Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 28, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 28, 2025

Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and George Barros with William Runkel

March 28, 2025, 5:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on March 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin is reintensifying efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Putin reiterated longstanding boilerplate rhetoric during a visit to a Russian submarine command post in Murmansk Oblast on March 27, claiming that "Nazis" and people with "neo-Nazi views" have significant influence in the Ukrainian government and that "neo-Nazi groups" have the "actual power in their hands" in Ukraine.[1] Putin reiterated claims that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is illegitimate because Ukraine did not hold presidential elections in 2024 and additionally alleged that all Ukrainian civil authorities are therefore illegitimate since the president appoints regional officials. The Ukrainian Constitution explicitly prohibits elections during periods of martial law and invasion by a hostile country, however.[2] Putin claimed that "neo-Nazi formations" are ruling Ukraine in the absence of a legitimate Ukrainian government and questioned how Russia can negotiate with these groups. Putin has previously characterized the Ukrainian government as illegitimate in an effort to justify Russia's unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations to end the war and has consistently identified "denazification" – a phrase the Kremlin uses to make its demand for the removal of the Ukrainian government and the installation of a pro-Russian puppet regime – as a goal of his full-scale invasion since February 2022.[3]

Putin repeatedly accused Zelensky of being the illegitimate leader of Ukraine ahead of Putin's February 12 phone call with US President Donald Trump, but has made these accusations much less frequently in recent weeks.[4] Putin notably implicitly acknowledged Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner for the first time in late February 2025, and Putin's March 27 statement appears to be a reintensification of his accusations designed to undermine Zelensky's legitimacy.[5] ISW previously noted that the Kremlin's ongoing effort to characterize the Ukrainian government as an illegitimate negotiating partner casts serious doubt on the Kremlin's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and sets informational conditions for Russia to violate any agreement reached on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.[6]

Putin reiterated his demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement – a reference to Russia’s initial war demands that directly contradict US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to achieve a just and sustainable resolution to the war. Putin claimed that Russia is committed to ending the war in Ukraine but only if a peace agreement addresses the "root causes" of the war.[7] Senior Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[8] The Kremlin's demands to address these so-called "root causes" amount to a demand for full Ukrainian capitulation with the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and commitments of Ukrainian neutrality – the same demands Putin has made since before the full-scale invasion.

Putin is attempting to inject a new demand aligned with the Kremlin's long-standing efforts to undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy into discussions about the resolution of the war. Putin proposed that the United Nations (UN), United States, and European countries install a temporary administration in Ukraine that would hold democratic elections to bring to power "a viable government that enjoys the people's trust."[9] Putin claimed that a temporary Ukrainian government would allow Russia to "begin negotiations [with the new Ukrainian administration] on a peace treaty" and "sign legitimate documents that will be recognized throughout the world." White House National Security Council Spokesperson James Hewitt rightly dismissed Putin's proposal to impose a temporary administration over Ukraine, stating that the Ukrainian Constitution and the Ukrainian people determine Ukraine's governance.[10] UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres also rejected Putin's proposal and stated that Ukraine has a legitimate government that must be respected.[11]

Putin's new demand for an interim government in Ukraine as a precondition for peace negotiations demonstrates how the Kremlin continues to hold negotiations hostage and is attempting to extract additional concessions from the West following the progress made in the ongoing ceasefire negotiations. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains committed to its goal to prolong any negotiations for a temporary frontline ceasefire or permanent peace agreement in order to continue making incremental gains on the battlefield and establish favorable conditions to pursue Ukraine's complete capitulation.[12]

The Kremlin appears to be renewing efforts to reorganize Russia's five naval infantry brigades into divisions. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 28 that the Russian General Staff approved a program to reorganize the Russian naval infantry forces from brigades into divisions.[13] Putin stated that two brigades, including the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), will become divisions in 2025, that two more brigades will become divisions in 2026, and that the final brigade will become a division in 2027. Putin also appointed the commander of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, Major General Mikhail Gudkov, to deputy commander of the Russian Navy on March 28. There are currently five naval infantry brigades in the Russian military: the Pacific Fleet's 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades, the Baltic Fleet's 336th Naval Infantry Brigade, the Northern Fleet's 61st Naval Infantry Brigade, and the Black Sea Fleet's 810th Naval Infantry Brigade.[14] Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 that Russia intended to form 17 new maneuver divisions, including the expansion of five existing naval infantry brigades into five divisions.[15] Shoigu stated in January 2023 that Russia intended to only form 12 new maneuver divisions by 2026, however, and did not mention the five naval infantry formations.[16] Putin appears to be renewing this effort, indicating that Russia is likely working to form 17 maneuver divisions over several years.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is reintensifying efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
• Putin reiterated his demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement -- a reference to Russia’s initial war demands that directly contradict US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to achieve a just and sustainable resolution to the war.
• Putin is attempting to inject a new demand aligned with the Kremlin's long-standing efforts to undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy into discussions about the resolution of the war.
• The Kremlin appears to be renewing efforts to reorganize Russia's five naval infantry brigades into divisions.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk and Kurakhove, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russia plans to expand its nuclear submarine fleet.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

Ukrainian state-owned gas operator Naftogaz reported on March 28 that overnight Russian strikes damaged Naftogaz gas production facilities in unspecified areas.[17] Ukrainian Presidential Communications Advisor Dmytro Lytvyn reported on the evening of March 27 that Russian forces struck Ukrainian energy facilities at least twice within the past day since March 26.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff and other Ukrainian officials reported on March 28 that Russian Shahed drones struck oil and gas infrastructure in Poltava City and other energy infrastructure in Kherson City.[19]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Kursk, Bryansk, and Saratov oblasts on the night of March 27 to 28. The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted drone and HIMARS strikes against the Sudzha gas metering station on the morning of March 28 and targeted an energy facility in Bryansk Oblast on the afternoon of March 28.[20] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin stated that Russian forces downed Ukrainian drones over Engels Airbase and Saratov City overnight, and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces were targeting the Saratov Oil Refinery.[21] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on March 28 that Ukrainian forces were targeting ammunition and missile storage facilities at Engels Airbase – a legitimate military target not covered by a moratorium on striking energy infrastructure.[22]

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced in border areas of Kursk Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 28 indicates that elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) advanced to the northern outskirts of Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[23]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), reiterated claims that Russian forces seized Gogolevka (southwest of Sudzha) and advanced east of and in central Guyevo.[24]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking in Kursk Oblast near Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha) and Gogolevka and in northern Sumy Oblast near Volodymyrivka and Veselivka (both north of Sumy City) and near Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy City).[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Guyevo, Gornal (south of Guyevo), and Oleshnya.[26]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue operating in Kursk Oblast.[27] Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in border areas of Kursk Oblast.[28]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[29] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces advanced into the outskirts of Popovka but claimed that the settlement is a contested "gray zone."[30]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Popovka, Demidovka (east of Popovka), and Grafovka (southeast of Popovka).[31]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight, citing satellite imagery and open-source data, reported on March 25 that Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure between September 1, 2024 and February 12, 2025 caused at least 60 billion rubles ($658 million) worth of damage.[32] RFE/RL and Frontelligence Insight reported that at least 67 percent of the 67 verified Ukrainian long-range strikes between September 2024 and mid-February 2025 were successful and that the outcomes of the other 33 percent of the strikes are unclear. RFE/RL and Frontelligence Insight noted that the project only accounted for verified Ukrainian strikes and that Ukrainian forces may have conducted more than 67 strikes during this six-month period. RFE/RL and Frontelligence Insight reported that Ukrainian forces most frequently targeted Russian military facilities, including ammunition depots, in early Fall 2024 and later prioritized strikes against Russian oil and gas storage and processing facilities. RFE/RL and Frontelligence Insight reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil and gas production facilities at least 27 times between September 2024 and mid-February 2025 and destroyed 50 oil storage tanks and damaged 47 more tanks.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 27 and 28.[33]

Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated that Russian forces are conducting up to five assaults near Vovchansk every day and that the Vovcha River has formed a natural barrier to Russian advances in Vovchansk.[34] Shamshyn stated that Russian forces last attempted to cross the river a few weeks ago when there was ice.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 28 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 28 that Russian forces seized Krasne Pershe (northeast of Kupyansk).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from Topoli toward the Russian bridgehead near Dvorichna (both northeast of Kupyansk).[36]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on March 27 and 28.[37] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 28 that Russian forces launched a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault with 13 armored vehicles in the Kupyansk direction on the morning of March 27 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 12 armored vehicles and one tank.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on March 27 and 28.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating northeast of Lyman seized Terny and advanced to the outskirts of Katerynivka, near Nove, north of Novolyubivka and Kolodyazi, and toward Zelena Dolyna.[40]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, Myrne, Nove, Novomykhailivka, and Olhivka; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area and in the direction of Dronivka on March 27 and 28.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Daryivka on March 27 and 28.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on March 28 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields east of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[43]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and toward Predtechyne on March 27 and 28.[44]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[45]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 24 and 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Darhomyzhskoho Street in northern Toretsk and in the Tsentralna Mine in southwestern Toretsk.[46]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Krymske; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Leonidivka on March 27 and 28.[47]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Russian forces have lost over 15,000 Russian soldiers killed in action in Toretsk since mid-July 2024.[48] The spokesperson estimated that Russian forces have sustained over 50,000 total casualties in the Toretsk direction.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Panteleymonivka (southwest of Toretsk).[49] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 28 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 28 that Russian forces advanced over two kilometers east of Kotlyarivka and southeast of Bohdanivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[51]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and toward Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Kalynove; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Novoserhiivka, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Kotlyarivka, Uspenivka, and Preobrazhenka on March 27 and 28.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed on March 28 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyne and Kotlyarivka.[53]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March 28 that Russian forces are increasing the intensity of their attacks in the Pokrovsk direction and are attempting to reach the same level of intensity as in January 2025.[54] Trehubov stated that Russian forces have changed their main direction of attack and are attempting to advance east of Pokrovsk toward the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 28 that Russian forces have recently increased their usage of armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction.[55] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction noted that Russian forces have intensified infantry and mechanized assaults and that the brigade destroyed nearly 10 pieces of Russian heavy equipment on March 27.[56] The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces recently damaged a Russian tank and eight infantry fighting vehicles while repelling a Russian mechanized assault in the area. A Ukrainian servicemember stated on March 27 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 12 Russian armored vehicles during an attempted Russian mechanized assault in the Pokrovsk direction.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove).[59]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of and in the eastern outskirts of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove), near Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove), and along the T-0518 Rozdolne-Bahatyr road.[60]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 27 and 28.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 28 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Kostyantynopil.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 28 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 27 and 28 that Russian forces advanced in Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and near Rozdolne, Burlatske (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka), Vesele, and Dniproenerhiya (both north of Velyka Novosilka).[63]

Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka toward Odradne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya, Skudne, and Burlatske and toward Komar; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and Vilne Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on March 27 and 28.[64]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault involving one tank and four armored vehicles near Vesele.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 691st Separate Howitzer Artillery Battalion (subordination unclear) and the 1461st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Vesele.[66]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Zherebyanky (northwest of Robotyne).[67]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanske, Lobkove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky, and Nesteryanka on March 27 and 28.[68]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on March 28 that Russian forces in the Orikhiv and Hulyaipole directions significantly increased assaults using small groups of infantry in the past few days.[69] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 28 that Russia has concentrated 70,000 to 72,000 troops, up to 320 tanks, and up to 725 armored vehicles in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[70]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that most of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) is operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast, including elements of its: 19th and 42nd motorized rifle divisions; 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade; 110th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade; 12th Missile Brigade; 291st Artillery Brigade; 67th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade; 34th Command Brigade; 4th Military Base; and 31st Engineering-Sapper Regiment.[71] Mashovets stated that up to two battalions of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), one battalion of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division), and elements of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division) are attacking near Shcherbaky and Stepove.[72] Mashovets stated that elements of the 40th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Regiment; 47th Motorized Rifle Division (40th Army Corps [AC], 18th CAA, SMD); 22nd Special Purpose Brigade; 45th Special Purpose Brigade; three BARS detachments; and three Rosgvardia battalions are also operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[73] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russian forces may conduct an offensive operation in southern Ukraine on March 15 and 18.[74]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on March 28 but did not advance.[75]

Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are trying to establish bridgeheads on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[76]

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted footage on March 27 showing recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian radar systems in occupied Crimea.[77] The GUR reported that Ukrainian forces struck one 48Ya6-K1 Podlet mobile long-range radar system, one RM-10M1E aircraft interception radar command post, one 9S32 "Imbir" radar station, one ST-68 radar station command post, one 39N6 "Kasta-2E2" low altitude radar system, and one Fyodor Uryupin tugboat.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on March 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 163 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 89 drones and that 51 decoy drones became "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Kharkiv Oblast officials reported that Russian Shahed drones struck the Zolochiv Hospital and damaged a power grid in Zolochiv, Kharkiv Oblast.[79] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes hit infrastructure and other objects in Sumy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[80]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia plans to expand its nuclear submarine fleet. Russian President Vladimir Putin virtually attended the ceremonial launch of Russia's new Perm nuclear submarine during his visit to Murmansk on March 27.[81] Putin stated that the Perm submarine is one of Russia's first submarines equipped with Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles and that the submarine will begin participating in naval operations in 2026. Putin stated during a March 27 visit to the Arkhangelsk nuclear submarine that the Russian Navy is preparing a strategy for the navy's development and the construction of surface ships and submarines until 2050.[82] Putin stated that Russia plans to build five more Yasen-M class nuclear submarines and three more Borei-A class nuclear submarines in an unspecified time period.

Putin highlighted on March 27 Russia's ongoing work to cooperate with North Korea in the military-technical and military spheres.[83]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian Minister of Industry and Trade Anton Alikhanov stated on March 27 that the first flight of the fully import-substituted Superjet aircraft will take place in April 2025.[84] Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec reported on March 16 that it conducted the first flight of the aircraft using a Russian-produced PD-8 aircraft engine.[85]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557

[2] https://rm.coe.int/constitution-of-ukraine/168071f58b

[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/putin-announces-a-military-operation-in-ukraine-as-the-un-security-council-pleads-with-him-to-pull-back.html ; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121624

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525

[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025

[7] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025

[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557

[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-suggests-temporary-administration-ukraine-end-war-2025-03-28/ ; https://x.com/steveholland1/status/1905437485703836008

[11] https://en.interfax.com dot ua/news/general/1059617.html ; https://x.com/michellenichols/status/1905645685187194980

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025

[13] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/October%2012%2C%202023%20Russian%20Orbat_Final.pdf

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023

[17] https://www.naftogaz dot com/news/chergova-kombinovana-ataka-vorog-obstrilyav-ob-ekty-grupy-naftogaz; https://suspilne dot media/981301-18-ta-ataka-unaslidok-kombinovanogo-udaru-rf-poskodzeno-gazovidobuvni-potuznosti-naftogazu/

[18] https://x.com/dmtrltvn/status/1905373359569076484

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042bjpGRmowgfdyEjDw7VuiSd2vCjuxbqCSuPHPs6rdKNZPFnrqc432U4fJT54a8Ll; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0vvSQmhsy2d4wx492rW6X8znFYqzuvP7BqqhAiRwBHvZZD8DrLj221Y6bk7M2Dnkul; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/981223-u-poltavi-vinikli-pereboi-zi-svitlom-cerez-ataku-bpla/; https://t.me/suspilnepoltava/25538; https://www.youtube.com/live/ZG27pxZmxTc?si=pHLtfCoWTfkIL8nY ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/27/prezydent-prokomentuvav-udar-rosiyi-po-energetyczi-v-hersoni/

[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/50641 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50647 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159453 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22133 ; https://t.me/rybar/69195 ; https://t.me/rybar/69207 ; https://t.me/rybar/69207 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67818

[21] https://t.me/busargin_r/8343 ; https://t.me/severrealii/30075 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67818 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50641

[22] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9037

[23] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8751; https://t.me/rian_ru/287316

[24] https://t.me/rusich_army/22123 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63172 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50644 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/308152 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22116

[25] https://t.me/wargonzo/25579 ; https://t.me/rybar/69195?single ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22116

[26] https://t.me/rusich_army/22123 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25592

[27] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88922 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50639 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/308154

[28] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159468

[29] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7157; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8753

[30] https://t.me/dva_majors/67838 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19275; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7157 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22131 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22124

[31] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63166 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25579 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67835 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12764 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22116

[32] https://www.svoboda dot org/a/voda-kamenj-tochit-uron-ot-udarov-vsu-po-energetike-i-armii-rossii/33357589.html

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12764

[34] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/28/praktychno-cze-buv-kvytok-v-odyn-kinecz-u-vovchansku-tryvayut-boyi-na-beregah-richky-vovchoyi/

[35] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63178 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50648 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50650

[36] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12764

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml

[38]https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7010 ; https://t.me/oaembr77/727

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml

[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88893; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159440 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22112; https://t.me/rybar/69191

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7006

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7006

[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33927

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml; https://t.me/wargonzo/25579

[45] https://t.me/dva_majors/67796

[46] https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/797; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905561968343216325 ; https://www.facebook.com/150obTRO/videos/586280104571045/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905531165114560712; http://facebook.com/150obTRO/videos/675737521691481/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905531165114560712; https://t.me/BBpS_28/741; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905530649588441534

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml

[48] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rl7ov8EUXuc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/28/na-konczert-kobzona-vidpravyly-15-tysyach-okupantiv-v-toreczku-praczyuye-velychezna-fabryka-znyshhennya-protyvnyka/

[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159432

[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13607

[51] https://t.me/yurasumy/22111

[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/25579

[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/25579 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22111

[54] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/981505-armia-rf-zbilsue-intensivnist-atak-v-napramku-pokrovska-podrobici-vid-osuv-hortica/

[55] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7006

[56] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/28/namagayutsya-dijty-do-spoluchen-do-dorogy-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-palyly-vorozhi-kolony/

[57] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1905343184697229488; https://t.me/officer_alex33/5197

[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/67807; https://t.me/rusich_army/22130

[59] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26810; https://t.me/immitis71/930; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8748

[60] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63176 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159440 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14109 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22114 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26117

[61] https://t.me/yurasumy/22114 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63176 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159391

[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63176

[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159440 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14109

[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7006 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63176

[65] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7006

[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/14120

[67] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26794 ; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/424

[68]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml

[69] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/28/na-ukrayinskyh-gromadyanah-trenuyut-pilotiv-fpv-droniv-okupanty-aktyvizuvalysya-na-pivdennyh-napryamkah/

[70] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2652 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02Jmw2ULcVNHHLrkPJvhnTM2LU4SW58c3CtcZBFVJpFwLF8UnZDt8LZ3jm8R8fAVCsl

[71] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2652

[72] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2653

[73] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2652

[74] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032725

[75]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl

[76] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/28/na-ukrayinskyh-gromadyanah-trenuyut-pilotiv-fpv-droniv-okupanty-aktyvizuvalysya-na-pivdennyh-napryamkah/

[77] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5606

[78] https://t.me/kpszsu/31538

[79] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/981287-sahedi-atakuvali-likarnu-na-harkivsini-ta-znisili-zitlovij-budinok/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22128 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/28/unaslidok-ataky-rosijskyh-bpla-na-harkivshhyni-poshkodzheno-likarnyu/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22128 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/28/unaslidok-ataky-rosijskyh-bpla-na-harkivshhyni-poshkodzheno-likarnyu/

[80] https://t.me/kpszsu/31538 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/20397; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/981287-sahedi-atakuvali-likarnu-na-harkivsini-ta-znisili-zitlovij-budinok/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22128 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/28/unaslidok-ataky-rosijskyh-bpla-na-harkivshhyni-poshkodzheno-likarnyu/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/981269-rf-atakuvala-odesinu-bezpilotnikami-u-dsns-pokazali-naslidki-2;

[81] https://t.me/tass_agency/308072; https://t.me/tass_agency/308074; https://t.me/tass_agency/308076 ; https://iz dot ru/1861261/2025-03-27/putin-prizval-podderzhivat-status-rf-v-kachestve-moshchnoi-morskoi-derzhavy ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557

[82] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557

[83] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557

[84] https://ria dot ru/20250327/superjet-2007781069.html

[85] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2025