Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, March 22, 2023
Authors: Brian Carter, Liam Karr, and Kathryn Tyson
Data Cutoff: March 22, 2023, at 10 a.m.
Figure 1. ISIS Activity and Regime Response North of Deir ez Zor City, February 1 to March 21, 2023
Note: Some of the locations on this map are approximate. CTP defines “attacks” as kinetic activity, including assassinations, armed assaults on military positions, executions, and bombings. “Activity” includes all forms of ISIS activity, including attacks, force movements, and reports of governance activity like zakat collection. ISIS does not generally report on these non-kinetic activities and does not claim all of its attacks.
Source: Brian Carter.
Figure 2. The Salafi-Jihadi Movement in the Middle East
Source: Kathryn Tyson.
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Islamic State has leveraged its global network to rapidly grow its DRC-based affiliate. The group’s current leader took charge in 2016, quickly began espousing global jihadist ideology, and grew ties to IS before becoming the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP-DRC) in 2019.[19] IS has used important logistical cells in Somalia and South Africa to support ISCAP-DRC and build the group’s capabilities.[20] With assistance from IS, ISCAP-DRC began carrying out suicide-vest bombings, operating surveillance drones, and creating special barracks to handle an influx in foreign fighters by 2021.[21]
Support for ISCAP-DRC from the IS global network demonstrates the threat the network poses in enabling various terrorist groups in Africa. IS-Somalia sent trainers, media officials, and other operatives to the DRC no later than 2021.[22] US raids against the network’s key logistical nodes, such as a recent raid that killed a high-ranking IS-Somalia leader and facilitator, cause only short-term disruptions to the network. [23]The US killed the previous deputy leader in a 2019 airstrike, but this did not stop the support that reached ISCAP-DRC.[24] IS also uses South Africa as a financing and recruiting hub.[25] IS presence in South Africa provides the group with unique access to money and technology that IS facilitators can send to ISIS cells in other theaters.
ISCAP-DRC has regional ambitions that could threaten the counterterrorism efforts of US partners, such as Rwanda and Uganda, elsewhere in Africa. ISCAP-DRC cells attempted to carry out attacks in both countries in 2021, though it was only successful in Uganda.[26] Rwanda and Uganda are vital counterterrorism partners that underpin efforts to degrade the Islamic State affiliate in Mozambique and al Shabaab in Somalia, respectively.[27]
A greater threat from ISCAP-DRC could lead Rwanda and Uganda to give less priority to these other counterterrorism efforts. This scenario is unlikely because ISCAP-DRC cells have not been capable of generating large enough internal threats to warrant abandoning other theaters. However, the large number of foreign fighters from nearby countries operating in the DRC risks fighters eventually returning to their home areas and forming insurgent cells as IS has done in other theaters.[28] ISCAP-DRC also has cells in South Africa and Tanzania that it uses to recruit foreign fighters, but there is no evidence these recruiting cells have attack capabilities.[29]
Ugandan forces and their Congolese partners are unlikely to contain ISCAP-DRC given their divergent interests and lack of capacity. The inability of the DRC central government and armed forces to project power into northeastern DRC has historically encouraged Rwanda, Uganda, and a myriad of armed groups to compete for spheres of influence over the resource-rich area.[30] Uganda has deployed forces to combat ISCAP-DRC in northeastern DRC since November 2021, but it allegedly waited months before initially sending them so that the deployment would line up with its readiness to begin a road-building project in the eastern DRC.[31] Uganda only invaded at the border crossing where the road-building project started instead of trying to corner ISCAP-DRC from multiple directions.[32]
Uganda has primarily directed its operations at border security, which has not contained or degraded the insurgency.[33] Rwanda viewed Uganda’s entry to the DRC in 2021 as infringing on its own economic and security interests, which likely prompted Rwanda to support separatist rebels with ethnic ties to the Rwandan ruling party fighting further south to counterbalance the increase in Ugandan influence.[34] Congolese forces are now presumably focusing on these rebels—who pose a greater territorial threat—further exacerbating their capacity issues and reducing counterterrorism pressure on ISCAP-DRC.[35]
The lack of effective pressure on ISCAP-DRC likely will allow the group to continue strengthening while increasing its threat regionally and globally. The group has proven resilient to regional counterterrorism efforts by relocating, which allows it to expand its area of operations to the benefit of its propaganda and reestablish support zones from which it can continue growing its capabilities.[36] This is unlikely to change due to the multilayered crisis in the eastern DRC and regional politics underlying the intervention.[37] The US targeting and sanctioning strategy has also proven insufficient to slow support to this group and others on the African continent.[38] These actions temporarily hinder IS support chains but are not sustained enough to sufficiently disrupt the network in the long term.
Figure 3. The Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Africa
Source: Kathryn Tyson.
Pakistan. Pakistani government officials are attempting to use the insecurity in northwestern Pakistan to delay elections for the foreseeable future. The governor for Khyber Pakhtunkwa province Haji Ghulam Ali said on March 17 that the regional government will postpone provincial elections until Pakistani political and military leadership address the expansion of TTP shadow governance in the region.[39] Ali said on March 14 that elections would be held in late May but backtracked on this statement and did not provide a new date, suggesting that elections will be delayed indefinitely.[40]
Pakistan has held elections in Khyber Pakhtunkwa during previous periods of significantly higher TTP activity, indicating that the postponement is likely due to political conflicts rather than the TTP threat.[41] Khyber Pakhtunkwa held provincial elections in 2008 and 2013, when the TTP controlled swaths of land in the region. There have been few concrete indicators of greater TTP governance since December 2022, when the group announced appointments for new TTP ministries. The appointments included ministries for politics, judiciary affairs, and education. The decision demonstrates that the TTP seeks to formalize and expand its governance structures, but so far these efforts do not appear to have materialized. The TTP has escalated attacks against Pakistani security forces since ending a cease-fire with the Pakistani government in November 2022, including a significant bombing in Peshawar in January.[42] However, the TTP has conducted major attacks significantly less frequently than during other periods when Khyber Pakhtunkwa held elections.[43]
Ali announced the delay likely because he opposes efforts by the Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) political party to hold early provincial elections. There may be rifts between Ali and the Khyber Pakhtunkwa chief minister, who also serves as a senior member of the PTI.[44] The PTI dissolved the Khyber Pakhtunkwa assembly in January 2023 to push provincial elections and secure support for the party before the general elections in October 2023. Provincial and general elections have occurred at the same time in previous years.[45] The Khyber Pakhtunkwa police chief reiterated Ali’s statements on March 17 and added that separate provincial and national elections will double police expenditure and increase the risk of TTP attacks.[46] The PTI threatened to file court charges against Ali on March 19 in response to the decision.[47] No other Pakistani political or military leadership has publicly commented on Ali’s claims. It is possible that senior Pakistani officials are not commenting to avoid drawing attention to Pakistan’s military failures.
Figure 4. The Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Central and South Asia
Source: Kathryn Tyson.
Other Updates:
Asia
Pakistan. Unknown militants killed senior Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) official Mustafa Kamal Barki in Angoor Ada, South Waziristan, in northwestern Pakistan on March 21.[48] The militants ambushed Barki’s convoy, leading to a firefight that killed the ISI leader and injured seven other security-force members.[49] The attack marks the second killing of a senior ISI official since January 2023, when a TTP militant killed the ISI deputy director in Khanewl in northeastern Pakistan.[50] The TTP may have been responsible for the killing of Barki. The TTP regularly conducts attacks in South Waziristan. Barki was also reportedly involved in peace talks between Pakistan and the TTP in 2022, which some TTP members opposed.[51]
[1] Authors’ research; https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1631721427966791680?s=20
[2] https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1632421292942008322?s=20
[3] https://twitter.com/humam__isa/status/1632425818692505601?s=20; https://www.facebook.com/Deir.ezour.news.network/posts/pfbid06Eq4cdVvgwytpWLh32JLAHx1VMduLaTAm4V2YzDTBpP9zbcB1rqsDYa9j8ZJE2TDl?__cft__[0]=AZWh2b2Fg0EoLnyxe2GFT6tR2LTU9Mr11NWzFtSud5RzmRAADzQdOnDYdxpPyigKRaGN_RLYuQOQ6LCP6_-Jexcj8SU-HLke8G9dGyeUlpignDNk9pjuaES5jkY8D6wTtZH7iwntQajhj18vXeme0yjh&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://twitter.com/nahermedia/status/1638181073900142593?s=20
[4] https://www.mei.edu/publications/between-coalition-isis-and-assad-courting-tribes-deir-ez-zor#pt3
[5] https://www.syriahr dot com/%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%80-%D9%80%D9%87%D9%80-%D9%80%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%80-%D9%80%D8%A8-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80-%D9%80%D9%86/589344
[6] https://orient-news dot net/ar/news_show/202203; https://nahermedia dot net/%D8%A8%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A9%D9%90-%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%8D-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A7
[7] https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1637861302381994004?s=20; https://twitter.com/nahermedia/status/1633830114772516867
[8] https://www.mei.edu/publications/between-coalition-isis-and-assad-courting-tribes-deir-ez-zor
[9] https://www.mei.edu/publications/between-coalition-isis-and-assad-courting-tribes-deir-ez-zor#pt3
[10] https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1631721427966791680?s=20
[11] https://jihadology.net/wp-content/uploads/_pda/2023/03/The-Islamic-State-al-Naba%CC%84-Newsletter-382.pdf
[12] https://jihadology.net/2023/03/02/new-issue-of-the-islamic-states-newsletter-al-naba-380; Source available upon request
[13] SITE Intelligence Group, “Ahead of Ramadan, Prominent IS-Aligned Unit Rallies Fighters and Supporters to ‘Ignite the Earth,’” available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.
[14] https://jihadology.net/wp-content/uploads/_pda/2023/03/The-Islamic-State-al-Naba%CC%84-Newsletter-380.pdf; Source available upon request
[15] https://jihadology.net/wp-content/uploads/_pda/2023/03/The-Islamic-State-al-Naba%CC%84-Newsletter-382.pdf
[16] https://twitter.com/brian_cartr/status/1618321015712681984?s=20; https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2021-09/Islamic%20State%20Under-Reporting%20in%20Central%20Syria-%20Misdirection%2C%20Misinformation%2C%20or%20Miscommunication%3F.pdf
[17] Authors’ research; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/back-basics-us-iraq-security-cooperation-post-combat-era; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-state-at-low-ebb-in-iraq-the-insurgent-tide-recedes-again
[18] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2020.1734318
[19] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-threat-to-central-africa-the-2021-transformation-of-the-islamic-states-congolese-branch
[20] https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/ICSR-Report-The-Arc-of-Jihad-The-Ecosystem-of-Militancy-in-East-Central-and-Southern-Africa.pdf; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/financial-crime-watchdog-adds-south-africa-nigeria-grey-list-2023-02-24; https://www.int-comp.org/insight/2022/october/25/south-africa-edges-towards-fatf-grey-list
[21] https://extremism.gwu.edu/islamic-state-congo-growing; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-threat-to-central-africa-the-2021-transformation-of-the-islamic-states-congolese-branch; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-arrests-middle-eastern-national-links-islamist-militia-2021-09-22
[22] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3899398?ln=en; https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/ICSR-Report-The-Arc-of-Jihad-The-Ecosystem-of-Militancy-in-East-Central-and-Southern-Africa.pdf
[23] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2023
[24] https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/31765/u-s-confirms-airstrike-against-isis-somalias-abdulhakim-dhuqub
[25] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/financial-crime-watchdog-adds-south-africa-nigeria-grey-list-2023-02-24; https://www.int-comp.org/insight/2022/october/25/south-africa-edges-towards-fatf-grey-list; https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2022%2F547&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0616; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0616; https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220301; https://issafrica.org/iss-today/are-red-flags-about-islamic-state-in-south-africa-alarmist
[26] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-islamic-state-bombings-in-uganda-challenge-east-africa-counterterrorism-response; https://www.africanews dot com/2021/10/01/rwanda-arrests-13-suspected-of-plotting-terrorist-attacks
[27] https://atmis-au.org/military-component; https://issafrica.org/iss-today/uganda-terror-attacks-point-to-deeper-jihadi-coordination; https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/regional-security-support-vital-first-step-peace-mozambique
[28] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-threat-to-central-africa-the-2021-transformation-of-the-islamic-states-congolese-branch; https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2022/06/relocating-or-expanding-islamic-state-mozambiques-reaction-to-foreign-intervention.php; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/winning-peace-mozambiques-embattled-north; https://www.cnn.com/2014/11/18/world/isis-libya/index.html
[29] https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-ever-adaptive-allied-democratic-forces-insurgency
[30] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo-uganda-burundi-rwanda/easing-turmoil-eastern-dr-congo; https://africacenter.org/spotlight/rwanda-drc-risk-of-war-new-m23-rebellion-emerges-explainer; https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022
[31] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59507543; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo-uganda-burundi-rwanda/easing-turmoil-eastern-dr-congo
[32] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo-uganda-burundi-rwanda/easing-turmoil-eastern-dr-congo
[33] https://www.radiookapi dot net/2023/03/20/actualite/securite/beni-la-coalition-fardc-updf-appelee-redefinir-ses-zones-dintervention
[34] https://africacenter.org/spotlight/rwanda-drc-risk-of-war-new-m23-rebellion-emerges-explainer; https://issafrica.org/iss-today/tshisekedi-opens-a-pandoras-box-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo
[35] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/regional-powers-should-drive-diplomacy-dr-congo-m23; https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2022
[36] https://extremism.gwu.edu/islamic-state-congo-growing; https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2023%2F95&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
[37] https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/multi-layered-violence-drc-history-repeating-itself
[38] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/we-must-do-more-than-over-the-horizon-to-fight-terrorism; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/05/over-the-horizon-biden-afghanistan-counter-terrorism
[39] https://twitter.com/khorasandiary/status/1636644510812839937; https://www.dawn dot com/news/1742831/governor-backtracks-on-kp-polls-date-citing-challenges
[40] https://www brecorder dot com/news/40231348/kpk-governor-announces-assembly-elections-for-may-28-report
[41] https://www dawn dot com/news/1739357
[42] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/28/pakistan-taliban-ends-ceasefire-with-govt-threatens-new-attacks; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2023
[43] https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/11/pakistans-ambivalent-approach-toward-a-resurgent-tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan
[44] https://tribune.com dot pk/story/2407128/rumours-of-rift-between-k-p-governor-caretaker-cm; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/18/another-khan-party-led-provincial-assembly-dissolved-in-pakistan
[45] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/3/pakistan-president-says-punjab-polls-to-be-held-on-april-30
[46] https://www.geo dot tv/latest/477006-no-guarantee-of-peace-during-elections-kp-top-officials-tell-ecp
[47] https://tribune.com dot pk/story/2407056/pti-to-move-sc-against-k-p-governor-ecp
[48] https://www.dawn dot com/news/1743412/brigadier-martyred-in-encounter-with-hard-core-terrorists-in-south-waziristan-ispr
[49] https://twitter.com/khorasandiary/status/1638220813248733185
[50] https://twitter.com/ShabbirTuri/status/1638235962395205662; https://twitter.com/ShabbirTuri/status/1610610220979339265
[51] https://twitter.com/DaudKhattak1/status/1638189128482160641; https://twitter.com/Natsecjeff/status/1620424100236898304