Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 19, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 19, 2024

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 19, 2024, 5:15pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on March 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin presented the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) as a key guarantor of Russian security and sovereignty following his victory in the Russian presidential election, likely signaling that Russian security services and siloviki (Russian strongmen with political influence) will continue to represent his core constituency in his fifth presidential term. Putin delivered his first major address following his March 18 electoral victory speech at the FSB board meeting on March 19 and praised FSB officers for ensuring Russian security and sovereignty.[1] Putin thanked FSB officers for successful operations in Ukraine, for suppressing attempts to interfere in Russian internal affairs, and for repelling “terrorist” attacks against Russia (in reference to limited raids by all-Russian pro-Ukrainian volunteers in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts).[2] Putin also highlighted the FSB’s role in suppressing attempts by unnamed actors to provoke internal unrest and interethnic conflict within Russia and the FSB‘s responsibilities to ensure Russia’s economic security, combat corruption, and protect critical infrastructure.[3] Putin’s appeals to these FSB functions likely sought to remind his domestic constituency that his regime has the backing of an extensive security apparatus, which the Kremlin has been attempting to expand since the start of the full-scale invasion, particularly since the Wagner Group‘s failed rebellion in June 2023.[4] It is notable that one of the greatest challenges to the stability of Putin’s rule came from a silovik, deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Putin likely aims to signal that Russia’s siloviki are firmly united in support of his fifth presidential term and his war effort in Ukraine.[5] Putin, a former KGB officer himself, may be highlighting the FSB as an organization that has his current favor, although Putin has traditionally pitted Russia’s security organizations and siloviki against each other to compete for his support and prevent any singular entity from amassing too much power.[6]

Russia continues efforts to build a coalition to counterbalance the West by pursuing bilateral relationships with Iran, North Korea, and China. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko met with Chinese Special Representative on Korean Peninsula Affairs Liu Xiaoming in Moscow on March 19 to discuss the situation on the Korean Peninsula.[7] Rudenko and Liu accused the United States and its allies of threatening the military situation in northeastern Asia and warned the United States against the proliferation of Cold War-style “bloc thinking.”[8] Russia has notably been pursuing an intensified relationship with North Korea and has received ballistic missiles and artillery ammunition from North Korea in exchange for likely technological cooperation and other unspecified support, which has generated concern in Seoul about the security situation on the peninsula.[9] Russian Ambassador to China Igor Morgulov additionally met with Chinese Xinhua News Agency Head Fu Hua to discuss bilateral cooperation in the media sphere.[10] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi held a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 19 to discuss bilateral cooperation, and Raisi affirmed his willingness to help Russia stabilize the South Caucasus region, potentially in reference to ongoing developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan.[11] Russia’s pursuit of a stronger political and diplomatic bilateral relationship with Beijing while also leveraging its bilateral relationships with Iran and North Korea for military benefit represents the type of ”bloc thinking ” of which Liu and Rudenko accused the US and its allies. The Kremlin has exploited the war in Ukraine to pursue bilateral relationships and create a coalition of states to counterbalance the West, which has long been a central aspect of Russia’s foreign policy.[12]

Armenia's Central Bank will reportedly ban the use of Russia’s “Mir” national payment system to prevent Armenia from falling under secondary US sanctions.[13] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on March 19 that a high-ranking source in the Armenian banking sector stated that Armenia’s Central Bank will ban local Armenian banks from using the “Mir” system starting on March 29.[14] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Armenian service Radio Azatutyun reported that 17 of 18 Armenian commercial banks will stop using the ”Mir” national payment system on March 30 and that only VTB-Armenia, a subsidiary of the Russian VTB Bank, will continue to use the system.[15] Turkey and Uzbekistan stopped using the “Mir” system in 2022, likely to avoid secondary sanctions.[16] The United States imposed sanctions against VTB Bank in February 2022 and against ”Mir” national payment system’s operator the National Payment Card System Joint Stock Company in February 2024.[17]

Pro-Russian actors in Moldova are continuing efforts to support wider Kremlin hybrid efforts to destabilize Moldova. The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) informed Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Vasnetsov that the Moldovan government is expelling an unspecified Russian diplomat in connection with their organization of polling stations in Transnistria for the Russian presidential elections despite the lack of official Moldovan consent.[18] Vasnetsov and Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova responded, stating that Russia will not leave Moldova’s “unfriendly” actions unanswered.[19] Ilan Shor, a US-sanctioned, pro-Russian Moldovan politician, stated in an interview with Russian-language diaspora-focused outlet RTVi published on March 16 that he plans to become the Moldovan Prime Minister following the 2025 Parliamentary elections.[20] Governor of the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, stated on March 19 that she will sue Moldovan President Maia Sandu for defamation after Sandu stated to journalists on March 18 that Gustul works for a “criminal group and not the residents of Gagauzia” and Sandu would therefore not sign the decree to include Gutsul in the Moldovan government.[21] Sandu stated in September 2023 that she would not sign the decree until the Moldovan Prosecution Service completed its investigation regarding corruption and bribery in the Gagauzia gubernatorial election that brought Gutsul to power.[22] ISW continues to assess that Russia and Russian-linked actors in Moldova are engaged in a hybrid campaign that is most likely aimed at destabilizing Moldova from within ahead of the upcoming Moldovan presidential election in late 2024 and Parliamentary elections in summer 2025.[23] Shor is currently living in exile in Israel after he fled Moldova in 2019 to avoid serving a prison sentence for massive fraud and money laundering charges.[24] The Moldovan Constitutional Court also deemed Shor’s pro-Russian political party, the Shor Party, unconstitutional in 2023.[25] Shor’s confident statement that he plans to become the Moldovan Prime Minister in 2025 indicates that he hopes a pro-Russian politician will become Moldovan president in 2024, exonerate him, vacate his prison sentence so that he can safely return to Moldova and then presumably appoint him prime minister. It is also notable that Gutsul plans to sue Sandu for defamation now, as Sandu made identical statements in November 2023 about her refusal to allow Gutsul into the Moldovan government because of Gutsul’s involvement in a ”criminal group,” which did not prompt Gutsul to press charges at that time.[26] Gutsul’s avowed decision to press charges now suggests that charges against Sandu are part of a wider effort to discredit or distract Sandu in her campaign for re-election.

Ukraine’s European partners continue efforts to stand up significant initiatives to provide military support to Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on March 19 that the European Union (EU) has prepared draft legislation that would allow the transfer of profits from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine as early as July 2024.[27] EU High Commissioner Josep Borrell stated that the EU should transfer 90 percent of Russian frozen asset revenue to an EU-run fund to finance security assistance for Ukraine and that he will submit a formal proposal for this mechanism to EU member states on March 20.[28] Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for National Defense Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz additionally announced on March 18 that Germany and Poland are creating an “armored vehicle coalition” to support Ukraine and noted that Sweden, the UK, and Italy have already declared their willingness to participate in the coalition.[29]

The Russian military confirmed that Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Alexander Moiseev replaced Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov as acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy. The Russian military officially introduced Moiseev as acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy at a Russian Navy ceremony in Kronstadt in St. Petersburg on March 19.[30] ISW recently assessed that Moiseev may have been appointed as acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy to retain a high-ranking command role as the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) deprives the Northern Fleet of its status as an “interservice strategic territorial organization” (a joint headquarters in Western military parlance) to restore the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts (MMD and LMD).[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin presented the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) as a key guarantor of Russian security and sovereignty following his victory in the Russian presidential election, likely signaling that Russian security services and siloviki will continue to represent his core constituency in his fifth presidential term.
• Russia continues efforts to build a coalition to counterbalance the West by pursuing bilateral relationships with Iran, North Korea, and China.
• Armenia's Central Bank will reportedly ban the use of Russia’s “Mir” national payment system to prevent Armenia from falling under secondary US sanctions.
• Pro-Russian actors in Moldova are continuing efforts to support wider Kremlin hybrid efforts to destabilize Moldova.
• Ukraine’s European partners continue efforts to stand up significant initiatives to provide military support to Ukraine.
• The Russian military confirmed that Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Alexander Moiseev replaced Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov as acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.
• Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance near Avdiivka on March 19.
• Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov stated on March 19 that the Russian military will not increase the number of conscripts summoned during the upcoming semi-annual spring conscription cycle in comparison to the previous fall 2023 conscription cycle.
• Kremlin officials continue to implicate themselves directly in the illegal removal of Ukrainian children to other Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine and the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled “Ukrainian” (likely referring to the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps [RDK]) sabotage and reconnaissance attempts near Kozinka, Belgorod Oblast.[32]

Russian forces reportedly unsuccessfully attacked near Kupyansk and Kreminna on March 19, and there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; west of Kreminna near Terny; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[33] Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continue operating near Bilohorivka.[34]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 18 that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces, operating in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction, consists of a maximum of 80,000 personnel.[35] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian Western Military District (WMD), including the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA), 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA), and 11th AC (Baltic Fleet, WMD) operate in the Kupyansk direction. Mashovets noted that elements of the 138th and 25th motorized rifle brigades (both 6th CAA) and 11th AC are operating along the Synkivka-Petropavlivka line (northeast of Kupyansk, and that elements of the 2nd and 4th motorized rifle divisions, 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (all 1st GTA), and 11th AC are operating southeast of Kupyansk along the Stepova Novoselivka-Tabaivka-Pishchane line. Mashovets concluded that Russian forces have five regiments and up to three battalion-sized units in reserve in the Kupyansk direction. Mashovets also stated that elements of the Russian 20th and 25th CAA (both Central Military District [CMD]) and individual elements of the 1st GTA (WMD) are deployed in the Lyman direction and that elements of the 3rd and 144th motorized rifle divisions (20th CAA) are attempting to advance near Terny while elements of the 11th Tank Brigade (25th CAA) are trying to advance to Torske.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional engagements continued near Bakhmut on March 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported positional fighting west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and southwest of Bakhmut near Andriivka, Klishchiivka, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora.[36] Russian milbloggers noted that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the western outskirts of Ivanivske and that heavy fighting is ongoing in the settlement.[37] Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Guards Air Assault (VDV) Brigade, 98th VDV Division, 3rd AC, and 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating around Bakhmut.[38]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Orlivka, but ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian forces fully controlling the settlement. The Russian MoD claimed on March 19 that elements of the Central Grouping of Forces seized Orlivka, northwest of Avdiivka.[39] Several milbloggers amplified this claim, and one prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces fully captured and began clearing Orlivka on March 17 but faced challenges in fully consolidating control over the settlement due to Ukrainian counterattacks.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are intensifying attacks on Berdychi (just north of Orlivka and northwest of Avdiivka) and Tonenke (south of Orlivka and west of Avdiivka) and that Russian aviation is conducting constant FAB glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in these two settlements.[41] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted reconnaissance-in-force near Russian positions north and northwest of Avdiivka.[42] Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are operating near Orlivka.[43]

Geolocated footage published on March 19 shows that Russian forces recently advanced on the northwestern edge of the Pervomaiske Dam in Pervomaiske, southwest of Avdiivka.[44] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[45]

Positional engagements continued west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that heavy fighting is ongoing near Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), but that Russian forces have been unable to significantly advance in this area despite conducting frequent armored and infantry assaults.[46] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued fighting west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka.[47] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Krasnohorivka.[48]

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryyutne.[49] Elements of the Russian Baltic Fleet, 14th Spetsnaz Brigade and 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Vuhledar (30km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating south of Velyka Novosilka.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed any confirmation of this claim.[51] Positional fighting continued near Robotyne and Verbove.[52]

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson oblast, including near Krynky, on March 19.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that a small number of Ukrainian forces remain in Krynky and that the majority of Ukrainian forces in east bank Kherson Oblast hold positions west of the settlement in coastal and forest areas.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in dacha areas near the Antonivsky roadway bridge (north of Oleshky).[55]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces have launched 130 missiles of various types, 320 Shahed drones, and 900 glide bombs since the beginning of March.[56]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov stated on March 19 that the Russian military will not increase the number of conscripts summoned during the upcoming semi-annual spring conscription cycle in comparison to the previous fall 2023 conscription cycle. Kartapolov stated that Russian authorities will issue both electronic and paper summonses during the spring cycle, which will occur from April 1 to July 15.[57] Kartapolov also stated that the number of conscripts called up in the upcoming conscription cycle will not change from the previous call-ups and that conscripts will not go to the “special operation zone” in Ukraine.[58]

The Russian State Duma adopted a law on March 19 that will release individuals from criminal liability if they sign contracts for military service.[59] The bill will likely allow Russia to expand its recruiting base outside of existing convict recruitment schemes.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Kremlin officials continue to implicate themselves directly in the illegal removal of Ukrainian children to other Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine and the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova stated on March 19 that Russian authorities removed 84 Ukrainian children from occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts to occupied Crimea under the guise of rehabilitation programs and that Russian authorities removed a total of 150 Ukrainian children and brought them to sanatoriums in occupied Crimea in 2023.[60] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) stated on March 19 that Yana Lantratova, a Russian Duma deputy, and Inna Varlamova, wife of Just Russia Party leader Sergei Mironov, are also involved in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[61] The SBU stated that its investigation found that Lantratova and Varlamova previously traveled to Kherson City when it was under Russian occupation under the guise of an official visit and took a newborn girl and a two-year-old boy from an orphanage to Moscow. The SBU stated that Ukrainian officials discovered fake documents detailing these illegal deportations with Lantratova’s and Varlamova’s signatures when Russian forces left Kherson City. BBC Panorama and Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii published investigations in November 2023 detailing how Mironov adopted a 10-month-old Ukrainian infant whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from a Kherson City orphanage in autumn of 2022 alongside over 40 other children.[62]

Russian officials likely falsified record high support for Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Russian presidential election. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) claimed that more than 1.4 million people voted for Putin in occupied Luhansk Oblast, and Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor stated that this number exceeds the oblast’s current total population.[63] Ukrainian partisan movement Yellow Ribbon stated on March 18 that actual voter turnout in occupied Ukraine was significantly lower than the Kremlin’s claimed numbers, in part due to the fact that the Kremlin knows that Russian journalists largely do not work in occupied Ukraine and Russian occupation authorities do not have clear numbers about how many Ukrainians still live in Russian-occupied areas.[64]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials continue to threaten escalation to stifle discussions about Western support for Ukraine. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin baselessly claimed on March 19 that France is preparing to send a contingent of 2,000 French soldiers to Ukraine and asserted that any French military unit within Ukraine would be a legitimate and priority target for Russian forces.[65] French officials have not confirmed Naryshkin’s claim about the French contingent. French President Emmanuel Macron has recently discussed proposals to send Western troops to Ukraine but has stressed that the current situation does not require it.[66] Macron discussed these proposals while calling on the West to expand the level and types of security assistance it sends to Ukraine, and Naryshkin likely aimed to portray these wider calls as possible routes to confrontation with Russia. Russian officials have routinely attempted to portray any level of Western security assistance to Ukraine as inherently escalatory, although Russia has not previously significantly responded when Ukrainian forces and Western assistance to Ukraine have crossed Russia’s supposed and self-defined “red lines.”[67]

Russian officials rejected the possibility of bilateral arms control discussions with the United States and dismissed potential future talks as non-viable. US Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Linda Thomas-Greenfield stated on March 18 that the US is willing to engage in bilateral arms control discussions with Russia without preconditions, but Russia’s First Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Dmitri Polyanskiy stated that Russia does not see any basis for a dialogue on new arms control agreements with the United States.[68] Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev attempted to portray possible arms control talks with the United States as outlandish by comparing them to hypothetical Soviet negotiations with Hitler about lowering the threshold for the use of ”offensive weapons” during the Second World War.[69] The Soviet Union, of course, had concluded the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany that partitioned Poland and ceded the Baltic States to the USSR in 1939. Russian officials routinely place the onus for negotiations and “strategic stability” on the United States despite increasingly framing Russia’s war in Ukraine as a geopolitical confrontation with the West.[70]

Kremlin officials continue to accuse the West of interfering in Russia’s presidential election. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on March 18 that unfriendly countries attempted to interfere in the Russian MFA’s administration of the Russian presidential election abroad.[71] The Russian Embassy in London claimed on March 19 that United Kingdom (UK) officials are trying to discredit the Russian presidential election and accused UK diplomatic and consular missions in Russia of ”essentially” inciting damage to ballot boxes during the election, referencing limited acts of disruptions by Russian citizens at polling stations in Russia between March 15 and 17.[72]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73678

[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73678

[3] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73678

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041923 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct4

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041923

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023

[7] https://t.me/MID_Russia/37120

[8] https://t.me/MID_Russia/37120

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar091623; https://www.nknews dot org/pro/russian-cargo-ship-returns-to-north-korean-port-in-sign-of-arms-trade-restart/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2023-0; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011924

[10] https://t.me/MID_Russia/37122

[11] https://en dot mehrnews.com/news/213182/Russia-Iran-share-positions-regarding-Palestine-issue; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/12/29/3057257/)

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/report/how-we-got-here-russia-kremlins-worldview

[13] https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32868743.html ; https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32868991.html

[14] https://t.me/tass_agency/237874 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/237939

[15] https://www.azatutyun dot am/a/32868991.html ; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/20279425

[16] https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/uzbekistan-halts-use-russias-mir-payment-cards-2022-09-23/ ; https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/turkeys-ziraat-bank-suspends-use-russian-mir-payment-system-ceo-2022-09-29/

[17] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2117 ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0608

[18] https://newsmaker dot md/ro/vasnetov-despre-decizia-moldovei-de-a-declara-persona-non-grata-un-diplomat-rus-nu-va-ramane-fara-raspuns/ ; https://moldova.europalibera dot org/a/moldova-declara-un-angajat-al-ambasadei-rusiei-persona-non-grata-/32868312.html

[19] https://newsmaker dot md/ro/vasnetov-despre-decizia-moldovei-de-a-declara-persona-non-grata-un-diplomat-rus-nu-va-ramane-fara-raspuns/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/237983

[20] https://rtvi dot com/news/ilan-shor-podtverdil-svoi-ambiczii-stat-premerom-moldovy/

[21] https://newsmaker dot md/rus/novosti/gutsul-prigrozila-sandu-sudom-ee-zayavleniya-oskorblyayut-vseh-gagauzov/ ; https://t.me/evgheniagutul/2502

[22] https://www.infotag dot md/rebelion-en/310756/

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2024

[24] https://apnews.com/article/moldova-oligarch-ilan-shor-bank-fraud-chisinau-israel-maia-sandu-e7c9639f354f27c4975030f7b40629be

[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldova-bans-pro-russian-shor-party-after-months-protests-2023-06-19/

[26] https://newsmaker dot md/rus/novosti/vklyuchit-li-sandu-v-sostav-pravitelstva-bashkana-gagauzii-otvechaet-prezident/

[27] y https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-18/eu-drafts-law-to-send-russian-central-bank-profits-to-ukraine

[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eus-borrell-wants-use-90-frozen-russian-assets-revenues-buy-arms-ukraine-2024-03-19/

[29] https://defence24 dot pl/wojna-na-ukrainie-raport-specjalny-defence24/polska-i-niemcy-wspolliderami-koalicji-zdolnosci-opancerzonych; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2024/03/18/7447069/; https://www.rmf24 dot pl/raporty/raport-wojna-z-rosja/news-polsko-niemiecka-koalicja-chodzi-o-ukraine,nId,7397406#crp_state=1; https://suspilne dot media/708696-urad-vidiliv-5-mlrd-griven-na-zakupivlu-droniv-kndr-vidpravila-rosii-vijskovu-dopomogu-755-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1710831517&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://tvpworld dot com/76499159/poland-germany-to-launch-tank-coalition-in-late-march-rapid-reaction-force-in-july ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/62326

[30] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20281675 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/236435 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/236431

[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031024

[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/36781 ; https://t.me/russvolcorps/922 ; https://t.me/rybar/58307 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/15037 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/15041 ; https://t.me/brussinf/7226 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18827

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TWM7nvkpmAMTjswjhYuYEXfczLYi3fN4D66Nnh1s8TchAwK9g9gBAdg1dgjD6ibel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F6YUHufA3MMV6T9B7DH2opoL1wB2EzoWpSP6vGh1jmqHHv1YfDCiigf6W45XULLzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034DXWQuYJKuqYbYr95pka91f9f5ssBYUyJ683gbZB9XEqTKqznUesEATWXBzM4Vral

[34] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/13320 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/118544

[35] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1716 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1717

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034DXWQuYJKuqYbYr95pka91f9f5ssBYUyJ683gbZB9XEqTKqznUesEATWXBzM4Vral; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TWM7nvkpmAMTjswjhYuYEXfczLYi3fN4D66Nnh1s8TchAwK9g9gBAdg1dgjD6ibel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F6YUHufA3MMV6T9B7DH2opoL1wB2EzoWpSP6vGh1jmqHHv1YfDCiigf6W45XULLzl; https://t.me/rybar/58291 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37315

[37] https://t.me/rybar/58287; https://t.me/rybar/58291 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37315

[38] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/15834 (Dyliivka); https://t.me/RVvoenkor/64032; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/64042; https://t.me/rusich_army/13709 (general Bakhmut direction)

[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/36781 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36787

[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8408; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/15837; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/117082; https://t.me/vrogov/14810; https://t.me/rybar/58304 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37355; https://t.me/wargonzo/18839

[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8384; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8395; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8406; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8411; https://t.me/wargonzo/18827

[42] https://t.me/rybar/58287

[43] https://t.me/milinfolive/118532

[44] ttps://t.me/creamy_caprice/4800; https://t.me/ssternenko/26472

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034DXWQuYJKuqYbYr95pka91f9f5ssBYUyJ683gbZB9XEqTKqznUesEATWXBzM4Vral; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TWM7nvkpmAMTjswjhYuYEXfczLYi3fN4D66Nnh1s8TchAwK9g9gBAdg1dgjD6ibel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F6YUHufA3MMV6T9B7DH2opoL1wB2EzoWpSP6vGh1jmqHHv1YfDCiigf6W45XULLzl; https://t.me/mod_russia/36781 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36787; https://t.me/rybar/58291 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37315

[46] https://t.me/rybar/58287; https://t.me/rybar/58291 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37315

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034DXWQuYJKuqYbYr95pka91f9f5ssBYUyJ683gbZB9XEqTKqznUesEATWXBzM4Vral; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TWM7nvkpmAMTjswjhYuYEXfczLYi3fN4D66Nnh1s8TchAwK9g9gBAdg1dgjD6ibel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F6YUHufA3MMV6T9B7DH2opoL1wB2EzoWpSP6vGh1jmqHHv1YfDCiigf6W45XULLzl; https://t.me/mod_russia/36764; https://t.me/rybar/58291 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37315

[48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/117061; https://t.me/nm_dnr/11987

[49] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7333; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034DXWQuYJKuqYbYr95pka91f9f5ssBYUyJ683gbZB9XEqTKqznUesEATWXBzM4Vral; https://t.me/mod_russia/36781 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36788

[50] https://t.me/voin_dv/7561; https://t.me/voin_dv/7560; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/117050 (near Vuhledar); https://t.me/voin_dv/7556 (Rivnopil); https://t.me/voin_dv/7553 (near Vremivka)

[51] https://t.me/rybar/58291 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37315 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8383 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8391 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18827

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TWM7nvkpmAMTjswjhYuYEXfczLYi3fN4D66Nnh1s8TchAwK9g9gBAdg1dgjD6ibel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F6YUHufA3MMV6T9B7DH2opoL1wB2EzoWpSP6vGh1jmqHHv1YfDCiigf6W45XULLzl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7333 ; https://t.me/rybar/58291 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37315 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8383 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8391 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18827

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TWM7nvkpmAMTjswjhYuYEXfczLYi3fN4D66Nnh1s8TchAwK9g9gBAdg1dgjD6ibel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02F6YUHufA3MMV6T9B7DH2opoL1wB2EzoWpSP6vGh1jmqHHv1YfDCiigf6W45XULLzl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7333 ;   https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/841 ; https://t.me/rybar/58291 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/37315 ;

[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/18823

[55] https://t.me/romanov_92/44576 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/117063

[56] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/9804

[57] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/19/03/2024/65f95e849a7947d96141dbed

[58] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/951189

[59] https://t.me/tass_agency/237906 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/03/19/gosduma-prinyala-v-tretiem-chtenii-zakonoproekty-osvobozhdayuschie-kontraktnikov-i-mobilizovannyh-ot-ugolovnoy-otvetstvennosti ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2024

[60] https://t.me/malvovabelova/2950

[61] https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/sbu-povidomyla-pro-pidozru-dvom-soratnytsiam-putina-yaki-deportuvaly-ukrainskykh-ditei-do-moskvy

[62] https://www.understandingwar dot org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2023

[63] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/17684 ; https://t.me/lpr_tsik/1818

[64] https://suspilne dot media/708504-avka-na-okupovanih-teritoriah-bula-znacno-nizcou-vid-zaavlenoi-rosianami-recnik-zovtoi-stricki/

[65] https://t.me/tass_agency/237971

[66] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031524

[67] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030924 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2024

[68] https://t.me/tass_agency/237806 ;

[69] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/468

[70] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021524

[71] https://t.me/tass_agency/237804 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/237801

[72] https://t.me/MID_Russia/37117 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031624