Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 27, 2023

Sep 27, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 27, 2023

Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 27, 2023, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2pm ET on September 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 27. Geolocated footage published on September 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut).[1] Additional geolocated footage published on September 26 indicates that Russian forces likely no longer control a roughly one-kilometer-long trench line west of Verbove (16km southeast of Orikhiv).[2] The absence of Russian forces in this trench line could facilitate further Ukrainian advances in this area, as this trench line is no longer a significant obstacle for Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that “there will be good news” in the Zaporizhia operational direction and noted that Ukrainian forces are steadily advancing but did not provide additional information.[3]

The situation near Verbove remains unclear as prominent Russian milbloggers have become noticeably less inclined to report in detail on Russian activity on this frontline or present bad news about Russian failures, while a discussion about reported Russian problems in this area has emerged on the fringes of the Russian information space. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on September 26 that at least four Ukrainian companies with a significant number of armored vehicles stormed Russian positions along the Robotyne-Verbove line after conducting a massive artillery barrage.[4] A Russian milblogger who avidly supports Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky by criticizing the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) responded to Rogov, stating that Ukrainian forces have already passed the minefields and “dragon’s teeth” anti-tank fortifications on the Robotyne-Verbove line and that Ukrainian forces would have conducted such attacks sooner or later.[5] Another Russian milblogger claimed on September 26 that there is intense mutual shelling that is making it dangerous to operate above ground near Verbove and Robotyne.[6] Still another milblogger reportedly affiliated with the VDV Forces responded to this claim, stating that a personal source from the Russian 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reported that there is intense Ukrainian shelling in the area.[7] The milblogger added that their source provided unclear information about whether the 108th VDV Regiment was moving to Verbove or leaving from Verbove. The milblogger also claimed that the Russian military command in Moscow canceled plans for the redeployment of the Russian 106th VDV Division to the Robotyne area to aid the 7th and 76th VDV Divisions currently operating there and offered an unreasonable explanation for the motivation behind this decision.[8] ISW has observed that this channel has demonstrated a tendency to make exaggerated statements and implausible claims that favor Teplinsky against Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov. ISW has also previously observed elements of the 106th VDV Division in the Bakhmut area.[9] The Russian information space has largely been hesitant recently to discuss Russian forces’ operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast, as the Russian milblogger community has reduced its criticisms of the Russian conduct of the war on this sector of the front since Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion on June 24. ISW will continue to adapt to this new information space.

Russian media continues to publish inconclusive “proof” that Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Viktor Solokov is alive. Zvezda News published an interview with Solokov on September 27, but ISW is unprepared at this time to make an assessment about the authenticity of the footage or the date of its filming.[10] The Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) have been notably silent on the matter and have not directly confirmed that Sokolov is alive.

Ukrainian and Russian confirmations of some former Wagner Group personnel deploying to the Bakhmut area indicate that the Wagner Group is struggling to cohesively reform around new leadership. A Russian milblogger claimed on September 26 that the appointment of a new overall Wagner commander triggered an exodus of Wagner personnel to Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-related structures.[11] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash confirmed on September 27 the presence of 500 former Wagner personnel operating in MoD-related formations in the Bakhmut area and that these personnel are insufficient to change the situation on the battlefield.[12] A Ukrainian drone operator reportedly operating in the Bakhmut area reported that Wagner personnel changed commanders and returned to the Bakhmut area to compensate for ongoing personnel shortages in the area.[13] The piecemeal deployment of former Wagner personnel to any area of the frontline is unlikely to generate any significant strategic or even localized effects on the battlefield in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 27.
The situation near Verbove remains unclear as prominent Russian milbloggers have become noticeably less inclined to report in detail on Russian activity on this frontline or present bad news about Russian failures, while a discussion about reported Russian problems in this area has emerged on the fringes of the Russian information space.
Russian media continues to publish inconclusive “proof” that Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Viktor Solokov is alive.
Ukrainian and Russian confirmations of some former Wagner Group personnel deploying to the Bakhmut area indicate that the Wagner Group is struggling to cohesively reform around new leadership.
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 27 but did not make any confirmed gains.
The Guardian reported on September 27 that Iranian drones that Russian forces operate in Ukraine contain European components despite international sanctions.
Ukrainian partisans continue to disrupt Russian logistics in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance on September 27. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked in the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna) but did not specify an outcome.[14] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces participated in combat engagements near the Serebryanske forest area on September 26.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash reported on September 27 that Russian forces did not conduct offensive actions in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[16] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed two unspecified bridge crossings over the Oskil River.[17]

The Russian military is reportedly deploying elements of the recently created 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) to the Kreminna area instead of the Kupyansk area, likely disrupting Russian attempts to pin Ukrainian forces in the Kupyansk direction away from southern Ukraine. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on September 27 that elements of the Russian 67th Motorized Rifle Division and 164th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Eastern Military District) are operating west of Severodonetsk and Kreminna.[18] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov previously stated on September 22 that the Russian military had deployed elements of the 25th CAA “roughly north of Bakhmut.”[19] Elements of the 25th CAA may be operating both west of Kreminna and Severodonetsk as well as north of Bakhmut, though the situation is currently unclear. Budanov also stated on August 31 that elements of the 41st CAA (Central Military District) have begun to slowly redeploy from the Kupyansk direction to southern Ukraine.[20] The deployment of elements of the 25th CAA to the Severodonetsk-Kreminna area and possibly to the north of Bakhmut — and not to the Kupyansk direction to replace elements of the 41st CAA — will likely disrupt Russian efforts to fix Ukrainian forces in the Kupyansk direction, as ISW has previously assessed.[21]

The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations south of Kreminna on September 27. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna), the Serebryanske forest area, Hryhorivka (11km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[22]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 27 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced east of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut).[23] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash stated on September 27 that Ukrainian forces were successful in the direction of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), Odradivka (7km south of Bakhmut), and Shumy (22km southwest of Bakhmut).[24] The Ukrainian Border Guards Service stated on September 26 that Ukrainian forces continued to advance in the Bakhmut direction and are defending recently recaptured positions.[25] Russian sources claimed on September 27 that Ukrainian forces continue attempts to break through Russian defenses near Klishchiivka, Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[26] Another Russian milblogger that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian armored assault between Zaliznyanske (13km north of Bakhmut) and Orikhovo-Vasylivka.[27] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) on September 26.[28] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are concentrating manpower near Bakhmut potentially for an attempted breakthrough in the area.[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 27 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack near Hryhorivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut).[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Klishchiivka and Andriivka but did not specify an outcome.[31] Russian sources continued to claim that Russian forces advanced near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[32] Yevlash stated that Russian forces are attempting to restore lost positions near Bakhmut and have concentrated 50,000 personnel in the Bakhmut direction, and this number likely includes Russian rear-area personnel.[33] Russian sources amplified footage claiming to show elements of the Russian 58th Separate Special Purpose Battalion (Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] 1st Army Corps) operating near Bakhmut.[34]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 27 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka) and Marinka (directly west of Donetsk City).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also attacked near Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[36]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations on the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast frontline on September 27 but did not make any territorial gains. Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekhov claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks north of Pryyutne (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), near Staromayorske (8km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), near Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), and near Marfopil (5km southeast of Hulyaipole).[37] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that heavy fighting is ongoing near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) in western Donetsk Oblast despite reports that Ukrainian activity slightly decreased near Urozhaine (7km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Staromayorske.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) repelled Ukrainian attacks in an unspecified area in the Vremivka salient on September 27, and a Russian news aggregator added that Russian forces repelled an assault on Pryyutne on September 26.[39]

Russian forces counterattacked against Ukrainian positions in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on September 27 but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and south of Novodarivka (15km west of Velyka Novosilka).[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked in an unspecified area on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border and pushed Ukrainian forces from unspecified positions.[41]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 27 and have entered a trench line west of Verbove (16km southeast of Orikhiv). Geolocated footage published on September 26 shows a Russian drone striking Ukrainian infantry inside a trench west of Verbove, and the Russian use of drones to engage these Ukrainian forces indicates that Russian forces likely are no longer present at the roughly one-kilometer-long trench line west of Verbove.[42] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on September 26 that at least four Ukrainian companies with a significant number of vehicles stormed Russian positions along the Robotyne-Verbove lines after first conducting a massive artillery barrage.[43] A Russian milblogger who avidly supports the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky by criticizing the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) responded to Rogov stating that Ukrainian forces have already passed the minefields and dragon’s teeth anti-tank fortifications on the Robotyne-Verbove line and that Ukrainian forces would have conducted such attacks sooner or later.[44] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated that “there will be good news” in the Zaporizhia operational direction and noted that Ukrainian forces are steadily advancing but did not provide additional information.[45]

Other sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Russian forces continued to repel Ukrainian attacks near Verbove on September 27 and that Ukrainian forces have not achieved any breakthroughs in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[46] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully tried to advance toward Novoprokopivka (15km south of Orikhiv) and Verbove.[47] Russian sources also claimed that elements of the “Timer” volunteer battalion from the Republic of Tatarstan is shelling advancing Ukrainian forces on the Robotyne-Verbove line.[48] The North Ossetian “Alania” and “Storm Ossetia” volunteer battalions that operate in the area claimed that the intensity of fighting is decreasing in some areas of the Robotyne-Verbove line.[49]

Russian forces conducted an airstrike against Kherson Oblast on September 26. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 27 that Russian forces launched 26 Kab-500 aerial bombs at Kherson Oblast.[50]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Guardian reported on September 27 that Iranian drones that Russian forces operate in Ukraine contain European components despite international sanctions targeting these parts.[51] The Guardian cited a document that Ukrainian officials originally presented to international leaders at a G7 meeting in August 2023 and reported that Iranian drone manufacturers used drone components from companies based in the United States, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Japan, and Poland, including one Polish subsidiary of a United Kingdom company. The Guardian reported that the Shahed-131 drone uses 52 parts from Western companies while the Shahed-136 drone uses 57 parts. The Guardian reported that Iranian-assembled drones travel to Russia through the Caspian Sea while drones assembled at Iranian factories in Syria travel to Russia through Novorossiysk.

Senior Russian officials continue to posture as effectively mobilizing the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Moscow Oblast Head Andrey Vorobov visited the Tactical Missiles Corporation in Moscow Oblast on September 27.[52] Tactical Missiles Corporation Head Boris Obnosov stated claimed that the Tactical Missiles Corporation has doubled its production of high-precision weapons and increased production of other products by three-and-a-half to five times due to production modernization, more personnel, and shifting to a 24/7 work schedule. Obnosov claimed that the corporation recently hired 40 specialists from technical schools in Orenburg Oblast and Perm Krai and is working with technical schools for further recruitment efforts.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian partisans continue to disrupt Russian logistics in occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Crimean-based partisan group “Atesh” stated on September 26 that Atesh agents disabled five Russian military ZIL-131 fuel and lubricant transportation vehicles over the past ten days in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[53] Atesh also insinuated that its agents were involved in the disappearances of an unspecified number of Russian servicemen in occupied Luhansk.[54] Geolocated footage published by Atesh confirms that its agents are operating in occupied Luhansk City and likely have access to Russian military transportation vehicles.[55] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on September 27 that unspecified Ukrainian partisans have recently helped Ukrainian forces strike Russian military equipment and warehouses in occupied Ukraine.[56]

The Russian government will now require State Duma and Federation Council members to receive permission from the Russian military to travel to occupied Ukraine. Russian State Duma Deputy Mikhail Matveyev announced on September 26 that Duma deputies were banned from travelling to occupied Ukraine without approval from Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov.[57] Matveyev stated that these travel restrictions also apply to employees of other Russian government structures, including the Presidential Administration.[58] The order reportedly does not apply to occupied Crimea.[59] Russian news outlet RBC reported on July 27 that Russian State Duma deputies would have to receive permission from Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu or Gerasimov to visit Russian military units fighting in Ukraine.[60] Russian servicemen reportedly complained that Russian State Duma deputies were disruptive and “constantly taking pictures, putting on a show.”[61]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://x.com/VigorousFalcon/status/1706812464644669895?s=20; https://t...

[2] https://twitter.com/vosintt/status/1706794313181466663?s=20 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/53719

[3] https://t.me/otarnavskiy/255

[4] https://t.me/vrogov/12232

[5] https://t.me/zonaosoboho/21443

[6] https://t.me/frontbird/3685

[7] https://t.me/vdv_ZA_teplinsky/434

[8] https://t.me/vdv_ZA_teplinsky/433

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[10] https://t.me/zvezdanews/130148

[11] https://t.me/akashevarova/6654 ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1706750636870537281 ; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1706995425205522594/photo/1

[12] https://suspilne dot media/581703-kolisni-bijci-vagnera-spravdi-perebuvaut-na-bahmutskomu-napramku-ce-psihologicna-operacia-evlas/