Iran Update, April 5, 2023

Apr 5, 2023 - ISW Press

 

Iran Update, April 5, 2023

Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Zachary Coles, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Johanna Moore

April 5, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Contributors: Anya Caraiani and James Motamed

Student poisonings have resumed in Iran after approximately three weeks without reported incidents, indicating that the regime has failed to take the necessary security measures to permanently prevent these attacks. CTP recorded ten student poisoning cases on April 5, four cases on April 4, and one case on April 3.[1] The April 3 chemical poisoning attack on Iranian school girls in Naghadeh, West Azerbaijan Province marked the first of such attacks since March 13, as CTP previously reported.[2] The pause in student poisonings between March 13 and April 3 roughly corresponds to the Iranian New Year holiday between March 20 and April 2, suggesting that the recent respite from student poisonings was not due to the regime’s ability to effectively crack down on the perpetrators of these attacks, but because schools were not in session. The resumption of student poisoning attacks also indicates that the network targeting Iranian school girls still exists and retains the ability to operate in Iran.

There are numerous similarities between the most recent student poisonings and the poisonings that occurred between December 2022 and March 2023. Students poisoned in recent days have reported symptoms—such as smelling a strange smell before becoming ill, dizziness, and headaches—which match the symptoms experienced by students poisoned in March.[3] Students from schools where poisoning attacks have occurred in recent days have additionally reported that school principals confiscated their cellphones to prevent the dissemination of news about the attacks.[4] School officials reportedly behaved in a similarly abnormal and unsympathetic manner during the peak of student poisonings in early March, as CTP previously reported.[5] Regime officials have largely disregarded the resumption of student poisoning attacks. Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi stated on April 5 that he “could not confirm” the poisoning of students in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province. Vahidi added that “further investigations should take place,” but did not exhibit any sense of urgency regarding the recent attacks.[6] The regime’s lack of response suggests that it is incapable of preventing such attacks, does not want to acknowledge the existence of a network capable of instilling fear into the Iranian people, and still tolerates the poisoning of Iranian schoolgirls.

Iranian media and officials provided conflicting reports on an alleged attempted drone strike on a Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) facility in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on April 4. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency confirmed reports that Iran’s air defenses shot down a drone targeting the MODAFL’s Amir al-Momenin (AaM) complex on April 5.[7] The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated the AaM complex as one of Iran’s ballistic missile research and development facilities on July 28, 2017.[8] Esfahan Province Governorate Security Deputy Mohammadreza Jannashari denied the report and stated that regime security forces are prepared to “deal with any threats.”[9] Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi separately stated that such reports required further investigation without confirming or denying the veracity of the report.[10] Iranian officials provided similarly ambiguous and conflicting responses to previous reports of drone attacks on military facilities.[11]

Israel previously conducted a kamikaze drone attack on a military munitions factory near Esfahan City on January 28, as CTP previously reported.[12] Israel also conducted a drone attack on two IRGC complexes in the vicinity of Karaj, Alborz Province on February 23.[13] Reports of a possible drone strike on the AaM complex coincide with recent escalations between Iran and Israel in Syria.

Key Takeaways

  • Student poisonings have resumed in Iran after approximately three weeks of no reported incidents, indicating that the regime has failed to take the necessary security measures to permanently prevent these attacks.
  • Iranian media and officials provided conflicting reports on an alleged attempted drone strike on a Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) facility in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on April 4.
  • At least seven protests occurred in four cities across four provinces.
  • Senior regime officials publicly demonstrated their commitment to fulfilling Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s economic and socio-cultural visions articulated in his April 4 speech.
  • The Iranian rial depreciated from 506,500 rials to one US dollar on April 4 to 511,500 rials to one US dollar.
  • Iranian media and officials continued to engage with and promote rapprochement with Gulf states.
  • 210 Iranian parliamentarians signed a statement condemning Azerbaijan’s newly opened embassy In Israel.
  • A Hamas delegation led by Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh arrived in Beirut.
  • The Eye of Euphrates reported that approximately 25 IRGC missile and air defense specialists arrived in Abu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province.
  • Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki signaled that he is prepared to use force to consolidate his and his State of Law political coalition’s position in Iraqi politics.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least seven protests occurred in four cities across four provinces on April 5. CTP assesses with high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[14]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retirees

Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province[15]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Individuals gathered around the grave of killed protester Aram Habibi

Mashhad, Razavi Khorasan Province[16]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Khorasan Razavi Construction Engineering Organization employees

Tehran City, Tehran Province[17]

  • Size: Medium
  • Demographic: Anti-regime protesters commemorating the birthday of killed protester Hamid Reza Rouhi

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Mashhad, Razavi Khorasan Province[18]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Imam Reza Hospital employees on strike

Mashhad, Razavi Khorasan Province[19]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Ghaem Hospital employees

Tehran City, Tehran Province[20]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Darugar Company employees
 

Senior regime officials publicly demonstrated their commitment to fulfilling Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s economic and socio-cultural visions articulated in his April 4 speech. Khamenei emphasized the importance of resolving Iran’s economic problems and reiterated his determination to enforce mandatory veiling after a period of relative silence on the issue in yesterday’s speech.[21] Supreme National Security Council-affiliated Nour News notably framed Khamenei’s address as principally focused on the economy.[22]

Regime officials expressed their readiness to execute Khamenei’s plans on April 5. President Ebrahim Raisi characterized Khamenei’s speech as “a beacon of light for everyone” in a cabinet meeting on April 5 and ordered executive agencies to present their plans for fulfilling Khamenei’s vision within 25 days.[23] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, denied rumors that he opposed passing a mandatory hijab bill through parliament and expressed his commitment to expediting the legislative process if such a bill was introduced, for ”the statements of the leader of the revolution are clear.“[24] Vice President for Women and Family Affairs Ensieh Khazali stated on April 5 that the Interior Ministry formed a “headquarters” to enforce mandatory veiling through “educational, skills training, and support aspects,” though she did not specify the headquarters will operate.[25]

Economic Affairs

The Iranian rial depreciated from 506,500 rials to one US dollar on April 4 to 511,500 rials to one US dollar on April 5.[26]

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Iranian media and officials continued to engage with and promote rapprochement with Gulf states. National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Member Yaghub Reza Zadeh stated on April 5 that UAE President Mohammad bin Zayed Al Nahyan will soon travel to Tehran to meet President Raisi at an unspecified date.[27] I RGC-affiliated media circulated Saudi government-owned Ashraq al Awasat newspaper reporting’s that Iranain Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian will meet with his Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud in Beijing, China on April 6.[28] IRGC-affiliated media separately published an op-ed on April 5 promoting the formulation of a ”broad Arab-Islamic Front” to counter Israeli influence and end Iranian isolation in the region.[29]

210 Iranian parliamentarians signed a statement condemning Azerbaijan’s newly opened embassy in Israel. The statement threatened that the embassy opening may have many “negative political consequences” for Azerbaijan.[30] The statement follows several days of heightened tensions between Tehran and Baku. Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani had previously condemned Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Eli Cohen’s March 29 discussion on Iran with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov on March 31. Kanani warned that Azerbaijan was “expected to avoid the trap of enemy relations” and added that Iran would be unable to remain indifferent to improved Israeli-Azerbaijani ties. Uncorroborated reports on April 3 separately stated that three of the four individuals that Azerbaijani security services arrested for shooting Azerbaijani Parliamentarian Fazil Mustafa on March 28 were working on the order of Iranian security forces. Several Azerbaijani parliamentarians have additionally blamed Iran for the attack, as CTP previously reported.[31]

External Security and Military Affairs

A Hamas delegation led by Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh arrived in Beirut on April 5.[32]  Hamas Spokesperson in Lebanon Walid Kilani said that Haniyeh intends to follow up on his previous meetings with Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) officials to “coordinate stances” against Israel. Haniyeh last traveled to Beirut on June 21, 2022, when he met with LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and officials from multiple Palestinian resistance groups.[33]

Haniyeh’s visit coincides with an outbreak of violence between Israel and Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and other Palestinian resistance militias. PIJ militants fired as many as 15 rockets into Israel from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip on April 4 and April 5 in response to Israeli security forces raiding the Al Aqsa Mosque and detaining approximately 350 people.[34] The Israel Defense Force launched airstrikes against targets in the Gaza Strip on April 5 in response to the rocket fire.[35]

The Eye of Euphrates reported that approximately 25 Iranian missile and air defense specialists arrived in Abu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province on April 4.[36] Anonymous sources told Eye of Euphrates that the specialists entered Syria via the Al Qaim border crossing in a bus escorted by a security convoy. The outlet also claimed that the specialists will subsequently travel to unspecified sites in Deir ez Zor, Homs, Daraa, and As Suwayda provinces.[37] CTP cannot verify the accuracy of this report.

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki signaled that he is prepared to use force to consolidate his and the Coordination Framework’s position in Iraqi politics. Maliki threatened to “take up arms” against those attempting to undermine the Iranian-aligned Shia Coordination Framework’s political agenda on April 5.[38] Maliki also called on independent political parties to ally themselves with the Coordination Framework instead of protesting, in reference to anti-Coordination Framework protests that took place from March 20 to 28 likely with support from the Sadrist Movement and Tishreen Movement.[39] Maliki similarly signaled a willingness to use force in the leadup to the August 2022 armed confrontations in Baghdad between his militia and that of Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr.[40]

[1] https://www dot eghtesadnews dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7-61/564790-%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%85-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF;

https://www dot entekhab dot ir/fa/news/721210/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%DB%B2%DB%B0-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%AF%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86 ;

https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1643231579282587648?cxt=HHwWgIC-7cia980tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1643201834490773509?cxt=HHwWioC-8ZjX6c0tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1643294149754384384?cxt=HHwWgMCzmdPUk84tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1643536950924566528 ;

https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1643543520219746306?s=20 ;

https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1643560749304799233?s=20 ;

https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1643544407520542720?s=20 ;

https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1643567253982523396?cxt=HHwWiMC9obTtj88tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1643629186131582988?s=20 ;

https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1643569709684596736?cxt=HHwWgIC91az8kM8tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1643561270581362693 ;

https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1643578988353277954 ;

https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643625034227875840?cxt=HHwWgIC80dSQqs8tAAAA

[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-3-2023

[3] https://www dot tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1170015/%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%DB%B1%DB%B4%DB%B0%DB%B2 ;

https://www dot entekhab dot ir/fa/news/721377/%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7-%DB%B7-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%E2%80%8C%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B2-%D9%82%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AF%DA%86%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF

[4] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1643561270581362693

[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-5-2023 ;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-6-2023

[6] https://www dot irna dot ir/news/85074552/%D8%AA%D8%B0%DA%A9%D8%B1-%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%82%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86

[7] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/01/16/2875624/حمله-ناکام-به-مجتمع-وزارت-دفاع-در-اصفهان-سرنگونی-ریزپرنده 

[8] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/amir-al-momenin-industries

[9] https://t dot co/iKF3sthINu

[10] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/01/16/2875779/واکنش-وزیر-کشور-به-خبر-ریزپرنده-در-اصفهان-باید-بررسی-دقیق-تری-شود

[11] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-23-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-29-2023

[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-29-2023 ;

[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-23-2023

[14] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643608507093241858?cxt=HHwWhMDS8dPOos8tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643583200323596317?cxt=HHwWusCz4c2Nl88tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1643596508988690434?cxt=HHwWhMC-haOUnc8tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1643648024315408384?cxt=HHwWgMC9ke7KtM8tAAAA

[15] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1643624203629862919?cxt=HHwWjoC9majgqc8tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643637629190127617?cxt=HHwWgoC-teTtr88tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1643689169716224006?cxt=HHwWjIC9oeulx88tAAAA

[16] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643577693265354752?cxt=HHwWgICz_YbNlM8tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1643596813067337730?cxt=HHwWhIC-zfylnc8tAAAA

[17] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1643685375855009805?cxt=HHwWmoC95YDJxc8tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1643688290086789140?cxt=HHwWqIC9wdHyxs8tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1643706431814742017?cxt=HHwWgsC99c-Sz88tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1643704176906493959?cxt=HHwWjoCzxa-Pzs8tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643660061665787922?cxt=HHwWpICwscOHus8tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643687435216343040?cxt=HHwWgMC-nfDAxs8tAAAA

[18] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643520706720808961?cxt=HHwWgoC-kYDY-s4tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1643560108272635904?cxt=HHwWgMC-ybzNjM8tAAAA

[19] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1643558129936867330?cxt=HHwWhIC96ajai88tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643527018863030272?cxt=HHwWgMCzobXH_c4tAAAA

[20] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1643519540658073601?cxt=HHwWgsCzpZCU-s4tAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1643556956412551168?cxt=HHwWgIC9sYGWi88tAAAA

[21] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-4-2023

[22] https://nournews dot ir/Fa/News/138202/%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%87%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%87-%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%AB%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%84%D9%87%E2%80%8C-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1

[23] https://president dot ir/fa/143179

[24] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85074398/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%B4%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%A8%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D9%84%D9%88%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88 ; https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020116000273/قالیباف-دولت-و-قوه-قضائیه-درباره-حجاب-لایحه-بدهند-خارج-از-نوبت-رسیدگی ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/01/16/2875736/قالیباف-شایعات-مبنی-بر-جلوگیری-مجلس-از-قانون-حجاب-و-عفاف-را-تکذیب-کرد

[25] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85074552/%D8%AA%D8%B0%DA%A9%D8%B1-%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D9%82%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86

[26] https://bonbast dot com/

[27] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1402011607130/%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%AF

[28] www.tasnimnews dot com%2Ffa%2Fnews%2F1402%2F01%2F15%2F2875548%2F%25D8%25B1%25D8%25B3%25D8%25A7%25D9%2586%25D9%2587-%25D8%25B3%25D8%25B9%25D9%2588%25D8%25AF%25DB%258C-%25D8%25A8%25D9%2586-%25D9%2581%25D8%25B1%25D8%25AD%25D8%25A7%25D9%2586-%25D8%25A8%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A7%25DB%258C-%25D8%25AF%25DB%258C%25D8%25AF%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B1-%25D8%25A8%25D8%25A7-%25D8%25A7%25D9%2585%25DB%258C%25D8%25B1%25D8%25B9%25D8%25A8%25D8%25AF%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D9%2584%25D9%2587%25DB%258C%25D8%25A7%25D9%2586-%25D9%25BE%25D9%2586%25D8%25AC%25D8%25B4%25D9%2586%25D8%25A8%25D9%2587-%25D8%25A8%25D9%2587-%25D9%25BE%25DA%25A9%25D9%2586-%25D9%2585%25DB%258C-%25D8%25B1%25D9%2588%25D8%25AF&hmac=xnURRiTg8Y59b67SVwbdFZ3CgJiJAGUUBFxWYHiaWJ0%3D

[29] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/01/16/2875859/تشکیل-جبهه-گسترده-عربی-ـ-اسلامی-برای-مقابله-با-صهیونیست-ها-چگونه-میسر-است

[30] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85074318/%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%81%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%81%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D8%B0%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B1%DA%98%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%84%DA%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3

[31] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-3-2023

[32] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230405-hamas-chief-arrives-in-lebanon-for-hezbollah-talks-amid-al-aqsa-tension/; https://msdrnews dot com/225222/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%87%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AA/

[33] https://www.haaretz dot com/middle-east-news/2022-06-23/ty-article/.premium/hezbollahs-nasrallah-meets-hamas-chief-haniyeh-in-beirut-to-discuss-anti-israel-alliance/00000181-8faf-dca5-a5c1-9faf517d0000

[34] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/air-force-strikes-in-gaza-after-rocket-fire-350-arrested-in-al-aqsa-clashes/; https://timesofisrael dot com/police-clash-with-palestinians-inside-al-aqsa-mosque-dozens-arrested/; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1643517036604055552

[35] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/5/israel-attacks-gaza-after-israeli-forces-raid-al-aqsa-mosque

[36] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/04/05/8153

[37] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/04/05/8153

[38] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%B2-5-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%A8%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD

[39] https://twitter.com/BasharSabaawi70/status/1637860399889383426 ;

https://twitter.com/AlTaghierTV/status/1638266863367905282 ;

https://twitter.com/AlmirbadMedia/status/1639327499875123213 ;

https://twitter.com/SarmadMedia/status/1639339887479357449 ;

https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1639755923244605440 ;

https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1639736657468350464 ;

https://twitter.com/alrafidain_tv/status/1640451123537661954 ;

https://t.me/wa3ediq/66933

[40] https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/iraq-iran-shiites/

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Iran Project