China-Taiwan Weekly Updates: 2023

This Page Collects all China-Taiwan Weekly Updates Published in 2023

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 28, 2023

Click here to read the full report with maps

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Ian Jones, and Frank Hoffman of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: December 28, 2023 at 5pm EST

Key Takeaways

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-te remains first in the polls.
Two Chinese high-altitude balloons have moved through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) since December 20.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) continued to accuse the Philippines of “colluding with external forces” and deliberately provoking confrontations after a series of maritime confrontations in the South China Sea in December.
A PRC-brokered ceasefire agreement has failed to stop the fighting between the government of Myanmar and three rebel groups in Myanmar.
A loss of Compacts of Free Association funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to expand its leverage points over these countries.

Taiwan

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-te continues to lead in the polls. The polls that Formosa and ETtoday released between December 20 through December 24 showed that Lai has a roughly 5% lead over Kuomintang (KMT) presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih.[1] The Poll of Polls, which is a weighted average of public election polls over the past 15 days that Taiwan News publishes, showed a similar lead for Lai as of December 25. Lai received 34.91% support, Hou received 30.49% support, and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je received 20.90% support, according to the aggregated polling numbers.[2] The support levels do not reflect significant change since last week.

Two Formosa polls from December 25 and 26 indicate that Lai’s lead over Hou is steadily increasing. The December 25 poll showed Lai at 37.5% support compared to Hou’s 30.49%.[3] The December 26 poll showed Lai at 38.9% support compared to Hou’s 29.4%.[4] This is the largest gap between the candidates since the November 15 Formosa polling. It is also the first time that Hou has fallen below 30% support since then.[5]

The increase in support for Lai may be due to a shift in young voters from Ko. Support for Lai among the 20-29 and 30-39 age groups in the December 26 Formosa poll was 34.8% and 31.0%, respectively.[6] Lai’s polling among the 20-29 age group increased from 20.8% in Formosa’s December 21 poll and has held steady between 34-35% through Formosa’s December 22-26 polling. Lai’s polling among the 30-39 age group decreased slightly between December 22 and 25 from 34.7% to 27.6% before increasing back to 31% on December 26.[7] Support for Ko among the same demographics was 29.9% and 30.4% on December 26.[8] Ko’s support among the 20-29 age group fell from a high of 38.2% on December 22 and support within the 30-39 age group has remained steady at 30-31%.[9]

Hou’s decline in polling could be partly attributed to a decrease in support among the KMT voter base. Support for Hou within the KMT base fell from 91.9% on December 20 to 87.5% on December 26, according to the latest Formosa poll. Support among his base had been above 90% since candidate registration on November 24.[10]

Taiwan’s three presidential candidates gave televised policy presentations on December 20, 26, and 28. Cross-strait issues featured heavily in all three presentations. Taiwan’s political status, sovereignty, and trade with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were some of the most in-focus topics. Candidates also discussed a wide range of domestic political issues, such as public security, housing, and energy policy.

DPP candidate Lai Ching-te used his time to highlight the looming threat from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and emphasize the importance of upholding Taiwan’s sovereignty. Lai related domestic governance to cross-strait issues, asserting that equitable development and economic prosperity hinged on preserving Taiwan’s democracy in the face of authoritarian expansion.[11] Lai likened economic treaties between Taiwan and the PRC as conforming to the One-China principle and urged for separate economic development initiatives to counteract the PRC’s weaponization of trade for political leverage.[12] The One-China principle describes the PRC's position that the PRC is the sole legal representative of China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Neither Taiwan nor the United States recognize the One-China principle.

KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih mostly focused on promoting domestic governance proposals while criticizing Lai and the DPP administration for encouraging formal Taiwanese independence.[13] Hou defended the KMT’s cross-strait policy against claims of alignment with unification, stressing his fundamental support for Taiwan’s democracy and freedom.[14] Hou disparaged the DPP for what the KMT perceives as independence-minded policies that are directly harmful to the livelihoods of Taiwan’s citizens. Hou pointed to the PRC’s December 21 suspension of tariff reductions under the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) as a consequence of the DPP’s inflammatory approach to cross-strait relations.[15] The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua blamed the DPP’s “separatist stance” for the tariff reduction suspension on December 27.[16] The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) consistently points to the DPP’s alleged secessionism as the source of tension in cross-strait relations.[17]

TPP candidate Ko Wen-je emphasized domestic governance issues, keeping with his appeal to voters who are weary of cross-strait issues dominating the political discourse. Ko addressed issues such as Taiwan’s aging population, housing policy, and government reforms.[18] Ko presented his cross-strait policy as an alternative to the polarizing extremes of an independence-focused DPP and unification-focused KMT. Ko accused his opponents of promoting cross-strait policies that disrupt the status quo and are unacceptable to both the Taiwanese public and the international community.[19] Ko asserted Taiwan’s status as a sovereign and independent nation while advocating for pragmatic diplomacy that balances cross-strait engagement with strong international partnerships and national defense capabilities. [20]

The three vice-presidential candidates also gave a televised policy presentation on December 22. The candidates’ messaging reflected that of their running mates. DPP vice-presidential candidate Hsiao Bi-khim criticized the KMT for proposing a trade policy that would increase Taiwan’s economic reliance on the PRC at a time when other countries were reducing their economic exposure to the PRC.[21] KMT vice-presidential candidate Jaw Shaw-kong used strong language to criticize the DPP and Lai’s independence stance, referring to the latter as a “terrorist” endangering cross-strait relations.[22] TPP vice-presidential candidate Cynthia Wu did not discuss cross-strait issues and instead emphasized economic issues.[23] The vice-presidential candidates maintain a relatively strong presence in the public eye thanks to their high-profile positions in government and media, making their policy presentation potentially more consequential to the race.

The format of the presidential and vice-presidential presentations was similar to that of a debate. The candidates shared the stage to articulate policy stances and often used their allotted time to criticize each other. The presidential candidates will participate in a formal televised debate on December 30. The vice-presidential candidates will participate in a debate on January 1.

Two Chinese high-altitude balloons have moved through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) since December 20. One balloon crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait on December 22 and the other crossed the median line on December 24.[24] Five other balloons previously crossed the median line between December 7 and 19.[25] The balloons floated at altitudes between 12,000 and 26,000 feet. [26] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported a similar balloon above Taipei on February 10.[27] The MND and the director-general of Taiwan’s Central Weather Service have also reported at least seven balloon sightings over Taiwan between 2021 and 2022. The Financial Times quoted unnamed Taiwanese officials as stating Chinese balloons “come very frequently” and “on average once a month” in a February 12 report.[28] The unnamed officials stated that the February balloons’ dimensions and payload “put them outside the scope of ordinary weather balloons.”[29]

The PRC sending the balloons across the median line of the Taiwan Strait is likely part of a broader effort to wear down Taiwan’s resources and response capabilities. The PRC has normalized daily air and naval activities around Taiwan, including near-daily aerial crossings of the median line in the Taiwan Strait, since 2020. The MND publicly stated that the balloons were weather balloons but has started including them among its daily reports of PRC ADIZ incursions since December 8.[30] MND’s unprecedented inclusion of balloon flights in its daily updates and maps of ADIZ violations in December shows that Taiwan is increasingly concerned about these balloons and may consider them part of the PRC’s broader coercion campaign.

South China Sea

The PRC continued to accuse the Philippines of “colluding with external forces” and deliberately provoking confrontations after a series of maritime confrontations in the South China Sea in December. On December 9 and 10, Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels attempted to thwart Philippine supply missions near Scarborough and Second Thomas Shoals by firing water cannons and acoustic weapons at Philippine government ships delivering supplies. A CCG vessel rammed a Philippine ship near Second Thomas Shoal.[31] Both countries claim both maritime features. The PRC administers Scarborough Shoal since seizing control of it in 2012, while the Philippines administers Second Thomas Shoal.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attributed the recent “difficulties” to the Philippines' “altered policy stance, failure to uphold commitments, and provocative actions in disputed waters” during a December 20 phone call with Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo. Wang said that Beijing wished to resolve the disputes through consultation but warned of “resolute responses” if the Philippines continued its “disruptive actions.”[32] The MFA spokesperson said on December 25 that the Philippines had “repeatedly violated and provocatively violated relevant waters in the South China Sea, spread false information, and colluded with external forces to undermine peace and stability in the South China Sea.”[33] PRC state media, such as People’s Daily, also wrote that the Philippines relied on US support to “provoke” the PRC.[34] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also harshly criticized and warned the Philippines through December 26. The Philippines denied on December 26 that it had acted provocatively and instead blamed the PRC for escalating its tactics.[35]

The United States and Japan have shown support for the Philippines during the recent disputes with the PRC. The US, Japanese, and Filipino national security advisors participated in a trilateral call on December 13 in which they denounced the PRC’s aggression against the Philippines and expressed their commitment to closer security cooperation.[36] Japan also provided the Philippine Air Force with an advanced air surveillance radar system on December 20. The provision was part of a $110 million deal for four units that Japan and the Philippines signed in 2020. The radar system will help the Philippines detect intrusions around any part of the country and its claimed territories. This transfer marks Japan’s first export of a complete defense product since it eased its arms trade ban in 2014.[37]

Myanmar

A PRC-brokered ceasefire agreement has failed to stop the fighting between the government of Myanmar and three rebel groups in Myanmar. Three ethnic rebel groups formed a “brotherhood alliance” and began an offensive in northern Myanmar against the ruling junta on October 27. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed on December 14 that it had brokered a temporary ceasefire between the Myanmar military government and the three allied rebel groups.[38] The PRC MFA spokesperson confirmed on December 19 and 20 that the PRC had hosted ceasefire negotiations in Kunming that resulted in an agreement on December 14. He said the PRC was working to get the warring parties to implement the terms of the agreement, exercise “maximum restraint,” and “properly manage occasional frictions during the ceasefire process.”[39] Fighting between the rebel factions and the government has continued throughout Myanmar, however. A rebel group captured the border town of Namhsan one day after the alleged ceasefire on December 15.[40] Rebels also carried out attacks on military bases and bombings in the major cities of Yangon and Mandalay.[41] The PRC MFA spokesperson confirmed on December 19 and 20 that the PRC had hosted ceasefire negotiations in Kunming that resulted in an agreement on December 14. He said the PRC was working to get the warring parties to implement the terms of the agreement, exercise “maximum restraint,” and “properly manage occasional frictions during the ceasefire process.”[42]

The MFA has repeatedly urged the belligerent parties to maintain the security and stability of the PRC-Myanmar border and safeguard the safety of Chinese projects and personnel in Myanmar.[43] The fighting has resulted in the deaths of an unspecified number of PRC nationals. One such incident was possibly due to an artillery shell that the junta forces fired which landed in the PRC. [44] The fighting has also blocked PRC–Myanmar cross-border trade and sent thousands of Myanmar nationals to briefly seek safety in the PRC.[45] [46] The CCP may also seek to negotiate a ceasefire to bolster its diplomatic reputation. The PRC has often portrayed itself as a promoter of global peace, security, and stability, for example through its Global Security Initiative.[47]

The PRC has also been using the fighting to crack down on cyber scam centers based in northern Myanmar, which defraud Chinese nationals and have kidnapped thousands of Chinese to work for them.[48] The PRC has offered rewards for the capture of criminal leaders and carried out joint policing with Myanmar authorities, which culminated in Myanmar authorities handing over 31,000 cybercrime suspects to the PRC as of November 21.[49] The junta has since said it is limited in its ability to do more because the scam centers are in areas held by rebel groups.[50] The allied rebel groups have also targeted cyber scam centers and announced eradicating such centers as a major goal of their offensive.[51]

Israel-Hamas War

Chinese state media portrayed the U.S.-proposed “Guardian Shield” multinational Red Sea naval task force as a self-serving and ineffective move that will worsen the situation in the Red Sea and the Middle East. Chinese state media questioned the effectiveness of the initiative and accused the U.S. of being biased and hegemonic in its approach.[52] Chinese media analysis of the situation acknowledged the global implications of the Red Sea crisis, such as the disruption of shipping routes, the increase in costs and prices, and the pressure on the supply chain, but dismissed Guardian Shield as a "band-aid.”[53] State-controlled media outlets emphasized that the “root cause of a series of problems in the Middle East … lies in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict” and stressed the need for a ceasefire.[54] The PRC has not signaled any willingness or interest to support the U.S.-led regional security initiatives to protect maritime shipping through the Bab al Mandeb and Red Sea.[55]

The reaction from Chinese state media aligns with the PRC’s diplomatic and information lines of effort that aim to supplant U.S. influence with Arab states by proposing what it claims to be a more inclusive and cooperative regional security framework.[56] This involves portraying Washington as a self-interested and destabilizing influence in the region while simultaneously positioning Beijing as an altruistic and unbiased actor.[57]

Compacts of Free Association

A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while also granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[58] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[59] The signed agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[60] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[61] Deputy Secretary of State nominee Kurt Campbell stated during his Senate confirmation hearing on December 7 that “if we don’t get it [COFA funding] you can expect that literally the next day Chinese diplomats — military and other folks — will be on the plane…trying to secure a better deal for China.”[62] The US House of Representatives Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party also called for renewing the COFAs in a mid-December report.[63] President Biden signed the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act into law on December 22, but it did not include COFA funding.[64]

These three island countries control key sea lanes that provide a secure route connecting American allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, to the US territory of Guam and the state of Hawaii. Palau and the Marshall Islands are 2 of the 13 countries that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[65]

The loss of COFA funding would present an opportunity for the CCP to expand its economic influence with these vital Pacific Island countries. For example, this funding loss would exacerbate Palau’s existing deficit, which amounts to $37 million as of its 2021 budget of $150 million.[66] This is an economic vulnerability that the CCP could partially fill by encouraging PRC nationals to vacation in Palau. The CCP cut tourism to Palau over the last decade to nearly zero as punishment for maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[67] The reversal of this CCP policy would provide the party with economic leverage to wield over Palau in the event of future policy disagreements. The expansion of the CCP’s economic influence in Palau would also provide the party a leverage point to coerce the countries into switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC aims to coerce countries into switching diplomatic recognition to falsely argue that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China rather than a legitimate country named the Republic of China.

The loss of COFA funding would also exacerbate the CCP narrative put forth by the propaganda outlet Global Times that the United States only cares about Palau for security reasons rather than mutually beneficial cooperation. [68] The Palau Senate passed a resolution in November rejecting the permanent deployment of a US Patriot missile defense battery.[69] This was the first instance of lawmakers challenging President Surangel Whipps Jr’s request for the United States to construct an over-the-horizon radar system in Palau.[70] The associated fiscal cliff that Palau faces without COFA funding buttresses the CCP’s narrative, which in turn creates hurdles for deploying mutually beneficial United States defense resources to the country.

The loss of COFA funding would also provide the CCP an opportunity to expand influence efforts targeting Micronesian political elites. The CCP has completed infrastructure projects throughout the country, such as houses for the country’s president, vice president, speakers of congress, and chief justice.[71] Axios reported that former Micronesian officials confirmed receiving gifts from the PRC, such as money, while on official state visits to the country.[72] The lack of COFA funding would exacerbate the appeal of CCP monetary gifts or infrastructure projects that target the Micronesian political elite. Micronesian President Wesley Simina also stated in late November that his country would be at a “fiscal cliff” without US Congressional approval of COFA funding. This would mean that “we [Micronesia] will have to find different sources of funding… and that’s not out there available immediately.”[73] The loss of COFA funding would also provide opportunities for external powers such as the CCP to enhance their economic influence in the country by filling these funding gaps.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 21, 2023

Click here to read the full report with maps

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: December 21, 2023 at 12pm EST

Key Takeaways

1. The Taiwanese government and DPP officials, including Vice President Lai Ching-te, accused the PRC of using an ongoing trade investigation to interfere in Taiwan’s election.

2. ROC authorities are investigating reports that local Taiwanese officials accepted CCP-funded trips to the PRC and received instructions to back particular candidates in the presidential elections.

3. Five Chinese balloons moved through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone since December 7. This may be part of a broader effort to wear down Taiwan’s resources and response capabilities.

4. Chinese Maritime Militia vessels entered the Philippines-controlled Second Thomas Shoal after the PRC attempted to deny access to Filipino government vessels on routine resupply missions on December 9 and 10.

5. The PRC, Saudi Arabia, and Iran held their first trilateral joint committee on December 15 in Beijing.

Taiwan

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-te continues to lead in the polls. A Taiwan News Poll of Polls released on December 20 showed Lai with 34.34% support, Hou with 30.01%, and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je in third place with 20.83%.[1] The Poll of Polls is a weighted average of all public election polls in Taiwan over the past 15 days. The previous polling release on December 15 release showed that both Lai and Hou briefly reached their highest levels of support since the Poll of Polls began on September 1, with 15-day averages of 36% and 31.2% support, respectively. Ko has dropped from 21.84% on December 10.[2]

Support for Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou Yu-ih has plateaued even as he has become the clear leader of the opposition to Lai. Hou and his running mate Jaw Shaw-kong are continuing efforts to consolidate the KMT base. Their efforts include Hou supporting the revival the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), which is an unratified 2010 trade agreement with the PRC that the KMT Ma Ying-jeou administration negotiated.[3] KMT Chairman Eric Chu also claimed that “nearly all” supporters of former independent candidate Terry Gou have shifted to supporting the KMT ticket.[4] The KMT is seeing diminishing returns, however. Formosa E-News polling shows Hou’s support from self-identified KMT voters rose above 90 percent after November 25 but stayed in the low 90s since then.[5] The KMT has also been making outreach efforts to young voters, one of its weakest demographics.[6]

Ko remains in third place in the polls and his level of support has gradually declined since the November 25 candidate registration. Taiwanese media have reported that a type of strategic voting called the “dump/save” effect may be one factor influencing the polling trends.[7] The dump/save effect is a phenomenon in which supporters of a third-place candidate shift to a higher-ranked candidate once it is clear who the race’s two frontrunners are. Ko acknowledged that such an effect may be occurring but downplayed its impact, saying his “third force” would persist.[8]

The PRC’s Ministry of Commerce announced on December 15 that Taiwan violated a joint economic cooperation agreement. The PRC announced after an eight-month investigation that “Taiwan’s trade restrictions on the mainland [China] constitute a trade barrier” in violation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The PRC and ROC signed the EFCA in 2010, which committed both parties to gradually eliminate most of the trade barriers between them. The PRC’s Ministry of Commerce alleged that Taiwan had banned 2,509 imports from the PRC as of November 2023.[9] The PRC’s Ministry of Commerce announced the investigation on April 12, the same day the DPP nominated Lai Ching-te as its presidential candidate and said that it would last until October 9.[10] On October 9, the ministry extended the investigation to January 12, the day before Taiwan’s election, however.[11] The timing suggests that the PRC intends for the investigation to influence the election.

The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office announced its support for implementing “corresponding measures” in response to Taiwan’s alleged violations on December 15.[12] The PRC’s State Council’s Customs Tariff Commission announced on December 12 that it will end tariff reductions on 12 chemical products from Taiwan on January 1.[13] It is unclear whether the PRC will impose additional measures in the future.

The Taiwanese government and DPP officials, including Vice President Lai Ching-te, accused the PRC of using an ongoing trade investigation to interfere in Taiwan’s election. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council said that Taiwan cannot accept the PRC’s “political manipulation” and “violation of WTO norms” by “unilaterally conducting an investigation against us.” It called on the PRC to resolve trade disputes through the World Trade Organization (WTO).[14] Taiwan and the PRC are both WTO members.[15] Lai called the announcement “blatant interference in Taiwan’s election” and also said the PRC should resolve disputes through the WTO.[16] DPP spokesperson Chang Chih-hao questioned if the investigation result was the result of “collusion” between China and the Kuomintang following KMT vice chair Andrew Hsia’s trip to the PRC from December 13-20.[17] The KMT said Hsia was meeting with Taiwanese businessmen in China and would not meet with senior officials of the Taiwan Affairs Office.[18]

KMT Chairman Eric Chu said that the DPP government should address the PRC’s accusations with “real action” instead of just words.[19] TPP candidate Ko Wen-je’s spokesperson called on the DPP to propose countermeasures instead of rhetoric.[20] Both Ko and Hou Yu-ih support increasing cross-strait trade and reviving the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) under the framework of ECFA.[21]

ROC authorities are investigating reports that local Taiwanese officials accepted CCP-funded trips to the PRC and received instructions to back particular candidates in the presidential elections. Taipei authorities questioned 41 borough wardens on December 15 about trips the wardens took to the PRC during the last several months. A borough warden is a type of political office below the municipal level. The investigation received reports that many borough wardens and their friends and relatives in Taipei accepted funding from the PRC’s Shanghai Taiwan Affairs Office to travel to Shanghai and other places in the PRC. The PRC allegedly offered favorable prices for group travel of this nature.[22] The reports also stated that the chiefs received instructions to grant or withhold support for certain candidates in Taiwan’s presidential or legislative election. An unnamed “national security source” told the Taipei Times on December 16 that the PRC has now delayed future all-expenses-paid trips to the PRC until after Taiwan’s election considering Taiwan’s crackdown on such trips.[23]

The Taipei Times also cited an unnamed Taiwanese official who said the PRC is using TikTok to influence target young voters.[24] Polling released December 19 by the Taiwan Information Environment Research Center (IORG) showed a correlation between Taiwanese people’s use of TikTok and higher acceptance of pro-China narratives. For example, the statement “the government's pro-American stance is provoking China and will lead to a cross-strait war” received 51% agreement from Taiwanese TikTok users compared to 38.8% of the general population. The same poll found agreement with this statement was correlated with support for Hou or Ko. About 18% of Taiwanese use TikTok.[25]

Five Chinese high-altitude balloons moved through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) since December 7. One balloon crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait on December 7. The other four crossed the median line over a four-day period; two on December 16, one on December 17, and one on December 19. The balloons floated at altitudes between 12,000 and 27,000 feet.[26] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) publicly stated that these were weather balloons but included them for the first time among its daily reports of ADIZ violations by the PRC.[27] The MND previously reported a similar balloon above Taipei on February 10.[28] The MND and the director-general of Taiwan’s Central Weather Service have also reported at least seven balloon sightings over Taiwan between 2021 and 2022. A February 12 Financial Times report cited unnamed Taiwanese officials who said such balloons flew over Taiwan once a month on average.[29]

Sending the balloons across the median line of the Taiwan Strait is likely part of a broader effort to wear down Taiwan’s resources and response capabilities.[30] The PRC has normalized daily air and naval activities around Taiwan, including near-daily aerial crossings of the median line in the Taiwan Strait, since 2020.[31] MND’s unprecedented inclusion of the balloon flights in its daily updates and maps of ADIZ violations in December shows that Taiwan is increasingly concerned about these balloons and may consider them part of the PRC’s broader harassment campaign against Taiwan. NPR reported on December 18 that the PRC is “subtly increasing” military coercion and gray zone tactics to influence the presidential election. NPR said Beijing aims to wear down Taiwan’s capabilities through intimidation and daily harassment without triggering a larger conflict. Former Taiwanese defense chief Admiral Lee Hsi-ming said the PRC uses such activities to test its military requirements and Taiwanese responses. Taiwan’s resources are stretched thinner because Taiwan must “scramble its own jets and ships” in response but cannot match the PRC’s military resources or manpower.[32]

These activities aim to wear down Taiwanese military readiness, force difficult decisions regarding ROC resource allocation, and create a sense of impenetrable siege among the Taiwanese population. These effects support CCP efforts to degrade the Taiwanese populace’s confidence in its government’s capacity to defend the country, a key part of the longer-term CCP coercion campaign to induce unification under the PRC. Compressed decision-making timelines about whether to engage PLA aircraft also enhance the risk of miscalculation by the PRC or ROC that could lead to a crisis. ISW does not assess that Chinese balloon flights over Taiwan presage an imminent invasion or other intentional acts of war by the PRC or ROC.

South China Sea

Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) vessels entered the Philippines-controlled Second Thomas Shoal after the PRC attempted to deny access to Filipino government vessels on routine resupply missions on December 9 and 10. Commercially available satellite imagery from December 11 showed that 11 CMM vessels had entered the Second Thomas Shoal. This is the largest observed number of CCM vessels that have entered the shoal to date.[33] None of the ships were broadcasting transponder signals, which most larger vessels are required to use for maritime traffic safety. “Going dark” is a common tactic used by PRC vessels in the South China Sea (SCS) that want to avoid detection, and have previously played a role in the PRC’s blockading Filipino resupply missions.[34] 27 other PRC vessels surrounded the Shoal on December 11 and were identifiable through their transponder signals. Among them was a Chinese Coast Guard ship and multiple CMM vessels that were present during the December 10 confrontation.[35] Four CMM vessels remained within the Shoal while five others remained outside the shoal as of December 14.[36] The lingering presence of PRC vessels is unusual, as they normally return to the PRC’s nearby Mischief Reef after such incidents.[37]

The Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) immediately publicized videos of CCG vessels using water cannons against Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) vessels during the confrontations at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.[38] The Philippines’ active transparency serves to preempt the PRC-propagated notion that the Philippines is instigating confrontation and acting aggressively against PRC vessels.

Armed Forces of the Philippines Western Command (WesCom) Commander Vice Admiral Alberto Carlos stated on December 13 that the PRC is escalating actions short of armed attacks against Filipino vessels.[39] Carlos downplayed the extended contingent of CMM vessels within the Shoal as a common swarming tactic.[40] Carlos earlier stated, however, that he expects the PRC to resort to greater use of water cannons, lasers, ramming, and eventual boarding of Filipino vessels to deny the Philippines access to disputed locations.[41] Carlos announced that the Philippines’ National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea is devising a new strategy to carry out rotation and resupply (RoRe) missions following the PRC’s most recent confrontation.[42]

PRC officials and media unleashed a barrage of criticism against the United States and the Philippines after the confrontations at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. Ministry of Defense Spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang condemned the USS Gabrielle Giffords on December 14 for “illegally intruding” into waters adjacent to the Second Thomas Shoal during a routine transit a week earlier.[43] State-media outlet Global Times published an article on December 19 accusing the United States of waging cognitive warfare against China over the SCS.[44] The article was the second of its kind from PRC state media this month. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Wang Wenbin criticized Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos on December 18 for expressing support for trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan in the SCS. Wang urged the Philippines to “recognize the futility of tying up with certain major powers and compromising China's core interests.”[45]

The criticisms follow US efforts to reassure the Philippines of its support in the face of the PRC’s aggression. US, Japanese, and Filipino national security advisors participated in a trilateral call on December 13 in which they denounced the PRC’s aggression against the Philippines and committed to closer security cooperation.[46] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin called his Filipino counterpart on December 14 to reaffirm the United States' commitment to the Philippines.[47]

Compacts of Free Association

A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while also granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[48] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[49] The signed agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[50] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[51] Deputy Secretary of State nominee Kurt Campbell stated during his Senate confirmation hearing on December 7 that “if we don’t get it [COFA funding] you can expect that literally the next day Chinese diplomats — military and other folks — will be on the plane…trying to secure a better deal for China.”[52] The US House of Representatives Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party also called for renewing the COFAs in a mid-December report.[53] The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act that passed both the Senate and House of Representatives as of December 14 did not include COFA funding.[54]

The loss of COFA funding would present an opportunity for the CCP to expand its economic influence with these vital Pacific Island countries. For example, this funding loss would exacerbate Palau’s existing deficit, which amounts to $37 million as of its 2021 budget of $150 million.[56] This is an economic vulnerability that the CCP could partially fill by encouraging PRC nationals to vacation in Palau. The CCP cut tourism to Palau over the last decade to nearly zero as punishment for maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[57] The reversal of this CCP policy would provide the party with economic leverage to wield over Palau in the event of future policy disagreements. The expansion of the CCP’s economic influence in Palau would also provide the party a leverage point to coerce the countries into switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC aims to coerce countries into switching diplomatic recognition to falsely argue that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China rather than a legitimate country named the Republic of China.

The loss of COFA funding would also provide the CCP an opportunity to expand influence efforts targeting Micronesian political elites. The CCP has completed infrastructure projects throughout the country, such as houses for the country’s president, vice president, speakers of congress, and chief justice.[58] Axios reported that former Micronesian officials confirmed receiving gifts from the PRC, such as money, while on official state visits to the country.[59] The lack of COFA funding would exacerbate the appeal of CCP monetary gifts or infrastructure projects that target the Micronesian political elite. Micronesian President Wesley Simina also stated in late November that his country would be at a “fiscal cliff” without US Congressional approval of COFA funding. This would mean that “we [Micronesia] will have to find different sources of funding… and that’s not out there available immediately.”[60] The loss of COFA funding would also provide opportunities for external powers such as the CCP to enhance their economic influence in the country by filling these funding gaps.

China in the Middle East

The PRC, Saudi Arabia, and Iran held their first trilateral joint committee on December 15 in Beijing. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the meeting focused on improving Iran-Saudi relations as well as the cessation of military operations in the Gaza Strip.[61] PRC officials met with their Iranian counterparts four times since November 26 to discuss enhancing mutual cooperation, regional stability, and the Gaza Strip.[62] This meeting comes after three weeks of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, which have caused international shipping disruptions.[63]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 15, 2023

Click here to read the full report.

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Ian Jones, Frank Hoffman, and Kyle Lim of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: December 12 at 5pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te made significant gains in the polls while support for KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih plateaued.
Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia vessels took aggressive actions against Philippine government vessels near the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea on December 9 and 10.
A loss of Compacts of Free Association funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries.
PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized the need for an immediate ceasefire to the Israel-Hamas War during separate conversations with American and Iranian officials. Wang’s comments are consistent with the PRC’s efforts to use the Israel-Hamas War to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States.

Taiwan

DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te made significant gains in the polls while support for KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih plateaued. A December 10 Taiwan News Poll of Polls showed that in a weighted average of polls from the past ten days, Lai had 38.06% support, Hou had 31.27%, and Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je had 18.48%. These numbers show a nearly 5 percentage point jump from 33.2% for Lai since the December 5 Poll of Polls, a 2% rise from 29.3% for Hou since then, and a 3.5% drop from 22.0% for Ko. This is the first time Lai has surpassed 35% support since the Poll of Polls’ first data point on September 1. It is also Ko’s worst performance in the Poll of Polls since October 16.[1] The Poll of Polls normally aggregates polls from the previous 15 days.

Hou and his running mate Jaw Shaw-kong continued their strategy of appealing to the KMT base to grow their support. Hou, Jaw, and other KMT officials called on former independent candidate Terry Gou to return to the KMT to strengthen their pan-Blue support.[2] Gou has not answered their calls, however. Gou was a KMT member who left the party after losing the nomination to Hou and then ran as an independent until November 24. Hou and Jaw also nominated former KMT legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng as chairman of their campaign’s National Support Association. The KMT-aligned media outlet United Daily News reported that Wang might use this position to help the KMT win back Gou’s support.[3] Wang held a banquet for Terry Gou supporters on December 12.[4]

Formosa E-News polling collected from December 4 to December 11 showed that support for the Hou-Jaw ticket among self-identified KMT voters consistently remained between 90% and 95%.[5] It first rose above 90% in the last week of November after the candidates’ registration and the collapse of the Hou-Ko joint ticket negotiations.[6] The KMT’s base consolidation strategy has kept KMT-aligned support for Hou strong but may be hitting diminishing returns, however. This would explain why Hou’s rise in the polls has slowed. Lai’s support among self-identified DPP voters was also above 90% in the same polls since candidate registration.[7] Formosa is a politically centrist news website and polling organization that is widely cited in Taiwanese media due to the frequency, detail, and perceived reliability of its polling.

TPP candidate Ko Wen-je has pivoted his messaging to appeal to pan-Green (DPP-aligned) voters. Ko declared himself “deep-Green at heart” in a December 7 interview and said that he would largely continue incumbent president Tsai Ing-wen’s foreign and defense policy.[8] This is a major shift in messaging from Ko. He previously attempted to align with the KMT in a joint presidential ticket. The shift may be related to polling that shows support for Ko among KMT-identifying voters has declined to 2-4% from 9.4% on November 24.[9] Although Ko has consistently presented himself as a pragmatic middle option between the DPP and KMT, the bulk of his voting base consists of voters below 40. These younger voters are primarily contested with the DPP.[10] A December 8 article in KMT-aligned China Times said youth turnout was key to winning the election. Ko remains the most popular candidate among this age group.[11]

The dominant message in the Taiwan election remains focused on cross-strait relations, which favors the DPP. The DPP continued to promote its message that the election is about maintaining Taiwan’s democracy and sovereignty. DPP vice presidential candidate Hsiao Bi-khim said on December 12 that the PRC wants to “turn Taiwan into Hong Kong.”[12] This is a line of argument previously used by Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen and other DPP politicians. Tsai won the 2020 presidential election in a landslide and was boosted by the 2019 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, which the CCP brutally repressed.[13] Hong Kong’s loss of governing autonomy under the PRC’s “one country, two systems” framework bolstered the DPP argument for resisting Chinese influence, because “one country, two systems” is also the framework intended for Taiwan if the PRC successfully “reunifies” it. Hsiao made the comments days after Hong Kong held a “patriots only” district council election that saw a record-low turnout of 27.5% and the detention of pro-democracy activists.[14]

The dominant framing of cross-strait relations has changed since November, however. Formosa polling collected November 27-28 showed that the DPP’s framing that the election is about “democracy vs autocracy” has overtaken the KMT (and CCP) “peace vs war” narrative to become the plurality viewpoint among the ROC electorate. 36.5% of respondents agreed that the election was a choice between “democracy and autocracy” compared to 29% who said it was between “war and peace.”[15] This shows the dominant narrative preferred by the CCP is not resonating with most voters in Taiwan. ISW has assessed since May 26 that “war and peace” is the dominant framing on cross-strait relations in the Taiwan election.[16] KMT leaders, such as former president Ma Ying-jeou, have been promoting this message since at least April, before the party confirmed Hou as its presidential nominee.[17]

The CCP is improving the coordination of its efforts to influence the outcome of Taiwan’s election, according to an unnamed senior Taiwanese security official. The source disclosed to Western media that the CCP convened a top-level meeting in Beijing led by Politburo member Wang Huning to coordinate efforts by various agencies to influence Taiwan’s presidential election. Wang is chairman of both the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and is thus the PRC’s top official for Taiwan affairs. The Taiwanese source claimed this meeting focused on stepping up the effectiveness of influencing Taiwan’s public opinion and reducing the detectability of CCP interference. Attending officials were allegedly told to coordinate their efforts with the Central Propaganda Department and the People’s Liberation Army Base 311, which is a unit that serves as the operational command for Taiwan-targeted “public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.”[18] The PRC has used strategies to promote pro-China candidates such as magnifying war versus peace narratives, social media disinformation, outreach programs to bring Taiwanese politicians, businesspeople, and nationals to visit China, and cultural and religious exchanges.

Radio Free Asia reported on December 6 that a “wave of misinformation” about Democratic Progressive Party vice presidential candidate Hsiao Bi-khim has appeared on Chinese social media, including that she cannot speak Mandarin, holds US citizenship, and is “unreliable.”[19] Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council spokesperson Chan Zhih-hong also stated on December 7 that the CCP is interfering in Taiwan’s elections through the Chinese Pan-Blue Association, the Taiwan New Residents Care Association, the Chinese People's Party, and other groups by inviting village chiefs to travel to China and requesting support for specific candidates.[20]

The CCP’s efforts to reduce the detectability of its election influence efforts likely reflect a recognition that more heavy-handed methods, such as military coercion, are ineffective. Historically, the CCP’s use of overt coercion to intimidate Taiwanese voters into opposing perceived “anti-China” presidential candidates has backfired and resulted in higher support for those candidates. This effect played out in the landslide victories of Tsai Ing-wen in 2020 and Lee Teng-hui in 1996.[21] The PRC is continuing daily air and naval activities around Taiwan at numbers comparable to 2022. ISW has not detected a significant increase in these activities as the election nears.[22]

South China Sea

Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and Maritime Militia (CMM) vessels took aggressive actions against Philippine government vessels near the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (SCS) on December 9 and 10. On December 9, CCG ships deployed water cannons against Filipino Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) vessels delivering food and fuel to fishing boats around the Shoal. The Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) stated that CMM vessels also deployed a “long-range acoustic device” that incapacitated some of the Filipino crew.[23] The PRC wrested control of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012 after a month-long maritime standoff. CCG vessels once again deployed water cannons against BFAR vessels on December 10 during a Philippine resupply mission to a naval outpost on the nearby Second Thomas Shoal. The Philippines National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea (NTF-WPS) accused a CCG vessel of ramming a Filipino vessel.[24] Philippines Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Romeo Brawner Jr. was among the passengers of the vessels that the CCG rammed. The NTF-WPS announced that the resupply mission was a success, despite BFAR vessels suffering significant damage from the water cannons.[25] NTF-WPS stated the PCG had prepared “contingencies” because of Brawner’s presence.[26] Brawner stated later that he was unhurt and that he did not believe that the PRC knew he was on the boat.[27]

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) blamed the Philippines for the incidents. MFA spokesperson Mao Ning accused the Filipino resupply ship of ramming the CCG vessel and endangering the safety of Chinese crew members.[28] The PRC’s framing of the incidents is consistent with its portrayal of rival SCS claimants as aggressors while the CCG and CMM instigate confrontation. PRC Ambassador to the UN Geng Shuang on December 5 derided the Philippines’ resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal as “infringements and provocations” to achieve “permanent occupation” during an address to the General Assembly.[29] The MFA accused the US of “coercing, making threats, and unprovoked attacks” after the latter reassured the Philippines of its support in the wake of the confrontations.[30]

The latest confrontations at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal illustrate the PRC’s increasingly brazen approach to assert control over its territorial claims in the SCS. The incident at Second Thomas Shoal is the fifth of its kind this year. The CCG deployed water cannons against Filipino vessels on August 5 for the first time in two years during a similar routine resupply mission.[31] CCG vessels used water cannons again under the same circumstances on November 10.[32] Collisions are also an increasingly common tactic to harass Filipino vessels. CMM vessels twice collided with Filipino vessels on October 22 to prevent Filipino ships from delivering construction materials.[33]

Compacts of Free Association

A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while also granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[34] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[35] The signed agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[36] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[37] President Biden’s Deputy Secretary of State nominee Kurt Campbell stated during his Senate confirmation hearing on December 7 that “if we don’t get it [COFA funding] you can expect that literally the next day Chinese diplomats — military and other folks — will be on the plane… trying to secure a better deal for China.”[38]

The loss of COFA funding would present an opportunity for the CCP to expand its economic influence with these vital Pacific Island countries. For example, this funding loss would exacerbate Palau’s existing deficit, which amounts to $37 million as of its 2021 budget of $150 million.[40] This is an economic vulnerability that the CCP could partially fill by encouraging PRC nationals to vacation in Palau. The CCP cut tourism to Palau over the last decade to nearly zero as punishment for maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[41] The reversal of this CCP policy would provide the party with economic leverage to wield over Palau in the event of future policy disagreements. The expansion of the CCP’s economic influence in Palau would also provide the party a leverage point to coerce the countries into switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC aims to coerce countries into switching diplomatic recognition to falsely argue that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China rather than a legitimate country named the Republic of China.

Israel-Hamas War

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized the need for an immediate ceasefire to the Israel-Hamas War during separate conversations with American and Iranian officials. Wang held a phone call with Secretary of State Antony Blinken on December 6.[44] Wang subsequently held a phone call with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian on December 11.[45] Wang’s emphasis on a ceasefire is consistent with the Israeli-Palestinian peace plan that he presented to the United Nations Security Council on November 29. The PRC was president of the UN Security Council in November.[46] Wang called for implementing a “comprehensive cease-fire” and releasing “people in captivity,” providing humanitarian supplies to Gaza, and pursuing the two-state solution.[47] His proposal came after CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping stated his desire on November 21 for “all parties” to implement an immediate ceasefire, end collective punishments against the people of Gaza, allow the flow of humanitarian relief, and prevent the conflict from spreading across the Middle East.[48] The PRC voted in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire on December 12.[49]

Wang’s comments are consistent with the PRC’s efforts to use the Israel-Hamas War to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and state propaganda outlets have repeatedly condemned violence between Palestine and Israel since October 7 but never condemned Hamas. They continue to call for an immediate ceasefire and promote a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.[50] The PRC’s targeted criticism of Israel and call for an immediate ceasefire align with the views of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Arab states.[51] The PRC MFA and state-owned outlets, such as the Global Times, previously criticized US support for Israel and claimed that the PRC has no “selfish interest” in the conflict and is committed to bringing peace and justice.[52] The PRC proposal would be tantamount to a defeat for Israel, as CTP and ISW reported on November 29.[53]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 7, 2023

Click here to read the full report.

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: December 5 at 5pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih gained significant support since November 24 and closed the gap with DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te, who leads in the polls.
A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would exacerbate CCP leverage points over these countries.
The CCP aims to use the December 7 EU-PRC summit to advance its goal of increasing economic cooperation with Europe while preventing an EU consensus on “de-risking” from materializing.
The Philippines Coast Guard announced over 100 Chinese Maritime Militia vessels “swarmed” the Philippine-controlled Whitson Reef in the South China Sea.

Taiwan Presidential Election

KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih gained significant support since November 24 and closed the gap with DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te, who leads in the polls. Taiwan’s presidential election settled into a three-way race last week after Lai, Hou, and TPP candidate Ko Wen-je registered their candidacies during the week of November 20. Hou and Ko registered and announced their respective running mates on November 24, the last day for registration, after the collapse of their eleventh-hour negotiations to form a joint ticket to challenge Lai.[1] Polling data since the joint ticket collapse shows Hou Yu-ih’s support has risen considerably. The Taiwan News Poll of Polls on December 5 showed Hou in second place with 29.3% support, which is a nearly 7% jump from 22.5% on November 20. The same poll aggregator showed Lai in first place at 33.2% on December 5, a slight rise from 31% on November 20. The aggregator also showed that Ko remains in third place at 22%, which is similar to the 21.8% support he had in the polls on November 20.[2]

Hou’s rise in the polls reflects the consolidation of the KMT base around his candidacy. Formosa E-News polling showed that around 90% of self-identified KMT voters now support Hou’s candidacy, compared to 82% on November 24 and below 80 before that. His support with voters over 50, which is his strongest constituency, has also increased since November 24, according to Formosa and ETtoday polls.[3]

Hou and the KMT have made several moves that likely contributed to re-integrating their base and gaining support in the polls. First, Hou picked KMT firebrand Jaw Shaw-kong as his running mate. Jaw is a well-known KMT hardliner and media personality who has been outspoken in his harsh criticism of the incumbent DPP administration and his support for closer engagement with the PRC.[4] Second, the KMT signaled that former Kaohsiung mayor and 2020 KMT presidential candidate Han Kuo-yu would become the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan if a KMT-aligned coalition wins the legislative elections. Han enjoys high popularity among KMT supporters.[5] Third, Hou and Jaw have continued to push for traditional KMT positions, including re-starting talks with the PRC on the controversial Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA).[6] The KMT Ma Ying-jeou administration initially signed the CSSTA with the PRC in 2013. The agreement was never ratified in the legislature, however, because student protesters opposing the agreement stormed the Legislative Yuan building in 2014. The student protests grew into the nationwide Sunflower Movement.[7]

Independent candidate Terry Gou’s exit from the race on November 24 possibly added to the rise in Hou’s support. Gou had policy positions similar to Hou’s and polled at 6.7% in the Poll of Polls on November 20 before he dropped out of the race.[8] Some of Gou’s supporters may have gone to Ko Wen-je, however. Ko and Gou were both perceived as “outsider” candidates and frequently discussed cooperating during the election.[9] Taiwan News polling analyst Courtney Donovan Smith assessed based on polling data that Ko absorbed most of Gou’s supporters. Smith said Ko did not rise accordingly in the polls because some of his KMT-leaning supporters moved to support Hou.[10] According to Formosa, KMT-leaning voters who supported Ko Wen-je declined from 9.4% on November 24 to 3.8% by December 4.[11]

Hou may have gained supporters who had previously backed Ko. New polling data from Formosa and other organizations suggests that many KMT-identifying supporters of Ko Wen-je have moved to support Hou Yu-ih in the aftermath of the joint ticket collapse and Hou’s consolidation of the KMT base. Hou’s emergence in the polls as the clear leader among the opposition following the joint ticket collapse may also have improved his standing among electors voting “strategically” to unseat the DPP. There are limits to how many additional supporters Hou could draw from Ko, however. The majority of Ko Wen-je’s remaining supporters are young people between the ages of 20 and 39. This demographic group is predominantly contested by Lai and the DPP, not with the KMT and Hou.[12] This suggests that if Ko Wen-je drops out of the race, many of his supporters could switch to Lai rather than Hou.

Hou’s ability to further close the gap with Lai during the coming weeks depends on his ability to attract new supporters from the KMT base or more moderate voters. These two constituencies likely require mutually exclusive strategies, however. Hou can continue to lean on his deep-Blue messaging to attract even more KMT or pan-Blue-identifying voters who were previously unsure about him, but such messaging would likely alienate more moderate voters. Alternatively, fighting with Lai and Ko for the “center” could cost Hou the support of some of his KMT base. The success of either of these strategies will be made easier if Lai’s support levels drop.

The dominant election narrative continues to focus on cross-strait relations. The KMT has continued its narrative that the election is a choice between war and peace. Jaw and Hou have promoted dialogue with the PRC and re-starting cross-strait agreements, such as the CSSTA.[13] Hou said that Taiwan declaring independence will lead to war.[14] Both attempted to mitigate criticism that they are “pro-China” by stressing that they are also committed to alliances with the United States and other liberal democracies.[15] The DPP has framed the election as a choice between “democracy and autocracy” while mitigating fears that a Lai victory would lead to war with the PRC. ROC president Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP said in a New York Times interview that the PRC was too overwhelmed with domestic issues to invade Taiwan.[16] The DPP has continued to highlight Chinese Communist Party (CCP) election interference and portray its opponents as doing the bidding of the CCP.[17] TPP candidate Ko Wen-je has tried to shift focus to domestic issues and said on December 3 that the election would be about “unification” versus “independence” if he were not in the race. He said that the pro-independence or “pro-America” faction (Lai and the DPP) would win in a simple two-way race between the DPP and KMT.[18]

Several other domestic issues, such as economic growth and energy issues, could shape the dynamics of the election in the coming weeks. None of them have been as prominent as cross-strait relations in the prevailing narrative of the election. Some are gaining traction, however. Ko, Hou, and other KMT officials criticized the DPP on November 30 and December 5 for its plan to phase out nuclear power and criticized Lai’s perceived reversal on this issue, for example.[19] Scandals that emerge or re-surface in the coming weeks could also harm support for candidates of the involved political party. Scandals related to sexual misconduct and mishandling of food imports have hurt the DPP earlier in the summer and fall, for example.

Compacts of Free Association

These three island countries control key sea-lanes that provide a secure route connecting American allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, to the US territory of Guam and state of Hawaii. Palau and the Marshall Islands are two of the 13 countries that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[33] This international diplomatic recognition is critical to demonstrating the false nature of CCP claims that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China.

European Union-People’s Republic of China Summit

The CCP aims to use the December 7 EU-PRC summit to advance its goal of increasing economic cooperation with Europe while preventing an EU consensus on “de-risking” from materializing. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel will meet with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang.[38] Party officials messaged that the economic focus of the meeting would surround EU de-risking efforts. This meeting is part of a yearlong effort throughout 2023 by the CCP targeting high-level engagement with leading European states, such as France and Germany, to facilitate economic cooperation. The CCP aims to encourage Sino-European country-to-country cooperation to undermine what the party perceives as hostile EU investigations targeting PRC companies. Policy dissonance between European countries and the EU provides an avenue for the CCP to engage economically with Europe while impeding the creation of a united EU front against the party’s economic interests.

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Wang Wenbin stated at a press briefing on December 4 that the PRC calls on the EU to “always be rational on ‘de-risking.’” Wang further criticized that unspecified “certain individuals selectively emphasize on competing aspects [sic] between China and the EU, [and] deliberately overlook partnerships and hype up ‘de-risking.’”[39] The CCP-controlled English language propaganda outlet Global Times also repeated Wang’s message on December 4 regarding China and Europe choosing cooperation over de-risking.[40]
French President Emmanuel Macron and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping previously emphasized the importance of economic cooperation as well as cultural exchanges during their April meeting.[41] Chinese Premier Li Qiang similarly emphasized economic cooperation with German and French officials in late June during a visit to France and Germany.[42]
European Commission President Von der Leyen previously announced an investigation into electric vehicle subsidies in China as part of this de-risking effort during her September 15 State of the Union speech.[43] This effort, regardless of intention, runs counter to messages of economic cooperation emphasized by PRC officials towards major European economies like France or Germany.

South China Sea

The Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) announced on December 3 the presence of over 100 Chinese Maritime Militia vessels (CMM) “swarming” the Philippine-controlled Whitson Reef in the South China Sea’s (SCS) contested Spratly Islands since November 13.[44] The PCG stated the number grew to more than 135 vessels by December 3 and that the vessels have not complied with PCG warnings to disperse. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Wang Wenbin reprimanded the Philippines’ “irresponsible remarks” in a press conference on December 4, stating that the reef is China’s territory and the Chinese fishing vessels sheltered there are operating within the law.[45]

The surge in suspected CMM presence comes amid the Philippines’ completion of a coast guard “monitoring base” on nearby Thitu Island, which was formally inaugurated on December 1. Philippine National Security Adviser Eduardo Ano stated he witnessed at least 18 suspected CMM ships and a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessel off Thitu while visiting the island for the inauguration ceremony.[46]

The PRC operates hundreds of CMM ships in the SCS at any given time under the guise of fishing vessels.[47] These vessels often remain anchored for extended periods around nearby PRC military bases and contested features. The current “swarm” of 135 vessels surrounding Whitson Reef is unusually high, however. The grouping is the largest since March 2021, when a flotilla of over 220 alleged CMM vessels moored there.[48] The PRC in 2021 similarly justified the ships’ presence as sheltering from rough conditions, despite the prolonged stay of several weeks.[49]

The PRC’s deployment of non-traditional maritime power serves to further control of claimed territory while manipulating the narrative to portray challengers as aggressors. There is precedent for the PRC using the CMM to gain footholds in the SCS. CMM vessels played a role in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, which ended in the PRC wresting control of the feature from the Philippines.[50] The PRC justified its deployment of paramilitary surveillance ships to confront the Philippines Navy after the latter sought to arrest PRC militiamen for illegal fishing. The Philippines claims the PRC maintained its presence there after an agreement by both parties to withdraw their ships.[51] The PRC erected a barrier to deny entry to the shoal’s lagoon a month later.[52]

The PRC uses the CMM to challenge territorial sovereignty in the SCS more frequently than in other disputes with Japan and Taiwan. Former Rear Admiral of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Katsuya Yamamoto stated in 2019 that the CMM has played a smaller role in the PRC’s maritime incursions in the East China Sea (ECS) than the SCS.[53] Japan suffers routine harassment from Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels, however, mostly near the Senkaku Islands in the ECS. The Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) recorded 127 incursions into Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands by the CCG over the twelve months since November 30.[54] Taiwan experiences a constant flow of illegal PRC fishing vessels in its restricted waters. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported 1,081 cases of illegal fishing from PRC vessels in its restricted waters during the twelve months since October 31, resulting in 25 detainments. These instances have not escalated into conflict with the PRC military, however. Taiwan’s Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng stated on March 6 that the PRC military approached Taiwan’s contiguous zone in August 2022 and may cross it this year.[55]

Messaging from PRC leadership signals strong backing for the maritime forces’ antagonistic posturing. Xi Jinping urged the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and CCG to defend the PRC’s territorial sovereignty and maritime interests during a visit to the East China Sea Regional Command headquarters in Shanghai on December 1.[56]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 30, 2023

Click here to read the full report.

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: November 29 at Noon ET

Key Takeaways

Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou Yu-ih and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je registered as separate presidential candidates on November 24. A fragmented opposition is advantageous for Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and frontrunner Lai Ching-te but does not guarantee his victory.
A Congressional decision not to renew funding for the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) would severely undermine American and Taiwanese national security in the Pacific.
A new “action plan” for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the next ten years emphasizes cooperation in green and digital development.
People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized economic cooperation and dialogue during a November 24 meeting with French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna, likely to persuade individual European countries not to coalesce around European Union (EU) investigations targeting the PRC.
The PLA conducted live-fire exercises near its border with Myanmar to strengthen border security and deter an escalation of violence in northern Myanmar.
PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented an Israeli–Palestinian peace plan to the United Nations Security Council on November 29. Wang’s proposal is consistent with the PRC’s efforts to use the Israel-Hamas War to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States. The proposal itself is tantamount to Israeli defeat, however.

Taiwan

Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou Yu-ih and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je registered as separate presidential candidates on November 24. The parties reconvened for eleventh hour talks on November 23 in a final effort to agree on who would lead a KMT-TPP joint presidential ticket before the November 24 candidate registration deadline.[1] The failure of negotiations ended hopes for a joint ticket. Independent candidate Terry Gou, who mediated the negotiations, dropped out of the race on November 24.[2] Hou and Ko both announced their running mates on the morning of their November 24 registration. Hou’s vice-presidential pick is media personality and former legislator Jaw Shaw-kong.[3] Ko’s vice-presidential pick is TPP legislator Cynthia Wu.[4]

Jaw founded the pro-unification New Party in 1993, which formalized the separation of the New Kuomintang Alliance faction from the KMT.[5] The New Party has not had representation in the Legislative Yuan since 2012. Jaw reinstated his KMT membership in 2021.[6]
Wu is a current TPP legislator who Ko appointed to the Legislative Yuan in 2022 after the resignation of founding member Tsai Pi-ru.[7]

A fragmented opposition is advantageous for Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and frontrunner Lai Ching-te but does not guarantee his victory. The KMT’s and TPP’s failure to unite their support bases reduces the opposition’s ability to garner enough support to unseat the DPP. The latest polls show Lai’s previously wide lead of five to ten percentage points has narrowed to just a few percentage points over Hou, however.[8] Three trends have likely contributed to Hou’s rise in support. First, Hou has likely benefited from Gou’s withdrawal from the race.[9] Gou is a former KMT member whose policy platform most closely aligns with Hou. Second, Ko’s corresponding drop in polls suggests that the KMT-leaning portion of his support base is rallying back to Hou as the novelty of the TPP’s presidential debut wears off.[10] A February poll showed that 47 percent of Ko’s supporters would support Hou, with only 32 percent supporting Lai.[11] Third, Hou’s designation of Jaw as vice-presidential candidate is another contributing factor. Jaw is a high-profile figure who commands strong support in the KMT. Jaw’s public-facing roles as the host of the popular talk show Shaw-kong War Room and Chairman of the Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC) make him a recognizable candidate.[12]

The dominant election narrative continues to focus on cross-strait relations. The KMT is doubling down on the narrative that the election is a choice between war and peace. Jaw joined the chorus of KMT voices pushing this narrative during a campaign event on November 25.[13] The DPP is burnishing its reputation as the defender of democracy and freedom. A group of three DPP legislative candidates referred to themselves as the “Taiwan Defense Team,” emphasizing their commitment to rejecting interference from the PRC in Taiwan’s elections and protecting democracy.[14] Lai’s choice of former Taiwanese Representative to the US Hsiao Bi-khim as his running mate buttresses this election narrative. The DPP’s prioritization of strong ties with the US signals its desire for support in the face of threatening rhetoric and intimidation from the CCP. Lai has touted Hsiao’s foreign policy credentials and her strong relationship with the US as the pair’s biggest strength.

Compacts of Free Association

A Congressional decision to not renew funding for the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) would severely undermine American and Taiwanese national security in the Pacific. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while also granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[15] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[16] The signed agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[17] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion USD spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[18]

These three island countries control key sea-lanes that provide a secure route connecting American allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, to the United States territory of Guam and state of Hawaii. Palau and the Marshall Islands are two of the 13 countries that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[19] This international diplomatic recognition is critical to demonstrating the false nature of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) claims that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China. The loss of COFA funding would present an opportunity for the CCP to expand its economic influence with these strategically vital countries in the Pacific.

China

A new “action plan” for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the next ten years emphasizes cooperation in green and digital development. The State Council’s Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative released a document entitled “Vision and Actions for High-Quality Belt and Road Cooperation: Brighter Prospects for the Next Decade” on November 24. The document said that the BRI’s second decade would focus on international cooperation in new fields such as green and digital development, scientific and technological innovation, and health. The document also said the BRI should prioritize "small but beautiful" projects and engage in more projects with "small investment, quick results, and good economic, social and environmental benefits.” The document set five broad objectives for the next decade: building a more efficient connectivity network, deepening comprehensive and practical cooperation, enhancing the sense of gain for participating countries' peoples, establishing a new system to support China's open economy, and promoting the vision of a global community of shared future. The BRI will continue to promote its original five priorities: policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people ties.[20]

People’s Daily and Qiushi, which are CCP publications targeted at party cadre, both stressed on November 26 the need to expand the breadth and depth of cooperation in building the Belt and Road, improving the development of China–Europe freight trains, and promoting green development.[21]

New adjustments to BRI priorities partly reflect problems the initiative has faced related to environmental concerns and investment risks. The PRC has invested over one trillion dollars in various Belt and Road infrastructure projects in around 150 countries since 2013.[22] The PRC has also faced both criticism and financial risks from massive and often unprofitable BRI infrastructure projects that have burdened developing countries with debts they are unable to repay.[23] The PRC announced at the 2021 UN General Assembly that it would cease construction of overseas coal plants and increase investments in renewable energy.[24] It has adjusted to focus on “small but beautiful” projects,[25] tightened standards to improve debt sustainability,[26] and pursued less resource-intensive priorities such as the Digital Silk Road.[27]

People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized economic cooperation and dialogue during a November 24 meeting with French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna, likely to persuade individual European countries not to coalesce around European Union (EU) investigations targeting the PRC. Colonna pledged an increase in the number and duration of visas issued to Chinese students studying in France as part of an effort to facilitate Sino–French people-to-people exchanges. Colonna also stated that France counted on “the vigilance of the Chinese authorities so that no structure in China … contributes directly or indirectly to Russia’s illegal war effort in Ukraine.”[28] PRC MFA spokesman Wang Wenbin stated in a November 27 press conference that China and France agreed to deepen cooperation in economics, cultural exchanges, and emerging scientific technologies.[29]

Colonna’s meetings in the PRC are part of a larger trend of Sino-European engagement throughout 2023. French President Emmanuel Macron and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping previously emphasized the importance in the same areas of cooperation in their April meeting in Beijing.[30] EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen expressed displeasure at unfair Chinese trade practices during the April EU-French joint visit to the PRC.[31] Chinese Premier Li Qiang similarly emphasized economic cooperation with German and French officials in late June during a visit to France and Germany.[32] Li told audiences of German politicians and business figures that Germany and China do not have “fundamental conflicts of interest” and that “risk prevention and cooperation are not mutually exclusive.”[33] He also called for a “more resilient” Sino-French industrial supply chain while in France.[34] The targeted PRC efforts to increase economic cooperation with Germany and France aim to buttress an ailing Chinese economy while also preventing an EU consensus on “de-risking” from materializing and threatening Chinese financial and supply chain interests. Von der Leyen previously announced an investigation into electric vehicle subsidies in China as part of this de-risking effort during her September 15 State of the Union speech.[35] A divided EU would suit CCP objectives vis-à-vis Europe ahead of an excepted December 7–8 summit between European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President Charles Michel, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, and Premier Li Qiang.

The prolific CCP state media coverage of an upsurge in respiratory illnesses in northern China indicates that the party is fearful of appearing to be incompetent public health managers to its own citizenry in the aftermath of the pandemic. The state health apparatus responded publicly shortly after the current disease outbreak came to light, in marked contrast to the CCP’s delayed response after the start of COVID-19. Deputy Director of the Beijing Center for Disease Control and Prevention Wang Quanyi advised the wearing of face masks beginning on November 24.[36] The National Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) urged the PRC populace on November 26, particularly children and the elderly, to receive vaccinations against respiratory diseases.[37] English and Chinese language state media reported that this upsurge occurred due to the circulation of known pathogens among the populace. It further stated that these pathogens cause diseases such as influenza, adenovirus, and mycoplasma pneumonia.[38]

The guidance to wear masks aims to prevent disease spread and demonstrate that the CCP-controlled governmental organs can effectively manage initial disease outbreaks without worldwide consequences like COVID-19. The public governmental response differed from the party’s response at the beginning of COVID-19, when the Public Security Bureau investigated whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang before he died from COVID-19 in February 2020.[39] The CCP’s English- and Chinese-language messaging indicate that the party aims to avoid recreating the image of irresponsible negligence that it endured in the aftermath of Li’s death.

The PLA conducted live-fire exercises near its border with Myanmar to strengthen border security and deter an escalation of violence in northern Myanmar. The PLA Southern Theater Command announced the start of three days of live-fire military drills in southwest Yunnan Province near the border with Myanmar on November 25.[40] The PLA deployed multiple types of artillery and counter-battery radars as part of the drills. It claimed that these exercises were intended to test rapid maneuvering, border blockade, and fire strike capabilities.[41] A PLA Daily editorial on November 26 called for an immediate ceasefire in northern Myanmar. This call is consistent with statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 16, 20, and 28.[42] Northern Myanmar has been engulfed in violence since a “brotherhood alliance” of three ethnic rebel groups launched attacks on Myanmar’s military junta government on October 27.[43] The violence has nearly ended legal PRC–Myanmar cross-border trade,[44] caused an unknown number of Chinese casualties,[45] and sent thousands of refugees to seek safety in the PRC.[46]

One of the rebel groups claimed to have seized a key border gate and trading point on November 25, the same day the PLA exercises began.[47] About 120 trucks in a convoy carrying building materials and consumer goods from the PRC into Myanmar were destroyed by fire on November 24 in what the Myanmar government called a “terrorist attack.”[48] Local insurgents denied responsibility.[49]

Israel-Hamas War

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented an Israeli–Palestinian peace plan to the United Nations Security Council on November 29. The PRC is president of the UN Security Council for the month of November.[50] Wang called for implementing a “comprehensive cease-fire” and releasing “people in captivity,” providing humanitarian supplies to Gaza, and pursuing the two-state solution.[51] His proposal came after CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping stated his desire on November 21 for “all parties” to implement an immediate ceasefire, end collective punishments against the people of Gaza, allow the flow of humanitarian relief, and prevent the conflict from spreading across the Middle East.[52]

Wang’s proposal is consistent with the PRC’s efforts to use the Israel–Hamas war to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and state propaganda outlets have repeatedly condemned violence between Palestine and Israel since October 7 but never condemned Hamas. They continue to call for an immediate ceasefire and promote a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.[53] The PRC’s targeted criticism of Israel and call for an immediate ceasefire align with the views of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Arab states.[54] The PRC MFA and state-owned outlets, such as the Global Times, previously criticized US support for Israel and claimed that the PRC has no “selfish interest” in the conflict and is committed to bringing peace and justice.[55] The PRC proposal would be tantamount to a defeat for Israel, as CTP and ISW reported on November 29.[56]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 22, 2023 

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War 

Data Cutoff: November 21 at Noon ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments. 

Key Takeaways

The TPP-KMT deal to form a joint presidential ticket broke down after the parties failed to reach a consensus on who would head the ticket. TPP candidate Ko Wen-je is signaling he is prepared to run as a solo candidate but left open the possibility of reaching a new deal by November 24.
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied the validity of alternative regional security frameworks in response to the Philippines’ calls to establish an ASEAN-led South China Sea code of conduct.
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping called for convening a “more authoritative international peace conference” to promote a “just and lasting solution to the Palestinian issue” during a speech at a special BRICS leaders video summit on November 21.

Taiwan

The TPP-KMT deal to form a joint presidential ticket broke down after the parties failed to reach a consensus on who would head the ticket. Ko Wen-je and KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-Ih agreed on November 15 to form a joint presidential ticket to challenge DPP candidate Lai Ching-te. They agreed to use public opinion polls conducted from November 7-17 to determine which of them would lead the presidential ticket and to announce the results on November 18. The parties agreed to a point system in which a candidate would receive one “point” for each poll in which a ticket led by that candidate had more support against Lai than a ticket led by the other candidate. The deal included a concession by Ko that he would accept as a “loss” any poll result in which the difference between him and Hou fell within the margin of error.[1] Disagreements over the definition of this “margin of error” led to disagreement on the outcome on November 18, however. The KMT claims Hou won 5 of the 6 polls, while the TPP claims Ko and Hou tied 3-3.[2]

Hou, Ko, and former Taiwan president Ma Ying-Jeou (a KMT member, who mediated the deal) each designated a statistician to evaluate six polls that compared how a joint ticket led by each candidate would fare against Lai Ching-te. The “winner” in each poll would be whichever version of the joint ticket achieved a higher lead over Lai. If the difference between a Hou-Ke and a Ke-Hou joint ticket fell within the margin of error, Hou would be given the victory for that poll.[3]
Ko’s main concession in the negotiation was his offer to accept a loss on any polls that showed the difference between him and Hou to be within the margin of error (estimated at 3%). Ko made this concession on November 3 after consistently polling above Hou for several weeks.[4] However, Hou closed the gap and even surpassed Ko in many polls during the last two weeks.[5] Including this concession in the deal significantly hurt Ko’s performance against Hou. When ignoring the margin of error, a Ko-Hou ticket outperformed a Hou-Ko ticket in five of the six polls.[6]
Ko Wen-je claimed that the KMT demanded he concede on a 6% margin of error rather than the 3% margin he wanted, however. KMT Chairman Eric Chu denied the allegation and said a 3% margin of error means “plus or minus 3,” for a total range of six percentage points. Under Ko’s definition, a “3% margin of error” would mean 1.5 percentage points in either direction.[7] 3% is just an approximation as each poll has its own margin of error depending on its sample size, however.

Taiwanese media reported that the KMT-TPP agreement on November 15 was unfavorable to Ko, but it more closely resembles Ko’s earlier demands than any past proposal by the KMT.[8] Ko has consistently insisted the lead candidate of a joint ticket be determined by a nationwide poll. The KMT initially advocated for a primary election but dropped this demand because there was insufficient time before the November 24 candidate registration deadline. Later proposals by the KMT, such as incorporating polls of overall party support rather than just candidate support, or asking legislative nominees to vote, were also dropped.[9] The KMT also agreed to drop three of the initial nine polls it proposed to use in the November 15 deal, which the TPP perceived as favorable to the KMT.[10]

Independent presidential candidate Terry Gou privately met with Ko Wen-je the day after the breakdown in the KMT-TPP deal and on November 22 released communications records from November 21 and 22 showing he has been trying to facilitate cooperation between Ko and Hou. According to the records, Gou met with Ko on November 22 and called Hou multiple times. The records also said that Ko agreed to meet Gou and Hou in person on the same day in a meeting described as being focused on combining the KMT, TPP, and Gou’s power to assist in achieving cooperation.[11] There is no evidence that this latter meeting happened as of late November 22.[12] Gou said when he announced his candidacy in August that his goal was to consolidate the anti-DPP opposition.[13] His actions on these two days are consistent with that goal. Running as an independent presidential candidate would further fragment the anti-DPP camp, however.

TPP candidate Ko Wen-je is signaling he is prepared to run as a solo candidate but left open the possibility of reaching a new deal by November 24. Ko told supporters on November 19 that he would not betray them and “fight to the end as the TPP candidate.”[14] He further said KMT-TPP cooperation may require working “to the last second” to ensure the strongest candidate would lead the ticket.[15] Hou Yu-Ih said on November 21 that he would wait for Ko Wen-je “until the last minute.”[16] He proposed each party name two statisticians to re-evaluate the nine polls originally designated in the KMT-TPP deal and broadcast the process, but Ko rejected this proposal.[17] KMT Chairman Eric Chu said November 22 was the KMT’s deadline to come to a deal,[18] but no deal has been reached as of late November 22 local time.

November 24 is the deadline for candidate registration. KMT-TPP cooperation has wide support from the constituencies of both parties and is seen as the only way to defeat frontrunner Lai Ching-te.[19]

The breakdown of the KMT-TPP joint ticket deal benefits Lai Ching-te, who is the only registered presidential candidate for the election as of 22 November. The fracturing of KMT-TPP cooperation allows the DPP to present itself as a united front in contrast to its opposition. Polling data suggests that Lai will be the frontrunner in the election, as he has consistently led in the polls. The absence of a joint KMT-TPP ticket removes a major obstacle to a Lai victory. Most polls, including the six that the KMT and TPP used in their negotiations, suggest that a joint ticket would enable the opposition parties to outperform the DPP in the elections regardless of whether Ko or Hou heads the joint ticket. Lai announced on November 20 that he had chosen Taiwan’s representative to the United States Hsiao Bi-khim as his running mate. Hsiao resigned her post and the two officially registered their candidacy.[20]

Independent presidential candidate Terry Gou has not registered his candidacy as of November 22. Gou officially met the signature threshold to qualify as a candidate on November 14, six days ahead of the November 20 opening of candidate registration.[21] Gou is in a distant fourth place in the polls. His participation in the election would further fragment the opposition to the DPP.[22]

PRC security developments

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denied the validity of alternative regional security frameworks in response to the Philippines’ calls to establish an ASEAN-led South China Sea (SCS) code of conduct (COC). ASEAN and the PRC signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in 2002, a non-binding document that aimed to establish a framework for a subsequent formal COC.[23] The parties have failed to solidify a binding code during the last two decades amid the PRC’s aggressive militarization of the SCS.[24] Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. stated the Philippines recently appealed to Malaysia and Vietnam to construct an ASEAN-led COC to establish a binding framework during a speech in Hawaii on November 19.[25] MFA Spokesperson Mao Ning declared “any agreement that deviates from the DOC framework is invalid” during a press conference on November 20.[26] The lack of unity among ASEAN and other Asia-Pacific nations ensures the PRC’s dominant military presence in the SCS remains unchallenged by a unified regional front.

The PRC’s statements align with its strategy to thwart cohesion among Asia-Pacific nations in maritime security cooperation. PRC narratives consistently portray efforts to promote cohesion in Asia-Pacific security as disruptive to regional stability. State media outlet Global Times accused recent Japanese joint naval exercises with countries like the Philippines, Australia, and South Korea of bowing to a US-led containment strategy against the PRC.[27] The PRC Ministry of National Defense rebuked Japan’s decision to share radar equipment with the Philippine military on November 16, labeling Japan a disruptor in the SCS.[28]

President Xi Jinping lobbied for Fiji’s support on “core issues” and advocated for a stronger “comprehensive strategic partnership” during a meeting with Prime Minister Sitivena Rebuka at the APEC forum on November 16.[29] Xi also pledged the PRC’s cooperation in the “Belt and Road” initiative, infrastructure, agriculture, and more to assist with Fiji's economic and social development.[30] This is consistent with the PRC’s strategy of shoring up ties with non-US-aligned partners to strengthen its regional security foothold. The PRC’s increasing diplomatic and economic engagement with Pacific Island states highlights the strategic importance of those states to furthering the PRC’s security ambitions in the Asia-Pacific.

PRC state media emphasized the benefits that the Solomon Islands has reaped from the PRC’s diplomatic and economic support in its coverage of the 2023 Pacific Games, an Oceania-focused multi-sport event that the Solomon Islands is hosting. The Global Times lauded the two countries’ “comprehensive strategic partnership” as mutually beneficial, in contrast to the “colonial mindset” of the West.[31] The Global Times’ framing is consistent with the PRC’s efforts to style itself as a benevolent partner and present an alternative to what it characterizes as exploitative Western-style diplomacy. The PRC’s close political support and infrastructure assistance to the Solomon Islands has already won its political victories. In 2022, the two nations signed a security pact that allows PRC vessels to replenish there and authorizes the deployment of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel to “maintain social order.”[32]

The PRC continues to use intimidation tactics to deter foreign military presence around the PRC. Australia’s Department of Defence revealed a Chinese warship sent out a sonar pulse in proximity to an Australian naval vessel in the East China Sea on November 14, injuring a diver.[33] The Australian vessel was within Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and en route for a port visit.

This incident is the latest in a string of recent maritime confrontations between the PRC and foreign militaries. A PRC fighter jet intercepted a US Air Force bomber over international airspace in the SCS on October 24, flying within ten feet of the aircraft.[34] A PRC military aircraft confronted a Canadian Navy helicopter over international waters near the Paracel Islands on October 29, forcing the helicopter to take evasive action.[35]

Israel-Hamas War

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping called for convening a “more authoritative international peace conference” to promote a “just and lasting solution to the Palestinian issue” during a speech at a special BRICS leaders video summit on November 21. He also stated his desire for an immediate ceasefire, ending collective punishments against the people of Gaza, the necessity for humanitarian relief, and preventing the conflict from spreading across the Middle East.[36] His speech aimed to portray the PRC as a responsible international leader of non-Western countries by rhetorically supporting the Palestinian cause.

The PRC leadership probably intends to side with the Palestinian cause in the event of an “authoritative” peace conference. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi on November 20 called for Israel to “stop collective punishment of the people of Gaza” during a meeting with Arab leaders in Beijing.[37] Wang had met with officials from 18 countries and international organizations to discuss the Gaza war from October 8 to November 8, as ISW previously noted.[38] There have been no meetings between the PRC and Israel since Wang called Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen on October 24 to urge him to prevent the war from escalating.[39]

Xi and Wang’s comments are consistent with the PRC’s efforts to use the Israel-Hamas War to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and state propaganda outlets have repeatedly condemned violence between Palestine and Israel since October 7 but never condemned Hamas. They continue to call for an immediate ceasefire and promote a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.[40] The PRC’s targeted criticism of Israel and call for an immediate ceasefire align with the views of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Arab states.[41] The lack of a tangible PRC articulated plan to bring about this ceasefire led to frustrated questioning by an Al Jazeera reporter at a November 15 PRC MFA press conference.[42]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 17, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: November 16 at Noon ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its suppression of dissents by targeting overseas Chinese expatriate critics.
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam will participate in the Aman Youyi 2023 military exercise with People’s Liberation Army forces for the first time, which buttresses CCP efforts to construct a Sino-centric regional security order.
US President Joe Biden and PRC President Xi Jinping announced the resumption of US-PRC military-to-military talks and cooperation to combat illegal fentanyl production after their meeting in San Francisco.
The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and Kuomintang (KMT) overcame the biggest hurdle to forming a joint presidential ticket on November 15 and plan to announce the ticket order on November 18.
The PRC continued using the Israel-Hamas War to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States while framing Israel as the driver of the war. The PRC has also expanded its diplomatic outreach in the Middle East while building its image as an important and fair broker in the region.

China

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its suppression of dissents by targeting overseas Chinese expatriate critics. The party previously targeted the owner of the “Teacher Li is Not Your Teacher” X account in December. The owner is a PRC national living in Italy who published videos of dissent in the PRC amid the end of the Zero-Covid policy from November to December 2022.[1] The party has since expanded its reach to also target dissidents in the United States, such as Jiajun Qiu, by a combination of internet and potential overseas in-person harassment. The Chinese Ministry of Public Security complements these threatening messages by running secret police stations in locations such as New York City to induce fear into diaspora communities and coerce dissidents into silence.[2] These police stations serve as the enforcement mechanism to induce fear into individuals, such as Qiu. Their presence, regardless of whether undercover agents follow dissidents, such as Qiu, presents an omnipresent sense of fear and tension to these individuals to coerce them into silence.

The local police visited the “Teacher Li is Not Your Teacher” X account owner’s parents’ house in the PRC at midnight to intimidate them into persuading their son to stop posting. The police repeated these visits at differing hours, but the X account owner continued to post despite his parents’ pleas.[3] This demonstrates that the party previously used domestic harassment to achieve political goals that involved overseas expatriate critics.
CNN reported on November 13 that Qiu faces dozens of accounts impersonating him as well as threats to his safety from unidentified sources that he claims have ties to the CCP.[4] Qiu said that “every day I live in a sense of fear,” which reflects the persistent pressure that the CCP aims to inflict on expatriate citizens.[5]

Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam will participate in the Aman Youyi 2023 military exercise with the People’s Liberation Army forces for the first time, which buttresses CCP efforts to construct a Sino-centric regional security order. [6] The CCP seeks to develop a regional security architecture where it is the primary power broker rather than the United States.[7] The trend of growing military to military relationships between the PRC and these three countries fits into this regional vision. Aman Youyi began as a bilateral Sino-Malaysian exercise in 2014, before Thailand joined in 2018.[8] The expansion of the exercise to include Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam demonstrates and messages the tangible impacts of this architecture. The 2023 iteration is also the first year that Aman Youyi will occur in Chinese waters, off the coast of Zhanjiang, Guangdong.[9] The exercise occurring in Chinese waters reinforces the image of a Sino-centric security architecture.

Cambodia already conducts periodic military exercises with the PLA, such as Golden Dragon.[10] Laos began to do so in 2023 with the Friendship Shield exercise.[11] Vietnam also conducted a joint patrol with the People’s Republic of China Coast Guard in April. This was the first time the two countries' coast guard leaders jointly commanded a patrol.[12]

US President Joe Biden and PRC President Xi Jinping announced the resumption of US-PRC military-to-military talks and cooperation to combat illegal fentanyl production after their meeting in San Francisco. PRC President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden met in San Francisco on November 15 on the sidelines of the APEC Leaders’ Meeting to discuss a variety of issues affecting US-China relations. The two had not met since November 14, 2022, in Bali, Indonesia. A White House official readout after the meeting and PRC state media said the two had agreed to resume bilateral cooperation to combat global illicit drug manufacturing and trafficking and high-level military-to-military talks. PRC officials and state media described the meeting as “positive, comprehensive, and constructive.”[13] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs also strongly criticized Biden’s comment after the meeting that Xi was a “dictator” but did not publicize the controversy.

Biden and Xi announced they would resume cooperation to combat global illicit drug manufacturing and trafficking, including synthetic drugs like fentanyl, and establish a working group for ongoing communication and law enforcement coordination on counternarcotics issues.[14]
Biden and Xi agreed to resume high-level military-to-military communications, the U.S.-China Defense Policy Coordination Talks, and the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings, as well as telephone conversations between theater commanders.[15] The PRC severed such talks with the United States in August 2022 following then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. President Biden said before the meeting that resuming military-to-military talks was his goal.[16]
President Biden maintained that Xi Jinping was a “dictator” in comments after his meeting with Xi. Reuters reported the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson called these comments “extremely wrong and irresponsible political manipulation” during her November 16 press conference.[17] The spokesperson’s comments on this topic were omitted from the MFA’s readouts of the press conference.[18]

Biden and Xi affirmed the need to address the risks of advanced AI systems and improve AI safety through US-PRC government talks and agreed to establish an inter-governmental dialogue on artificial intelligence.[19] The PLA has invested billions of dollars in AI systems for military use.[20] Differences between the United States and PRC in ethical and operational regulatory limits for AI systems remain unclear and are a potential point of friction.

The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post exclusively reported on November 11 that “sources familiar with the matter” said the two sides would pledge a ban on artificial intelligence in autonomous weaponry and in the control and deployment of nuclear warheads.[21] No such ban was announced after the meeting as of noon Eastern Time on November 16.
The PRC also has not endorsed the US-led Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, which aims to build international consensus on regulating military AI.[22]

Biden and Xi also discussed a wide range of other issues affecting US-China relations, including Taiwan, human rights, trade, climate change, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the Israel-Palestine conflict.[23] They praised agreements reached by the US and PRC climate envoys before the meeting but did not announce agreements on any of these other topics.

U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry and China Special Envoy for Climate Change Xie Zhenhua met in Sunnylands, California from November 4-7 and released a joint statement on November 14. They agreed to resume talks on climate cooperation, including curbing methane and plastic pollution, and to operationalize the Working Group on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s.[24]

Taiwan

The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and Kuomintang (KMT) overcame the biggest hurdle to forming a joint presidential ticket on November 15 and plan to announce the ticket order on November 18. TPP candidate Ko Wen-je and KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih agreed on a method to determine the ticket order for the joint ticket. The issue was a key sticking point that stalled progress on cooperation since the two parties entered formal negotiations on October 14.[25] The two parties agreed to use opinion polls from November 7-17 to determine the selection of a joint candidate but did not specify which polls they will consider.[26] The parties will appoint their own polling statisticians to contribute additional internal polls and determine which public polls qualify.[27] This outcome is consistent with ISW’s earlier assessments that the two parties would unite under a joint ticket before the candidate registration deadline on November 24.[28]

The parties agreed to a point system in which a candidate will receive one “point” for each poll in which he has more support than the other candidate. This means that the candidate leading in a poll wins one point.

The November 15 agreement provides Hou with an advantage in the selection process in polls where he is trailing behind Ko by a number of percentage points smaller than the margin of error.[29] If, for example, a poll shows Ko ahead of Hou by 2.5 percentage points but the margin of error is 3 percentage points, Hou would take the point.

The data from several polls within the November 7-17 timeframe indicates the advantage provided to Hou could be the deciding factor in the evaluation process. A landline poll from CNEWS released on November 13 showed Ko polling at 0.2 percentage points higher than Hou.[30] This difference is less than the poll’s 2.17 percent margin of error. As a result, Hou would win the point for this poll. A poll from United Daily News released on November 14 shows support for a Ko-led ticket is one percentage point higher than support for a Hou-led ticket.[31] This difference is less than the poll’s 2.9 percent margin of error. Hou would once again win the point for this poll.

The polls that the parties decide to use could have a significant role in selecting the presidential candidate for the joint ticket. Levels of candidate support vary widely across polls according to each polling organization’s specific survey scenarios and methods. These considerations will affect the outcome of the evaluation process.

Taiwan’s election authorities confirmed independent candidate Terry Gou’s eligibility to run on November 14.[32] However, some polls do not consider Gou’s candidacy when surveying respondents. Gou’s inclusion in the polls to determine the presidential candidate could be disproportionately helpful or harmful to Ko or Hou, depending on the poll.
Differences in polling numbers are wider in polls that measure individual candidate support. Differences in polling numbers are narrower in polls that compare support for a Ko-led joint ticket versus a Hou-led joint ticket. Using polls that compare support between Ko-led and Hou-led joint tickets is more favorable to Hou because the difference is more likely to fall within a given poll’s margin of error.[33]
Polling methodology has implications for the evaluation process. Generally, polls conducted by mobile phone emphasize Ko’s popularity over Hou, while polls that use a higher proportion of landline phones reflect higher levels of support for Hou.[34]

The formation of a KMT-TPP joint ticket will significantly diminish Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and frontrunner Lai Ching-te’s chances of victory. Most polls suggest that a KMT-TPP joint ticket would outperform the DPP in the elections, regardless of the presidential candidate on the joint ticket.[35] A Ko-led ticket will likely pose an especially difficult challenge for the DPP, which shares a similar voter demographic to the TPP.[36]

The KMT and TPP would need to form a coalition government in the case their joint ticket wins in the presidential election. Such a coalition is unprecedented in Taiwan’s history. The agreement that the two parties reached on November 15 arranged for a joint TPP-KMT committee to manage the presidential ticket and selection of legislative candidates for the coalition. The agreement also stipulates that positions in policymaking institutions will be allocated based on proportional representation in the legislature, except for matters of defense, diplomacy, and cross-strait relations.[37] The KMT currently holds 38 seats in the Legislative Yuan and the TPP holds 5 seats. Reconciliation over policy differences will be an obstacle for the two parties in a coalition government because they hold disparate views on cross-strait policy and engagement with the Chinese Communist Party.[38]

Israel-Hamas War

The PRC continued using the Israel-Hamas War to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States while framing Israel as the driver of the war. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and state propaganda outlets have repeatedly condemned violence between Palestine and Israel since October 7 but never condemned Hamas. They continued to call for an immediate ceasefire and promoted a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.[39] PRC MFA officials maintained their strong condemnation of Israeli military actions in the Gaza Strip and called them beyond the scope of self-defense.[40] The MFA strongly condemned the violence around the al-Shifa Hospital and the bombing of the UN compound in Gaza.[41] State media outlet Global Times strongly implied Israel was responsible for bombing the al-Shifa hospital and criticized the United States and its allies for their “perfunctory” response to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.[42] The PRC’s targeted criticism of Israel and call for an immediate ceasefire align with the views of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Arab states.[43]

The PRC’s call for a two-state solution aligns with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states but differs from Iran. Iran rejects a two-state solution.[44]

PRC Deputy Representative to the UN Geng Shuang condemned comments by an Israeli official about using nuclear weapons in Gaza.[45] Israel Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu said on November 5 that Israel could drop a nuclear bomb in the Gaza Strip.[46] Geng criticized the comment as “extremely irresponsible and disturbing.” Geng’s statement did not mention that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu disavowed Eliyahu’s comments and indefinitely suspended him from his post.[47] Geng further urged Israel to accede to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a non-nuclear weapon state and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.[48]

The PRC has also expanded its diplomatic outreach in the Middle East while building its image as an important and fair broker in the region. PRC officials have highlighted the PRC’s diplomatic efforts to meet with Middle Eastern states and other relevant actors to bring an end to the violence.[49] These actions also serve to garner support as a leader in the international system, especially with the Global South. The PRC also backed the first United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution about the Gaza Strip.

The MFA said on November 8 that Foreign Minister Wang Yi had met with officials from 18 countries and international organizations to discuss the Gaza war.[50] Wang had meetings or calls with only two high-ranking Middle Eastern officials in the two months prior to October 7.[51]
MFA Department of West Asian and North African Affairs Director-General Wang Di met with Iran’s Foreign Ministry Deputy for Political Affairs Ali Bagheri and other Iranian officials on November 11. The event was the first bilateral meeting between PRC and Iranian officials since the war in Gaza began. Iranian officials said they hoped to work with the PRC to de-escalate the war.[52]
The UN Security Council passed its first resolution on the Gaza war on November 15. The resolution called for “urgent and extended” humanitarian pauses and corridors in the Gaza Strip to allow the provision of essential goods and services. It also called for Hamas and other groups to release all hostages. The PRC voted for the resolution and promoted its implementation in official statements and state media. The PRC is the rotating president of the UN Security Council in November.[53] The United States, UK, and Russia abstained from the vote.[54]

The MFA did not confirm claims by senior Hamas official Ali Baraka on November 2 that a Hamas delegation will soon visit Beijing but said the PRC “maintained close communication with relevant parties.” In the same statement, Baraka also claimed that “China and Russia met with the leaders of Hamas,” possibly referring to Russian and Chinese Middle East envoys visiting Doha, Qatar, on October 20.[55] ISW cannot confirm a direct meeting between PRC and Hamas officials. Doha hosts a Hamas political office and has been the site of ongoing Qatar-mediated negotiations between Israel and Hamas since the war in Gaza began, however.[56]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 10, 2023

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Ian Jones of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: November 7 at 5pm ET

Taiwanese Presidential Election

The negotiations between the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and Kuomintang (KMT) about forming a joint presidential ticket have stalled. TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je and KMT chairman Eric Chu agreed on October 30 to inter-party cooperation for the January 13 legislative elections.[1] The parties have not agreed to a joint ticket since their initial meeting on October 31, however. Disagreement about how to determine the ticket order remains the key hurdle.[2] Each party favors the method that would most likely ensure it heads a joint ticket. The progress the parties make during future meetings will be the basis for future assessments, as ISW previously noted.[3] The fast-approaching November 24 candidate registration deadline will impose a practical constraint on the feasibility of implementing any selection process.

KMT chairman Eric Chu proposed two options for selecting which candidate would lead the joint ticket during a phone call with Ko on November 2.[4] Chu’s first proposal entailed an anonymous vote by all opposition legislative candidates to decide the presidential candidate.[5] The second proposal would consider a calculation of party popularity as a factor.[6] The KMT offered to give equal consideration to a public poll in both cases. Ko rejected both proposals as disproportionately favoring the KMT.[7]
Ko continues to insist on using a public poll to decide the order of a joint ticket and is messaging that he will not accept the KMT’s alternatives.[8] He cast doubt over the two parties’ ability reach a consensus during a campaign event on November 3.[9]

The impetus for TPP-KMT cooperation to form a joint presidential ticket remains, however. Polling data indicates that the parties will need a joint ticket to overcome Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te’s consistent lead.[10] A majority of polls suggest that a joint ticket would enable the parties to outperform the DPP in the elections regardless of who heads the joint ticket.[11] The entry of independent candidate Terry Gou into the presidential race is also an incentive for the parties to form a joint ticket, as Gou’s candidacy will draw support and votes from the TPP and KMT.

An October 24 poll from the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) showed Ko and Hou are trailing Lai by 4.1% and 8.6%, respectively, even though Lai’s lead has diminished during the last several weeks.[12]
Terry Gou’s campaign office announced on November 2 it has collected over one million signatures, three times the required amount. Gou’s campaign is awaiting certification from the Central Election Commission (CEC).[13]

South China Sea military tensions

The PRC instigated two aggressive encounters with US-allied militaries in the South China Sea (SCS) between October 29 and November 6. Canada’s military disclosed on November 3 that PRC military aircraft confronted a Canadian Navy helicopter over international waters near the Paracel Islands on October 29.[14] The helicopter took evasive action in response. A People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warship and militia vessels followed a US Navy ship within 12 nautical miles of the Taiwan-controlled Itu Aba (Taiping) Island in the South China Sea on November 6.

The PRC falsely blamed the United States and its allies for these types of aggressive interactions in the SCS. The PRC pointed to the United States’ “increased regional military deployment, close-up reconnaissance, and encouragement of other parties’ infringement” in the SCS.[15] A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs official made the statement during bilateral maritime security talks on November 3, which followed US reassurances to the Philippines after PRC Coast Guard Vessels obstructed a Philippine resupply mission in the Second Scarborough Shoal.[16] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized Canada’s “so-called reconnaissance activities” as “inappropriate.”[17] Such statements that frame the US and allied military presence in the SCS as unlawful and provocative are consistent with ISW’s assessment that the PRC is shaping the information environment to blame the United States for geopolitical confrontations.

Israel-Hamas war

The PRC is using the Israel-Palestinian war to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and state propaganda outlets repeatedly condemned violence between Palestine and Israel since October 7 but never condemned Hamas. They repeatedly said the core of the conflict was the absence of a Palestinian state and promoted a two-state solution. [18] The PRC’s messaging indicates that it supports the Palestinian cause to gain diplomatic influence among Middle Eastern countries sympathetic to Palestine. Beijing’s diplomatic efforts in the UN and bilaterally show an effort to build an image as an important and fair mediator in the Middle East and to garner support as a leader in the international system.

The MFA and state-owned outlets, such as The Global Times, criticized US support for Israel and re-iterated that the PRC has no “selfish interest” in the conflict and is committed to bringing peace and justice.[19] PRC officials also discussed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the United States, EU, and Middle Eastern countries including Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE.[20]
The PRC assumed the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council on November 1 and stated that its top priority in that role would be to promote a ceasefire and an end to the Israel-Hamas war, prevent more civilian casualties, prevent larger-scale humanitarian disasters, and prevent the conflict from spilling over.[21]

The PRC extended a naval deployment in the Middle East during the Israel-Hamas war, possibly as a means of increasing its influence in the Middle East. The PLAN 44th Escort Task Force completed a routine escort mission in the Gulf of Aden on October 2 but remained in the vicinity to conduct a series of “goodwill visits” in Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE until November 3. The Oman and UAE visits included joint maritime exercises with the navies of those countries.[22] The task force’s departure on November 3 makes it unlikely that its extended presence was meant to respond to contingencies related to the Israeli-Palestinian violence since the violence is still ongoing. The establishment of PRC naval facilities in the Middle East would support future PLAN deployments.

US President Joe Biden reportedly received a briefing about PRC-Oman negotiations in October to build a PLA military facility in an unspecified location in Oman. The facility would complement China’s other overseas base in Djibouti and would place a permanent PLA facility near a key chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz.[23]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 2, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: November 1 at 5pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) agreed to cooperation in the legislative elections and will likely form a joint presidential ticket before the January 13 presidential election.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is interfering in the Taiwanese election in order to harm the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) chances of victory in the January 13 presidential and legislative elections.
High-level meetings between PRC and United States officials are unlikely to mitigate People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military coercion targeting Taiwan.
The PRC is shaping the information environment to blame the United States for potential future geopolitical incidents in the South China Sea.
The PRC is using the Israel-Hamas War to enhance its image as an international mediator in the Middle East.

Taiwanese Presidential Election

The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) agreed to cooperation in the legislative elections and will likely form a joint presidential ticket before the January 13 presidential election. TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je and KMT chairman Eric Chu agreed on October 30 to inter-party cooperation for the January 13 legislative elections.[1] KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih previously stated on October 26 that there was no longer time to conduct a national primary or poll to determine the lead of a hypothetical joint KMT-TPP presidential ticket. Hou and Ko agreed that day to enter into party-to-party negotiations in the unspecified future to decide on whether to form a joint presidential ticket.[2] This rendered moot the prior sticking point between the parties on deciding whether to use a primary or poll to determine the composition of the presidential ticket. Ko, Hou, and Chu held an initial meeting to start the party-to-party negotiations on October 31.[3] These meetings are tangible progress towards the forming of a joint ticket. The progress of future meetings will be the basis for future assessments. There is majority support among the KMT and TPP bases for a joint ticket, according to the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation. [4] This further incentivizes the candidates to form a joint ticket.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is interfering in the Taiwanese election in order to harm the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) chances of victory in the January 13 presidential and legislative elections. The CCP interferes in the Taiwanese election to prevent DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te from winning and prevent the DPP from retaining its majority in the Legislative Yuan. The CPP views Lai and the DPP as “separatists” that threaten the status quo. [5]

DPP spokesperson Chang Chih-hao alleged that the CCP manipulated polls, used tax inspection and land survey investigations, forced Taiwanese businesspeople to express pro-PRC political positions, subsidized airfare for Taiwanese pro-China figures to return to Taiwan, and employed other forms of economic and military coercion to interfere in the election.[6] “Tax inspections and land survey investigations” refer to the October 22 PRC probes into Foxconn, the company founded by independent presidential candidate Terry Gou.[7] These probes create a financial incentive for Gou to comply with CCP objectives in order to placate the investigators. The PRC state media outlet Global Times criticized Terry Gou for being a spoiler candidate and dividing the anti-DPP opposition on multiple occasions. An October 22 Global Times article that disclosed the Foxconn probes reiterated this point about Gou and implicitly linked the probes to the election.[8] The Republic of China’s (ROC) Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) also seized NT$11.5 billion (US$354.6 million) in illegal inward remittances and warned that unspecified foreign actors are using remote funding, internet betting, and cognitive warfare to influence the January 2024 presidential and legislative elections. The MJIB did not specify the origin of the illegal remittances but said it would increase monitoring of PRC nationals coming to Taiwan on the pretext of “social interaction.” The MJIB said unspecified organizations use offshore funding from remittances to make donations to political candidates via Taiwanese businesspeople.[9]

An unnamed Taiwanese “senior government official” said on October 29 that the Executive Yuan had established a task force to combat election disinformation by the PRC. The official said that the PRC has built a network within Taiwan’s religious communities and that disinformation proliferated through these communities.[10] Members of Taiwanese Buddhist organizations like Fo Guang Shan and Mazu-worshiping organizations like the Taiwan Matsu Fellowship have met with officials from the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office and United Front Work Department at various cross-strait exchanges.[11]

Sino-American Relations

High-level meetings between PRC and United States officials are unlikely to mitigate People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military coercion targeting Taiwan. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Secretary of State Antony Blinken on October 26 and President Joe Biden on October 27.[12] Reuters reported on October 31 that the meetings led to an agreement in principle for Xi and Biden to meet in San Francisco in November.[13] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesman Wang Wenbin stated on October 30 that the “road to San Francisco will not be a smooth journey,” indicating persisting friction points in Sino-American relations such as the United States’ regional military presence.[14] Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia struck a similar tone on October 30 at the Xiangshan Forum on International Security when he accused the United States of “meddling in regional affairs.”[15] He also declared the Chinese military would “never show mercy” to those who want to separate Taiwan from China.[16] The meetings preceded unannounced October 31 PLA drills to Taiwan’s southeast by the Shandong aircraft carrier strike group.[17] The Shandong’s deployment on October 26 and subsequent commencement of drills corresponded to spikes in Taiwan ADIZ violations by People’s Liberation Army Air Force aircraft.[18] The PRC rhetoric in conjunction with the ongoing unannounced military drills indicates that high-level Sino-American diplomatic engagement will not translate to easing military pressure on Taiwan.

The PRC is shaping the information environment to blame the United States for potential future geopolitical incidents in the South China Sea. The PRC state-controlled China Global Television Network (CGTN) aired an October 29 interview with Lieutenant General He Lei accusing the United States of arrogantly interfering in the Sino-Philippines territorial disputes in the South China Sea.[19] This echoes PRC MFA spokeswoman Mao Ning’s condemnation of United States “interference” in the South China Sea amidst Sino-Philippines territorial disputes.[20] Her comments occurred after the PRC Coast Guard rammed Philippine ships near the Second Thomas Shoal on October 22.[21] This PRC aggression extends to a growing trend of People’s Liberation Army Air Force planes dangerously operating near United States aircraft in the East and South China Sea since 2021, according to images declassified by the United States Department of Defense.[22] The China Military Power Report stated the United States has documented in excess of 180 such instances since 2021.[23] The CCP inaccurately placing blame on the United States for interfering in the South China Sea indicates that the party’s false rhetoric aims to provide cover for coercive People’s Liberation Army military activity. This activity aims to degrade the American-led security architecture.

Israel-Hamas War

The PRC is using the Israel-Hamas War to enhance its image as an international mediator in the Middle East. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and state propaganda outlets repeatedly condemned violence between Palestine and Israel since October 7 but never condemned Hamas.[24] The PRC Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs Zhai Jun emphasized the necessity of a two-state solution during an October 29 interview with the radio station Voice of Palestine. He stated that the root cause of the conflict was the lack of a Palestinian state.[25] Zhai also called for a ceasefire while meeting with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi on October 30.[26] This messaging indicates that the PRC supports the Palestinian cause in order to gain diplomatic influence among Middle Eastern countries sympathetic to Palestine.

The PRC's messaging on the Israel-Hamas War also aims to enhance its status as leader of the Global South. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and state-affiliated Global Times portrayed the PRC as listening to the Arab and Palestinian people in alleged contrast to the hypocritical United States on October 19.[27] This portrayal came after the United States vetoed an October 18 United Nations Security Council resolution on the war in the Middle East put forth by Brazil.[28] The CCP routinely frames the PRC as a developing country and says that Chinese-led institutions, such as BRICS, represent the Global South on the international stage.[29] The CCP’s call for a ceasefire and implementation of the two-state solution amidst the Israel-Hamas War supports the party’s messaging that it is the leader of the Global South.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 26, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: October 24 at 5pm ET

Taiwanese Presidential Election

A recent poll revealed broad backing among Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) supporters for a joint KMT-TPP presidential ticket. 81 percent of KMT supporters and 67 percent of TPP supporters approve of a joint presidential ticket, according to data from the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF).[1] The polling data is consistent with ISW’s assessments that the two candidates will form a joint ticket, but such a ticket is unlikely to capture the entirety of each candidate’s support base.

The KMT and TPP still need to resolve disagreements over the method of selecting a presidential candidate, however, as cooperation talks between the parties have made little headway. TPP candidate Ko Wen-je’s polling lead over KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih has emboldened him to take a tougher negotiating stance. Ko proposed two polling-based selection methods, one split 50-50 between mobile and landline phones, and another purely mobile-based, where his lead is especially wide.[2] Hou rejected both proposals but indicated his willingness to accept a poll as part of the selection process if equal weight was given to a primary vote. This illustrates his confidence in mobilizing KMT voters for a primary.[3] Hou also noted he has not ruled out being the vice president on a joint ticket, showing some flexibility in his negotiating stance.[4] Ko ridiculed Hou’s counter proposal, demonstrating an unwillingness to yield.[5]

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te is losing ground in the polls, which compounds the challenge for his electability in the face of TPP-KMT cooperation. TPOF has attributed Lai’s narrowing lead in the polls to public revelations relating to a damaging egg import scandal on the DPP government’s watch.[6] Support for the KMT has proven resilient in the face of scandals, however. The Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau is investigating KMT legislator Ma Wen-chun for allegedly leaking classified material about Taiwan’s submarine program to South Korea.[7] DPP accusations of Ma’s foreign collusion and treason have not translated to lower poll support for Hou.

The DPP and KMT are seizing on the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) probes into Foxconn to influence Terry Gou's decision-making about continuing his campaign. The DPP aims for Terry Gou to stay in the presidential race, while the KMT wants him to drop out. The state-owned Global Times revealed on October 22 that PRC authorities opened simultaneous tax and land use investigations into Foxconn enterprises in four Chinese provinces.[8] Foxconn’s founder Terry Gou is currently pursuing an independent run for president in Taiwan. Gou is polling in fourth place behind frontrunner Lai, TPP candidate Ko Wen-je, and KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih.[9] Gou said when he announced his campaign in August that his goal was to unify the DPP’s opposition, but his campaign draws votes from Ko and Hou. Gou’s campaign declined to comment on the investigations.[10]

Top DPP officials, such as Vice President and presidential candidate Lai Ching-te, have framed the PRC probes as Chinese economic coercion to interfere in the election.[11] Defending Gou against the Foxconn probes serves to pressure him to remain in the race. Gou dropping out may be framed as a capitulation to the PRC.

An October 24 editorial in the pro-KMT China Times called for Gou to withdraw to avoid helping Lai by splitting the opposition vote. The editorial cited the Foxconn probes as one of several recent controversies harming Gou’s campaign.[12] The China Times is a Taiwanese media outlet that receives editorial oversight from the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office on sensitive articles pertaining to cross-strait relations, according to a 2019 Financial Times report.[13]

The PRC-based Global Times published an English-language article about the probe on October 22 that cited unnamed “analysts from both sides of the Taiwan Straits” who also noted that Gou is a spoiler candidate who helps Lai. This is consistent with Global Times coverage of Gou’s campaign when Gou announced his candidacy. The PRC considers Lai a secessionist and the framing in the article is consistent with the PRC’s aim of undermining Lai’s campaign.

An October 23 Global Times article also highlighted Taiwanese speculation that the Foxconn probes were a “way for the mainland to prevent Gou from running.” It quoted an unnamed PRC expert who speculated Gou was running “most likely” because US or DPP authorities are coercing him to damage anti-DPP unity.[14]

Chinese Communist Party Regional Coercion

The PRC Coast Guard and maritime militia committed aggression against Filipino ships near the Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC Coast Guard and maritime militia rammed Filipino ships on a resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal on October 22.[15] The maritime militia is an assortment of professional vessels and fishing boats that operate under the CCP’s control but are not standard military ships.[16] The aggression aims to legitimize PRC territorial claims to the Second Thomas Shoal, which the Philippines has occupied since 1999.

The PRC’s naval aggression contradicts the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) claim to build a peaceful Asia. The Embassy of the PRC in the Republic of the Philippines urged the Filipino government on October 23 to “stop causing trouble” and remove the grounded ship near the shoal.[17] The maritime aggression and PRC rhetoric demonstrate the CCP is not interested in long-term friendship with neighboring countries such as the Philippines. It also contradicts the PRC's claim to “adhere to the concept of peaceful coexistence” and “maintain long-term friendships with neighboring countries” in an October 24 foreign policy white paper.[18]

Chinese Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army Decision Making

The National People’s Congress officially removed Defense Minister Li Shangfu from his post on October 24, a month after the CCP purged him following investigations into corrupt military equipment procurement.[19] Li oversaw the Central Military Commission Equipment Development Department, the organization that oversees military procurement, The Central Military Commission Equipment Development Department announced investigations into corrupt procurement practices in July 2023.

The National People’s Congress also officially removed former Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang from his official role as State Councilor on October 24.[21] The State Council is an executive organ within the PRC. Wang Yi re-assumed the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs on July 25.[22] Wang is a veteran diplomat who served as foreign minister from 2013 to 2022, and as Central Foreign Affairs Commission Director since the start of 2023.

The dismissals are the latest in a trend of purges of high-ranking PLA officers. The CCP purged PLA Rocket Force commander Li Yuchao and two of his deputies in July 2023 following corruption investigations.[23] They were replaced later that month by Wang Houbin and Xu Xisheng, two commanders with no prior experience serving in the Rocket Force. The purges indicate Xi’s perspective that the PLA is not sufficiently loyal to the party and his willingness to risk projecting instability within the CCP to establish loyalty within the party.[24]

Israel-Hamas War

Media outlets with CCP oversight hypocritically and falsely accused the Republic of China (Taiwan) of not assisting overseas Taiwanese to evacuate Israel. The Taiwanese media outlet China Times spread rumors during the week of October 9 that the Republic of China (Taiwan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs told an ROC national stranded in Israel to “book his own flight” home.[25] The China Times is a media outlet that receives editorial oversight from the People’s Republic of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office on sensitive articles pertaining to cross-strait relations, according to a 2019 Financial Times report.[26] The CCP-controlled Huanqiu repeated the narrative on October 12 that the China Times spread earlier in the week.[27] The ROC proved Huaniqu’s narrative false by evacuating nine ROC nationals, four Guatemalans, and one Paraguayan from Israel to Rome on a chartered plane on October 20.[28] The false narrative also conflicts with the PRC’s assertion that it would assist PRC nationals in leaving the region. The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs instead told PRC citizens on October 16 to buy commercial flights back to the PRC.[29]

This false reporting is consistent with the CCP's propagated narrative that the ROC government is capable neither of governing effectively nor of protecting its citizenry.[30] The CCP spreads this false narrative to undermine the confidence of the ROC populace in its government. This supports the main effort of the CCP coercion campaign, which is to unify with Taiwan through means other than invasion, by degrading the confidence of the ROC populace that its government can effectively govern.

The CCP is using the Israel-Hamas War to message its status as leader of the Global South and convey that the United States is not a responsible actor in the Middle East. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned violence between Palestine and Israel since October 7 but did not condemn Hamas.[31] CCP English-language propaganda outlets accused the United States and European countries of hindering the creation of a Palestinian state because of “biased” support for Israel.[32] CCP-propagated narratives also portray the party as an ostensibly neutral broker in the Israel-Palestine conflict. This narrative blames the West and primarily the United States for the current instability in the Middle East in contrast to the supposedly responsible and problem-solving PRC.

The PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi held a phone call with Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen on October 23. Wang emphasized the importance of the two-state solution to resolving historical Israeli-Palestinian tensions.[33] Wang opposed “acts that harm civilians” and “any violations of international law” in his call with Cohen.[34]

The PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi held a phone call with Palestinian Foreign Affairs Minister Riyad al-Maliki on October 23. Wang expressed support for the two-state solution and the Palestinian right to return.[35] He stated that the PRC supports an immediate ceasefire to “ensure the most basic living conditions for the people of Gaza.”[36]

The party routinely frames the PRC as a developing country and says that Chinese-led institutions, such as BRICS, represent the Global South on the international stage.[37] The CCP’s call for a ceasefire and implementation of the two-state solution amidst the Israel-Hamas War aligns with the party’s messaging that it is the leader of the Global South.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) retained its three-ship task force in the Middle East after relief from another PLAN task force. There are now six PLAN warships in unspecified locations in the Middle East since mid-October.[38] The 45th PLAN Task Force took over as scheduled from the 44th Task Force in the Gulf of Aden in early October.[39] The stated purpose of these task forces is to conduct escort missions for merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden.[40] The PRC denies that the additional ships in the region are in response to the Israel-Hamas War.[41] The 44th task force staying behind is unusual and a deviation from the normal procedure of one task force rotating out of the region upon a handover, however.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 19, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson and Matthew Sperzel of the Institute for the Study of War

Data Cutoff: October 17 at Noon ET

Key Takeaways

The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) agreed to debates between their presidential candidates and will likely form a joint presidential ticket before the January 13 election.
KMT member and former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016) proposed that the United States encourage the ROC to “hold peace talks” with the PRC during an October 16 New York University event.
The CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) held the Taiwanese Association Forum in Beijing on October 16 to undermine the sovereignty of the ROC (Taiwan).
Reuters reported on October 13 that General Liu Zhenli could become the next Minister of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China.

Taiwanese Presidential Election

The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) agreed to debates between their presidential candidates and will likely form a joint presidential ticket before the January 13 election. Officials from the parties agreed on October 14 to hold three debates between KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih and TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je to determine who should lead a joint presidential ticket.[1] The parties still need to resolve disagreements over the method of selecting a presidential candidate, however. Forming a joint ticket would enable the parties to combine their support and mount a challenge to the leading Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-te.[2] The agreement to hold the debates is consistent with ISW’s standing assessment that the KMT and TPP could form a joint presidential ticket before the January election.[3]

KMT campaign officials King Pu-tsung and Justin Huang and TPP campaign officials Huang Shan-shan and Chou Yu-hsiu held a three-hour meeting to discuss electoral cooperation on October 14.[4] The agreed upon debates would have to occur before the November 24 presidential candidate registration deadline with the Central Election Commission.[5]

The KMT and TPP disagreed over how to select the presidential nominee for a joint ticket during the October 14 meeting. The TPP negotiators advocated for opinion polls while the KMT advocated for an open primary.[6]

A KMT-TPP joint presidential ticket is unlikely to capture the entirety of each candidate’s support base. An alliance risks alienating voters who are reluctant to accept divergent views on cross-strait issues given the centrality of cross-strait relations to the election narrative. Hou Yu-ih’s support of the 1992 Consensus stands in contrast to Ko Wen-je’s reluctance to identify with the stigmatized term. Support for the parties and Taiwanese statehood are also divided along demographic lines. A September voter poll by Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) reveals a demographic divide on opinions toward Taiwan’s status vis-a-vis China. A majority of voters aged 44 and below favor an independent Taiwan over maintaining the status quo or cross-strait unification, whereas voters 45 and up show comparatively stronger support for the status quo and unification.[7] The meaning of independence in Taiwan refers to a governing framework different from the current Republic of China. The Republic of China (Taiwan) is already an independent state apart from the People’s Republic of China.

The age discrepancy is also reflected in each party’s support base. An excerpt from a September TPOF poll notes Ko has a distinct advantage among voters aged 44 and below, while Hou finds stronger support with voters 54 and up.[8] This suggests young green voters supporting the TPP may struggle to accept a joint ticket with the outspokenly anti-independence KMT.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 13, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson of the Institute for the Study of War

Data Cutoff: October 12 at Noon ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

The Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party are discussing a joint presidential ticket and may form one before the January 13 election.
The Chinese Communist Party blamed the United States and Europe of “biased” support for Israel, indicating that the party aims to delegitimize the United States as a responsible regional actor.

Taiwanese Presidential Election

The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) are discussing a joint presidential ticket and may form one before the January 13 election. The KMT aims to overcome its third place standing in the presidential race by partnering with the second place TPP to create a competitive challenge to the leading Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Lai Ching-te. The second place TPP also seeks a joint ticket to increase its competitiveness against Lai. KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih and TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je have expressed openness to working together over the past two months but have not agreed on specific measures for cooperation. The KMT and TPP leadership began planning for pre-negotiation discussions during the past week and scheduled the first staff dialogue for October 14.[1] The parties taking tangible steps towards dialogue is consistent with ISW’s October 5 assessment that the TPP could form a joint presidential ticket before the January election.[2]

Ko has been open to cooperating with Hou to forge a winning electoral strategy since August but without working toward a joint ticket.[3] KMT Chairman Eric Chu and Hou also have expressed a willingness to work with the TPP in late August.[4] Several local district level KMT leaders called for cooperation between Hou and Ko on September 20.[5]
Ko proposed on October 10 to hold three debates with Hou before a third-party poll that would determine the presidential candidate for a joint KMT-TPP ticket. He also nominated his campaign chief Huang Shan-shan and campaign office chair Chou Yu-hsiu for negotiations with the KMT on organizing the debates.[6]
Ko leads Hou by 7.4 percentage points in the presidential election, according to the most recent poll by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation from September 25.[7]

ISW assesses that the CCP holds the following leverage points over each of the Taiwanese presidential candidates:

ISW assesses that a joint Ko-Hou presidential ticket would have the following implications for the CCP leverage points over the Taiwanese presidential candidates:

Chinese Communist Party in the Middle East

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) blamed the United States and Europe for “biased” support for Israel, indicating that the party aims to delegitimize the United States as a responsible regional actor. The CCP condemned violence between Palestine and Israel but did not condemn Hamas.[8] The party called for all involved parties to remain restrained and immediately implement a cease fire on October 8 and October 9. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesman Wang Wenbin expressed support for the October 11 resolution passed by the Arab League that called for an immediate cessation of Israeli military action in Gaza.[9] CCP English-language propaganda outlets accused American and European countries of hindering the creation of a Palestinian state because of “biased” support for Israel.[10] This narrative places the blame for the current instability in the Middle East on the West. This aligns with the CCP’s messaging during Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine which blamed the United States and NATO expansion for instigating the crisis.[11]

The CCP’s October 8 statement called for an immediate ceasefire in order to protect civilians and prevent the situation from deteriorating.[12] PRC Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Mao Ning stated on October 9 that the party’s top priority was for the war to end as soon as possible.[13] She also declined to label Hamas’ actions as “acts of terrorism” and refused to state whether the PRC urged Iran to restrain Hamas.[14] This statement came after Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on October 9 in Beijing. Schumer urged him to “stand with the Israeli people and condemn [Hamas’] cowardly and vicious attacks.”[15]
The CCP-controlled English language Global Times claimed on October 10 and 11 that American and European “biased” support for Israel would worsen the situation and reveal the greed of the American military-industrial complex. The outlet also questioned the motives of Secretary of State Blinken’s Israel trip. It asked “But what is he supporting exactly? Is it a retaliatory mass killing?”[16]

The CCP is portraying itself as an ostensible neutral broker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The PRC MFA pushed for a two-state solution amid the war.[17] The CCP also framed itself as a neutral broker in the Ukraine War.[18] The similarities in CCP-propagated narratives between Ukraine and Israel indicate that the party will use the claim of neutrality to portray itself as a responsible power compared to the allegedly irresponsible West.

The party began portraying itself as a neutral broker via Special Envoy on the Middle East Zhai Jun, who called the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 10 to offer PRC assistance to broker an “immediate ceasefire and cessation of violence, and to provide humanitarian support to the Palestinian people.”[19] Egypt has not publicized its response.
This framing of ostensible neutrality would allow the CCP to build off its March 2023 mediation of Saudi-Iran diplomatic normalization to enhance its political stature in the region.[20] This also advances the CCP narrative of a PRC-led world order as founded on principles of non-intervention and peace compared to the alleged militarism of the United States.[21]
The English language CCP propaganda outlets China Daily and Global Times framed the United States' move to deploy the USS Gerald R. Ford near Israel as evidence that the American military-industrial complex perniciously exploits the conflict for profit.[22] Such articles propagate the narrative that the United States is a destabilizing world power.

Hamas' attack on Israel is the focus of international attention, and the CCP may exploit the situation to advance its coercion campaign targeting the Republic of China (Taiwan). The table below lists some of the CCP’s coercion efforts, their status, and how the party could advance them.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 5, 2023

Taiwanese Presidential Election

The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) could form a joint presidential ticket before the January 13 election. The KMT aims to overcome its third place standing in the presidential race by partnering with the second place TPP to create a competitive challenge to the leading Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Lai Ching-te.[1] KMT Chairman Eric Chu and KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih both separately expressed a willingness to work with the TPP in late August.[2] Several local district level KMT leaders called for cooperation between Hou and Ko on September 20.[3] ISW previously assessed on September 29 that the KMT and TPP were unlikely to obtain a compromise deal because KMT-leaning Broadcasting Corporation of China Chairman Jaw Shaw-kong insisted on preconditions to negotiations in September.[4] Jaw’s precondition that KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih be the nominee on a joint ticket amounted to a call for TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je to drop out of the race. [5] Ko responded on September 30 by calling for an independent third party poll to determine the presidential candidate on a joint KMT-TPP ticket. [6] Ko called for this approach because he currently leads Hou in the polls. There is no precedent in Taiwanese politics for determining a presidential ticket via this method between two parties. The KMT has neither publicly agreed to this suggestion nor publicly engaged Ko about any such poll since September 30.[7] Chairman Eric Chu made a statement on October 4 expressing willingness to engage in dialogue with the TPP without preconditions, removing the obstacle to cooperation presented by Jaw’s demands.[8] Neither Hou nor Ko has shown a willingness to drop out of the race. It remains unclear how the two parties would choose a presidential candidate for a joint ticket or resolve dissimilar policy views about mechanisms, such as the 1992 Consensus, for engaging with the Chinese Communist Party.[9]

Ko leads Hou by 7.4 percentage points in the presidential election, according to a September 25 poll by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation.[10]

Online activist Lin Yu-hung reportedly requested that death threats be made against himself related to the imported egg scandal, shifting the electoral narrative away from cross-strait relations this week. The dominant narrative of the election as a choice between peace and war is likely to reemerge in the next week, however. The Democratic Progressive Party-led government imported 145 million eggs over the summer to alleviate supply shortages. Several million of these eggs had mislabeled expiration dates, which gave rise to public concern about the safety of the imported eggs. Multiple Taiwanese media outlets reported on October 3 that Lin criticized the DPP over the egg scandal and requested that death threats be privately sent to himself by a friend in the KMT named Hsu Che-pin.[11] The egg scandal is now entering its third week.[12] The media focus on other scandals during this election cycle has generally lasted no more than three weeks. The emerging scandal surrounding former Taiwan naval advisor Kuo Hsi accusing KMT legislator Ma Wen-chun of leaking classified secrets related to Taiwan’s indigenous submarine to the PRC is also pushing the electoral narrative back to national security and cross-strait policy.[13] The multi-year trend of cross-strait relations shaping Taiwanese presidential elections, along with the emerging national security-related scandal, suggests that the narrative of the election as a choice between peace and war will be the central issue of the 2024 presidential election.

The DPP-led government imported the eggs between March to July to address shortages caused by the avian flu.[14] Egg processing plants mixed imported and domestic eggs to create liquid egg products and mislabeled the products as made in Taiwan.[15] The government destroyed 54 million eggs that had expired in storage facilities.[16] The agriculture minister resigned on September 17 and Premier Chen Chien-jen responded to the controversy before the Legislative Yuan on September 22.[17]
Lin stated that he solicited the fake threats because the Kuomintang failed to hold the DPP accountable.[18] Lin also announced that he was a DPP member and planned to resign from the party on October 3.[19] The KMT confirmed on October 3 that Hsu was a KMT party worker and that there would be an investigation into his actions.[20] Both Taiwan Premier Chen Chien-jen and Justice Minister Cai Qingxiang stated on October 3 that they would continue to investigate and search for more accomplices.[21]
The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense announced on October 3 that it is cooperating with the judicial authorities to “clarify the facts” regarding the allegation against Ma but will not comment on the situation.[22] Ma filed a defamation lawsuit against Kuo on September 30.[23]

Chinese Communist Party and Europe

Sino-German economic agreements on October 1 demonstrate that the CCP is utilizing international governmental agreements to offset the image of a poor business environment in China. The raiding of foreign firms and exit restrictions from China for select foreign employees since the anti-espionage law came into effect in April projects an image of hostility to foreign investment in China.[24] This aligns with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s contradictory pursuit of increasing private sector growth while simultaneously making the business regulatory environment more stringent on national security grounds since the 20th Party Congress in October 2022. CCP Vice Premier He Lifeng and German Finance Minister Christian Lindner agreeing on October 1 to deepen unspecified financial cooperation buttresses China’s image as a favorable location to do business, which is contradictory to the party’s actions such as raiding foreign firms.[25] The CCP also loosened capital control restrictions in Shanghai throughout September to buttress this image.[26]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 29, 2023

Taiwanese Presidential Election

The Kuomintang (KMT) seeks to lead a joint presidential ballot with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and is unlikely to obtain a compromise deal with the TPP in the coming two weeks. The KMT aims to overcome its third place standing in the presidential race by partnering with the TPP to create a competitive challenge to the leading Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Lai Ching-te.[1] KMT leadership at the party and grassroots levels support cooperation between KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih and TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je. This is consistent with ISW’s September 15 assessment that hostility between KMT leadership and independent presidential candidate Terry Gou may prompt the KMT to reconsider cooperation with the TPP in the presidential election.[2] Ko has been open to cooperating with Hou since August but rejected a precondition articulated by KMT-leaning Broadcasting Corporation of China Chairman Jaw Shaw-kong in September that Hou automatically be presidential candidate.[3] The two parties have dissimilar views about the mechanisms, such as the 1992 Consensus, for engaging in dialogue with the Chinese Communist Party, which are hurdles to the two candidates running on a joint ticket.[4] Neither candidate has shown the willingness to drop out of the race to form a KMT-TPP joint ticket. Either party expressing willingness to engage in dialogue without preconditions would prompt a reevaluation of this assessment.

Several local district level KMT leaders called for cooperation between Hou and Ko on September 20.[5] The KMT-leaning Broadcasting Corporation of China Chairman Jaw Shaw-kong met with former KMT presidential nominee Han Kuo-yu on September 26 and claimed to have “reached a consensus on promoting ‘opposition integration’” between the KMT and TPP, with negotiations alleged to begin in mid-October.[6]
Ko stated in late September that cooperation cannot be “purely reduced to distribution of power” and that cooperation requires consensus and the combination of ideas.[7] Ko is polling ahead of Hou by 7.4 percentage points, according to a September 25 poll by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation.[8] Ko reportedly told an internal TPP meeting on an unspecified date in September that the KMT could “go to hell.”[9]
The KMT interprets the 1992 Consensus to mean that there is one China, the ROC, and sees it as a means for engaging in dialogue with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[10] Ko does not align with the 1992 Consensus because it has become politically contentious in Taiwan.[11] He does support dialogue with the CCP that avoids the domestic Taiwanese political polarization around using the term 1992 Consensus.

The trend is for media coverage surrounding controversy in the election, such as Jaw’s comments, to not last substantially into a third week. The sexual assault and barbiturate scandals that occurred in May and June that affected the DPP and KMT lasted no more than three weeks.[12]

ISW assesses that the CCP holds the following leverage points over each of the Taiwanese presidential candidates:[13]

A joint Ko-Hou presidential ticket would have the following implications for the CCP leverage points over the Taiwanese presidential candidates:

The imported egg scandal shifted the presidential electoral narrative away from cross-strait relations over the past two weeks, and the dominant narrative of the election as a choice between peace and war is likely to reemerge in the next two weeks. The Democratic Progressive Party-led government imported 145 million eggs over the summer to alleviate supply shortages. Several million of these eggs had mislabeled expiration dates, which gave rise to public concern over prior and future consumption of the imported eggs. Other scandals during this election cycle lasted no more than three weeks. The multi-year trend of cross-strait relations shaping Taiwanese presidential elections, along with the short-lived length of prior scandal coverage, suggests that the narrative of the election as a choice between peace and war will be the central issue of the 2024 presidential election.

The DPP-led government imported the eggs between March to July to address shortages caused by the avian flu.[14] Egg processing plants mixed imported and domestic eggs to create liquid egg products and mislabeled the products as made in Taiwan.[15] The government destroyed 54 million eggs that had expired in storage facilities.[16] The agriculture minister resigned on September 17 and Premier Chen Chien-jen responded to the controversy before the Legislative Yuan on September 22.[17]
The sexual assault and barbiturate scandals that occurred in May and June that affected the DPP and KMT lasted no more than three weeks.[18] The egg scandal is now entering its second week.[19]

The framing of the election as a choice between peace and war has been ongoing since at least January 2023 and remains salient in Taiwanese and Chinese media outlets.[20] The last two Taiwanese presidential elections, which occurred in 2016 and 2020, centered around the candidates’ differing views of cross-strait relations.[21] The 2024 presidential election coverage also focused on cross-strait relations with brief interludes of political scandal.

Chinese Communist Party Coercion toward Taiwan

The CCP aims to economically integrate the ROC-controlled offshore island of Kinmen with the PRC province of Fujian, which could allow the CCP to exacerbate domestic ROC internal divisions over cross-strait engagement with the PRC.[22] Economically integrating the island with China would provide an avenue for the CCP to exacerbate ROC internal divisions over cross-strait engagement with the PRC. The ROC opposition parties are willing to engage in expansive economic, cultural, and political engagement with the PRC whereas the DPP is not. Exacerbating internal ROC divisions benefits the CCP by portraying the ROC government as incompetent to the Taiwanese public. A consternated populace would be more receptive to CCP messaging promoting unification.

The CCP put forth a plan on September 12 titled “Opinions on Supporting Fujian in Exploring a New Road for Cross-Strait Integrated Development and Building a Cross-Strait Integrated Development Demonstration Zone.”[23]
This proposal comes amid proposals by KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih since August to build a bridge between Kinmen and Xiamen.[24] TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je also supports the construction of the bridge.[25] The Chinese Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Zhu Fenglian voiced support for constructing the bridge on September 27.[26]
An unnamed Taiwanese official stated on September 20 that building such a bridge would “accelerate the ‘Crimeaization’ of Kinmen, and it will eventually be annexed by China.”[27]

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, September 23, 2023

Taiwanese Presidential Election

Terry Gou aims to unify with the KMT and TPP against the DPP ahead of the 2024 presidential election and is unlikely to succeed in bridging differences between the parties. Gou’s electoral strategy and chances of winning rely on joining forces with one of the other opposition candidates rather than prevailing in a four-way race. The KMT and TPP have not expressed willingness to merge their campaigns with Gou. Polling released on September 20 after the announcement of Tammy Lai as his vice-presidential candidate still shows Gou in a distant fourth place.[1]

Gou’s campaign spokesperson Huang Hsih-hsiu reiterated on September 17 that the purpose of Gou's entry into the presidential race is to “unite the opposition.”[2] Huang suggested that newly announced vice-presidential candidate Tammy Lai is prepared to step aside if Gou forms a combined ticket with another of the current presidential candidates.[3]
KMT Chairman Eric Chu on September 15 said Gou should “focus on the big picture” and “put self-interest aside.” A recent Taiwanese media report suggests Ko has decided against working with Gou.[4] A Storm Media report from September 19 stated that high-level KMT officials claim Ko Wen-je’s team indicated that Ko has already ruled out the possibility of collaboration with Gou, which is in line with his late August statement that such a pairing would be “impossible.”[5]
Gou’s previous outreach to TPP candidate Ko Wen-je on the topic of cooperation did not produce a combined ticket, however.[6] Ko stated that Ko-Gou cooperation is impossible and called on Gou to first discuss cooperation with the KMT.[7]

The consensus among major Taiwanese political parties to defend the Republic of China’s (ROC) sovereignty provides the CCP with opportunities to advance its coercive unification campaign. Messaging by KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je to the American foreign policy community in conjunction with the DPP’s attacks on Hou shows the Taiwanese political consensus over defending the ROC’s sovereignty. The parties agree on the necessity of defending the ROC’s sovereignty. However, their arguments demonstrate that they disagree over what the term means. This disagreement presents the CCP with opportunities to exacerbate leverage points over each of the three mainstream presidential candidates as a means to achieve unification.

Hou stated that Taiwan should strengthen dialogue to decrease the chance of war at a forum hosted by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy on September 15.[8] Hou promoted his “3D” strategy that calls for deterrence, dialogue, and de-escalation in a speech on September 18 before scholars at the Brookings Institute and in an article published on the same day in Foreign Affairs magazine.[9]
On September 19, the DPP criticized Hou’s article for ignoring China as “the biggest source of regional tension.”[10] The party also criticized Hou for supporting the 1992 Consensus without viewing it as a vehicle for the CCP to unify with the ROC.[11]
Ko stated during a September 13 interview with Bloomberg that he would prefer to rename the 1992 Consensus, which would allow him to publicly reject the 1992 Consensus while opening dialogue with China.[12] Ko stated that “we cannot always tell [China] no, because after ‘no,’ there is no other step.”[13]

Meaning of ROC Sovereignty for Leading ROC Presidential Candidates

Terminology: 1992 Consensus: a disputed cross-strait policy formulation supported in different formations by the CCP and KMT that acts as a precondition to cross-strait dialogue. The TPP conceptually supports the 1992 Consensus but rejects openly supporting it due to its polarizing effect in Taiwanese politics. The DPP does not support the 1992 Consensus.

The CCP could falsely message to Taiwanese and international audiences that cross-strait economic and political dialogue on the party’s terms is a means to maintain cross-strait peace. This would expand the CCP’s capacity to create cross-strait engagement agreements through which to coerce the ROC into unification.

Chinese Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army Decision Making

The CCP purged Defense Minister Li Shangfu in September 2023 following investigations into corrupt equipment procurement. The Central Military Commission Equipment Development Department announced the investigations in July 2023. Li oversaw the department from 2017-2022.[18] Li’s dismissal is the latest in a trend of purges of high-ranking PLA officers. The CCP purged PLA Rocket Force commander Li Yuchao and two of his deputies in July 2023 following corruption investigations.[19] They were replaced later that month by Wang Houbin and Xu Xisheng, two commanders with no prior experience serving in the Rocket Force. The purges indicate Xi’s perspective that the PLA is not sufficiently loyal to the party and his willingness to risk projecting instability within the CCP in order to establish loyalty within the party.[20]

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) launched a record number of 103 aircraft as part of a violation of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) on September 17.[21] This development is part of a trend of increasing PLAAF ADIZ violations. The PLAAF began employing new flight patterns on August 24 in Taiwan’s ADIZ. The new flight patterns involve longer horizontal incursions across the median line and counterclockwise flights in the sensitive northern part of Taiwan.[22] Horizontal refers to a parallel flight path to the Taiwan Strait median line, which runs between the PRC and ROC. The PLA very likely increased the number of ADIZ violations in order to wear down Taiwanese military readiness, force difficult decisions regarding ROC resource allocation, as well as create a sense of impenetrable siege among the Taiwanese population.

The PLA also conducted naval exercises in the Yellow Sea from September 17 to 23 in response to the September 15-19 trilateral US-Canada-South Korea exercise further southeast in the Yellow Sea.[23] These exercises messaged CCP displeasure at what it considered sensitive exercises in the Yellow Sea. Exercises in the Yellow Sea are sensitive from the party’s view because of their relative proximity to Beijing. This is consistent with ISW’s September 15 assessment that the CCP may stage a similar reaction to the upcoming US-Canada-South Korea exercise in the Yellow Sea.[24]

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, September 15, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Kuomintang (KMT) leaders threatened party disciplinary action against the party members supporting independent presidential candidate and former KMT member Terry Gou, which is unlikely to bolster the KMT’s unity before the presidential election. The KMT’s leaders have threatened “strict party discipline” against the pro-Gou members ranging from censure to party expulsion.[1] The KMT leaders also criticized Gou and his supporters for causing division in the party and giving an advantage to the governing Democratic Progress Party (DPP).[2] Prominent pro-Gou KMT members declined to renounce their support.[3] Gou stated that the KMT’s rhetoric towards his supporters was harsher than the party’s rhetoric towards the DPP.[4] The animus between the KMT and Gou indicates the hurdles to unifying the KMT’s support for a single candidate.

KMT Chair Eric Chu (Chu Li-lun) stated that “there is no room for ambiguity, party discipline will be strictly enforced” against publicly pro-Gou KMT members.[5] KMT Disciplinary Committee Chair Huang Yiteng also warned against supporting the election of non-party candidates.
[6] The KMT stripped party power from the Standing Committee of the Central Committee member Fan Chenglian for two years after he appeared with Gou at a campaign event.[7] The KMT stated that this was to promote party unity and support the KMT-nominated candidates.[8]

Several KMT legislators and party members publicly urged Gou to rethink his candidacy. KMT members stated that they would support Hou over Gou and framed Gou’s presidency as handing the election to the DPP.[9] The KMT leadership’s rhetoric is framed as uniting behind Hou as opposed to building bridges with Gou.[10]

Pro-Gou KMT members have stated that they are unafraid of party discipline. Pro-Gou members have quit the KMT and appeared at rallies with Gou.[11] Gou has criticized the KMT for criticizing his campaign more harshly than the DPP.[12]

The hostility between KMT leadership and Gou may prompt the KMT to reconsider cooperation with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) in the election. KMT Chairman Eric Chu previously considered cooperation with the TPP, even before Gou entered the race in late August, which KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih opposed.[13] Chu repeated this call for KMT-TPP cooperation in mid-September, while Hou expressed openness to potential working with the TPP.[14] TTP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je has remained noncommittal to working with the KMT.[15] A KMT-TPP coalition would result in competitive races with the governing DPP candidates in the legislative and presidential elections.

Chu has implemented a joint-campaign headquarters to consolidate KMT leaning county and local officials behind Hou.[16] Chu stated on August 24 that he is willing to work with the TPP in the interest of defeating the DPP.[17] Chu caveated his calls for cooperation by stating the KMT will only cooperate with parties that have a consensus on cross-strait policies and constitutional reform issues.[18]
Hou’s campaign issued a statement that it is “happy to see the possibility of cooperation with opposition forces.”[19] Hou stated he is open to working with the TPP.[20]
Ko has repeatedly stated he is open to dialogue with other opposition leaders and that “anything is possible” when asked specifically about cooperation with Hou.[21] Ko’s and Chu’s offices are rumored to be in contact about electoral cooperation.[22] An unnamed Ko staffer allegedly stated that Ko is more likely to work with Hou than Gou because of the grassroots strength of the KMT.[23] Ko has explicitly denied that the TPP and KMT have come to any agreement about cooperation and denied reporting that he and Chu communicated.[24]

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The CCP responded to the US-Canada-Japan Noble Stingray exercise last week with a naval “show of force” and may stage a similar reaction to the upcoming US-Canada-South Korea exercise in the Yellow Sea. The CCP dispatched the Shandong aircraft carrier and associated People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships east of Taiwan in response to the trilateral Noble Stingray exercise that involved a transit through the Taiwan Strait, which the CCP views as provocative.[25] The United States, Canada, and South Korea will conduct a trilateral exercise in the Yellow Sea from September 15-19, which will be the first “large scale” exercise in the vicinity of the PRC’s northern coast in a decade.[26] Exercises in the Yellow Sea are sensitive from the party’s view because of their relative proximity to Beijing. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs has consistently framed American regional Asia-Pacific military engagement as interference necessitating a “resolute” retaliatory response.

The United States, Canada, and Japan conducted the trilateral naval exercise Noble Stingray in the waters of Okinawa on September 8. Two of the four ships that participated in the exercise, the guided-missile destroyer USS Ralph Johnson and frigate HMCS Ottawa, transited through the Taiwan Strait on September 9.[27]
The PRC’s Shandong aircraft carrier group sailed in waters 60 nautical miles off the southernmost point of the Taiwanese home island on its way to the western Pacific on September 11.[28] The PRC state-media outlet Global Times framed the event as a “show of force” in response to the transit of the Ralph Johnson and Ottawa.[29] The Global Times claimed that a “large” PLAN task force transiting through the Miyoko Strait to the western Pacific would join the Shandong carrier group to conduct a coordinated exercise. [30][31]
The United States, Canada, and South Korea will conduct a trilateral naval exercise to commemorate the 1950 Battle of Incheon from September 15-19. The exercise will consist of over 20 ships, 10 aircraft, and 3,000 service members.[32] The China-based South China Morning Post noted that this will be the first large-scale US exercise” near China’s northern coast in approximately ten years.[33] The PRC Foreign Ministry officials have framed U.S.-South Korean exercises as adding to regional “tension and confrontation” and vowed that US “interference” in the region will be met with “vigilance and opposition.” [34][35]

Chinese Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia expressed concerns about the quality of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) equipment, which suggests that the PRC’s defense industrial base is not performing to the satisfaction of the CCP leadership. Zhang spoke at a PLA military equipment conference in Beijing in late August.[36] He said that the PLA needs “supplies that can meet our needs in any real battles and struggles.”[37] He also stated the necessity of mobilizing the civilian and military apparatus to enhance equipment quality.[38] Zhang’s emphasis on the need for supplies for battles suggests that the PRC’s defense industry is not performing to the party’s expectations. The lack of commonplace ideological references in official state media reporting on the event indicates that the equipment quality problems are deeply rooted.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing met to discuss enhancing Sino-Russian economic relations during the Eastern Economic Forum on September 12. Putin praised Sino-Russian trade volume in 2023 and claimed that the two countries will reach 200 billion USD by the end of 2023.[39] Zhang stated that China is ready to “deepen mutually beneficial cooperation” with Russia.[40] Zhang’s current purview is China‘s advanced manufacturing sector, which has played a key role in Xi Jinping‘s goal for manufacturing self-reliance since the 20th Party Congress in October 2022.[41] Zhang previously spent over twenty years at NORINCO, which is a leading Chinese state-owned defense manufacturing and sales company.[42] His professional background and current responsibilities suggest that increases in Sino-Russian trade volume will involve goods to support the Russian war effort in Ukraine. The CCP has provided Russia with military assistance such as rifles and smokeless powder at varying points in 2023.[43]

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, August 31, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Foxconn founder Guo Taiming (Terry Gou) formally announced his campaign for president of the Republic of China (ROC) as an independent candidate. His entrance will likely further divide non-Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) voters, thereby increasing the chance of the DPP candidate Lai Ching-te (William Lai) winning the race. Gou’s announcement at a press conference of the “Mainstream Opinion Alliance,” a political organization supporting his candidacy, followed numerous campaign-like events in the months after he failed to secure the Kuomintang (KMT) nomination in May.[1] The KMT expressed regret over Gou’s announcement, calling on him to honor his May pledge to support the KMT nominee.[2] Gou stated that the purpose of his candidacy is to unify the opposition and invited the other two non-Lai candidates, Ko Wen-je (TPP) and Hou You-ih (KMT), to sit down for discussions.[3] Gou’s previous outreach to Ko Wen-je on the topic of cooperation did not produce a combined ticket, however.[4] Ko stated that Ko-Gou cooperation is impossible and called on Gou to first discuss cooperation with the KMT.[5] Ill will between Gou and the KMT, which dates to the 2020 presidential election cycle when Gou quit the party, would complicate any potential cooperation between Hou and Gou.[6] The CCP-controlled Global Times bemoaned that Gou’s entrance into the race would split the anti-DPP vote in the upcoming election.[7] Hou was polling thirty points behind the leading presidential candidate Lai Ching-te in late August before Terry Gou also entered the race.[8] Gou draws his base of support from the KMT, which indicates his entrance will hurt Hou’s candidacy.

A Terry Gou victory is the most dangerous outcome from the perspective of US interests relative to the other presidential candidates. This is because Gou has proposed the most concrete steps toward negotiations with the People’s Republic of China that could compromise ROC sovereignty.[9] Gou on August 25 announced the “Kinmen Peace Initiative,” a series of new civil-society projects to promote cross-strait peace.[10] Gou stated he would fund the “Kinmen Peace Initiative Foundation” with $20 million of personal funds to develop eight major projects, including a “cross-strait peace consultation” office and an accompanying peace-oriented think tank.[11] This announcement follows his May “Kinmen Peace Declaration,” in which he affirmed support for “One China, respective interpretations,” whereby Taiwan affirms it is part of “One China” but not the PRC, and called for Kinmen to become the permanent site of new rounds of negotiations with the PRC.[12] This position contrasts with that of KMT candidate Hou You-ih, who has called for communication and the reduction of cross-strait tensions but said “democratic consultations” with the PRC are not practical.[13] Negotiations as proposed by Gou could provide an avenue for delivering concessions on ROC sovereignty to the PRC. Statements of support from other presidential candidates for Gou’s cross-strait proposals would prompt a revision of ISW’s assessment of the unique danger of a Gou victory.

ISW is updating its prior assessment of CCP leverage points over each of the Taiwanese presidential candidates under the dominant but contested war versus peace narrative. The updated leverage points account for Gou’s candidacy.

There are four scenarios that could play out now that Gou has entered the Taiwanese presidential election.

KMT presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih plans to visit New York City, San Francisco, and Washington DC from September 14-22 visit, which is unlikely to draw a military or economic response by the CCP.[29] The CCP inaccurately portrays the DPP as radicals pushing for Taiwan's independence while ignoring the reality that the ROC is already an independent and sovereign polity.[30] The CCP used this false reasoning as justification for the economic and military coercion in response to Lai’s August 12 and 16 transits through the United States.[31] The CCP portrays the KMT as a responsible party in comparison to the DPP due to the former’s emphasis on cross-strait economic integration and political dialogue.[32] The continued independent KMT attacks on the DPP for pursuing Taiwan's independence align with the CCP’s portrayal of the DPP. This alignment indicates that the CCP will not carry out a military or economic response to Hou’s visit to the United States. A CCP military or economic reprisal for the visit would also undermine the party’s inaccurate portrayal of a KMT election leading to cross-strait peace while a DPP election victory would lead to war with the PRC.

Presidential candidates Ko, Gou, and Hou released separate peace plans that center on Kinmen, which is a group of Taiwan-governed islands that are roughly ten kilometers off the coast of China. All three candidates view Kinmen as a good staging ground for cross-strait initiatives due to the islands’ proximity to China. Ko and Hou’s plans both broadly aim to increase cross-strait exchanges and cooperation through the transformation of Kinmen into an economic and transportation hub. Gou also aims to increase the number of peaceful interactions with the PRC via the establishment of foundations and think tanks. Gou’s plan differs from Ko’s and Hou’s plans in that he is not advocating for building physical infrastructure and has not discussed building a Jinxia bridge between Kinmen and Xiamen, China. Democratic Progressive Party politicians have come out against the three’s plans stating that their rhetoric promotes ”one country, two systems,” placates the CCP, and that their plans carry national security risks.[33] The KMT and TPP point to Kinmen as an area where cooperation can be easily developed between Taiwan and China while the DPP point to Kinmen as an example of why Taiwan needs to maintain its sovereignty and national defense capabilities.[34]

The Central American Parliament expelled the ROC as an observer, which advances a CCP coercion campaign to politically control Taiwan. Nicaraguan dictator Daniel Ortega proposed on June 23 that the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN) replace Taiwan as an observer with the PRC.[45] PARLACEN expelled Taiwan in favor of the PRC on August 22.[46] This successful proposal fits within a trend of the PRC courting PARLACEN countries to reverse their recognition of the ROC as an independent state since the 2016 election of ROC President Tsai Ing-wen. The expulsion of Taiwan from PARLACEN buttresses CCP efforts to diplomatically isolate the ROC on the international stage.

The CCP’s ongoing efforts to diplomatically isolate the ROC are part of a campaign to degrade the ROC’s legitimacy on the international stage to unify with Taiwan. The ROC losing full diplomatic relations with other countries and participating in fewer international organizations makes it easier for the CCP to increase pressure on the ROC to unify with the PRC without prompting an international backlash. Undermining international recognition of the ROC buttresses the CCP’s argument that the ROC is not a state, but rather a province of the PRC.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) began employing new flight patterns on August 24 in the Republic of China (Taiwan) air defense identification zone (ADIZ) likely to complicate and reduce Taiwan’s decision response timeline. The new flight patterns involve longer horizontal incursions across the median line and counterclockwise flights in the sensitive northern part of Taiwan.[52] Horizontal refers to a parallel flight path to the Taiwan Strait median line, the black line running between the PRC and ROC in Figure 1. The location of the capital Taipei in northern Taiwan makes this portion of the island politically sensitive. On August 25, the PLAAF carried out an unusual combination of clockwise and counterclockwise flights part way around Taiwan in addition to longer horizontal flight violations of the median line.[53] The CCP-controlled Global Times stated that the August 25 violations came in response to the United States approving a $500 million arms sale to Taiwan on August 23.[54]

Figure 1: The image shows the Republic of China air defense identification zone violations by People’s Liberation Army Air Force planes and drones from August 25 to August 26.

Source: ROC Ministry of National Defense X[55]

These patterns complicate the ROC’s contingency planning compared to previous flights around Taiwan. Longer horizontal flight violations of the median line come with the possibility of turning into flights around the island, as demonstrated by the black flight path in the image above. The new PLAAF flight patterns around Taiwan confer operational advantages to the PLA by presenting an increasing number of situations to which the ROC military must be prepared to respond. This compresses the ROC’s decision-making timeline about engaging PLA aircraft and presents challenges to determining which aircraft to target.

The normalization of these new flight patterns around Taiwan within the ADIZ would support a CCP coercion campaign to induce unification on the PRC’s terms. The flights aim to wear down Taiwanese military readiness, force difficult decisions regarding ROC resource allocation, as well as create a sense of impenetrable siege among the Taiwanese population. These effects support CCP efforts to degrade the Taiwanese populace’s confidence in its government’s capacity to defend the country, a key part of the longer-term CCP coercion campaign to induce unification under the PRC. Compressed decision-making timelines about whether to engage PLA aircraft also enhances the risk of miscalculation by the PRC or ROC that could lead to a crisis. ISW does not assess that this new pattern of ADIZ violations presages an imminent invasion or other intentional act of war by the PRC or ROC.

The BRICS invited six new countries, including Iran, to become full member states on August 24. This supports the CCP’s efforts to reduce the party’s reliance on the United States dollar for international monetary exchange. The CCP seeks out opportunities to utilize the yuan as a currency for international trade as a mechanism to avoid American sanctions like those facing Russia. The party has achieved success in reaching deals to trade with other countries such as fellow BRICS member Brazil.[56] The CCP propaganda apparatus actively promotes the party’s efforts to achieve the “de-weaponization of the dollar” through such means as trading with Brazil in yuan.[57]

A future Iranian ascension to BRICS would present the CCP with another opportunity to trade in yuan as well as strengthen its claimed image as an anti-colonial counterweight to alleged Western hegemony.[58] The Critical Threats Project (CTP) and ISW previously assessed that Iranian ascension into BRICS would allow Iran to accelerate the completion of regional infrastructure projects and mitigate Western sanctions.[59] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stressed that the expansion of BRICS underscores the decline of “unilateralism” during a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on August 24.[60] These Iranian objectives align with the party’s economic and geopolitical effort to degrade Western influence on the international stage.

Iranian state media reported on August 24 that one of the biggest advantages Iran will gain through its newfound membership in BRICS is access to the New Development Bank.[61] The New Development Bank has its own payment notification system, which can act as an alternative to SWIFT. Iran has sought an alternative financial messaging system to Belgium-based SWIFT ever since SWIFT disconnected Iran from its platform in 2018.[62]
Iranian state media also reported on August 24 that Iran’s membership will help Iran “activate” the Russia-Iran-India corridor and China’s Belt and Road Initiative.[63] The completion of these projects would bolster Iran’s economy and help Iran become a regional and international “transit hub.”[64] Iran has repeatedly sought Russian and Chinese assistance and financing to complete infrastructure projects.

The CCP issued anti-Japanese messaging in response to Japan discharging radioactive wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear power plant into the Pacific Ocean. Japan’s Tokyo Electric Power Company began discharging the wastewater on August 24. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and state-run media accused Japan of “misrepresenting” the safety of the discharge. They also implied that Japan was working in concert with the IAEA to conceal the true danger that the wastewater presented on multiple occasions.[65] The messaging conflicts with statements from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which deemed the discharge from the Fukushima nuclear power plant safe.[66]

Chinese government and state media outlets messaged that the discharge is a “selfish and irresponsible” act on the part of the Japanese government.[67] They also issued the narrative that the discharge was unsafe and that Japan was disregarding near-unanimous opposition both internationally and domestically.[68]
China's General Administration of Customs imposed a “temporary” ban on all Japanese “aquatic products” for an indeterminate period following the discharge.[69] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Embassy to Japan both “urged” Japan to cease the discharge and pledged that China would take “all necessary measures” to “safeguard” the health and safety of Chinese citizens.[70]

Multiple incidents of threats and vandalism occurred in China against Japanese nationals and property, including Japan’s embassy staff and consulate.[71] Chinese social media accounts circulated calls to boycott Japanese products and “target” Japanese nationals.[72] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Wang Wenbin did not disavow domestic anti-Japanese sentiments but rather condemned the “selfish and extremely irresponsible behavior of the Japanese government.”[73] Chinese state media outlets also circulated articles and unsigned opinion pieces claiming that reports of anti-Japanese incidents were an information campaign by Tokyo to portray itself as a “victim” and “shift blame” onto Beijing.[74]

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, August 24, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

The Republic of China (Taiwan) Vice President and Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Lai Ching-te transited through the United States on August 12 and August 16. ISW will produce a forthcoming follow-up article to the pre-transit August 9 publication.

The Kuomintang (KMT) is facing several internal disputes as the party falls further behind in the presidential election polls. A faction in the party sought and failed to replace the KMT Chairman Eric Chu, who risked drawing the KMT into another scandal. Several KMT officials also recently left the party and raised concerns over the KMT’s internal decision-making process.[1] An August 21 Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation Poll shows Hou as polling at 13.6 percentage points of support compared to the leading candidate, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Lai Ching-te, at 43.4 percentage points.[2] This is a change from July when Hou polled 20.2 percentage points while Lai polled 36.4 percentage points.[3]

KMT Chairman Eric Chu publicly stated his support for Taiwan People’s Party Hsinchu Mayor Kao Hung-an after the Taipei District Prosecutors indicted her for corruption on August 14.[4] This angered KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih’s campaign manager Jin Pucong because he did not want the Hou campaign to become involved in the scandal.[5] A faction within the KMT also unsuccessfully submitted a proposal on July 19 to replace Chu as the party chairman.[6] Chu also stated in July that party “guns should be [focused] externally.”[7]
Several local KMT officials have also left the party. Former Miaoli County Magistrate Hsu Yao-Chang left the KMT on August 22 criticizing the KMT’s “minority decision-making and backroom politics.”[8] Hsu previously caused controversy by stating that “we not only want the DPP to step down, we also want to take down the KMT” at a rally with Terry Gou.[9] Gou is an ROC billionaire who maintains a popular base of support in the KMT.

The failure of the KMT to address these internal disputes and regain its footing in the polls likely would deny the CCP its most preferred ROC presidential candidate to influence cross-strait policy. ISW assessed in May that the CCP is framing the ROC presidential election as a choice between peace and war, which provides the party leverage points over the cross-strait policy of the three major Taiwanese political parties.[10] ISW also assessed that this electoral framing would confer leverage over a KMT administration. It would enable the CCP to frame cross-strait economic integration and political dialogue on the PRC’s terms as necessary to maintain peace.[11]

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-26-2023

The flagship CCP journal Qiushi republished a February article by Xi Jinping on August 15 that emphasized “Chinese-style modernization.” This content of the publication and its reprinting indicates that the party aims to buttress support for spreading its political and economic governance models in formerly colonized countries. Xi drew on the historical memory of Western modernization as one “full of bloody crimes such as war, slavery, [and] colonialism” that caused developing countries great suffering. He stated that China experienced “the tragic history of aggression and humiliation by Western powers” and will “never repeat [this] old path.”[12] Xi parlayed this shared historical memory of colonial grievance into a counter narrative that “Chinese-style modernization” is purely peaceful and economically responsible.[13] The timing of the release in the week before the ongoing BRICS summit, as well as the article’s harsh anti-Western tone, suggests the party’s aim was to degrade Western influence while exporting its own authoritarian model to developing countries.

The spread of CCP governance and economic influence in developing countries previously undermined the international definition of human rights in October 2022. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) successfully garnered votes from several African countries to help defeat a motion in the United Nations to debate human rights abuses against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. This came after the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report on August 31, 2022, that assessed PRC actions in Xinjiang “may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.”[14] The PRC’s success in voting down the debate despite the report demonstrates the international implications for global governing norms that arise from the party’s authoritarian economic and political support in developing countries.

The CCP outlet Red Flag Manuscript published an article on August 14 about the necessity of recapturing the spirit of “revolutionary patriotism” embodied by the Chinese military during the Korean War.[15] The content of the article indicates that creating ideological alignment amongst PLA leadership is becoming increasingly necessary to prepare for future wars.

The article entitled “Carrying Forward the Great Spirit of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” discusses the heroism and patriotism of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV). It also conveys the lessons on instilling a revolutionary mindset that the Chinese people should carry into the modern day.

The main audience of Red Flag Manuscript includes PLA leadership, CCP party theorists, and everyday party cadre. Readers of this article would likely recognize that its evaluations on the state of the modern PLA reflect several enduring self-criticisms that can be traced back to 2012 when Xi Jinping stated his intention to increase the PLA’s combat abilities across all services.[16] The most commonly mentioned weakness within PLA academic journals and publications such as PLA Daily is the lack of effective PLA leadership. One of the most commonly cited criticisms is known as the “Five Incapables,” which states that many PLA officers are not capable of judging situations, understanding the intentions of higher authorities, making operational decisions, deploying troops, or dealing with unexpected situations.[17] This description of many PLA officers as incapable of basic military leadership stands in stark contrast to the heroic historical figures discussed in the article. This contrast emphasizes how lacking modern PLA leaders are by comparison. As the article mentions, significant attention within the PLA has been given to reforming ideological education and political work to instill patriotic values in the ranks of PLA soldiers. While this may result in future generations of PLA leadership more closely adhering to party ideology, current educational reform efforts do not address the full extent of problems within current PLA leadership.

The article’s timing reflects the continued salience of these ideas and their current relevance to the PLA. In an October 2020 speech commemorating the 70th anniversary of China’s entry into the Korean War, Xi Jinping characterized the war as a victory for China against U.S. injustice and imperialism.[18] According to Xi, the “martial spirit” displayed by the CPV should guide the Chinese people to overcome today’s challenges. Xi then reminded the audience that it is sometimes necessary to “use war to prevent war,” and use the military victory to win respect. The phrase “using war to prevent war” refers to the party’s idea that escalation and smaller conflicts can be useful tools in preventing a large-scale war.

The author of the article, Fan Jing, has researched theories of military political work on behalf of the Military Political Work Research Institute of the Academy of Military Sciences for many years.[19] The Academy of Military Sciences is a high-level research institute of the PLA, and the Military Political Work Research Institute conducts research concerning the political work done within the PLA. Fan has published over 60 articles on the subject, including a longer piece on the lessons of the Korean War published a year earlier.[20] While the general sentiment of these two pieces is similar, the first article provided a purely historical overview of the conflict, whereas the more recent article stated that the heroism of the past should characterize the PRC’s future actions as it works towards the goal of national rejuvenation.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, August 18, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, presidential and legislative elections.

Lai Countered CCP-KMT Messaging in a Bloomberg Interview

Republic of China (ROC) Vice President and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-te gave an interview with Bloomberg in Taiwan on July 27, which Bloomberg released on August 14.[1] Lai emphasized maintaining the status quo with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) across the Taiwan Strait while explaining the basis for ROC’s sovereignty to an American audience. Lai stated he is willing to engage with the PRC so long as there is “parity and dignity.”[2] He elaborated on this phrase by highlighting the basis for cross-strait relations lies in the sovereignty of the ROC. Lai stated the reality that “Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country called the Republic of China. It is not part of the People’s Republic of China. The ROC and PRC are not subordinate to one another. It is not necessary to declare independence.”[3] This means Lai’s call for engagement with the PRC with “parity and dignity” is based on the PRC treating the ROC as a sovereign equal. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has never been willing to meet this condition nor met with a serving DPP leader. The CCP and KMT separately framing Lai as a radical worker for Taiwan's independence serve as political attack lines.[4] These lines inaccurately portray the DPP as working to subvert the existing status quo and do not represent the DPP's position of strengthening their already independent state: the ROC.

The publication of Lai’s statements in a leading English-language magazine helps him project his message to a wider American audience compared to attacks from the CCP and KMT that aimed to undermine Lai’s legitimacy. The DPP-leaning Liberty Times reported on August 1 that KMT Acting Representative in the United States Victor Chin spread rumors in US-Taiwan policy circles that Lai sought to visit the Washington area during his upcoming transit.[5] The KMT sought to portray Lai as a provocateur in the US-ROC relationship in spreading this rumor. Lai’s English-language rejection of Taiwan's independence in favor of Taiwanese sovereignty countered this rumor. KMT Chairman Eric Chu also argued on August 3 that Lai made foreign observers nervous as the “golden grandchild of Taiwan independence.”^[6] The People’s Republic of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Spokesperson Zhu Fenglian issued a statement in response to the interview claiming that Lai is a “troublemaker” and that his “arguments are a complete lie.”[7] The Vice Chairman of the Kuomintang Cultural Association Lin Jiaxing independently echoed this PRC attack on Lai by stating that Lai’s comments and interviews with foreign media have caused confusion and “deepened the world’s worries” about his “pro-independence” stance.[8]

Election Update: Civil Nuclear Policies

KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih emphasized nuclear energy policy during a press conference as a means to burnish his national security credentials. Hou promised to restart the two decommissioned nuclear power plants at Jinshan and Kuosehng and resume maintenance and safety inspections at both sites. He also promised to extend the lifespan of the single remaining operational plant at Maanshan. Hou further stated that he would review the decision to discontinue the construction of a fourth nuclear power plant at Lungmen.[9] Taiwan halted construction at the site in 2014 following years of political, legal, and regulatory delays.[10] Hou also cited the necessity of maintaining a stable energy supply as an imperative national security matter as part of his justification to use nuclear energy.[11] Hou stated that power shortages without nuclear energy are also a concern of Taiwanese citizens, implicitly criticizing the ruling DPP’s energy policy.[12] The DPP criticized Hou for not detailing how he would deal with the plants’ nuclear waste.[13] The ROC Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs Tseng Wen-sheng also questioned the validity of restarting the decommissioned plants.[14]

Hou emphasized his energy policy to portray the KMT as a responsible party on national security without having to address cross-strait policy, an issue where the ROC’s populace heavily favors the DPP.[15] The KMT’s cross-strait policy emphasizing economic and cultural relations with the PRC is deeply unpopular among the Taiwanese electorate. Recent polling numbers demonstrate the KMT’s unpopularity. Hou is polling last among the three presidential candidates at only 16 percentage points on the question of who could best protect Taiwanese sovereignty.[16] He is also polling last by 16 percentage points in the presidential election.[17]

The points Hou raised during the press conference also distinguish his views on nuclear energy from the DPP’s platform. The DPP has maintained a nuclear-free Taiwan as its party platform since 1999 and has promised to phase out nuclear power by 2025.[18] DPP presidential candidate and Vice President Lai Ching-te has broadly supported President Tsai Ing-wen’s efforts to de-nuclearize Taiwan but advocates for maintaining nuclear plants for emergency use.[19] This discrepancy between the party’s platform and his policy demonstrates that Lai will sacrifice ideological purity on the nuclear issue due to the utility of nuclear energy in select circumstances.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to the People’s Republic of China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Centralization Slowed CCP Response to Typhoon Doksuri

Typhoon Doksuri made landfall in China on July 28. Chinese President Xi Jinping ordered “all-out efforts” on search and rescue and the maintenance of “overall social stability” on August 1.[20] This included mobilizing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Central Theater command to support response and rescue operations, as well as assist with evacuation efforts. It also included mobilizing more than 500 rescuers from organizations such as the Blue-Sky Rescue Team, which is the PRC’s largest non-governmental humanitarian organization.[21] The typhoon significantly impacted China’s Hebei Province, which wraps around Beijing, bringing the most rainfall that the capital had experienced in 140 years.[22] The state-controlled Global Times reported on August 4 that 133,000 citizens of Zhouzhou, which is 50 miles southwest of Beijing, needed to be evacuated.[23] CCP-aligned news outlet The Paper also attributed the PRC’s slow response to Doksuri to a November 2022 directive from China’s Ministry of Emergency Management. The directive requires any non-public relief organization that seeks to assist in response efforts to obtain an official letter from the Ministry of Emergency Management.[24] The Blue-Sky Rescue Team, for example, explained that its response time was significantly delayed due to having to wait for official permission to deploy to affected areas.[25]

This demonstrates the negative impact that centralization had on incentivizing low level party cadres to take risks and work effectively with the rescue teams to address the emergency. The CCP has historically severely punished officials whom it has judged to lack effectiveness during crisis response.[26] This resulted in local officials not taking charge during this crisis before, according to former Chinese water systems engineer Wang Weiluo, Xi ordered so on August 1.[27] The failure of the local cadres to integrate emergency response teams in response to Typhoon Doksuri fits into this pattern.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, August 10, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024, and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

The KMT has echoed PRC attacks on Lai Ching-te’s association with “Taiwan independence” in the lead up to his mid-August US transit, indicating the KMT sees political gain in framing even Lai’s unexceptional actions as dangerous and provocative. The DPP-leaning Liberty Times reported on August 1 that KMT Acting Representative in the United States Victor Chin spread rumors in US-Taiwan policy circles that Lai aimed to visit the Washington area during his upcoming transit.[1] The Biden administration has emphasized Lai will not visit Washington.[2] KMT Chairman Eric Chu later stated on August 4 that Lai has made foreign observers worried because of his Taiwan independence “DNA” and called Lai the “golden grandchild of Taiwan independence.”[3] Chu’s comments came in response to a reporter’s question about the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office’s (TAO) August 3 statement calling Lai a “troublemaker” after condemning his upcoming transit.[4] Chu did not mention the transit explicitly in his comments, but both Chin’s and Chu’s messaging aligns with the PRC narrative that Lai’s transit poses a threat to cross-strait stability.[5]

An unverified KMT English-language press release from August 4 stated that the party supports Lai’s transit, indicating it seeks to allay potential American concerns about its commitment to strong ties with the United States.[6] The statement explained that the KMT “welcomes” Lai’s transit and “strongly favors” closer relations with the United States. It also rejected allegations that the KMT hopes to benefit from the perception that Lai’s transit is provocative or that the party was the source of rumors regarding a potential Lai visit to Washington. Brian Hioe, a Taiwanese journalist, and former Sunflower Movement activist frequently critical of the KMT, posted the release on Twitter. The KMT did not post the release on its website, and ISW was unable to find the press release elsewhere online at the time of writing. [7] That the KMT did not publish the statement indicates the party sought to avoid drawing additional attention to the negative allegations the statement rebuts. The lack of a Chinese-language version or any similar statement to the Taiwanese press indicates the KMT did not intend to make support for US transits a focus of its domestic messaging.

The KMT’s messaging on Lai’s transit indicates the party does not prioritize addressing critiques that it is too pro-PRC in Taiwan.[8] The unreleased English-language press statement demonstrates sensitivity to such concerns in US policy circles, however.[9] Framing Lai as harmful to cross-strait stability is a major KMT talking point in its 2024 election campaign, and the TAO’s attacks on Lai reinforce this framing.[10] Failing to rebut PRC criticism of US transits blurs the distinction between mainstream objections to Lai’s record by DPP opponents and the PRC’s position of categorical opposition to high-level US-ROC officials interacting in any capacity, however. The KMT’s tendency to echo PRC positions for political gain complicates its efforts to reassure Washington about its commitment to Taiwan’s autonomy.

The KMT’s amplification of PRC criticism of Lai’s transit could aid the PRC’s efforts to reduce US transits and US-ROC contact more broadly. Turning US transits into an occasion for launching partisan attacks would impose political costs on Taiwanese leaders considering such trips. Chu’s criticism prompted Lai to defend himself in an August 7 interview during which he explained his prior comments on “Taiwan independence” and rejected the “golden grandson” label.[11]

High-profile KMT parroting of PRC talking points indicates the success of the PRC’s efforts to influence discourse in Taiwan and could advance the PRC’s goal of broadening support for peaceful unification. The KMT and other DPP opponents have consistently cautioned against stances they view as provocative to the PRC, effectively allowing the PRC’s demands to acquire political weight in Taiwan.[12] Building cross-strait “trust” and “understanding” is a central element of the CCP’s stated cross-strait goals.[13] General Secretary Xi Jinping has directly linked the concept of cross-strait “mind-spirit alignment,”[14] which includes building cross-strait understanding, to increasing Taiwanese “identification with unification.”[15]

Other

The Republic of China (ROC) arrested active-duty Republic of China Army (ROCA) personnel for allegedly passing on national security secrets to China. Taiwan detained ROCA Lieutenant Colonel Hsieh and ROCA Major Ho on charges of spying for China.[16] Hsieh is also accused of developing a spy ring of past and present ROC military personnel for the PRC.[17] Seven unspecified collaborators, including active duty and retired military personnel as well as civilians, comprise the additional defendants.[18] Deputy Secretary-General to the Presidential Office Alex Huang called the incident “shameless” and called for more investigations.[19]

The arrests are part of a decade-long trend. Reuters reported that a least 21 serving or retired Taiwanese officers with a rank of captain or above have been convicted of spying for China during the last decade.[20] The Taipei District Prosecutors Office prosecuted retired ROC Air Force Major General Chien Yao-tung and retired ROCA Lieutenant Colonel Wei Hsien-yi in January 2023 for working with Chinese intelligence operative Xie Xizhang. Chien and Wei received fines and suspended prison sentences of less than two years.[21] Taiwanese Institute for National Defense and Security Research Director Su Zi-yun previously stated in May that the average sentence for Taiwanese espionage suspects is 18 months while espionage cases in the United States and Europe receive on average 19-year sentences.[22] The pattern of ROC military personnel spying for China in conjunction with light espionage punishments indicates the ineffectiveness of ROC’s current laws in deterring potential spies.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

CCP media published English-language reports about the recent party calls for the Chinese people to participate in counter-espionage work. The Ministry of State Security (MSS) called for the normalization of mass participation in counter-espionage work on August 1 through its first publicly available WeChat message, which was in Chinese.[23] The MSS also unveiled an anonymous reporting system for users in Chinese and English, indicating that the party aims to coopt both PRC and foreign nationals in their new counter espionage drive.[24] US State Department Spokesman Matt Miller expressed concern on August 2 regarding the MSS’s counter espionage efforts encouraging citizens to spy on each other.[25] The CCP-controlled Global Times responded on August 3 by criticizing Miller and alleging the United States had double standards on surveillance security efforts.[26] The Global Times stated that the counter espionage law helps prevent China from becoming “a haven for Western spies.”[27] The Global Times also stated the law does not “target the activities of foreign organizations in China” in response to a Bloomberg article reporting the cancellation of a TEDx event in Guangzhou sparked by the counter-espionage law.[28]

This English-language messaging comes as the CCP aims to increase foreign investment in China which has reached a 25-year low while the country also experiences economic deflation and falling exports.[29] The Global Times articles fit into this context and indicate that the CCP seeks to reassure foreign firms that they can safely engage in commercial activity in China.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, August 3, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

The Republic of China (Taiwan) Vice President and Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Lai Ching-te is scheduled to transit through the United States in mid-August. ISW will produce a forthcoming forecast for CCP responses to this transit.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Mao Ning’s condemnation of imperial-era Japanese military aggression indicates that the party aims to portray itself as a pan-Asian leader to legitimize its military buildup. Mao cited the history of “Japanese militaristic aggression” and increases in the Japanese defense budget in order to justify her condemnation of the 2023 Defense of Japan White Paper. The annual paper outlines Japan’s defense priorities for the coming year. It specifically mentioned Chinese military modernization as well as the CCP unilaterally changing the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas as threats to regional order.[1] Mao urged Japan to change course to “win the trust of its Asian neighbors.”[2] Her comments draw on the historical memory of the imperial Japanese past of the 1930s and 1940s in order to portray Japan as a threat to all of Asia and undermine Japan’s role as a regional leader. On July 3, CCP Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi accused Japan of needing to know “where our roots lie” while stating that “no matter how blonde you dye your hair, how sharp you shape your nose, you can never become European or American, you can never become a Westerner.”[3] His comments portray Japan as subservient to Western powers and abandoning their Asian roots. Wang laying claim to Pan-Asianism demonstrates that the CCP aims to win the trust of its Asian neighbors by justifying its military buildup to protect Asia against foreign powers, such as Japan and the United States. This CCP rhetoric supports the party’s internal narrative that China is righteous in throwing off foreign domination, which in this case it views as the United States-led security architecture. Pan-Asian narratives also allow the party to argue it promotes “win-win cooperation” across the region rather than what it portrays as ongoing United States hegemony and imperialism.[4]

The purge of People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) leadership indicates that Xi Jinping needs to reestablish confidence in portions of the military leadership. The anti-corruption purge included the PLARF leader Li Yuchao as well as his deputies Zhang Zhenzhong and Liu Guangbin.[5] Xi promoted General Wang Houbin to become the new PLARF leader. Xi also promoted General Xu Xisheng to become the new PLARF political commissar.[6] Wang and Xu have service experience in the People’s Liberation Army Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, respectively, but not the PLARF before this posting. The Financial Times cited an unnamed foreign government official as stating that the trigger for the purge was foreigners gaining an overall better understanding of the PLARF and the CCP suspicion that PLARF leadership divulged secrets.[7] The choice to promote from outside of the PLARF indicates that Xi lacks confidence in the lower echelon of PLARF general officers, who could have internal patronage networks pertaining to the past leadership. This purge fits into Xi’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign targeting economically and ideologically corrupt officials that began when he entered office in 2012.

Xi stated in late July that he aimed to strengthen military governance by ensuring party control over the military, indicating he thinks that the PLA is still not sufficiently ideologically loyal to the party.[8] He explicitly repeated this message and the need for the PLA to reject corruption on August 1, the 96th anniversary of the PLA.[9] This purge demonstrates to a new generation of PLA general officers that anti-corruption is still a top priority for Xi and an active tool to ensure their loyalty to the party.

The Ministry of State Security (MSS) called for the masses to participate in counter-espionage work, which may lead to the new expansion of the party’s online security apparatus. The MSS called for the normalization of the masses in participating in counter-espionage work on August 1 via creating and posting its first publicly available WeChat message, which state media also repeated.[10] This demonstrates the MSS’s aim to communicate directly to the Chinese people as WeChat is a dominant communication platform in the PRC. ISW previously assessed that the anti-espionage law could include the participation of individual citizens to serve societal policing functions either in an online or in person capacity via anonymous reporting systems.[11] The MSS has confirmed this assessment by unveiling an anonymous reporting system for users in Chinese and English, indicating that the party aims to coopt both PRC and foreign nationals in their new counter espionage drive.[12] The anonymous reporting system and opening of an MSS WeChat account indicate that the party aims to expand its influence on individual user behavior to enforce state sanctioned norms.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, July 27, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

The KMT called for coordinating with the TPP during the 2024 Legislative Yuan elections, which indicates that the KMT aims to expand its ability to win legislative seats even if it loses the presidency. KMT Chairman Eric Chu made the call on July 23.[1] KMT presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih’s campaign stated it did not know to what Chu was referring.[2] Hou is reluctant to endorse Chu’s call because it could signal the party lacks faith in him as their standard bearer going into the presidential and legislative elections.

Chu called for this coordination because the KMT is trailing in the presidential polls. Hou is polling 16 percentage points behind the frontrunner DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te.[3] One way of salvaging the upcoming election for the KMT is to aim to gain a majority in the legislative elections. The DPP currently controls 61 of the 113 seats in the Legislative Yuan while the KMT controls 38.[4] All 113 members of the Legislative Yuan will be up for reelection during the 2024 election. Hou’s unpopularity indicates that the KMT would need a coalition to be part of a majority in the Legislative Yuan. Legislative election cooperation with the TPP is one avenue open to the KMT that could allow it to increase its representation in the Legislative Yuan even if it loses the presidential election.

The KMT and TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je never agreed to run a joint presidential campaign.[5] The two parties disagree on the degree of cooperation they should engage in for legislative elections. Ko stated that any potential cooperation should “go with the flow” and remained non-committal about it potentially come to fruition in the coming months.[6] KMT Chairman Eric Chu called for coordination between the TPP and KMT when nominating their separate legislative election candidates to enhance the likelihood of defeating the DPP.[7]

Ko is lukewarm about alignment with the KMT because the KMT presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih remains third in the polling at roughly 20 percentage points of support.[8] Ko is second in the polling at almost 28 percentage points of support while DPP presidential nominee Lai Ching-te is in the lead at 36 percentage points of support.[9] Ko aligning with the KMT could cause him to lose swing voters who view him as an alternative to the DPP-KMT dominated Taiwanese political structure.

Other

The CCP’s United Front apparatus coordinated attacks on DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te’s July 4 The Wall Street Journal op-ed “My Plan to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait” to reduce support for his candidacy by framing him as pro-war. The United Front group All-China Taiwan Compatriot Friendship Association[10] published articles from over 50 purported representatives of Taiwanese diaspora groups that criticized the op-ed.[11] Various United Front media organs then republished the articles.[12] Many “Taiwan compatriots” quoted in the articles contended that Lai’s overture to peace was a deceitful ploy to win votes.[13] They claimed the true purpose of Lai’s op-ed was to further “Taiwan independence” and the “suppression” of China by building American support for his candidacy.[14] The quoted individuals were affiliated with groups based in countries including the United States, Hong Kong, Japan, and the People’s Republic of China.[15] That the coordinated United Front attacks centered the views of ostensibly non-political “Taiwan compatriot” organizations indicates the CCP sought to portray opposition to Lai as the consensus of the Taiwanese diaspora. These messages put Lai on the defensive by making him contest such criticism under the dominant but contested narrative that the election is a choice between peace and war.

The coordinated attacks differ from prior United Front responses to “provocations,” such as then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 and President Tsai’s meeting with Speaker McCarthy in April 2023. Prior responses featured criticism from communities of “overseas Chinese” groups explicitly aligned with the CCP’s goal of “peaceful unification,”[16] as well as groups claiming to be from the “international community.”[17] These communities’ opinions would have less influence on Taiwanese voters compared to that of other Taiwanese due to the groups’ explicit alignment with the CCP. In this wave of attacks on Lai’s op-ed, the United Front portrayed itself as speaking for the Taiwanese diaspora. This shift could provide the CCP with leverage points to manipulate international public opinion during a crisis by using United Front groups to falsely show Taiwanese disunity.

The DPP-controlled Taiwanese Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) may allow limited future cross-strait exchanges to blunt domestic criticism that the party is not sufficiently engaging with China since President Tsai took office in 2016. A delegation of Chinese students visited Taiwan at the invitation of the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation from July 19 to 24 after approval by the MAC. The students visited several Taiwanese universities and cultural sites before returning to China.[18] Taiwan’s MAC approved the students after rejecting several students for having ties to the United Front or being members of the CCP.[19] Several DPP legislators opposed the move.[20] Ma announced his intentions on July 24 to start a “cross-strait university principal forum” to enable higher education cross-strait exchanges.[21] Both the KMT and TPP have criticized the DPP for not engaging enough with China.[22] The KMT and TPP frame cross-strait exchanges as necessary to reduce cross-strait tensions.[23]

The DPP has previously responded to criticism of not engaging enough with China by reopening the passenger ferries between Taiwan’s Matsu and Kinmen islands and China’s Fujian Province.[24] This occurred over opposition within the DPP.[25] China previously criticized the DPP for “unilaterally restricting” restricting cross-strait exchanges and heavily urged the DPP to restart the passenger ferries.[26] The KMT had also criticized the DPP closing the ferry service and had previously called for them to be opened as Taiwan relaxed COVID-19 restrictions.[27] Lai has stated that the DPP is open to cross-strait exchanges on the basis of parity and mutual respect but does not want to engage in exchanges solely on Beijing’s terms.[28] The similar criticism facing the DPP in this situation and the subsequent decision by the party to blunt that criticism by opening up the ferry service suggests the MAC will follow a similar course of action by allowing for future limited cross-strait exchanges.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The CCP announced the creation of the National Data Bureau (NDB) in March to manage the PRC’s public and private data. The organization may serve as a coordination vehicle between the CCP’s economic and national security organs. The NDB falls under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which deals heavily with economic planning.^[29] The development of the NDB is part of the CCP’s broader effort to centralize control of the internet via the enforcement of cyber security and data norms.^[30] The state-owned China United Network Communications Chairman Liu Liehong will be the first head of the NDB.[31] Liu has over thirty years of experience that culminated in leading Chinese state-owned electronics and IT companies that bridge national security and economic policy areas. He served as Deputy Director of the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission while also being Deputy Head of the Cyberspace Administration of China from 2018 to 2020 before becoming Vice-Minister of Industry and Information Technology from 2020 to 2021.[32] Liu also has considerable experience with internet governance, which the CCP views as critical to national security, and advanced in July through the Cyberspace Administration of China’s renewed crackdown on “self-media.”[33]

The NDB is part of the CCP’s strategy to create a socio-economic business environment devoid of threats to the party through stronger regulations of the PRC’s internet and economy. The CCP does not view security legislation as a hindrance to attracting economic investment and economic growth. The party is willing to tolerate a business environment less attractive to foreign investment due to expansive national security laws in order to change the norms for foreign economic activity in China. The party aims to make foreign cooperation with state security services an aspect of doing business in China that foreign investors must tolerate. The CCP pursues this goal while simultaneously holding Ministry of Commerce news conferences to increase foreign investment in China.[34]

Higher-ranking Chinese officials decided to meet with Henry Kissinger rather than US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry during their recent visits to China. Kissinger met with CCP officials such as General Secretary Xi Jinping, Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu, and Director of the CCP Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Wang Yi.[35] Kerry met with lower-ranking officials such as Premier Li Qiang, Vice President Han Zheng, as well as Wang Yi.[36] That higher-ranking CCP officials met with Kissinger indicates that the party will use access to CCP policy-makers as leverage to induce American policy-makers to enact the party’s preferred policy outcomes.

CCP Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Office Director Wang Yi stated that the United States needed “Kissinger-style diplomatic wisdom” and should “avoid confrontation” with China.[37] This statement coupled with the CCP’s complaints of American hegemony indicate that these are two policy areas that the party aims to shift the policy positions of the United States.[38] Wang’s comments place the onus for resolving tension in Sino-American relations solely on the United States. He is pushing this message for an external American audience as well as an internal Chinese audience. The internal audience is relevant because his narrative legitimizes the CCP by exculpating the party from blame for international tension.

Wang Yi re-assumed the role of foreign minister on July 25and will very likely serve in the role as an interim caretaker. Wang is a veteran diplomat who served as foreign minister from 2013 to 2022, and as Central Foreign Affairs Commission Director since the start of 2023. Wang’s age[39] and the length of his previous term suggest that he will not be in the role for 5 to 10 years, which is the typical length of time that officials serve in that position. The choice of a seasoned diplomat such as Wang indicates the Party’s desire to stabilize the foreign ministry and project continuity in China’s foreign relations domestically and abroad. Since the 1990s the only times officials have concurrently held the role of foreign minister and been Politburo members are during transitions between foreign ministers.[40]

Selecting Wang to replace Qin after the latter’s month-long absence indicates that the Party is still unsure of how to handle the fallout of Qin’s disappearance. Immediately after the National People’s Congress Standing Committee made the announcement, the Foreign Ministry website began quickly deleting all pages relating to Qin, but as of July 27 the page on foreign minister was still blank. This indicates that whoever oversees updating the Ministry site was not informed of Wang’s re-appointment in advance. Otherwise, they could have prepared to put up a page with information on Wang immediately after he was re-appointed so as to project continuity. The specific wording of the July 25 announcement also indicates the Party is still in the process of deciding Qin’s fate.[41] The announcement relieved Qin of his position but did not remove his Party membership.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, July 20, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third-party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Foxconn founder Terry Gou published an article in the Washington Post urging high-level dialogue between the ROC and PRC. Gou was a leading contender for the opposition KMT presidential nomination, but the party selected Hou Yu-ih as its candidate for the 2024 election. He framed the United States, China, and Taiwan as all sharing responsibility for cross-strait tension.[1] He repeated the KMT position that the PRC and ROC engaged in fruitful cross-strait dialogue under the 1992 Consensus even while holding different interpretations of “One China.”[2] Gou argues that President Tsai’s inflexibility on the 1992 Consensus places the onus for cross-strait tension on the DPP for allegedly aggravating the threat of war.[3] The 1992 Consensus refers to a mutual yet contested understanding of “One China” that the CCP and KMT claim emerged from a series of 1992 meetings in Hong Kong between the semiofficial Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits. The KMT interprets “One China” to refer to the ROC while allowing the ROC and PRC to have conflicting interpretations of China. The CCP interprets “One China” as referring to the PRC, including Taiwan. The DPP has never fully accepted the consensus and has sought to move away from any “One China” framework.[4]

The article likely will further CCP information operations that aim to exculpate the party from blame for exacerbating cross-strait tensions. This assessment is independent of Gou’s intentions behind publishing the article. Placing the blame for cross-strait tensions on the current DPP administration ignores the CCP’s military and economic coercion measures that exacerbate cross-strait tensions. This coercion involves normalizing violations of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone as well as suspending Taiwanese imports before resuming them as the election neared.[5] Failing to address these measures allows the party to frame itself as willing to resolve cross-strait tensions while ratcheting up its coercive activities that contribute to that tension.

Gou’s blaming of cross strait tensions predominantly on the DPP is consistent with KMT presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih’s rhetoric. ISW previously assessed that this rhetoric exacerbates CCP leverage points targeting the DPP under the dominant but contested “war versus peace” election narrative.[6]

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The Taiwanese media outlet United Daily News (UDN) falsely alleged the United States pressured Taiwan to develop biological weapons. UDN leans heavily toward pan-blue parties such as the KMT. The UDN report falsely claimed that the United States urged the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense's National Defense Medical Center to develop biological weapons.[7] These claims are consistent with false CCP messaging over the past three years regarding United States biological laboratories operating in other regions of the world.[8] Taiwanese Presidential Office Spokesperson Lin Yuchan stated that Taiwan does not and will not in the future have any plans to develop biological weapons.[9] An unnamed spokesperson from the US Department of State also stated to the Taiwanese Central News Agency that UDN’s report had no factual basis.[10]

The UDN’s allegation likely will further CCP information operations that aim to decrease the confidence of the Taiwanese population in the United States as a reliable partner. The purpose of the UDN article is to harm the DPP’s standing in the presidential elections by falsely framing the party as irresponsible for seeking to develop biological weapons with the United States.[11] This is in line with the CCP’s objective to degrade the pan-blue electorate’s trust in the United States. In the event of a future KMT president, this could create a leverage point for the CCP to coerce Taiwan away from US security collaboration. The CCP does not risk blowback from the article because it is not overtly linked to the publication.

The CCP is likely to fuse human and technological surveillance methods in implementing its anti-espionage law. The anti-espionage law came into effect on July 1 and expands the definition of espionage to any item related to national security interests, without a clear definition of that term.[12] Chinese Minister of State Security Chen Yixin wrote an article instructing party cadre on how to implement the anti-espionage law in which he emphasized the “subversive characteristics” of new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, but also the necessity to utilize them more effectively to carry out the law.[13] Chen also referred to the anti-espionage fight as a people’s war, the same terminology CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping used to refer to Chinese society’s efforts to fight COVID-19, indicating his intent for broad societal implementation of the anti-espionage law.[14]

Prior societal control mechanisms in China during the pandemic also relied on combining human and technological surveillance. The CCP divided urban communities into grids beginning in 2013 in order to “let high-tech digital platforms, social volunteers, and local police jointly and actively find and handle social issues.”[15] This unit of organization played a key role in the party’s resource allocation and social control response during the pandemic by allowing for “nationwide instructions, policies and rules to reach every resident” regardless of citizenship status.[16] This grid system combined with the mobilization of party cadre and migrant laborers converted to rule enforcing healthcare workers demonstrated the party’s usage of technological surveillance conjoined with community policing for governance.[17]

In the online environment, the Cyberspace Administration of China renewed the enforcement of digital state censorship by cracking down over the past week on “self-media,” content published online by individual autonomous users rather than through traditional state outlets, as well as announcing a measure aimed at restricting generative artificial intelligence that is scheduled to come into effect on August 15.[18] The party also draws on offline societal policing groups like the Wulin Aunties to ensure “correct” behavior that does not stray from the party’s political line or breach societal norms.[19] The CCP’s fusion of human and technological surveillance during Covid and for enforcing digital as well as societal norms suggest that the party will take a similar approach for implementing the anti-espionage law.

The CCP criticized Japan’s release of over one million tons of water from the destroyed Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, possibly to buttress the party’s image as a responsible regional power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved Japan’s discharge plan by stating that it complied with global safety standards and would have “negligible radiological impact to people and the environment.”[20] Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Wang Wenbin framed the release as an irresponsible regional action that endangers the environment by treating the Pacific Ocean as a sewer.[21] Chinese state media published articles to exacerbate rifts over the nuclear discharge between the Japanese government and domestic constituents like fishermen as well as regional partners like South Korea.[22] The CCP’s portrayal of Japan as acting irresponsibly contrasts with the party’s long standing narrative of China as a responsible international stakeholder.[23] This framing indicates that the party aims to increase the prominence of this narrative by portraying itself as the rhetorical champion defending the rights of fellow Pacific countries that it frames as the victims of the IAEA-approved nuclear discharge.

Chinese Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Office Wang Yi stating that China aims to expand “mutually beneficial cooperation” at the ASEAN summit underscores the party’s messaging to portray itself as a responsible regional power. He claimed that China promotes regional stability and prevents interference in Southeast Asia.[24] His comments about regional interference imply that the United States is the irresponsible provocative power in the region. In both the context of Japan and ASEAN, the party rhetoric suggests that it is a reasonable power compared to America and its regional allies.

The CCP messaged its alignment with Russia’s view of NATO as an instigator in other regions’ affairs to signal its opposition to greater NATO involvement in East Asia. NATO’s Vilnius Summit Communiqué condemned the People’s Republic of China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies” as it “strives to subvert the rules-based international order” via decisions such as its strategic partnership with Russia. [25] Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Wang Wenbin criticized the communiqué and urged NATO to stop “smearing China.”[26] Chinese state media also endorsed Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s framing of NATO as an instigator of European and Asia-Pacific regional instability.[27] The promulgation of this narrative portrays China as the victim of aggression in order to shift attention away from destabilizing Chinese regional military activity such as normalizing daily People’s Liberation Army Air Force violations of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone over the past three years.[28]

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, July 13, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Cross-strait issues have reemerged as the prominent topics of debate in the Taiwanese presidential election. The sexual assault and barbiturate scandals that the Taiwanese media space focused on for most of May and June are no longer the top media stories, nor are they significantly shaping the election. DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen publicly apologized for the sexual assault scandal that primarily affected the DPP in early June and launched three internal party processes to prevent further sexual harassment in the party.[1] The barbiturate scandal that primarily affected KMT presidential candidate and New Taipei City mayor Hou Yu-ih in May to June prompted Hou to publicly apologize for the scandal.[2] New Taipei City’s education department randomly checked several dozen preschools and tested the blood of 34 children throughout June, but found no trace of barbiturates.[3] The KMT and DPP candidates’ remarks in early July moved the electoral narrative away from the scandals and back to focusing on cross-strait relations. KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih and DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te have separately re-emphasized the centrality of cross-strait issues for the election since early July, after media coverage of the scandals subsided.

Lai published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal on July 4 detailing his “four-pillar plan for peace.” He called for increasing Taiwan’s military deterrence, treating economic security as a national security matter, partnering with democracies around the world, and supporting the cross-strait status quo.[4] The article ignited criticism from the KMT and TPP. KMT spokesperson Lin Jiaxing stated that Lai’s four pillars make it “difficult to maintain the status quo” and contain confrontational thinking that will exacerbate cross-strait tensions.[5] TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je criticized Lai’s four pillars as unachievable under a DPP administration because of its poor relations with China that make dialogue difficult.[6]

Lai also framed the presidential election as a choice between moving closer to the White House or Zhongnanhai (the CCP leadership compound). He stated Taiwan is moving closer to the White House under President Tsai Ing-wen and that he would continue leading the country in that direction as president.[7] This prompted the pan-blue media outlet China Times to criticize Lai as aiming for independence and being biased towards the United States.[8]

Hou Yu-ih recanted his opposition to extending mandatory conscription for Taiwanese men from four months to one year. Hou stated on July 3 that he would limit mandatory military service to four months to “ensure stability and peace on both sides of the strait.”[9] Hou stated on July 4 that he does not oppose the government’s plan to extend compulsory military service to one year but that he is opposed to the DPP’s “3+1” system. This system allows university students to complete both their degree and military service in four years.[10]

The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Beijing is trying a “more subtle approach” to influence Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election. This “more subtle approach” involves the CCP not directly attacking the DPP as much as in previous elections.[11] Instead, the party takes a combination of coercive actions. SCMP cited an unnamed Taiwanese security source stating that the CCP aims to generate fear in Taiwan by equating a vote for the DPP with a vote for war. It also aimed to place the onus for cross-strait tensions on the DPP via messaging on TikTok and more frequent PLA military activity near Taiwan. The source claimed that the CCP is pushing narratives to the Taiwanese domestic audience that frame countries friendly to Taiwan, such as the United States, as unreliable.[12] The unnamed source also stated that the CCP coerces Taiwanese public opinion by “first suspend[ing] the import of certain Taiwanese products, only to resume shipments as the elections approached.”[13] This is consistent with ISW’s prior assessments that the CCP has leverage points over each of the Taiwanese presidential candidates regarding cross-strait policy due to the peace versus war election narrative framing.[14] The CCP’s efforts indicate that the party is setting conditions to shape the Taiwanese political landscape regardless of the outcome of the Taiwanese presidential election.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The Cyberspace Administration of China renewed its crackdown on “self-media” to create an internet order governed by stricter central censorship. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) launched the crackdown on self-media in March 2023. It aimed to eliminate “harmful information” such as that which does “damage to the party and government image.”[15] The July 2023 regulations go further by forbidding censored accounts from making money and gaining followers and blocking other users from interacting with the censored accounts’ past posts. The new regulations also require the censored accounts to mark the time and date for all photos and videos and stipulate that those without timestamps will be marked as computer generated. Posts that include the logos of the party, government organizations, or the PLA require manual review.[16]

The CAC initially operationalized this crackdown by banning the social media accounts Health Insight and Media Camp that reported on Covid-19 governance scandals and investigative journalism in China, respectively.[17] The new regulations and crackdown show that the CCP aims for a stricter crackdown on self-media that it can centrally control, however.

The Fengqiao Experience may be the CCP’s framework for ensuring a backup form of internet control. The Fengqiao Experience refers to the party mobilizing the population to root out and shame alleged class enemies in China during the 1960s before the Cultural Revolution.[18] The Fengqiao Experience entailed the purging of party members—including Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun—which isolated them and their families from the rest of respectable Chinese society pending rehabilitation by party leadership. This process of isolation involved moving some, such as Xi’s family, to the Central Party School as social pariahs for re-education and persecution in struggle sessions during the Cultural Revolution.[19] The term Fengqiao Experience became disreputable due to its association with the Mao years. Xi has brought the term back since becoming General Secretary in 2013.[20] The new CAC regulations articulate virtual isolation along lines somewhat similar to the societal purges of the Fengqiao Experience. The CAC crackdown aims to deny users the ability to show solidarity with a censored user by interacting with their posts.

The party has also drawn on the Fengqiao Experience for offline informal societal policing functions. The party has held summits praising community policing groups, such as the Chaoyang Masses and Wulin Aunties, under the banner of the Fengqiao Experience.[21] These groups function as a semi-decentralized force to ensure “correct” behavior that does not stray from the party’s political line or breach societal norms. The CCP could replicate the informal system of neighbors reporting on each through groups like the Wulin Aunties in online settings via anonymous reporting for users suspected of violating CAC “self-media” guidelines.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, July 6, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Terminology: 1992 Consensus: a disputed cross-strait policy formulation supported in different formations by the CCP and KMT that acts as a precondition to cross-strait dialogue. The DPP does not support the 1992 Consensus.

KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih stated his intent to stop the extension of mandatory military service to one year, likely exacerbating existing CCP leverage points targeting the DPP under the dominant but contested “war versus peace” election narrative. Mandatory male military service in Taiwan is currently four months long.[1] Hou stated he would limit the period of mandatory military service to four months to “ensure stability and peace on both sides of the strait.”[2] This would undo President Tsai Ing-wen’s extension of male conscription to one year beginning in 2025.[3] Her decision to extend conscription garnered a majority of societal support but remains a political topic for internal Taiwanese debates on the contributing factors of cross-strait tensions.[4] Hou’s rhetoric links the extension of Taiwanese military service as a driver of cross-strait tensions. His comments also place the onus for reducing cross-strait tensions on Taiwan without accounting for the coercive activities that prompted the conscription reform, such as the PLA escalating violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ since 2020.[5] Hou’s comments contribute to the framing of the Taiwanese election as a choice between peace and war, a narrative that ISW previously assessed provides the CCP with leverage points to influence Taiwanese cross-strait policy.[6] This creates opportunities for the CCP to plant information narratives both domestically in Taiwan and internationally that exculpate the party from blame for cross-strait tension and lay that responsibility at the feet of the DPP.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The CCP publicly qualifies comments from the Chinese Ambassador to the European Union Fu Cong about Ukraine reclaiming its 1991 borders and is unlikely to replace Fu Cong. Fu Cong stated that he “didn’t see why not” Ukraine should reclaim its 1991 territorial borders during an interview with Al Jazeera in late June.[7] The Chinese state media outlet Global Times published an article claiming that unspecified Western media aimed to use Fu’s comments out of context as a means to sow discord between China and Russia.[8] Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Mao Ning responded to a question about whether Fu Cong’s comments represented the People’s Republic of China’s official position by stating that China wants all parties in the Ukraine crisis to reach a political settlement via negotiation.[9] Fu Cong’s remarks are the second time a high-ranking Chinese official in Europe has strayed from Beijing’s official line on Ukraine as articulated by Mao Ning. In April 2023, Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye dismissed the sovereignty of former Soviet republics.[10] Mao Ning subsequently repudiated Lu’s comments by claiming that China “respects all countries’ sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.”[11] Despite rumors of his removal, Lu Shaye still serves as Chinese Ambassador to France.[12]

Neither Xi nor any Politburo Standing Committee member has publicly made international calls or remarks in response to Fu’s comments. This differs from China’s response to Lu’s comments, after which CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to mitigate the associated diplomatic fallout in Europe.[13] Keeping Fu Cong’s comments out of public conversation also avoids any high-profile international calls, which plays to the CCP’s advantage in terms of its economic relationship with Europe. Drawing attention to Fu Cong’s comments could risk undermining German and French alignment with Chinese views about avoiding economic disengagement.[14]

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, June 30, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

The PLA has normalized drone flights around Taiwan within Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and may begin conducting such flights with regular manned aircraft during the next 12-24 months. The PLA began flying drones in Taiwan’s ADIZ on September 4, 2022.[1] The PLA conducted its first drone flight around Taiwan within the ADIZ in April 2023 and did so twice in May 2023.[2] The flights around the island reflect a change over the last year, during which the PLA flew drones and manned aircraft up to halfway around Taiwan starting from southwestern ADIZ.[3] The way in which PLA violations of Taiwan’s southwestern ADIZ changed over the last year suggests that that the PLA will expand flights around Taiwan. The pattern of PLA intrusions into the southwestern ADIZ began with individual aircraft or drones on a near daily basis. The PLA committed ADIZ violations intermittently with sorties of tens of planes in the months and years thereafter.[4] The PLA has not regularly sent large numbers of drones into Taiwan’s ADIZ without accompanying manned aircraft. The PLA’s flights around Taiwan within the ADIZ is a change from the manned “island encirclement patrol” flights, which have circumnavigated Taiwan outside of the ADIZ since 2016.[5] It is unclear if some of these flights briefly entered into the Taiwanese ADIZ. This demonstrates the PLA conducts manned flights that circle Taiwan.

The PLA likely aims to reduce Taiwan’s decision-making timeline for responding to military flights within the ADIZ. The PLA flights encircling Taiwan within the ADIZ complicate the ROC’s contingency planning compared to previous flights around Taiwan. Aerial encirclement of Taiwan confers operational advantages to the PLA by presenting nearly constant flights that the ROC must track. This compresses the ROC’s decision-making timeline about engaging PLA aircraft and presents challenges to determining which aircraft to target.

The normalization of manned flights around Taiwan within the ADIZ would support a CCP coercion campaign to induce unification on the PRC’s terms. The flights aim to wear down Taiwanese military readiness, force difficult decisions regarding ROC resources allocation, as well as create a sense of impenetrable siege among the Taiwanese population. These effects support CCP efforts to degrade the Taiwanese populace’s confidence in its government’s capacity to defend the country, a key part of the longer-term CCP coercion campaign to induce unification under the PRC. Compressed decision-making timelines about whether to engage PLA aircraft also enhances the risk of miscalculation by the PRC or ROC that could lead to a crisis.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Ongoing media coverage about TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je’s support for resuming cross-strait talks involving the controversial Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) may improve the standing of the DPP or KMT in the 2024 presidential election. The CSSTA is an unratified cross-strait trade agreement that many Taiwanese view as controversial due to the length it would have opened the Taiwanese economy to Chinese investment.[6] Ko called for resuming cross-strait talks through the CSSTA on June 20.[7] He renounced this statement on June 24, stating that his comments were from an internal discussion rather than his policy proposal or campaign platform. Ko accused the media of defaming him as being a pro-China candidate.[8] The media coverage of Ko’s comments reflects a change in public attention from scandals that involve the DPP and KMT that contributed to an increase in popular support for Ko to cross-strait policy issues that favor the DPP.[9] The DPP stands to gain voters amid concerns that Ko’s cross-strait policy is unfavorable or incoherent and as a counterpoint to the KMT’s policy of pro-China engagement. DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te is maintaining the platform of Taiwanese sovereignty that helped the party win the last two presidential elections.[10]

Ko’s comments about resuming cross-strait talks involving the CSSTA are surprising because he opposed the agreement during his successful run for Taipei mayor in 2014.[11] This aligned him with Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement, which was a series of protests in 2014 that resulted in the occupation of the Legislative Yuan and the successful prevention of the ratification of the CSSTA. Ko competes with pan-green parties such as the DPP for the political support of individuals who participated in the Sunflower Movement. KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih took the position that Taiwan should pass the CSSTA and engage in greater overall exchange with China.[12] The DPP released a statement condemning the CSSTA and condemning the PRC for coercive trade practices aimed at Taiwan.[13] Ko’s comments could push some of his supporters to vote for pan-green parties like the DPP who condemn the CSSTA.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The PRC framed the Wagner Group rebellion as a minor challenge that Russia overcame. The Chinese press portrayed Russian daily life in a state of normalcy by showing that the Scarlet Sails festival went ahead as scheduled in St. Petersburg.[14] The Chinese state expressed support for Russia in stabilizing the situation and framed China as a responsible power aiming to maintain regional stability.[15] Chinese state media also repeated Russian narratives blaming Western intelligence agencies for inciting the rebellion.[16]

ISW is considering two hypotheses about Chinese support to Russia in the aftermath of the rebellion.

The CCP may message support for Putin’s regime without providing direct materiel assistance to him. This is plausible because China is sensitive to European criticisms of its military support to Russia.[17] This hypothesis is unlikely because China already provides Russia with military assistance such as rifles and smokeless powder.[18] Indicators that would support the hypothesis include: 1) Chinese state media repeating Russian information narratives about the Wagner rebellion and 2) Chinese ambassadors in Europe stressing Chinese neutrality while falsely blaming NATO and the United States for instigating the war. In this outcome, the PRC would weaken its relationship with Putin.

The CCP may alternatively increase its economic, military, or intelligence support to Russia to ensure regime stability. This is plausible because the CCP aims to avoid an economically and politically unstable Russia.[19] This hypothesis is unlikely because the PRC is sensitive to Europeans viewing China as a threat rather than partner.[20] Indicators that would support the hypothesis include: 1) Unannounced meetings between Politburo or CMC members and their Russian counterparts during the coming weeks; 2) negotiations or agreements for arms sales or technological transfer; and 3) the expansion of Sino-Russian military cooperation through military exercises or intelligence sharing. In this outcome, Chinese material assistance to Russia would undermine the CCP’s efforts to divide the United States and Europe on trade restrictions, including sensitive technology such as semiconductor chip production.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, June 23, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Ongoing scandals involving the DPP and KMT are likely contributing to greater support for TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je. The sexual assault scandal that largely focused on the DPP was the dominant story in Taiwanese media from May 31 to June 8 and led to the DPP announcing systemic reforms.[1] The media shifted its attention to a scandal about the drugging of children at a Kid Castle Educational Institute in New Taipei on May 31. The drugging scandal affected KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih because he is the mayor of New Taipei.[2] The TPP and TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je have not been implicated in either scandal. The polling data shows that the TPP has gained popular support amid the scandals.

Ko polled in third place prior to the scandals.[3] He is now polling in second place behind DPP nominee Lai Ching-te (William Lai).[4]
A Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation poll revealed a four-percent point increase in support for Ko between May and June. This increase is greater than gains for Ko in the foundation’s previous polls, which included a two and a half percent point increase in support between April and May.[5]
Another Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation poll also shows that party identification with the TPP increased by seven percentage points between May and June, compared to nearly seven percent point drop in identification with the DPP and a nearly six percent point drop with the KMT.[6]

Progressive pan-green parties, such as the New Power Party (NPP) and Taiwan Statebuilding Party, have also made gains in the polls. This highlights how the scandals are affecting the presidential campaigns beyond the DPP, KMT, and TPP.[7]

Ko articulated a controversial policy as part of his electoral platform, which may undermine the support he has gained while the DPP and KMT are facing scandals. Ko announced his support for resuming cross-strait talks involving the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) on June 20.[8] The CSSTA is an unratified cross-strait trade agreement involving telecommunications, banking, and healthcare that many Taiwanese view as controversial due to the secretive nature of the negotiations process.[9] It also sparked the Sunflower Movement that successfully prevented the agreement from passing in 2014 via protests that led to the occupation of the Legislative Yuan for the first time in Taiwanese history. Taiwan’s media is focused on the scandals, but such stories will not dominate press coverage of the elections in the mid-to-long term. Rather, the trend is that cross-strait relations is the central issue for Taiwan’s presidential elections. The last two Taiwanese presidential elections, which occurred in 2016 and 2020, centered around the candidates’ differing views of cross-strait relations.[10] The 2024 presidential election coverage also focused on cross-strait relations until the sexual assault and drugging scandals. Ko’s controversial and unpopular stance on the CSSTA will therefore re-open a divisive debate on cross-strait relations in Taiwanese politics and chip away at his appeal as a pragmatic non-polarizing candidate.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China emphasized economic cooperation over de-risking and the protection of advanced technological sectors during meetings with German officials, likely to split US-EU technological and economic restriction strategies aimed at China. A May Group of Seven (G-7) joint statement discussed the importance of “de-risking” from China.[11] Germany later released its first National Security Strategy (NSS) on June 14, which refers to China as a “partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival.”[12] Chinese Premier Li Qiang subsequently traveled to Europe as part of an effort to strengthen ties with Europe after the EU removed five Chinese companies from an export restrictions list during the week of June 12.[13] The CCP views his visit as a way to split an increasingly hostile US approach to China by wooing Europe with prospects of further economic collaboration.

Chinese Premier Li Qiang warned about the supposed dangers of de-risking during his first overseas visit to Germany on June 19 and 20.[14] Li told audiences of German politicians and business figures that Germany and China do not have “fundamental conflicts of interest” and that “risk prevention and cooperation are not mutually exclusive.”[15] Li instead said that “the biggest risk is non-cooperation” while acknowledging that other parties have their own unspecified security concerns.[16] This type of rhetoric aims to prevent US-EU consensus on de-risking from materializing and threatening Chinese economic interests. The CCP strongly objected to multinational semiconductor restrictions targeting China that the US led in February in conjunction with Japan and the Netherlands.[17] The PRC aims to prevent similar and wider scale coordination aimed at degrading China’s economy

Li’s efforts to split US-EU technological and economic restriction strategies continued during his June 22 visit in France. Li called for the French government to provide a “fair, just, and non-discriminatory” business environment to Chinese firms during a meeting with French business leaders where he praised the French government’s “opposition to bloc confrontation and decoupling.”[18] He also called for a ”more resilient” Sino-French and Sino-European industrial supply chain upon his arrival to France.[19] Greater resilience implies that there is a need to hedge against disruptions, which Chinese state media often frame as a result of US-led efforts.[20]

China refused to restart military-to-military dialogue with the United States, possibly to extract political concessions from the United States for future dialogue. China suspended military-to-military dialogue to express opposition to then–US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan.[21] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited China on June 18-19, during which he called for future exchanges and dialogue in military and non-military disciplines.[22] CCP officials, including General Secretary Xi Jinping, emphasized during Blinken’s visit that China will not adjust its approach to Taiwan. They also stressed the United States is responsible for the current poor state of US-China relations and needs to adjust its approach to China .[23]

Xi emphasized China’s willingness to cooperate internationally on scientific and technological matters during a meeting with Bill Gates on June 16 in Beijing, likely to support Sino-American private sector relationships as leverage points in the US system.[24] The general secretary framed this willingness as part of a broader push to provide ”Chinese solutions to global challenges” via the Global Security, Global Development, and Global Civilizational Initiatives.[25] Xi stated that Gates is his first “American friend” to visit China in 2023 and stressed the importance of Sino-American people-to-people relations.[26] The CCP also portrayed the United States government as intransigent while framing the American business community embodied by Bill Gates as drivers of progress. This framing aims to persuade the United States government to change its sanctions-related policies that target China. Targeting the American private sector provides a route for the PRC to push for its preferred US policies via sympathetic business entities that stand to profit financially from scientific and technological cooperation with China.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, June 16, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

The scandal surrounding the drugging of children at a Kid Castle Educational Institute in New Taipei will very likely shift the electoral narratives away from the DPP sexual assault scandals no longer than the short term. 17 parents filed police reports stating that the school illegally drugged their children with barbiturates. An unspecified number of children subsequently developed withdrawal symptoms.[1] KMT presidential candidate and New Taipei Mayor Hou Yu-ih subsequentially apologized for the scandal during media interviews.[2] This scandal and sexual assault allegations centered on the DPP have shifted media coverage away from the dominant but contested narrative in the Taiwanese information space that the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election is a choice between peace and war.[3] The Taiwanese media since May 31 has focused heavily on ongoing sexual assault scandals that center on the DPP.[4] Taiwan’s media coverage also has given priority to reporting on the Kid Castle Educational Institute since the scandal broke on June 8.[5]

Short-Term Electoral Narrative Impacts on Leading Presidential Candidates

Candidate (Party)	Temporary Impact
Hou Yu-ih (KMT)	Harder to frame himself as a responsible alternative to the sexual harassment scandal-plagued DPP.
Lai Ching-te (DPP)	Reprieve from election media coverage focusing extensively on the sexual harassment scandals engulfing the party.
Ko Wen-je (TPP)	Easier to frame the TPP as a viable third-party alternative to pick up swing voters offput by KMT and DPP scandals.

The narrative that the 2024 presidential election is a choice between peace and war is likely to reemerge as the dominant narrative in the mid to long term. The framing of the election as a choice between peace and war has been ongoing since at least January 2023 and continues to be a salient point within both Taiwanese and Chinese media outlets.[6] The sexual assault scandal was the dominant story in Taiwanese media from May 31 to June 8 and led to the DPP announcing systemic reforms.[7] Coverage is ongoing but its dominance in the media space lasted nine days from May 31 to June 8. The barbiturate scandal differs insofar as it is not directly linked to a political party. It instead affects only Hou because he is the New Taipei Mayor. The trend and importance of cross-strait relations to the Taiwanese electorate, along with the short-lived length of scandal coverage, suggests that cross-strait issues will be the central issue of the 2024 presidential election. The last two Taiwanese presidential elections, which occurred in 2016 and 2020, centered around the candidates’ differing views of cross-strait relations.[8] The 2024 presidential election coverage also focused on cross-strait relations until the sexual assault and drugging scandals.

The CCP used a recent report about US evacuation plans for Taiwan to advance information operations that aim to degrade United States-Taiwan security cooperation. The United States expanded US citizen evacuation plans to prepare for potential cross-strait conflicts, according to a report The Messenger published on June 12. Unspecified US officials relayed that they do not believe that a cross-strait conflict is imminent.[9] Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin responded by accusing the United States of “using Taiwan as a pawn and the Taiwan people as cannon fodder to serve the US strategy of using Taiwan to contain China.”[10] Wang’s rhetoric implies that American security cooperation with Taiwan only hinders the Taiwanese people’s chances for a peaceful life devoid of cross-strait conflict. Breaking that security collaboration would be the prime way for the Taiwanese people to avoid becoming “cannon fodder” according to Wang’s reasoning.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China questioned the United States’ motives for re-joining the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in a likely attempt to establish the conditions for discrediting US global leadership. The United States messaged its intent to rejoin UNESCO on June 8, 2023, six and half years after leaving the organization.[11] UNESCO is responsible for matters that regard press freedom and the development of technological guidelines, including for artificial intelligence.[12] The Chinese Foreign Ministry responded by claiming that the United States’ exit from UNESCO “negatively impacted” the organization and accusing the United States of re-entering UNESCO to achieve the self-centered geopolitical aim of countering Chinese influence in international organizations.[13] This is similar to China’s reaction to the United States 2021 re-entry into the Paris Climate Agreement, where Chinese state-controlled media accused the United States of “betray[ing]” the agreement.[14] Chinese rhetoric in both cases frames the US participation in and leadership of international organizations as politicized and selfish to other member states.

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping called for “large domestic [economic] circulation” that can withstand “extreme circumstances,” which is part of China’s long-term effort to create a sanction-resistant economy. Xi said that the “purpose of a large domestic [economic] cycle is to ensure the normal operation of the national economy under extreme circumstances” during a June 7 tour of Inner Mongolia.[15] “Domestic cycle” is one of the elements of the CCP’s “dual circulation” strategy, which involves the creation of a self-sustaining economy with links to international markets.[16] The strategy aims to leverage foreign investment and trade to bolster China’s economy without becoming reliant on international markets, thereby reducing the country’s vulnerabilities to sanctions during crises. Xi did not define “extreme circumstances.” This is not the first time “dual circulation” has been framed as a strategy that can protect the Chinese economy during “extreme circumstances.” A state-controlled Xinhua article used the same terminology to describe “dual circulation” in 2022.[17]

“Extreme circumstances” includes a potential Taiwan Strait conflict but is not limited to it. Statements from influential CCP economic figures like former Vice Premier Liu He suggest a connection between “dual circulation” and larger international economic trends. Liu previously said that international anti-globalization trends, supply chain challenges, and the need for China to adopt a new innovation-driven “development pattern” are all tied to “dual circulation.”[18] Xi’s statement reiterates his commitment an approach that will ideally re-orient the Chinese economy to adapt to several evolving circumstances rather than one Taiwan-centric scenario.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, June 9, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Terminology: 1992 Consensus: a disputed cross-strait policy formulation supported in different formations by the CCP and KMT that acts as a precondition to cross-strait dialogue. The DPP does not support the 1992 Consensus.

Ongoing sexual harassment scandals primarily within the DPP may increase the domestic appeal of TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je, who promotes cross-strait policies broadly emphasizing economic and political engagement with China. The scandals began on May 31 when a DPP Women’s Department employee said she was sexually harassed during her time with the party.[1] Some sexual harassment claims are also arising in the KMT against tangential party figures.[2] KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih claimed solidarity with all victims of sexual assault.[3] The TPP under their presidential candidate Ko Wen-je has not faced harassment allegations. Ko attacked the DPP for not doing enough for the victims. In concert with societal criticism, this prompted DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen to publicly apologize and launch three internal party processes to prevent further sexual harassment in the DPP.[4] Ko’s June 4–8 visit to Japan along with absence of sexual harassment allegations toward members of his party has distanced him from press coverage of the scandals. He frames his candidacy as an alternative to the DPP and KMT that can better manage cross-strait relations via unspecified economic and political engagement. He does this without providing details about his policy platform. This framing positions Ko as the candidate who could pick up swing voters offput by the DPP-centric sexual assault scandal but also wary of the KMT’s deep support for the 1992 Consensus.[5]

KMT-leaning media outlets are using the sexual harassment scandals to frame the DPP as immoral, which is unlikely to generate additional support for the KMT while the party maintains its unpopular cross-strait policy. [6] KMT-leaning media outlets frame the DPP as irresponsible and unfit to govern due to the scandal.[7] The KMT endorsed the 1992 Consensus as the basis for cross-strait policy in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. This contributed to the party’s defeat in presidential elections.[8] Swing voters leaning towards voting for the DPP but now having scandal induced doubts have the option of voting for Ko Wen-je, whose amorphous policy positions are closer to the DPP when compared to Hou Yu-ih.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Chinese participation in high-level dialogue with the United States may aim to mitigate the risks of additional US sanctions and export controls on Chinese technological sectors. Chinese Foreign Ministry Officials Ma Zhaoxu and Yang Tao met with US State Department Official Daniel Kritenbrink and US National Security Council Official Sarah Beran on June 5. They discussed US-China lines of communication, cross-strait relations, and US-China policy challenges.[9] This is part of a larger resumption of high-level dialogue between US and Chinese officials with the United States signaling that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken will visit China in late June.[10] The United States previously imposed export controls limiting Chinese access to semiconductor manufacturing equipment.[11] This is part of a larger international push to limit China’s ability to leverage technological developments for military purposes, which includes sanctions by US allies like Japan and the Netherlands.[12] The party views this as a threat to China’s technological and development ambitions, as evidenced by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping previously lamenting “external attempts to contain China” at the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in 2022. [13] The CCP can use the appearance of dialogue to frame new export controls as unprovoked escalations.

The CCP may also attempt to use dialogue as a way to encourage the United States to change its rhetoric and public discourse towards China. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs frequently condemns the US government and media for supporting a so-called “China threat narrative.”[14] China’s desire for the United States to change its rhetoric is evident with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang calling for US officials to “correct” their perceptions of China.[15]

China conducted aggressive naval actions near US naval ships in the Taiwan Strait ahead of the high-level US-China dialogue, which signals China’s willingness to continue engaging in provocative military activity. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) destroyer Luyang III came within 150 yards of the USS Chung-Hoon destroyer and Canadian HMCS Montreal frigate as they transited through the Taiwan Strait on June 3.[16] Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu defended this action on June 4 by saying that the United States should “not come close to [Chinese] waters and airspace.”[17] China’s unsafe and unprofessional naval interaction in the Taiwan Strait is part of a larger trend involving the PLA projecting control over regional territory the party claims as its own. A People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) J-16 Shenyang fighter jet maneuvered towards a US Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea on May 26.[18]

China is unlikely to frame itself as the aggressor when engaging in provocative military activity in the Indo-Pacific. China engaged in this activity at time when it frequently frames US actions as being motivated by “bloc confrontation” and a “Cold War mentality.” [19] This framing portrays provocative military activity as a response to US actions that are supposedly motivated by “bloc confrontation.”

Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu introduced a four-point Asia-Pacific security cooperation proposal on June 4 as part of a larger promotion of the Global Security Initiative (GSI), which may aim reduce regional countries’ security cooperation with the United States. The GSI is a Chinese security initiative that aims to reform international security norms.[20] The four points include avoiding “bloc confrontation” and promoting “mutual trust over bullying and hegemony.”[21] Li’s condemnation of “bloc confrontation” and “hegemony” aim to appeal to many Southeast Asian states’ anti-colonial sympathies and reluctance to choose between the United States and China. These points simultaneously aim to encourage Indo-Pacific states to participate in the GSI by framing it as a mutually beneficial initiative with norms appealing to the interests of regional countries.

Chinese military activities in the Indo-Pacific may undermine the GSI’s ability to re-orient Indo-Pacific security cooperation away from the United States. Chinese military activities counter the GSI’s claims to oppose hegemonism and “bloc confrontation.” China maintains ongoing territorial disputes with many states in the Indo-Pacific, especially involving the South and East China Seas.[22] These disputes frequently highlight China’s willingness to bully states in the region with provocative military actions, such as the Chinese Coast Guard’s decision to flash lasers at Philippine Coast Guard vessels near the South China Sea’s Second Thomas Shoal in February.[23] Provocative Chinese military activity in the South China Sea is further evident with China’s militarization of South China Sea artificial islands.[24] A Chinese research vessel also operated within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from May 7 to June 5, despite Vietnamese calls for the vessel to leave.[25] These actions highlight China’s prioritization of its own interests and ambitions over lofty principles that the GSI claims to embody. This type of aggressive activity can prove counter-productive by making states in the region view security cooperation with the United States as a critical tool needed to address Chinese aggression. This is evident with the Philippines’ April decision to expand the United States’ access to Philippine bases as a part of the US–Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.[26]

Chinese Minister of State Security Chen Yixin’s article calling for CCP party cadres to study a new anti-espionage law may aim to set conditions for the party to strengthen existing efforts to counter foreign influences it deems subversive. Chen wrote an article in the CCP Central Party School Study Times that both called for cadres to “focus on the newly-revised [sic] Anti-Espionage Law” and said that “it is necessary to carry out the anti-espionage struggle…and severely crack down on foreign espionage activities.”[27] He did not describe specific espionage activities. Chen wrote the article amid CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s warning that “external” forces aim to undermine China.[28] The CCP previously raided foreign firms in April and May in line with the new anti-espionage law it adopted in April.[29] Continued study of the anti-espionage law indicates the party could target other foreign entities that deal with information that party leadership deems sensitive.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, June 2, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Terminology

1992 Consensus: a disputed cross-strait policy formulation supported in different formations by the CCP and KMT that acts as a precondition to cross-strait dialogue. The DPP does not support the 1992 Consensus.

One-China Principle: a formulation created by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claiming that the PRC is the sole legal representative of China in the international arena and that Taiwan is a part of China.[1] The ROC (Taiwan) and United States do not recognize the one-China principle. The United States operates under its own one-China policy that acknowledges the PRC’s position towards Taiwan without accepting PRC territorial claims over the island.

2024 Taiwanese presidential candidates are basing their cross-strait policy positions within the “peace vs war” framework, which may provide China greater influence over their election narratives through the PRC-supported framework. ISW previously assessed that framing the election as a choice between war and peace provides the CCP with leverage points over each candidate.[2] The leverage points could enable the CCP to influence how the candidates form their cross-strait and US-Taiwan policies, as well as how they present those policies to domestic and international audiences in the post-election period. The PRC frequently frames the policies of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as a major source of cross-strait tension that could lead to war.[3] KMT nominee Hou Yu-ih and TPP nominee Ko Wen-je are both promoting cross-strait dialogue and engagement, which may allow the CCP to promote economic and political dialogue under their leadership. DPP nominee Lai Ching-te (William Lai) countered the larger ”peace vs war” framing by promoting rhetoric that emphasizes the protection of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Each candidates’ statements respond to the prevalence of the ”peace vs war” framework in the Taiwanese election cycle.

KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih endorsed former President Ma Ying-jeou's cross-strait policy approach, which signals continuity in the KMT’s cross-strait policy. Hou praised Ma’s cross-strait policy as “peaceful and stable.”[4] He signaled his view that close cross-strait economic and political engagement, such as that which occurred under Ma’s leadership from 2008-2016, is necessary to the return of cross-strait stability.[5] Hou’s praise of Ma’s cross-strait policy signals his acceptance of the 1992 Consensus even as he refuses to clarify his views of the consensus, given its unpopularity among a majority of Taiwanese voters.[6]His acceptance of the 1992 Consensus shows that he will not stray from the KMT’s existing approach to cross-strait relations, which frames cross-strait engagement as beneficial to Taiwan’s economic interests and overall stability. This is in line with the views among the ”dark blue” bases of support within the KMT and the CCP

Hou’s statements signal the KMT’s internalization of the view that close engagement with China is needed to secure Taiwan’s stability and cross-strait peace. His association with Ma highlights the KMT’s view that Ma’s cross-strait policy remains an influence cross-strait policy influence within the KMT. Hou’s open support for Ma’s cross-strait policy complements existing leverage points by providing the CCP with ideological synergy and points of agreement regarding the general direction of cross-strait relations that could be leveraged during a hypothetical Hou presidency. This ideological synergy could operationalize shared desires for economic engagement and dialogue with specific engagement and initiatives during a Hou presidency.

DPP presidential nominee Lai Ching-te (William Lai) opposed framing the upcoming Taiwanese presidential election as a choice between war and peace. ISW previously assessed that the “peace vs war” narrative could frame Lai’s refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus as a major source of cross-strait tension.[7] Lai warned on May 28 that Taiwanese political parties “unintentionally or intentionally” repeat CCP-supported rhetoric in framing the 2024 Taiwanese election as a choice between war and peace.[8] Lai instead merged calls for peace with calls for the protection of Taiwan‘s sovereignty by promoting “peace and sovereignty.[9] He also stated that certain measures intended to promote cross-strait peace, such as accepting the 1992 Consensus, would ”sacrifice sovereignty” and lead to ”fake peace.”[10] This rhetoric aligns with Lai’s existing framing of the 2024 election as a choice between democracy and authoritarianism.[11]

Lai’s rhetoric challenges the “peace vs war” narrative by re-orienting the discussion around the well-being of Taiwan’s sovereignty. This may allow voters to re-think their view of the election by re-framing the DPP as a party that will defend Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy from persistent CCP threats. By doing so, Lai can frame the CCP as the source of existing threats towards Taiwan. Lai provides this counter-argument at a time when a majority of Taiwanese say they agree with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait policy, which emphasizes the protection of Taiwanese sovereignty.[12]

TPP presidential nominee Ko Wen-je emphasized the need for cross-strait dialogue, which aligns with the need for immediate engagement with the CCP at the core of the “peace vs war” narrative. Ko contributed to the framing of the upcoming election as a choice between war and peace by blaming the DPP for the lack of cross-strait dialogue and saying that the chances of a cross-strait conflict will “reduce” under his leadership.[13] This type of rhetoric implies that immediate dialogue is needed to secure cross-strait peace and stability. Ko framed himself as a candidate that can both stabilize cross-strait relations through dialogue and preserve Taiwanese autonomy by calling for “cross-strait peace and Taiwanese autonomy” on May 28.[14] This rhetoric resembles that of DPP nominee Lai Ching-te (William Lai), who called for a Taiwanese policy approach emphasizing “peace and sovereignty.”[15] Ko differentiates himself from Lai by blaming the DPP for failing to engage in cross-strait dialogue and stressing the need for immediate cross-strait dialogue.[16] Ko has not mentioned existing barriers to cross-strait dialogue, such as the CCP’s emphasis on Taiwanese participants recognizing formulations like the 1992 Consensus.[17] Ko did not specify how his vision of cross-strait dialogue would emerge and even said that Taiwan could emphasize its “freedom and democracy” in talks where China emphasizes its “One Country, Two Systems” post-unification formula.[18] Rhetoric involving “democracy and freedom” aims to appeal to Taiwanese voters concerned about the future of Taiwan’s democracy amid the CCP’s military threats against Taiwan.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Xi Jinping stressed the need to establish China’s national security risk monitoring and early warning system, which could serve as a tool to implement the CCP’s holistic security concept. This is a low confidence assessment. Xi approved a document on accelerating the “Construction of a National Security Risk Monitoring and Early Warning System” at the meeting of the National Security Commission on May 30.[19] His comments fit the trend of the party viewing itself in a protracted struggle in a more hostile geopolitical environment coming out of the 20^th Party Congress in October 2022. An early warning system that indicates when the party is losing ground in different areas broadly aligns with the CCP’s holistic security concept, which involves cultural influence, economic power, military strength, and party control of domestic society. This includes preventing mass protests, such as those that occurred from November to December 2022 in response to societal discontent stemming from the zero-Covid policy.

The CCP policy guidance to diversify China’s supply chain indicates the party views food supplies, particularly pork, as part of a long-term protracted struggle with hostile powers, including the United States. The party claims China is self-sufficient in grains but relies on imports for proteins, such as soybeans, meat, and milk.[20] The CCP policy guidance aims to increase self-reliance in these import dependent sectors.[21] Xi Jinping reiterated this position in a party journal article on May 30 by stating that the party faces a challenging strategic environment where it must be prepared to face “high winds” and “turbulent waves.”[22]

Xi included food security as a necessity in this strategic environment, which he aims to achieve via the “big food concept.”[23] The concept calls for cultivating food sources beyond limited arable land via means such as greenhouses and intensive livestock breeding.[24] The absence of rhetoric about future geopolitical tranquility in CCP state media and journals indicates that Xi views the party as in a protracted period of struggle against hostile powers for the foreseeable future.

Recent food shortages and associated popular discontent during China’s zero-Covid policy make food security a sensitive issue for the regime. The party derives legitimacy from addressing the livelihood concerns of its people rather than through democratic institutions.[25] Food-related discontent during the pandemic, in part, led the party to fire three Shanghai party officials in April 2022.[26] Pork is particularly important as China accounts for over half the world’s consumption annually and maintains a strategic pork reserve of several hundred thousand tons.[27] The ongoing construction of high-rise buildings housing hog farms to increase Chinese domestic pork production serves the larger goal of implementing the ”big food concept” and partly decreases the country’s reliance on foreign protein imports.[28]

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, May 26, 2023

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) debates on the strategic role of hybrid warfare may mean the CCP’s ongoing “unification” campaigns targeting Taiwan do not primarily rely on military force. This is a low confidence assessment. The PLA debate on hybrid warfare broadly revolves around theories that emphasize a holistic conception of national strength and state power.[1] More precise theories place political and public opinion as the lead elements of hybrid warfare, which military force undergirds.[2] The concept of “comprehensive national strength” also plays a role in PLA internal debates on hybrid warfare because the party sees it as the way that great powers compete, which includes over Taiwan, to avoid traditional large scale military-to-military confrontation.[3] The PLA Western Theater Commander Wang Haijiang, who has commanded in various capacities in western China such as Xinjiang since the mid-2010s, entered this debate on May 14.[4] He published an article defining hybrid warfare as revolving around a “contest of comprehensive national strength” while avoiding discussions on how to implement this concept.[5] The term “comprehensive national strength” includes ongoing Chinese military modernization and expansion as well as PLA attempts to reduce Taiwanese sovereignty via military actions like air defense identification zone violations. Wang’s views on hybrid warfare are in line with the broad contours of the PLA debate on the topic, which reflects existing Chinese debates among military theorists.

Chinese conceptions of hybrid warfare may also aim to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States. This is a low confidence assessment. Select Chinese theorists draw from Russia’s 2014 annexation in Crimea to emphasize how to successfully employ non-kinetic means in combination with special forces during hybrid warfare.[6] The more precise hybrid warfare theories viewing use of force as an undergirding element of hybrid warfare demonstrates awareness in segments of the PLA of its comparative weakness to United States and allied forces. The party potentially aims to avoid an existential military confrontation over Taiwan that it could lose in favor of coercion campaigns as seen by it drawing from the aforementioned examples where military force is one among many components. Ongoing PLA modernization and expansion present opportunities for this calculus to change.

The recent appointment of Xie Feng as Chinese Ambassador to the United States is unlikely to initiate a thawing of Sino-American relations by the CCP. He served in several North America-related posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the 1990s to the early 2010s, including in the United States from 2008-2010.[7] Xie also played a key role in securing the release of Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou after she was arrested on charges of bank fraud in 2018.[8] He previously helped implement the crackdown on pro-democracy Hong Kong protestors from 2019-2020.[9] China has not had an ambassador to the United States since promoting the prior ambassador Qing Gang to Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 2023. Filling the ambassador post is normal diplomatic practice. Xie’s previous statements on the beneficial nature of Sino-American cooperation is standard rhetoric to attract foreign investment as the Chinese economy emerged from Zero-Covid, not evidence for potential thawing in Sino-American relations.[10] Xi Jinping’s use of anti-espionage laws to raid foreign firms to advance domestic technological and manufacturing self-reliance indicates that any potential thawing in relations will not translate into meaningful CCP action on the ground.[11] The willingness of select CCP leadership like Commerce Minister Wang Wentao to engage in high-level meetings with relevant American officials combined with the potential absence of Chinese aggressive ”wolf-warrior” diplomacy during Xie Feng’s tenure in America does not equate to a thaw in Sino-American relations by the CCP.[12]

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

The dominant but contested domestic framing of the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election as a choice between war and peace likely supports CCP efforts to coerce Taiwan into supporting cross-strait engagement. KMT legislators and party elders like former President Ma Ying-jeou refer to the election as a choice between war and peace by arguing that ruling DPP cross-strait policies will lead Taiwan to war.[13] DPP presidential nominee Lai Ching-te (William Lai) criticized this framing by saying that “the president of Taiwan will be decided by China” if war threats influence voting results.[14] Lai frames the election as a choice between democracy and authoritarianism, which channels current President Tsai Ing-wen‘s 2020 election rhetoric stressing the defense of the status quo and Taiwanese democracy in the face of a rising Chinese authoritarian threat.[15] The “war or peace” framing advantages the KMT by making their calls for cross-strait engagement appear necessary to preserve the status quo.

Framing the upcoming election as a choice between war and peace, regardless of the election results, likely supports the CCP’s objective to alter Taiwan’s security policy toward the United States. This perspective can effectively frame Taiwanese military and political engagements with the United States, such as arms sales and unofficial political exchanges, as irresponsible acts that risk war in the eyes of Taiwanese voters. This electoral viewpoint could constraint the next Republic of China (Taiwan) president’s policy options regarding US-Taiwan relations. These constraints become CCP leverage points that the party could use to push Taiwan to take part in cross-strait or international engagements on PRC terms.

CCP Leverage Points

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, May 19, 2023

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Complementary CCP industrial and anti-espionage policies may facilitate the long-term expansion of China’s domestic industrial base and supply chain security. CCP industrial policy entails using foreign investment to facilitate knowledge and technology transfers that in turn strengthen domestic workforce and infrastructure. This development supports the creation of an increasingly autarkic domestic economic cycle still augmented by the international market.[1] The CCP then selects domestic companies to continue receiving state subsidies. These subsidies in combination with the enforcement of the anti-espionage law allow the CCP to push out foreign firms like Ford and GM by eating away at their market share.[2] The anti-espionage law includes a broad definition of foreign agent that the CCP uses to control what information businesses’ allow foreign entities to access.[3] High-ranking CCP officials previously called for foreign investment at the Boao Forum for Asia in March 2023 before the party subsequently raided business intelligence firms with foreign links in line with the new anti-espionage law.[4] The call for foreign investment buttresses the development of Chinese domestic industries while the implementation of the anti-espionage law undercuts the competitiveness of foreign firms.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Kuomintang (KMT) presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih emphasizes the preservation of peace over clear cross-strait policy positions, possibly to create a pragmatic image in the eyes of Taiwanese voters. Hou became the KMT presidential nominee on May and continued emphasizing domestic issues as well as the necessity of cross-strait peace.[5] Hou is framing himself as a moderate while the Chinese media and "deep blue" KMT political figures frame the upcoming election as a choice between war and peace.[6] Hou's broad focus on peace and domestic issues likely aims to frame his election as one that will create domestic stability in Taiwan. This approach may be preferable for the KMT since the party’s deep support for the 1992 Consensus and cross-strait engagement contributed to their recent presidential election defeats in 2016 and 2020.[7] The 1992 Consensus refers to a cross-strait policy formulation supported in different formulations by the CCP and KMT that acts as a precondition to cross-strait dialogue.[8] Hou's further attempted to frame himself as a pragmatist via statements calling for both cross-strait engagement with China and strong US-Taiwan relations.[9]

Chinese cognitive warfare operations target Taiwanese consumers, which may aim to demoralize Taiwanese citizens during the Taiwanese presidential election cycle. Cognitive warfare refers to efforts aimed at influencing the target’s thoughts and perceptions of the world. Taiwanese citizens who purchased a book called "If China Attacks" from Taiwan's Eslite bookstore chain reportedly received calls after a data leakage from unknown individuals claiming they wanted the readers to participate in an Eslite customer survey.[10] The callers went on to promote messages about the “inevitability” of cross-strait unification, the inability of Taiwanese soldiers to fight in a cross-strait war, the United States’ unwillingness to support Taiwan, and the Kuomintang's (KMT) superiority in Taiwanese politics.[11] This messaging reiterates Chinese propaganda to degrade the Taiwanese populace’s confidence in their own government’s capacity to govern.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, May 12, 2023

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

CCP Leadership Activity

Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang met with French and German officials from May 8-12, likely undermining EU efforts to sanction Chinese firms that are supporting the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Qin emphasized the intertwined Sino-French and Sino-German economic relationships when advocating against reducing trade linkages.[1] His visits correspond with EU discussion about proposed sanctions on seven Chinese firms reportedly selling equipment to Russia.[2] Two of the companies, 3HC Semiconductors and King-Pai Technology, already are under US sanctions. Germany reportedly opposed the initial sanctions proposal.[3] Only one EU state needs to oppose the sanctions to prevent their passage by the bloc.

Other

The CCP has raided three business intelligence firms in line with the anti-espionage law it adopted in April, which will likely advance the CCP’s goal of technological and manufacturing self-reliance. Chinese state security raided Mintz Group and Bain & Company over the past two months before raiding Capvision Partners this May for failing to “fulfill their anti-espionage and security obligations.”[4] The Capvision raid demonstrates that the CCP will use the broad definition of foreign agent in the anti-espionage law to control the information that companies operating in China allow foreign employees or clients to access.[5] This will place companies with foreign links at a competitive disadvantage compared to domestic companies when investing or operating in China. Increasing the domestic success of Chinese companies is in line with Xi’s core goals of achieving technological and manufacturing self-reliance that he re-stated in February and March.[6] However, he will continue to face the tension between achieving a heightened level of national security via self-reliant industries and growing the economy while disincentivizing foreign investment.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Chinese and KMT-leaning media outlets expand an existing debate over the future of US-Taiwan relations amid the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election, which could lead to the election of a candidate that is less supportive of US-Taiwan relations than the current administration. 2024 Taiwanese presidential election contenders like Gou Tai-ming (Terry Gou) question whether deep US-Taiwan relations could endanger Taiwan’s security.[7] Chinese and KMT-leaning media circulated comments from May 4 to 8 from US Representative Seth Moulton that the United States would “blow up” the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.[8] He recognized that Taiwan “does not like” this idea and specified that he does not support this perspective.[9] Chinese state-controlled media framed the United States as a military provocateur willing to endanger Taiwan’s security by promoting a Douyin social media video showing Moulton calling for TSMC to be “blow[n] up” without the context of Moulton saying that he does not promote that narrative.[10] Taiwanese KMT-leaning media outlets framed the story in the same way, which led Taiwanese Minister of National Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng to say that the Taiwanese military would “not tolerate” an attack on Taiwanese facilities.[11] Gou is one of two frontrunners to capture the KMT nomination for the presidency.

China frames the Taiwan-US Defense Industry Forum as a reckless contribution to military tensions, likely to promote Taiwanese skepticism towards US-Taiwan security cooperation. 25 representatives from the US defense industry, including companies like Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, visited Taiwan to discuss defense strategy and industry cooperation at the Taiwan-US Defense Industry Forum.[12] Chinese Defense Ministry Spokesperson Tan Kefei accused US “military industrial complexes” of “export[ing] wars and seek[ing] windfall profits.”[13] Chinese state-controlled media quoted Taiwanese pro-unification Labor Party Chairman Wu Jung-yuan saying that “the US arms dealers are coming to Taiwan to tout for conflicts,” likely to add legitimacy to their claims by citing a Taiwanese resident.[14] This rhetoric occurs in an existing political debate in Taiwan over the trustworthiness of US security collaboration. 2024 Taiwanese presidential contenders like Gou Tai-ming (Terry Gou) contributed to this debate by questioning if deep US-Taiwan relations will lead Taiwan to a cross-strait conflict with China and calling for Taiwan to avoid becoming an “ammunition depot.”[15] China stokes this debate since it frames the United States as the instigator of military tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

Other

China expelled a Canadian diplomat in response to Canada declaring Chinese diplomat Zhao Wei persona non grata, which maintains China’s practice of “tit-for-tat" diplomacy. The Canadian government expelled Zhao Wei on May 8 after a Canadian intelligence report linked Zhao to efforts to intimidate Canadian Member of Parliament Michael Chong by targeting Chong’s family in China due to Chong’s support for Uyghurs in Xinjiang.[16] China expelled Canadian diplomat Jennifer Lynn Lalonde on May 9 in response to Zhao’s expulsion.[17] China frequently engages in this type of “tit-for-tat" diplomacy, such as their decision to close the United States’ consulate in Chengdu, China in response to the United States closing the Chinese Embassy in Houston due to espionage concerns.[18]

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, May 5, 2023

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

CCP Leadership Activity

The Military Service Law reform that came into effect on May 1 may enable faster Chinese mobilization during the event of a conflict. The Military Service Law reform stated that all levels of government in conjunction with military agencies should cooperate to implement the reforms and standardize local conscription organizations.[1] This indicates that the CCP bureaucratic apparatus aims to enhance its capability to deliver information in a timely fashion across locations such as universities and local party offices. The reformed Military Service Law also emphasized recruiting “high-quality soldiers” with pertinent technological prowess, especially college students.[2] This portion of the reform fits within existing PLA efforts to technologically modernize the force and its personnel. The Military Service Law reform does not indicate that Xi ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to prepare for imminent military conflict around Taiwan.

The Military Service Law reform indicates that Xi learned the necessity of bureaucratic coordination for mobilization from Putin’s force generation challenges in Ukraine. Putin’s mobilization notice system relied on the physical delivery of the notices to individuals, with limited testing of digitally delivering summonses.[3] This opened the door for mobilization evasion.

Li Ganjie replaced Chen Xi as Director of the Central Organization Department (COD) on April 26, possibly to bolster the implementation of Xi’s aim to have a technologically self-reliant China. The replacement is one of the last major personnel switches stemming from the 20^th Party Congress that occurred in October 2022. The COD oversees CCP personnel appointments. Li has used his nuclear engineer degrees in party organs, such as Director General of the Department of Nuclear Safety Management of the State Environmental Protection Administration, which contrasts with Chen who did not extensively apply his chemical engineering background after becoming party secretary at Tsinghua University in the early 1990s.[4] Successfully advancing Xi’s vision would degrade the business environment in China for foreign companies, however, because this implementation will involve selective enforcement of the anti-espionage law. The law includes the broad and unspecific use of “foreign agents,” which enables the CCP to track and gather data on foreign companies’ trade secrets and their employees.[5] A business environment less permissive for foreign companies would reduce the inflow of foreign capital that Xi aims to translate into improved domestic technological production and development.

The personnel change likely does not represent a shift in Xi's ideological thinking because Chen Xi now plays a key role in training party cadre who will implement Xi’s ideological campaigns. Xi outlined that the most recent party education campaign on “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” will aim to improve bureaucratic functioning, crackdown on alleged corruption, and must be implemented in a wholistic rather than staged manner.[6] He also emphasized leading party cadre giving lectures to promote intra-party education.[7] Chen will help fulfill this portion of the campaign by serving as head of the prestigious Central Party School that trains party cadre.[8] Chen’s removal from the COD but continued leadership at the Central Party School indicates Xi approves of Chen’s ability to interpret and transmit his intent as General Secretary onto the rising elite party cadre.

Other

Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu met with Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization defense ministers’ meeting to discuss Sino-Indian border disputes. The Indian Ministry of Defense meeting readout implicitly accusing China of violating existing agreements generated claims in Chinese state media of India inaccurately portraying itself as the victim on the international stage.[9] These claims in Chinese state media will not set conditions for substantive progress on resolving Sino-Indian border disputes. No new agreements came out of Li’s attendance at the SCO.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

TPP Chairman Ko Wen-je's reluctance to participate in a KMT-led “opposition alliance” may bolster the DPP’s standing in the upcoming presidential election. This is a low confidence assessment as the KMT has not yet selected its presidential candidate and the election is several months away. KMT Chairman Chu Li-luan (Eric Chu) proposed an alliance consisting of non-DPP figures that could include Ko. The coalition aims to unite non-DPP figures and parties to win the 2024 Taiwanese presidential and legislative elections. Chu did not specify if the potential “coalition” would feature a united presidential ticket. Ko initially said he was willing to speak with Chu during a May 1 speech, but later said that he did not want to hear about “blue-white cooperation” on May 2. He maintained this rhetoric on May 3 by comparing “blue-white cooperation” to “dividing up the spoils of power” and noting that his TPP is “not without opportunity” since it polls show that 20 percent of Taiwanese support the TPP.[10] Blue-white cooperation” refers to potential cooperation between Ko and the KMT. An “opposition alliance” between the KMT and Ko is reminiscent of the 2004 unified pan-blue presidential ticket between KMT candidate Lien Chan and People-First Party Chairman Soong Chu-yu (James Soong) that attempted to unseat sitting DPP President Chen Shui-bian.[11] The coalition failed to win the 2004 election.[12]

Chu’s proposed alliance recognizes Ko Wen-je's popularity with segments of the KMT voting bloc. A February poll showed that 47 percent of Ko’s supporters would support potential KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih compared to 32 percent supporting DPP nominee Lai Ching-te.[13] While Ko and the KMT both call for cross-strait dialogue with China, Ko diverges from the KMT on the issue of the 1992 Consensus. The KMT supports the 1992 Consensus with the belief that it refers to one China with “different interpretations.”[14] Ko claimed that the 1992 Consensus “has been smeared in Taiwan” and that no consensus exists.[15] These divergent views on the 1992 Consensus would pose a substantial hurdle to an “opposition alliance” forming a uniform cross-strait policy approach and may alienate “deep blue” KMT voters. An alliance with the KMT would also contradict Ko’s campaign rhetoric calling for a ”coalition government” to unite Taiwan by making Ko explicitly side with one side of the Taiwanese political spectrum.[16] This failure to form a potential ”opposition alliance” could aid DPP presidential nominee William Lai by splitting the KMT-leaning pan-blue vote.

Potential KMT presidential nominee Hou Yu-ih's rhetoric on US-Taiwan relations and national security furthers the popular domestic discussion about the role of the United States in Taiwan’s national security. Hou called for Taiwan to maintain both a “very good relationship with the United States” and “stability in the Taiwan Strait.”[17] He also stressed the importance of national security by saying that “only by safeguarding national security can economic development continue.”[18] Hou’s position is more moderate compared to other potential KMT presidential nominees like Gou Tai-ming (Terry Gou), who questioned if Taiwan’s close relations with the United States could endanger Taiwan’s security.[19] The internal KMT debate discussion is occurring as ruling DPP candidate Lai Ching-te promotes continuity with current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s policies, which promotes close security, diplomatic, and economic cooperation with the United States.[20] A focus on security or the United States’ commitment to Taiwan within internal Taiwanese political debates make a figurative referendum on Taiwan’s relations with the United States an important component of the upcoming 2024 Taiwanese presidential election.

Other

DPP legislators are considering stronger punishments for espionage that could increase the cost of CCP-led espionage attempts in Taiwan. DPP Legislators Lo Chih-cheng, Liu Chao-hao, Tsai Yi-yu, Chuang Jui-hsiung, and Wang Mei-hui held an expert hearing on “Suggestions on How to Improve National Security with Repeated Light Sentences in Communist Espionage Cases” on May 2.[21] Taiwanese Institute for National Defense and Security Research Director Su Zi-yun stated during the hearing that the average sentence for Taiwanese espionage suspects is 18 months while espionage cases in the United States and Europe receive on average 19-year sentences.[22] Taiwanese Ministry of Justice Deputy Minister Tsai Pi-chung noted that judges should be required to “impose heavy sentences” if there is clear evidence that a suspect engaged in espionage against Taiwan. Chinese agents attempt to recruit retired and serving Taiwanese military personnel to become informants and recruit other Taiwanese military personnel. The Taipei District Court previously sentenced a major general in the Taiwanese Air Force and Lieutenant Colonel in the Taiwanese Army for spying activities and attempting to recruit Taiwanese military personnel to support espionage activity in January.[23] Both suspects received sentences that were shorter than two years.[24] The hearing displays recognition of the threat posed by CCP espionage efforts to Taiwanese security and the inadequacy of the Taiwanese legal system‘s current tools to fight espionage. Potential Taiwanese espionage law revisions are not made in coordination with the United States.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, April 28, 2023

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

CCP Leadership Activity

China may attempt to expand the state security apparatus’ reach in foreign companies via the new anti-espionage law revision. The second meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress adopted the revision prohibiting “collaborating with spy organizations and their agents” and conducting cyber-attacks against state entities.[1] Its stated aim is to strengthen espionage prevention.[2] The CCP used the alleged hack of Northwestern Polytechnical University by the NSA in June 2022 and a Xinjiang civil servant supposedly interacting with an overseas spy agency via dating app as justification for enacting the law.[3] United States Congressional consideration of TikTok bans did not drive this revision as China already bans foreign tech products like YouTube. The broad definition of “agents” offers the CCP an avenue to justify gathering data from foreign firms and their employees while they do business in China. This may grant the CCP access to sensitive company data or trade secrets under the guise of preventing foreign cyber espionage. The law exemplifies Xi’s contradictory pursuit of increasing private sector growth while simultaneously making the business regulatory environment more stringent on national security grounds since the 20th Party Congress in October 2022.

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on April 26, likely to mitigate the European fallout of Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye dismissing the sovereignty of former Soviet republics on April 21.[4] Xi did not mention Russia’s role in starting the war and made veiled references to the United States for “exploiting the situation for self-gain” and “adding oil to the fire.”[5] He also cautioned against the use of nuclear weapons as “there is no winner in nuclear wars.“ Zelensky also called for the restoration of peace and resumption of Ukrainian-Chinese trade. He emphasized that no state should seek to support Russia, including in military-technical cooperation and the supply of weapons.[6]

Lu is a prominent wolf warrior, a term for aggressive Chinese diplomacy named after a successful Chinese movie of the same name. His comments came after French President Emmanuel Macron visited China in early April and signified a break from official CCP policy. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning repudiated Lu’s April 21 comments saying that “China respects all countries’ sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and upholds the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.”[7] Lu previously called in August 2022 for “re-education” campaigns in Taiwan following alleged “unification.”[8] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not disavow Lu’s August comments.

Other

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Shandong aircraft carrier strike group conducted exercises in the Philippine Sea from April 13 to April 24, likely to maintain operational readiness and demonstrate the ability to isolate the Philippines during Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s visit. The exercises were a continuation of the carrier strike group’s activity in early April closer to Taiwan in the response to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen meeting with Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Kevin McCarthy. The carrier strike group was comprised of the Shandong, a Renhai-class destroyer, two Luyang III-class destroyers, two Jiangkai II-class frigate, and a Fuyu-class support ship.[9] This is the first time the Shandong conducted exercises in the Philippine Sea since commissioning in December 2019.[10] The ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) subsequently detected the group on its return voyage 120 nautical miles southeast of Taiwan.[11] The ROC MND reportedly mobilized unspecified forces onto Taiwan’s southernmost peninsula in response to the carrier’s return voyage.[12] PLA carrier strike groups in the Philippine Sea demonstrate Chinese intent and capability to interdict US forces and supplies aimed for American partner nations such as Taiwan or the Philippines in crisis scenarios.

This naval activity coincided with Qin Gang’s meetings with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo on April 22 to convey Chinese displeasure at Filipino security cooperation with the United States. Manalo reassured Qin in his meeting that the Philippines “pursues an independent foreign policy” to assuage concerns of closer US-Philippine military relations in light of the United States’ expanded Philippine military base access.[13] China seeks to limit the US military’s access in the Philippines to contain American operational capabilities in the region.

Chinese state media announced that the Fujian aircraft carrier successfully conducted propulsion and mooring tests since launching on June 17, 2022 to commemorate the PLAN’s 74th anniversary on April 23.[14] The PLAN has not officially commissioned the carrier.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Chairman and potential presidential candidate Ko Wen-je refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, likely to broaden his appeal to KMT and DPP leaning voters in the upcoming 2024 Taiwanese presidential election. Ko expressed his views on the 1992 Consensus, a broad agreement involving one China that the Kuomintang (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) subscribe to, throughout his tour of the United States from April 8 to April 27.[15] Before his visit to the United States, Ko questioned the 1992 Consensus on March 27 by saying that Taiwan has a 1996 instead of a 1992 Consensus because “Taiwan’s character largely formed” through the first direct presidential election in 1996.[16] Ko later implied that the differing interpretations of the 1992 Consensus invalidate it by saying that the “biggest failure of the 1992 Consensus is that there is no consensus” during an April 24 interview with Voice of America.[17] Ko seeks to balance his refutation of the 1992 Consensus with calls for cross-strait dialogue to portray himself as a pragmatic moderate who aims to avoid conflict and preserve autonomy. His statements on the 1992 Consensus will resonate with “light green” Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-leaning voters who stress the importance of Taiwan’s democratic character and give priority to Taiwanese autonomy prioritize of Taiwanese autonomy over cross-strait initiatives. His messaging also will resonate with “light blue” KMT-leaning voters who seek dialogue with the PRC. April 2023 polls show Ko support from voters is at 22 percent, compared to 33 percent for DPP nominee Lai Ching-te (William Lai), and 29 percent for potential Kuomintang (KMT) nominee Hou Yu-ih.[18]

The KMT is portraying Taiwanese Vice President and DPP presidential nominee Lai Ching-te (William Lai) as out-of-touch with popular concerns possibly to center the presidential election narrative around livelihood issues while the KMT formulates its cross-strait election messaging. KMT Deputy Spokesperson Lu Jian-wei condemned Lai on April 21 for filming an election promotion video inside the Taiwanese Presidential Office Building by asking if Lai’s video is “worthy of the hard-working Taiwanese people” who pay taxes to fund Lai’s salary.[19] KMT Taipei City Councilor Lee Po-yi complemented Lu’s comments by accusing Lai of “not touch[ing] Taiwan’s most serious livelihood issues such as the economy, election bribery, and public security.”[20] Lee also linked Lai to questionable DPP political figures through Lai’s role as DPP Chairman. He specifically referenced corruption and sexual misconduct cases involving former Executive Yuan Spokesperson Chen Tsung-yan and former New Taipei City Deputy Speaker Chen Wen-zhi.[21] He referred to Chen Zong-yan as Lai’s “big disciple.”[22] Lee and Lu’s comments aim to discredit Lai by portraying him as a politician that does not understand the struggles of the Taiwanese working class and maintains connections to corrupt individuals. This type of rhetoric benefits the KMT as KMT-backed cross-strait concepts like the 1992 Consensus remain controversial among the Taiwanese populace.[23] The KMT has not selected its presidential election candidate and will not finalize its cross-strait platform until it announces its selection.

Potential KMT presidential candidate Gou Tai-ming (Terry Gou) may frame himself as preserving cross-strait stability and Republic of China (ROC) autonomy by promoting a foreign policy that does not align Taiwan explicitly with the United States or China. Gou announced his intention to seek the KMT presidential nomination on April 5.[24] Gou is the billionaire founder of Taiwanese electronics company Foxconn, which maintains strong economic interests in China.[25] He is not formally a KMT primary candidate. The party will select a candidate via an internal consensus process involving KMT legislators, mayors, and county magistrates instead of a primary election.[26] He portrayed Taiwan as a pawn in a larger US-China rivalry by saying that “Taiwan is like prey walking on a tightrope” and that Taiwan will “fall to pieces” if China and the United States “tightens a little bit” on April 22.[27] Gou said that Taiwan should not lean towards the United States and questioned the premise of Taiwan being forced to choose between China and the United States. His messaging must resonate with the KMT elite due to the KMT’s presidential nominee selection process.

Gou elaborated on his views in Facebook posts on April 25 by articulating the “Taiwan Powerlessness Theory,” which envisions a third path for Taiwan amid the US-China rivalry.[28] He said the theory is mainstream in Taiwan, with one side believing that Taiwan cannot maintain close relations with China and should thus follow the United States and the other side emphasizing that Taiwan must protect itself by “obey[ing]” China. [29] Gou argued instead that Taiwan can use its interactions with the United States and China to provide knowledge to both sides amid a US-China rivalry that lacks mutual understanding. [30] Gou launched his campaign by saying that “Taiwan needs a great CEO” and that he can “solve crises that traditional politicians cannot.” [31] Gou may use his “outsider” status to promote his vision as one that looks beyond existing debates and strategies that fail to protect ROC interests. His message also attempts to frame the ROC as an autonomous actor that can navigate the existing US-China rivalry by making decisions that suit its own interests instead of those of either the United States or China. Gou’s messaging comes at a time when KMT frontrunner New Taipei City Mayor Hou Yu-ih is pondering his decision to pursue the KMT presidential nomination.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, April 24, 2023

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Geopolitical Initiatives

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may view the tenth anniversary on March 23 of Xi Jinping’s announcement of a “community with a shared future for mankind” as an opportunity to redouble efforts to focus international governance discussions on economic development. Xi’s speech laid the intellectual foundation for ongoing Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road, Global Security, Global Development, and Global Civilizational Initiatives, which aim to reorient the international political, economic, and security architecture towards Beijing.[1] Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang used the anniversary to publish a report about Sino-Russian relations that argued against viewing the world in a democracy versus autocracy framework but rather as a “struggle between development and [the] containment of development.”[2] The report builds on Xi’s 2013 speech, which laid the intellectual foundation for ongoing Chinese initiatives that aim to reorient the international political, economic, and security architectures towards Beijing. Such programs include the Belt and Road, Global Security, Global Development, and Global Civilizational Initiatives.

Qin Gang’s report is also part of the CCP’s effort to gain “discourse power” by focusing international governance discussions on economic development rather than governance models. “Discourse power” refers to CCP efforts to shape international public opinion about sensitive subjects for the party, such as human rights, in service of setting international norms for discussing such issues. [3] The term is part of Xi’s aim to have CCP narratives gain substantial traction in the global information space as alternatives to those produced in democratic countries. China can use advances in “discourse power” in conjunction with economic engagement to strengthen its ideological appeal amid a larger US–China competition in regions like the Global South. “Discourse power” advances can also encourage these states to support Chinese initiatives in international organizations like the United Nations.

CCP Leadership Activity

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping aims to bolster domestic R&D and manufacturing to insulate China from Western sanctions and export restrictions and is likely to pursue foreign capital to fuel economic growth to develop sectors critical to China’s national security. Xi stated his intent for the PRC to achieve technological self-reliance and obtain the “two must-haves" of a secure food supply and strong domestic manufacturing industry on March 5.[4] Xi primarily aims for China to develop strong domestic manufacturing in areas relevant to manufacturing high-tech products including computers, robots, and planes.[5] CCP leaders have tried to develop strong domestic manufacturing since the Reform and Opening Up period began in 1978. Xi aims for manufacturing to work in tandem with technological innovation toward self-reliance to insulate China from US sanctions and technological export bans. Xi aims to keep the threat of Western sanctions from limiting his policy options due to the prospect of facing economic downturn like Russia. The CCP aggressively sought foreign investment prior to the pandemic and will now redouble those efforts going forward to achieve Xi’s stated must-haves.[6]

CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin from March 20 to 22 shows Xi attempts to balance the need to incorporate Russia into its international economic and strategic architecture while avoiding Western sanctions. Xi aims to utilize Russia as part of his strategy to develop alternatives such as Chinese-led international organizations like the Global Security and the Global Development Initiatives that aim to reorient the international development and security architecture towards Beijing. Putin claimed that Sino-Russian relations are stronger than the Cold War era military-political alliance between the two countries and that the relationship is “without leaders and followers” in a Chinese state-controlled media piece titled “Russia and China: A Partnership Looking to the Future.”[7] Chinese agreement to include the phrase “without leaders and followers” indicates the CCP’s desire to portray Sino–Russian relations as ostensibly aligning with Beijing’s often repeated mantra of providing “win-win cooperation” with partner states as equals. However, China clearly remains the more powerful country in the relationship. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang displayed the limits to the Sino–Russian relationship by stating on April 14 that China will not sell weapons to either side in the Russian war in Ukraine.[8] The PRC simultaneously funds Russia’s war effort by purchasing vast quantities of oil from the country while disregarding G7 price caps.[9]

Other

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Joint Sword exercise around Taiwan from April 8 to 10 likely provides a rough sketch for future isolation campaigns around Taiwan that the CCP may use to try and create a sense of inevitability regarding “unification” among the Taiwanese populace. The Shandong aircraft carrier operated east of Taiwan during the exercise, which indicates China aims to create a sense of inevitability that the PLA can isolate the island at will and prevent foreign intervention. The April exercises included tactical-level firsts, such as PLA J-15s launched from the Shandong entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) from the east of the island. These firsts do not reflect new PLA operational-level capabilities, however. China demonstrated it could fly tens of aircraft around Taiwan on a daily basis in August 2022.[10] The Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning also previously sailed well east of Taiwan in December 2022 and could operate where the Shandong did in April if ordered.[11] The Chinese Fujian Maritime Safety Administration’s April 5 announcement that it would embark on a three day “special joint patrol and inspection operation” in the central and southern Taiwan Strait indicates the CCP may interfere in future Taiwan Strait shipping in conjunction with military activity to isolate the island.[12] The exercises were China’s response to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen meeting with US officials in the United States and in Taiwan between April 5 and April 8. Taiwanese political figures routinely visit the United States and meet with American political figures without the trappings of a state visit.[13] The April exercises also helped increase sales in Taiwan of a clothing patch showing a Formosan black bear punching Winnie the Pooh, a symbol for Xi Jinping that Chinese social media censors.[14] This example demonstrates the potential difficulty PLA exercises around Taiwan will have inducing fear among the Taiwanese populace.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third-party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024, and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Taiwanese Vice President William Lai’s campaign rhetoric emphasizing continuity with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait approach may increase popular support for his candidacy as the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election nears. Lai became the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential nominee on April 12.[15] Lai's cross-strait policy approach does not promote Taiwan independence, despite previously declaring himself a ”political worker for Taiwan independence” in 2017 and 2018.[16] Lai defended Taiwan’s de facto independence through the Republic of China (ROC) framework after becoming the DPP nominee by emphasizing that there is no need for Taiwan to declare independence because Taiwan is “already a sovereign and independent country."[17] This position aligns with the views of Tsai Ing-wen.[18] Lai further displayed his support for Tsai’s approach by saying that he supports Tsai's "four persistences" policy, which consists of adhering to democracy and freedom, emphasizing that the Republic of China and People’s Republic of China are not affiliated with each other, emphasizing that sovereignty is not compatible with annexation, and to confirm that the Taiwanese people will determine the future of Taiwan.[19] Lai also said he would follow Tsai's "road of democracy" and attempted to reframe the election debate away from discussions involving unification and independence by emphasizing a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism.[20] This rhetoric incorporates defending the existing status quo from Chinese military and political threats against Taiwan. Lai's rhetoric portraying himself as a defender of the existing status quo may make it difficult for the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) to portray him as a pro-independence radical that will endanger Taiwan. This approach may also undercut the KMT's attempts to portray itself as the sole traditional defender of the Taiwan Strait status quo and ROC framework.[21] Lai will likely maintain this rhetoric unless "deep green" pro-independence elements within the DPP force Lai to signal support for Taiwan independence rhetoric.

Lai’s rhetorical advances occurred as former KMT Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou redoubled support for cultural and political unity between China and Taiwan. Ma explicitly called for the “revitalization” of zhonghua during a visit to China from March 27-April 7.[22] He also emphasized his belief that Mainland China and Taiwan belong to one-China under the ROC constitution.[23] Zhonghua is a term that refers to China in a cultural sense while not being bound by the physical borders of China. The KMT defended Ma’s comments by reiterating support for Ma’s “one China” approach and accusing the DPP of “lack[ing] the determination to defend the Republic of China.”[24] Ma retains substantial influence in the KMT as the party’s last leader in government. Ma’s repetition of this terminology likely means that the KMT has not rethought its CCP-friendly cross-strait policy emphasizing one-China with different interpretations despite its unpopularity with the Taiwanese electorate.[25] Their formulation encourages political, cultural, and economic engagement across the strait while maintaining ROC autonomy from the PRC. An emphasis on cross-strait cultural and political unity may make the KMT appear out of touch with public opinion if William Lai successfully frames himself as a pragmatic defender of the status quo and Republic of China (Taiwan) autonomy. [26] Early polling shows that Lai is narrowly leading in the election despite the fact that the KMT have not yet selected their presidential election nominee.[27] While Lai still leads in the polls, April polling data showed a small decline in support for Lai.[28] This is likely tied to undecided voters’ reactions to Lai officially becoming the nominee. Eventual 2020 Taiwanese presidential election winner Tsai Ing-wen also trailed in April 2019 presidential election polls.[29] Lai’s pragmatic rhetoric may gain appeal as the importance of the cross-strait issue grows with the nearing of the election. This appeal will likely gain strength if the KMT refuses to rethink its current cross-strait approach.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 28, 2023

Click here to read the full report with maps

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Ian Jones, and Frank Hoffman of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: December 28, 2023 at 5pm EST

Key Takeaways

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate Lai Ching-te remains first in the polls.
Two Chinese high-altitude balloons have moved through Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) since December 20.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) continued to accuse the Philippines of “colluding with external forces” and deliberately provoking confrontations after a series of maritime confrontations in the South China Sea in December.
A PRC-brokered ceasefire agreement has failed to stop the fighting between the government of Myanmar and three rebel groups in Myanmar.
A loss of Compacts of Free Association funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to expand its leverage points over these countries.

Taiwan

South China Sea

Myanmar

Israel-Hamas War

Compacts of Free Association

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 21, 2023

Click here to read the full report with maps

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: December 21, 2023 at 12pm EST

Key Takeaways

1. The Taiwanese government and DPP officials, including Vice President Lai Ching-te, accused the PRC of using an ongoing trade investigation to interfere in Taiwan’s election.

5. The PRC, Saudi Arabia, and Iran held their first trilateral joint committee on December 15 in Beijing.

Taiwan

South China Sea

Compacts of Free Association

A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while also granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[48] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[49] The signed agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[50] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[51] Deputy Secretary of State nominee Kurt Campbell stated during his Senate confirmation hearing on December 7 that “if we don’t get it [COFA funding] you can expect that literally the next day Chinese diplomats — military and other folks — will be on the plane…trying to secure a better deal for China.”[52] The US House of Representatives Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party also called for renewing the COFAs in a mid-December report.[53] The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act that passed both the Senate and House of Representatives as of December 14 did not include COFA funding.[54]

The loss of COFA funding would present an opportunity for the CCP to expand its economic influence with these vital Pacific Island countries. For example, this funding loss would exacerbate Palau’s existing deficit, which amounts to $37 million as of its 2021 budget of $150 million.[56] This is an economic vulnerability that the CCP could partially fill by encouraging PRC nationals to vacation in Palau. The CCP cut tourism to Palau over the last decade to nearly zero as punishment for maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[57] The reversal of this CCP policy would provide the party with economic leverage to wield over Palau in the event of future policy disagreements. The expansion of the CCP’s economic influence in Palau would also provide the party a leverage point to coerce the countries into switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC aims to coerce countries into switching diplomatic recognition to falsely argue that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China rather than a legitimate country named the Republic of China.

The loss of COFA funding would also provide the CCP an opportunity to expand influence efforts targeting Micronesian political elites. The CCP has completed infrastructure projects throughout the country, such as houses for the country’s president, vice president, speakers of congress, and chief justice.[58] Axios reported that former Micronesian officials confirmed receiving gifts from the PRC, such as money, while on official state visits to the country.[59] The lack of COFA funding would exacerbate the appeal of CCP monetary gifts or infrastructure projects that target the Micronesian political elite. Micronesian President Wesley Simina also stated in late November that his country would be at a “fiscal cliff” without US Congressional approval of COFA funding. This would mean that “we [Micronesia] will have to find different sources of funding… and that’s not out there available immediately.”[60] The loss of COFA funding would also provide opportunities for external powers such as the CCP to enhance their economic influence in the country by filling these funding gaps.

China in the Middle East

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 15, 2023

Click here to read the full report.

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Ian Jones, Frank Hoffman, and Kyle Lim of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: December 12 at 5pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te made significant gains in the polls while support for KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih plateaued.
Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia vessels took aggressive actions against Philippine government vessels near the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea on December 9 and 10.
A loss of Compacts of Free Association funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries.
PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized the need for an immediate ceasefire to the Israel-Hamas War during separate conversations with American and Iranian officials. Wang’s comments are consistent with the PRC’s efforts to use the Israel-Hamas War to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States.

Taiwan

South China Sea

Compacts of Free Association

A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would enable the CCP to expand its leverage points over these countries. These COFAs govern the United States’ relationship with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands while also granting the United States extensive military access throughout their territories. The United States renewed COFAs with Palau and Micronesia in May.[34] It then did so with the Marshall Islands in October.[35] The signed agreements are now before Congress for funding consideration. Congress previously funded the COFAs for a twenty-year period in 2003.[36] The total cost for all three of the twenty-year agreements would be roughly $7 billion spread over the period 2024 to 2043, according to the Congressional Research Service.[37] President Biden’s Deputy Secretary of State nominee Kurt Campbell stated during his Senate confirmation hearing on December 7 that “if we don’t get it [COFA funding] you can expect that literally the next day Chinese diplomats — military and other folks — will be on the plane… trying to secure a better deal for China.”[38]

The loss of COFA funding would present an opportunity for the CCP to expand its economic influence with these vital Pacific Island countries. For example, this funding loss would exacerbate Palau’s existing deficit, which amounts to $37 million as of its 2021 budget of $150 million.[40] This is an economic vulnerability that the CCP could partially fill by encouraging PRC nationals to vacation in Palau. The CCP cut tourism to Palau over the last decade to nearly zero as punishment for maintaining full diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[41] The reversal of this CCP policy would provide the party with economic leverage to wield over Palau in the event of future policy disagreements. The expansion of the CCP’s economic influence in Palau would also provide the party a leverage point to coerce the countries into switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC aims to coerce countries into switching diplomatic recognition to falsely argue that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China rather than a legitimate country named the Republic of China.

Israel-Hamas War

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, December 7, 2023

Click here to read the full report.

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: December 5 at 5pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih gained significant support since November 24 and closed the gap with DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te, who leads in the polls.
A loss of Compacts of Free Association (COFA) funding for Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands would exacerbate CCP leverage points over these countries.
The CCP aims to use the December 7 EU-PRC summit to advance its goal of increasing economic cooperation with Europe while preventing an EU consensus on “de-risking” from materializing.
The Philippines Coast Guard announced over 100 Chinese Maritime Militia vessels “swarmed” the Philippine-controlled Whitson Reef in the South China Sea.

Taiwan Presidential Election

Compacts of Free Association

European Union-People’s Republic of China Summit

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Wang Wenbin stated at a press briefing on December 4 that the PRC calls on the EU to “always be rational on ‘de-risking.’” Wang further criticized that unspecified “certain individuals selectively emphasize on competing aspects [sic] between China and the EU, [and] deliberately overlook partnerships and hype up ‘de-risking.’”[39] The CCP-controlled English language propaganda outlet Global Times also repeated Wang’s message on December 4 regarding China and Europe choosing cooperation over de-risking.[40]
French President Emmanuel Macron and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping previously emphasized the importance of economic cooperation as well as cultural exchanges during their April meeting.[41] Chinese Premier Li Qiang similarly emphasized economic cooperation with German and French officials in late June during a visit to France and Germany.[42]
European Commission President Von der Leyen previously announced an investigation into electric vehicle subsidies in China as part of this de-risking effort during her September 15 State of the Union speech.[43] This effort, regardless of intention, runs counter to messages of economic cooperation emphasized by PRC officials towards major European economies like France or Germany.

South China Sea

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 30, 2023

Click here to read the full report.

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: November 29 at Noon ET

Key Takeaways

Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou Yu-ih and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je registered as separate presidential candidates on November 24. A fragmented opposition is advantageous for Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and frontrunner Lai Ching-te but does not guarantee his victory.
A Congressional decision not to renew funding for the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) would severely undermine American and Taiwanese national security in the Pacific.
A new “action plan” for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the next ten years emphasizes cooperation in green and digital development.
People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized economic cooperation and dialogue during a November 24 meeting with French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna, likely to persuade individual European countries not to coalesce around European Union (EU) investigations targeting the PRC.
The PLA conducted live-fire exercises near its border with Myanmar to strengthen border security and deter an escalation of violence in northern Myanmar.
PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented an Israeli–Palestinian peace plan to the United Nations Security Council on November 29. Wang’s proposal is consistent with the PRC’s efforts to use the Israel-Hamas War to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States. The proposal itself is tantamount to Israeli defeat, however.

Taiwan

Jaw founded the pro-unification New Party in 1993, which formalized the separation of the New Kuomintang Alliance faction from the KMT.[5] The New Party has not had representation in the Legislative Yuan since 2012. Jaw reinstated his KMT membership in 2021.[6]
Wu is a current TPP legislator who Ko appointed to the Legislative Yuan in 2022 after the resignation of founding member Tsai Pi-ru.[7]

Compacts of Free Association

China

People’s Daily and Qiushi, which are CCP publications targeted at party cadre, both stressed on November 26 the need to expand the breadth and depth of cooperation in building the Belt and Road, improving the development of China–Europe freight trains, and promoting green development.[21]

One of the rebel groups claimed to have seized a key border gate and trading point on November 25, the same day the PLA exercises began.[47] About 120 trucks in a convoy carrying building materials and consumer goods from the PRC into Myanmar were destroyed by fire on November 24 in what the Myanmar government called a “terrorist attack.”[48] Local insurgents denied responsibility.[49]

Israel-Hamas War

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 22, 2023 

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War 

Data Cutoff: November 21 at Noon ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments. 

Key Takeaways

The TPP-KMT deal to form a joint presidential ticket broke down after the parties failed to reach a consensus on who would head the ticket. TPP candidate Ko Wen-je is signaling he is prepared to run as a solo candidate but left open the possibility of reaching a new deal by November 24.
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied the validity of alternative regional security frameworks in response to the Philippines’ calls to establish an ASEAN-led South China Sea code of conduct.
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping called for convening a “more authoritative international peace conference” to promote a “just and lasting solution to the Palestinian issue” during a speech at a special BRICS leaders video summit on November 21.

Taiwan

Hou, Ko, and former Taiwan president Ma Ying-Jeou (a KMT member, who mediated the deal) each designated a statistician to evaluate six polls that compared how a joint ticket led by each candidate would fare against Lai Ching-te. The “winner” in each poll would be whichever version of the joint ticket achieved a higher lead over Lai. If the difference between a Hou-Ke and a Ke-Hou joint ticket fell within the margin of error, Hou would be given the victory for that poll.[3]
Ko’s main concession in the negotiation was his offer to accept a loss on any polls that showed the difference between him and Hou to be within the margin of error (estimated at 3%). Ko made this concession on November 3 after consistently polling above Hou for several weeks.[4] However, Hou closed the gap and even surpassed Ko in many polls during the last two weeks.[5] Including this concession in the deal significantly hurt Ko’s performance against Hou. When ignoring the margin of error, a Ko-Hou ticket outperformed a Hou-Ko ticket in five of the six polls.[6]
Ko Wen-je claimed that the KMT demanded he concede on a 6% margin of error rather than the 3% margin he wanted, however. KMT Chairman Eric Chu denied the allegation and said a 3% margin of error means “plus or minus 3,” for a total range of six percentage points. Under Ko’s definition, a “3% margin of error” would mean 1.5 percentage points in either direction.[7] 3% is just an approximation as each poll has its own margin of error depending on its sample size, however.

PRC security developments

Israel-Hamas War

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 17, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: November 16 at Noon ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its suppression of dissents by targeting overseas Chinese expatriate critics.
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam will participate in the Aman Youyi 2023 military exercise with People’s Liberation Army forces for the first time, which buttresses CCP efforts to construct a Sino-centric regional security order.
US President Joe Biden and PRC President Xi Jinping announced the resumption of US-PRC military-to-military talks and cooperation to combat illegal fentanyl production after their meeting in San Francisco.
The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and Kuomintang (KMT) overcame the biggest hurdle to forming a joint presidential ticket on November 15 and plan to announce the ticket order on November 18.
The PRC continued using the Israel-Hamas War to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States while framing Israel as the driver of the war. The PRC has also expanded its diplomatic outreach in the Middle East while building its image as an important and fair broker in the region.

China

The local police visited the “Teacher Li is Not Your Teacher” X account owner’s parents’ house in the PRC at midnight to intimidate them into persuading their son to stop posting. The police repeated these visits at differing hours, but the X account owner continued to post despite his parents’ pleas.[3] This demonstrates that the party previously used domestic harassment to achieve political goals that involved overseas expatriate critics.
CNN reported on November 13 that Qiu faces dozens of accounts impersonating him as well as threats to his safety from unidentified sources that he claims have ties to the CCP.[4] Qiu said that “every day I live in a sense of fear,” which reflects the persistent pressure that the CCP aims to inflict on expatriate citizens.[5]

Cambodia already conducts periodic military exercises with the PLA, such as Golden Dragon.[10] Laos began to do so in 2023 with the Friendship Shield exercise.[11] Vietnam also conducted a joint patrol with the People’s Republic of China Coast Guard in April. This was the first time the two countries' coast guard leaders jointly commanded a patrol.[12]

Biden and Xi announced they would resume cooperation to combat global illicit drug manufacturing and trafficking, including synthetic drugs like fentanyl, and establish a working group for ongoing communication and law enforcement coordination on counternarcotics issues.[14]
Biden and Xi agreed to resume high-level military-to-military communications, the U.S.-China Defense Policy Coordination Talks, and the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings, as well as telephone conversations between theater commanders.[15] The PRC severed such talks with the United States in August 2022 following then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. President Biden said before the meeting that resuming military-to-military talks was his goal.[16]
President Biden maintained that Xi Jinping was a “dictator” in comments after his meeting with Xi. Reuters reported the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson called these comments “extremely wrong and irresponsible political manipulation” during her November 16 press conference.[17] The spokesperson’s comments on this topic were omitted from the MFA’s readouts of the press conference.[18]

The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post exclusively reported on November 11 that “sources familiar with the matter” said the two sides would pledge a ban on artificial intelligence in autonomous weaponry and in the control and deployment of nuclear warheads.[21] No such ban was announced after the meeting as of noon Eastern Time on November 16.
The PRC also has not endorsed the US-led Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, which aims to build international consensus on regulating military AI.[22]

U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry and China Special Envoy for Climate Change Xie Zhenhua met in Sunnylands, California from November 4-7 and released a joint statement on November 14. They agreed to resume talks on climate cooperation, including curbing methane and plastic pollution, and to operationalize the Working Group on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s.[24]

Taiwan

The parties agreed to a point system in which a candidate will receive one “point” for each poll in which he has more support than the other candidate. This means that the candidate leading in a poll wins one point.

The November 15 agreement provides Hou with an advantage in the selection process in polls where he is trailing behind Ko by a number of percentage points smaller than the margin of error.[29] If, for example, a poll shows Ko ahead of Hou by 2.5 percentage points but the margin of error is 3 percentage points, Hou would take the point.

The data from several polls within the November 7-17 timeframe indicates the advantage provided to Hou could be the deciding factor in the evaluation process. A landline poll from CNEWS released on November 13 showed Ko polling at 0.2 percentage points higher than Hou.[30] This difference is less than the poll’s 2.17 percent margin of error. As a result, Hou would win the point for this poll. A poll from United Daily News released on November 14 shows support for a Ko-led ticket is one percentage point higher than support for a Hou-led ticket.[31] This difference is less than the poll’s 2.9 percent margin of error. Hou would once again win the point for this poll.

Taiwan’s election authorities confirmed independent candidate Terry Gou’s eligibility to run on November 14.[32] However, some polls do not consider Gou’s candidacy when surveying respondents. Gou’s inclusion in the polls to determine the presidential candidate could be disproportionately helpful or harmful to Ko or Hou, depending on the poll.
Differences in polling numbers are wider in polls that measure individual candidate support. Differences in polling numbers are narrower in polls that compare support for a Ko-led joint ticket versus a Hou-led joint ticket. Using polls that compare support between Ko-led and Hou-led joint tickets is more favorable to Hou because the difference is more likely to fall within a given poll’s margin of error.[33]
Polling methodology has implications for the evaluation process. Generally, polls conducted by mobile phone emphasize Ko’s popularity over Hou, while polls that use a higher proportion of landline phones reflect higher levels of support for Hou.[34]

Israel-Hamas War

The PRC’s call for a two-state solution aligns with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states but differs from Iran. Iran rejects a two-state solution.[44]

The MFA said on November 8 that Foreign Minister Wang Yi had met with officials from 18 countries and international organizations to discuss the Gaza war.[50] Wang had meetings or calls with only two high-ranking Middle Eastern officials in the two months prior to October 7.[51]
MFA Department of West Asian and North African Affairs Director-General Wang Di met with Iran’s Foreign Ministry Deputy for Political Affairs Ali Bagheri and other Iranian officials on November 11. The event was the first bilateral meeting between PRC and Iranian officials since the war in Gaza began. Iranian officials said they hoped to work with the PRC to de-escalate the war.[52]
The UN Security Council passed its first resolution on the Gaza war on November 15. The resolution called for “urgent and extended” humanitarian pauses and corridors in the Gaza Strip to allow the provision of essential goods and services. It also called for Hamas and other groups to release all hostages. The PRC voted for the resolution and promoted its implementation in official statements and state media. The PRC is the rotating president of the UN Security Council in November.[53] The United States, UK, and Russia abstained from the vote.[54]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 10, 2023

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Ian Jones of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: November 7 at 5pm ET

Taiwanese Presidential Election

KMT chairman Eric Chu proposed two options for selecting which candidate would lead the joint ticket during a phone call with Ko on November 2.[4] Chu’s first proposal entailed an anonymous vote by all opposition legislative candidates to decide the presidential candidate.[5] The second proposal would consider a calculation of party popularity as a factor.[6] The KMT offered to give equal consideration to a public poll in both cases. Ko rejected both proposals as disproportionately favoring the KMT.[7]
Ko continues to insist on using a public poll to decide the order of a joint ticket and is messaging that he will not accept the KMT’s alternatives.[8] He cast doubt over the two parties’ ability reach a consensus during a campaign event on November 3.[9]

An October 24 poll from the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) showed Ko and Hou are trailing Lai by 4.1% and 8.6%, respectively, even though Lai’s lead has diminished during the last several weeks.[12]
Terry Gou’s campaign office announced on November 2 it has collected over one million signatures, three times the required amount. Gou’s campaign is awaiting certification from the Central Election Commission (CEC).[13]

South China Sea military tensions

Israel-Hamas war

The MFA and state-owned outlets, such as The Global Times, criticized US support for Israel and re-iterated that the PRC has no “selfish interest” in the conflict and is committed to bringing peace and justice.[19] PRC officials also discussed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the United States, EU, and Middle Eastern countries including Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE.[20]
The PRC assumed the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council on November 1 and stated that its top priority in that role would be to promote a ceasefire and an end to the Israel-Hamas war, prevent more civilian casualties, prevent larger-scale humanitarian disasters, and prevent the conflict from spilling over.[21]

US President Joe Biden reportedly received a briefing about PRC-Oman negotiations in October to build a PLA military facility in an unspecified location in Oman. The facility would complement China’s other overseas base in Djibouti and would place a permanent PLA facility near a key chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz.[23]

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 2, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: November 1 at 5pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) agreed to cooperation in the legislative elections and will likely form a joint presidential ticket before the January 13 presidential election.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is interfering in the Taiwanese election in order to harm the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) chances of victory in the January 13 presidential and legislative elections.
High-level meetings between PRC and United States officials are unlikely to mitigate People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military coercion targeting Taiwan.
The PRC is shaping the information environment to blame the United States for potential future geopolitical incidents in the South China Sea.
The PRC is using the Israel-Hamas War to enhance its image as an international mediator in the Middle East.

Taiwanese Presidential Election

Sino-American Relations

Israel-Hamas War

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 26, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson, Matthew Sperzel, and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: October 24 at 5pm ET

Taiwanese Presidential Election

Top DPP officials, such as Vice President and presidential candidate Lai Ching-te, have framed the PRC probes as Chinese economic coercion to interfere in the election.[11] Defending Gou against the Foxconn probes serves to pressure him to remain in the race. Gou dropping out may be framed as a capitulation to the PRC.

An October 24 editorial in the pro-KMT China Times called for Gou to withdraw to avoid helping Lai by splitting the opposition vote. The editorial cited the Foxconn probes as one of several recent controversies harming Gou’s campaign.[12] The China Times is a Taiwanese media outlet that receives editorial oversight from the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office on sensitive articles pertaining to cross-strait relations, according to a 2019 Financial Times report.[13]

The PRC-based Global Times published an English-language article about the probe on October 22 that cited unnamed “analysts from both sides of the Taiwan Straits” who also noted that Gou is a spoiler candidate who helps Lai. This is consistent with Global Times coverage of Gou’s campaign when Gou announced his candidacy. The PRC considers Lai a secessionist and the framing in the article is consistent with the PRC’s aim of undermining Lai’s campaign.

An October 23 Global Times article also highlighted Taiwanese speculation that the Foxconn probes were a “way for the mainland to prevent Gou from running.” It quoted an unnamed PRC expert who speculated Gou was running “most likely” because US or DPP authorities are coercing him to damage anti-DPP unity.[14]

Chinese Communist Party Regional Coercion

Chinese Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army Decision Making

Israel-Hamas War

The PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi held a phone call with Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen on October 23. Wang emphasized the importance of the two-state solution to resolving historical Israeli-Palestinian tensions.[33] Wang opposed “acts that harm civilians” and “any violations of international law” in his call with Cohen.[34]

The PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi held a phone call with Palestinian Foreign Affairs Minister Riyad al-Maliki on October 23. Wang expressed support for the two-state solution and the Palestinian right to return.[35] He stated that the PRC supports an immediate ceasefire to “ensure the most basic living conditions for the people of Gaza.”[36]

The party routinely frames the PRC as a developing country and says that Chinese-led institutions, such as BRICS, represent the Global South on the international stage.[37] The CCP’s call for a ceasefire and implementation of the two-state solution amidst the Israel-Hamas War aligns with the party’s messaging that it is the leader of the Global South.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 19, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson and Matthew Sperzel of the Institute for the Study of War

Data Cutoff: October 17 at Noon ET

Key Takeaways

The Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) agreed to debates between their presidential candidates and will likely form a joint presidential ticket before the January 13 election.
KMT member and former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016) proposed that the United States encourage the ROC to “hold peace talks” with the PRC during an October 16 New York University event.
The CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) held the Taiwanese Association Forum in Beijing on October 16 to undermine the sovereignty of the ROC (Taiwan).
Reuters reported on October 13 that General Liu Zhenli could become the next Minister of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China.

Taiwanese Presidential Election

KMT campaign officials King Pu-tsung and Justin Huang and TPP campaign officials Huang Shan-shan and Chou Yu-hsiu held a three-hour meeting to discuss electoral cooperation on October 14.[4] The agreed upon debates would have to occur before the November 24 presidential candidate registration deadline with the Central Election Commission.[5]

The KMT and TPP disagreed over how to select the presidential nominee for a joint ticket during the October 14 meeting. The TPP negotiators advocated for opinion polls while the KMT advocated for an open primary.[6]

The age discrepancy is also reflected in each party’s support base. An excerpt from a September TPOF poll notes Ko has a distinct advantage among voters aged 44 and below, while Hou finds stronger support with voters 54 and up.[8] This suggests young green voters supporting the TPP may struggle to accept a joint ticket with the outspokenly anti-independence KMT.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 13, 2023

Authors: Nils Peterson of the Institute for the Study of War

Data Cutoff: October 12 at Noon ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

The Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party are discussing a joint presidential ticket and may form one before the January 13 election.
The Chinese Communist Party blamed the United States and Europe of “biased” support for Israel, indicating that the party aims to delegitimize the United States as a responsible regional actor.

Taiwanese Presidential Election

Ko has been open to cooperating with Hou to forge a winning electoral strategy since August but without working toward a joint ticket.[3] KMT Chairman Eric Chu and Hou also have expressed a willingness to work with the TPP in late August.[4] Several local district level KMT leaders called for cooperation between Hou and Ko on September 20.[5]
Ko proposed on October 10 to hold three debates with Hou before a third-party poll that would determine the presidential candidate for a joint KMT-TPP ticket. He also nominated his campaign chief Huang Shan-shan and campaign office chair Chou Yu-hsiu for negotiations with the KMT on organizing the debates.[6]
Ko leads Hou by 7.4 percentage points in the presidential election, according to the most recent poll by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation from September 25.[7]

ISW assesses that the CCP holds the following leverage points over each of the Taiwanese presidential candidates:

ISW assesses that a joint Ko-Hou presidential ticket would have the following implications for the CCP leverage points over the Taiwanese presidential candidates:

Chinese Communist Party in the Middle East

The CCP’s October 8 statement called for an immediate ceasefire in order to protect civilians and prevent the situation from deteriorating.[12] PRC Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Mao Ning stated on October 9 that the party’s top priority was for the war to end as soon as possible.[13] She also declined to label Hamas’ actions as “acts of terrorism” and refused to state whether the PRC urged Iran to restrain Hamas.[14] This statement came after Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on October 9 in Beijing. Schumer urged him to “stand with the Israeli people and condemn [Hamas’] cowardly and vicious attacks.”[15]
The CCP-controlled English language Global Times claimed on October 10 and 11 that American and European “biased” support for Israel would worsen the situation and reveal the greed of the American military-industrial complex. The outlet also questioned the motives of Secretary of State Blinken’s Israel trip. It asked “But what is he supporting exactly? Is it a retaliatory mass killing?”[16]

The party began portraying itself as a neutral broker via Special Envoy on the Middle East Zhai Jun, who called the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 10 to offer PRC assistance to broker an “immediate ceasefire and cessation of violence, and to provide humanitarian support to the Palestinian people.”[19] Egypt has not publicized its response.
This framing of ostensible neutrality would allow the CCP to build off its March 2023 mediation of Saudi-Iran diplomatic normalization to enhance its political stature in the region.[20] This also advances the CCP narrative of a PRC-led world order as founded on principles of non-intervention and peace compared to the alleged militarism of the United States.[21]
The English language CCP propaganda outlets China Daily and Global Times framed the United States' move to deploy the USS Gerald R. Ford near Israel as evidence that the American military-industrial complex perniciously exploits the conflict for profit.[22] Such articles propagate the narrative that the United States is a destabilizing world power.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 5, 2023

Taiwanese Presidential Election

Ko leads Hou by 7.4 percentage points in the presidential election, according to a September 25 poll by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation.[10]

The DPP-led government imported the eggs between March to July to address shortages caused by the avian flu.[14] Egg processing plants mixed imported and domestic eggs to create liquid egg products and mislabeled the products as made in Taiwan.[15] The government destroyed 54 million eggs that had expired in storage facilities.[16] The agriculture minister resigned on September 17 and Premier Chen Chien-jen responded to the controversy before the Legislative Yuan on September 22.[17]
Lin stated that he solicited the fake threats because the Kuomintang failed to hold the DPP accountable.[18] Lin also announced that he was a DPP member and planned to resign from the party on October 3.[19] The KMT confirmed on October 3 that Hsu was a KMT party worker and that there would be an investigation into his actions.[20] Both Taiwan Premier Chen Chien-jen and Justice Minister Cai Qingxiang stated on October 3 that they would continue to investigate and search for more accomplices.[21]
The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense announced on October 3 that it is cooperating with the judicial authorities to “clarify the facts” regarding the allegation against Ma but will not comment on the situation.[22] Ma filed a defamation lawsuit against Kuo on September 30.[23]

Chinese Communist Party and Europe

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, September 29, 2023

Taiwanese Presidential Election

Several local district level KMT leaders called for cooperation between Hou and Ko on September 20.[5] The KMT-leaning Broadcasting Corporation of China Chairman Jaw Shaw-kong met with former KMT presidential nominee Han Kuo-yu on September 26 and claimed to have “reached a consensus on promoting ‘opposition integration’” between the KMT and TPP, with negotiations alleged to begin in mid-October.[6]
Ko stated in late September that cooperation cannot be “purely reduced to distribution of power” and that cooperation requires consensus and the combination of ideas.[7] Ko is polling ahead of Hou by 7.4 percentage points, according to a September 25 poll by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation.[8] Ko reportedly told an internal TPP meeting on an unspecified date in September that the KMT could “go to hell.”[9]
The KMT interprets the 1992 Consensus to mean that there is one China, the ROC, and sees it as a means for engaging in dialogue with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[10] Ko does not align with the 1992 Consensus because it has become politically contentious in Taiwan.[11] He does support dialogue with the CCP that avoids the domestic Taiwanese political polarization around using the term 1992 Consensus.

The trend is for media coverage surrounding controversy in the election, such as Jaw’s comments, to not last substantially into a third week. The sexual assault and barbiturate scandals that occurred in May and June that affected the DPP and KMT lasted no more than three weeks.[12]

ISW assesses that the CCP holds the following leverage points over each of the Taiwanese presidential candidates:[13]

A joint Ko-Hou presidential ticket would have the following implications for the CCP leverage points over the Taiwanese presidential candidates:

The DPP-led government imported the eggs between March to July to address shortages caused by the avian flu.[14] Egg processing plants mixed imported and domestic eggs to create liquid egg products and mislabeled the products as made in Taiwan.[15] The government destroyed 54 million eggs that had expired in storage facilities.[16] The agriculture minister resigned on September 17 and Premier Chen Chien-jen responded to the controversy before the Legislative Yuan on September 22.[17]
The sexual assault and barbiturate scandals that occurred in May and June that affected the DPP and KMT lasted no more than three weeks.[18] The egg scandal is now entering its second week.[19]

The framing of the election as a choice between peace and war has been ongoing since at least January 2023 and remains salient in Taiwanese and Chinese media outlets.[20] The last two Taiwanese presidential elections, which occurred in 2016 and 2020, centered around the candidates’ differing views of cross-strait relations.[21] The 2024 presidential election coverage also focused on cross-strait relations with brief interludes of political scandal.

Chinese Communist Party Coercion toward Taiwan

The CCP put forth a plan on September 12 titled “Opinions on Supporting Fujian in Exploring a New Road for Cross-Strait Integrated Development and Building a Cross-Strait Integrated Development Demonstration Zone.”[23]
This proposal comes amid proposals by KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih since August to build a bridge between Kinmen and Xiamen.[24] TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je also supports the construction of the bridge.[25] The Chinese Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Zhu Fenglian voiced support for constructing the bridge on September 27.[26]
An unnamed Taiwanese official stated on September 20 that building such a bridge would “accelerate the ‘Crimeaization’ of Kinmen, and it will eventually be annexed by China.”[27]

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, September 23, 2023

Taiwanese Presidential Election

Gou’s campaign spokesperson Huang Hsih-hsiu reiterated on September 17 that the purpose of Gou's entry into the presidential race is to “unite the opposition.”[2] Huang suggested that newly announced vice-presidential candidate Tammy Lai is prepared to step aside if Gou forms a combined ticket with another of the current presidential candidates.[3]
KMT Chairman Eric Chu on September 15 said Gou should “focus on the big picture” and “put self-interest aside.” A recent Taiwanese media report suggests Ko has decided against working with Gou.[4] A Storm Media report from September 19 stated that high-level KMT officials claim Ko Wen-je’s team indicated that Ko has already ruled out the possibility of collaboration with Gou, which is in line with his late August statement that such a pairing would be “impossible.”[5]
Gou’s previous outreach to TPP candidate Ko Wen-je on the topic of cooperation did not produce a combined ticket, however.[6] Ko stated that Ko-Gou cooperation is impossible and called on Gou to first discuss cooperation with the KMT.[7]

Hou stated that Taiwan should strengthen dialogue to decrease the chance of war at a forum hosted by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy on September 15.[8] Hou promoted his “3D” strategy that calls for deterrence, dialogue, and de-escalation in a speech on September 18 before scholars at the Brookings Institute and in an article published on the same day in Foreign Affairs magazine.[9]
On September 19, the DPP criticized Hou’s article for ignoring China as “the biggest source of regional tension.”[10] The party also criticized Hou for supporting the 1992 Consensus without viewing it as a vehicle for the CCP to unify with the ROC.[11]
Ko stated during a September 13 interview with Bloomberg that he would prefer to rename the 1992 Consensus, which would allow him to publicly reject the 1992 Consensus while opening dialogue with China.[12] Ko stated that “we cannot always tell [China] no, because after ‘no,’ there is no other step.”[13]

Meaning of ROC Sovereignty for Leading ROC Presidential Candidates

Chinese Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army Decision Making

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, September 15, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

KMT Chair Eric Chu (Chu Li-lun) stated that “there is no room for ambiguity, party discipline will be strictly enforced” against publicly pro-Gou KMT members.[5] KMT Disciplinary Committee Chair Huang Yiteng also warned against supporting the election of non-party candidates.
[6] The KMT stripped party power from the Standing Committee of the Central Committee member Fan Chenglian for two years after he appeared with Gou at a campaign event.[7] The KMT stated that this was to promote party unity and support the KMT-nominated candidates.[8]

Several KMT legislators and party members publicly urged Gou to rethink his candidacy. KMT members stated that they would support Hou over Gou and framed Gou’s presidency as handing the election to the DPP.[9] The KMT leadership’s rhetoric is framed as uniting behind Hou as opposed to building bridges with Gou.[10]

Pro-Gou KMT members have stated that they are unafraid of party discipline. Pro-Gou members have quit the KMT and appeared at rallies with Gou.[11] Gou has criticized the KMT for criticizing his campaign more harshly than the DPP.[12]

Chu has implemented a joint-campaign headquarters to consolidate KMT leaning county and local officials behind Hou.[16] Chu stated on August 24 that he is willing to work with the TPP in the interest of defeating the DPP.[17] Chu caveated his calls for cooperation by stating the KMT will only cooperate with parties that have a consensus on cross-strait policies and constitutional reform issues.[18]
Hou’s campaign issued a statement that it is “happy to see the possibility of cooperation with opposition forces.”[19] Hou stated he is open to working with the TPP.[20]
Ko has repeatedly stated he is open to dialogue with other opposition leaders and that “anything is possible” when asked specifically about cooperation with Hou.[21] Ko’s and Chu’s offices are rumored to be in contact about electoral cooperation.[22] An unnamed Ko staffer allegedly stated that Ko is more likely to work with Hou than Gou because of the grassroots strength of the KMT.[23] Ko has explicitly denied that the TPP and KMT have come to any agreement about cooperation and denied reporting that he and Chu communicated.[24]

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The United States, Canada, and Japan conducted the trilateral naval exercise Noble Stingray in the waters of Okinawa on September 8. Two of the four ships that participated in the exercise, the guided-missile destroyer USS Ralph Johnson and frigate HMCS Ottawa, transited through the Taiwan Strait on September 9.[27]
The PRC’s Shandong aircraft carrier group sailed in waters 60 nautical miles off the southernmost point of the Taiwanese home island on its way to the western Pacific on September 11.[28] The PRC state-media outlet Global Times framed the event as a “show of force” in response to the transit of the Ralph Johnson and Ottawa.[29] The Global Times claimed that a “large” PLAN task force transiting through the Miyoko Strait to the western Pacific would join the Shandong carrier group to conduct a coordinated exercise. [30][31]
The United States, Canada, and South Korea will conduct a trilateral naval exercise to commemorate the 1950 Battle of Incheon from September 15-19. The exercise will consist of over 20 ships, 10 aircraft, and 3,000 service members.[32] The China-based South China Morning Post noted that this will be the first large-scale US exercise” near China’s northern coast in approximately ten years.[33] The PRC Foreign Ministry officials have framed U.S.-South Korean exercises as adding to regional “tension and confrontation” and vowed that US “interference” in the region will be met with “vigilance and opposition.” [34][35]

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, August 31, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

There are four scenarios that could play out now that Gou has entered the Taiwanese presidential election.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Figure 1: The image shows the Republic of China air defense identification zone violations by People’s Liberation Army Air Force planes and drones from August 25 to August 26.

Source: ROC Ministry of National Defense X[55]

Iranian state media reported on August 24 that one of the biggest advantages Iran will gain through its newfound membership in BRICS is access to the New Development Bank.[61] The New Development Bank has its own payment notification system, which can act as an alternative to SWIFT. Iran has sought an alternative financial messaging system to Belgium-based SWIFT ever since SWIFT disconnected Iran from its platform in 2018.[62]
Iranian state media also reported on August 24 that Iran’s membership will help Iran “activate” the Russia-Iran-India corridor and China’s Belt and Road Initiative.[63] The completion of these projects would bolster Iran’s economy and help Iran become a regional and international “transit hub.”[64] Iran has repeatedly sought Russian and Chinese assistance and financing to complete infrastructure projects.

Chinese government and state media outlets messaged that the discharge is a “selfish and irresponsible” act on the part of the Japanese government.[67] They also issued the narrative that the discharge was unsafe and that Japan was disregarding near-unanimous opposition both internationally and domestically.[68]
China's General Administration of Customs imposed a “temporary” ban on all Japanese “aquatic products” for an indeterminate period following the discharge.[69] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Embassy to Japan both “urged” Japan to cease the discharge and pledged that China would take “all necessary measures” to “safeguard” the health and safety of Chinese citizens.[70]

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, August 24, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

KMT Chairman Eric Chu publicly stated his support for Taiwan People’s Party Hsinchu Mayor Kao Hung-an after the Taipei District Prosecutors indicted her for corruption on August 14.[4] This angered KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih’s campaign manager Jin Pucong because he did not want the Hou campaign to become involved in the scandal.[5] A faction within the KMT also unsuccessfully submitted a proposal on July 19 to replace Chu as the party chairman.[6] Chu also stated in July that party “guns should be [focused] externally.”[7]
Several local KMT officials have also left the party. Former Miaoli County Magistrate Hsu Yao-Chang left the KMT on August 22 criticizing the KMT’s “minority decision-making and backroom politics.”[8] Hsu previously caused controversy by stating that “we not only want the DPP to step down, we also want to take down the KMT” at a rally with Terry Gou.[9] Gou is an ROC billionaire who maintains a popular base of support in the KMT.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-26-2023

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, August 18, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, presidential and legislative elections.

Lai Countered CCP-KMT Messaging in a Bloomberg Interview

Election Update: Civil Nuclear Policies

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to the People’s Republic of China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Centralization Slowed CCP Response to Typhoon Doksuri

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, August 10, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

Other

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, August 3, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, July 27, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Other

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, July 20, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third-party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, July 13, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Lai published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal on July 4 detailing his “four-pillar plan for peace.” He called for increasing Taiwan’s military deterrence, treating economic security as a national security matter, partnering with democracies around the world, and supporting the cross-strait status quo.[4] The article ignited criticism from the KMT and TPP. KMT spokesperson Lin Jiaxing stated that Lai’s four pillars make it “difficult to maintain the status quo” and contain confrontational thinking that will exacerbate cross-strait tensions.[5] TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je criticized Lai’s four pillars as unachievable under a DPP administration because of its poor relations with China that make dialogue difficult.[6]

Lai also framed the presidential election as a choice between moving closer to the White House or Zhongnanhai (the CCP leadership compound). He stated Taiwan is moving closer to the White House under President Tsai Ing-wen and that he would continue leading the country in that direction as president.[7] This prompted the pan-blue media outlet China Times to criticize Lai as aiming for independence and being biased towards the United States.[8]

Hou Yu-ih recanted his opposition to extending mandatory conscription for Taiwanese men from four months to one year. Hou stated on July 3 that he would limit mandatory military service to four months to “ensure stability and peace on both sides of the strait.”[9] Hou stated on July 4 that he does not oppose the government’s plan to extend compulsory military service to one year but that he is opposed to the DPP’s “3+1” system. This system allows university students to complete both their degree and military service in four years.[10]

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, July 6, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, June 30, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

ISW is considering two hypotheses about Chinese support to Russia in the aftermath of the rebellion.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, June 23, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Ko polled in third place prior to the scandals.[3] He is now polling in second place behind DPP nominee Lai Ching-te (William Lai).[4]
A Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation poll revealed a four-percent point increase in support for Ko between May and June. This increase is greater than gains for Ko in the foundation’s previous polls, which included a two and a half percent point increase in support between April and May.[5]
Another Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation poll also shows that party identification with the TPP increased by seven percentage points between May and June, compared to nearly seven percent point drop in identification with the DPP and a nearly six percent point drop with the KMT.[6]

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, June 16, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Short-Term Electoral Narrative Impacts on Leading Presidential Candidates

Candidate (Party)	Temporary Impact
Hou Yu-ih (KMT)	Harder to frame himself as a responsible alternative to the sexual harassment scandal-plagued DPP.
Lai Ching-te (DPP)	Reprieve from election media coverage focusing extensively on the sexual harassment scandals engulfing the party.
Ko Wen-je (TPP)	Easier to frame the TPP as a viable third-party alternative to pick up swing voters offput by KMT and DPP scandals.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, June 9, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, June 2, 2023

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Terminology

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, May 26, 2023

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

CCP Leverage Points

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, May 19, 2023

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, May 12, 2023

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

CCP Leadership Activity

Other

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Other

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, May 5, 2023

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

CCP Leadership Activity

Other

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

Other

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, April 28, 2023

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

CCP Leadership Activity

Other

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

China–Taiwan Weekly Update, April 24, 2023

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Geopolitical Initiatives

CCP Leadership Activity

Other

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third-party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024, and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.