0213EgGvTk2189JWsvJNjs7wbZwMd4SQwdqARF6NvLWp3WVNjuu2DBACUh3xVwL7kNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f63e5THo1saBhjfZ36LEKsrhLs2Au7fhz6tqwrzPyrEwdjamq3sjYn4EKLPR3SjPl

[49] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/25/vorog-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-vzhe-tyzhden-atakuye-vyklyuchno-pihotoyu/ 

[50] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/25/vorog-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-vzhe-tyzhden-atakuye-vyklyuchno-pihotoyu/

[51] https://t.me/motopatriot/24237; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/128011; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57213; https://t.me/motopatriot/24240

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jg5dghHXFUjB9zSFD6Fpbg13ubqVy2wUnrTN5CE93JvhfoKz8WCwbdFaa7qbC5jxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0213EgGvTk2189JWsvJNjs7wbZwMd4SQwdqARF6NvLWp3WVNjuu2DBACUh3xVwL7kNl;

[53] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/15248 (Vyimka)

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zbnp5hcFhznRsZJNLRoF7iVmwDtsFXPxCBQLJhBsxG4pvnaU4spZbPRLJ7sNjzH9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jg5dghHXFUjB9zSFD6Fpbg13ubqVy2wUnrTN5CE93JvhfoKz8WCwbdFaa7qbC5jxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0213EgGvTk2189JWsvJNjs7wbZwMd4SQwdqARF6NvLWp3WVNjuu2DBACUh3xVwL7kNl; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71236; https://t.me/wargonzo/20730;

[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/26/poblyzu-chasovogo-yaru-zafiksovano-zminy-u-vykorystanni-tehniky-protyvnykom/

[56] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/25/russia-ukraine-war-donetsk/ff952da0-32e7-11ef-872a-1d22f44a0d95_story.html

[57] https://t.me/dva_majors/46129; https://t.me/rusich_army/15423

[58] https://t.me/motopatriot/24241; https://t.me/motopatriot/24226  (Chasiv Yar)

[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71212; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12146; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37125;

[60] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37125;

[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zbnp5hcFhznRsZJNLRoF7iVmwDtsFXPxCBQLJhBsxG4pvnaU4spZbPRLJ7sNjzH9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f63e5THo1saBhjfZ36LEKsrhLs2Au7fhz6tqwrzPyrEwdjamq3sjYn4EKLPR3SjPl 

[62] https://t.me/wargonzo/20730; https://t.me/dva_majors/46129; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/128011; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57213; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12148

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zbnp5hcFhznRsZJNLRoF7iVmwDtsFXPxCBQLJhBsxG4pvnaU4spZbPRLJ7sNjzH9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jg5dghHXFUjB9zSFD6Fpbg13ubqVy2wUnrTN5CE93JvhfoKz8WCwbdFaa7qbC5jxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0213EgGvTk2189JWsvJNjs7wbZwMd4SQwdqARF6NvLWp3WVNjuu2DBACUh3xVwL7kNl

[64] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/26/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-novu-taktyku-rosiyan-pid-chas-pishyh-shturmiv-na-donechchyni/

[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71223 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/46116 (Karlivka); https://t.me/sashakots/47535 (Avdiivka)

[66] https://t.me/motopatriot/24234; https://t.me/dva_majors/46129; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/128011; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57213; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10785; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18200; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18205

[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f63e5THo1saBhjfZ36LEKsrhLs2Au7fhz6tqwrzPyrEwdjamq3sjYn4EKLPR3SjPl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jg5dghHXFUjB9zSFD6Fpbg13ubqVy2wUnrTN5CE93JvhfoKz8WCwbdFaa7qbC5jxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0213EgGvTk2189JWsvJNjs7wbZwMd4SQwdqARF6NvLWp3WVNjuu2DBACUh3xVwL7kNl

[68] https://t.me/mod_russia/40332 (Kostyantynivka)

[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jg5dghHXFUjB9zSFD6Fpbg13ubqVy2wUnrTN5CE93JvhfoKz8WCwbdFaa7qbC5jxl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0213EgGvTk2189JWsvJNjs7wbZwMd4SQwdqARF6NvLWp3WVNjuu2DBACUh3xVwL7kNl

[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/9366; https://t.me/voin_dv/9368  (Urozhaine)

[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/128011 https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57213 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12171   

[72] https://t.me/wargonzo/20730 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02r5cZRQXuQSQYdDYMgvT2vna4v36TxMmaVZrXhzkFUNHbFwy747LwHHxpD1sfoN6Vl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10173   ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0213EgGvTk2189JWsvJNjs7wbZwMd4SQwdqARF6NvLWp3WVNjuu2DBACUh3xVwL7kNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jg5dghHXFUjB9zSFD6Fpbg13ubqVy2wUnrTN5CE93JvhfoKz8WCwbdFaa7qbC5jxl

[73] https://t.me/mod_russia/40334

[74] https://t.me/tass_agency/257118 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/257119 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71231 ; https://ura dot news/news/1052785467; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/254894 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/257128   

[75] https://t.me/rusich_army/15428   ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f63e5THo1saBhjfZ36LEKsrhLs2Au7fhz6tqwrzPyrEwdjamq3sjYn4EKLPR3SjPl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0213EgGvTk2189JWsvJNjs7wbZwMd4SQwdqARF6NvLWp3WVNjuu2DBACUh3xVwL7kNl ;  https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02r5cZRQXuQSQYdDYMgvT2vna4v36TxMmaVZrXhzkFUNHbFwy747LwHHxpD1sfoN6Vl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10173   

[76] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/26/minus-10-chovniv-za-dvi-doby-dmytro-pletenchuk-pro-te-yak-proridyly-vorozhe-vijsko-na-pivdni/

[77] https://t.me/dva_majors/46129   

[78] https://www.facebook.com/PvKPivden/posts/pfbid0GfMUsgPz8fqC6h15dAukuFbF4oZeiXcuGaVdgunYPPH9iFCTyv2cUaDTXhfnByqbl?ref=embed_post; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10171

[79] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10171; https://t.me/odeskaODA/5689; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/90217

[80] https://static.rusi.org/methodology-degrading-russian-arms-rusi-op-june-2024.pdf

[81] https://static.rusi.org/methodology-degrading-russian-arms-rusi-op-june-2024.pdf

[82] https://static.rusi.org/methodology-degrading-russian-arms-rusi-op-june-2024.pdf

[83] https://static.rusi.org/methodology-degrading-russian-arms-rusi-op-june-2024.pdf

[84] https://static.rusi.org/methodology-degrading-russian-arms-rusi-op-june-2024.pdf

[85] https://static.rusi.org/methodology-degrading-russian-arms-rusi-op-june-2024.pdf

[86] https://static.rusi.org/methodology-degrading-russian-arms-rusi-op-june-2024.pdf

[87] https://static.rusi.org/methodology-degrading-russian-arms-rusi-op-june-2024.pdf

[88] https://static.rusi.org/methodology-degrading-russian-arms-rusi-op-june-2024.pdf

[89] https://static.rusi.org/methodology-degrading-russian-arms-rusi-op-june-2024.pdf

[90] https://t.me/milinfolive/124874

[91] https://t.me/milinfolive/124874

[92] https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/3822024-51101

[93] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/26/magura-v5-predstavnyk-rozvidky-rozpoviv-pro-novi-mozhlyvosti-i-vdoskonalennya-morskogo-drona/

[94] https://www.wsj.com/world/naval-drones-innovation-warfare-ukraine-russia-ce35adfa

[95] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/21/mo-zakupylo-cherez-konkurentni-torgy-mavikiv-na-25-mlrd-grn-detali/

[96] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/26/lytva-shvalyla-vydilennya-025-vvp-na-oboronnu-dopomogu-ukrayini/; https://x.com/GitanasNauseda/status/1805954291007426761

[97] https://suspilne dot media/775831-ispania-peredala-ukraini-drugu-partiu-raket-dla-patriot/ ; https://www.eldiario dot es/politica/segundo-lote-misiles-patriot-enviado-espana-ucrania-viernes_1_11473697.html

[98] https://www.fmn dot dk/da/nyheder/2024/danmark-imodekommer-ukraines-akutte-behov-med-ny-donationspakke/ ; https://mil dot in.ua/uk/news/daniya-peredast-ukrayini-obladnannya-dlya-pidtrymky-f-16/  

[99] https://www.facebook.com/naudiUA/posts/pfbid021rxbPK5kX3eYYnUBcKe3Kirc4hEnp87ctNfkfDfYwuU6wCaTJYRsM19shpv8DqmZl ; https://mil dot in.ua/uk/news/ukrayina-spivpratsyuvatyme-z-asotsiatsiyeyu-opk-rumuniyi-patromil/  

[100] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-economy/3876703-francuzka-zbrojova-kompania-stvorit-v-ukraini-spilne-pidpriemstvo.html ; https://www.thalesgroup dot com/en/worldwide/defence-and-security/press_release/thales-signs-three-agreements-ukrainian-industry

[101] https://breakingdefense.com/2024/06/northrop-planning-to-build-munitions-inside-ukraine/

[102] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3876776-zbroa-peremogi-tank-protipovitrannoi-oboroni-frankenstein.html ; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/06/17/ukraine-to-get-german-made-frankenstein-tank/; https://www.newsweek.com/new-ukraine-frankenstein-tank-combat-russian-drones-1913914   

[103] https://www.ilfattoquotidiano dot it/in-edicola/articoli/2024/06/18/usa-vertice-atlantista-nel-9-pacchetto-i-missili-a-lunga-gittata-per-kiev/7591093/; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/06/18/putin-north-korea-ukraine-kim-russia-war-latest-news/

[104] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/19/nablyzhayemos-do-miljona-v-ukrayini-zgenerovano-645-tys-elektronnyh-vijskovo-oblikovyh-dokumentiv/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/19/ponad-500-tysyach-vijskovo-oblikovyh-dokumentiv-uzhe-zgenerovano-u-rezerv/

[105] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/18/do-rekrutyngovyh-czentriv-minoborony-uzhe-zvernulosya-ponad-7-tysyach-osib/

[106] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/06/17/u-kropivnyczkomu-vidkryly-czentr-rekrutyngu/

[107] https://yle dot fi/a/74-20096412; https://suspilne dot media/777291-finlandia-pidgotuvala-tisaci-ukrainskih-vijskovih-ministr-oboroni/

[108] https://t.me/tass_agency/257163; https://t.me/bbcrussian/67009  

[109] https://t.me/tass_agency/257137

[110] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57206

[111] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032023