Iran Update, August 11, 2024

Aug 11, 2024 - ISW Press
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Iran Update, August 11, 2024

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 

Iran has not retaliated quickly against Israel because Iran very likely seeks to ensure that its next attack restores deterrence with Israel while simultaneously avoiding a large-scale war. Iran previously attacked Israel on April 13, 12 days after Israel killed one of Iran’s senior-most military commanders in Syria on April 1.[1] Iran and its allies fired around 170 one-way attack drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in its April 2024 attack.[2] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles, and the Iranian attack did significantly less damage than Tehran intended.[3] Iranian leaders are therefore incentivized to carefully and slowly calculate their next attack to ensure that the attack inflicts serious damage on Israel, thereby restoring Iranian deterrence with Israel. Iran will likely also ensure that the attack will not trigger a major war. Western intelligence sources previously assessed that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah may attack Israel on the Jewish holiday Tisha B’Av on August 12-13, although Iran might wait longer to conduct its next attack to ensure that the attack achieves its strategic goals.[4]

Iran also intends to stoke fear and anxiety among Israelis by slowing its response and capitalizing on speculation about when and how it will respond. Iranian armed forces-run outlet Defa Press claimed on August 11 that Iran is conducting a “flawless psychological war” against Israel by drawing out its retaliation.[5] Defa Press claimed that Iran’s psychological war on Israel has disrupted Israelis’ daily routines and stagnated the Israeli economy. Defa Press also claimed that many Israelis have tried to flee Israel since the start of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023. This claim is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that part of Iranian leaders’ theory on how to destroy Israel revolves around stoking instability and terror in Israel to catalyze reverse migration away from Israel.[6] A member of the Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee separately asserted on August 10 that “keeping Israel in limbo is part of the revenge operation.”[7] Iran similarly exploited uncertainty surrounding its “imminent” attack in April 2024 to stoke terror in Israel, as CTP-ISW previously reported on April 11, two days before Iran attacked Israel on April 13.[8]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is conducting a military exercise in Kermanshah Province in western Iran between August 9 and 13 to “enhance combat readiness and vigilance.”[9] The Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base, which covers Kermanshah, Hamedan, and Ilam provinces, is overseeing the exercise.[10] The 29th IRGC Nabi Akram Division operates under the Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base.[11] Iran separately issued a notice to airmen (NOTAM) on August 10 warning pilots not to fly near the Nojeh Airbase in Hamedan Province between August 11 and 14.[12] This NOTAM is similar to previous Iranian NOTAMs issued over the last week.[13]

Hardline parliamentarian Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani claimed on August 10 that Iran could conduct a series of attacks targeting Israel over three or four days.[14] Ardestani also claimed that Iran may refrain from retaliating against Israel if Israel reaches a ceasefire deal with Hamas. Ardestani may have made this statement to set conditions for Iran to be able to blame a potential attack on Israel on the Israeli government’s failure to agree to a ceasefire. Ardestani finally claimed that Iran could use 600 projectiles in its next attack on Israel, in contrast to the approximately 300 drones and missiles it used in its April 2024 attack. Ardestani’s comments were speculative in nature, and he is very likely not privy to information regarding Iran’s retaliation given his current role as a parliamentarian. Ardestani has previously made speculative comments about Iran’s nuclear program, such as in May 2024 when he claimed that Iran had developed nuclear weapons.[15] 

The August 10 drone attack that targeted US forces at the Rumalyn Landing Zone in northeastern Syria wounded several US and coalition personnel.[16] Initial reports previously showed that the attack had not caused any injuries.[17] An unspecified US official told Reuters on August 11, however, that some personnel are undergoing testing for traumatic brain injuries.[18] The August 10 attack follows a rocket attack that injured at least five US personnel at Ain al Assad Airbase in Iraq on August 5.[19]

Key Takeaways: 

  • Iranian Retaliation: Iran has not retaliated quickly against Israel because Iran very likely seeks to ensure that its next attack restores deterrence with Israel while simultaneously avoiding a large-scale war. Iran also intends to stoke fear and anxiety among Israelis by slowing its response and capitalizing on speculation about when and how it will respond.
  • Iraq and Syria: The August 10 drone attack that targeted US forces at the Rumalyn Landing Zone in northeastern Syria wounded several US and coalition personnel. An unspecified US official told Reuters that some personnel are undergoing testing for traumatic brain injuries.
  • Gaza Strip: The IDF issued evacuation orders for central Khan Younis on August 10.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 98th Division continued clearing operations in Khan Younis on August 11.[20] The IDF said that it re-entered Khan Younis on August 9 following intelligence indicating the presence of additional militia infrastructure in the area.[21] The IDF 7th Brigade and Yahalom combat engineering unit located an underground tunnel containing small arms, explosive devices, and long-term residence facilities in an unspecified area of Khan Younis on August 10.[22] The IDF Air Force struck dozens of militia sites and Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis, including Hamas engineering commanders and snipers.[23] The IDF 98th Division also targeted a Hamas rocket launch site used by fighters on August 10 to target southern Israel.[24] Palestinian militias continued to defend against Israeli advances into northeastern Khan Younis with mortar fire.[25] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) targeted Israeli forces with sniper fire in al Zana, northeast of Khan Younis.[26]

Palestinian militias conducted at least two rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on August 10.[27]

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on August 11.[28] The IDF Nahal and Givati brigades continue to operate in Rafah, including by directing airstrikes on Palestinian cells operating near Israeli forces.[29] Israeli forces directed strikes on a Palestinian cell emerging from a tunnel in Rafah, and a Palestinian cell entering a military building.[30] Palestinian fighters continued to target Israeli positions along the Philadelphi Corridor.[31] Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine targeted the IDF’s westernmost position along the corridor at Swedish Village with mortar and sniper fire.[32] Hamas claimed to target Israeli forces with a thermobaric rocket shell inside the Indonesian Hospital in Tal al Sultan.[33] Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also targeted Israeli forces in eastern Rafah with improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars.[34]

The IDF Air Force struck over 30 targets across the Gaza Strip including military buildings, an anti-tank post, and a weapon warehouse on August 11.[35]

The IDF issued evacuation orders for central Khan Younis on August 10.[36] The IDF said it would act “forcefully” against Palestinian militants who are firing rockets into Israel from the evacuation zone.[37] The IDF separately removed a section of northwest Khan Younis from the al Mawasi humanitarian zone on August 11.[38] The IDF removed the neighborhood of al Jalaa from the humanitarian zone because of attacks from the area targeting Israel and Hamas infrastructure in the block.[39] The IDF said that it announced that it changed the status of the area to a combat zone in order to warn civilians and enable them to leave.[40] Palestinian journalists and militias have not reported an IDF presence in these re-designated areas at the time of this writing.

The IDF provided additional information about the results of its strike on the al Tabaeen school mosque in Gaza City on August 10.[41] The IDF said that the IDF conducted the strike targeting a Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad “military facility” from which 24 Palestinian fighters were operating.[42] The IDF said it closely monitored the mosque before conducting the strike and that it is very likely the PIJ Central Camps Brigade commander Ashraf Joda was inside at the time of the strike.[43] The IDF said it remains unclear if he died in the targeting.[44] The IDF released the names and photos of 19 other Palestinian fighters who died in the strike.[45] Hamas claimed that the strike killed hundreds of civilians.[46]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Palestinian militias conducted at least four attacks targeting Israeli civilians and forces in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on August 10.[47] PIJ fighters in Jenin detonated improvised explosive devices and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Silat al Harithiya and Kafr Dan, northwest of Jenin. Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters targeted Israeli forces in Al Ain refugee camp near Nablus.[48]

Unidentified Palestinian militants fired an assault rifle at several civilian vehicles on Highway 90 in the northern Jordan Valley.[49] The attack killed one Israeli civilian and injured another near the Israeli settlement of Mehola.[50] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that the IDF believes two to three Palestinian fighters conducted the attack.[51] The IDF Duvdevan unit, the Valley Brigade Rapid Response Unit, and several other units deployed to the Jordan Valley look for the fighters.[52] No militant group has claimed responsibility for the attack at this time, but several have praised the operation.[53]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 11 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on August 10.[54] Hezbollah targeted Alon Field Base with attack drones in response to Israel’s killing of a Hamas commander in Sidon on August 9.[55] The IDF said that it intercepted one drone, but others struck and caused damage.[56] This is the first time that Hezbollah has targeted Alon since the start of the war.[57] Hezbollah claimed that Alon Field Base is used to assemble and mobilize forces and emergency warehouses for the IDF Northern Command.[58]

The IDF 646th (Res.) Brigade conducted a military exercise in simulating an operation into southern Lebanon over the past week.[59] The forces practiced movement in complex terrain including operating in mountainous environments.

The IDF fired artillery into Syria at military sites near the Syria-Golan Heights border on August 11, according to local journalists.[60]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

See topline section.


 

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-13-2024

[2] https://x.com/IDF/status/1779503384434819454 ;

https://www.aei.org/articles/irans-attempt-to-h-it-israel-with-a-russian-style-strike-package-failedfor-now/

[3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/13/iran-israel-hamas-war-news-gaza-palestine/#link-LFWWPTKAPZFTXDUVQCTFH6HSM4

[4] https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-813044

[5] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/683817

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-11-2024

[7] https://www.didbaniran dot ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3/196135-%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D8%B6%D9%88-%DA%A9%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C%D9%84-%D9%87%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D9%87%DB%8C%DA%86-%DA%AF%D9%88%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AE-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%AF

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-11-2024

[9] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85564712

[10] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Irans-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf ;

https://www.irna dot ir/news/85564712

[11] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Irans-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf

[12] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-814175

[13] https://www.notams.faa.gov/dinsQueryWeb/queryRetrievalMapAction.do?reportType=Raw&retrieveLocId=oiix&actionType=notamRetrievalbyICAOs

[14] https://www.didbaniran dot ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3/196135-%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D8%B6%D9%88-%DA%A9%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C%D9%84-%D9%87%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0-%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D9%87%DB%8C%DA%86-%DA%AF%D9%88%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%AE-%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AE-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%AF

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-10-2024

[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/several-us-coalition-personnel-suffer-minor-injuries-syria-attack-us-official-2024-08-10/

[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-troops-attacked-syria-no-initial-reports-injuries-official-says-2024-08-10/

[18] https://www.reuters.com/world/several-us-coalition-personnel-suffer-minor-injuries-syria-attack-us-official-2024-08-10/

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2024

[20] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822367241821921564

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-9-2024 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822367241821921564

[22]https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822367241821921564 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822367251330117744

[23] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822367255096623609

[24] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822512842030850312

[25] https://t.me/sarayaps/18453 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18457 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7052

[26] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2896

[27] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7048 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/5038

[28] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822512859978297464

[29] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822512859978297464

[30]https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822512859978297464 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822512842030850312

[31] https://t.me/nedalps/4345; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4381 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2890

[32] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2891 ; https://t.me/kataebabuali/10818

[33] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2890

[34] https://t.me/nedalps/4345 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2893 ; https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52927

[35] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822512863593779324

[36] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1822375599777927388

[37] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1822375599777927388

[38]https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1822492670981259665 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822493452497539496

[39] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1822492670981259665

[40] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1822492670981259665

[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-10-2024 ; https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1822363349239378417

[42] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1822365536887447719

[43]https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1822365536887447719 ; https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1822364057590186409

[44] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1822364057590186409

[45] https://www dot idf.il/222419

[46] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52918

[47]https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822625379091095608 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1423 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1424 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7050

[48] https://t.me/hamza20300/280878 ;  https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7050 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7053

[49] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12760 ; https://www.timesofisrael  dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-finds-jordan-valley-terror-attack-carried-out-with-assault-rifle/

[50] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822625379091095608 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/12765

[51] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12760

[52] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12760

[53] https://t.me/darebmojahden/5043 ; https://t.me/hamaswestbank/52924

[54]https://t.me/mmirleb/6029 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6032 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6036 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6038 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6040 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6042 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6044 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6046 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6049 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6051 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/6032

[55] https://t.me/mmirleb/6029 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1821954853075136799

[56] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1822369348545388851

[57] https://t.me/moriahdoron/12736

[58] https://t.me/mmirleb/6029

[59] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1822619819432362251

[60] https://t.me/damascusv011/23342 ; https://twitter.com/nourabohsn/status/1822624115338977292